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Palestinianism

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Palestinianism is a term occasionally used to denote either the national political movement or Identity of the Palestinian people.[1][2] It gained currency by its use in the works of Edward Said to describe a certain vein of theology opposed to Christian Zionism and that challenges Zionism and the right of Israel to exist.

History of the term

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During the British Mandate over Palestine, the word was used as a loose expression to either describe the integration of the Zionist Aliyah into Mandatory Palestine,[3][4] or as an alternative to Non-Zionism.[5][6][page needed]

The word was employed as a term in its modern meaning as early as 1970 by Edward Said in his work "A Palestinian voice".[7] It was also used by Alfred Sherman, the London correspondent for Haaretz at the time also in 1970, while expressing his surprise that the Palestinians' bid for independent statehood had garnered widespread support in the West.[8]

Multiple observers in the early 1970s were under the impression that Palestinian national identity was a product of the late 1960s.[9][10][11] Sherman was supportive of the view that it emerged after the disillusionment with the outcome of the Six-Day War, in the aftermath of which Palestinian Arabs realized that they had to rely on their own resources, rather than on the broader Arab world, to secure their aspirations.[12] However others pointed to its prior existence in the early 20th century in Mandatory Palestine,[13] as well as the period between 1948 and 1967.[14][15]

According to Sherman, Israeli Jews were uncomfortable with Palestinian nationalism, since the aspiration of Palestinians for statehood ("Palestinianism") mirrored exactly what Jews had sought by Zionism. To challenge Palestinians on this ground would mean Israelis would find themselves querying a right they themselves had asserted and therefore implicitly question the legitimacy of the Israeli state itself.[a]

In 1973, John B. Wolf made a similar diagnosis to that advanced by Sherman: the 1967 war had compelled Palestinians to recognize the truth of their isolation from allies, and their "Palestinianism" thereby developed two goals: to reintegrate themselves with the land they lost, and strive to change a politics that had excluded and "negated their presence", denying Palestinians a say in their own future.[b]

Edward Said's usage of the term

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The word assumed some importance in the 1980s when the Palestinian academic Edward Said, author of the influential book Orientalism which analysed bias in foreign representations of the Arab world, adopted it. For Said, Israel and its supporters had striven to deny Palestinians, with their long and fragmented history of dispossession, war, exile and ethnic cleansing, "permission to narrate"[16] what they had undergone as a result of the establishment of the state of Israel. Said defined the term as "a political movement that is being built out of a reassertion of Palestine's multiracial and multireligious history."[c] According to Adam Shatz, US editor for the London Review of Books, Said endeavoured to elaborate a "counter-myth" to that which underwrote Zionism, one written in counterpoint to the "dark historical fatalism and exclusionary fear of the other" characteristic of the Zionist narrative. "Palestinianism" for Said referred to a kind of open-ended dissident narrative testifying to the contradictions of exile and military occupation, one that was non-doctrinal, unobsessed with racial ontology, as a premise for the creation of a future for both Palestinians and Jews.[17]

As construed by Ilan Pappé, Said's "Palestinianism" was a compromise between the narrow call of nationalist impulses and the universal values he subscribed to, consisting in striving to overcome both Zionism and Arab tyrannies by the three principles of acknowledgement, accountability and acceptance: namely, global recognition of the Nakba which was more important than achieving Palestinian statehood; in obeisance to universal principles, Israel should accept its accountability for ethnic cleansing, as a prelude to a future return of refugees; and, thirdly, an acceptance of the historic reality of Jewish suffering, a precondition for integrating Israelis into the larger Arab world within which their state was founded.[18]

Haim Gerber, professor of Islamic history at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, argued in 2004 that, as one could see from the research of Rashid Khalidi on the press in Arabic before WW1, a national Palestinian sentiment, or "Palestinianism", was attested before the onset of fully-fledged Zionist emigration under the British Mandate.[d]

Two years later, Jason Franks employed it to denote the ensemble of values, beliefs, traditions and history underwriting Palestinian nationhood.[e] In his analysis, it stood in diametrical opposition to Zionism, and both it and Zionism were twin ideological codes competing in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, both accounting for the terroristic, nationalist and religious elements driving the conflict.[f]The roots of Palestinianism lay, he further argued, in the Young Turks' revolt in 1908, which was crucial to the emergence of a Palestinian nationalist sentiment in that period because the revolution in Turkey freed up the press from Ottoman censorship, and enabled local assertions of a distinct identity to emerge. It developed thereafter "not only (as) a reaction against Zionism and British imperialism but also against the wider Arab world."[19]

In her 2016 monograph on Palestinian film history, Chrisoula Lionis challenged the recency theory of Palestinian identity. In tracing the development of national awareness, she detects a transition via three core episodes from "Palestinianess", stirred by both the Balfour Declaration of 1917, and the 1948 nakba, which crystallised this national consciousness of Palestinianess, to "Palestinianism" proper, which she sees as the outcome of the Battle of Karameh in 1968.[20]

Palestinianism as a threat to Western civilization

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A year after Gerber's article, in 2005, and writing in the context of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, Bat Ye'or, in her book Eurabia: The Euro-Arab which peddled a conspiracy theory,[21] dedicated a whole chapter to the word, entitled "Palestinianism: The New Eurabian Cult", where she claimed that Palestinianism, which she glossed as "Palestinolatry", was both a new vehicle for traditional European anti-Semitism,[22] and "a return of the Euro-Arab Nazism of the 1930-1940s."[23] In her view, it emerged with the works of the Anglican bishop and theologian Kenneth Cragg[24] and the Palestinian Anglican priest Naim Ateek, director of the Jerusalem-based Sabeel Ecumenical Liberation Theology Center.[25][26] Neither of these writers, however, had ever used the term at the time of her writing, but Bat Ye'or deployed it to characterize what she saw as ecclesiastical attempts to play on European consciences by depicting Palestinian suffering under Israeli occupation.[27][g] The impact of this "Palestinianism" can be discerned, she claimed further, in the positions of major politicians in Europe, ranging from Jacques Chirac, Javier Solana, Romano Prodi to Dominique de Villepin and Mary Robinson, who came to consider the Palestinian problem a central issue for world peace.[28] For her, Christian evocations of the plight of Palestinians betrayed an underlying tradition of Christian demonization of Jews,[27] and had assumed the status of a "modern Eurabian cult".[29] More specifically, in theological terms, she interpreted this "Christian Palestinianism" as heretical, because she claimed that it was a variety of Marcionism.[30][h]

The term was subsequently picked up as a negative description for the Palestinian cause, by British journalist Melanie Phillips in her Londonistan: How Britain Is Creating a Terror State Within, where she claimed that the Muslim Association of Britain, in her view an arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, had become the "spearhead" of "radical Palestinianism." in Great Britain.[31]

In 2007, the idea that Palestinian national rights were a threat to Western civilization, and in particular to its religious values, was argued for in a book by evangelical theologian Paul Wilkinson, assistant Minister at Hazel Grove Full Gospel Church in Stockport, Cheshire and a member of Tim LaHaye's Pre-Tribulation Rapture Research Center.[32] A British Christian Zionist, in that year he devoted a chapter in his book For Zion's Sake, to what he called "Christian Palestinianism", as the antithesis of Christian Zionism.[33][34] He pursued his assertions in more detail in 2017, in the second volume, entitled Israel Betrayed – Volume 2: The rise of Christian Palestinianism, of his study of replacement theology.[35]

Wilkinson's critique of Christian Palestinianism holds that Christians must acknowledge that God's "sovereign hand" established Israel in 1948.[36] Only pro-Zionists are true Christians, since the ingathering of Jews to Palestine is a precondition for the parousia, or return of Christ the King.[37] Unconditional support of the Jewish state of Israel is premised on a Christian anticipation of the Messianic end time. Wilkinson says that there is no such thing as a Palestinian people, their nation, language, culture and religion are hoaxes perpetrated by anti-Christian liberals.[38] The very idea itself is merely "another tactical manoeuvre in the Islamic war waged against Israel to effect her destruction." Other Christians, in particular Palestinian Christians who criticize Israel, speaking of the "perceived" suffering of Palestinians,[39] foment Jew-hatred in favouring pro-Palestinian propaganda. Non-Zionists are anti-Semitic Nazi sympathizers.[40] The book was excoriated by theologian Darren M. Slade. professor of humanities at the Rocky Mountain College of Art and Design.[i]

Modern usage

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In 2010 Palestinianism was described by Israeli journalist Moshe Dann as an "ideology", that viewed Israel as a settler-colonial state, and one which had two immediate goals: Palestinian statehood in the Palestinian territories defined by the 1949 armistice lines, and the implementation of the right of return of Palestinian refugees. According to Dann, who repeated his claims in 2021, the long-term goal of the "elimination of Israel" was explicitly called for in both the Palestinian National Covenant, (nullified in 1996 after the Oslo Accords), and the Hamas Covenant (a provision officially cancelled in 2017, but still endorsed by Hamas).[41] This "ideology" had been, he asserted, legitimized by Israel itself by the 1993 Oslo Accords. Dann claimed that Palestinian identity is a fiction contrived to oppose Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, and that Israel was entitled to the Palestinian West Bank because it was full of Jewish archaeological sites, with no evidence for any Palestinian historical heritage, there or anywhere else in Palestine.[42]

According to Tower Magazine journalist, and former advisor to The Israel Project Ben Cohen,[43] Palestinianism is the core ideology informing recent antisemitism, one that assumes the guise of a social movement which, bundling together neo-fascists, liberals, extreme leftists, and Islamicists, is militantly opposed to the age of Jewish self-empowerment after 1945.[j]

In 2018, a pro-Zionist English blogger David Collier, whose mission was described as one "show(ing) everybody how toxic our enemies are", claimed that Palestinianism was a threat to freedom of speech and the cause of human rights, an infective agent of anti-Semitism:

"Palestinianism" is a disease that is anathema to freedom, to debate, to openness and to human rights. ... It will infect those who catch the disease with anti-Semitism just as it provides them with a denial mechanism to protest their innocence.[k]

Criticism of hostility to Palestinianism

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In 2021, analyzing American bipartisan congressional attacks on Democratic Party colleagues ("the Squad") such as Rashida Tlaib, Ilhan Omar, Ayanna Pressley and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez for their having criticized Israel's human rights record, the Zionist critic Peter Beinart, writing in Jewish Currents, rose to the defense of the latter. He argues that the allegations of the former, that such criticism was anti-Semitic, was itself evidence of bigotry – "treating people as inferior because of their group identity" – and takes the form of anti-Palestinianism, which is, he claims, commonplace throughout American society.[l]

The bigotry of anti-Palestinianism, for Beinart, is "ubiquitous" notwithstanding the fact that, unlike "anti-Israeli" or "anti-Jewish", the word "anti-Palestinian" hardly exists. Any Google search, he found,[m] will unfold an endless number of links associating such politicians with antisemitism, whereas Google yields no evidence that the congressmen he cites – Michael Waltz, Jim Banks, Claudia Tenney, Ted Deutch, Josh Gottheimer, Kathy Manning, Elaine Luria, and Dean Phillips – who repeat these accusations in the House of Representatives, are hostile to Palestinians, despite his claim that there is strong evidence for their bias in this regard.[n] Beinart considers that the group of Democrats accusing Israel of apartheid practices or Jewish supremacist territorial ambitions (B'Tselem) are simply reflecting an opposition to violations of international law: a view shared by NGOs like Human Rights Watch. Beinart makes an historical analogy between anti-Semitism and anti-Palestinianism.[44] There was no term to denote treating Jews as inferior before pressure for treating Jews equally gained some political traction in the 19th century. Once they had achieved legal recognition, the term anti-Semitism came into vogue to denote those hostile to parity of rights for Jewish citizens. A similar logic applies to the term (anti-)Palestinianism. Throughout the 20th century, American and Israeli discourse hardly tolerated a word like Palestinian. It is still unmentionable that Palestinians also deserve equality, and relentless allegations that those who advocate for Palestinian equality are ipso facto anti-Semitic constitute, for Beinart, a form of bigotry. The effectiveness of the IHRA definition of anti-Semitism strikingly illustrates the way, thus construed, anti-Palestinian oppressive practices are silenced.[45]

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ "The Israelis' slowness to react to the idea of a Palestinian Arab nation also reflected their ideological history and present problems. Having devoted much of their political apprenticeship to demonstrating that the Jews were indeed a nation, and that each nation deserved its own national home, they were ill at ease when faced with the prospect of questioning either another group's claim to nationhood or the self-evident corollary that this ipso facto entitled them to statehood.." (Sherman 1971, p. 112)
  2. ^ "The failure of contemporary international relations to gauge the efficacy of Palestinian nationalism is understandable; even the Palestinians did not become aware of their latent ability to help themselves until after the Six-Day War. That war demonstrated to them that Arab military forces were no match for the Israeli defense organizations, and that only they themselves were sufficiently motivated to continue the prosecution of an armed and protracted struggle to regain their homeland. Their recognition of this truth is the source of 'Palestinianism,' a national political movement with two objectives. The first objective is to achieve the full integration of the Arab Palestinian with his lost lands, and its second objective is to alter the political situation which has excluded him or negated his presence in the formulation of plans concerning his future." (Wolf 1973, p. 6)
  3. ^ "if one believes that the crux of the Near East today is the conflict between Israel and a dispersed, or occupied, population of Palestinian Arabs, then a clearer view of that problem becomes possible. For the major distraction to any scrutiny of the region has been everyone's unwillingness to allow for a Palestinian presence. This has been no less true of the Palestinians themselves than it has of the other Arabs, or of Israel. My thesis is that since 1967 the confusions have somewhat diminished because the Palestinians have had to recognize this truth, and have gradually begun to act upon it. This recognition is the source of what I call Palestinianism: a political movement that is being built out of a reassertion of Palestine's multiracial and multireligious history. The aim of Palestinianism is the full integration of the Arab Palestinian with lands and, more importantly with political processes that for twenty-one years have either systematically excluded him or made him a more and more intractable prisoner." (Said 2007, p. 16)
  4. ^ "local Palestinian identity clearly existed in the country before the British and before Zionism. The importance of the Palestinian embrace of pan-Syrianism between 1918 and 1920 should not be overstated: it is clear that it was seen as a first step toward Arab nationalism, and that. Faysal, installed as king of Syria, seemed like a force capable of overpowering Zionism. As Porath maintains, it was a union of convenience, not a deep-seated union of hearts, and the Palestinians hastened to forget Syria with Faysal's ouster in July 1920. Clearly, Palestinianism was stronger among Palestinians in 1920 than Syrianism." (Gerber 2003, p. 28)
  5. ^ "Palestinianism or Palestinian Nationalism is the other principle discourse in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and like Zionism can also be seen as an identity discourse. ... Acceptance of the discourse of Palestinianism is an acceptance of the assumptions upon which it is based. These include territory, identity, history, culture, and religion. Palestinianism is not only a reaction against Zionism and British imperialism but also against the wider Arab world; it is an expression of a collective and individual entity. Schultz points out that there is no single understanding of the phenomenon and suggests that Palestinian Nationalism can be understood by employing a number of different discourses, from ethnographic, through religious to nationalist." (Franks 2006, p. 129)
  6. ^ "The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has two principal ideological motivations for terrorism, nationalism and religion, in the guise of Palestinianism and Zionism, and Islam and Judaism." (Franks 2006, p. 181)
  7. ^ "Several times a day, television, radio and newspapers focus the European mind on an obsessive and ritual veneration of Palestinianism. Everything derives from it; everything goes back to it. A grieving Arab Palestine constantly calls on the distressed compassion of Europeans, provoking frustrated hatred against Israel, which is mentioned only in negative terms: occupation, injustice, apartheid, Nazism. Israel's population, which had liberated from dhimmitude a tiny corner from the vast Christian, Buddhist, and Hindu regions colonized by Arabs, appears to have been expelled to another galaxy." (Ye'or 2005, p. 180)
  8. ^ "The Christian policy that would eliminate the Jewish source of Christianity by suppressing the link between the Hebrtew Bible and the Gospels represents an old and lingering trend, always opposed by the Church. It was first formulated by Marcion, a second-century Byzantine priest of pagan background who was strongly influenced by Gnosticism. Today, Palestinian Marecionism (Palestinianism) paves the way for the Islamization of the Church as it prepares mentalities for an Islamic replacement theology." (Ye'or 2005, p. 213)
  9. ^ "Bluntly stated, Wilkinson is no scholar. His writing does not demonstrate the meticulousness necessary for a balanced, equitable, and disinterested presentation of the type of specialized research expected of genuine scholarship. It is clear that Wilkinson wrote his book for popular audiences who already share his Zionist biases, betraying his lack of professional ethics by consistently disrespecting other viewpoints....The book clearly has an ideological agenda because of its uncontrolled need to slander and attack non-Zionists. The book's conclusions are without warrant, the opinions and judgments without evidence, the opposition without a fair presentation, and the author without a clear sense of scholarship. The book is terribly unbalanced because it gives preferential treatment to Zionism and refuses to acknowledge the injustices and atrocities committed against the Palestinian people under the guise of Jewish statehood." (Slade 2016, pp. 21–22)
  10. ^ "From this vantage point, the Palestinians become iconic, transcendental victims, rather like the Jews were for a brief period after the Second World War. Those who kneel before the altar of Palestinian suffering with almost spiritual fervor can be relied on to traffic in the kinds of themes that have now gained a foothold in mainstream discourse: that Israel, the Jewish state., is a carbon copy of South Africa's old aparetheid regime, that it consciously mimics the practices of the Nazis, that it is – as formulated in the perverse Twitter hashtag #JHSIL-a Jewish reflection of the Islamic State terrorist gang than has raped, murdered, enslaved and decapitated thousands of innocents in Syria and Iraq." (Cohen 2016, pp. 9–10, 10)
  11. ^ "'Palestinianism' is a disease that is anathema to freedom, to debate, to openness and to human rights," Collier blogged. "It will infect those who catch the disease with anti-Semitism just as it provides them with a denial mechanism to protest their innocence." This highlights an issue that many of the charges of anti-Semitism against Palestine solidarity activists are coming from partisan political opponents rather than objective racism monitors. Collier is a longstanding Israel advocate and critic of Palestinian activism who has described his mission as "showing everybody how toxic our enemies are" (Monks 2018).
  12. ^ "ANTI-PALESTINIANISM is not only commonplace in Congress. It's commonplace across American society. It's not just that prominent media, business, and religious figures argue openly that Palestinians under Israeli control be denied elemental human rights. Americans who advocate for those rights are often penalized for doing so. On college campuses, administrators frequently cancel lectures, classes, professorships, and even entire student organizations, because they espouse pro-Palestinian views. Pro-Israel politicians and organizations pressure museums, theaters, and concert halls to deny venues to pro-Palestinian performers. In 2017, the state of Arizona refused to renew its contract with a lawyer who works with incarcerated people because he wouldn't pledge not to boycott Israel. In 2018, Texas did the same when a speech pathologist who works with developmentally disabled children would not sign a non-boycott pledge." (Beinart 2021)
  13. ^ "In public discourse, examples of anti-Semitism are numerous, but a search for illustrations of prejudice towards Palestine and Palestinians yields almost nothing. To fill this vacuum, and to hinder the rush to endorse the poorly conceived International Holocaust Remembrance Association (IHRA) definition of anti-Semitism, a statement of anti-Palestinianism is desperately needed." (Rees 2021)
  14. ^ "the evidence that the Squad's critics are anti-Palestinian is far stronger than the evidence that the Squad is anti-Jewish." (Beinart 2021)

Citations

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  1. ^ Wolf 1973, p. 6.
  2. ^ Yehoshafat 1974, p. 24.
  3. ^ Jeffries 1923, pp. 12–13.
  4. ^ The Economist 1941, p. 791.
  5. ^ Steinberg 1945, p. 239.
  6. ^ Tulchinsky 1987, pp. 174–193.
  7. ^ Iskandar & Rustom 2010, p. 32.
  8. ^ Sherman 1971, pp. 104, 105–106.
  9. ^ Congressional Record 1971, p. 23856.
  10. ^ Congressional Record 1973, p. 17603.
  11. ^ Stone 1972, p. 200.
  12. ^ Sherman 1971, p. 106.
  13. ^ Congressional Record 1974, p. 41275.
  14. ^ Gerson 1978, pp. 79, 80.
  15. ^ Jansen 1971, p. 284.
  16. ^ Said 1984.
  17. ^ Shatz 2021.
  18. ^ Pappé 2010, pp. 463–464.
  19. ^ Franks 2006, pp. 129–130.
  20. ^ Lionis 2016, pp. 21–47.
  21. ^ Bangstad 2019, pp. 170–184.
  22. ^ Ye'or 2005, pp. 177, 184.
  23. ^ Ye'or 2005, p. 181.
  24. ^ Cragg 1991.
  25. ^ Haugen 2017, pp. 42–43.
  26. ^ Ye'or 2005, pp. 176–188, 177ff..
  27. ^ a b Haugen 2017, p. 43.
  28. ^ Ye'or 2005, p. 185.
  29. ^ Ye'or 2005, p. 177.
  30. ^ Ice 2017, pp. 37–38.
  31. ^ Phillips 2008, p. 120.
  32. ^ Haugen 2017, p. 52, n.9.
  33. ^ Ice 2017, p. 37.
  34. ^ Wilkinson 2007.
  35. ^ Wilkinson 2018.
  36. ^ Haugen 2017, p. 46.
  37. ^ Slade 2016, pp. 1–8.
  38. ^ Slade 2016, pp. 2, 10.
  39. ^ Slade 2016, p. 13.
  40. ^ Slade 2016, p. 8.
  41. ^ Dann 2021.
  42. ^ Dann 2010.
  43. ^ Cohen 2016, p. 303.
  44. ^ Moussa 2021.
  45. ^ Beinart 2021.

Works cited

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