Article

Adaptive mechanism design: a metalearning approach

Authors:

Maytal Saar-Tsechansky,

Kerem TomakAuthors Info & Claims

ICEC '06: Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Electronic commerce: The new e-commerce: innovations for conquering current barriers, obstacles and limitations to conducting successful business on the internet

Pages 92 - 102

https://doi.org/10.1145/1151454.1151480

Published: 13 August 2006 Publication History

Abstract

Auction mechanism design has traditionally been a largely analytic process, relying on assumptions such as fully rational bidders. In practice, however, bidders often exhibit unknown and variable behavior, making them difficult to model and complicating the design process. To address this challenge, we explore the use of an adaptive auction mechanism: one that learns to adjust its parameters in response to past empirical bidder behavior so as to maximize an objective function such as auctioneer revenue. In this paper, we give an overview of our general approach and then present an instantiation in a specific auction scenario. In addition, we show how predictions of possible bidder behavior can be incorporated into the adaptive mechanism through a metalearning process. The approach is fully implemented and tested. Results indicate that the adaptive mechanism is able to outperform any single fixed mechanism, and that the addition of metalearning improves performance substantially.

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Cited By

Yang JWang ETrivedi RZhao TZha HPelachaud CTaylor MFaliszewski PMascardi V(2022)Adaptive Incentive Design with Multi-Agent Meta-Gradient Reinforcement LearningProceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3535850.3536010(1436-1445)Online publication date: 9-May-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3535850.3536010
Tuyls KStone P(2018)Multiagent Learning ParadigmsMulti-Agent Systems and Agreement Technologies10.1007/978-3-030-01713-2_1(3-21)Online publication date: 14-Oct-2018
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01713-2_1
Breskovic IBrandic IAltmann J(2013)Maximizing Liquidity in Cloud Markets through Standardization of Computational ResourcesProceedings of the 2013 IEEE Seventh International Symposium on Service-Oriented System Engineering10.1109/SOSE.2013.48(72-83)Online publication date: 25-Mar-2013
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/SOSE.2013.48
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Index Terms

Adaptive mechanism design: a metalearning approach
1. Computing methodologies
  1. Machine learning

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cover image ACM Other conferences

ICEC '06: Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Electronic commerce: The new e-commerce: innovations for conquering current barriers, obstacles and limitations to conducting successful business on the internet

August 2006

624 pages

ISBN:1595933921

DOI:10.1145/1151454

Conference Chairs:
Mark S. Fox
University of Toronto, Canada
,
Bruce Spencer
National Research Council Canada

Copyright © 2006 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

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Publication History

Published: 13 August 2006

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ICEC '06 Paper Acceptance Rate 53 of 112 submissions, 47%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 150 of 244 submissions, 61%

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Cited By

Yang JWang ETrivedi RZhao TZha HPelachaud CTaylor MFaliszewski PMascardi V(2022)Adaptive Incentive Design with Multi-Agent Meta-Gradient Reinforcement LearningProceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3535850.3536010(1436-1445)Online publication date: 9-May-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3535850.3536010
Tuyls KStone P(2018)Multiagent Learning ParadigmsMulti-Agent Systems and Agreement Technologies10.1007/978-3-030-01713-2_1(3-21)Online publication date: 14-Oct-2018
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01713-2_1
Breskovic IBrandic IAltmann J(2013)Maximizing Liquidity in Cloud Markets through Standardization of Computational ResourcesProceedings of the 2013 IEEE Seventh International Symposium on Service-Oriented System Engineering10.1109/SOSE.2013.48(72-83)Online publication date: 25-Mar-2013
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/SOSE.2013.48
Caton SBreskovic IBrandic I(2013)A Conceptual Framework for Simulating Autonomic Cloud MarketsCloud Computing10.1007/978-3-319-03874-2_10(92-102)Online publication date: 2013
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03874-2_10
Breskovic IMaurer MEmeakaroha VBrandic IDustdar S(2011)Cost-Efficient Utilization of Public SLA Templates in Autonomic Cloud MarketsProceedings of the 2011 Fourth IEEE International Conference on Utility and Cloud Computing10.1109/UCC.2011.38(229-236)Online publication date: 5-Dec-2011
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Breskovic IHaas CCaton SBrandic I(2011)Towards Self-Awareness in Cloud MarketsProceedings of the 2011 IEEE Ninth International Conference on Dependable, Autonomic and Secure Computing10.1109/DASC.2011.38(81-88)Online publication date: 12-Dec-2011
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Pardoe DStone PSaar-Tsechansky MKeskin TTomak K(2010)Adaptive Auction Mechanism Design and the Incorporation of Prior KnowledgeINFORMS Journal on Computing10.1287/ijoc.1090.035322:3(353-370)Online publication date: 1-Jul-2010
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Gomes EKowalczyk R(2009)Learning the IPA market with individual and social rewardsWeb Intelligence and Agent Systems10.5555/1551707.15517087:2(123-138)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2009
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Zhang JLau HShen JChau PLyytinen KWei CYang CLin F(2009)Setting discrete bid levels adaptively in repeated auctionsProceedings of the 11th International Conference on Electronic Commerce10.1145/1593254.1593284(195-204)Online publication date: 12-Aug-2009
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Klos Tvan Ahee G(2008)Evolutionary dynamics for designing multi-period auctionsProceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 310.5555/1402821.1402932(1589-1592)Online publication date: 12-May-2008
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