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Balancing accountability and privacy in the network

Published: 17 August 2014 Publication History

Abstract

Though most would agree that accountability and privacy are both valuable, today's Internet provides little support for either. Previous efforts have explored ways to offer stronger guarantees for one of the two, typically at the expense of the other; indeed, at first glance accountability and privacy appear mutually exclusive. At the center of the tussle is the source address: in an accountable Internet, source addresses undeniably link packets and senders so hosts can be punished for bad behavior. In a privacy-preserving Internet, source addresses are hidden as much as possible.
In this paper, we argue that a balance is possible. We introduce the Accountable and Private Internet Protocol (APIP), which splits source addresses into two separate fields --- an accountability address and a return address --- and introduces independent mechanisms for managing each. Accountability addresses, rather than pointing to hosts, point to accountability delegates, which agree to vouch for packets on their clients' behalves, taking appropriate action when misbehavior is reported. With accountability handled by delegates, senders are now free to mask their return addresses; we discuss a few techniques for doing so.

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    cover image ACM Conferences
    SIGCOMM '14: Proceedings of the 2014 ACM conference on SIGCOMM
    August 2014
    662 pages
    ISBN:9781450328364
    DOI:10.1145/2619239
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    Published: 17 August 2014

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    1. accountability
    2. privacy
    3. source address

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    SIGCOMM'14: ACM SIGCOMM 2014 Conference
    August 17 - 22, 2014
    Illinois, Chicago, USA

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