Mandatory offer

Last updated

In mergers and acquisitions, a mandatory offer, also called a mandatory bid in some jurisdictions, is an offer made by one company (the "acquiring company" or "bidder") to purchase some or all outstanding shares of another company (the "target"), as required by securities laws and regulations or stock exchange rules governing corporate takeovers. Most countries, with the notable exception of the United States, have provisions requiring mandatory offers.

Contents

Overview

Country or territoryMandatory offer threshold [1]
Argentina15%
Australia20%
Austria30%
Belgium30%
BermudaNo mandatory offer
Brazil25%
British Virgin IslandsNo mandatory offer
Canada20%
China30%
Czech Republic30%
Egypt50%
France30%
Germany30%
Guernsey30%
Hong Kong30%
India25%
Indonesia25%
Israel25%
Italy25%
Japan
Jersey30%
Kuwait30%
Malaysia33%
Mexico30%
Netherlands30%
Russia30%
Saudi Arabia50%
Singapore30%
South Africa35%
South Korea5%
Spain30%
Sweden30%
Switzerland
Taiwan20%
Thailand25%
Turkey50%
United Kingdom30%
United StatesNo mandatory offer
Vietnam25%

Typically, a mandatory offer must be made when the acquiring company exceeds a certain shareholding threshold in the target, or gains actual control of the target. [2] Most countries, with the notable exception of the United States, have such a requirement. [3] The purpose of mandatory offer regulations is to protect minority shareholders in situations where control of the target is being transferred, and in particular to discourage acquisitions driven by private benefits of control by requiring that a premium be paid for such control. [4]

Thresholds for mandatory offers vary widely between countries. A 2006 World Bank survey of the laws of 50 countries found thresholds ranging from 15% (India; became 20% in 2011) to 67% (Finland); the author's literature review did not find any study of the optimal level for the threshold. [5] Thirty percent is a fairly common threshold, found in the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers followed in the United Kingdom as well as the laws of several other European countries. Depending on the ownership structure of the target, any given threshold short of absolute majority may in practice result in an acquirer being obliged to make an offer even when the acquirer has not yet established a controlling interest in the target, and even when another shareholder besides the acquirer retains the majority of shares; conversely, if the remaining shares not held by the acquirer are highly dispersed, actual control of the target could be attained without crossing the mandatory offer threshold. Takeover legislation in various European countries in the 1990s, for example in Austria, thus attempted to use de facto control rather than a specific threshold as the trigger for a mandatory offer; however, this presented enforcement difficulties, given that the threshold for control varied not only between target corporations but over time in the same target, and regulations later provided for a presumption of control upon achieving a specific threshold. [6]

A mandatory offer rule is distinct from tag-along rights, which give minority shareholders the right to join in any sale by the majority shareholder: the former is an obligation imposed on the acquirer by laws and regulations, while the latter may be provided voluntarily by the majority shareholder of the target to minority shareholders through unilateral announcement or in a shareholders' agreement or similar private contract. [7]

By jurisdiction

Americas

Brazil

Brazilian corporate law provided for a mandatory offer rule prior to 1997. It was repealed that year, but then partially reinstated in 2000 due to pressure from institutional investors. A major transaction concluded prior to the rule's reinstatement was the Brazilian government's sale of its 66.7% of voting shares in Banco Banespa to Banco Santander, in which Banco Santander's tender offer covered only the government's state and excluded the minority shareholders. [8]

United States

In the United States, the Williams Act of 1968, which regulates tender offers, does not contain any provisions requiring mandatory offers, due to concerns that such provisions could increase transaction costs in mergers and acquisitions. [9]

Asia

China's mainland

A mandatory bid rule has been applicable in some form since 1993 to companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, although the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is empowered to grant exemptions, and in practise acquirers can also structure their transactions to avoid triggering the rule in many cases. [10] [11] The first version of the rule was adapted from the similar rule in Hong Kong, as at the time many state-owned enterprises of China had already listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and the regulations' drafters sought advice from Hong Kong experts. The rule provided that upon acquiring 30% of the outstanding common stock of the target, the acquirer must make a bid for all remaining outstanding shares within 45 working days, at a price which at least matches the highest price paid by the acquirer in the past year for the shares it already holds, as well as the average market price of the shares within the last 30 days. [12] That rule remained in effect after the passage of the 1998 Securities Law  [ zh ], though the 1999 law relaxed some related reporting requirements. 2002 regulations maintained the 30% threshold, but provided that the mandatory bid only had to be made if the acquirer intended to acquire more shares, and permitted the CSRC to grant exceptions to the obligation to bid. [13] In 2006, both the Securities Law and the 2002 regulations were revised; Article 88 of the revised law left the 30% threshold intact, but weakened the bid requirement from the earlier mandatory bid for all outstanding shares to a bid for at least 5% of the outstanding shares. [14]

Hong Kong

In Hong Kong, mandatory offers have been governed since 1975 by Rule 26 of the Code on Takeovers and Mergers, issued by the Securities and Futures Commission. The code does not have force of law. [15] However, compliance with the code is required by Listing Rule 13.23 of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. [16]

India

In India, the mandatory bid rule originated in the 1980s as part of the listing agreement between listed companies and stock exchanges. After the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) became a statutory body with the power to issue subsidiary legislation under the SEBI Act 1992, the board promulgated the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover) Regulations, 1994 (colloquially, the "Takeover Code"), governing takeovers, including a mandatory bid rule. A subsequent review committee chaired by former chief justice P. N. Bhagwati recommended the repeal of the 1994 regulations and their replacement by the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover) Regulations, 1997. A third review led by Securities Appellate Tribunal chief C. Achuthan led to the replacement of the 1997 regulations by the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover) Regulations, 2011. [17] The mandatory bid provided for under the Takeover Code is a partial bid: it requires acquiring companies exceeding the shareholding threshold to offer to purchase some portion of the outstanding shares rather than all of them. Under the 1997 Takeover Code, the shareholding threshold was 15%; once exceeded, the acquirer would have to make an offer to purchase 20% of the outstanding shares. Under the 2011 Takeover Code, these percentages were raised to 20% and 26% respectively. [18] The 2011 Takeover Code also provides for further mandatory bids by an incumbent who holds between 25% and 75% of a target upon an increase in holdings of at least 5% during a financial year. [19]

South Korea

South Korea enacted a partial mandatory offer rule in January 1997 by an amendment to the Securities and Exchange Law  [ ko ]. [20] Under the rule, an acquirer which reached a 25% shareholding threshold would then have to make a bid to increase its holdings to a total amount defined by regulations; the subsequent regulatory update which took effect in April 1997 set the total amount to 50% plus one of the outstanding shares. [21] However, as the financial crisis which began that year deepened, the rule was repealed the following year under pressure from the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, who believed that the rule could deter takeover bids against companies in financial distress. [22] [23]

Taiwan

Though the United States is the main model for Taiwan's mergers and acquisitions laws, Taiwan adopted a partial mandatory offer requirement in 2002 in Article 43-1 of the Securities and Exchange Act  [ zh ]. The mechanics of the rule were largely based on United Kingdom and Hong Kong rules, although Taiwan requires only a partial offer to purchase outstanding shares, rather than the full offer required in the United Kingdom and Hong Kong. [24]

Europe

European Union directive

Among member states of the European Union, the 2004 Takeover Directive specifies general standards for national takeover legislation, including a mandatory offer rule, though the choice of threshold is left to individual states. [25]

Germany

In Germany, mandatory offers are required under the Public Takeover Act  [ de ]. [26] An acquiring company must make a mandatory offer upon achieving a "controlling interest" in the target, defined by § 35 of the act as a thirty percent direct or indirect shareholding. Upon reaching this threshold, the acquiring company must notify the target company and the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, and make an offer in the form specified by § 11 of the act and its regulations to acquire the remaining shares. [27]

France

France adopted a partial mandatory offer rule in 1989: it obligated the acquirer to offer to purchase two-thirds of the outstanding shares. In the 1990s, France's rule was expanded to require an offer to purchase 100% of outstanding shares. [28] As of 2020, a mandatory offer is required when the threshold of 30% is reached, and the mandatory tender offer price must be at least the highest price paid by the bidder for securities of the target during the 12-month period preceding the crossing of the 30% threshold. In addition, a bidder launching a tender offer for a French target must extend its offer to any listed subsidiary of the target. [29]

Sweden

Sweden adopted a mandatory offer rule in 1999. [30]

Turkey

The legal framework governing mandatory offers in Turkish law was established by Article 26(1) of the Capital Markets Law (Sermaye Piyasası Kanunu, Law No. 6362 of 1981), authorising the Turkish Capital Markets Board to promulgate regulations governing mandatory offers. The first such regulations, the Communiqué on Principles Regarding Takeover Bids (Serial: IV, No. 44), were superseded in 2014 by the Communiqué on Tender Offers No II-26.1. [31] [32]

Related Research Articles

A shareholder rights plan, colloquially known as a "poison pill", is a type of defensive tactic used by a corporation's board of directors against a takeover.

In business, a takeover is the purchase of one company by another. In the UK, the term refers to the acquisition of a public company whose shares are publicly listed, in contrast to the acquisition of a private company.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Corporate action</span> Event initiated by a public company


A corporate action is an event initiated by a public company that brings or could bring an actual change to the debt securities—equity or debt—issued by the company. Corporate actions are typically agreed upon by a company's board of directors and authorized by the shareholders. For some events, shareholders or bondholders are permitted to vote on the event. Examples of corporate actions include stock splits, dividends, mergers and acquisitions, rights issues, and spin-offs.

Greenmail or greenmailing is a financial maneuver where investors buy enough shares in a target company to threaten a hostile takeover, prompting the target company to buy back the shares at a premium to prevent the takeover.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Singapore Exchange</span> Investment holding company in Singapore

Singapore Exchange Limited is a Singapore-based exchange conglomerate, operating equity, fixed income, currency and commodity markets. It provides a range of listing, trading, clearing, settlement, depository and data services. SGX Group is also a member of the World Federation of Exchanges and the Asian and Oceanian Stock Exchanges Federation. it is ASEAN's second largest market capitalization after Indonesia Stock Exchange at US$609.653 billion as of September 2023.

In corporate finance, a tender offer is a type of public takeover bid. The tender offer is a public, open offer or invitation by a prospective acquirer to all stockholders of a publicly traded corporation to tender their stock for sale at a specified price during a specified time, subject to the tendering of a minimum and maximum number of shares. In a tender offer, the bidder contacts shareholders directly; the directors of the company may or may not have endorsed the tender offer proposal.

In business, the flip-in is one of the five main types of poison pill defenses against corporate takeovers.

Lock-up provision is a term used in corporate finance which refers to the option granted by a seller to a buyer to purchase a target company’s stock as a prelude to a takeover. The major or controlling shareholder is then effectively "locked-up" and is not free to sell the stock to a party other than the designated party.

A special-purpose acquisition company, also known as a "blank check company", is a shell corporation listed on a stock exchange with the purpose of acquiring a private company, thus making the private company public without going through the initial public offering process, which often carries significant procedural and regulatory burdens. According to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), SPACs are created specifically to pool funds to finance a future merger or acquisition opportunity within a set timeframe; these opportunities usually have yet to be identified while raising funds.

A squeeze-out or squeezeout, sometimes synonymous with freeze-out, is the compulsory sale of the shares of minority shareholders of a joint-stock company for which they receive a fair cash compensation.

Share repurchase, also known as share buyback or stock buyback, is the reacquisition by a company of its own shares. It represents an alternate and more flexible way of returning money to shareholders. Repurchases allow stockholders to delay taxes which they would have been required to pay on dividends in the year the dividends are paid, to instead pay taxes on the capital gains they receive when they sell the stock, whose price is now proportionally higher because of the smaller number of shares outstanding.

<i>Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.</i>

Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 is a landmark decision of the Delaware Supreme Court on corporate defensive tactics against take-over bids.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Williams Act</span>

The Williams Act (USA) refers to 1968 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 enacted in 1968 regarding tender offers. The legislation was proposed by Senator Harrison A. Williams of New Jersey.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">London Stock Exchange Group</span> British financial services company

London Stock Exchange Group plc, also known as LSEG, is a global provider of financial markets data and infrastructure. Headquartered in the City of London, England. It owns the London Stock Exchange, Refinitiv, LSEG Technology, FTSE Russell, and majority stakes in LCH and Tradeweb.

Whitewash waiver or whitewash resolution is a corporate law concept originating in Hong Kong and Singapore. It refers to a proposed resolution for the waiver of rights of independent shareholders to receive a mandatory takeover from the undertaking shareholders and its concert parties for the ordinary shares of the company not already owned or controlled by them.

Mergers and acquisitions in United Kingdom law refers to a body of law that covers companies, labour, and competition, which is engaged when firms restructure their affairs in the course of business.

<i>Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.</i>

Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, was a landmark decision of the Delaware Supreme Court on hostile takeovers.

The following is a glossary which defines terms used in mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers of companies, whether private or public.

The Takeover Code, or more formally The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, is a binding set of rules that apply to listed companies in the United Kingdom, such as those trading on the London Stock Exchange. Many of its provisions are mirrored in the EU Takeover Directive.The Code is administered by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, which has the authority to enforce compliance and provide guidance on the interpretation of its rules.

<i>Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.</i>

Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., C.A. Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935 (Consol.), 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 77, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 94, 514, aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140, is a U.S. corporate law case from Delaware, concerning defensive measures in the mergers and acquisitions context. The Delaware Court of Chancery and the Supreme Court of Delaware upheld the use of defensive measures to advance the long-term goals of the target corporation, where the corporation was not in "Revlon mode".

References

  1. ↑ "Stakebuilding, mandatory offers and squeeze-out comparative table". Thomson Reuters. 1 October 2017. Retrieved 23 December 2020.
  2. ↑ Schultz, Martin (2012). The Law of Business Organizations: A Concise Overview of German Corporate Law. Springer. pp. 123–126. ISBN   9783642177934.
  3. ↑ Vernimmen, Pierre; Quiry, Pascal; Dallocchio, Maurizio; Le Fur, Yann; Salvi, Antonio (2014). Corporate Finance: Theory and Practice. Wiley. p. 810. ISBN   9781118849293.
  4. ↑ Hertig, Gerard; Kanda, Hideki (2004). "Issuers and Investor Protection". The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach. Oxford University Press. p. 186. ISBN   9780199260645.
  5. ↑ Nenova, Tatiana (October 2006). "Takeover Laws and Financial Development" (PDF). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. p. 9.
  6. ↑ Ventoruzzo, Marco (2006). "Europe's Thirteenth Directive and U.S. Takeover Regulation: Regulatory Means and Political Economic Ends". Texas International Law Journal. 141: 195–196.
  7. ↑ Bennedsen, Morten; Meisner Nielsen, Kasper; Vester Nielsen, Thomas (2012). "Private Contracting and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Provision of Tag-Along Rights in Brazil". Journal of Corporate Finance. 12 (4): 904–918. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.03.007. SSRN   1779845.
  8. ↑ Bennedsen, Meisner Nielsen & Vester Nielsen 2012 , p. 905
  9. ↑ Kenyon-Slade, Stephen (2004). Mergers and Takeovers in the US and UK: Law and Practice. Oxford University Press. pp. 676–691. ISBN   9780198260516. Cited in Chu 2017 , p. 316.
  10. ↑ Cai, Wei (December 2011). "The Mandatory Bid Rule in China". European Business Organization Law Review. 12 (4): 653–680. SSRN   2604568 , p. 653. For more detailed treatment, see the author's doctoral dissertation: Cai, Wei (2011). The mandatory bid rule, hostile takeovers and takeover defences in China. Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Legal Studies. University of Hong Kong. doi:10.5353/th_b4696839 (inactive 1 November 2024).{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of November 2024 (link)
  11. ↑ Zhu, Ciyun; Tang, Linyao (2018). "Limitations of Legal Transplantation: The Comparison of Tender Offer Regulations between China and Western Countries" (PDF). Tsinghua China Law Review. 10 (2): 275.
  12. ↑ Cai 2011 , p. 655, citing Article 48, 股票发行与交易管理暂行条例 [Tentative Regulations on the Administration of the Issuing and Trading of Shares] (State Council Order 112) (in Chinese). 22 April 1993.
  13. ↑ Cai 2011 , p. 656, citing Articles 23–24 and 49, 上市公司收購管理辦法 [Regulations on Takeovers of Companies Listed in China](PDF) (China Securities Regulatory Commission Order 11) (in Chinese). 28 September 2002.
  14. ↑ Cai 2011 , p. 658 and Zhu & Tang 2018 , p. 281
  15. ↑ Au, Alan (1987). "Hong Kong Code on Takeovers and Mergers: Toothless Watchdog or Handmaiden of Equality?". Hong Kong Law Journal. 17: 24.
  16. ↑ "Consolidated Main Board Listing Rules" (PDF). Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 6 July 2019. Retrieved 20 August 2020.
  17. ↑ Varottil, Umakanth (2017). "The Nature of the Market for Corporate Control in India". In Varottil, Umakanth; Wan, Wai Yee (eds.). Comparative Takeover Regulation: Global and Asian Perspectives. Cambridge University Press. p. 347. ISBN   9781107195271.
  18. ↑ Laskar, Anirudh; Mohan, Vyas (29 July 2011). "India raises threshold for mandatory takeover offer". LiveMint. Retrieved 20 August 2020.
  19. ↑ Varottil 2017 , p.  355
  20. ↑ Kim, Hong-sik (June 2014). 우리나라의 공개매수제도에 관한 연혁적 검토 [A historical review of the public tender system in our country]. Sogang Journal of Law and Business. 4 (1): 97.
  21. ↑ Kim 2014 , p. 98, citing Article 21 of the 증권거래법 [Securities and Exchange Law] (As Amended by Law 5254) (in Korean). 13 January 1997. Article 11-2 of the 증권거래법시행령 [Securities and Exchange Law Implementation Order] (As Amended by Order 15312) (in Korean). 22 March 1997.
  22. ↑ Rho, Hyeok-Joon (2017). "M&A in Korea: Continuing Concern for Minority Shareholders". In Varottil, Umakanth; Wan, Wai Yee (eds.). Comparative Takeover Regulation: Global and Asian Perspectives. Cambridge University Press. p. 293. ISBN   9781107195271.
  23. ↑ Black, Bernard; Metzger, Barry; O'Brien, Timothy J.; Shin, Young-Moo (2001). "Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millenium: Enhancing International Competitiveness" (PDF). Journal of Corporation Law. 26 (Spring): 605–606.
  24. ↑ Chu, Claire Te-fang (2017). "Takeover laws and practices in Taiwan". In Varottil, Umakanth; Wan, Wai Yee (eds.). Comparative Takeover Regulation: Global and Asian Perspectives. Cambridge University Press. p. 315. ISBN   9781107195271.
  25. ↑ Ventoruzzo 2006
  26. ↑ Schultz 2012 , pp. 124
  27. ↑ Schultz 2012 , pp. 126
  28. ↑ Hertig & Kanda 2004 , p. 186
  29. ↑ Grumberg, Armand W; Attar-Rezvani, Arash; Zika, Julien; Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom (1 March 2020). "Public mergers and acquisitions in France: overview". Thomson Reuters. Retrieved 25 December 2020.
  30. ↑ Hertig & Kanda 2004 , p. 186
  31. ↑ Gürkaynak, Gönenç; Yukaruc, Nazli; Yetim, Irmak (8 March 2021). "Turkey: The Changes Proposed By The Draft Communiqué To The Tender Offer Procedures In Turkey". Mondaq . Retrieved 8 September 2021.
  32. ↑ Turan, M. Togan; Şahan, Ökkeş; Bezirci, Nazlı (1 April 2020). "Public mergers and acquisitions in Turkey: overview". Thomson Reuters. Retrieved 8 September 2021.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.