



DelegaTEE: Brokered Delegation using Trusted Execution Environments

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PayPal Student Account

• Effective April 25, 2018, PayPal Student accounts are no longer be able to make purchases online. The send money feature to transfer funds from the Student Account to the parent's PayPal account will be available until April 25, 2018.

Are there other PayPal products I can use to send money to my student?

At this time, we aren't introducing a replacement for PayPal Student Accounts and PayPal Student Debit MasterCards. We will continue to explore ways to serve our younger population in the future. If




- Bob really wants to make Alice happy...
- Bob is fine sharing his account...
- But, he doesn't really want to reveal his login credentials to Alice and also give her unlimited spending capabilities...
- (since Bob is very security aware and uses the same password in all web service that he has...:D)




- If only the service would support such a scheme...
- Applicable to all types of online services and action performed on the web
 - Delegation is only possible if directly supported by the service provider





Solution – Brokered Delegation






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


Trusted Execution Environments

- Enable isolated execution within a user's system
 - ARM Trustzone, Intel SGX, ...
- Intel SGX secure enclaves
 - Runtime isolation, ecall/ocall interfaces, sealing, attestation
 - Memory content encrypted



- Side-channel attacks, Spectre, Meltdown, Foreshadow (see talks from yesterday)
- Patches on the way





Our contribution: Brokered Delegation with enclaves

- A new concept that seems very familiar
- Flexibly, securely and selectively share and delegate access (credentials and rights)
- No explicit support (or even knowledge) of the service providers
- Fine-grained delegation without trust between the credential owner and other users
- Supported with the usage of TEEs
- Credential Owners (give access) and Delegatees (receive restricted access)




DelegaTEE - Challenges and desired properties

- The Owner's credentials remain confidential.
- The Owner can restrict access to his account, e.g., in terms of time, duration
 of access, no. of reads/writes etc. with rich contextual policies
- The system logs the actions of Owners and Delegatees so that post-hoc attribution of their behaviour is possible (as a means of resolving disputes)
- The system minimizes the ability of a service to distinguish between access by the Delegatee and that of the legitimate Owner
- Owner does not have to always be online



DelegaTEE – two system designs

- Peer-to-peer system model
- Centrally brokered system model







Trust assumptions and security

- Intel SGX enclaves are trusted for confidentiality and attestation
 - The Owner is to be fully protected
- Server and the operator per se do not need to be trusted
- System works as trusted a proxy, a man-in-the-middle
 - End-to-end TLS from enclave-to-delegatee and enclave-to-service


Case Study Implementation 1: PayPal












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













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
Case Study Implementation 2: Credit Card - Demo









Case Study Implementation 3: Email - Demo





Case Study Implementation 4: General website browsing - Demo







Performance

- In line with the original performance of the use case scenario
- P2P system
 - Minimal and negligible overhead
 - Functions as a local proxy
 - Supports all provided use-cases
- Centrally Brokered System
 - Serves all delegation request through a central system
 - All use cases except video streaming handled almost instantaneously
 - No. of concurrent users depends on the server hardware



Brokered Delegation may undermine service's policy enforcement

- MAC-to-DAC
 - Similar to the setuid in Unix systems
- Building secondary markets for any service
 - Netflix, and any other video streaming service
 - Paid subscription services, such as news portals, etc.
 - **.**...
- Services expect the difficulty of broadly sharing credentials



Discussion, Challenges and Limitations

- Identity-based model
- Anonymous model
- Policy creation and enforcement
 - Easy for standardized protocols and messages
 - More difficult for a general use-case example
 - Curated "policy app store" for different use cases?

For more details please see the paper!



Discussion, Challenges and Limitations

- Authentication challenges
 - Two-step authentication
 - CAPTCHA
- Authentication Collisions
- Usability
- Deployment
- Service Prevention
- Scalability

For more details please see the paper!



Summary & Conclusion

- Secure and flexible delegation of user access rights and credentials
- Applicable for online transactions with password-based authentication
 - Can be developed to support brick-and-mortar transactions
- No changes needed on the service side
- Compatibility with wide range of services
- Rise of new sharing economies and business models
- A potential game changer? Market disruptor?



Thank you for your attention! Questions?

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