Peshmerga

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Peshmerga
پێشمەرگه
Flag of Kurdistan.svg
Motto Ey Reqîb [1]
Founded1920s/1946
Current form2003–present
Headquarters Erbil, Kurdistan Region
Website gov.krd/mopa
Leadership
President of Kurdistan Region Nêçîrvan Barzanî
Minister of Peshmerga Affairs Şoreş Îsmaîl Abdulla
Personnel
Military age21–41
Conscription None
Active personnel150,000 (see § Structure) [2]
Industry
Domestic suppliersFlag of Iraq.svg  Republic of Iraq [3]
Foreign suppliers
Related articles
HistoryBefore 2003:
After 2003:

The Peshmerga (Kurdish : پێشمەرگهPêşmerge, transl.'Those Who Face Death') [25] comprise the standing military of Kurdistan Region, an autonomous political entity within the Republic of Iraq. According to the Constitution of Iraq, the Peshmerga and their security subsidiaries are solely responsible for the security of Kurdistan Region, chiefly due to the fact that the Iraqi Armed Forces are forbidden to enter Iraqi Kurdistan. [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] These subsidiaries include Asayish (intelligence agency/security forces), Parastin û Zanyarî (assisting intelligence agency), and Zêrevanî (the gendarmerie). The Peshmerga's history dates back to the 18th century, when they began as a strictly tribal pseudo-military border guard under the Ottoman Turks and the Safavid Iranians. By the 19th century, they had evolved into a disciplined and well-trained guerrilla force. [33]

Contents

Formally, the Peshmerga are under the command of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs of the Kurdistan Regional Government. In practice, however, the Peshmerga's structure is largely divided and controlled separately by the two Iraqi Kurdish political parties: the Democratic Party of Kurdistan and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Though unifying and integrating the Peshmerga has been on the Kurdistan Region's public agenda since 1992, the individual forces remain divided due to factionalism, which has proved to be a major stumbling block. [34]

Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Peshmerga played a key role in helping the United States on the mission to capture deposed Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. [35] [36] In 2004, they captured Saudi-born Pakistani terrorist Hassan Ghul, who was operating for al-Qaeda in Iraq. Ghul was turned over to American intelligence officers shortly afterwards, and revealed the identity of several key al-Qaeda figures during his interrogation, which eventually led to the killing of Osama bin Laden in a covert American military operation in Pakistan in 2011. [37] [38] [39] One year later, in 2012, Ghul was assassinated by an American drone strike in northwestern Pakistan.

Etymology

The word "Peshmerga" can be translated to "to stand in front of death", [40] [41] [42] and Valentine states it was first used by Qazi Muhammad in the short-lived Mahabad Republic (1946–47). [43] The word is understandable to Persian speakers. [44]

History

The Kurdish warrior tradition of rebellion has existed for thousands of years along with aspirations for independence, and early Kurdish warriors fought against the various Persian empires, the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire. [33] [45]

Historically the Peshmerga existed only as guerrilla organizations, but under the self-declared Republic of Mahabad (1946–1947), the Peshmerga led by Mustafa Barzani became the official army of the republic. [46] [47] After the fall of the republic and the execution of head of state Qazi Muhammad, Peshmerga forces reemerged as guerrilla organizations that would go on to fight the Iranian and Iraqi governments for the remainder of the century. [48]

In Iraq, most of these Peshmerga were led by Mustafa Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party. [47] In 1975 the Peshmerga were defeated in the Second Iraqi–Kurdish War. Jalal Talabani, a leading member of the KDP, left the same year to revitalize the resistance and founded the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. This event created the baseline for the political discontent between the KDP and PUK that to this day divides Peshmerga forces and much of Kurdish society in Kurdistan. [49] [50]

After Mustafa Barzani's death in 1979, his son Masoud Barzani took his position. [47] As tension increased between KDP and PUK, most Peshmerga fought to keep a region under their own party's control while also fighting off Iraqi Army incursions. Following the First Persian Gulf War, Iraqi Kurdistan saw the Kurdish Civil War between the two major parties, the KDP and the PUK, and Peshmerga forces were used to fight each other. [51] The civil war officially ended in September 1998 when Barzani and Talabani signed the Washington Agreement establishing a formal peace treaty. [52] In the agreement, the parties agreed to share revenue and power, deny the use of northern Iraq to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and not allow Iraqi troops into the Kurdish regions. By then, around 5,000 had been killed on both sides, and many more had been evicted for being on the wrong side. [53] In the years after, tension remained high, but both parties moved towards each other, and in 2003 they both took part in the overthrowing of the Baathist regime as part of the Iraq War. Unlike other militia forces, the Peshmerga were never prohibited by Iraqi law. [54]

Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga fighter (KDP) in 2003. Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga fighter in the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in 2003.jpg
Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga fighter (KDP) in 2003.

In 2014, the Peshmerga withdrew from the Nineveh Plains which was said by the locals as being a contributing factor of the quick Islamic State victory in the invasion, and the widespread massacre of Yazidis, who were rendered defenseless. [55]

Structure and capabilities

Peshmerga special unit near the Syrian border on June 23, 2014. Pershmega near Syria - June 23, 2014.jpg
Peshmerga special unit near the Syrian border on June 23, 2014.

The Peshmerga are mostly divided among forces loyal to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and those loyal to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), [56] while other, minor Kurdish parties such as the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party also have their own small Peshmerga units. [57] The KDP and PUK do not disclose information about the composition of their forces with government or media. [56] Thus there is no reliable number of how many Peshmerga fighters exist. [56] Media outlets have speculated that there are between 150,000 and 200,000 Peshmerga, but this number is highly disputed. [58] [59] Peshmerga have divided Kurdistan Region into a KDP-governed "yellow" zone covering Dohuk Governorate and Erbil Governorate and a PUK-governed "green" zone covering Sulaymaniyah Governorate and Halabja Governorate. [60] [56] [34] Each zone has its own branch of Peshmerga with their own governing institutions that do not coordinate with the other branch. [34] [61]

As a result of the split nature of the Peshmerga forces, there is no central command center in charge of the entire force, and Peshmerga units instead follow separate military hierarchies depending on political allegiance. [62] Multiple unification and depoliticizing efforts of the Peshmerga have been made since 1992. But so far all deadlines have been missed, [34] reforms have been watered down, [56] and most of the Peshmerga are still under the influence of the KDP and the PUK, who also maintain their separate Peshmerga forces. Following the events of the Iraqi Civil War in 2014, the United States and several Europe nations pressured the PUK and KDP to set up mixed brigades of Peshmerga as a condition for aid and funding. The PUK and KDP united 12 to 14 brigades under the Regional Guard Brigades, which were then placed under the command of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. [56] However, officers continue to report to and take orders from their party leaders who also control the deployment of forces loyal to them and appoint front-line and sector commanders. [34]

Both the KDP and the PUK rely heavily on irregulars in times of conflict to increase their ranks. [63] However, both maintain several professional military brigades. The following units have been identified within the Peshmerga force:

ForceEstimated sizeCommanderParty affiliation
Regional Guard Brigades [56] [34] 40,000–43,000Ministry of Peshmerga AffairsSupposedly apolitical
Hezekani Kosrat Rasul [34] 2,000–3,000 Kosrat Rasul Ali PUK
Anti-terror force [34] 5,000 [64] Lahur Shekh JangiPUK
Presidential Peshmerga brigades [34] unknown Hero Ibrahim Ahmed PUK
70 Unit [34] [56] 60,000Sheikh Jaafar Sheikh MustafaPUK. Supposedly becoming incorporated into MPA [65]
Emergency Forces [34] 3,000 [64] unknownPUK
PUK Asayish (security) forceunknownunknownPUK
Presidential Guard (Iraqi Kurdistan ) [34] unknown Nechirvan Barzani W
80 Unit [34] [56] 70,000–90,000Najat Ali SalihKDP. Supposedly becoming incorporated into MPA [65]
Zerevani [34] 51,000–120,000 active/250,000 reservists [66] [33] Masoud BarzaniKDP
Flag of HPS.svg Êzîdxan Protection Force [67] 7,000 [68] –8,000 [69] Haydar Shesho Yazidi Democratic Party, Incorporated into Peshmerga Ministry [70]
Flag of the Assyrians.svg Nineveh Plain Guard Forces or "Christian Peshmerga" [71] 1,500unknown Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Popular Council
KDP Asayish (security) forceunknownunknownKDP

Due to limited funding and the vast size of the Peshmerga forces, the KRG has long planned to downsize its forces from large numbers of low-quality forces to a smaller but much more effective and well-trained force. [72] Consequently, in 2009, the KRG and Baghdad engaged in discussions about incorporating parts of the Peshmerga forces into the Iraqi Army in what would be the 15th and 16th Iraqi Army divisions. [73] [74] However, after increasing tension between Erbil and Baghdad regarding the disputed areas, the transfer was largely put on hold. Some Peshmerga were already transferred but reportedly deserted again, and there are allegations that former Peshmerga forces remained loyal to the KRG rather than their Iraqi chain of command; regardless, thousands of members of the 80 Unit of KDP and the 70 Unit of PUK are based in Baghdad, and they have good cooperation with other Iraqi forces in Baghdad. [75] [76] [77]

The Peshmerga forces are secular with a Muslim majority and Assyrian and Yazidi units. [78] [79]

Peshmerga soldiers stand in formation during the Modern Brigade Course graduation ceremony. Task Force Talon advises, assists Ministry of Peshmerga July 28, 2016.jpg
Peshmerga soldiers stand in formation during the Modern Brigade Course graduation ceremony.

Peshmerga forces largely rely on old arms captured from battles. The Peshmerga captured stockpiles of weapons during the 1991 Iraqi uprisings. [80] Several stockpiles of weapons were captured from the old Iraqi Army during the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, in which Peshmerga forces were active. Following the retreat of the new Iraqi Army during the June 2014 Islamic State offensive, Peshmerga forces reportedly again managed to get hold of weapons left behind by the Army. [81] Since August 2014, Peshmerga forces have also captured weapons from the Islamic State. [82] In 2015, for the first time, Peshmerga soldiers received urban warfare and military intelligence training from foreign trainers, the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve. [83]

The Peshmerga arsenal is limited and confined by restrictions because the Kurdish Region has to purchase arms through the Iraqi government. Due to disputes between the KRG and the Iraqi government, arms flows from Baghdad to Kurdistan Region have been almost nonexistent, as Baghdad fears Kurdish aspirations for independence. [84] [85] [56] After the Islamic State offensive of August 2014, multiple governments armed the Peshmerga with some light equipment such as light arms, night goggles, and ammunition. [86] [87] However, Kurdish officials and Peshmerga stressed that they were not receiving enough. They also stress that Baghdad was blocking all arms from reaching the KRG, emphasizing the need for weapons to be sent directly to the KRG and not through Baghdad. [88] [89] Despite this, the United States has maintained that the government of Iraq is responsible for the security of Iraqi Kurdistan and that Baghdad must approve all military aid. [56]

The Peshmerga lack a proper medical corps and communication units. [56] This became apparent during the Islamic State offensive in 2014 where the Peshmerga found itself lacking ambulances and frontline field hospitals, forcing wounded fighters to walk back to safety. [56] There is also a lack of communication tools, as Peshmerga commanders are forced to use civilian cellphones to communicate with each other. [56] Under the guidance of the US-led coalition the Peshmerga has started to standardize its weapons systems, replacing Soviet-era weapons with NATO firearms. [56]

Inventory

Small arms

NameOriginTypeCaliberNotes
Pistols
P1 Germany Semi-automatic pistol 9×19mm Parabellum [90]
Rifles and carbines
AK-47 Soviet Union Assault rifle 7.62×39mm [91]
AKM Soviet UnionAssault rifle7.62×39mm [92]
M16 United States Assault rifle 5.56×45mm NATO M16A4 variant used. [93]
M4 United StatesAssault carbine5.56×45mm NATO [94]
H&K G36 GermanyAssault rifle5.56×45mm NATO [90]
H&K G3 Germany Battle rifle 7.62×51mm NATO [90]
SVD Soviet Union Designated marksman rifle 7.62×54mmR [92]
Zijiang M99 China Anti-materiel rifle 12.7×108mm [95]
Machine guns
PKM Soviet Union General-purpose machine gun 7.62×54mmR [96]
M240B United StatesGeneral-purpose machine gun7.62×51mm NATO [93]
MG3 GermanyGeneral-purpose machine gun7.62×51mm NATOIncludes the Beretta MG 42/59 variant. [90]
DShK Soviet Union Heavy machine gun 12.7×108mm [97]
M2 Browning United StatesHeavy machine gun 12.7×99mm NATO [90] [93]
Grenade launchers
Neopup PAW-20 Grenade launcher South Africa 20×42mm [98]
Denel Y3 AGL Automatic grenade launcher South Africa40×53mm [98]
QLZ-87 Automatic grenade launcherChina35×32mmSR [95]
Anti-tank weapons
RPG-7 Soviet Union Rocket-propelled grenade 40 mm [91]
SPG-9 Soviet Union Recoilless gun 73 mm [99]
Carl Gustaf Sweden Recoilless rifle84 mm [99]
M40 United StatesRecoilless rifle105 mm [99]
HJ-8 China Anti-tank guided missile 120 mm [99]
9M14 Malyutka Soviet UnionAnti-tank guided missile125 mm [99]
9M113 Konkurs Soviet UnionAnti-tank guided missile135 mm [99]
9M133 Kornet Russia Anti-tank guided missile152 mm [99]
MILAN France / GermanyAnti-tank guided missile115 mm [99]
BGM-71 TOW United StatesAnti-tank guided missile152 mm [99]

Combat vehicles

NameOriginVariantQuantityNotes
Main battle tanks
T-55 Soviet UnionT-54
T-55
[99]
T-62 Soviet Union [99]
Type 69 China [99]
Reconnaissance
EE-9 Cascavel Brazil [99]
Armoured personnel carriers
MT-LB Soviet Union [99]
EE-11 Urutu Brazil2+ [99]
Type 63 China [99]
MRAPs
Cougar United States6×6 [99]
IAG Guardian United Arab Emirates [99]
STREIT Group Spartan United Arab Emirates [99]
BAE Caiman United States [99]
Maxxpro United States [99]
Reva South Africa [99]
Wer'wolf MKII Namibia [99]
Utility vehicles
Humvee United StatesM115136 Humvees and 77 up-armored Humvees supplied by the US in 2017 [93]
ATF Dingo GermanyDingo 1Up to 18 [99]
M1117 United States [99]
Otokar APV Turkey [99]
Armoured recovery vehicle
Type 653 ARV China1+ [99]

Artillery

NameOriginTypeCaliberQuantityNotes
Self-propelled artillery
2S1 Gvodzika Soviet UnionSelf-propelled howitzer122 mm [99]
Towed artillery
M119 United States Howitzer 105 mm36 M119A2 supplied by the US in 2017. [93]
D-30 Soviet UnionHowitzer122 mm6+ [99]
M-46 Soviet Union Field gun 130 mm [99]
Type 59 ChinaField gun130 mm [99]
D-20 Soviet Union Gun-howitzer 152 mm [99]
Multiple rocket launchers
Type 63 ChinaTowed MRL107 mmMounted on technicals. [100]
BM-21 Grad Soviet UnionSelf-propelled MRL122 mm [100]
HM20 Iran Self-propelled MRL122 mm [100]
Mortars
M224 United StatesLight mortar60 mm [91]
M252 United StatesMedium mortar81 mm [100]
M120 United StatesHeavy mortar120 mm [100]

Air defense

NameOriginCaliberVariantNotes
Anti-aircraft guns
ZPU Soviet Union 14.5×114mm ZPU-1
ZPU-2
ZPU-4
Some mounted on technicals. [100]
53T2 Tarasque France20 mmSome mounted on technicals. [100]
AZP S-60 Soviet Union57 mmSome mounted on technicals. [100]
Self-propelled anti-aircraft guns
ZSU-57-2 Soviet Union57 mm [100]

Aircraft

AircraftOriginTypeIn serviceNotes
Helicopters
Airbus H135 FranceTransport3+ [100]
MD Helicopters MD-350FUnited StatesTransport2+ [100]

Issues

The Peshmerga forces are plagued by frequent allegations of corruption, partisanship, nepotism, and fraud. [101] [102] [103] [104] A common result of corruption in the Peshmerga are "ghost employees" which are employees on paper who either do not exist or do not show up for work but receive a salary. Those setting up such a scam split the salary of these employees. [56]

In addition the KDP and PUK have used the Peshmerga to exert or attempt to exert a monopoly on the use of force within their zones. [56] In 2011 KDP Peshmerga fired on anti-government protesters in Sulaymaniyah, and the PUK later used its own security forces to break up these protests, [34] leading to criticism from all of the opposition parties in the parliament. In 2014 the KDP used its Peshmerga to stop ministers from the Gorran Movement to enter Erbil and attend parliament. [56]

Outside of Kurdistan Region the Peshmerga has been criticized for using force to exert control of local Arab, Yazidi and Assyrian communities, particularly after taking control of areas officially outside of Kurdistan Region during the Iraqi Civil War. [105]

Role of women

Women have played a significant role in the Peshmerga since its foundation. The Kurdish Zand tribe was known for allowing women in military roles. [33] During the Iraqi–Kurdish conflict the majority of women served within the Peshmerga in supporting roles such as building camps, taking care of the wounded, and carrying munitions and messages. [63] Several women brigades served on the front lines. Margaret George Malik [106] was an iconic [107] Assyrian guerilla fighter who was given a leading position in important battles such as the battle of Zawita Valley. [108] The PUK started recruiting women during the Kurdish Civil War. Women were given a 45-day basic training that included parade drills and basic marksmanship with various rifles, mortars, and RPGs. [33]

In the months leading up to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the United States launched Operation Viking Hammer which dealt a huge blow to Islamic terrorist groups in Iraqi Kurdistan and uncovered a chemical weapons facility. [109] [110] [111] [112] [113] The PUK later confirmed that female Kurdish fighters had participated in the operation. [63]

People's Defense Units' (YPG) woman volunteer with Peshmerga soldier Peshmerga & YPG.jpg
People's Defense Units' (YPG) woman volunteer with Peshmerga soldier

The modern Peshmerga is almost entirely made up of men, while having at least 600 women in their ranks. [114] In the KDP, these Peshmerga women have been refused access to the frontline and are mostly used in logistics and management positions, [115] but PUK Peshmerga women are deployed in the front lines and are actively engaged in combat. [116] [117] [33]

See also

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Bibliography

Further reading

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