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A new public-key encryption scheme

Published: 01 January 2007 Publication History

Abstract

This paper proposes a new public-key encryption scheme which removes one element from the public-key tuple of the original Cramer-Shoup scheme. As a result, a ciphertext is not a quadruple but a triple at the cost of a strong assumption, the third version of knowledge of exponent assumption (KEA3). Under assumptions of KEA3, a decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and a variant of target collision resistance (TCRv), the new scheme is proved secure against indistinguishable adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2). This scheme is as efficient as Damgård ElGamal (DEG) scheme when it makes use of a well-known algorithm for product of exponentiations. The DEG scheme is recently proved IND-CCA1 secure by Bellare and Palacio in ASIACRYPT 2004 under another strong assumption. In addition to our IND-CCA2 secured scheme, we also believe that the security proof procedure itself provides a well insight for ElGamal-based encryption schemes which are secure in real world.

References

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Ronald Cramer, Victor Shoup. A practical public-key cryptosystem provable secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Krawczyk H (ed.), Springer-Verlag, 1998, 1462: 13-15.
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Ran Canetti, Oded Goldreich, Shai Halevi. The random oracle methodology, revisited. J. the ACM, 2004, 51(4): 557-594.
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Mihir Bellare, Alexandra Boldyreva, Adriana Palacio. A uninstantiable random-oracle-model scheme for a hybrid-encryption problem. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Cachin C, Camenisch J (eds.), Springer-Verlag, 2004, 3027: 171-188.
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Mao Wenbo. Modern cryptography: Theory and Practice. Prentice-Hall PTR, 2003.
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Mihir Bellare, Adriana Palacio. Towards plaintext-aware public-key encryption without random oracles (full version). IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/221, 2004. Available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/221/. An extended abstract of this paper appears in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Lee P J (ed.), Springer-Verlag 2004, 3329: 48-62.
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Moni Naor. On cryptographic assumptions and challenges. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Boneh D (ed.), Springer-Verlag, 2003, 2729: 96-109.

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cover image Journal of Computer Science and Technology
Journal of Computer Science and Technology  Volume 22, Issue 1
January 2007
167 pages

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Springer-Verlag

Berlin, Heidelberg

Publication History

Published: 01 January 2007
Revised: 03 November 2006
Received: 13 January 2005

Author Tags

  1. deduction
  2. public-key cryptosystems
  3. security

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