article

Evaluation of Information Leakage via Electromagnetic Emanation and Effectiveness of Tempest

Author:

Hidema TanakaAuthors Info & Claims

IEICE - Transactions on Information and Systems, Volume E91-D, Issue 5

Pages 1439 - 1446

https://doi.org/10.1093/ietisy/e91-d.5.1439

Published: 01 May 2008 Publication History

Abstract

It is well known that there is relationship between electromagnetic emanation and processing information in IT devices such as personal computers and smart cards. By analyzing such electromagnetic emanation, eavesdropper will be able to get some information, so it becomes a real threat of information security. In this paper, we show how to estimate amount of information that is leaked as electromagnetic emanation. We assume the space between the IT device and the receiver is a communication channel, and we define the amount of information leakage via electromagnetic emanations by its channel capacity. By some experimental results of Tempest, we show example estimations of amount of information leakage. Using the value of channel capacity, we can calculate the amount of information per pixel in the reconstructed image. And we evaluate the effectiveness of Tempest fonts generated by Gaussian method and its threshold of security.

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Cited By

Hernandez-Ardieta JGonzalez-Tablas ADe Fuentes JRamos B(2013)A taxonomy and survey of attacks on digital signaturesComputers and Security10.1016/j.cose.2012.11.00934(67-112)Online publication date: 1-May-2013
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.cose.2012.11.009
Mizuno HIwai KTanaka HKurokawa T(2013)Information Theoretical Analysis of Side-Channel AttackProceedings of the 9th International Conference on Information Systems Security - Volume 830310.1007/978-3-642-45204-8_20(255-269)Online publication date: 16-Dec-2013
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-642-45204-8_20

Evaluation of Information Leakage via Electromagnetic Emanation and Effectiveness of Tempest
1. Social and professional topics
  1. Computing / technology policy

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cover image IEICE - Transactions on Information and Systems

IEICE - Transactions on Information and Systems Volume E91-D, Issue 5

May 2008

363 pages

ISSN:0916-8532

EISSN:1745-1361

Issue’s Table of Contents

Copyright © Copyright © 2008 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers.

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Oxford University Press, Inc.

United States

Publication History

Published: 01 May 2008

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Cited By

Hernandez-Ardieta JGonzalez-Tablas ADe Fuentes JRamos B(2013)A taxonomy and survey of attacks on digital signaturesComputers and Security10.1016/j.cose.2012.11.00934(67-112)Online publication date: 1-May-2013
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.cose.2012.11.009
Mizuno HIwai KTanaka HKurokawa T(2013)Information Theoretical Analysis of Side-Channel AttackProceedings of the 9th International Conference on Information Systems Security - Volume 830310.1007/978-3-642-45204-8_20(255-269)Online publication date: 16-Dec-2013
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-642-45204-8_20

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