Investigatory Powers Tribunal | |
---|---|
Established | 2000 |
Jurisdiction | United Kingdom |
Authorised by | Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 |
Appeals to | Court of Appeal of England and Wales (in England and Wales) Court of Session (in Scotland) |
Website | investigatorypowerstribunal.org.uk |
President | |
Currently | Lord Justice Singh |
Since | 2018 |
Vice President | |
Currently | Lord Boyd of Duncansby |
Since | 2019 |
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The Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) is a first-instance tribunal and superior court of record in the United Kingdom. It is primarily an inquisitorial court. [1]
It hears complaints about surveillance by public bodies, primarily the intelligence services. It does not hear complaints about surveillance by private bodies. [2]
It is a part of the Home Office but operates independently. [3] It is also separate from the administration of the rest of the UK tribunals system. [1]
The IPT was established by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA 2000), replacing the Interception of Communications Tribunal, the Security Service Tribunal, and the Intelligence Services Tribunal.
Its powers were amended by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA 2016) to, among other things, introduce appeals to higher courts. [4]
The IPT is a UK-wide tribunal. This means it operates in all three legal jurisdictions within the UK, taking into account the differences in law between them. [1]
The IPT considers complaints about the conduct any organisation with powers under RIPA, particularly with regards to surveillance. [5] These include:
Section 65 of the RIPA 2000 empowers the IPT to consider proceedings under the Human Rights Act 1998, to enforce Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights. [6]
It has exclusive jurisdiction over HRA complaints against any of the intelligence services. Other claims under the HRA can only be considered by the IPT if it regards conduct by or on behalf of:
Unless the Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction, claims against public authorities for the use of covert investigatory powers can also be brought in the ordinary courts. The Tribunal does, however, have the power to investigate a complaint made to it which ordinary courts do not possess. [5]
There are two types of complaint possible: [7]
Complaints may be dealt with on paper or by oral hearing, at the IPT's discretion. [8] The vast majority of decisions are dealt on paper only. This means only a small percentage of cases submitted to the Tribunal proceed to a hearing in court. The Tribunal is under no duty to hold a hearing.
Unlike most courts in the UK, which use an adversarial system, the IPT mostly uses an inquisitorial system, similar to that of Coroner's Courts, Sheriff Courts under fatal accident inquiry proceedings, or many courts in continental Europe. This is necessary because of the confidentiality of the evidence being considered.
The Counsel to the Tribunal assists the IPT in closed sessions to ensure that points of law or other matters that may have been advanced by the complainants are fully considered. [9]
However, the IPT may also facilitate adversarial open sessions by assuming facts, allowing for advocates to debate over points of law without disclosing confidential evidence. [9] Since 2003, it has tried to sit in public where possible.
It may make interim orders to prevent activities from continuing when investigations are taking place. [10]
The IPT has two outcomes that 'favour' a party: [11]
There are also a number of inconclusive outcomes, which make up the vast majority of outcomes: [11]
The IPT has powers of the High Court when making judgments. As such, when finding in favour of the complainant it can: [10]
It does not normally award legal costs to either party. It also does not order remedies in any other outcome. [1]
The Tribunal is a judicial body, entirely independent of Parliament and HM Government. Its judicial independence is enshrined in law by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. No organisation can intervene in the IPT's investigations or influence its decisions. [6]
The IPT is administered separately from the rest of the UK tribunal system, and is not under the leadership of the Senior President of Tribunals. This is both because it deals primarily with issues of national security and because its inquisitorial system differs from most tribunals. [1]
It exempt from the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
The vast majority of cases have an outcome where neither side 'wins' as such. In 2021: [12]
Year | Cases decided | Percentage found 'no determination' | Percentage found in favour of complainant | Source |
---|---|---|---|---|
2012-2016 | 200 (on average per year) | 28.9% | 5% | [13] |
2017 | 201 | 10% | 4% | [12] |
2018 | 207 | 22% | 1% | |
2019 | 249 | 14% | 1% | |
2020 | 211 | 18% | None | |
2021 | 372 | 13% | None |
The RIPA did not originally provide an avenue for appeal, other than to take the case to the European Court of Human Rights. [14]
However, this was amended by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 to introduce appeals to: [4]
This gives it senior court status, equivalent to for example the Crown Court or the Upper Tribunal.
The IPA 2016 allows for the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, with the permission of the Northern Ireland Assembly, to use the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland instead of its English equivalent when in Northern Ireland. However, as of 2021 this has not happened. [12]
The Supreme Court found in R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal that errors in law made by the court may be subject to judicial review. [15] As such, decisions may be reviewed by:
Parties may choose to be represented by a barrister, advocate (in Scotland), or solicitor, but these are not required. It is common for complainants to represent themselves. [12]
Counsel to the Tribunal are normally temporary appointments to assist the Tribunal's consideration of a complaint. This can be because:
The CTT will ensure that all relevant arguments are put before the Tribunal, as well as organising and summarising evidence to be shown to the complainant. [12] The role is somewhat comparable to the role of the procurator fiscal in Sheriff Court fatal accident inquiries.
The IPT's judiciary are known as Tribunal Members. They are appointed from experienced lawyers and judiciary.
The Tribunal President is always a Lord Justice of Appeal. The Vice-President is always a Senator of the College of Justice, as must be one other Member. There must also be a Member from Northern Ireland. [1]
As of 2023, the Tribunal Members are: [16]
Members are usually appointed for a term of five years, after which they are eligible for reappointment. [16]
The Tribunal Members are assisted in their work by a Secretariat, who provide administrative support for the Tribunal including investigating complaints as directed by a Tribunal Member.
The Secretariat comprises a Head of Secretariat who is responsible for the effective and efficient management of processes, a Tribunal Secretary, Deputy Tribunal Secretary, a Business Manager and a case-working team. [17]
In The National Council of Civil Liberties et al v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs , following the global surveillance disclosures by Edward Snowden in 2013, the UK government submitted documents to the IPT which showed for the first time that its intelligence services could access raw material collected in bulk by the National Security Agency (NSA), and other foreign spy agencies, without a warrant. This appeared to contradict assurances given in July 2013 by the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee which stated that in all cases in which GCHQ obtained intelligence from the US a warrant was signed by a minister. [18] [19]
On 6 November 2014, official documents disclosed to the IPT by the intelligence agencies revealed that their guidance policies allowed staff to access confidential communications between lawyers and their clients. This privileged relationship is usually strictly protected under British law, and leading campaigners[ who? ] said the disclosures had "troubling implications for the whole British justice system".
The release of the documents resulted from a claim brought on behalf of two Libyan men who had sued the British government for alleged complicity in their detention and subsequent rendition to the Libyan authorities. The British government refused to make a full statement concerning the revelations contained in the documents, saying only that it did not comment on ongoing legal proceedings. [20]
The IPT initially ruled in December 2014 that GCHQ did not breach the ECHR, and that its activities were compliant with Articles 8 ('right to privacy') and 10 ('freedom of expression'). [21]
However, in February 2015, the tribunal refined its earlier judgement and ruled that aspects of the data-sharing arrangement that allowed UK Intelligence services to request data from the US surveillance programmes Prism and Upstream did contravene the ECHR and as such were illegal between at least 2007, when Prism was introduced, and 2014, [22] when two paragraphs of additional information, providing details about the procedures and safeguards, were disclosed to the public in December 2014. [23] [24]
It also ruled that the legislative framework in the United Kingdom does not permit mass surveillance and that while GCHQ collects and analyses data in bulk, it does not practice mass surveillance. [21] [25] [26] This complemented independent reports by the Interception of Communications Commissioner, [27] and a special report made by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. [28]
Paton v Poole Borough Council was a high-profile case of a family who were placed under surveillance by Poole Borough Council in order to investigate claims that the family were not living in the school catchment area which they claimed.
Jenny Paton family was applying to send her child to Liliput First School, which was over-subscribed at the time. Believing that she lived elsewhere, PBC used its powers under RIPA 2000 to 'spy on her family 21 times'. [29]
The IPT would rule that the use of covert surveillance by the council was not an appropriate use of these powers. [30]
In 2015, three parliamentarians took a case to the IPT that the Wilson Doctrine, that parliamentarians' communications should not be tapped, was being broken. [31] [32] [33]
The IPT would find that the Wilson Doctrine was not enforceable in law and does not impose any legal restraints on the intelligence agencies. It stated MPs have the same level of legal protection as the general public when it comes to interception of their communications, and that only lawyers and journalists have more protection due to human rights law. [34] [35]
Subsequently, the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary said in Parliament that the protection of MPs communications from being intercepted still applies but does not extend to a blanket ban on surveillance. [36] [37] [38]
Section 26 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 partly enshrined the Wilson Doctrine in statute law. [39]
In 2014, the IPT was criticised by The Guardian for its association with the Home Office, who stated the two were based within the same building. They also criticised the low number of cases it had upheld - then 10 of the 1500 complaints it had received. [40]
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is an intelligence and security organisation responsible for providing signals intelligence (SIGINT) and information assurance (IA) to the government and armed forces of the United Kingdom. Primarily based at "The Doughnut" in the suburbs of Cheltenham, GCHQ is the responsibility of the country's Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, but it is not a part of the Foreign Office and its director ranks as a Permanent Secretary.
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, regulating the powers of public bodies to carry out surveillance and investigation, and covering the interception of communications. It was introduced by the Tony Blair Labour government ostensibly to take account of technological change such as the growth of the Internet and strong encryption.
MI5, officially the Security Service, is the United Kingdom's domestic counter-intelligence and security agency and is part of its intelligence machinery alongside the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), and Defence Intelligence (DI). MI5 is directed by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), and the service is bound by the Security Service Act 1989. The service is directed to protect British parliamentary democracy and economic interests and to counter terrorism and espionage within the United Kingdom (UK).
Mass surveillance is the intricate surveillance of an entire or a substantial fraction of a population in order to monitor that group of citizens. The surveillance is often carried out by local and federal governments or governmental organizations, but it may also be carried out by corporations. Depending on each nation's laws and judicial systems, the legality of and the permission required to engage in mass surveillance varies. It is the single most indicative distinguishing trait of totalitarian regimes. It is often distinguished from targeted surveillance.
Privacy International (PI) is a UK-based registered charity that defends and promotes the right to privacy across the world. First formed in 1990, registered as a non-profit company in 2002 and as a charity in 2012, PI is based in London. Its current executive director, since 2012, is Dr Gus Hosein.
The Intelligence Services Act 1994 is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.
The Wilson Doctrine is a convention in the United Kingdom that restricts the police and intelligence services from tapping the telephones of members of the House of Commons and House of Lords. It was introduced in 1966 and named after Harold Wilson, the Labour Prime Minister who established the rule. Since it was established, the development of new forms of communication, such as mobile phones and email, has led to extensions of the doctrine. However, it was never extended to cover members of the new devolved legislatures.
Homeland Security Group is an executive directorate of the UK government Home Office, created in 2007, responsible for leading the work on counter-terrorism in the UK, working closely with the police and security services. The office reports to the Home Secretary, and to the Minister of State for Security and Counter-Terrorism. Its current Director General is Chloe Squires, who is the senior government official responsible for counter-terrorist and organised crime strategy.
Big Brother Watch is a non-party British civil liberties and privacy campaigning organisation. It was launched in 2009 by founding director Alex Deane to campaign against state surveillance and threats to civil liberties. It was founded by Matthew Elliott. Since January 2018, Silkie Carlo is the Director.
The Intelligence Services Commissioner, was a regulatory official in the United Kingdom appointed under Section 59 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. They are tasked with reviewing actions and warrants taken by the Secretary of State under the Intelligence Services Act 1994 and the activities of British intelligence only in regard to the use of surveillance, covert human intelligence sources and interception of communications by MI5, MI6, and GCHQ assuming such actions and activities are not being reviewed by the Interception of Communications Commissioner.
Sir Charles Blandford Farr was a British civil servant, intelligence officer, and diplomat. He was Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and Head of the Joint Intelligence Organisation at the Cabinet Office until his death in February 2019. Before that, from 2007 until 2015 Farr was the Director of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) at the United Kingdom's Home Office.
The Telecommunications Act 1984 is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The rules for the industry are now contained in the Communications Act 2003.
The use of electronic surveillance by the United Kingdom grew from the development of signal intelligence and pioneering code breaking during World War II. In the post-war period, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) was formed and participated in programmes such as the Five Eyes collaboration of English-speaking nations. This focused on intercepting electronic communications, with substantial increases in surveillance capabilities over time. A series of media reports in 2013 revealed bulk collection and surveillance capabilities, including collection and sharing collaborations between GCHQ and the United States' National Security Agency. These were commonly described by the media and civil liberties groups as mass surveillance. Similar capabilities exist in other countries, including western European countries.
The Government of the United Kingdom maintains several intelligence agencies that deal with secret intelligence. These agencies are responsible for collecting, analysing and exploiting foreign and domestic intelligence, providing military intelligence, and performing espionage and counter-espionage. Their intelligence assessments contribute to the conduct of the foreign relations of the United Kingdom, maintaining the national security of the United Kingdom, military planning, public safety, and law enforcement in the United Kingdom. The four main agencies are the Secret Intelligence Service, the Security Service (MI5), the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and Defence Intelligence (DI). The agencies are organised under three government departments, the Foreign Office, the Home Office and the Ministry of Defence.
The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 was an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, repealed in 2016. It received Royal Assent on 17 July 2014, after being introduced on 14 July 2014. The purpose of the legislation was to allow security services to continue to have access to phone and internet records of individuals following a previous repeal of these rights by the Court of Justice of the European Union. The act was criticised by some Members of Parliament for the speed at which the act was passed through parliament, by some groups as being an infringement of privacy.
"Bulk personal datasets" is the UK government's euphemism for datasets containing personally identifiable information on a large number of individuals, as part of mass surveillance in the United Kingdom and on citizens around the world.
The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom which received royal assent on 29 November 2016. Its different parts came into force on various dates from 30 December 2016. The Act comprehensively sets out and in limited respects expands the electronic surveillance powers of the British intelligence agencies and police. It also claims to improve the safeguards on the exercise of those powers.
Targeted surveillance is a form of surveillance, such as wiretapping, that is directed towards specific persons of interest, and is distinguishable from mass surveillance. Both untargeted and targeted surveillance is routinely accused of treating innocent people as suspects in ways that are unfair, of violating human rights, international treaties and conventions as well as national laws, and of failing to pursue security effectively.
The Special Envoy on Intelligence and Law Enforcement Data Sharing is a British creation of the diplomatic corps at Cabinet level to report on, and facilitate dialogue between the executive branch of government and technology firms, often global in nature, that provide service in the internet realm.
R v Investigatory Powers Tribunal [2019] UKSC 22, is a judgment of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. It caused controversy due to the majority's suggestion that courts will not give effect to ouster clauses even when Parliament's intent is clear, thus undermining the concept of parliamentary sovereignty.
1. A declaration that the regime governing the soliciting, receiving, storing and transmitting by UK authorities of private communications of individuals located in the UK which have been obtained by US authorities pursuant to Prism and/or Upstream does not contravene Articles 8 or 10 ECHR. 2. A declaration that the regime in respect of interception under ss8(4), 15 and 16 of the Regulation of investigatory Powers Act 2000 does not contravene Articles 8 or 10 ECHR and does not give rise to unlawful discrimination contrary to Article 14, read together with Articles 8 and/or 10 of the ECHR.