2024 Georgian parliamentary election
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All 150 seats in Parliament 76 seats needed for a majority | |||||
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Parliamentary elections are scheduled to be held in Georgia on 26 October 2024.[1][2]
Background
[edit]Political context
[edit]By the time of the elections, Georgian Dream had been the ruling party in Georgia since defeating Mikheil Saakashvili's United National Movement (UNM) in the 2012 parliamentary election. Announcing its plans to pursue a policy of joining the European Union and NATO, Georgian Dream has also professed a more conciliatory approach towards Russia compared to its anti-Russian opponents.[3]
However, the geopolitical strains of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict made it more difficult to maintain a balancing act, amid statements from Ukrainian politicians that Georgia would have "greatly aided" Ukraine by opening a "second front" against Russia[4] and Western efforts to isolate Russia with international sanctions.[citation needed]
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/11/Ukraine_solidarity_protests_in_Tbilisi%2C_Georgia_26.02.2022_16.jpg/220px-Ukraine_solidarity_protests_in_Tbilisi%2C_Georgia_26.02.2022_16.jpg)
The Georgian government condemned Russian actions and provided humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, but did not join the sanctions against Russia, which allowed an influx of Russian capital and highly skilled Russians dodging military mobilization. Russia, in turn, did not approve the proposal of Georgia's breakaway de facto South Ossetian republic to hold a referendum on joining the Russian Federation[5] and, despite otherwise hostile relations, has not put Georgia on its unfriendly countries list.[6]
On February 25, 2022, large protests took place in front of the Georgian parliament in Tbilisi, lasting for six consecutive days to show solidarity with Ukraine. The demonstration took on an anti-government tone, reflecting growing frustration with the Georgian authorities' perceived inadequate response to Russian invasion.[7][8][9]
Elene Khoshtaria, leader of the Droa party, addressed the crowd, demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili and his administration. She called for immediate and effective actions to support Ukraine and urged Georgia to apply for EU membership.[10]
The rally also underscored dissatisfaction with the government's handling of the crisis. Protesters were angered by obstacles created for volunteers and the government's refusal to join Western sanctions against Russia.[11] On February 28, Georgian authorities had blocked a Ukrainian plane carrying 30 Georgian volunteers from landing in Tbilisi.[12] The Georgian Dream leader Mamuka Mdinaradze said that Georgia could not allow to send volunteers to Ukraine because Georgia was in vulnerable position and it would risk a war with Russia. In response, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy's decided to recall Ukraine’s ambassador to Georgia.[13] Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili had also announced that Georgia would not join Western sanctions against Russia because it would harm the Georgian economy more than it would hurt Russia, fueling the rising anti-government sentiment in the protests.[14]
Following this, in June 2022, the European Union refused to approve Georgia's application to join the union, citing an alleged media censorship and the government's refusal to join the international sanctions against Russia.[15] This led to mobilization by the opposition against the government.[16] In turn, a sovereignist faction People’s Power broke away from Georgian Dream in August 2022, and proposed legislation to regulate foreign influence by creating a special registry to monitor politically active foreign-funded organizations, many of which are Western-funded.[17][18] While the government claimed that the bill was necessary for public disclosure and transparency, the opposition, aided by the statements of Western embassies and politicians, managed to mobilize protests to tackle the bill, likening it to Russian foreign agent law and saying that it would have jeopardized Euro-Atlantic integration, ultimately leading to the parliament withdrawing the bill.[19]
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/e5/Tbilisi_-_Yes_to_Europe%2C_No_to_Russian_Law_28_April_2024_%282%29.jpg/300px-Tbilisi_-_Yes_to_Europe%2C_No_to_Russian_Law_28_April_2024_%282%29.jpg)
On 8 March 2023, tens of thousands of people gathered in front of the Parliament, demanding a halt to further discussions on the law. Opposition leader Giorgi Vashadze issued an ultimatum, calling for the rejection of the bills and the release of those detained during the protests.
Amid protests in Tbilisi, Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement, cautioning against the violent change of power in Georgia,[20] with some Russian politicians suggesting Russia might use military means in case of "instability on the Russian border". In September 2023, the State Security Service of Georgia claimed to have uncovered plans of the opposition and the Western-funded groups to stage a coup in Georgia with the support of Ukraine-based Georgian oppositionist politicians.[21][22] This in turn led to the pro-Russian Georgian opposition Conservative Movement party and the TV channel Alt-Info starting to mobilize an "Anti-Maidan movement" to counter the alleged coup.[23]
However, in December 2023, the European Union decided to grant Georgia candidate status following the release from prison of oppositionist journalist Nika Gvaramia, who had been arrested on charges of abuse of power and embezzlement, and the parliament's decision to turn down impeachment proceedings against the pro-opposition president Salome Zourabichvili.[24][25][26] In late December 2023, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili summarized the year by saying that the government had managed to "preserve the peace" amid the threat of destabilization caused by "radical groups and hostile forces operating within the country",[27] and also to secure EU candidate status for Georgia.[28]
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/3d/Georgian_Dream_pro-%22foreign_agent_law%22_rally%2C_Tbilisi%2C_29_April_2024_%284%29.jpg/220px-Georgian_Dream_pro-%22foreign_agent_law%22_rally%2C_Tbilisi%2C_29_April_2024_%284%29.jpg)
In early 2024, Georgia again experienced significant political crisis and public unrest due to the reintroduction of the "foreign agent" law, which many citizens perceived as a threat to civil liberties and democratic principles. The leader of parliamentary majority Mamuka Mdinaradze said that the reason for reintroduction of the bill was the continued circulation of slush funds in the country through non-governmental organizations and covert foreign financing of political activities.[29] On 8 April, the Bureau of Parliament of Georgia registered the bill for the parliamentary discussions.[30] Critics said that the law, requiring organizations and individuals receiving foreign funding to register as "organizations carrying the interests of a foreign power," was a measure to stifle dissent and limit the activities of NGOs and independent media. Protests erupted across the country, with demonstrators calling for the repeal of the law and the "protection of democratic freedoms". The government's response to the protests varied, with some efforts to engage in dialogue, while many instances of police violence were reported.[31][32][33]
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/d/dc/2024_Georgian_Protests%2C_May_2_a.jpg/220px-2024_Georgian_Protests%2C_May_2_a.jpg)
The widespread opposition to the law underscored deep-seated concerns about the future of democracy and human rights in Georgia. Protesters and other critics, including the European Union and other Western countries, spoke out against the bill, arguing that it would stifle democracy and freedom of the press in Georgia and comparing it to the Russian foreign agent law.[34] Proponents of the bill denied this characterization, claiming it would ensure transparency of foreign funding and protect Georgia's sovereignty from malign foreign influence. People's Power has argued that the law would protect democracy and sovereignty of Georgia from foreign interference through financing of NGOs with a goal of promotion of foreign agenda.[35][36]
In August 2024, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze said that he expected the elections to be held against the backdrop of "unprecedented" and "disruptive" foreign interference.[37] His expectation was also shared by the Speaker of Parliament Shalva Papuashvili, who cited the Danish Government-sponsored "Festival of Democracy" event, organised by the non-profit organisation "Eastern European Centre for Multiparty Democracy" in Telavi, presenting banners demanding release of Mikheil Saakashvili from prison. He said that the foreign funding was funneled into Georgian politics for the purpose of election campaigning in favor of the radical opposition parties against the ruling party.[38]
Georgian Charter
[edit]On 26 May 2024, In response to the 2023–2024 Georgian protests, President Salome Zourabichvili introduced the Georgian Charter, an action plan aimed at "fostering unity among opposition parties ahead of the parliamentary elections". The Charter, announced during Georgia's Independence Day celebrations, seeks to create a platform for the opposition to present a unified stance. Zourabichvili's proposal emphasizes a new electoral format where voters will choose between the ruling party and a coalition of opposition parties. The plan includes forming a temporary government post-elections to implement key reforms intended to "enhance democratic processes and align Georgia more closely with European standards", after which new elections will be held. The Charter's main goals include repealing laws that the opposition considers as hindrances to European integration and undertaking significant judicial and electoral reforms to ensure "a fair and democratic process".[39][40][41]
The president emphasized that the October parliamentary elections should focus on the question of "what direction the country should take rather than which individuals or parties should be elected". She stated that the 2024 elections will effectively act as a referendum on whether Georgia seeks closer integration with Europe.[42]
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/93/Georgian_Charter_Signatures.jpg/220px-Georgian_Charter_Signatures.jpg)
So far 17 political parties from the opposition, including: UNM, Strategy Aghmashenebeli, Ahali, Lelo, European Georgia, Girchi – More Freedom, Droa, Citizens, For the People, the Republican Party, the Greens Party of Georgia, For Justice, European Democrats, Law and Justice, Tavisupleba, State for the People and the National Democratic Party, as well as 5 individual MPs have signed the Georgian Charter presented by the president.[43][44][45]
Some opposition parties refused to sign the agreement. Girchi has praised the president Salome Zourabichvili's initiative 'Georgian Charter' for attempting to bring opposition together, nevertheless, they criticized her for not taking their opinions into consideration and refused to sign it.[46][47] For Georgia party also did not join the agreement, saying that they supported the reforms outlined the charter, however, they said that talking about forming a temporary government post-elections was damaging to the pre-election process.[48]
MEGOBARI Act
[edit]On July 11, 2024, the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations passed the MEGOBARI Act (Mobilizing and Enhancing Georgia's Options for Building Accountability, Resilience, and Independence Act)[49] with a vote of 41 to 6. Initiated by Republican Congressman Joe Wilson, the Act—named after the Georgian word for "friend" (Georgian: მეგობარი, romanized: megobari)—addresses "democratic and human rights issues in Georgia" and outlines specific measures for support and oversight. The MEGOBARI Act emphasizes "the U.S. commitment to upholding democratic values, human rights, and the rule of law" in Georgia. It acknowledges the progress made by Georgian civil society and stresses the need to "strengthen democracy for regional stability and U.S. interests".[50]
The Act responds to recent "democratic backsliding" by calling for increased scrutiny of the Georgian government's actions, particularly "its ties to Russia and other authoritarian regimes".[51] To ensure accountability, the Act mandates several reports on issues such as "corrupt practices that support Russian interests and evade sanctions, Russian intelligence activities, and potential Chinese cooperation". It also includes sanctions and travel bans on "individuals undermining Georgian democracy". A Democracy Monitoring Task Force will be established to "oversee democratic practices", especially during elections, to "ensure fairness".[52] Should "significant democratic progress be confirmed", the MEGOBARI Act provides for additional U.S. assistance, including a more preferential trade agreement with Georgia, enhanced people-to-people exchanges and visa simplification, an economic modernization package, and security and defense support against Russian aggression.[53]
The Act received strong bipartisan support, with committee members highlighting its importance for "supporting Georgia's democratic aspirations and countering Russian influence".[54][55][56] Secretary of State Antony Blinken also announced visa restrictions for those "undermining Georgian democracy", further demonstrating U.S. commitment.[57][58]
Georgian opposition representatives have expressed their gratitude to Congressman Wilson for his support, praising the Act’s focus on Georgia’s sovereignty, democracy, and Euro-Atlantic integration. They urged Congress and the Senate to pass the legislation quickly and requested additional resources and congressional visits to monitor the October parliamentary elections, given the critical nature of this support.[59][60] Conversely, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze criticized the MEGOBARI Act, labeling it as blackmail. He argued that the Act could harm Georgia-U.S. relations and criticized the approach of using sanctions and threats. Instead, he called for more constructive and pragmatic discussions to improve bilateral relations.[61][62] The ruling Georgian Dream party issued a statement, saying that the MEGOBARI Act constituted a "blackmail, intimidation" against the independent Georgian policy and "especially cynical" in the light on Georgian celebration of Independence Day two days before. The party condemned the threat of sanctions against legislators for "voting in favor of a law" and added that this was against the spirit of cooperation between sovereign nations. The party rejected the possibility of following the MEGOBARI Act, saying that "we do not intend to trade on our country’s sovereignty and security, and no blackmail whatsoever can force us to go against our country".[63]
Parties and coalitions
[edit]The ruling Georgian Dream party will seek a fourth term in office.[64]
In January 2023, Levan Khabeishvili unseated Nika Melia from the position of United National Movement chairman after winning internal party elections. Accusing Khabeishvili of being a protégé of shadowy businessman Davit Kezerashvili, Melia announced a break with the UNM and plans for his own party in December 2023.[65] On 8 June 2024, Tinatin Bokuchava became chair of the United National Movement, succeeding Khabeishvili, who resigned due to health complications.[66]
On 20 July 2023, the United National Movement, the largest opposition party, announced an alliance with Strategy Aghmashenebeli of Giorgi Vashadze.[67] According to Khabeishvili, the coalition, named Victory Platform, will center around former president Mikheil Saakashvili. Imprisoned on charges of abuse of power and violence, Saakashvili will lead his party in the election from prison.[68]
On 30 December 2023, Bidzina Ivanishvili, an influential businessman and a founder of Georgian Dream, announced his return to politics as honorary chairman of Georgian Dream, suggesting he would play an active role in the election campaign.[69]
On 8 February 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze was confirmed by the parliament as the new Prime Minister of Georgia from the ruling Georgian Dream party.[70]
In March 2024, the People's Power movement was registered as a political party, and is expected to participate in the election.[71]
On 11 April, the Public Registry revoked the registration of the extreme right Conservative Movement party, banning it from participating in the election. In June 2024, it was announced that the party would merge with the Alliance of Patriots of Georgia and run together in the election.[72][73]
On 8 July, the Chair of the United National Movement, Tina Bokuchava, announced a new political platform named "Unity – to Save Georgia". This platform aims to bring together the United National Movement, Strategy Agmashenebeli — two parties that have been in coalition for a year already — as well as representatives from other parties, civil society, and academia. The new platform will use the UNM ballot number 5 in the upcoming elections.[74]
On 9 July, three opposition parties, Ahali, Girchi - More Freedom, and Droa, announced their decision to post a joint election list for the Parliamentary elections in October. The leaders mentioned that an expected alliance with another party, Lelo, did not materialize due to "minor differences".[75] Subsequently, this alliance was renamed to "Coalition for Change".[76] On August 18, the Republican Party and the youth organization of Georgian Azerbaijanis "Activists for the Future" joined the coalition.[77][78][79]
On July 16, Mamuka Mdinaradze, Executive Secretary of Georgian Dream, announced during his speech at the opening of the election campaign and the new central office of Georgian Dream that People's Power will participate in the parliamentary elections with a common list alongside the ruling Georgian Dream party.[80][81]
On July 17, Lelo for Georgia, For the People, and the political movement Freedom Square announced their unification under a single electoral list for the upcoming elections.[82] Subsequently, this alliance was renamed to "Strong Georgia". Later in August, the Citizens party also joined the alliance.[83]
On August 1, a majority of the European Georgia electoral list, chosen during the party’s internal primary election, left the party, including key figures Giga Bokeria and Tamar Chergoleishvili. The split arose from disagreements with other key figures, Gigi Tsereteli and Akaki Bobokhidze over the primary results.[84][85] Later, on August 15, the members who left European Georgia formally established a new party called the "Federalists".[86][87] 2 days later European Georgia, in an announcement with the Unity coalition, announced that it would be running on a joint list with the UNM and Strategy Aghmashenebeli.[88]
On August 12, the Leader of the Anti-Occupation movement "Strength is in Unity",[89][90] Davit Katsarava, who during the spring protests was violently beaten by law enforcement,[91][92] announced the founding of a new political party called “Chven” (Meaning "Us" in Georgian), as an alternative to the existing political forces in the country, but did not disclose specific details regarding the party's upcoming plans.[93]
Campaign
[edit]Georgian Dream
[edit]On 21 August 2024, the ruling Georgian Dream party officially announced starting a pre-election campaign.[94] The first campaign event was launched in the Georgian town of Mtskheta on 22 August.[95] A second campaign event was held in Ambrolauri in Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti region.[96] The Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, who leads the electoral office of the ruling party, announced the delegates who would run the party's election campaign. Kobakhidze added that all delegates would be present in the ruling party's electoral list and represent their cities and regions in the Georgian Parliament.[97] Soon after, the Chair of the Government of Autonomous Republic of Adjara, Tornike Rizhvadze presented the ruling party's delegates to run the campaign for the elections of the Supreme Council of Adjara, which is held along with the elections for Georgian Parliament.[98]
On 20 August, the Political Council of Georgian Dream issued a statement, saying that the election would be a referendum on "on war vs. peace, traditional values vs. moral degradation, subservience to external powers vs. an independent and sovereign state". The party urged its supporters to "put everything aside and come out to vote", emphasizing the need for the ruling party to secure a constitutional majority in the election to implement its long-term goals. The party presented the objectives for which it would use the constitutional majority. The Georgian Dream pledged to have the former ruling United National Movement party banned upon winning office, accusing it of various crimes against the Georgian people during its rule, including pushing Georgia into the the war with Russia in 2008 and seeking to embroil Georgia into a "second front" of the Russo-Ukrainian War. According to the statement, the existance of the UNM, "which is entirely controlled from outside and is constantly engaged in hostility towards the state", makes the healthy democratic process and alteration of political forces "impossible".[99]
The ruling party also promised to fully pass the Protection of Family Values and Minors bill, which it had already initiated in the Georgian Parliament. The bill, intended to ban the "LGBT propaganda", has been justified by the ruling party by a necessity of preventing the spread of "pseudo-liberal ideology" into Georgia from outside.[99]
The third objective outlined by the ruling party revolved around reintegrating Georgia's Russian-backed separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. According to the statement, given the "dynamic development of events", Georgia might get a chance to "peacefully restore" its territorial integrity at "any time", therefore, "it will be necessary to amend the Constitution of Georgia to bring Georgia's governance system and territorial state structure in line with the new reality". According to the ruling party, the "externally-controlled anti-state" opposition parties would not be willing to support the restoration of territorial integrity, therefore, it would be necessary for the ruling party to hold constitutional majority.[99][100]
There has also been a fourth issue related to "protecting Georgia's identity and national values", however, the statement said that the issue was still under discussion within the ruling party.[99] Later Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder of the Georgian Dream, elaborated that the issue was related to "faith", with several observers speculating a plan to make the Orthodox Christianity a state religion in Georgia.[99][101]
After a several-month hiatus, Bidzina Ivanishvili delivered a speech in Mtskheta. Addressing the crowd from a specially arranged rostrum surrounded by bulletproof glass, Ivanishvili followed speeches by other Dream leaders.
Bidzina Ivanishvili's speech largely reiterated the contents of the statement published by the Georgian Dream party a day earlier.[102] His address began with a sharp critique of the United National Movement, laced with threats and inflammatory rhetoric. He framed the upcoming October 26 elections as a pivotal moment to hold the UNM accountable, likening it to a "Nuremberg trials". According to Ivanishvili, securing a constitutional majority is crucial for the Georgian Dream to effectively address and eliminate what he described as a "severe disease" that has plagued the country for two decades. He asserted that this majority would enable legal action to ban the UNM and its affiliated parties, citing legal grounds for such a move.[103]
Ivanishvili emphasized that the UNM continued unrest and wartime influence in Georgia render its conviction increasingly relevant. He vowed that the Georgian Dream would not permit the country to remain on a politically unstable path and that a constitutional majority would preclude any external influence from protecting the UNM from political consequences.
He further asserted that the October 26 elections should serve as a decisive moment for the Georgian people to render judgment on the UNM and its associations, including foreign agents engaging in anti-state activities. According to Ivanishvili, only after the UNM is replaced by patriotic political forces will Georgia be able to conduct truly healthy elections.
The speech also included homophobic rhetoric, with Ivanishvili referencing a controversial propaganda and homophobic bill initiated by the Georgian Dream. He suggested that with a constitutional majority, the party would be positioned to pass this legislation.
Additionally, Ivanishvili discussed the potential for bringing the issue of Georgia's territorial integrity back onto the agenda, which would necessitate constitutional amendments. He indicated that such changes would include revisions to the system of government and territorial arrangements, asserting that the UNM would obstruct these efforts and impede the restoration of territorial integrity.
Finally, Ivanishvili announced the prospect of another constitutional amendment aimed at protecting Georgia's identity and national values. He provided few details, citing ongoing consultations.[104][105]
According to the Prime Minister of Georgia, Irakli Kobakhidze, the prohibition of political parties is considered a democratic process when there is a legal basis for it. He argues that in a democratic state, such actions are justifiable. Kobakhidze notes that political parties have been banned in Ukraine and Moldova, and similar measures have received positive evaluations from the EU.[106]
Later, Kobakhidze clarified that Georgian Dream intends to ban nearly all opposition parties, including the Unity — National Movement (UNM, European Georgia, Strategy Aghmashenebeli), Coalition for Change (Ahali, Girchi - More Freedom, Droa, Republican Party), Strong Georgia (Lelo, For the People, Freedom Square, Citizens) alliances, and the For Georgia party founded by former Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia. He accused these groups of secretly aligning with the United National Movement and called for criminal investigations against figures like Mamuka Khazaradze of Lelo. Kobakhidze stated that if the Constitutional Court deems the "collective National Movement" unlawful, their parliamentary mandates should be revoked after the elections.[107][108]
Political experts criticize the ruling party Georgian Dream for its recent statement, labeling it as a populist and hypocritical move aimed solely at pre-election publicity. They argue that the party, after 12 years in power, is using extreme rhetoric about the opposition to divert attention from its own shortcomings, such as rising prices, inflation, and unresolved social issues. The statement's call for a constitutional majority is seen as a desperate attempt to strengthen its position, with experts noting that the party's actions are more about maintaining power than addressing the country's real challenges, and that the urgency and intensity of their rhetoric suggest a sense of panic within the party as they face growing public discontent and political competition.[109]
Electoral system
[edit]The Parliament of Georgia is composed of 150 members who are elected for a term of four years.
As stipulated by constitutional amendments that were adopted on 26 September 2017, the 2024 election will mark the move to a fully proportional system with a 5% minimal threshold for parties to enter parliament.[110][111][112]
A similar seat distribution method used in previous elections is being applied for the proportional system.[113] For the 2024 election with 150-member proportional representation, the method involves multiplying the number of votes by 150 and then dividing it by the sum of votes received by all parties that passed 5% threshold (including by the votes of party for which the number of seats is determined with this calculation) to determine the number of seats the party will get in parliament. If after these calculations for all parties the number of total seats distributed is still below 150, the remaining seats will be proportionally distributed among the parties that crossed the 5% threshold.[114]
On 6 February 2023, the Central Election Commission of Georgia adopted a decree introducing an electronic voter registration and voting system at most of the polling stations.[115]
On 20 February 2024, the Georgian Parliament passed amendments to the electoral code with 81 votes in the third reading. These amendments change how the Chairman and "professional members" of the Georgian Central Election Commission (CEC) are elected and abolish the Deputy Chairman role, traditionally reserved for an opposition representative.
Under the new law, the Speaker of Parliament, instead of the President, nominates and opens the competition for the election of the CEC Chairman and professional members. Parliament requires a 3/5 majority (90 votes) in the first round to elect candidates. If unsuccessful, a simple majority (76 votes) can be used in the next round, with two attempts allowed. If both attempts fail, the President gains the authority to appoint the CEC chairperson/member. The law also stipulates that CEC members serve a full five-year term, even if elected with a lower quorum.
The CEC is composed of 17 members: 7 nominated by the Speaker of Parliament and appointed by Parliament, and 9 nominated by opposition parties. The opposition and civil society organizations argue that these changes increase political pressure on the CEC and compromise its neutrality, violating the European Commission's conditions[116] and ignoring the Venice Commission's recommendations against these amendments.[117]
On May 30, the Parliament adopted further amendments to the electoral code, including changes to the CEC's operational rules and the abolition of the CEC advisory group, which included representatives from the Public Defender and selected national and international experts. The ruling Georgian Dream party justified these changes by claiming that the advisory group was not functional due to the lack of participation from monitoring organizations.
Another significant amendment is the change in the CEC's decision-making process. Previously, decisions required a two-thirds majority. Now, if a decision cannot be passed in a CEC meeting, it will be subject to a revote at the same meeting and will be considered passed if it receives a majority vote. The ruling party defends this as an anti-deadlock mechanism.[118]
On August 16, the CEC issued a decree requiring the chairman of each precinct election commission to draw lots to assign duties among commission members one week before the election, instead of on election day. Critics argue this change gives authorities time to influence the election process and threatens transparency. The opposition has challenged this decree in court, but the Tbilisi City Court upheld the CEC's decision.
Independent watchdogs and opposition parties remain concerned that these changes undermine the election process's fairness and transparency, particularly ahead of the critical elections in October.[119]
Concerns have been raised about the voting rights of Georgian emigrants. Despite the significant impact of Georgian emigrants on the economy through remittances, their participation in national elections remains limited. Official statistics indicate that over 125,000 people left Georgia in the past year, while estimates suggest that the number of Georgian emigrants could be as high as 1.6 million.
The current voting procedures for Georgians abroad are criticized for being cumbersome, with few polling stations often located only in major cities, making it challenging for emigrants residing in more remote areas to vote. As a result, voter turnout among emigrants has been relatively low; for instance, only 66,217 registered to vote in the 2020 parliamentary elections, with just 12,247 actually participating. Various stakeholders, including opposition parties, non-governmental organizations, and President Salome Zourabichvili, advocate for more accessible voting options, such as additional polling stations, electronic voting, or extended voting periods. However, the government, led by the ruling "Georgian Dream" party, has been slow to respond, citing bureaucratic and logistical challenges. Critics argue that the reluctance to reform the voting process may stem from a political strategy to limit the influence of emigrants, who are perceived as a potentially opposition-leaning electorate.[120][121][122]
Opinion polls
[edit]![]() | This section needs to be updated.(May 2024) |
Date | Sample size | Pollster | GD-PP | Unity | Strong Georgia | APG-CM/Alt Info | Girchi | GLP | Coalition for Change | For Georgia | Federalists | No party | Others | N/A | Lead | ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
GD | PP | UNM | SA | EG | Lelo | For the People | FS | Citizens | APG | CM/Alt Info | Girchi-MF | Droa | Ahali | RP | |||||||||||
24 July–4 August 2024 | 1,700 | GORBI | 59.3 | 13.1 | 2.2 | 5.8 | - | 3 | 2.1 | - | 5.5 | - | 4.8 | - | - | 4.2 | - | 46.2 | |||||||
11–24 July 2024 | 1,000 | Edison Research | 32.4 | 17.3 | 1.9 | 12.8 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 5.2 | 3.3 | 9.9 | - | 11.2 | - | - | 1.3 | - | 15.1 | |||||||
June–July 2024 | 2,000 | ISSA | 34.4 | 0.8 | 16.9 | 4.4 | 8 | 2.3 | - | 1.6 | 2.1 | 0.9 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 5.1 | 12.4 | - | 6.9 | - | - | 0.3 | - | 17.5 | ||
1–10 April 2024 | 1,601 | ISSA | 37.4 | 0.6 | 18.8 | 2.3 | 4.7 | 1.8 | - | 2.2 | 0.6 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 2.7 | 1.7 | 13.8 | 0.4 | 5.2 | - | - | 3.9 | - | 18.6 | ||
11–18 March 2024 | 1,711 | GORBI | 60.4 | - | 12.6 | 4.5 | 4.7 | - | - | 0.6 | 0.9 | - | 1.4 | 0.6 | 3 | 1.6[a] | - | 3.7 | - | - | 6 | - | 47.8 | ||
1–22 December 2023 | 1,500 | Edison Research | 36.6 | 2.5 | 21.5 | 0.7 | 6.7 | 3.7 | - | 1.7 | 1.7 | 3 | 2.9 | 4.7 | 5 | - | - | 8.8 | - | - | 0.5 | - | 15.1 | ||
20 October–6 November 2023 | 1,000 | Edison Research | 37 | 3 | 21 | 1 | 5 | 4 | - | 3 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | - | - | 9 | - | - | 1 | - | 16 | ||
30 September–20 October 2023 | 1,212 | GORBI | 55 | - | 20 | 3 | 4 | - | - | 1 | 2 | - | 1 | 2 | 4 | - | - | 3 | - | - | 5 | - | 35 | ||
14 September–14 October 2023 | 1,200 | IRI[b] | 25 | 1 | 16 | 1 | 2 | 2 | - | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | - | - | 4 | - | 24 | 1 | 5 | 9 | ||
7–24 September 2023 | 1,500 | Edison Research | 37 | 3 | 22 | 1 | 4 | 4 | - | 2 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | - | - | 10 | - | - | <1 | - | 15 | ||
25 May–14 June 2023 | 1,500 | Edison Research | 37 | 2 | 25 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 3 | - | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 2 | - | - | 6 | - | - | - | - | 12 |
22 April–7 May 2023 | 1,212 | GORBI | 53 | - | 19 | 4 | 2 | 2 | - | - | 2 | 2 | - | 1 | 3 | 3 | - | - | - | 2 | - | - | 7 | - | 34 |
4–23 March 2023 | 1,500 | IRI[b] | 19 | <1 | 14 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | - | 2 | <1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | - | - | 3 | - | 25 | <1 | 7 | 5 |
17–30 November 2022 | 2,024 | GORBI | 52 | - | 23 | 3 | 3 | 3 | - | - | 2 | 3 | - | 2 | 1 | 3 | - | - | - | 1 | - | - | 4 | - | 29 |
13 September–2 October 2022 | 1,500 | IRI[b] | 25 | - | 12 | 1 | - | 2 | 2 | - | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | - | - | 3 | - | 17 | 2 | 23 | 13 |
4–24 March 2022 | 1,486 | IRI[b] | 31 | - | 16 | 2 | - | 2 | 2 | - | 1 | 1 | 1 | - | 2 | 1 | 2 | - | - | 4 | - | 15 | 2 | 19 | 15 |
2020 election | 48.22 | - | 27.18 | 3.15 | 3.79 | 3.15 | - | - | 1.33 | 3.14 | - | 2.89 | 1.00 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 6.13 | - | 21.04 |
Notes
[edit]References
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