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The North Caucasus: resting or restive?
On 19 September, the EUISS convened a closed-door event in Brussels, bringing together independent experts and EU policymakers for a collective assessment of current developments in the North Caucasus. The roundtable, moderated by Ondrej Ditrych, featured introductory briefings by Emil Aslan (Charles University) and Harold Chambers (Indiana University).
Brutally pacified in two bloody wars in the 1990s and 2000s, the North Caucasus has recently (re-)emerged as a hotspot of unrest and violence. It is the most volatile region of Russia, with the underlying causes of conflict remaining mostly unresolved. Internecine violence – the conflict in Chechnya turned into a largely internal one in the 2000s – created blood feud obligations that have been postponed until more favourable conditions obtain for retributive violence. Extreme corruption, oppressive state apparatuses and dysfunctional basic infrastructures constitute further immediate conditions conducive to social unrest and mobilisation of protest and insurgent/Islamist movements. In addition to protests fuelled by socioeconomic conditions or against mobilisation for the war in Ukraine (or the widespread boycott thereof in Ingushetia), an attempted Jewish pogrom in Dagestan and other forms of protests like recirculation of ruble notes marked with independence slogans, rebounding militancy has also been on the rise.
More organised violence may be observed in the future if a political transition is mismanaged in Chechnya following Ramzan Kadyrov’s succumbing to illness. If Russia is still to be preoccupied in Ukraine, this could result in a situation akin to civil war. In this case, Dagestan could follow suit – while the more Russified and secular Northwest Caucasus would likely stay aside. At the same time, Ramyan Kadyrov’s death should not be seen as a necessary and/or imminent cause of instability. His health appears to have improved recently, though it is possible he will relapse to old habits and it will deteriorate again. There is also a robust system of managers in place to facilitate the transition.
Regarding Kadyrovtsy/Akhmat’s deployment in Ukraine, Kadyrov engages in a balancing act. On one hand, he needs to continually show his loyalty to Putin – there is a close personal bond between the two – on whose support he vitally relies. On the other hand, Kadyrov cannot afford to either lose or alienate his experienced troops and their families which would undermine his support base. Simultaneously, public bravado related to Kadyrovtsy alleged activities in Ukraine has been a source of widespread mockery.
The North Caucasus plays a certain role in Moscow’s strategy of advancing relations with non-western countries. This includes the Gulf, Jordan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan – and more recently also African countries.