



UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM

Protecting religious sites from terrorist attacks

GOOD PRACTICES GUIDE

Specialized module



Global Programme on Countering Terrorist Threats against Vulnerable Targets

Implemented in partnership with:



UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORATE (CTED)



UNAOC
United Nations Alliance of Civilizations



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United Nations
International Crime and Justice
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Preface

The Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT)'s Global Programme on Countering Terrorist Threats against Vulnerable Targets¹ developed this document as a guide on the protection of religious sites against terrorist acts. It was conceived as a sector-specific module to *The Protection of Critical Infrastructures against Terrorist Attacks: Compendium of Good Practices*.²

Following an overview of key terrorism-related threats and vulnerabilities affecting religious sites, this module explores the specific role that individual stakeholders can and should play in a complex – and often volatile – security environment by acting within the conceptual framework of a risk and crisis management approach. It contains a selection of case studies illustrating how key security-related principles – including internationally endorsed recommendations – have been operationalized by Governments, private-sector actors, operators of religious sites and civil society organizations. The module also summarizes the content of several tools (manuals, handbooks, compendiums), providing guidance for the establishment of sound policy and operational settings to reduce religious sites' vulnerabilities and increase their resilience.

The analytical framework, case studies, tools and all the resources featured in this module are the result of intensive desk research, a formal request for inputs from all 193 United Nations Member States, discussions with individual experts, international organizations and project partners, as well as input from the Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact.³ The Expert Group Meeting (EGM) held virtually by UNOCT on 14–15 June 2021

1 The Programme's partners are the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). The Programme is being implemented in close consultation with other relevant organizations, including INTERPOL. For more information, see www.un.org/counterterrorism/vulnerable-targets

2 The Compendium was developed in 2018 by the Working Group on the Protection of Critical Infrastructure, including Vulnerable Targets, Internet and Tourism Security, of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). In 2019, CTITF was folded into the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact. Under this new structure, the above-mentioned Working Group and the Working Group on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorist Attacks were combined to create the Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection.

3 See www.un.org/counterterrorism/global-ct-compact.

provided important insight and brought together more than 250 representatives from Governments, international and regional organizations; civil society; the private sector; and academic experts from around the world. The process also benefited from the input of UNOCT's Gender Advisor and a dedicated human rights consultant in UNOCT's Special Projects and Innovation Branch.⁴

4 This module strives to mainstream gender equality concerns throughout the various themes addressed. It highlights, in particular, the need to mainstream gender in the design and implementation of plans of action, develop gender-sensitive security planning, recognize and support the role of women in the security of religious sites and address gender biases in law enforcement. This is a non-exhaustive list, and context-specific considerations regarding gender equality should be incorporated from planning to execution and evaluation of all measures highlighted in this module.



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The terrorist threat to religious sites

At its seventh review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2021, the General Assembly called upon Member States to “strengthen efforts to improve the security and protection of particularly vulnerable targets, including religious sites ... as well as to enhance their resilience to terrorist attacks, in particular in the area of civil protection”.⁵

Religious sites are places where individuals or groups gather to pray, participate in ceremonies or perform acts of devotion and meditation.⁶ They are normally found within designated structures, although some communities consider certain natural spaces to be sacred, elevating them to the status of religious sites.

As stated in the preamble of the United Nations Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites,⁷ “religious sites are representative of the history, social fabric and traditions of

people in every country and community all over the planet and must be fully respected as places of peace and harmony where worshippers feel safe to practice their rituals”. They can be hosted in ancient⁸ or modern buildings, located in densely populated urban areas or remote parts of a country. Alongside areas reserved for worship and prayer, the same site may include nurseries, educational structures, shelters for the homeless and facilities for various social and community-outreach programs. The same religious sites may be sacred to more than one faith community.

Numerous religious sites around the world are regularly targeted by terrorists, who seek to strike at the very core of communities’ sense of identity and belonging. Perpetrators of attacks conducted during religious holidays or celebrations also seek to have a stronger symbolic and human impact due to the higher number of congregants – and thus potential victims – being present.⁹

5 See General Assembly resolution 75/291, para. 71.

6 The notions of “religious site” and “house of worship” are often used interchangeably, although the former technically encompasses also places such as cemeteries and shrines.

7 The Plan of Action was developed by the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) and launched by the Secretary-General on 12 September 2019.

8 Roughly 20 per cent of properties inscribed in UNESCO’s World Heritage List have a religious or spiritual connection.

9 Recent examples of terrorist attacks conducted during religious festivities include the shooting at the synagogue in Halle, Germany, during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur; the bombing of Christian churches in Sri Lanka on Easter Sunday; the attack against the Cathedral of Makassar in Indonesia as worshippers were wrapping up a mass marking Palm Sunday in 2021; the bombing of a crowded mosque in Sanaa, Yemen, causing the death of 29 people attending Eid prayers.

According to the United States Department of Homeland Security 2020 report, over the past few years, virtually every faith community has witnessed acts of violence sparked by religious bias and hatred¹⁰ with attacks on religious sites tending to increase at times of acute racial and religious tensions.¹¹

While not an exhaustive list of attack typologies, the following scenarios of attacks against religious sites are of significant concern:¹²

- *Active-shooter incidents:* Events of mass shootings targeting religious sites are on the increase. Examples include the 2012 attack perpetrated against the Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, United States; and, in 2019, the two consecutive mass shootings at mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand.
- *Suicide attacks:* A recent example is the 2019 bomb detonation killing 23 people and injuring around 100 more during a Mass celebration in the Roman Catholic cathedral on the island of Jolo, Philippines.
- *Improvised explosive devices (IEDs):* IEDs have been employed in a number of attacks against religious sites. This may be partly due to the wide availability of the components needed to assemble them. The attacks may be by individual IEDs or part of a complex attack featuring both IEDs and armed attackers against one or multiple sites.
- *Arson:* In 2018, a string of arson attacks targeted Jehovah's Witnesses Kingdom Halls in the United States; while in 2020, notably, the cathedral of Nantes was set on fire by a volunteer who, it subsequently emerged, was very close to the clergy.¹³
- *Cold weapons:* The knife attack perpetrated in 2020 at a church in Nice, France, epitomizes the modus operandi and unpredictability of "lone wolves" and the associated challenges for intelligence and law enforcement agencies to detect individuals preparing terrorist attacks with minimal planning effort and funds.
- *Cyberattacks:* In addition to financially motivated attacks and data theft, "website defacements" are discrete forms of attacks increasingly targeting faith-based communities. They typically feature hateful language or imagery intended to instill fear and sow division among different faith groups.
- *Vandalism:* Although they may not by themselves satisfy the threshold to be considered terrorist acts under domestic legal frameworks, acts of vandalism – such as the displacement and destruction of religious symbols – are nevertheless symptomatic of an increasing threat environment that is intended to intimidate, potentially indicating a propensity to "move to the next stage" and foreshadowing the commission of fully fledged terrorist acts.¹⁴

10 See section 4.1.1.2 on the nexus between hate speech and acts of terrorism against religious sites.

11 As the United Nations entity in charge of drafting and implementing the United Nations Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites, UNAOC keeps a record of major attacks against religious sites around the world, based on information obtained in open sources. It recorded 13 major attacks in 2019, 10 in 2020, and 7 as of October 2021. Also, between 1998 and 2019, the Global Terrorism Database managed by the University of Maryland recorded worldwide 30 attacks against synagogues, 482 on Muslim mosques, 7 on Hindu temples, and 70 on Christian churches (Pethő-Kiss, 2020, p. 74).

12 The incidents mentioned are intended to provide only a few examples of recent terrorist acts for the purpose of illustrating certain attack modalities.

13 Although the investigation revealed that the attack was motivated by the perpetrator's personal grievances and not religious hatred, it indicates that the "insider threat" may not be a negligible aspect of the overall threat landscape surrounding religious sites.

14 Out of a total of 456 cases of major violent acts against Jewish targets in 2019, vandalism in all forms was recorded in more than half of the cases (Kantor Center, 2020).



Box 1.

The copycat dynamic

In December 2019, anti-Semitic graffiti were painted on the South Hampstead synagogue, London, United Kingdom. Just a few hours later, a masked individual broke into the home of a rabbi in New York, United States, during Hannukah celebrations and stabbed five of his guests. While a connection could not be established between the acts of vandalism taking place in London and the New York assault, the chronology of the two events suggests that one event might have inspired the other (The Guardian 2019).

A clear copycat dynamic was at play during the mosque onslaught in Christchurch, New Zealand. The peculiar modality of the mass-shooting, which was live-streamed for the first time, was reminiscent of the attack against Jewish people committed in Lyon, France, in 2012, when the perpetrator wore a camera on his helmet. In these two cases, the copycat dynamic is all the more interesting in view of the very different profiles and motivations of the two perpetrators. While the Christchurch assailant was a far-right anti-Muslim extremist, the attacker in Lyon was moved by his grievances about the treatment of Muslim communities in France and elsewhere.



Religious sites' vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks



- Depending on their size, location, configuration and the characteristics of associated groups and rituals, religious sites present a number of distinctive vulnerabilities that set them apart from other soft targets. The following is a non-exhaustive overview of vulnerabilities that have been historically exploited by terrorists or have been emphasized as being susceptible to exploitation.
- Religious sites, both as physical premises and locations where individuals belonging to a religious denomination gather, present significant symbolic value, particularly to terrorist groups that exploit religious divisions.
- A distinctive fragility of many religious sites is inherent in the mission for which they have been conceived. Enshrined in most religions and religious communities

is the duty to implement “open door” policies by welcoming strangers and not asking questions about the identity or provenance of unknown visitors.

- Related to a general reluctance to screen visitors is the frequent perception that security is detrimental to the image that a religious community wants to project of itself. It has been noted also that those who manage and run religious facilities generally operate from a very different emotional and mental perspective than law enforcement professionals

and have a different base of experience. This will make security a “hard sell” for many of these individuals, who will either fail to understand the necessity of such measures or be frightened by the idea that they are necessary. In either case, the police are likely to find that they are treated like messengers of bad news that the institutions would rather not hear or deal with (Wood, 2018). If security measures are implemented, they are often not as minimally visible and intrusive as possible.¹⁵



Box 2.

Attitudes towards security: case of Christian churches

The analysis of a sample of 26 attacks perpetrated against Christian places of worship worldwide between 1998 and 2019 showed that preventive action was prioritized only when there had been prior attacks on the same church or when a warning of an imminent threat had been communicated in advance. In a significant number of cases, no preventive measures were taken to tighten security, regardless of warning signals or the receipt of advance intelligence (Pethő-Kiss, 2020).

- Religious sites may be more appealing to malicious actors than other soft targets as congregants may be less likely to mount effective defenses. When attacks occur, for example, worshipers are often in an introspective mood and immersed in their own spiritual practice. Also, during religious holidays, not only are religious sites attended by a significantly larger influx of people than at normal times, but some of those people might be not necessarily be familiar with the facility (e.g., the location of emergency exits).¹⁶
- Some vulnerabilities stem from the architectural features of the sites that host religious facilities. For example, some churches have easily accessible attics in flammable wooden structures. Also, the fact that congregants often face the altar and turn their backs to the main entrance makes them less reactive in the case of an attack, and allowing an assailant to better exploit the surprise factor.
- Some regulatory frameworks place significant constraints on the types of permissible security overhauls (e.g., installing

¹⁵ Skeptical attitudes towards security-hardening projects may be exacerbated in contexts where religious communities are losing congregants or witness decreasing rates of attendance to religious services. In such cases, security may be seen as an obstacle in efforts to lure back disaffected members.

¹⁶ In general, as information about services and ceremonies is often public, vulnerabilities are accentuated by the possibility of knowing in advance when congregants will gather.

security-rated doors) to religious sites based on the need to maintain the integrity of culturally and historically valuable buildings.¹⁷

- In some cases, the geographical context of the religious site itself (e.g., an ancient city with narrow and busy streets) makes it particularly challenging to address certain security concerns. For example, it may be impossible to place concrete blocks in front of the entrance to protect congregants from vehicle-ramming attacks.¹⁸
- Many faith groups hold large celebrations in the open air. Outdoor religious events – such as religious processions moving from one village to another one – may not experience some of the security challenges

encountered in buildings (e.g., bottlenecks in evacuation operations). However, they are exposed to other types of threats and remain equally attractive as potential targets for terrorist activity.

- Religious sites' vulnerabilities critically depend on the duration of services or ceremonies. The longer they last, the more they are exposed to any given threat environment.¹⁹
- Several religious sites also serve as meeting places for non-religious groups, recreational activities, election polling stations, etc., thus levels of vulnerability are kept high even at times when no religious services or related activities are taking place.

17 By contrast, a religious site under construction may offer builders the unique opportunity of injecting a strong security-by-design approach into the planning phase, preventing certain vulnerabilities from even emerging.

18 Statistically, a significant number of terrorist attacks have targeted congregants gathering outside religious sites, either before or after the holding of religious services.

19 Some members of the Muslim community, for example, spend the last part of Ramadan in mosques, raising distinctive security concerns and extending sites' vulnerabilities for as long as an uninterrupted period of 10 days.



Safeguarding religious sites: the international normative framework



Pursuant to the mandate received by the Secretary-General in the aftermath of the attacks against mosques that took place in March 2019 in Christchurch, New Zealand, the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) elaborated the United Nations Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites: In Unity and Solidarity for Safe and Peaceful Worship. Launched by the Secretary-General on 12 September 2019, the Plan of Action is anchored in relevant General Assembly,

Security Council and Human Rights Council resolutions, as well as key documents agreed upon by religious leaders. It provides a framework for action addressed to all relevant stakeholders to better prevent, prepare for and respond to possible attacks against religious sites. Moreover, the Plan encourages collaboration among stakeholders to build trust, information sharing, partnerships and joint action.

The Plan of Action contains a number of specific recommendations to Member States in relation to preparedness and responses that are useful for addressing vulnerabilities and responses to terrorist attacks, including to ensure that religious sites are defined as vulnerable targets and incorporated in relevant national strategies and plans; reviewing or strengthening existing national strategies and plans to make them more effective for safeguarding religious sites; considering the establishment of specialized units to safeguard religious sites;

carrying out assessments of the respective roles and responsibilities at all levels of government.

The Plan of Action also encourages Member States to develop and sustain collaboration with religious leaders to build trust and help ensure information sharing; connect religious leaders with local enforcement authorities; organize training for congregations on security measures; and develop public-private partnerships.



Box 3.

The principles underpinning the United Nations Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites

The Plan of Action is based upon the following principles:

- RESPECT for all peoples, regardless of their faith, culture and history;
- RESPONSIBILITY to build bridges of mutual understanding and cooperation;
- DIVERSITY to accept and respect the differences among human beings;
- DIALOGUE as a tool to better communicate and engage with one another;
- SOLIDARITY to support and share compassion for one another, particularly in times of sorrow or trouble;
- STANDING TOGETHER as one to respond with unity to attempts to divide us; and
- STAYING TOGETHER as one to ensure that unity in response to attacks against religious sites is sustained and reinforced over time.

In 2021, the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 75/258 on “Promoting a culture of peace and tolerance to safeguard religious sites”. The General Assembly strongly deplores attacks against religious sites and condemns all acts or threats of violence, destruction, damage or endangerment directed against religious sites; invites

relevant stakeholders to support, as appropriate, the United Nations Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites; and invites the Secretary-General to convene a global conference involving all relevant stakeholders to spearhead political support for specific actions to take the Plan of Action forward.



Furthermore, in the context of its seventh review of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, in 2021, the General Assembly called upon Member States to strengthen efforts to improve the security and protection

of particularly vulnerable targets, including religious sites, as well as to enhance their resilience to terrorist attacks, in particular in the area of civil protection.²⁰

²⁰ General Assembly resolution 75/291, para. 71.



Risk mitigation and response: stakeholders' roles and good practices



Religious sites vary considerably in terms of size, location, features and reception capacity. They are exposed to different levels of threats and do not necessarily possess the same degree of resources and preparedness to prevent, prepare and respond to a potential terrorist attack. As a result, there is no one-size-fits-all security standard, but

rather a variety of approaches and mitigation measures that need to account for specific contexts and threat scenarios. Some religious sites, for example, are meeting places for millions of pilgrims coming from all over the world. Protecting them, in terms of safety and security, can be an extremely complex endeavour, requiring a nationwide

mobilization effort to account for the massive influx of people entering and exiting the host country. Other sites are structured around campuses comprising multiple buildings and social activities. At the other end of the spectrum are isolated places of worship serving small congregations and operating with tight security budgets. Despite their reclusive nature and limited reception capacity, the weak security measures implemented in these sites can be a magnet for hostile actors seeking significant media coverage and impact with minimal planning effort.

As stated in the United Nations Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites, whether

religious sites are large or small, attracting several visitors or just a few local congregants, a multi-stakeholder approach is key to prevent, prepare and respond to potential attacks against them. This approach is particularly important to protect these sites against terrorist attacks and should be a collective task to be pursued in a sustained and coordinated manner by relevant actors in Member States, including policymaking bodies, legislative authorities, law enforcement and emergency responders, as well as religious leaders, faith-based organizations, civil society groups and community members.

4.1 Member States

Whether they act in a strategic, policymaking, law enforcement or other operational capacity, Member States can employ a variety of approaches and measures to mitigate the risk of terrorism and manage crises affecting religious sites.

In performing these tasks, Member States must not only mobilize all the levels of government in which they are structured, based on clear divisions of tasks,²¹ but also ensure that all agencies concerned understand how faith communities are organized on their territory. This will help relevant government entities engage with religious leaders and others in fruitful dialogue and partnerships to prevent, prepare, respond to and recover from attacks against religious sites.

In whatever capacity they act, it is essential that governmental agencies continue abiding by international human rights law, especially at times of acute social tensions, such as in the wake of a terrorist attack against a religious site that is considered as a symbol of a country's identity.²² Some countries, for example, have experienced vigilante-like attacks against religious communities and symbols, campaigns of economic boycott and organized violence in the wake of such attacks.

4.1.1 Policymakers

Member States should ensure that comprehensive policy and regulatory frameworks are in place to protect religious sites against terrorist acts. The United Nations Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites identifies

21 This includes local and municipal authorities, which often have important roles to play in secure religious sites' surrounding areas (e.g., by imposing restrictions to park cars near houses of worship entrances at times of religious services, ensuring adequate street lighting, etc.).

22 Critically, government agencies need to do their utmost to prevent the stigmatization of entire religious groups on grounds that they sheltered or provided ideological cover to perpetrators of the terrorist act in question.

several areas that Member States should consider for preventive purposes and to enhance levels of preparedness of relevance to policymakers. These include:

- Develop multidisciplinary national plans anchored in the Sustainable Development Goals to prevent violent extremism, as and when conducive to terrorism;
- Mainstream gender in the design and implementation of plans and actions to prevent violent extremism, as and when conducive to terrorism;
- Invest in gender-sensitive research and data collection on women's roles in preventing violent extremism, as and when conducive to terrorism;
- Engage with religious leaders to promote respect and mutual understanding through interfaith activities;
- Encourage the promotion of interfaith and intercultural dialogue;
- Facilitate the involvement of civil society in strategies and programmes to prevent violent extremism, as and when conducive to terrorism, through the organization of workshops and other initiatives, and establish benchmarks to measure progress in the implementation of relevant strategies and programmes;
- Ensure that religious sites are defined as vulnerable targets and include them in relevant national strategies and plans;
- Review or strengthen existing national strategies and plans to make them more effective for safeguarding religious sites;
- Develop or strengthen national plans to include early-warning systems, emergency response, crisis management, security and resilience;
- Consider establishing, where appropriate, in accordance with national legislation and procedures, specialized units in central and local administrations to safeguard religious sites; and
- Carry out assessments of the respective roles and responsibilities of different entities at all levels of government, including at the local level, and develop and maintain relationships between various levels of government to ensure a multipronged and coordinated approach that fosters synergies among different actors with responsibilities in safeguarding religious sites.

The following sections highlight some specific action – and related case studies – that policymaking bodies should consider in preparing criminal legislation, addressing hate speech and conducting governmental surveys.



Case study 1.

Investigation into the terrorist attacks on Christchurch mosques by the Royal Commission of Inquiry – New Zealand

Following the terrorist attack of 15 March 2019 against two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, which resulted in 51 people killed and 40 injured, the Government established a Royal Commission of Inquiry to investigate and report on what had happened. The terms of reference instructed the Commission to investigate three broad areas: 1) the actions of the individual; 2) the actions of relevant public sector agencies; 3) any changes that could prevent such terrorist attacks in the future.

The process was conducted in private, which ensured the protection of sensitive information and the privacy of affected families, survivors and witnesses. At the same time, the Commission took steps to achieve a reasonable measure of transparency and, in this way, provide reassurance to the New Zealand public. For example, it undertook broad based engagement through meetings with New Zealand communities, including Muslim communities, and provided regular updates on progress through the Royal Commission's website. In respect of updates, it published the names of most of the people interviewed, procedural minutes, meeting notes from the Muslim Community Reference Group, and outlined each stage of the inquiry as it progressed.

The information-gathering process included:

1. Engaging with affected *whānau* survivors and witnesses;
2. Meeting with Muslim communities;
3. Meeting with ethnic and religious communities and interest groups;
4. Receiving submissions;
5. Requesting evidence from public-sector agencies;
6. Meeting with local authorities;
7. Meeting with the integrity agencies;
8. Requesting information from businesses;
9. Interviewing public-sector employees, including chief executives of the named public-sector agencies, under oath or affirmation;
10. Seeking information from relevant Australian organizations;
11. Meeting with and consulting experts;
12. Interviewing former and current ministers of the Crown; and
13. Interviewing the individual.

The Report contains 44 recommendations covered the following areas: a) improving New Zealand's counter-terrorism efforts; b) improving New Zealand's firearms licensing system; c) supporting the ongoing recovery needs of affected families, survivors and witnesses; d) improving New Zealand's response to its increasingly diverse population; and e) implementation of the recommendations.

Source: Royal Commission of Inquiry, 2020

4.1.1.1 Adopting and strengthening criminal legislation

In the counter-terrorism domain, Member States have the overarching obligation – stemming from relevant Security Council resolutions and international treaties – to

ensure that terrorist acts (and preparations therefor) are subject to criminal sanctions reflecting the grave nature of such offences. In practice, depending on the domestic legal framework, States have an array of provisions at their disposal to hold perpetrators responsible for attacks on religious sites through



criminal proceedings. In addition to legislation that criminalizes terrorist acts, countries may resort to general criminal statutes, typically dealing with arson or damage to property.²³ Sometimes a system of “aggravating circumstances” is applicable. In French legislation, for example, the general offence of property destruction, degradation or deterioration is subject to more severe sanctions when it concerns a house of worship.²⁴ The United States has followed a slightly different approach by enacting statutes that criminalize conduct against religious sites when such conduct is motivated by the religious nature of the property in question or the

religion professed by the victim.²⁵ Although these statutes do not specifically target the commission of terrorist acts, their scope of application is often broad enough to encompass conduct perpetrated with terrorist intention.

Separate bodies of law are often enacted to account for criminal acts targeting religious sites during armed conflict. These provisions implement specific requirements found in international humanitarian law treaties concerning cultural property more broadly and are largely regarded as codification of customary international law (see box 4).²⁶

23 The penal codes of several countries provide for offences against religious sentiment, profanation of houses of worship, interrupting religious ceremonies, etc. These provisions may be used for minor incidents and are usually inadequate to respond to the most egregious forms of violence and property destructions involving religious sites.

24 French Penal Code, article 322-3-1.

25 1996 Church Arson Prevention Act (18 US 247), which was amended by the 2018 Protecting Religiously Affiliated Institutions Act. This latter increased the criminal penalties for actions resulting in the damage or destruction of religious property, whose definition was also broadened to protect not only property owned by churches, but also “real property owned or leased by a nonprofit, religiously affiliated organization”.

26 The Criminal Code of Colombia, for example, punishes “whoever on the occasion and during the course of an armed conflict, without any justification based on imperative military needs and without having previously taken adequate and timely protection measures, attacks and destroys (...) places of worship that constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of the peoples, duly indicated with the conventional signs, or use such assets in support of the military effort (...)” (Article 156).



Box 4.

Religious sites under international humanitarian law

Under the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, the term “cultural property” covers, irrespective of origin or ownership, “movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people ... whether religious or secular”.

The Convention is complemented by two Protocols adopted in 1954 and 1999. The 1999 Protocol contains detailed provisions on criminal responsibility and jurisdiction (chapter 4).

The 1977 Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions contain obligations specifically concerning the protection of cultural objects and places of worship in times of armed conflict.

Furthermore, making clearly recognized places of worship the object of attack could constitute a grave breach pursuant to Article 85 (4) (d) of 1977 Additional Protocol I. Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, provided they are not military objectives, constitutes a war crime in international and non-international armed conflicts under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.





Case study 2.

Judgment of the International Criminal Court on the destruction of religious sites in Timbuktu, Mali

In the case *The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi*, the International Criminal Court found the defendant guilty of criminal acts occurring in the context of the non-international armed conflict in Mali.

Al Mahdi, who was very active in the Ansar Eddine and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb,²⁷ was convicted as a co-perpetrator of the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against religious and historic buildings in Timbuktu, including nine mausoleums and one mosque. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment in 2016.

In handing down its judgment, the Trial Chamber of the Court considered that “the mausoleums of saints and mosques of Timbuktu are an integral part of the religious life of its inhabitants. Timbuktu’s mausoleums and mosques constitute a common heritage for the community. These mausoleums are frequently visited by the residents – they are places of prayer and, for some, places of pilgrimage” (ICC 2016, para. 34). Accordingly, “the fact that the targeted buildings were not only religious buildings but had also a symbolic and emotional value for the inhabitants of Timbuktu is relevant in assessing the gravity of the crime committed” (para. 79).

Source: International Criminal Court



²⁷ The two groups took control of Timbuktu following the withdrawal of Malian Armed Forces in 2012.

4.1.1.2 Addressing hate speech

International human rights law prohibits any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility and violence.²⁸ However, hate speech may be harmful even when it does not constitute such incitement. Indeed, although advocacy to hatred may not per se be directly instigating someone to take violent action, the denigration element that it contains towards people professing a certain religion or symbols may play a decisive role in radicalizing individuals and convince someone to “cross the line” by engaging in terrorist conduct, including against religious sites.

In the 2019 United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, “hate speech” is understood as “as any kind of communication in speech, writing or behaviour, that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are, in other words, based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, colour, descent, gender or other identity factor”.²⁹ In the same document, the

Secretary-General underlines that “tackling hate speech is also crucial to deepen progress across the United Nations agenda by helping to prevent [inter alia] terrorism”.

In resolution 73/328 of 2019, the General Assembly identified interreligious and intercultural dialogue as the foundational element on which to build efforts to counter hate speech. Key recommendations addressed to Member States include:

- Identifying areas for practical action in all sectors and levels of society and engage with all relevant stakeholders for the promotion of interreligious and intercultural dialogue, tolerance, understanding and cooperation (paras. 3 and 4);
- Generating public awareness to enlighten the public about the dangers of intolerance and sectarian violence (para. 5);
- Encouraging religious and community leaders to engage in intra- and interfaith dialogue to respond to incitement to violence, discrimination and hate speech (para. 7).

28 Article 20.2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. According to the United Nations Strategy and Action Plan on Hate Speech, “there is no international legal definition of hate speech, and the characterization of what is ‘hateful’ is controversial and disputed”.

29 As stated by the General Assembly in resolution 73/328, hate speech should be condemned “whether it involves the use of print, audiovisual or electronic media, social media or any other means” (para. 2).



Case study 3.

“Public provocation” in the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism

The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, referring to Article 5 of the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, considers as good practice the criminalizing of incitement to terrorism and public provocation to commit acts of terrorism.³⁰

Article 5 – Public provocation to commit a terrorist offence

1. For the purposes of this Convention, “public provocation to commit a terrorist offence” means the distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence, where such conduct, whether or not directly advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed.
2. Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, as defined in paragraph 1, when committed unlawfully and intentionally, as a criminal offence under its domestic law.

Source: www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/196



Case study 4.

Recording hate incidents below the “crime threshold” – Alberta, Canada

In 2017, the Alberta Hate Crimes Committee launched the StopHateAB.ca website to encourage the reporting of hate incidents. The innovative aspect of this initiative is its focus on incidents that do not reach the legal thresholds necessary to be classified as criminal offences. As they do not fall within the radar of law enforcement agencies, they often go undocumented.

By providing an online form and an anonymous reporting channel for incident recording, the StopHateAB.ca website seeks to fill a void and create greater awareness about the impact of hate on communities in the province of Alberta. Information generated from the online platform is expected to support outreach and education initiatives of the Alberta Hate Crimes Committee.

Source: <https://stophateab.ca/>

³⁰ See A/HRC/16/51, paras 29-32

- Tackling hate speech is everyone’s responsibility – governments, civil society, the private sector – starting with individual women and men. We are all responsible and we must all act;
- In the digital age, the United Nations shall support a new generation of digital citizens, empowered to recognize, reject and stand up to hate speech;
- We need to know more to act effectively; therefore we need coordinated data collection and research, including on the root causes, drivers and conditions conducive to hate speech.



Tool 2.

Guidance note on addressing and countering hate speech related to COVID-19 – United Nations

(<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3863213>)

The rationale for this guidance note was the surge, during 2020, of false information and unsubstantiated theories attributing the spread of the COVID-19 virus to various religious, ethnic and minority groups. The fueling of discriminatory speech against members of those communities has sometimes resulted in the commission of hate crimes.

The guidance note identifies Member States as having the primary responsibility to tackle COVID-19-generated hate speech, and encourages them to, among others, implement robust public messaging against COVID-19-related hate speech; verify that communications by State officials are accurate and reliable; not put blame for the virus on any particular group; and ensure that discriminatory speech related to COVID-19 is addressed openly and critically through education and training.



Tool 3.

Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, 2012 (A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, Annex, Appendix)

(www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Articles19-20/Pages/Index.aspx)

Adopted in 2012, the Rabat Plan of Action consists of a series of recommendations stemming from a wide consultative process coordinated by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). It provides practical guidance for countries on how to implement the international prohibition of incitement to hatred in the areas of legislation, judicial practice and policy. The reference international standard is article 20.2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

OHCHR and freedom of expression vs incitement to hatred: the Rabat Plan of Action



The Rabat Plan of Action emphasizes the need to apply a “three-part test” (legality, proportionality and necessity) to legislation restricting freedom of expression, as well as a “six-part threshold test” to guide courts in determining when expressions of hatred should be regarded as criminal offences. As part of the evaluations needed to satisfy the six-part threshold test, courts in particular should consider the context in which the speech in question has been delivered, the speakers’ position, the content and form of the speech, its extent (public/non-public, size of the audience, etc.), as well as the likelihood that the action being advocated will occur.

The policy section of the Rabat Plan of Action features recommendations for strengthening cultural understanding as part of school curriculums for pupils of all ages, training security forces and criminal justice actors on issues concerning the prohibition of incitement to hatred in the setting up of mechanisms for the systematic collection of data related to hate offences.

4.1.1.3 Conducting government surveys

Improving reporting rates for hate crime and incidents clearly helps authorities better understand the nature and scale of the threat landscape affecting religious sites that may also lead to terrorist activity. Equally important towards this goal is the conduct of surveys as a complementary and potentially powerful source of information supporting threat and vulnerability assessments carried out by governmental agencies. When properly conducted, such

surveys may highlight issues and perspectives that would have otherwise gone undetected, particularly when their outcome is cross-checked with data contained in law enforcement databases, intelligence reports, etc. Surveys may also be useful tools in the context of broader initiatives for the engagement of community members in taking stock of existing security measures, as well as discussing and developing new approaches or fine-tuning current ones.



Case study 5.

Protecting places of worship – United Kingdom Home Office consultation

From 15 March to 29 April 2020, the Government of the United Kingdom conducted a public consultation aimed at increasing its understanding of current good practices and gaps in protecting places of worship. The consultation was a broad-based initiative soliciting input on the protection of not only places of worship, but also other faith-related locations such as schools and community centres. It targeted individuals, businesses and organizations in England and Wales, while guaranteeing respondents' anonymity. The survey envisaged various sets of questions in different thematic areas:

- Section 1: Scale and prevalence. Questions in this section were designed to draw a picture about the prevalence, scale and personal experiences related to hate crime.
- Section 2: Faith-specific needs. Questions in this section sought to understand who and when people within faith groups feel the most vulnerable.
- Section 3: Training and sharing of best practices. Questions in this section solicited views on how best to deliver security training, as well as the most effective ways to share knowledge with faith groups.
- Section 4: Roles and responsibilities. Questions in this section considered structures, arrangements and divisions of labor aimed at securing places of worship in view of the numerous players involved in the process.
- Section 5: Other means to improve security. In the final part of the consultation, respondents are encouraged to share any additional proposals to improve the security of religious sites and their congregants.

Source: www.gov.uk/government/consultations/protecting-places-of-worship-consultation

4.1.2 Law enforcement

An outstanding challenge for law enforcement authorities in protecting religious sites is the sheer number of places falling within their remit.³¹ The protection effort is further complicated by lack of homogeneity in terms of religious sites' location, size and levels of vulnerability. Those found in urban areas may be more easily and quickly reached than those in remote parts of a country. On the other hand, terrorist attacks against religious sites in densely populated urban centres raise other sets of complex issues, such as a higher risk of simultaneous multiple attacks targeting other vulnerable sites in the same area, or the presence of traffic jams potentially obstructing enforcement and rescue operations. Different approaches to increased security by different religious communities in their respective religious sites is also a factor to take into consideration.

Against this backdrop, law enforcement agencies can contribute to the protection of religious sites in numerous ways:

- The role of law enforcement agencies is essential throughout the whole protection cycle, starting with their support in security planning by operators of religious sites, to training that benefits members of congregations, and their intervention during an unfolding crisis or its aftermath. The police, for example, can advise religious institutions on points of vulnerabilities, secure perimeters and patrol sensitive zones to prevent and deter attacks.

- Law enforcement engagement on protecting religious sites needs to take into account gender considerations and other community and religious factors that may have an impact on the quality and sustainability of the engagement itself. It is also important to avoid engaging with one religious community so as not to exacerbate tensions with other communities which may feel that they are not receiving the same amount of support.
- Law enforcement agencies are key actors in the elaboration of nationwide and local threat assessments.³² The proper collection and reporting of instances of hate crimes and incidents by law enforcement is a prerequisite to ensure that an understanding of the threat landscape affecting religious sites is developed as accurately as possible (see box 5).³³ This knowledge, in turn, enables the mobilization of law enforcement resources towards the right locations at the right time.
- In addition to building trust with religious leaders to facilitate sharing of knowledge about perceived threats and report crimes, the development of solid and long-term links between law enforcement agencies and religious institutions also allows the former to determine when religious sites are most vulnerable – for example, on the occasion of religious festivities – and thus warrant increased security measures. The United Nations Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites encourages local law enforcement authorities to connect with religious leaders “to build trust and cooperation, and regularly

31 Italy, for example, counts 26,373 houses of worship (Marioli, 2020).

32 The United Nations Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites identifies a specific role for law enforcement agencies in “identifying the signs of a potentially volatile situation and help religious sites proactively seek to prevent an incident from escalating”.

33 Law enforcement agencies should process not only reported incidents categorized as being religiously motivated. Other bias motivators need to be considered as well. The racial bias, for example, can by itself represent a sufficient motive to attack religious sites, especially when the religious community that gravitates towards them is homogeneous from an ethnic standpoint.

discuss with religious leaders the threat environment”.

- Especially when law enforcement capacities are stretched, law enforcement agencies should conduct regular engagement

(e.g., awareness-raising, training, operational advice) with private security contractors and/or congregants discharging security-related functions to ensure that they can effectively exercise their roles.



Box 5. Reporting and recording hate crime

Victims of hate-motivated harassment and violence do not always report their experiences to the police, which may in turn lead, among others, to an underestimation of the threat scenario potentially leading to the commission of terrorist acts.³⁴ Even when they receive victims' complaints, law enforcement agencies may not be supported by a proper legislative framework for identifying and recording such incidents. In other cases, they may not sufficiently trained to recognize them as being the result of religious, racial or other types of biases. Lack of familiarity with the subject may be a manifestation of a broader institutional context that does not provide enough incentives to ensure the “emergence” of hate-based crime – starting from the unavailability of adequate operating procedures and report forms for use by front-line officers. According to research on hate crime recording and data collection practice across European Union countries, “hate crimes remain unidentified or unrecorded and thus uninvestigated, unprosecuted, uncounted and, ultimately, invisible. The ramifications are multilayered and mutually reinforcing. Law enforcement and policymakers may underestimate the scale and nature of the problem” (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2018, p. 3).

³⁴ Further, research indicates that women are even less likely to report harassment and violence to the police, and that when they do speak up, law enforcement tends to take them less seriously than reports by men.

At the same time, outreach campaigns and heightened awareness about the problem can contribute to changing reporting habits. This appears to have occurred in Canada, where the general uptick in recorded numbers is attributed partly to an objective increase in the amount of hate crimes being committed, and partly to the public being more inclined to report. According to Canada's latest official statistics, "in 2019, 608 hate crimes targeting religion were reported by police, down 7 per cent compared with 2018. Although this was the second year-over-year decrease in a row, following a peak of 842 incidents in 2017, the number was higher than those recorded prior to 2017. Victimization information has shown that people affiliated with a non-Christian religion were significantly more likely than Christians to report having experienced discrimination on the basis of their religion (11 per cent versus per cent)" (Statistics Canada, 2019).



Case study 6.

Clergy-law enforcement liaison programmes across the United States

In 2011, the Memphis Police Department established a Clergy-Police Academy (CLPA). The initiative consists of a 12-hour curriculum aimed at building stronger relationships and understanding between religious leaders and law enforcement officials. CLPA has been instrumental in facilitating the sharing of vital information in the crime prevention field.



Similarly, the New York City Police Department runs a clergy liaison programme, based on the premise that the participants' close connections to the community place them in a unique position to identify and intervene in locally sensitive issues without delay. Selected by local police commanders after completing the 10-week citizens-police academy, clergy liaisons participate in a variety of activities, such as precinct role calls and community council meetings.

Several other similar initiatives have been implemented across the United States.

Source: www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/administrative/clergy-liaisons.page



Tool 4.

Preventing terrorism and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism: A community-policing approach, OSCE, 2014
(www.osce.org/files/f/documents/1/d/111438.pdf)

The guide is centred around a “community policing” approach whereby law enforcement derives its strength and legitimacy through close partnerships with local communities and emphasis on the police’s role in delivering services to the public. Section 5.4.5 is specifically devoted to police engagement with faith-based organizations and religious leaders. Among the benefits of such engagement, is the possibility for the police to:

- better understand their communities and tailor their outreach initiatives;
- become aware of the presence of individuals or materials circulating within their community that provide narratives justifying terrorism;
- assess whether such narratives are gaining traction with particular individuals.

One of the challenges faced by law enforcement is the fact that there may be a history of tension and distrust between the State and religious communities, with real and/or perceived grievances related to discriminatory profiling practices by the police. The guide also highlights the complex dynamics that many religious communities face, with divisions based on ethnic, cultural, linguistic or doctrinal differences, as well as competition among leaders, factions and organizations.

The guide recommends a series of practices for successful police engagement, including:

- developing and basing engagement on an accurate understanding of local demographics, dynamics and the complexities of religious communities;

- explaining how the proactive involvement of religious leaders and faith-based organizations in preventing terrorism is in the interest of safeguarding communities; and
- making every effort not to be seen to favour one group over another but engaging with leaders and organizations from all religions and encouraging them to mobilize jointly.



Tool 5.

Advice for preventing criminal acts: securing houses of worship, information brochure, Ministry of Interior, France (in French)

([www.referentsurete.fr/wa_files/plaquette information les lieux de culte version 2020.pdf](http://www.referentsurete.fr/wa_files/plaquette_information_les_lieux_de_culte_version_2020.pdf))

This practical information leaflet was developed in the framework of a broader programme called “*Référent Sûreté*” (safety reference). Under this initiative, specifically trained personnel of the French gendarmerie provide advice and assistance to owners/operators of vulnerable targets in drawing up situation reports and determining weak points for risk mitigation purposes.



Tool 6.

Practical guides and resources on combating hate crime, European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA)

- **Hate Crime Recording and Data Collection Practice Across the European Union, 2018** (<https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2018/hate-crime-recording-and-data-collection-practice-across-eu>)

The recording and data collection practices gathered in this tool rely on consistent jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights, according to which, State authorities have a positive duty to render visible the bias motivation of a crime on the basis of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which sets a general clause prohibiting discrimination on various grounds, including religion. By illustrating practices from countries of the European Union, the report aims to provide police investigators, managers, hate crime officers and policymakers with a practical resource to enhance their efforts to improve their domestic recording and data collection systems. It includes step-by-step descriptions and insights to support readers in the identification of elements that can be adapted for use in national contexts.

(continued)

- **Compendium of Practices for Combating Hate Crime, FRA**
(<https://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/hate-crime/compendium-practices>)

The Compendium is a freely accessible tool. Users may search by scrolling through the practices, which are listed alphabetically, or by country and/or category. Since it is online, the Compendium is a living document that is kept up to date as new practices are collected and uploaded. It is the key output of the Working Party on Improving Reporting and Recording of Hate Crime in the European Union.³⁵

Examples of practices featured in the Compendium include the creation of specialized police units, obligations for investigating officers to prove bias motives and document the result in cases of violent crime, the establishment of observatories and hotlines encouraging the reporting and recording of a crime, requirements for law enforcement to report incidents nationally and send reports to Parliament each year.

4.1.3 First responders

The United Nations Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites prompts Member States to “ensure that comprehensive measures are in place for the immediate response to an attack in order to mitigate its impact” (UNAOC, 2019, p. 19). Similar to law enforcement, first responders (e.g., fire, rescue services) should seek to proactively liaise with religious leaders in order to understand the specific features of the sites under their responsibility and thus be in a position to more speedily and effectively intervene in case of an emergency.³⁶ For example, first responders may encourage those in charge of religious sites to share with them advance information about site features and propose that they conduct security drills and exercises. They may also significantly contribute to shaping crisis management plans by better preparing staff and congregants in prevention, reaction and response procedures.

First responders’ task of providing support to religious leaders and those in charge of religious sites may be facilitated by the fact that some religious communities already implement procedures and carry out drills to address incidents, such as fires. Having individual congregants already sensitized about general safety issues makes it easier for emergency responders to build a “security culture” on top of the existing safety-related body of knowledge and practice.

It is advisable for all first responders to have knowledge of the basic specific rules and practices pertaining to religious sites, as well as to understand where they, themselves, could become potential victims of secondary attacks. Collaboration and dialogue with those in charge of religious sites can contribute to improving relationships and have implications for evacuation planning or emergency response.

35 The Working Party is composed of all member States of the European Union, the European Commission, the Council of Europe’s Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR) and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA).

36 For instance, in the course of an informal site inspection, fire department officials may take note of shelter/escape routes or observe the presence of annexed facilities hosting children or disabled people for whom specific emergency plans might need to be drawn.



Case study 7.

Partnership between the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency and the American Red Cross

In 2020, the United States Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the American Red Cross renewed their Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) outlining the framework for both entities to cooperate throughout all phases of the disaster cycle with respect to preparedness, operational readiness, response and recovery operations in the event of a natural disaster, act of terrorism or man-made disaster.

Operationally, FEMA and the Red Cross commit to coordinate with other mass care partners to identify the most critical needs, carry out mass care capability assessments, organize joint training and exercises to improve and evaluate mass care capabilities, and provide mass care technical assistance to states and non-governmental organizations before, during and after a disaster has occurred.

Source: https://nationalmasscarestrategy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/FEMA_MOA-2020.pdf



Tool 7.

Guide for developing high-quality emergency operations plans for houses of worship, United States Government, 2013

(www.fbi.gov/file-repository/developing_eops_for_houses_of_worship_final.pdf/view)

The Guide provides practical information on emergency preparedness for the full spectrum of threats and hazards to which religious sites are subject. It discusses actions that may be taken before, during and after an incident in order to reduce the impact on property and any loss of life. To this end, it encourages emergency responders and faith-based organizations to develop close partnerships.



Tool 8.

Working with faith communities in the United States during crises, disasters and public health emergencies: A field guide for engagement, partnerships and religious competency, National Disaster Interfaiths Network (NDIN) and University of Southern California Center for Religion and Civic Culture, 2015

(<https://crcc.usc.edu/files/2015/02/FieldGuide-LoRes.pdf>)

Drawing from best practices and lessons learned during response and recovery operations throughout various disasters and public health emergencies in the United States, the Field Guide highlights religious literacy as a vital skill for all government and local provider agencies committed to helping faith groups to build more disaster-resilient communities.



Accordingly, a strong case is made for “the establishment of, at minimum, a highly religiously literate and competent dedicated government liaison to national, state or local faith communities – similar to staffing to address populations with disabilities or access and functional needs. This position would be responsible for further establishing religious literacy and competency within an agency, as well as in outreach efforts, planning documents and mass care operations. This function might be supported best by a regional or state governmental advisory committee or a staff team that supports local faith community liaisons with exceptional skills in religious literacy and competency, and that is responsible for sharing those skills and that knowledge with others in the agency as they work to engage faith communities in building a more resilient citizenry” (p. 17).



Tool 9.

Disaster Tip Sheets for Faith Community Partners - National Disaster Interfaith Network (NDIN)

(<https://n-din.org/disaster-tips-sheets-for-faith-community-partners-sheltering-mass-care/>)

In 2012, NDIN, in partnership with the University of Southern California Center for Religion and Civic Culture (USC-CRCC), launched the “Be a Ready Congregation Partner” campaign. Key to this initiative are the NDIN “Disaster Tip Sheets for Faith Community Partners”. The tip sheets provide basic notions about five religious communities (Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims, Jews and Sikhs), and are aimed at assisting public agencies and volunteers to competently meet the needs of minority faith communities during disaster response or recovery operations – whether at a government or private shelter, a shelter in houses of worship or other religious facility.

4.1.4 Intelligence agencies

Intelligence agencies are pivotal in undertaking analysis and assessing the overall threat level and the intent and capabilities of the terrorist groups operating in the country. They are critical for monitoring transactions, conversations, movements of individuals and goods, etc., which may be indicative of terrorist acts being prepared against religious sites. As data are gathered and processed about threats on specific religious sites, appropriate levels of coordination and information-sharing between intelligence and

law enforcement agencies need to be implemented in accordance with applicable legal frameworks.

With due respect for freedom of speech and assembly, and applicable national and international legal frameworks, preventing terrorist activity against religious sites requires that intelligence agencies monitor the Internet – especially social media platforms – for signs of individuals’ radicalization that may be inclined towards violent behaviour. Special challenges are clearly posed by those

engaged in self-radicalization processes and lack any official affiliation with terrorist groups. The difficulties are compounded by the fact that perpetrators are often individuals who are not affiliated with any terrorist group and who leave few or very light trace of their preparatory conduct. Over the past few years, the perpetrators of various successful attacks against religious sites have relied on rudimentary weapons and very limited planning, making their early detection even more challenging. Furthermore, the negligible amounts of money that is often involved in the preparatory stage of such attacks make the use of financial intelligence less relevant, limiting the ability of competent authorities to detect suspicious behaviour through the analysis of financial flows.

In order to prevent attacks against religious sites, it is thus essential for intelligence agencies to draw relevant information from a pool of heterogenous sources in a way that is consistent with fundamental human rights and freedoms. The United Nations Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites encourages Member States to “conduct

risk assessments on threats against religious sites regularly based on all available information from government and nongovernment sources” (UNAOC, 2019, p. 19).

Reliance on human sources is essential to ensure that intelligence agencies draw an accurate picture of the nature and level of threats against religious sites at the local level. For example, countries could establish bottom-up approaches whereby the local knowledge developed by grassroots organizations, religious leaders, members of congregations, among others, is collected and examined against data stemming from other sources.³⁷ Conversely, intelligence agencies need to disclose as much information as possible to those in charge of security at the level of individual religious sites, so as to enable them to fine-tune local security plans and arrange for adequate contingency measures. A delicate balance will often need to be found to ensure that threat scenarios are communicated in a way that supports security enhancements by individual religious without compromising confidential intelligence sources, surveillance methods, and other security aids.



Box 6.

Signs of pre-operational criminal activity against religious sites

Drawing on open-source research involving 37 incidents of targeted violence against religious sites that occurred in the United States between 2009 and 2019, the United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) concluded that, in a significant number of cases, perpetrators had engaged in some form of pre-operational contact with their future religious site targets. For example, many had posted threatening messages or made their intentions explicit via social media. In other cases, some had been purchasing ingredients needed to manufacture improvised explosive devices that were subsequently used in attacks.

Source: United States Department of Homeland Security

³⁷ At the same time, human sources should be used with caution, taking into account the personal and physical threat that may arise to individuals, especially in close-knit communities.

4.2 Non-governmental actors

4.2.1 Religious leaders

Religious leaders are individuals recognized as having authority within a particular religious community, whether or not they are ordained members of a clergy. Thanks to their position and charismatic behaviour, they can be powerful influencers and promoters of initiatives aimed at de-escalating religious tensions, offering counter-narratives to mitigate the attractiveness of extremist propaganda and reducing the appeal of hate speech which may be conducive to terrorism against religious sites.

The United Nations Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites contains specific recommendations for religious leaders to assist in the prevention of, and preparedness and response to attacks against religious sites, notably:

- Proactively and regularly engage in inter-faith dialogue, including the promotion of solidarity and resilience;
- Reach out within their own community to individuals or groups who may be prone to radicalization and possible recruitment by violent extremist groups and terrorist organizations;
- Engage with women and youth, in particular, to build strong counter-narratives to hatred and alienation;
- Promote education initiatives to highlight the role of religious sites in bringing people together, with special focus on education activities at the local level involving youth and communities living around religious sites;
- Discuss issues of contemporary relevance with the congregation and educate them about other religions and cultural diversity to promote interreligious dialogue, understanding, mutual respect and peace;
- Stay engaged and be vocal and active when religious sites and worshippers from other religions and faiths are targeted;
- Actively and proactively engage on social media to reach out to a variety of users;
- Develop media content, including through the creation or strengthening of websites to make religious texts and messages accessible to a wider audience and provide answers to challenges related to social exclusion, annihilation, and hatred;
- Use their influence to persuade those with whom they hold influence to avoid inflammatory speech;
- Conduct risk assessments and prioritize targets accordingly;
- Engage in regular information sharing with governments;
- Hold regular discussions with worshippers about the importance of preparation and early-warning;
- Share information with law enforcement and first responders about the particular features and characteristics of religious sites in preparation for a possible attack and subsequent emergency response;
- Facilitate engagement of law enforcement officers with the community to enhance trust. In particular, facilitate training by law enforcement to assist worshippers and religious leaders into detecting threats and potential attacks and devising effective responses that can reduce the consequences of an attack; and
- Acting in coordination with Member States, develop joint training sessions, communication networks, information-sharing and early-warning mechanisms.



Case study 8. **Agreement between the Muslim World League and the Appeal of Conscience Foundation, 2019**

The parties to the Agreement signed on 29 April 2019 undertake to join efforts to elevate the level of advocacy for the protection of religious sites worldwide, irrespective of the faith under consideration, and broadly including houses of worship, veneration or commemoration. The parties specifically commit to build stronger bonds between their respective institutions as well as encourage religious leaders over whom they hold sway to condemn any form of speech that may be inflammatory or violate the sanctity of human life.



The preamble informs that the agreement was adopted following a spate of terrorist attacks against various religious sites, including the Chabad of Poway Synagogue in California during Passover, several churches in Sri Lanka on Easter Sunday, the Al-Noor Mosque and the Linwood Islamic Centre in New Zealand, and the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pennsylvania, United States of America, and other violent acts at Houses of Worship.

Source: <https://appealofconscience.org/agreement-between-the-muslim-world-league-and-appeal-of-conscience-foundation/>



Case study 9. **Marrakesh Declaration, 2016**

The Marrakesh Declaration illustrates the proactive engagement of religious leaders in protecting minority faiths in predominantly Muslim-majority communities. The Declaration is the outcome document of the gathering in January 2016 of hundreds of scholars, representatives of governments, international organizations and various nationalities, and leaders of diverse religious communities in Marrakesh, Morocco. The Declaration's source of inspiration was the Charter of Medina³⁸ with its underlying principles of religious freedom and pluralism.



38 The Charter of Medina was drawn up on behalf of the Prophet Muhammad shortly after his arrival at Medina in 622 CE.

A key action of the Declaration is the call upon Muslim scholars around the world to develop a jurisprudence of the concept of “citizenship” that is inclusive of diverse religious groups. The Declaration also urges Muslim educational institutions and authorities to conduct a review of educational curricula and address any material that instigates aggression and extremism.

Source: <https://www.marrakeshdeclaration.org/>



Case study 10. **The Abrahamic Family House**

In Abu Dhabi, interreligious dialogue spurred by the meeting in 2019 between Pope Francis and the Grand Imam of al-Azhar will soon give rise to a multi-faith complex hosting a mosque, a church and a synagogue. Commissioned by the Higher Committee for Human Fraternity, the “Abrahamic Family House” is expected to serve both as a place of individual worship and a space for interreligious dialogue and exchange through the creation of a museum and education centre. One of the objectives of the initiative is to show – by means of a monumental architectural project – that the peaceful coexistence of the three religions is possible, contributing to a general de-escalation of inter-religious tensions and thus – indirectly – also reducing the appeal of terrorism.

The complex will consist of three large buildings sharing common architectural features while preserving features rooted in the histories of all three faiths.

Source: Gomes, 2021





Case study 11.

Mohammed VI Institute for the training of Imams and Morchidates³⁹

Sensitizing and training religious leaders to propagate a tolerant vision of their faiths is an essential tool to mitigate the risk of individuals developing extremist behaviour that may result in terrorist acts.

In Morocco, the Mohammed VI Institute trains some 777 students of 32 nationalities from Africa, Asia and Europe. Students take courses on religious education supplemented by language, computer, humanities and human rights instruction at the rate of 30 hours per week. The Institute notably aims to provide its trainees with the skills and knowledge to communicate the provisions of Islamic sharia by explaining its purposes and highlighting the values of tolerance and moderation.

Sources: Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), 2016; Permanent Mission of Morocco to the United Nations



Tool 10.

Universal Code of Conduct on Holy Sites

(www.codeonholysites.org/)

Developed by a coalition of civil society organizations,⁴⁰ the Code sets forth a policy framework to enhance the protection of holy sites and promote interfaith dialogue and reconciliation. Launched in 2011, it is currently adhered to by senior religious leaders from more than 10 faiths and several religious institutions.

In article 1 of the Code, Holy Sites are defined as “places of religious significance to particular religious communities. They include, but are not limited to, places of worship, cemeteries and shrines, incorporating their immediate surroundings when these form an integral part of the site. ...holy sites are places of defined and limited area that are designated as such by each religious community and in agreement with the relevant public authorities, according to its diverse heritages and customs, recognizing also that a single site can be sacred to more than one community” (art. 1).

³⁹ “Morchidates” are Moroccan women preachers.

⁴⁰ Oslo Centre for Peace and Human Rights, One Word in Dialogue, Religions for Peace and Search for Common Ground.



Tool 11.

Fez Process and Plan of Action for religious leaders to prevent incitement to violence

(www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/Plan_of_Action_Religious_Prevent_Incite.pdf)

The Fez Process refers to a series of extensive expert consultations held between April 2015 and December 2016 organized under the auspices of the Office of the United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.⁴¹ The resulting Plan of Action encourages religious leaders to prevent and counter incitement to violence, especially – but not exclusively – in situations potentially leading to the commission of atrocity crimes. The recommendations are arranged into nine thematic groups and three main clusters:

Prevent:

1. Specific actions to prevent and counter incitement to violence;
2. Prevent incitement to violent extremism;
3. Prevent incitement to gender-based violence;

Strengthen:

4. Enhance education and capacity-building;
5. Foster interfaith and intra-faith dialogue;
6. Strengthen collaboration with traditional and new media;
7. Strengthen engagement with regional and international partners;

Build:

8. Build peaceful, inclusive and just societies through respecting, protecting and promoting human rights;
9. Establish networks of religious leaders.

⁴¹ The Fez Process builds on a specific recommendation contained in the Rabat Plan of Action (see tool 3) for countries to go beyond legal responses to incitement and begin in-depth discussions about the specific role that religious leaders can play.



4.2.2 Civil society organizations

Over the past few years, a wide range of civil society organizations have been supporting religious communities through projects and initiatives that directly or indirectly contribute to the protection of religious sites from a security perspective. While some of those initiatives focus on specific faith groups, others take an interfaith perspective with activities ranging from the establishment of “connecting bridges” between religious institutions and law-enforcement to action aimed at incentivizing the reporting of hate crime and incidents and spearheading the adoption of policy and institutional frameworks to facilitate inter-religious collaboration.

Within the community of civil society organizations, faith-based organizations have a pivotal role to play in protecting religious

sites against terrorist acts. As entities based on the social values of the particular faith they represent, faith-based organizations can play an important role in the identification of threats to religious sites and related vulnerabilities. To do so, information needs to be actively sought from such heterogeneous sources as law enforcement agencies, social media groups linking locally based faith-based organizations,⁴² individuals’ reporting unusual behaviour, etc. Signs of an increasingly biased environment against certain faiths should also be promptly fed into threat assessments as well as indications of pre-operational activities.

Lessons learned from past incidents – involving the same or other sites – need to be internalized as well as the idea that the threat landscape is constantly evolving, requiring regular adjustments to security plans and

⁴² The establishment of information-sharing platforms among faith-based organizations – whether from the same or different religious groups – may have potential for other purposes as well, including the activation of emergency plans when an incident occurs in the neighborhood and the exchange of best practices (United Kingdom Home Office, 2020).

a willingness to question previous assumptions. Threats scenarios may even change as a direct result of the security measures put in place. For example, one could reasonably expect an increase in attacks conducted outside the premises of houses of worship to the extent that the interior of the building becomes better protected (e.g., by means of a security door). This clearly points to the need for faith-based organizations to carry out threat and vulnerability assessments as

dynamic exercises and on a regular basis in collaboration with other relevant actors.

Whether it aims at risk mitigation or crisis management, security planning by faith-based organizations needs to take into account the specific features and characteristics of their members. Also, different categories of people can be present at the site at different times of the day or may use different facilities.



Box 7.

Gender-sensitive security planning for religious sites

Under the United Nations Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites, Member States are encouraged to “mainstream gender in the design and implementation of plans and actions to prevent violent extremism and as when conducive to terrorism” as well as “invest in gender-sensitive research and data collection on women’s roles in preventing violent extremism as and when conducive to terrorism.” In the design of security plans, for example, it should be considered that during official services and celebrations women and men may be sitting separately from each other, including in different rooms.

Security needs assessment for each religious site shall also be conducted taking into consideration the overall range of activities offered (e.g., volunteering and nursery activities), who is actually participating in each activity, as well as any specific feature/sign (such as the clothing) characterizing participating members that may increase their vulnerability.

Physical security measures constitute a critical line of defense⁴³ Attitudes towards these, however, vary significantly depending on the religious community under consideration, reflecting deep-seated historical, cultural and theological peculiarities.⁴⁴ An overarching challenge for faith-based organizations is to reconcile the security imperative with the need for religious sites to remain the open and welcoming places that define their very nature and purpose.⁴⁵

It should be noted that the implementation of basic security measures often requires minimal capital investment. At the same time, when budgets are tight and external financial support unavailable or insufficient, faith-based organizations may leverage available spaces, as well as their close connections with local communities, to organize non-religious events within their premises (e.g., a concert) and use its proceeds to fund the necessary security-upgrade purposes.

Faith-based organizations can take advantage of their connections within local communities for broader prevention and preparedness purposes. The United Nations Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites recommends that civil society organizations:

- organize community-level initiatives and help disseminate information about preparedness and response to attacks to religious sites;

- promote initiatives for intra- and interfaith dialogue that foster intercommunal understanding, help resolve differences and build community resilience;
- develop coalitions of civil society organizations to work with individuals and communities vulnerable to radicalization.

Several religious sites may also serve as meeting places for non-religious groups, recreational activities, election polling stations, etc. Their involvement in local communities' daily social life can be leveraged to sensitize and create awareness about security issues, recruit volunteers to assist in security planning, etc.

Faith-based organizations and other civil society organizations have an important role to play not only in security planning and risk mitigation, but also as disaster relief centres. In particular, faith-based organizations found in areas frequently hit by catastrophic events (e.g., hurricanes, flooding) may have already gained first-hand experience on crisis management, and be able to apply that knowledge to attacks against religious sites.

From a crisis management perspective, faith-based organizations may thus be critical in providing a service to the broader community in which they operate, particularly in the event of a terrorist attack hitting a religious site belonging to a different faith, or a different type of vulnerable targets in the same neighborhood.

43 When security measures need to be introduced outside the premises/perimeter of the religious site in question, reaching out to the authorities in charge of those spaces becomes a necessity, too.

44 Jewish organizations, for example, are often cited as being more inclined than other faith-based organizations to accept the presence of visible security arrangements. Some of them have invested significant amounts of resources to purchase protective equipment for synagogues or communal facilities, ranging from high fencing and gates to door-access cameras, etc.

45 In some Middle Eastern countries, mega-religious complexes have been built to suit the needs of large expatriate populations. In some cases, Christian churches have been grouped together in a compound-like setting on the outskirts of cities. Public access is via security checkpoints, and parking lots are placed outside complex perimeters. Once inside campus, worshippers simply go to the church of their choice. The fact that no religious symbols are visible from a distance is intended to inject an element of discretion, reducing the potential for those religious spaces to entice would-be attackers (Hesterman, 2019, p. 352).

Many faith-based organizations have the status of non-profit entities and very small budgets available. Typically, their limited resources are used to pay for the basic operations of the facilities and the provision of social services to congregants and surrounding communities. In this context, a recurrent difficulty stems for the financial burdens created by the imperative to introduce sometimes costly security improvements, especially – albeit but not exclusively – physical security. It is thus critical that faith-based

organizations look for funding mechanisms and grants that may be available to cover in total or in part the expenses needed for compulsory and/or recommended security enhancements. At the same time, it is important for them to leverage to the greatest extent possible the time as well as the specific security-related competencies and skills that members of congregations may be able and willing to contribute for security purposes.



Box 8.
The SOAR programme

The “Strengthening the security and resilience of at-risk religious sites and communities” (SOAR) programme seeks to advance the protection and safeguarding of places for worship. It is funded and supported by the European Commission and implemented by Enhancing Faith Institutions (EFI), the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers and Architects’ Council of Europe. The United Nations Alliance of Civilizations will chair an advisory board to provide strategic advice and support. Based on primary research, the programme aims to identify the threat of terrorist attack on places of worship and the risk of religious communities being victims of hate crimes. A key programme component will focus on promoting the “security by design” concept to the protection of religious institutions. National, regional and local training will be provided, including for 1,100 religious leaders and security officers, and on-site training with over 1,500 leaders, security officers, women and young people. Notably, the project aims to run a survey to better understand the needs and perspectives of women and young people, in terms of their engagement with local communities and how to improve local communities’ security. The insight of those who had firsthand experience of the threat or actual terrorist attacks and hate crimes will be engaged to enhance regional level policy-dialogue.

The programme will be implemented over 2021–2023 in seven pilot European Union member States.

Source: <https://soarproject.eu/>



Case study 12.

Civil society's interface between faith-based organizations and law enforcement

“One congregation, one Precinct” (OneCOP) is a United States-based initiative that facilitates the creation of mutually beneficial relationships between local law enforcement authorities and congregations of all faiths. This includes, notably, organizing meetings on crime and violence prevention/solving efforts, hosting public safety briefings, providing cultural and sensitivity training, holding community safety workshops and hosting forums designed to smooth the relationship between and better connect citizens and law enforcement.

The OneCOP Initiative was launched in July 2016 after a series of high-profile violent crimes affecting religious sites in the Atlanta area, United States, prompted clergy leaders to seek a deeper level of engagement with law enforcement authorities based on a culture of cooperation, and reciprocal respect. Today, OneCOP is established in various cities across the United States.

Some civil society organizations are playing the role of interface between faith-based organizations and law-enforcement agencies in relation to specific religious communities. The Secure community Network, for example, performs this function vis-à-vis the American Jewish community on safety and security issues. This includes its role in facilitating information exchange on threat and incidents, developing and assisting in the implementation of strategic frameworks, best practices and coordination in training and educational program.

Sources: <https://movementforward.org/onecop/> and www.securecommunitynetwork.org/





Case study 13.

Registry of attacks on holy sites in the Holy Land

From 2013 to 2016, Search for Common Ground (Jerusalem Office) and the Council of Religious Institutions of the Holy Land have run a pilot project aimed at monitoring, categorizing and recording attacks on religious sites in the Holy Land. Searching through the database, which features open-source information dating back to 2011, users can find the exact date and location of an attack, the nature of the crime involved, links to online media reports and information on subsequent police investigations. A Google map shows the exact geo-localization of all listed incidents. The Registry has been used as a platform to compile statistics and understand attack trends and dynamics. It can be consulted online.

Source: www.sfcg.org/registry-of-attacks-on-holy-sites-in-the-holy-land/



Case study 14.

Working through the legislative process: experience of the Muslim-Jewish Advisory Council

The American Muslim-Jewish Advisory Council (MJAC) is an interreligious coordination body whose mission is to sensitive elected public officials to the need to adopt specific pieces of legislation on issues of common concerns to both religious communities. In the course of its advocacy activities targeting United States policymaking bodies,

(continued)

MJAC has played a key role in securing the passage of the 2019 Protecting Religiously Affiliated Institutions Act, which increased the penalty for actions leading to damage or destruction of religious property and extended the existing definition of “religious real property”. Currently, MJAC is an active promoter of the No Hate Act, a piece of legislation that aims to, among others, create incentives for hate crime reporting and provide grants for State-run hate crime hotlines.

Source: www.muslimjewishadvocacy.org/about-us/



Case study 15.

Security enhancements – Pittsburgh, United States, and Halle, Germany

Despite the loss of life resulting from the mass-shooting involving a synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States,⁴⁶ it appears that a security review conducted a few weeks before the attack helped to save lives. After the review, for example, the temple’s previously blocked emergency exits were cleared. Also, following a security training, the rabbi of the synagogue agreed exceptionally to keep his cell phone available on the Shabbat. Thanks to this precaution, he was able to promptly call the emergency services as soon as the shooting began.

A year later, a terrorist attack targeted another synagogue in Halle, Germany, during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. Despite repeated shooting and use of an improvised bomb, the locked, bulletproof door of the synagogue could not be knocked down. Barricaded inside, the congregants were not harmed.⁴⁷ Crucially, the temple’s door had been reinforced through a grant from Security Assistance Fund of the Jewish Agency for Israel.

Source: www.fbi.gov/news/stories/faith-leaders-gather-at-FBI-062019

46 The shooting took place on 27 October 2018, during Shabbat morning services, at the Tree of Life – Or L'Simcha Congregation. The attack resulted in 11 people dead and six wounded. The perpetrator was shot multiple times by police, and arrested on the spot.

47 While these enhancements were critical in preventing the armed man from accessing the building, they could unfortunately not prevent him from fatally shooting two people and wounding two more in the neighbourhood and while he was being chased by the police.



Case study 16.

High holiday tickets

As part of the accrued security measures implemented on the occasion of High Holidays, when a large influx of people is expected to flow into religious sites, many Jewish institutions require the purchase of High Holiday tickets as a condition for admission to services. Although the system is not per se sufficient to prevent malicious actors from accessing places of worships, it adds to other lines of defenses by allowing a preliminary identity screening of those who wish to attend. Some precautions may help to make sites more secure, such as adding anti-counterfeiting features to the ticket documents, or identifying a trustworthy ticket seller whenever intermediaries are relied upon.

Sources: United Jewish Communities and others, 2016



Case study 17.

Grant programmes for faith-based communities in Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States

- **Canada: Security Infrastructure Programme (SIP)**

SIP is available to private and not-for-profit entities that are at risk of being victimized by hate-motivated crime. Approved projects may receive up to 50 per cent of the total project costs, and applicants must demonstrate that they are able to provide at least the other half of the total cost. Eligible costs typically include security assessments, renovations directly related to enhancing the security of the building, security equipment and hardware costs (e.g., alarm systems, fences, gates, lighting), closed circuit television systems (CCTV).

The list of expenditures has recently been expanded to cover basic training for staff to respond to a hate-motivated incident. This could include hiring a certified security professional to provide training for personnel (including volunteers) of faith-based organizations.

- **France: Inter-ministerial Fund for the Prevention of Delinquency**

In 2018, the French Ministry of the Interior reported that, through the Fund, a subsidy of 297 euros was given to 17 projects presented by different Christian associations, of which nine video protection operations in eight operations aimed at securing buildings. Between 2015 and 2018, the subsidies afforded for securing Christian religious sites have amounted to approximately 2.9 million euros for 95 projects.

(continued)

- **United Kingdom: Places of Worship Protective Security Funding Scheme**

The Scheme is a financial mechanism intended to support places of worship that are considered vulnerable to hate crime. In 2019, the Scheme was extended to also cover “associated faith community centres”. Applicants are entitled to submit bids for up to three protective security measures, excluding general building improvement measures, with faith-based institutions required to contribute 20 per cent of the total projected costs.

The multi-stage selection process includes a site assessment conducted by nationally certified experts in crime prevention and environmental designs (“Designing Out Crime Officers”). Decisions are made by the Home Office upon the recommendation of an independent advisory panel made up of representatives from the Sikh, Hindu, Muslim and Christian communities with expertise on security issues in relation to their faith-related buildings. The panel includes a representative from police crime prevention units. Following project completion, the Home Office undertakes audit spot checks to ensure that the security upgrades conform to their description in the application.

- **United States: “Non-Profit Security Grant Programme”**

While the Programme, run by the United States Department of Home Security, does not only cover faith-based organizations, they can qualify as eligible entities. Funding is available for activities relating to security planning (e.g., security risk management plans), purchase of equipment (e.g., access control equipment, surveillance equipment, physical protective measures), training (e.g., active-shooter training, security training for employees or members/congregations), or security exercises.

In order to qualify, non-profit organizations need to demonstrate that they are at high risk of a terrorist attack. The application guidance document provides examples of ways in which evidence of such risk can be provided, such as by reporting received threats or incidents occurred at the applicant facility or other facilities advancing a similar mission. Applicants can also substantiate their applications by conveying information on the current threat environment provided by local law enforcement authorities, emergency management offices, etc.

In evaluating the applications, the competent administrative agencies prioritize those put forward by organizations – such as faith-based organization – that are at risk due to their ideology, beliefs or mission. Final decisions for funding are made by the United States Secretary of Homeland Security following recommendations by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

Sources: www.gov.uk/guidance/places-of-worship-security-funding-scheme#security-training-fund-and-consultation; www.fema.gov/media-collection/nonprofit-security-grant-program-notices-funding-opportunity; www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/crm-prvntn/fndng-prgrms/scrt-nfrstrctr-prgrm-en.aspx; www.lagazettesdescommunes.com/628363/quelles-actions-pour-lutter-contre-les-actes-de-malveillance-contre-les-lieux-de-culte/



Tool 12.

Implementation guides for faith-based organizations and law enforcement

(<https://movementforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Role-of-Houses-of-Worship-4.pdf>; and <https://movementforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Role-of-OneCOP-Officers-6.pdf>)

The implementation guides flesh out the basic steps that both faith-based organizations and law enforcement agencies are encouraged to take as a prerequisite to cement their operational relationships, notably to:

- Improve public safety through collaboration and information sharing to prevent, combat and solve crimes by tapping into the varied resources of faith-based organizations;
- Increase community engagement with patrol-level police officers, via congregations; and
- Proactively create a direct link between law enforcement executives and community leaders in an effort to give voice to growing public concerns relative to policing.



Tool 13.

Non-faith-specific risk mitigation and crisis management advice for faith-based organizations

The following is a selection of online resources offering practical guidance to faith-based organizations on risk mitigation and crisis management planning and implementation. They are explicitly designed for use across the full spectrum of existing faith communities.


- **Mitigating Attacks on Houses of Worship: Security Guide, United States Department of Homeland Security, Cyber-Security and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), 2020** (www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Mitigating%20Attacks%20on%20Houses%20of%20Worship%20Security%20Guide_508_0_0.pdf)

The premise of the Guide is that religious sites can best protect themselves by adopting a comprehensive and multilayered security strategy. It puts forward a conceptual framework for both thinking about the security of houses of worship and achieving a security plan best suited to the unique circumstances of each religious community. The Appendix features a resource guide with a consolidated list of products from the Department of Homeland Security that houses of worship can use to improve their overall safety and security strategies. Resources are organized by topic so that users can navigate the myriad of options and decision points most beneficial for their needs.

In particular, the following overarching security actions are recommended:

- Identify clear roles and responsibilities for developing and implementing security measures;
- Conduct a vulnerability assessment to understand the risks at houses of worship;
- Build community readiness and resilience by ensuring houses of worship are aware of potential threats, prepared to respond in the event of an emergency or incident, and connected with the wider community;

- Apply physical security measures to monitor and protect the outer, middle and inner perimeters, while respecting the purpose of each area of the house of worship;
 - Focus on the safety of children with security measures to protect childcare and day care facilities and schools;
 - Implement cybersecurity best practices to safeguard important information and prevent a potential cyberattack.
- **Building the Resilience of Citizens, Communities and Countries: Houses of Worship and Vulnerable Communities, Rutgers University, Eagleton Institute of Politics, 2020** (<https://millercenter.rutgers.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Resilience-Action-Guide.pdf>)



The Action Guide, which follows the R.E.S.I.L.I.E.N.C.E. model, is articulated around the following 10 principles:

1. Roles and responsibilities;
2. Engage partners;
3. Share information and intelligence;
4. Integrate information, preparations and responses;
5. Leverage resources and technology;
6. Implement best practice and lessons learned;
7. Enlist guardians and execute the plan;
8. Neutralize negative mindsets;
9. Constant communications;
10. Enduring organizational reform.

(continued)

- **Recommended Best Practices for Securing Houses of Worship around the World for People of All Faiths, ASIS International, 2017**

(www.asisonline.org/globalassets/get-involved/councils/documents/best-practices-securing-houses-of-worship.pdf)

These best practices were developed to assist faith-based organizations in elaborating security plans, and are divided into three sections: interior security, exterior security, procedural best practices. The document emphasizes that several of the featured security recommendations can be implemented at little or no cost.

- **House of Worship Safety and Security Assessment, National Institute of Justice and Justice Technology Information Centre**

(www.ccfm.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/disaster-supplement-NIJ.pdf)

The purpose of this tool is to assist faith-based organizations in producing a draft safety and security plan for a specific house of worship. Readers are guided through a series of questions designed to support them in the evaluating and prioritizing unique threats and making recommendations for improvement.

- **Protection of Places of Worship, European Commission, 2021**

(<https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/pps/items/696367/en>)

Adopting a practical perspective, this report discusses how houses of worship's specific features need to be considered in analysing and managing the risk of terrorist attacks against their premises. It provides a framework for threat assessment and for evaluating the degree of attractiveness of houses of worship as possible targets for terrorist acts. A series of physical protection measures and related good practices are listed.



- **Faith and Communities in Action: A Resource Guide for Increasing Partnership Opportunities to Prevent Crime and Violence, United States Department of Justice, 2013**

(www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/bja/241293.pdf)

The Guide emphasizes the strategies that houses of worship need to develop by leveraging community relationships. Additionally, it provides information on specific steps to compete for funding from a variety of sources.



- **Keeping Your Congregation and Places of Worship Safe: Incident Management Guide for Faith Communities, Faith Associates, 2019**
(www.faithassociates.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/incident-management-guide-2016.pdf)

The Guide walks the reader through the key stages of preparing for and managing an incident, highlighting the importance of communication. It also features a number of case studies of actual incidents to which faith-based organizations had to respond and key lessons learned.

- **ADL Guide to Protecting your Religious or Communal Institution, Anti-Defamation League, 2016**
(www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/combating-hate/ADL-Guide-to-Protecting-Your-Religious-or-Communal-Institution-2016.pdf)

Developed by the Anti-Defamation League, a civil rights organization founded in 1913 to fight anti-Semitism and all forms of hate, the Guide is intended to help faith-based organizations think through basic security considerations in the following areas: security planning, building relationships with emergency responders, physical security, detecting surveillance, mail and delivery protocols, computer and data security, explosive threat planning, active shooters, event security, dealing with protesters, hiring a security contractor and post incident procedures.





Tool 14.

Faith-specific risk mitigation and crisis management advice for faith-based organizations

Although the following tools have been developed for use by specific religious communities, they may offer useful tips and guidance to other faiths as well.

- **Low-Cost/No-Cost Security Measures for Jewish Facilities, Secure Community Network, 2020**
(https://jewishatlanta.org/wp-content/uploads/SCN_Low_Cost_No_Cost_Guide_May_2020-1.pdf)

The Guide was developed in response to the security challenges faced by Jewish religious facilities. It is intended to highlight security measures that are of little or no cost. Ten categories of security measures – complemented by a self-assessment checklist – are outlined, notably, securing the property; controlling the flow; signature; security facility; access control; alarm systems; staffing the phones; medical supplies; ensuring adequate lighting at night; law enforcement and coordinating first responders.

- **Muslim Community Safety Kit, Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIRN)**
([www.cairmn.com/images/downloads/publications/CAIR%20Muslim%20Community Safety Kit.pdf](http://www.cairmn.com/images/downloads/publications/CAIR%20Muslim%20Community%20Safety%20Kit.pdf))

Developed by America's largest Muslim civil liberties non-profit organization, the Safety Kit describes a list of tasks focusing on areas such as developing positive relationships with law enforcement agencies and meeting with elected officials to discuss community concerns, building coalitions within interfaith and minority groups, building emergency contact lists, reacting to incidents of anti-Muslim hate, enhancing mosque security by responding to bomb threats, handling suspect letters and packages, etc.

- **Safety Resources (Church), Adventist Risk Management**
(www.adventistrisk.org/en-us/safety-resources/church-safety)

The Safety Resources include practical modules on an accident-incident report form, church safety committee responsibilities and church safety officer responsibilities to assist faith-based organization in securing churches and related facilities. Most documents are also available in French, Spanish and Portuguese.



Tool 15.

Steps for securing places of worship, Collective against Islamophobia in France, 2019 (in French)

(www.islamophobie.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/securisation-lieux.pdf)

Focusing on the protection of mosques, the document suggests concrete steps for faith-based organizations to apply for security grants in France. It goes as far as to include template letters and information about points of contact within law enforcement agencies for the purpose of receiving advice for attack prevention and how to tackle site vulnerabilities.

4.2.3 Congregants

Congregants are not only the spine of a specific religious community, those who attend its services and engage in its various social and charitable initiatives, but also the eyes and ears of the community itself. As they walk around religious sites, discuss with neighbouring businesses and generally gather knowledge about local conflicts and grievances, congregants are in an ideal position to detect anomalous situations⁴⁸ and, depending on the perceived gravity or urgency of the case, report them to religious leaders, faith-based organizations or straight to law enforcement authorities.

Various precautions can be put in place by congregants in a non-intrusive manner. Among them, establishing a “welcoming committee” composed of congregants placed at the entrance of a religious site may not be perceived as a security measure from the outside and yet prove an effective means for identifying unwelcome visitors. (ASIS International, 2017, and CISA ,2021) At an even more basic level, individual congregants may find that simply saying “hello”

can trigger a conversation with an unknown person and provide an opportunity to obtain indirect – albeit potentially critical – insights about that person’s motives for wanting to access a religious site.

Congregants can also play a significant role in security planning and management. Religious sites are aggregators of large communities made up of individuals with often diverse sets of skills and expertise. For example, some congregants may possess specific law enforcement backgrounds, making them natural members of security planning teams to identify threats and vulnerabilities, or deployable in security roles such as guards, access controllers, advisers on relationships with local authorities, etc. (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2020, p. 35). In other cases, religious sites may leverage volunteers who already provide pro bono work to sustain their day-to-day life. Volunteering may be partly directed towards outreach activities for security purposes such as sensitizing local communities about impending threats or spotting fund-raising opportunities.

⁴⁸ Anomalous/suspicious behaviours include, for example, someone taking pictures or videos of unusual parts of a religious site or hanging around a house of worship without an apparent reason.

Congregants' knowledge may turn out to be crucial during crisis management, particularly during mass shooting events that unfold in a quick and unpredictable manner. When preventive measures prove insufficient

to avert an incident, congregants who are familiar with basic evacuation procedures and know how to proceed in emergency situations may help save lives and reduce the number of casualties.



Box 9.

Congregants' response to attacks against religious sites

In over half of the total armed assault cases recorded by the United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), "congregants responded by running or hiding once the attack began. Some were able to escape through exit doors, while others hid in bathrooms, closets, or under furniture. In one case, congregants locked all external doors after hearing commotion outside and prevented the assailant from gaining entry. In 45 percent of the armed assault case studies, members of the congregation or witnesses attempted to tackle, distract, or disarm the perpetrator. Using standard active assailant training, some victims confronted the assailant, a few at the cost of their lives; others threw books, chairs, or furniture. Many of these attempts slowed the assailant enough to allow others to escape to safety".

Source: United States Department of Homeland Security, 2020, p. 53



Case study 18.

Gurdwara Security Sewadars and the force of volunteer work

In the aftermath of the 2012 mass shooting against the Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, United States, the Sant Sipahi Security Advisory Team, a group devoted to serving the Sikh community on matters of security, delivered general protocols to the attention of Gurdwara Security Sewadars. These are volunteers who offer their services to a Gurdwara (place of assembly and worship for Sikhs) without expecting any type of reward or payment in return. Sewadars help purely because of their religious dedication and as part of their duty to the wider community.

The recommendations enshrined in the general protocols envisage a variety of functions for Sewadars, including monitoring ongoing activities in order to maintain a safe and hazard-free environment, taking direct protective and/or defensive action in the event of an emergency or an act of aggression, ensuring the security of the perimeters



of buildings, gathering and disseminating intelligence data and subsequently alert congregants and local authorities about the existence of imminent or potential security risks and interfacing with and assisting local emergency responders.

Source: www.sikhdharma.org/general-protocols-for-gurdwara-security-sevadars/



Tool 16.

Mapping reports on the Jewish-Muslim dialogue: Compendium of Good Practices: A Jewish Contribution to an Inclusive Europe

(<https://ceji.org/mapping-reports-of-jewish-muslim-dialogue-in-5-european-countries/>)

The Compendium aims to foster and promote dialogue and understanding between the two faith communities by mapping grassroots initiatives recorded in Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The underlying rationale for the Compendium is that several creative initiatives have been implemented on the ground, but successful local practices are rarely shared or disseminated.

4.2.4 The local community

Religious sites rely for their functioning on the services and support provided by local businesses, public structures, civil society organizations, neighborhood committees, etc. Action by the wider community can be particularly important when religious sites are hosted in old buildings with limited scope for physical security upgrades. In such cases, neighboring communities become key lines of defenses and the possibility to cooperate with them on prevention and preparedness, an imperative. Equally, the frequent commission of terrorist attacks just outside the buildings hosting religious institutions points to the need to involve adjacent businesses in broad security planning, information sharing and crisis management (Pethő-Kiss, 2020).

The relationship between religious leaders and local communities should be mutually reinforcing. City councils, neighbourhood alliances, non-religious partner groups and others can offer advice to religious leaders as well as share knowledge about impending threats and good practices about measures taken to secure other types of vulnerable targets. From their side, religious leaders can act as trusted interfaces and connecting points between citizens and municipalities, for example by ensuring that relevant information reaches the right audience through a variety of communication tools, such as bulletins board and weekly sermons delivered by religious leaders.



Tool 17.

Faith and communities in action: A resource guide for increasing partnership opportunities to prevent crime and violence, Bureau of Justice Assistance (United States Government) and Center for Faith-based and Neighborhood Partnerships, 2013

(www.ojp.gov/library/publications/faith-and-communities-action-resource-guide-increasing-partnership)

The Guide emphasizes the importance for faith-based organizations to develop partnerships with larger surrounding communities, based on the premise that most faith-based and community involvement in crime and violence prevention work begins at the local level in response to local needs and concerns. It provides specific examples of what faith-based and community partners can do and have done, ranging from the basic to the complex.

4.2.5 Online service providers

Online service providers are critical actors in the process of identifying and removing hate content – including religious-based content – from social media platforms, including those based on initiatives and self-regulation policies of individual platforms (see box 10).

A proactive attitude by technology companies in identifying and removing content that violates their own terms of reference and policies has been encouraged under some domestic and international legal frameworks. A new German law, for example, places an obligation on social platforms to report certain types of criminal content to the federal criminal police.⁴⁹ On 16 March 2021, the Council of the European Union adopted a new regulation on “addressing the dissemination of terrorist content online”.⁵⁰ Once it enters into force, in 2022, Internet platforms will be required to remove terrorist content or disable access to the content within an hour, following a request by

a Member State. Also, the regulation envisages that penalties of up to 4 per cent of the provider’s turnover be applied in the event of systematic breaches.

At the international level, the vast contribution that technology companies can provide in reducing online hate speech and related content was recognized and crystallized in the Christchurch Call for Action,⁵¹ a public-private partnership forged in the aftermath of the 2019 mosque terrorist attack in New Zealand. The United Nations Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites particularly recommends that online service providers “commit to implementing the Joint Statement in Support of Christchurch Call, including the individual and collaborative actions contained in the statement related to the prohibition of the distribution of terrorist and violent extremist content; reporting mechanisms; enhanced technology and transparency; crisis protocols, education and combatting online hate” (UNAOC, 2019, p. 24).

49 The 2020 “Law to Better Combat Right-Wing Extremism and Hate Crime” extends the provisions of the 2017 “Network Enforcement Act (also known as “Facebook Act”), designed to address the dissemination of fake news through social platforms. See www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2020/kw25-de-rechtsextremismus-701104.

50 See www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/?utm_source=linkedin.com&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=2021-03-16-terrorist-content-online&utm_content=vignette.

51 The Call for Action consists of two groups of recommendations addressed to Governments and online service providers, and a third group devoted to steps that both stakeholders can take to work together. As of today, 48 countries, the European Commission, two international organizations and 10 tech companies are contributing to the implementation of the Call, together with an advisory network comprising 44 international civil society representatives. On 7 May 2021, the United States officially announced that it would join the Call for Action (www.christchurchcall.com/call.html).



Box 10.

Social media hate speech policies: examples of Google and Twitter

Social media providers implement an array of self-policing measures to limit the presence of hateful content on their platforms.

For example, Google's hate speech policy aims at removing content promoting violence or hatred against individuals or groups based on, among others, their religious affiliation. This includes:

- dehumanizing individuals or groups by calling them subhuman, comparing them to animals, insects, pests, disease or any other non-human entity;
- praising or glorifying violence against individuals or groups based on their religious affiliation;
- using racial, religious or other slurs and stereotypes that incite or promote hatred. This can take the form of speech, text or imagery promoting these stereotypes or treating them as factual;
- claiming that individuals or groups are physically or mentally inferior, deficient or diseased based on their religious affiliation. This includes statements that one group is less than another, calling them less intelligent, less capable or damaged.
- conspiracy theories purporting that individuals or groups are evil, corrupt or malicious based on their religious affiliation;
- calling for the subjugation or domination over individuals or groups based on their religious affiliation; and
- denying that a well-documented, violent event took place.

Google's hate speech policy is reviewed on an ongoing basis⁵² and is currently predicated on the following principles:

- Removing hateful content from YouTube;⁵³
- Reducing borderline content and raising up authoritative voices;⁵⁴
- Reward trusted creators and enforce "monetization" policies;⁵⁵ and
- Report inappropriate content.⁵⁶

52 In 2018 alone, over 30 policy updates were made.

53 As some of this content may have value to researchers looking to understand hate in order to combat it, Google claims to be exploring options to make it available to them in the future.

54 For example, if a user is watching a video that comes close to violating its policies, Google may include more videos from authoritative sources (like top news channels) in the "watch next" panel.

55 Advertisement guidelines prohibit ads from running on videos that include hateful content. Also, YouTube channels that do not comply with Google's hate speech policy may be prevented from running ads or using other available monetization features.

56 Reporting content is anonymous, and that content is not automatically removed. Reported content is reviewed in light of Google's applicable guidelines.



Twitter's hateful conduct policy prohibits its users from “promot(ing) violence against or directly attack or threaten other people on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, caste, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, religious affiliation, age, disability, or serious disease. We also do not allow accounts whose primary purpose is inciting harm towards others on the basis of these categories”.

Twitter's managers implement a range of enforcement actions vis-à-vis problematic content, for example:

- **Tweet-level enforcement:** This may include action such as labeling a tweet that may contain disputed or misleading information, limiting tweet visibility, requiring tweet removal, hiding a violating Tweet while awaiting its removal;
- **Direct message-level enforcement:** This may include stopping conversations between a reported violator and the reporter's account or placing a direct message behind a notice;
- **Account-level enforcement:** This level applies to situations where Twitter rules have been violated repeatedly or in a particularly egregious way and may entail requiring media or profile edits, placing an account in read-only mode, verifying account ownership or permanent suspension.

Sources: <https://blog.youtube/news-and-events/our-ongoing-work-to-tackle-hate/>; <https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/hateful-conduct-policy>; <https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/enforcement-options>



Case study 19.

Code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online

Signed in 2016 by the European Commission and a number of information technology (IT) companies,⁵⁷ the code of conduct commits the latter to establish clear and effective processes to review notifications concerning illegal hate speech within 24 hours and communicate them to the authorities of European Union member States through a designated national contact point. IT companies also commit to remove or disable access to such content, if necessary.

The code of conduct seeks to actively involve IT companies in promoting the implementation of European Union framework decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on “combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law”. Its status of implementation and impact are subject to regular monitoring.

The fifth monitoring round, held in June 2020, showed that, since the code’s adoption, IT companies are on average assessing 90 per cent of flag content within 24 hours. Additionally, 71 per cent of the content deemed illegal hate speech is removed. Removal rates depend on the severity of hateful from content, including whether the content calls for murder and violence against specific groups, or uses defamatory words or pictures.

Source: https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combating-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/eu-code-conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-online_en

⁵⁷ The original signatories (Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube) were joined in 2018 by Instagram, Snapchat and Dailymotion. Jeuxvideo.com joined in January 2019, and TikTok announced its participation in September 2020.




Case study 20.

Use of artificial intelligence against hate speech

In addition to having dedicated policies to address hateful content, including instances of religious hatred,⁵⁸ IT companies are discussing about how they can play a more proactive role in flagging and removing illegal hate content. In its 2019 Community Standards Enforcement Report (November 2019), Facebook announced new tactics in combating hate speech through the proactive detection of harmful content via text and image matching, powered by artificial intelligence. According to the company, its artificial intelligence system was able to detect 94.7 per cent of the 22.1 million pieces of hate speech content it removed in the third quarter of 2020.

Source: <https://about.fb.com/news/2019/11/community-standards-enforcement-report-nov-2019/>



⁵⁸ See, for example, Twitter's Hateful Conduct Policy, <https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/hateful-conduct-policy>.



Case study 21.

Commitments by online service providers and progress under the Christchurch Call for Action

In their recommendations specifically addressed to technology companies, online service providers⁵⁹ pledge to “eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online”. In particular:

- Take transparent, specific measures seeking to prevent the uploading of terrorist and violent extremist content and to prevent its dissemination on social media and similar content-sharing services, including its immediate and permanent removal, without prejudice to law enforcement and user appeals requirements;
- Provide greater transparency in the setting of community standards or terms of service;
- Enforce those community standards or terms of service; implement immediate, effective measures to mitigate the specific risk that terrorist and violent extremist content is disseminated through live-streaming;
- Implement regular and transparent public reporting;
- Review the operation of algorithms and other processes that may drive users towards and/or amplify terrorist and violent extremist content; and
- Work together to ensure cross-industry efforts are coordinated and robust.

Since its inception, the multistakeholder partnership built around the Christchurch Call has yielded a number of tangible results, including:

- Restructuring of the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) as an independent organization with dedicated resources, a 24/7 crisis management function, and an enhanced governance structure;
- Developing and implementing crisis response protocols to prevent the online dissemination of terrorist and violent extremist content (TVEC) following a terrorist attack. Such protocols have already been activated on various occasions, allowing GIFCT companies to react quicker and more efficiently to real-world attacks with the potential to develop into online crises.

In an online consultation open to governments and tech companies supporting the Call,⁶⁰ all involved companies stated that “they (had) taken specific measures to prevent the upload, live-stream and dissemination of TVEC on their services, (had) provided greater

⁵⁹ Amazon, Dailymotion, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Qwant, Twitter, YouTube, Line, JeuxVideo.

⁶⁰ The consultation was open from 21 September to 30 October 2020.

transparency in their community standards or terms of services, (had) enforced them in a manner consistent with human rights, and reviewed algorithmic operations that may amplify TVEC or drive users to such content. All companies but one (said) they (had) implemented regular and transparent public reporting on the quantity and nature of TVEC being detected and removed. All but one also (said) they (had) supported smaller platforms to build capacity to remove TVEC” (Christchurch Call, 2021, p. 5)

The Christchurch Call for Action maintains a dedicated web page featuring follow-up initiatives, progress reports and updates (www.christchurchcall.com/call.html)

Source: www.christchurchcall.com/christchurch-call-community-consultation-report.pdf



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For more information, please visit:
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