article

Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions

Authors:

Shahar Dobzinski,

Michael SchapiraAuthors Info & Claims

Journal of Computer and System Sciences, Volume 78, Issue 1

Pages 15 - 25

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2011.02.010

Published: 01 January 2012 Publication History

Abstract

We present a new framework for the design of computationally-efficient and incentive-compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. The mechanisms obtained via this framework are randomized, and obtain incentive compatibility in the universal sense (in contrast to the substantially weaker notion of incentive compatibility in expectation). We demonstrate the usefulness of our techniques by exhibiting two mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with general bidder preferences. The first mechanism obtains an optimal O(m)-approximation to the optimal social welfare for arbitrary bidder valuations. The second mechanism obtains an O(log^2m)-approximation for a class of bidder valuations that contains the important class of submodular bidders. These approximation ratios greatly improve over the best (known) deterministic incentive-compatible mechanisms for these classes.

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Published In

cover image Journal of Computer and System Sciences

Journal of Computer and System Sciences Volume 78, Issue 1

January, 2012

393 pages

ISSN:0022-0000

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Copyright © Elsevier Inc. © 2011.

Publisher

Academic Press, Inc.

United States

Publication History

Published: 01 January 2012

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Cited By

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https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/TNSM.2024.3426076
Fikioris GFotakis D(2022)Mechanism Design for Perturbation Stable Combinatorial AuctionsTheory of Computing Systems10.1007/s00224-022-10078-966:4(778-801)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2022
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Garg JHoefer MMehlhorn KCzumaj A(2018)Approximating the nash social welfare with budget-additive valuationsProceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms10.5555/3174304.3175455(2326-2340)Online publication date: 7-Jan-2018
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Anshelevich ESekar S(2016)Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal WorldProceedings of the 12th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics - Volume 1012310.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_19(265-278)Online publication date: 11-Dec-2016
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Daniely ASchapira MShahaf GServedio RRubinfeld R(2015)Inapproximability of Truthful Mechanisms via Generalizations of the VC DimensionProceedings of the forty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing10.1145/2746539.2746597(401-408)Online publication date: 14-Jun-2015
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