The National Assembly elects both the president and the prime minister, meaning the democratic legitimacy of these votes rests largely on the fairness of parliamentary elections. The president’s duties are mainly ceremonial, but they may influence appointments and return legislation for further consideration before signing it into law. The president is limited to a maximum of two terms.

The April 2022 parliamentary elections were deemed severely flawed by observer missions, which noted that the rules were administered to advantage the Fidesz–Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) ruling coalition. Fidesz elected Katalin Novák, a former minister and parliamentarian, as the first woman to be president of Hungary.

The prime minister holds most executive power. Viktor Orbán has been prime minister since 2010, winning reelection for a third time in the flawed 2022 elections.

Voters elect representatives every four years to a 199-seat, unicameral National Assembly under a mixed system of proportional and direct representation (106 from single-member districts and 93 from compensatory party lists). The Fidesz–KDNP coalition won the April 2022 parliamentary elections with 54.13 percent of the vote, securing a fourth consecutive term and a two-thirds majority with 135 seats. The coalition of opposition parties, United for Hungary, took 57 seats, and the far-right Our Homeland (Mi Hazánk) won 6 seats.

An election observation mission performed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) found that the elections were well organized and professionally managed, but they failed to provide a level playing field and equality of opportunities among candidates. Significant media bias towards ruling parties and the misuse of state resources hindered voters’ ability to make informed choices. The OSCE/ODIHR report emphasized the lack of effective legal remedy against irregularities, as electoral authorities ruled mostly in favor of the Fidesz–KDNP coalition, and noted several legal changes in recent years that may have impacted the election’s outcome.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) found that the government misused personal data in several ways to disseminate Fidesz campaign messages. Civil society organizations (CSOs) documented a series of attempts at electoral fraud, and independent media revealed evidence that postal ballots in Romania and Serbia were potentially tampered with by Fidesz allies.

The electoral framework that was established by the Fidesz–KDNP majority has been amended regularly based on the political interest of the ruling coalition, and since 2010 Fidesz has redrawn constituency boundaries in its favor.

Electoral authorities are not independent. Members of the National Election Commission (NVB) are nominated by the president and confirmed to nine-year terms by the parliament. There is no formal parliamentary debate or public consultation process to inform the selection of NVB members, and observers have raised concerns about the body’s impartiality.

In recent years, Orbán’s government has been largely successful in superseding impartiality requirements. Voters living outside Hungary are not guaranteed equal access to vote, and national minority voters have long faced systemic challenges in exercising their right to vote.

Political parties can organize legally, but they face some practical impediments to garnering popular support. Opposition parties are disadvantaged by the politicized distortion of the advertising market, including the market for the country’s many billboards.

Individual politicians face smear campaigns in progovernment media outlets, and the government has taken steps to split the opposition vote in recent elections. Authorities have also interfered with opposition figures’ peaceful political activities.

Parliament further amended the electoral framework in 2020, requiring political parties to field candidates in 71 (instead of 27) single-member constituencies on a single list, forcing opposition parties to combine and field one consolidated list of candidates in the 2022 general elections. The government also maintains effective control of the State Audit Office (ÁSZ), which monitors campaign activities and party spending.

In recent years, the ÁSZ has imposed sanctions on opposition parties for financial irregularities, while condoning or overlooking problematic spending of state subsidies by Fidesz. In December 2023, the ÁSZ imposed a substantial fine on the six opposition parties that had formed a coalition to contest the 2022 parliamentary elections, claiming that the parties had received at least $700,000 in illegal foreign funding during the preelection campaign season. Prodemocracy organizations have expressed concern that such sanctions are used by Orbán’s government to target and harass its political opponents.

Fidesz has dominated the political landscape since the 2010 election. Opposition parties contended with even more obstacles and restrictions that detracted from their ability to gain power in the 2022 elections, despite banding together to present one unified slate of candidates. These included unequal access to media, smear campaigns by progovernment media outlets, politicized audits, and a campaign environment skewed by the ruling coalition’s mobilization of state resources.

The OSCE found a pervasive overlap between ruling coalition resources and government resources. Third-party spending, especially in social media, also strongly benefitted the ruling coalition.

Individuals are largely able to participate in public affairs without encountering undue influence over their political choices. However, Fidesz has increasingly harnessed its members’ political and economic power to sideline opposition groups and prevent them from presenting a meaningful challenge to its dominant position. The 2022 OSCE observation mission stressed recurring concerns of illegal practices that Roma are typically affected by, including vote buying and stigmatizing campaign rhetoric.

Women are underrepresented in political life. Only 26 of 199 National Assembly members are women, and as of June 2023, no women serve in cabinet positions. Ruling party ministers and progovernment media occasionally make derogatory and sexist remarks toward women parliamentarians.

Hungary’s constitution guarantees the right of ethnic minority populations to form self-governing bodies, and all 13 recognized minorities have done so. Minorities can also register to vote for special minority lists—with a preferential vote threshold—in parliamentary elections. Minorities without a parliamentary mandate can send a “national minority advocate” to the parliament without voting rights.

Roma have long been underrepresented in politics and government and have been the target of derogatory rhetoric from Fidesz members in recent years.

Though individual opposition politicians have openly supported equal rights for LGBT+ people, and the party Momentum has done so explicitly, LGBT+ people’s interests are not successfully represented in the parliament.

The governing coalition is effectively able to draft and implement laws and policies at will. Fidesz continues to dominate governance through a parliamentary supermajority acquired by means of elections that were not fully competitive. Prime Minister Orbán, the party’s leader, exerts considerable influence over the legislature. The ability of the opposition to check government activities remains limited.

Lawmakers’ behavior in the National Assembly has been restricted in several ways. The speaker of the National Assembly has disciplined and fined opposition lawmakers for occupying the lectern and bringing signs onto the floor.

In March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government declared a “state of danger” and passed the widely denounced Authorization Act, conferring sweeping emergency powers to the executive, which it has used without accountability to restrict civil liberties unrelated to public health or safety. This COVID-19 emergency legal regime enabled the government to rule by decree and was prolonged several times until November 2022, when the government declared another state of danger related to the Russia-Ukraine war. The order remained in force throughout 2023, and was extended for an additional six months in November. The government continued to misuse its emergency power to regulate issues unrelated to the war during the year.

Corruption remains a problem in Hungary, and instances of high-level government corruption have not been properly investigated. Fidesz has established control over auditing and investigative bodies, including the ÁSZ.

Prosecutors have also been reluctant to investigate long-standing allegations of the misuse of public development funds disbursed by the European Union (EU), despite the severity of the problem. During 2022, the government adopted a series of anticorruption measures for the proper handling of EU funds. An Integrity Authority was also established in 2022, though with limited power to conduct investigations and suspend ongoing public procurement processes. According to Hungarian and international watchdog organizations, the measures were broadly insufficient.

Hungary’s Freedom of Information Act contains numerous exemptions and is inconsistently enforced. In many cases, information is only made available because of litigation, but the implementation of the judgments is still insufficient. A narrow legal definition of what constitutes public funds hampers oversight of large amounts of public money.

Major legislation is frequently rushed through the parliament, leaving citizens and interest groups little time to provide feedback or criticism. Important proposals are hidden in long omnibus bills, and the government tends to submit substantial bills overnight, or just before the final vote takes place. The government continues to use manipulative “national consultations” and billboard campaigns to spread government propaganda and feed anti–EU sentiment.

Journalists have been curtailed from performing their duties while covering parliamentary events; the speaker prohibited audio and video recording in corridors surrounding the plenary chamber, entrances, and on-site cafeterias in 2019.

The constitution protects freedom of the press, but Fidesz has undermined this guarantee. While privately owned opposition-aligned media outlets exist, national, regional, and local media are increasingly dominated by progovernment outlets, which are frequently used to smear political opponents and highlight false accusations. Government advertising and sponsorships favor progovernment outlets, leaving independent and critical news sources in a financially precarious position. Some independent journalists and media outlets are regularly prevented from attending government press conferences.

Local and international media rights organizations have expressed concern that provisions in the National Sovereignty Defense law, adopted in December 2023, threaten independent media outlets in Hungary and could severely restrict their ability to operate. In September, Fidesz leader Máté Kocsis said the legislation was intended to target “left-wing journalists,” among others.

Public service media controlled by the government has disseminated disinformation and Russian war propaganda since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

The Fidesz governing coalition and their allies have worked to close or acquire many critical media outlets.

In 2021, an investigation by a team of international journalists, including the Hungarian outlet Direkt36, revealed that independent journalists were surveilled by the Hungarian authorities using the Israeli-made spyware, Pegasus.

Since 2010, Fidesz has gradually taken over artistic and cultural institutions and film and publishing industries and redirected funding for projects and artworks openly promoting nationalistic and Christian values. In June 2023, Hungary’s largest publishing house came under the almost exclusive ownership of a Fidesz-linked foundation, sparking concern that the publishing market would undergo an ideological transformation. In July, a bookseller was fined 12 million forints ($36,041) for selling a young adult graphic novel that included LGBT+ content without wrapping the books in plastic—deemed a violation of a 2021 law banning the “display or promotion” of LGBT+ content to minors.

The constitution guarantees religious freedom and provides for the separation of church and state, though these guarantees were weakened in the 2011 version of the constitution, the preamble of which makes direct references to Christianity. Constitutional amendments enacted in 2018 and 2020 reinforced those references, obliging all state organs to protect “Christian culture” and guaranteeing children’s right to education based on Christian values.

The government has led xenophobic campaigns in recent years, often with anti-Muslim sentiment.

The Fidesz-led government has maintained its efforts to bring schools and universities under close supervision. A gradual overhaul of the public education system raised concerns about excessive government influence on school curriculums, and the parliament has restructured institutions and their finances to increase government-appointed chancellors’ powers. Authorities have increasingly threatened the academic autonomy of well-established institutions, pulling support, interfering in their affairs, and landing progovernment supporters in leading positions. In October 2023, a professor at Budapest’s Corvinus University was dismissed after criticizing the decisions of the Fidesz-linked university leadership.

The government has revoked accreditation from all gender studies programs.

In July 2023, the government adopted the “Status Law,” which, among other things, abolished the public servant status of teachers and removed certain labor protections. Critics of the legislation have referred to it as the “revenge law,” saying that it was adopted in retaliation for teachers’ strikes and protests in 2022 and 2023. Many teachers quit after the law was passed. Additionally, a government decree issued in January made it easier to dismiss teachers who participate in work stoppages or are otherwise engaged in civil disobedience.

Progovernment media outlets commonly target activists, academics, programs, and institutions, often by calling them “Soros agents,” referring to Hungarian-born financier and philanthropist George Soros. In 2017, Fidesz targeted the Central European University (CEU), a graduate school founded by Soros, by changing the requirements for foreign universities to operate in Hungary. The government also targeted the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA), stripping the 200-year-old academy of its network of research institutions in 2019 and handing it over to a new governing body.

In January 2023, the European Commission announced that it had suspended the rights of 21 universities managed by Fidesz-controlled boards to participate in the EU’s Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe programs until the risk of executive interference with university autonomy was reduced. The suspension remained in place as of September.

While freedom of expression is constitutionally protected, ongoing efforts to sideline voices and perspectives that authorities find unfavorable, including many found at academic institutions, NGOs, and media outlets, have discouraged open criticism of the government and other politically sensitive speech. Human rights groups have also raised concerns that provisions in the new Sovereignty Defense Law, enacted in December 2023, can be used to intimidate and arbitrarily silence people who express criticism of the government.

In 2021, an investigation by a team of international journalists revealed that journalists, businessmen, lawyers, and politicians were the targets of secret surveillance conducted with the Israeli-made spyware, Pegasus. In 2022, authorities closed investigations into the allegations, claiming they had no evidence that any law had been broken in purchasing Pegasus. The Hungarian government has failed to fully execute European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) rulings to incorporate effective institutional guarantees against improper surveillance.

The constitution provides for freedom of assembly, and the government has generally respected this right in practice.

However, at some protests during 2023, police used disproportionate force against demonstrators; in April and May, student- and teacher-led protests against the government’s draft Status Law on public education were dispersed by police using tear gas and physical force. Young protesters faced criminal charges and heavy fines, which they reportedly believed were intended to deter further demonstrations. Police behavior towards student protesters was met with criticism by human rights organizations, and was reportedly much more restrained at subsequent protests.

Hungarian authorities prevented pro-Palestinian rallies from being held following an October intervention by Prime Minister Orbán, who called the rallies “pro-terror demonstrations.”

Score Change: The score declined from 4 to 3 because police used disproportionate measures, including tear gas and the detention of minors, to disband protests in support of teachers; the government also prohibited all pro-Palestinian demonstrations, arbitrarily conflating them with support for terrorist organizations.

NGOs whose activities conflict with government priorities have come under continued pressure since Fidesz took power. Fidesz has instituted burdensome registration and reporting requirements for NGOs, and police have illegally raided NGO offices. According to a 2021 law on the transparency of NGOs, civil society organizations are required to submit to yearly financial audits by the ÁSZ should they report donations of more than €55,000 (approximately $59,000).

The government continues to stigmatize NGOs as “foreign agents” or “Soros agents,” and frequently scapegoats them for developments unfavorable to the government or deemed unpopular in the eyes of the public. Organizations assisting asylum seekers have also been subject to Hungary’s “Stop Soros” laws, which heavily restricted the right to asylum and criminalized activities supporting asylum seekers. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled in 2021 that the “Stop Soros” laws violated EU law, but December 2022 amendments to the criminal code continue to threaten NGOs that assist asylum seekers with sanctions on vaguely defined grounds.

The new Sovereignty Defense Office—a body that will be created by the sovereignty protection law enacted in December 2023—will have extensive, vaguely defined powers to investigate and report on any activity suspected of serving foreign interests and capable of violating or endangering “the sovereignty of Hungary.” NGOs have criticized the law as being overly broad, and condemned it as an attempt to harass, intimidate, and silence activists and groups who criticize the government.

Workers’ rights to form associations and bargain collectively are generally recognized, but the 2012 Labor Code weakened the position of trade unions by curtailing their rights. There are significant limitations on what can be considered a lawful strike, and the government has successfully blocked efforts to organize strikes in recent years. Union membership is low, trade unions are present in less than 25 percent of workplaces, and only 7 percent of workers belong to one.

In 2022, teachers’ unions organized strikes across the country demanding higher salaries and lightened workloads in public education. The government responded by seriously curtailing the right to strike in schools. Protesting teachers were threatened with sanctions by their employers, and many of them were dismissed. Protests continued in 2023, many focusing on the Status Law that, among other things, eliminated teachers’ public servant status once passed in July. In February, the powers of the Hungarian Medical Chamber—a professional organization that has been in conflict with the Fidesz government—were curtailed overnight.

The government introduced draft legislation in 2023 that would abolish a long-standing rule allowing public employers to contribute to employees’ union membership fees.

Judicial independence remains a matter of concern. Rulings in recent years on politically sensitive cases have favored government interests. In July 2023, four new justices were appointed to the Constitutional Court, replacing four justices whose terms had ended. All four new justices were nominated by the ruling coalition in parliament; the sole opposition candidate was not able to garner enough support to receive a nomination.

High-ranking government officials and progovernment media berate judgments that are detrimental to Fidesz’s interests and regularly launch attacks against judges who publicly speak up against measures threatening judicial independence.

Significant powers are vested in the president of the National Judicial Office (NJO), while the powers of the judicial self-governing body, the National Judicial Council (NJC), which supervises the president of the NJO, were relatively weak. In May 2023, the government adopted a large-scale judicial reform—required to access frozen EU funds—which, among other things, entrusted the NJC with stronger powers intended to counterbalance the powers of the NJO president. The judicial reform also included provisions to strengthen the independence of the Supreme Court, but observers have expressed concern about whether the reforms will do so in practice.

Due process rights are enshrined in the constitution and are generally respected. However, Hungarian courts have shown some resistance to European judicial oversight on due process matters. Litigation costs are relatively high, while access to legal aid is limited. There have been concerns about the quality of lawyers appointed for defendants who are unable or unwilling to retain legal counsel on their own.

Inadequate medical care and poor sanitation in the country’s prisons and detention centers remain problems.

Physical abuse by police is a problem, and there are systematic deficiencies in reporting, indicting, investigating, and sanctioning such conduct.

The rights of refugees and asylum seekers are routinely violated in Hungary, where frequent changes to asylum policy—including the uncontestable declaration, by law, of Serbia as a safe third country—and the construction of barriers along the country’s southern border have made it nearly impossible for individuals to apply for asylum and receive protection. In the past, asylum seekers were frequently detained in poorly equipped transit zones, and few were recognized by Hungarian authorities as refugees. In 2020, the CJEU ruled that Hungarian asylum procedures were incompatible with EU law and placing asylum seekers in the transit zones constituted unlawful detention. The government subsequently closed the transit zones but passed legislation requiring asylum seekers to present their documentation at diplomatic missions in other countries. In June 2023, the CJEU found this “embassy procedure” to be in violation of EU law.

Despite European court rulings and in breach of EU law, the government has failed to discontinue the practice of “pushbacks,” or the removal of asylum seekers to Serbia. In September 2023, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers called on the Hungarian government to comply with a series of previous judgments requiring the reform of the asylum system in line with European standards.

While the southern borders are completely shut down to asylum seekers, the government has opened Hungary’s eastern borders for those fleeing Ukraine, reflecting its discriminatory migration policies. Hungary has provided temporary protection status for Ukrainian citizens and their family members fleeing the war; this protection, however, did not cover non-Ukrainians who had legally resided in Ukraine. Human rights NGOs and volunteer groups, not the government, were primarily those who provided aid in the form of accommodation, food, and information for those fleeing their homes.

Anti-immigration rhetoric is frequently deployed by the government. In June 2023, the parliament passed legislation to regulate the employment of so-called guest workers from 15 countries outside of the EU. The draft law was withdrawn in October, and the government introduced new, stricter legislation the following month that would significantly alter existing immigration policies. The new law, which was approved by the parliament in December and is scheduled to go into effect in 2024, includes provisions limiting the length of work permits and requiring that foreign workers be housed separately from Hungarians where possible.

Roma are Hungary’s largest ethnic minority and face widespread discrimination, societal exclusion, violence, and poverty. Roma students continue to be illegally segregated or improperly placed in schools for children with mental disabilities.

Women in Hungary are subject to employment discrimination and tend to be underrepresented in high-level business positions.

The Fidesz government has been increasingly and openly discriminatory toward many groups, but particularly LGBT+ people. In 2020, the parliament voted to end the legal recognition of gender identity, passed a law that severely restricts same-sex couples’ ability to adopt children, and declared that the legal parents of a child are a woman and a man. Senior Fidesz politicians, the government, and government-aligned media use anti–LGBT+ rhetoric extensively, often conflating homosexuality and expressions of gender identity with pedophilia. A 2021 law banned the discussion of gender and sexual diversity in schools, the media, advertising, and other public places; as a result, in October 2023, minors were banned from visiting the 2023 World Press Photo exhibition at the National Museum in Budapest because some photos portrayed LGBT+ content.

Antisemitism persists in Hungary, and the government’s anti-Soros campaigns pander to individuals with those sentiments. In 2021, the Equal Treatment Authority—one of Hungary’s most effective institutional mechanisms to fight discrimination—was abolished. Its powers were transferred to the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, whose independence and effectiveness is highly questionable.

There are no significant restrictions on Hungarians’ freedom of travel or their ability to change their place of residence or employment. Movement restrictions and curfews related to the COVID-19 pandemic were instituted based on epidemiological data.

Individuals have the right to own property and establish private businesses. However, the success of a business is somewhat dependent upon its owner’s government connections. Businesspeople whose activities are not in line with the financial or political interest of the government are likely to face harassment and intimidation, and subject to increasing administrative pressure for a possible takeover.

Changes in 2022 to the small-business tax scheme were adopted overnight without public consultation and negatively affected hundreds of thousands of entrepreneurs. The government has at times intervened to remove or reduce legal barriers and unduly favor industries and investments important to its economic policies.

The constitution defines marriage as a union between a man and a woman. LGBT+ individuals are allowed to pursue civil unions.

In 2020, the National Assembly ended the legal recognition of gender identity for transgender people. As a result of the Ninth Amendment of the Fundamental Law, the constitution now stipulates that “the mother is a woman, the father is a man,” and “Hungary protects the right of children to self-identify in line with their birth sex.” Furthermore, the law effectively limits the right to adoption only to married couples, excluding single people and unmarried partners—among them same-sex couples—from this right.

Domestic violence and spousal rape are illegal, but the definition of rape hinges on the use of force or coercion, not on lack of consent. NGOs describe government responses to violence against women as inadequate.

Though the constitution defines life as beginning from conception, the statutory regime makes abortion broadly available. However, in 2022, the government unexpectedly restricted access to abortion by ministerial degree, dubbed a “heartbeat law,” requiring the presentation of the fetus’s vital functions to the pregnant person before the termination of the pregnancy.

Hungary is a transit point, source, and to a lesser extent, destination for trafficked persons, including women trafficked for prostitution. Prevention, coordination efforts, and processes to identify and support victims remain inadequate, while trafficking investigations and enforcement of relevant laws are unreliable. In 2020, the government adopted a National Strategy against Human Trafficking for 2020–23, which included harsher sanctions for traffickers. The parliament also amended the relevant laws primarily to protect children against sexual exploitation.