The original position (OP), often referred to as the veil of ignorance, is a thought experiment often associated with the works of John Rawls. In the original position, one is asked to consider which principles they would select for the basic structure of society, but they must select as if they had no knowledge ahead of time what position they would end up having in that society. This choice is made from behind a "veil of ignorance", which prevents them from knowing their ethnicity, social status, gender, and (crucially in Rawls's formulation) their or anyone else's ideas of how to lead a good life. Ideally, this would force participants to select principles impartially and rationally. [1]
In Rawls's theory the original position plays the same role that the "state of nature" does in the social contract tradition of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. The original position figures prominently in Rawls's 1971 book, A Theory of Justice . It has influenced a variety of thinkers from a broad spectrum of philosophical orientations.
The phrases original position and veil of ignorance were coined by the American philosopher John Rawls. [2] However, the same thought experiment had already been described earlier in social choice by William Vickrey [3] and John Harsanyi, [4] [5] who independently derived proofs showing a rational observer in the original position would adopt a utilitarian framework. [6]
The concept of the veil of ignorance has been in use by other names for centuries by philosophers such as John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant whose work discussed the concept of the social contract, Adam Smith with his "impartial spectator", or the ideal observer theory. John Harsanyi was the first to mathematically formalize the concept, [4] [5] using it to an argument in favor of utilitarianism rather than an argument for a social contract (as rational agents consider expected outcomes, not worst-case outcomes). [7] The usage of the term by John Rawls was developed in his 1971 book A Theory of Justice . [8] [9]
Modern work tends to focus on the different decision theories that might describe the choice of the decision-maker "behind the veil". [10] [11] In addition, Michael Moehler has shown that, from a moral point of view, decision theory is not necessarily central to veil of ignorance arguments, but the precise moral ideals that are assumed to model the veil. From a moral point of view, there is not one veil of ignorance but many different versions of it. [12]
Rawls specifies that the parties in the original position are concerned only with citizens' share of what he calls primary social goods, which include basic rights as well as economic and social advantages. Rawls also argues that the representatives in the original position would adopt the maximin rule as their principle for evaluating the choices before them. Borrowed from game theory, maximin stands for maximizing the minimum, i.e., making the choice that produces the highest payoff for the least advantaged position. Thus, maximin in the original position represents a formulation of social equality.
In social contract theory, citizens in a state of nature contract with each other to establish a state of civil society. For example, in the Lockean state of nature, the parties agree to establish a civil society in which the government has limited powers and the duty to protect the persons and property of citizens. In the original position, the representative parties select principles of justice that are to govern the basic structure of society. Rawls argues that the representative parties in the original position would select two principles of justice:
The reason that the least well off member gets benefited is that it is argued that under the veil of ignorance people will act as if they were risk-averse. The original position is a unique and irrevocable choice about all the most important social goods, and they do not know the probability they will become any particular member of society. As insurance against the worst possible outcome, they will pick rules that maximize the benefits given to the minimum outcome (maximin).
Recently, Thomas Nagel has elaborated on the concept of original position, arguing that social ethics should be built taking into account the tension between original and actual positions.
Recently, the original position has been modeled mathematically along Wright-Fisher's diffusion, classical in population genetics. [13] The original position has also been used as an argument for negative eugenics, though Rawls's argument was limited to its use as a preventative measure. [14]
This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (January 2024) |
In Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), Robert Nozick argues that, while the original position may be the just starting point, any inequalities derived from that distribution by means of free exchange are equally just, and that any re-distributive tax is an infringement on people's liberty. He also argues that Rawls's application of the maximin rule to the original position is risk aversion taken to its extreme, and is therefore unsuitable even to those behind the veil of ignorance. [15]
In Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982), [16] Michael Sandel has criticized Rawls's notion of a veil of ignorance, pointing out that it is impossible, for an individual, to completely prescind from beliefs and convictions (from the Me ultimately), as is required by Rawls's thought experiment.
In a 1987 empirical research study, [17] Frohlich, Oppenheimer and Eavey showed that, in a simulated original position, undergraduates at American universities agreed upon a distributive principle that maximizes the average with a specified floor constraint (a minimum for the worst-off in any given distribution) over maximizing the floor or the average alone. The finding that a much less demanding distributive principle of justice is agreed upon in a (simulated) original position than Rawls's specification of the "difference principle", implies that the (rational) resistance to a cosmopolitan application of justice as fairness could be less forceful than its critics imagine. [18]
In How to Make Good Decisions and Be Right All the Time (2008), Iain King argues that people in the original position should not be risk-averse, leading them to adopt the Help Principle (help someone if your help is worth more to them than it is to you) rather than maximin. [19]
Philosopher and Law Professor Harold Anthony Lloyd argues that Rawls's veil of ignorance is hardly hypothetical but instead dangerously real since individuals cannot know at any point in time the future either for themselves or for others (or in fact know all aspects of either their relevant past or present). Faced with the high stakes of such ignorance, careful egoism effectively becomes altruism by minimizing/sharing risk through social safety nets and other means such as insurance. [20]
Justice, in its broadest sense, is the concept that individuals are to be treated in a manner that is equitable and fair.
Minimax is a decision rule used in artificial intelligence, decision theory, game theory, statistics, and philosophy for minimizing the possible loss for a worst case scenario. When dealing with gains, it is referred to as "maximin" – to maximize the minimum gain. Originally formulated for several-player zero-sum game theory, covering both the cases where players take alternate moves and those where they make simultaneous moves, it has also been extended to more complex games and to general decision-making in the presence of uncertainty.
Normative ethics is the study of ethical behaviour and is the branch of philosophical ethics that investigates questions regarding how one ought to act, in a moral sense.
In ethical philosophy, utilitarianism is a family of normative ethical theories that prescribe actions that maximize happiness and well-being for the affected individuals. In other words, utilitarian ideas encourage actions that lead to the greatest good for the greatest number. Although different varieties of utilitarianism admit different characterizations, the basic idea behind all of them is, in some sense, to maximize utility, which is often defined in terms of well-being or related concepts. For instance, Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, described utility as the capacity of actions or objects to produce benefits, such as pleasure, happiness, and good, or to prevent harm, such as pain and unhappiness, to those affected.
John Bordley Rawls was an American moral, legal and political philosopher in the modern liberal tradition. Rawls has been described as one of the most influential political philosophers of the 20th century.
Distributive justice concerns the socially just allocation of resources, goods, opportunity in a society. It is concerned with how to allocate resources fairly among members of a society, taking into account factors such as wealth, income, and social status. Often contrasted with just process and formal equal opportunity, distributive justice concentrates on outcomes. This subject has been given considerable attention in philosophy and the social sciences. Theorists have developed widely different conceptions of distributive justice. These have contributed to debates around the arrangement of social, political and economic institutions to promote the just distribution of benefits and burdens within a society. Most contemporary theories of distributive justice rest on the precondition of material scarcity. From that precondition arises the need for principles to resolve competing interest and claims concerning a just or at least morally preferable distribution of scarce resources.
Reflective equilibrium is a state of balance or coherence among a set of beliefs arrived at by a process of deliberative mutual adjustment among general principles and particular judgements. Although he did not use the term, philosopher Nelson Goodman introduced the method of reflective equilibrium as an approach to justifying the principles of inductive logic. The term reflective equilibrium was coined by John Rawls and popularized in his A Theory of Justice as a method for arriving at the content of the principles of justice.
A Theory of Justice is a 1971 work of political philosophy and ethics by the philosopher John Rawls (1921–2002) in which the author attempts to provide a moral theory alternative to utilitarianism and that addresses the problem of distributive justice . The theory uses an updated form of Kantian philosophy and a variant form of conventional social contract theory. Rawls's theory of justice is fully a political theory of justice as opposed to other forms of justice discussed in other disciplines and contexts.
"Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical" is an essay by John Rawls, published in 1985. In it he describes his conception of justice. It comprises two main principles of liberty and equality; the second is subdivided into fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle.
In philosophy, economics, and political science, the common good is either what is shared and beneficial for all or most members of a given community, or alternatively, what is achieved by citizenship, collective action, and active participation in the realm of politics and public service. The concept of the common good differs significantly among philosophical doctrines. Early conceptions of the common good were set out by Ancient Greek philosophers, including Aristotle and Plato. One understanding of the common good rooted in Aristotle's philosophy remains in common usage today, referring to what one contemporary scholar calls the "good proper to, and attainable only by, the community, yet individually shared by its members."
Anarchy, State, and Utopia is a 1974 book by the American political philosopher Robert Nozick. It won the 1975 US National Book Award in category Philosophy and Religion, has been translated into 11 languages, and was named one of the "100 most influential books since the war" (1945–1995) by the UK Times Literary Supplement.
Social choice theory is a branch of welfare economics that analyzes methods of combining individual opinions, beliefs, or preferences to reach a collective decision or create measures of social well-being. It contrasts with political science in that it is a normative field that studies how societies should make decisions, whereas political science is descriptive. Social choice incorporates insights from economics, mathematics, philosophy, political science, and game theory to find the best ways to combine individual preferences into a coherent whole, called a social welfare function.
Overlapping consensus is a term coined by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice and developed in Political Liberalism. The term overlapping consensus refers to how supporters of different comprehensive normative doctrines—that entail apparently inconsistent conceptions of justice—can agree on particular principles of justice that underwrite a political community's basic social institutions. Comprehensive doctrines can include systems of religion, political ideology, or morality.
"Instrumental" and "value rationality" are terms scholars use to identify two ways individuals act in order to optimize their behavior. Instrumental rationality recognizes means that "work" efficiently to achieve ends. Value rationality recognizes ends that are "right", legitimate in themselves.
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement is a 2001 book of political philosophy by the philosopher John Rawls, published as a restatement of his 1971 classic A Theory of Justice (1971). The restatement was made largely in response to the significant number of critiques and essays written about Rawls's 1971 book on this subject. The released book was edited by Erin Kelly while Rawls was in declining health during his final years.
Economic justice is a component of social justice and welfare economics. It is a set of moral and ethical principles for building economic institutions, where the ultimate goal is to create an opportunity for each person to establish a sufficient material foundation upon which to have a dignified, productive, and creative life.."
Prioritarianism, or the priority view, is a perspective within ethics and political philosophy stating that "social welfare orderings should give explicit priority to the worse off". Prioritarianism resembles utilitarianism, and is likewise a form of aggregative consequentialism.
The Idea of Justice is a 2009 book by the economist Amartya Sen. The work is a critique and revision of the philosopher John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971).
Natural Law and Natural Rights is a book by John Finnis first published by Oxford University Press, as part of the Clarendon Law Series. Finnis develops a philosophy of Law in the tradition of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas – Natural Law. His presentation and defence of Natural Law can be explored from three perspectives. First, polemical, by contradistinction with other philosophies of Law. Second, through its particular methodology, based on practical reasoning. Third, through its substantive content in the form of basic human goods. In addition, his 2011 edition included an extensive postscript, which is briefly discussed in the fourth section. The book is written as a collection of essays on a wide range of topics guided by an overall theme.
Justice and the market is an ethical perspective based upon the allocation of scarce resources within a society. The allocation of resources depends upon governmental policies and the societal attitudes of the individuals who exist within the society. Personal perspectives are based upon ones circle of moral concern or those who the individual deems worthy of moral consideration.
...the fictitious notion of 'original position' [was] developed by Vickery (1945), Harsanyi (1955), and Rawls (1971).
What Rawls says is that "Over time a society is to take steps to preserve the general level of natural abilities and to prevent the diffusion of serious defects." The key words here are "preserve" and "prevent". Rawls clearly envisages only the use of negative eugenics as a preventative measure to ensure a good basic level of genetic health for future generations. To jump from this to "make the later generations as genetically talented as possible," as Pence does, is a masterpiece of misinterpretation. This, then, is the sixth argument against positive eugenics: the Veil of Ignorance argument. Those behind the Veil in Rawls's Original Position would agree to permit negative, but not positive eugenics. This is a more complex variant of the Consent argument, as the Veil of Ignorance merely forces us to adopt a position of hypothetical consent to particular principles of justice.