third way

politics
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Key People:
Anthony Giddens

third way, in politics, a proposed alternative between two hitherto dominant models, namely left-wing and right-wing political groups. Historically, the term third way was used to refer to a variety of forms of government—from Nordic social democracy to fascism. At the end of the 20th century, however, it acquired a more specific meaning when British sociologist Anthony Giddens used it to describe an alternative to neoliberalism and social democracy in an era of globalization. The term third way may be applied to refer to a new and distinctive policy program, to a new political economy, to a new conception of social justice, and, by many of its critics, to a centre-left capitulation to neoliberal globalization.

The third way was associated most clearly with the New Labour administration of Tony Blair, who served as prime minister of the United Kingdom from 1997 to 2007. It also was associated, less directly, with a number of centre-left administrations, notably those of U.S. Pres. Bill Clinton (1993–2001) and Chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schröder (1998–2005).

The third way of the British New Labour

Giddens distinguished the third way unequivocally from both neoliberalism to the political right and a “traditional” conception of social democracy to the political left. Though clearly framed to coincide with the mood of modernization associated with the birth of New Labour in Great Britain in the late 20th century, the aspirations for the third way grew over time. So too did its intended audience. It came to be regarded as a guide to good governance, appropriate to conditions of globalization and complex economic and social interdependence for developed and developing economies alike. Yet, arguably, it continued to betray its origins in domestic British political discourse. For instance, the conception of social democracy, from which it distanced itself, was scarcely recognizable to students of the latter’s distinctive (and, arguably, defining) Nordic/Scandinavian form. Indeed, the conception of social democracy to which Giddens’s third way was a response in fact owed far more to Great Britain’s peculiar experiments with corporatism in the 1960s and 1970s than it did to the continental European tradition of social democracy—a tradition to which the British Labour party and movement never really belonged. Indeed, the rather ambiguous nature of the relationship between the third way and social democracy was merely compounded by periodic references to the third way as a “modernized” social democracy fit for the new prevailing social, political, and economic landscape of contemporary capitalism. This rested uneasily alongside the idea of the third way as “beyond left and right”—that is, beyond social democracy and neoliberalism.

Yet, whether conceived as an alternative to or an updating of the social democratic tradition, the central and defining features of the third way were set out very clearly by Giddens:

  1. A commitment to the seemingly paradoxical notion of the radical centre and, with it, to the idea that a modernizing centre-left administration can draw radical zeal from left and right simultaneously.
  2. An emphasis on the “new democratic state” and with it a commitment to a more open and dialogic conception of international politics (and, rather naïvely, as it was to turn out, to “states without enemies”), to raising environmental consciousness, and, domestically, to a far more transparent, direct, and open form of participatory government that empowers the citizen.
  3. An associated emphasis on a more active and engaged civil society that has taken greater responsibility for its own governance through a proliferation of more community-based initiatives and an expanded role for nonprofit and voluntary organizations.
  4. A commitment to the sustenance by public policy of the “democratic family” and with it an associated emphasis on support for coparenting, gender equality, and lifelong parental contracts.
  5. An emphasis on the “new mixed economy” and an acceptance of the need for public-private partnerships, private finance initiatives, and the incentivization of consumer-friendly public service provision.
  6. A commitment to “equality as inclusion” and with it a far greater emphasis on providing appropriate opportunities for citizens to improve themselves (for instance, investing in their own human capital) rather than the pursuit of equality of outcome.
  7. An associated commitment to the notion that rights come with responsibilities.
  8. A commitment to the use of public resources to build the national stock of human capital, thereby contributing to competitiveness and good economic performance.
  9. An emphasis on the development of a genuinely “cosmopolitan nation” celebrating cultural diversity and pluralism.
  10. A commitment to extending such cosmopolitan values into international arenas through a democratization of the institutions of global governance.