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Android security framework: extensible multi-layered access control on Android

Published: 08 December 2014 Publication History

Abstract

We introduce the Android Security Framework (ASF), a generic, extensible security framework for Android that enables the development and integration of a wide spectrum of security models in form of code-based security modules. The design of ASF reflects lessons learned from the literature on established security frameworks (such as Linux Security Modules or the BSD MAC Framework) and intertwines them with the particular requirements and challenges from the design of Android's software stack. ASF provides a novel security API that supports authors of Android security extensions in developing their modules. This overcomes the current unsatisfactory situation to provide security solutions as separate patches to the Android software stack or to embed them into Android's mainline codebase. This system security extensibility is of particular benefit for enterprise or government solutions that require deployment of advanced security models, not supported by vanilla Android. We present a prototypical implementation of ASF and demonstrate its effectiveness and efficiency by modularizing different security models from related work, such as dynamic permissions, inlined reference monitoring, and type enforcement.

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ACSAC '14: Proceedings of the 30th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
December 2014
492 pages
ISBN:9781450330053
DOI:10.1145/2664243
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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Published: 08 December 2014

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ACSAC '14
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ACSAC '14: Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
December 8 - 12, 2014
Louisiana, New Orleans, USA

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