research-article

Truthfulness and stochastic dominance with monetary transfers

Authors:

Thomas Kesselheim,

Berthold VöckingAuthors Info & Claims

EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce

Pages 567 - 582

https://doi.org/10.1145/2492002.2482548

Published: 16 June 2013 Publication History

Abstract

We consider truthfulness concepts for auctions with payments based on first- and second-order stochastic dominance. We assume bidders consider wealth in standard quasi-linear form as valuation minus payments. Additionally, they are sensitive to risk in the distribution of wealth stemming from randomized mechanisms. First- and second-order stochastic dominance are well-known to capture risk-sensitivity, and we apply these concepts to capture truth-telling incentives for bidders.

As our first main result, we provide a complete characterization of all social-choice functions over binary single-parameter domains that can be implemented by a mechanism that is truthful in first- and second- order stochastic dominance. We show that these are exactly the social-choice functions implementable by truthful-in-expectation mechanisms, and we provide a novel payment rule that guarantees stochastic dominance. As our second main result we extend the celebrated randomized meta-rounding approach for truthful-in-expectation mechanisms in packing domains. We design mechanisms that are truthful in first- order stochastic dominance by spending only a logarithmic factor in the approximation guarantee.

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Cited By

Hoefer MKesselheim TVöcking B(2016)Truthfulness and Stochastic Dominance with Monetary TransfersACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)10.1145/28475224:2(1-18)Online publication date: 3-Feb-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2847522
Dütting PKesselheim TTardos ERoughgarden TFeldman MSchwarz M(2015)Algorithms as MechanismsProceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/2764468.2764486(187-201)Online publication date: 15-Jun-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2764468.2764486
Hoefer MKesselheim TVöcking B(2014)Approximation Algorithms for Secondary Spectrum AuctionsACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)10.1145/266349614:2-3(1-24)Online publication date: 28-Oct-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2663496
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Truthfulness and stochastic dominance with monetary transfers
1. Theory of computation
  1. Design and analysis of algorithms

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cover image ACM Conferences

EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce

June 2013

924 pages

ISBN:9781450319621

DOI:10.1145/2492002

General Chair:
Michael Kearns
University of Pennsylvania., USA
,
Program Chairs:
Preston McAfee
Google, USA
,
Éva Tardos
Cornell University, USA

Copyright © 2013 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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SIGecom: Special Interest Group on Economics and Computation

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New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 16 June 2013

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EC '13: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

June 16 - 20, 2013

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EC '13 Paper Acceptance Rate 72 of 223 submissions, 32%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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Cited By

Hoefer MKesselheim TVöcking B(2016)Truthfulness and Stochastic Dominance with Monetary TransfersACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)10.1145/28475224:2(1-18)Online publication date: 3-Feb-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2847522
Dütting PKesselheim TTardos ERoughgarden TFeldman MSchwarz M(2015)Algorithms as MechanismsProceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/2764468.2764486(187-201)Online publication date: 15-Jun-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2764468.2764486
Hoefer MKesselheim TVöcking B(2014)Approximation Algorithms for Secondary Spectrum AuctionsACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)10.1145/266349614:2-3(1-24)Online publication date: 28-Oct-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2663496
Hassidim AMansour YVardi SBabaioff MConitzer VEasley D(2014)Local computation mechanism designProceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation10.1145/2600057.2602839(601-616)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2014
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2600057.2602839

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