James Andrew Wynn

Liberty University, Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011)

In a concurring opinion, Wynn became the first federal judge, and only lower-federal-court judge, to conclude that Congress had the authority to establish the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act pursuant to its plenary taxing power. ^{[21] [22]} The Supreme Court subsequently upheld the individual mandate under that theory in NFIB v. Sebelius . ^[23]

North Carolina Voting Rights Cases

In 2014, Wynn wrote the majority opinion preliminarily enjoining portions of a North Carolina law that denied minority groups equal access to voting. League of Women Voters of North Carolina v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014). Wynn was later a member of a panel that held that the provisions of the law that required photo identification to vote, reduced early-voting opportunities, and eliminated out-of-precinct voting, same-day registration, and pre-registration, were enacted with discriminatory intent, and thus, were unconstitutional. ^[24] North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016). The majority held that the North Carolina General Assembly's "new provisions target[ed] African Americans with almost surgical precision." Wynn wrote the section of the majority opinion as to remedy, permanently enjoining the State from implementing the unconstitutional provisions. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case, leaving the Fourth Circuit's holding in place. ^[25]

Partisan Gerrymandering

In August 2018, Wynn wrote the majority opinion for a three-judge district court panel striking down North Carolina's congressional districts on grounds that the state's 2016 districting plan constituted a partisan gerrymander in violation of Article I of the Constitution and the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777 (M.D.N.C. 2018). The Supreme Court vacated Wynn's opinion, holding that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question because there are no "judicially manageable standards" with which to measure political gerrymandering. Rucho v. Common Cause , 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). Wynn has been outspoken about his disagreement with the Supreme Court's decision. ^[26]

Long v. Hooks, 972 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc)

In 1976, an all-white North Carolina jury convicted a Black man, Ronnie Long, of raping a white woman. Decades later, new evidence that had not been disclosed to the defense came to light. The defendant sought habeas relief. The en banc majority remanded the case to the district court for further consideration. Wynn authored a concurring opinion, arguing that the court should grant immediate relief. ^[27] Wynn reasoned that no reasonable jury could convict the defendant based on the new evidence.

During oral arguments, Wynn questioned why, if the State's goal was to seek justice, it was not willing to look at the new evidence. He also called attention to the racial dynamics at play. The case involved police officers failing to disclose key evidence and lying on the stand. He noted that numerous Black men had been wrongfully prosecuted at the time and cited the country's history of lynchings. ^[28]

Less than four months after the case was decided, North Carolina Governor Roy Cooper pardoned Long. ^[29]

Peltier v. Charter Day School, Inc. (4th Cir. 2022) (en banc)

In a 10–6 decision, joined by Judge Wynn, the full court held that a public charter school was a state actor for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Senior Judge Barbara Milano Keenan, writing for the majority, also concluded that the school’s dress code, which "requires female students to wear skirts to school based on the view that girls are 'fragile vessels' deserving of 'gentle' treatment by boys," plainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.

Wynn penned a concurrence joined by four other judges critiquing policy arguments raised by some of the dissenting judges. He dismissed concerns that the majority's Equal Protection holding would threaten historically Black colleges and universities, pointing out that just because an "institution is historically Black . . . does not mean that school is currently engaging in racial discrimination." He also rejected the dissenting judges' argument that "subjecting schools like Charter Day to the demands of the Constitution" will stifle "educational progress," noting that "[t]wo hundred and fifty years of innovation and ingenuity—enabled by our American constitutional system—say otherwise."

Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615 (1998)

During his tenure on the Supreme Court of North Carolina, Wynn authored an opinion abolishing the longstanding invitee/licensee framework for evaluating premises-liability claims and replacing it with a new standard under which property owners owe a duty of reasonable care to all lawful visitors.

United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc)

Wynn wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, arguing that cell site location information is not voluntarily conveyed by cell phone users and, therefore, is protected by the Fourth Amendment. ^[30] The Supreme Court subsequently agreed. Carpenter v. United States , 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).

International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc)

Wynn wrote a concurring opinion contending that President Trump's "travel ban" exceeded the President's authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act because it denied entry to a class of aliens on the basis of invidious discrimination. ^[31] Wynn's opinion was grounded in the interpretive principle that absent a clear statement by Congress, courts should not construe a delegation of congressional power as authorizing the delegates to exercise that power in a manner that curtails or dilutes fundamental rights.

G. G. v. Gloucester County School Board, 972 F.3d 586 (4th Cir. 2020)

In August 2020, Wynn joined the majority in G. G. v. Gloucester County School Board. In a 2–1 decision, the court held that a Virginia school board violated Title IX when it prevented a transgender man from using the boys' bathroom. ^{[32] [33]} Judge Henry F. Floyd wrote for the majority that "[a]t the heart of this appeal is whether equal protection and Title IX can protect transgender students from school bathroom policies that prohibit them from affirming their gender. We join a growing consensus of courts in holding that the answer is resoundingly yes." Wynn, concurring, wrote that

the Board's classification on the basis of "biological gender"—defined in this appeal as the sex marker on a student's birth certificate—is arbitrary and provides no consistent reason to assign transgender students to bathrooms on a binary male/female basis. Rather, the Board's use of "biological gender" to classify students has the effect of shunting individuals like Grimm—who may not use the boys’ bathrooms because of their "biological gender," and who cannot use the girls’ bathrooms because of their gender identity—to a third category of bathroom altogether: the “alternative appropriate private facilit[ies]" established in the policy for "students with gender identity issues." That is indistinguishable from the sort of separate-but-equal treatment that is anathema under our jurisprudence. No less than the recent historical practice of segregating Black and white restrooms, schools, and other public accommodations, the unequal treatment enabled by the Board's policy produces a vicious and ineradicable stigma. ^[34]

The Supreme Court declined to grant review, leaving the Fourth Circuit's holding in place. ^[35]

Hirschfeld v. Bureau of Alcohol, Firearms, Tobacco and Explosives, 5 F.4th 407 (4th Cir. 2021)

In July 2021, Wynn dissented from a Fourth Circuit panel's decision to strike down as unconstitutional a longstanding federal statute preventing federally licensed gun dealers from selling handguns to individuals under the age of 21. ^{[36] [37]}

Cawthorn v. Amalfi, 35 F.4th 245 (4th Cir. 2022)

In a concurring opinion, Wynn became the first federal appellate judge to conclude that Article I, Section 5 does not render states "powerless to regulate candidates or ballot access" for congressional office. He observed that by its plain terms, Article I, Section 5 "only applies to Congress's 'own Members,'" so Congress must lack "exclusive control to judge the qualifications of nonmembers, including candidates." A contrary holding, he wrote, would not only do violence to the Constitution's text but would also mean states would be unable to prevent "'fraudulent or unqualified candidates such as minors, out-of-state residents, or foreign nationals' from running for office." And "[n]either the Constitution, nor Supreme Court precedent, nor common sense supports that irrational result."

E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. Kolon Industries, 637 F.3d 435 (4th Cir. 2011)

Wynn authored one of the first opinions applying the plausibility pleading standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544 (2007), to an attempted monopolization case under Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The opinion discusses at length what types of facts a complaint must allege to sufficiently plead a relevant geographic market.