research-article

Demand-Invariant Price Relationships and Market Outcomes in Competitive Private Commons

Authors:

Emir Kavurmacioglu,

Murat Alanyali,

David StarobinskiAuthors Info & Claims

ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT), Volume 14, Issue 2-3

Article No.: 15, Pages 1 - 30

https://doi.org/10.1145/2663495

Published: 28 October 2014 Publication History

Abstract

We introduce a private commons model that consists of network providers who serve a fixed primary demand and strategically price to improve their revenues from an additional secondary demand. For general forms of secondary demand, we establish the existence and uniqueness of two characteristic prices: the break-even price and the market sharing price. We show that the market sharing price is always greater than the break-even price, leading to a price interval in which a provider is both profitable and willing to share the demand. Making use of this result, we give insight into the nature of market outcomes.

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Cited By

Kavurmacioglu EStarobinski D(2021)Network dimensioning with carrier aggregation2015 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN)10.1109/DySPAN.2015.7343929(336-347)Online publication date: 9-Mar-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/DySPAN.2015.7343929
Peng JZhu YShu WWu M(2015)How multiple crowdsourcers compete for smartphone contributions?2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS)10.1109/INFCOMW.2015.7179437(516-521)Online publication date: Apr-2015
https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOMW.2015.7179437

Index Terms

Demand-Invariant Price Relationships and Market Outcomes in Competitive Private Commons
1. Networks
  1. Network architectures
2. Social and professional topics
  1. Professional topics
    1. Management of computing and information systems
      1. Implementation management

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Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Internet Technology

ACM Transactions on Internet Technology Volume 14, Issue 2-3

Special Issue on Pricing and Incentives in Networks and Systems and Regular Papers

October 2014

287 pages

ISSN:1533-5399

EISSN:1557-6051

DOI:10.1145/2684804

Editors:
Munindar P. Singh
Department of Computer Science, North Carolina State University
,
Costas Courcoubetis
SUTD, Singapore
,
Roch Guérin
Washington University in St. Louis, USA
,
Patrick Loiseau
EURECOM, France
,
David Parkes
Harvard University, USA
,
Jean Walrand
University of California, Berkeley, USA
,
Adam Wierman
Caltech, USA

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Copyright © 2014 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 28 October 2014

Accepted: 01 June 2014

Revised: 01 March 2014

Received: 01 September 2013

Published in TOIT Volume 14, Issue 2-3

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Cited By

Kavurmacioglu EStarobinski D(2021)Network dimensioning with carrier aggregation2015 IEEE International Symposium on Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks (DySPAN)10.1109/DySPAN.2015.7343929(336-347)Online publication date: 9-Mar-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/DySPAN.2015.7343929
Peng JZhu YShu WWu M(2015)How multiple crowdsourcers compete for smartphone contributions?2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS)10.1109/INFCOMW.2015.7179437(516-521)Online publication date: Apr-2015
https://doi.org/10.1109/INFCOMW.2015.7179437

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