Article

A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice

Authors:

Yann Chevaleyre,

Nicolas MaudetAuthors Info & Claims

SOFSEM '07: Proceedings of the 33rd conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science

Pages 51 - 69

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69507-3_4

Published: 20 January 2007 Publication History

Abstract

Computational social choice is an interdisciplinary field of study at the interface of social choice theory and computer science, promoting an exchange of ideas in both directions. On the one hand, it is concerned with the application of techniques developed in computer science, such as complexity analysis or algorithm design, to the study of social choice mechanisms, such as voting procedures or fair division algorithms. On the other hand, computational social choice is concerned with importing concepts from social choice theory into computing. For instance, the study of preference aggregation mechanisms is also very relevant to multiagent systems. In this short paper we give a general introduction to computational social choice, by proposing a taxonomy of the issues addressed by this discipline, together with some illustrative examples and an (incomplete) bibliography.

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SOFSEM '07: Proceedings of the 33rd conference on Current Trends in Theory and Practice of Computer Science

January 2007

934 pages

ISBN:9783540695066

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Springer-Verlag

Berlin, Heidelberg

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Published: 20 January 2007

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