



UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM

2

Protecting urban centres from terrorist attacks

GOOD PRACTICES GUIDE

Specialized module



Global Programme on Countering Terrorist Threats against Vulnerable Targets

Implemented in partnership with:



UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORATE (CTED)



UNAOCO
United Nations Alliance of Civilizations



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Preface

The Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT)'s Global Programme on Countering Terrorist Threats against Vulnerable Targets¹ developed this document as a guide on the protection of urban centres against terrorist acts. This sector-specific module complements *The Protection of Critical Infrastructure against Terrorist Attacks: Compendium of Good Practices*.²

Following an overview of key terrorism-related threats and vulnerabilities affecting urban centres, this module explores the specific role that individual stakeholders can and should play in a complex – and often volatile – security environment by acting within the conceptual framework of a risk and crisis management approach. It contains a selection of case studies illustrating how key security-related principles – including internationally endorsed recommendations – have been operationalized by Governments, private-sector actors, operators of vulnerable urban sites and civil society organizations. The module also summarizes the content of several tools (manuals, handbooks, compendiums) which provide guidance on establishing sound policies and operational settings to reduce the vulnerability of urban centres and increase their resilience.

The analytical framework, case studies, tools and the resources featured in this module are the result of intensive desk research, a formal request for inputs from all 193 United Nations Member States, discussions with individual experts, international organizations and project partners as well as input from the Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection of the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact.³ Important insight was obtained from an online Expert Group Meeting that was organized by UNOCT on 14 and 15 June 2021, which

1 The Programme's partners are the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) and United Nations Interregional Criminal Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). The Programme is being implemented in close consultation with other relevant organizations, including INTERPOL. See www.un.org/counterterrorism/vulnerable-targets.

2 The Compendium was developed in 2018 by the Working Group on the Protection of Critical Infrastructure including Vulnerable Targets, Internet and Tourism Security of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). In 2019, the CTITF was folded into the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact. Under this new structure, the above-mentioned Working Group and the Working Group on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorist Attacks were combined to create the Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection.

3 See www.un.org/counterterrorism/global-ct-compact.

brought together more than 250 experts from Member States, international and regional organizations, civil society, the private sector and academia. The process also benefited from the input of UNOCT's Gender Advisor and a dedicated human rights consultant in UNOCT's Special Projects and Innovation Branch.⁴

4 This module strives to mainstream gender equality concerns in the various themes addressed. It highlights in particular the need to collaboratively address women's particular security challenges in urban centres, create secure urban environments for women and girls, analyse gender inequality, the status of women and gender discrimination within the city, address gender bias in technologies used in the urban space, and integrate gender-responsive considerations within urban development plans. Context-specific considerations regarding gender equality should be incorporated from planning to execution and evaluation of all measures highlighted in this module.

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The terrorist threat to urban centres



At its seventh review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2021, the General Assembly called upon Member States to “strengthen efforts to improve the security and protection of particularly vulnerable targets, including ... urban centres ... as well as to enhance their resilience to terrorist attacks, in particular in the area of civil protection”.⁵

Urban centres are human settlements with a high population density. Typically, they encompass business and residential areas connected by a variety of infrastructure networks, in particular transportation systems.⁶ An urban centre may take the form of a big agglomeration divided into various municipalities. When different neighbouring municipalities come under the same administrative jurisdiction, they may form a metropolitan area.

⁵ See General Assembly resolution 75/291, para. 71.

⁶ “Megacities” (areas with populations in excess of 10 million people) and “megalopolises” (a fusion of multiple cities into one single interconnected urban area) are two distinct types of urban spaces (UN-Habitat, 2007, p. 334-335).



Box 1.

Current urbanization trends and the role of cities

More people live in cities today than ever before. While in 2005 the only city with more than 20 million residents was Tokyo, by 2020, nine cities had exceeded this threshold. Current estimates suggest that the same number will be reached in 14 cities by 2030. While the urbanization process is clearly accelerating, it is also chaotic and uneven. It predominantly affects the developing world, where 25 of the world's 30 largest cities are located.

Several vulnerable sites (both soft targets and critical infrastructure) are located within urban centres, often within close proximity to one another. The urban landscape is made up of a wide variety of locations that may be attractive to terrorists. Depending on the size and shape of cities, their social composition, geographical and historical features, as well as levels of economic strength, city-based targets may include parks, promenades, riversides, shopping districts, pedestrian zones, markets, museums, concert halls, hotels, financial districts, places of worship, etc. Densely built environments, busy pedestrian, shopping and tourist areas, and congested transport infrastructure result in high traffic and mass gatherings, and they often represent easy targets for terrorists bent on maximizing the impact of their actions. The significant migration flows that many cities have experienced in recent years as well as the resulting housing pressures have also added to social strains within urban centres. This increases the risk of terrorists and violent extremists trying to manipulate and radicalize marginalized communities or exacerbate xenophobic sentiments within the native population against such communities that may make such attacks more attractive.

Big cities may be targeted because a country's political and economic power is concentrated within them. In the mind of terrorists, striking at the heart of an urban area may be especially enticing, notably when the targeted area, with its monuments and buildings, has an iconic or symbolic value.

A specific characteristic of terrorist acts that take place in crowded urban spaces is their disproportionate impact. Although an attack may be limited to one physical spot, it is likely to trigger a cascade effect, exploiting and reverberating through the vulnerable and interconnected pieces of infrastructure that constitute the lifeblood of cities. Population density and the complex nature of urban environments can thus significantly intensify the intended physical, psychological and strategic impact of terrorist acts. Longer-term effects include falling income resulting from loss of business in affected areas, significant damage to the tourism industry, and the proliferation of urban gated communities.

Although most global media attention focuses on attacks perpetrated in cities in developed countries predominantly in the Western world, urban centres in Africa, Asia and the Middle East have not been spared.⁷

⁷ Examples include the suicide attack that killed 25 people in Lahore, Pakistan, in July 2017; the attack on a nightclub in Istanbul, Turkey, which claimed at least 30 lives, in January 2017; and in Nigeria, Boko Haram has carried out attacks in cities like Maiduguri, capital of Borno State.

Indeed, terrorist acts carried out in urban areas take a particularly high toll on cities located in developing countries and conflict zones, where often the cost of destruction and damage cannot be offset by private insurance, and governmental agencies are unable to shoulder the task of cleanup, service restoration, business support or victim assistance.

Against this backdrop, the terrorist threat to urban areas has evolved in two major directions over the past decade. Firstly, in the past, terrorist activity predominantly affected capital cities,⁸ but it has also increasingly been aimed at medium-sized urban areas.⁹ Secondly, while most terrorist attacks targeted highly visible commercial or government facilities¹⁰ as part of large-scale and meticulously prepared operations,

this trend appears to have changed – at least partially – in recent years. The introduction of strengthened security measures for prominent buildings – often under new, more stringent regulatory frameworks for the protection of critical infrastructure – may have contributed to the shift of terrorist activity to the street, where ordinary members of the community and tourists stroll and shop. Increasingly, attacks are improvised or perpetrated with minimum planning effort. They target random groups of people gathered in crowded urban locations and are driven by online terrorist propaganda which calls on sympathizers to strike wherever they can and using whatever rudimentary weaponry is available to them. Recent patterns of urban terrorism include the deliberate targeting of crowds with vehicles¹¹ as well as knives.¹²

8 For example, the decade-long bombing campaigns by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in London, and the attacks carried out by the Basque organization ETA, in Madrid.

9 For example, the 2017 terrorist attack in Barcelona, Spain, and the 2019 shooting in Halle and surrounding area, Germany, as well as the attacks in Nice (2016) and in Strasbourg (2018), France.

10 For example, the 2019 bombing in Oklahoma City, United States of America, and the 1998 bombings in front of the United States embassies in Nairobi, and in Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania.

11 For example, in recent years, a wave of deadly vehicular attacks has affected several European cities, including Nice, Stockholm, Barcelona and Berlin. It is estimated that, in 2016, vehicular attacks accounted for the largest number of terrorism casualties in the western hemisphere, resulting in 601 deaths (GCDN, 2018, p. 6).

12 For example, terrorist attacks with knives were carried out in London, as well as in Marseille and in Villejuif, France.



Urban centres' vulnerability to terrorist attacks

The fact that some vulnerable sites, such as tourist sites, are located in urban areas may increase their exposure to terrorist attacks. Some key factors of vulnerability created by urban-related dynamics include the following:

- Urban centres are densely populated areas that rely on highly interconnected and complex infrastructure networks. A critical vulnerability of urban sites thus stems from the snowball effect that terrorist acts may cause. The consequences of attacking one spot may easily affect the urban ecosystem as a whole with potentially paralysing effects.¹³
- In big urban centres, multiple ethnic, religious, linguistic and economic communities often live side by side, which may create significant social tensions. Terrorist groups may exploit community-specific resentments and grievances with the objective of attracting sympathizers to their cause. Also, pre-existing heightened social tensions may easily lead to outbursts of intracommunal violence in the aftermath of a terrorist attack blamed on individuals belonging to certain ethnic or religious groups.
- Social marginalization within sprawling urban areas, characterized by patterns of uncontrolled growth, may create situations where local communities and public authorities drift apart. This may result in a lack of collaborative approaches that would normally build on local knowledge and established relationships to respond to residents' grievances. Likewise, individuals who might provide the police and the city's social services with critical information about looming threats may not be willing to come forward.
- Urban environments present different types of challenges for police and first responders. From an operational perspective, the presence of virtually 24-hour traffic jams and a lack of emergency access lanes may severely impact public authorities' ability to intervene quickly and effectively in the event of an unfolding crisis. The challenge can be overwhelming in low- and middle-income countries,¹⁴ whose urban areas are outpacing the regulatory capacity of many local governments. A lack of consistent and regular urban transportation often means that "fleets of irregular buses

¹³ On 11 September 2001, for example, the waves of panic that affected New York City were exacerbated by the chaos caused by the failure of emergency communication networks. The crisis quickly crippled all critical urban systems and networks such as banks, hospitals, police, emergency call services, civil protection, etc. (Baudouï, 2015).

¹⁴ Today, 12 of the world's 15 largest urban areas are located in low- and middle-income countries.



and other forms of transportation clog roads and create opportunities for criminal activity. Disordered roads generate significant challenges for police by interfering with their arrival at crime scenes. In the poorest countries, police may also depend on public and informal modes of transport to reach crime scenes” (UNODC and UN-Habitat, 2011, p. 23). Finally, vast irregular settlements with their unmapped streets may be disorienting not only to outsiders, but also to public authorities, exacerbating the challenges of providing an emergency response or controlling crowds in the event of a terrorist attack.¹⁵ In such contexts, terrorist groups may well take advantage of the

anonymity and ungovernability of the city landscape for a variety of purposes, from creating effective hideouts to radicalizing disaffected or marginalized urban communities and exploiting the time gaps between attacks and law enforcement response.

- Overpopulation and overcrowding in urban centres create physical vulnerabilities that terrorists have exploited, for example by taking advantage of traffic jams that cause delays in the intervention of law enforcement authorities, or by maximizing casualties due to crowds’ limited ability to leave a crisis-affected area.

¹⁵ Many municipalities do not have the resources to enforce building regulations or issue construction permits in a timely, cost-effective and transparent manner, which often results in widespread illegal housing patterns.



Box 2.

Terrorists' exploitation of urban traffic jams in Kabul, Afghanistan

City traffic jams may be the source of various security vulnerabilities. In Kabul, for example, terrorists on motorbikes or on foot have exploited the very slow pace at which vehicles move in the streets to attach magnetic bombs to them. Home-made explosives (known as “sticky bombs”) are stuck as close as possible to a car’s fuel tank to ensure that the vehicle is set on fire. The devices can be detonated remotely via radio signals or with a time-delay fuse.

Reportedly, “magnetic bombs have been used in Afghanistan since the early years of the insurgency around 2005. ...But the intensified pace of such attacks [in 2020] has shifted the security equation in Kabul, forcing anyone connected to the government to reassess how and when they use their vehicles.”

Source: Zucchini and Abed, 2020.

- Poor urban planning processes and management practices may be at the root of cities’ challenges in security matters. Outdated perceptions that municipal services are not relevant for preventing terrorism may lead city authorities to see security as a mere add-on to major city projects. Budgets allocated to security may be sacrificed or deprioritized as project costs increase unexpectedly.
- Vulnerabilities may be the result of multiple local governing structures in urban centres. Different municipalities forming a single “megacity” may share the same security challenges but struggle to coordinate their response owing to institutional and bureaucratic obstacles that make it difficult to implement coherent planning and response strategies. Or, they may be supported by groups with divergent political agendas and different priorities with regard to addressing the terrorist threat.
- The spaces, sites and buildings in urban areas are subject to different regulations and access levels (UNODC and UN-Habitat, 2011, p. 48). Furthermore, they are sometimes conditioned by commercial interests and specific regulations, which in turn may have an impact on the overall economy. While drawing the line between public and private spaces is not always straightforward, terrorist attacks are increasingly committed in a “grey” territory,¹⁶ such as in the immediate surroundings of a vulnerable target (e.g., on a sidewalk). Unclear ownership structures translate into a lack of clarity about which entities are in charge of implementing preventive, and sometimes costly, security measures. In addition, the absence of a clear attribution of responsibilities may produce ineffective responses during or in the immediate aftermath of an attack, exacerbating its impact. This may also

¹⁶ The London Metropolitan Police defines “grey spaces” as “spaces or areas that have disputed risk ownership or no identified owner. Including areas and spaces that have shared usage and risk ownership but continue to sit outside of existing security planning. These can also be areas and spaces that can have gaps in security or blind spots” (see case study 16).

result in protracted litigation over liability for the consequences of terrorist acts.¹⁷

- While some urban policies may be successful in achieving a higher degree of social interaction in public spaces, or in making them more accommodating to ecological means of transport, the same policies may also create unintended security gaps. For example, new pedestrian areas or bike lanes may encourage

residents to exercise more and become more environmentally conscious, but they also create new vulnerable spots. Expanding public access to physical sites may also remove natural standoff distances that protect pedestrians. In view of their openness and accessibility, these sites may prove particularly challenging to protect.



Box 3.

Urban security and the United Nations system

Adopted by all United Nations Member States in 2015, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development enshrines the international community's shared blueprint for peace and prosperity. At the heart of the Agenda are 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), one of which aims to "make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable" (Goal 11).

Goal 11 is accompanied by specific targets and indicators that form the basis of the New Urban Agenda.¹⁸ In the words of the Secretary-General at the United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat III), "the New Urban Agenda presents a paradigm shift based on the science of cities; it lays out standards and principles for the planning, construction, development, management, and improvement of urban areas along its five main pillars of implementation: national urban policies, urban legislation and regulations, urban planning and design, local economy and municipal finance, and local implementation. It is a resource for every level of government, from national to local; for civil society organizations; the private sector; constituent groups; and for all who call the urban spaces of the world "home" to realize this vision."



(continued)

¹⁷ Arguably, "most people understand that these grey spaces are the weak link, but at the same time, nobody wants to claim them as that's generally connected to financial responsibility" (Ray, 2018).

¹⁸ The New Urban Agenda was adopted in Quito, Ecuador, at the 2016 United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development, and endorsed by the General Assembly in the same year. See General Assembly resolution 71/256, annex.

The involvement of the United Nations system in urban security dates back to 1996, when the



Safer Cities Programme was launched by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) at the request of African mayors who sought to tackle urban crime and violence in their cities. Since then, the Safer Cities Programme¹⁹ has supported 77 cities in 24 countries worldwide. The Programme has evolved over the years following improvements in the understanding of the drivers of urban insecurity. Today, the Programme follows a holistic, integrated, multilevel governance and multisectoral approach. It is predicated on the key role that good urban governance, planning and management can play to improve the safety of urban communities.

The approach embodied in the Safer Cities Programme permeates the activities of the Global Network on Safer Cities (GNSC),²⁰ an initiative launched by UN-Habitat in 2012 to support local authorities and urban stakeholders in the prevention of urban crime and the enhancement of urban safety strategies.

¹⁹ See <https://unhabitat.org/programme/safer-cities>.

²⁰ See <https://unhabitat.org/network/global-network-on-safer-cities>.



Risk mitigation and response: stakeholders' roles and good practices

Vulnerable urban centres differ considerably from each other. Some areas, like public squares and parks, are completely open, while others are confined or semi-confined. Vulnerability levels also depend on when crowds are physically present. Certain places are vulnerable almost around the clock (e.g., an iconic pedestrian area), while others only at certain times of the day or week (e.g., a food market), and this may change over time. Not all sites can be secured by employing protection measures similar to those in place for static critical infrastructure (e.g., airport-like metal detector screening) or certain tourist locations.

The vulnerability of sites located in urban centres is also reflected in the heterogeneous profiles of their users. This has considerable practical implications for policymakers and law enforcement bodies. For example, security briefings for school children will need to be conceptualized and delivered in a radically different manner than those provided to museum staff. Training sessions may also require regular repetition in industries with frequent turnover. Users also have their own viewpoints and assessments of the nature of the threat, which can impact awareness and responses within these sites. Moreover, as mentioned in chapter 2, the ownership and



management structures of vulnerable sites in urban areas vary widely. Public authorities operate some of them, while others are privatized or managed through public-private partnerships.

Overall, the protection of vulnerable urban sites needs to take into account a wide range of legal structures, locations, user profiles, crowd density, etc. While each site has its own unique characteristics, they all rely on the same interconnected urban space, with

its particular features in terms of transport facilities, population patterns and geography, and its use by members of the public. For this reason, securing these sites requires the coordinated engagement of several actors with varying mandates and degrees of responsibility – including the media – to ensure effective management of risk and crisis situations while preserving the open nature, liveability and accessibility of cities to residents, tourists, daily commuters and workers alike.

3.1 Member States

Whether acting at the national or subnational level, public authorities are central actors in coordinating and implementing system-wide approaches to terrorist risk reduction and crisis management in urban areas. In this context, the notion of “urban resilience”²¹ has become a new paradigm, requiring institutional actors from all levels of government to consider an expanded range of approaches to secure city spaces. In addition to traditional hard security measures aimed at reinforcing physical security at a site, including by deploying law enforcement agents, urban resilience rests on the following two elements: (1) urban planning processes in which security is a central concern in decisions

about architectural and other urban development projects, alongside considerations of functionality, aesthetics or accessibility; and (2) programmes and policies that promote inclusiveness and social connectedness among urban residents as conditions to achieving higher levels of resilience in the face of crises.

It is critical to recognize that no single city or level of government can address urban security by itself. Multi-tiered security governance arrangements are needed that draw on national competencies and leverage the role of municipal authorities as the level of government closest to citizens.



Box 4.

The protection of public places against terrorism: European Union initiatives

The European Union deals with the security of vulnerable urban sites through a variety of programmes and tools aimed at securing public places.



²¹ Urban resilience is broadly understood as the ability of urban systems and communities to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner.

- A Counter-terrorism Agenda for the EU

A forward-looking document, the Agenda (European Commission, 2020) identifies cities as the “backbone of urban security”. It envisages measures such as increased focus on security-by-design solutions and identifying minimum requirements for operators of public spaces. The Commission also announced a proposal for a European Union pledge on urban security and resilience aimed at setting out basic principles and objectives for local authorities. Interested cities will be called to sign up to a positive agenda to prevent and counter radicalization and reduce vulnerabilities in public spaces.

- Action Plan to support the protection of public spaces, 2017

The 2020 Counter-terrorism Agenda builds upon the Action Plan (European Commission, 2017), which outlines a strategic framework for the European Union based on two work streams: (1) fostering the exchange of best practices across borders through targeted funding as well as networks of practitioners and guidance material; and (2) involving a wide range of stakeholders from both the local level and the private sector. Using a joined-up, network-based approach, the Action Plan establishes various forums aimed at achieving a systematic and structured exchange of information and sharing of best practice to protect public spaces.

- EU Forum on the protection of public spaces

Based on the 2017 Action Plan, the Commission and European Union Member States have been meeting regularly to discuss the protection of public spaces. The EU Forum consists of two sub-groups: (1) the Operators’ Forum, which brings together public authorities and private operators; and (2) the Practitioners’ Forum, which gathers members of the European Union law enforcement community.²²

- Partnership on Security in Public Spaces, under the Urban Agenda for the EU,²³ and its Action Plan

Based on the understanding that local actors are on the front line to make public spaces more secure, the Partnership commits the European Commission to cooperate with cities and regions on urban planning and design to create safer cities, technologies for smart and safe cities, and managing security and sharing public space.²⁴

22 Members of the Practitioners’ Forum include AIRPOL (network of police and border guard units working to fight against crime in the European aviation sector), RAILPOL (network responsible for policing European railways), ENLETS (network of European law enforcement technology services), ATLAS (network of European police special intervention units), High Risk Security Network (military and police units protecting public spaces, critical infrastructures and high-risk locations) and the Explosive Detection Dogs Working Group.

23 Launched in 2016, the Urban Agenda for the EU addresses problems facing cities by setting up partnerships between the European Commission, European Union organizations, national governments, local authorities and stakeholders such as non-governmental organizations. Together, they develop action plans to promote more effective and coherent implementation of existing policies, legislation and instruments; improve funding programmes; and share knowledge (data, studies, good practices).

24 See <https://futurium.ec.europa.eu/en/urban-agenda/security-public-spaces>.




Tool 1.

Safe Cities Index 2019 – The Economist Intelligence Unit

(<https://safecities.economist.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Aug-5-ENG-NEC-Safe-Cities-2019-270x210-19-screen.pdf>)

The Safe Cities Index 2019 ranks 60 cities on 57 indicators covering digital security, health security, infrastructure security and personal security. Every city is scored across input and output performance within and across these four domains. In providing an overview of trends in city management across a range of capitals, the Index can be used as a tool by institutional stakeholders as a baseline to understand and compare vulnerability levels and the security-related gaps that each city needs to fill. The regular iteration of the Index makes it a potentially useful tool for gauging progress over time.



Key substantive findings from the 2019 edition include the following:

- Despite having many elements, city safety is indivisible. While the different kinds of security covered by the index require distinct interventions, performance in each of the pillars correlates very closely with that in every other one. In short, cities tend to do well, middling or poorly across every security pillar rather than having good results in one and lagging behind in others. This is consistent with expert commentary that, rather than representing clearly distinct fields, different kinds of safety are thoroughly intertwined and mutual supportive.
- Transparency matters as much as wealth in urban security. Levels of transparency in cities, as measured by the World Bank's Control of Corruption metric, correlated as closely as income with index scores. Transparency and accountability are essential in every pillar of urban security, from building safer bridges to developing the trust needed for relevant stakeholders to share information.

3.1.1 Policymakers (national level)

The overarching role of national-level policymakers is to create a regulatory, financial and programmatic framework consistent with international human rights law obligations, whereby all the stakeholders with

responsibilities for achieving urban resilience are synchronized and in the best position to have an impact.

One of their key tasks is to determine the division of responsibilities within the various levels of governments to prevent and handle terrorist acts against vulnerable urban sites.²⁵

²⁵ Exceptions are city-States such as Singapore, where the protection of urban security and national security overlap.

Determining such responsibilities is part of broader, and often politically charged, choices that need to be made about the degree of decentralization of State functions. Whatever solution is adopted regarding the vertical distribution of security-related functions, a clear institutional framework needs to be established specifying the roles and responsibilities of each level of government. In practice, effective urban security policies are the result of the joint involvement of central and local governments, as well as local communities' participation, in the decision-making process.

Decisions about the allocation of security-related functions across the different levels of government also need to consider the role of law enforcement agencies, including whether

these agencies should be locally or nationally organized (see section 3.1.3). Depending on the model chosen, the nature of policing itself may change and create distinct types of relationships between law enforcement and city communities (see box 7).

Furthermore, as urban spaces are often subject to different forms of private security arrangements,²⁶ government agencies must ensure that these arrangements are conducive to increased levels of security in ways that do not cause friction with law enforcement action. Effective regulation of private security companies guarantees not only basic professional standards for their employees, but also cooperation and clarity in their relationship with the police.



Case study 1.

Urban Areas Security Initiative – United States of America

Under the authority of the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) acts as a funding mechanism to support high-threat, high-density urban areas in efforts to build and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to and recover from acts of terrorism. As many capabilities that support terrorism preparedness simultaneously strengthen preparedness for other hazards, in order to become eligible, applicants must demonstrate the multi-purpose nature of any implemented activities that are not explicitly focused on terrorism preparedness.



In drafting applications, prospective recipients are encouraged to consider national areas identified for improvement, such as: (1) projects that address emerging threats, including cybersecurity; and (2) projects that enable continuous operation of critical business and government functions, including those essential to human health, safety, and/or economic security.

Source: www.homelandsecuritygrants.info/GrantDetails.aspx?gid=17162.

26 For example, shopping malls often rely on their own private security guards composed of off-duty police officers.



Case study 2.

National Observatory of Urban Policy – France

Established in 2014 by the Law on City Planning and Urban Cohesion, the National Observatory of Urban Policy is



a national-level tool to assist local decision makers in taking informed decisions about urban issues, including those related to security, such as managing radicalization patterns. The Observatory is made up of 53 decree-appointed members, including city-level policymakers, national government representatives, public operators, experts and elected officials. Its mission includes the following:

- Analysing the status of residents of priority neighbourhoods;
- Monitoring changes in inequality and development gaps within urban agglomerations;
- Analysing gender inequality and the status of women in the city;
- Providing independent input to the implementation of policies benefiting priority neighbourhoods;
- Assessing progress in terms of participation of urban residents in local decision-making bodies;
- Developing a national methodology and providing support to local evaluation structures;
- Analysing issues of gender discrimination and inequalities in priority neighbourhoods;
- Submitting to Government and Parliament a publicly available annual report on the development of priority neighbourhoods.

Source: www.onpv.fr/theme/securite-tranquillite-publiques.



Tool 2.

Securing global cities: best practices, innovation and the path ahead – Global Cities Initiative, 2017

(www.brookings.edu/research/securing-global-cities-2/)

This tool is intended as a compact compilation of state-of-the-art best practices from around the world on how cities can become safer. The featured examples are organized into conceptual categories that correspond to broad recommendations for action addressed to stakeholders in charge of urban security.

- Continue to refine community policing
- Break down stovepipes
- Establish clear strategies against organized crime
- Exploit new opportunities from technology
- Promote social cohesion
- Prepare for “black swan” events
- Enhance public-private partnerships.



Launched in 2011 as a joint project by Brookings and JPMorgan Chase, the Global Cities Initiative aimed to strengthen the international economic connections and competitiveness of city-regions through research, demonstration projects, advisory support and peer networking.



Tool 3.

Good practices to support the protection of public spaces – European Commission staff working document, 2019

(https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2019-03/20190320_swd-2019-140-security-union-update-18_en.pdf)

The good practices contained in the Staff Working Document are measures that operators and public authorities involved in the protection of public spaces can implement to strengthen urban security. The source of the information is the European Union’s public-private Operators’ Forum (see box 4), which brings together public authorities and private operators from different sectors such as public transport, mass events, hospitality and commerce.



The good practices are grouped under the following categories: assessment and planning; awareness and training; physical protection; and cooperation.



Tool 4.

The European Charter of Local Self-Government – Council of Europe, 1985 (<https://rm.coe.int/168007a088>)

The Charter sets out a comprehensive legal blueprint guiding national authorities in devolving responsibilities to local levels of government, including on matters of security. While the Charter is technically a Council of Europe legal instrument,²⁷ it offers a useful model for decentralization efforts by non-Council of Europe countries as well.



The Charter requires that its Parties recognize the principle of local self-government in domestic legislation and, where practical, in the Constitution (art. 2). “Self-government” is understood as the right and the ability of local authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local population (art. 3).

The Charter’s underlying principle is that public responsibilities should generally be exercised, where possible, by those authorities which are closest to the citizens (art. 4.3). It also recognizes that it would be impossible for local entities to discharge their duties without adequate financial instruments. In this regard, it mandates that national economic policies entrust local authorities with adequate financial resources. These resources should be commensurate with the responsibilities provided for under the law (art. 9).

3.1.2 Municipal authorities

The institutional prerogatives of municipal authorities in security matters vary considerably depending on each country’s division of responsibilities among its various levels of government. Still, the centrality of local governing bodies in this field is being steadily acknowledged and promoted in a growing number of international initiatives.²⁸

As the level of government that is closest to citizens, municipal authorities need to mobilize a variety of local services²⁹ and tools aimed at, notably: (1) integrating gender-responsive security considerations into urban development plans; (2) ensuring that residents and businesses take ownership of the overall objective to pursue urban resilience, including by opening up opportunities for consultation on major projects, security

27 The Charter has been ratified by all 46 Council of Europe Member States.

28 Such initiatives include the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the New Urban Agenda, several European Union-sponsored programmes on the protection of public spaces (see box 4), and the work of the Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (see box 5).

29 These services include public space agents (e.g., street mediators, urban guards, stewards, etc.), civil protection, urban security or crime prevention services, urban planning and design services, municipal police, transport mobility services, tourism, cultural and youth services. Their actions must be coordinated with other services outside the municipality, such as private security, tourism operators, parking operators, health services, fire brigade, transport companies, event organizers and local commerce.

and human rights-related issues; (3) identifying local vulnerable targets and conducting, in cooperation with law enforcement agencies, an assessment of security threats affecting them; (4) within the boundaries of their regulatory mandates, providing standards, incentives and oversight to ensure that local operators adequately protect their sites; (5) ensuring that residents and businesses are aware of the nature and threats posed by terrorism whilst reducing panic and chaos in the event of crises and defusing social tensions (e.g., ethnic, religious); and (6) preparing a crisis management plan supported by the proper communication tools.

Even when municipal authorities are not entrusted with any direct mandates in the counter-terrorism field, their indirect contribution in this field cannot be overestimated.

Based on their role in establishing, modulating and delivering social services to urban residents,³⁰ local governing bodies have a number of levers at their disposal to address some key risk factors that are typically conducive to a terrorist-prone environment. Even policies that may appear to be unconnected to the overall security effort, such as reducing traffic jams in congested urban areas, are not just about improving air quality or saving commuters precious time; they are also about reducing opportunities for attacks or ensuring that emergency responders can intervene more quickly at the scene of an ongoing terrorist attack. In general, the proper handling of urban spaces through routine interventions – ranging from garbage collection to street lighting – plays an important role in security delivery and its perception.



Box 5.

Urban terrorism: the work of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities – Council of Europe

The Congress is the Council of Europe's institution responsible for fostering political dialogue between national governments and local and regional authorities within the organization's 46 Member States. The Congress often addresses issues of urban security and the role that local authorities can play in protecting against terrorism in urban areas. Resolution 159 (2003)³¹ in particular envisages the following key tasks for local authorities in this field:



- a. Devise strong and clear policies to: (i) foster social cohesion and eradicate social exclusion; (ii) promote tolerance through educational and cultural programmes; (iii) ensure respect for cultural diversity and the peaceful coexistence of different cultures, minorities and communities; (iv) prevent residential or educational segregation;

(continued)

³⁰ Depending on the context, such services may stem from locally designed housing, transport and employment policies, including policies to revitalize neighbourhoods affected by concentrated disadvantage, and targeting at-risk young people.

³¹ See <https://rm.coe.int/1680719301>.

- b. Seek to address in an equitable manner social, political and economic problems in their populations and ensure fair and equal access to public utilities and educational and employment opportunities;
- c. Encourage and promote regular dialogue between different religious faiths, in other words between their leaders, institutions and communities, ensuring that equal conditions exist for the practice of each faith, and recall in this context the debates of the hearing on intercultural and interfaith dialogue held during the spring session of the Chamber of Local Authorities;
- d. Remain vigilant and, in particular, take all necessary steps to protect people in places where they gather and in partnership with specialized agencies and governments, to protect major civil and industrial and nuclear installations;
- e. Fully inform the public about all threats and risks, planned contingency measures and subsequent crisis management, using up-to-date information technology, including the Internet;
- f. Take all necessary steps to ensure the coordination of emergency services, ensuring that: (i) the chain of command, accountability and responsibilities are clearly defined; (ii) there is a back-up supply of basic services, communications and infrastructure which can be used in the event of a crisis; (iii) adequate training exercises and response simulations are organized in advance.

All texts adopted by the Congress in relation to urban security and the prevention on radicalization have been collected in a reference guide available at <https://rm.coe.int/16807197ff>.




Tool 5.

United Nations system-wide guidelines on safer cities and human settlements – UN-Habitat, 2012

(<https://unhabitat.org/united-nations-system-wide-guidelines-on-safer-cities-and-human-settlements>)

Drawing on the expertise gathered from the years of work conducted under UN-Habitat's Safer Cities Programme (see box 3), the Guidelines are the outcome of a multi-step process that engaged actors from across the United Nations system as well as external partners. They seek to enhance the role of cities and local governments in leading measurable improvements and highlight how segregation, economic inequality, gender inequality and loss of positive social cohesion are primary drivers of higher rates of crime and violence.





Tool 6.

100 promising practices on safer cities: collation of urban safety practices – Global Network on Safer Cities, 2014

(www.mercops.org/Vigentes/64.%20100_Promising_practices_safer_cities.pdf)



This report provides fresh and sometimes out-of-the-box ideas and practices from various cities worldwide to assist policymakers involved in urban security issues. The featured safety practices are arranged by themes: youth, gender, urban development, community mobilization, policing and security, and governance.

3.1.2.1 Urban planning

Municipalities have an important arsenal of tools at their disposal to avert a growing trend of terrorist attacks, to perform damage control in the event of a crisis and to facilitate recovery. The Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) concept is a key tool; it suggests that the achievement of security depends on the coordinated actions of architects, urban designers, engineers, urban planners, social planners and others in the design and development process for buildings and public spaces in general.

Security by design can be pursued by adopting a combination of two approaches. The first approach relies on “hard” security measures to protect vulnerable urban sites. Through the use of tools such as bollards, gates, metal detectors and security cameras operated in conjunction with heavily armed and visible policing, site security is strengthened by creating explicit deterrents and

filtering site access. A paradigmatic example of this approach is London’s “ring of steel”.³²

The second approach reflects the predominant view that municipal planners need to incorporate effective security measures into urban development projects without making them noticeable. In recent years, urban centres have increasingly sought to camouflage security features by subtly and cleverly embedding them into the cityscape. In many cases, the aim is to create sufficient stand-off distances from certain buildings or sites to limit the likelihood and impact of vehicle-borne attacks against crowded places.³³

Both approaches have pros and cons, and decisions as to which one to adopt may be influenced by objective constraints. For example, camouflaged security measures may be technically difficult or overly expensive to implement. The detection of an imminent terrorist threat may also oblige a municipality to opt for measures that may

32 The expression “ring of steel” refers to the set of security and surveillance measures gradually implemented since the 1990s to protect the City of London from terrorist attacks. The approach relies on measures such as the reduction of available access points, use of moving and fixed police checkpoints, reinforced roadway edges to prevent cars and trucks from going off track, and advanced technologies including CCTV and automatic number plate recognition.

33 Examples of unobtrusive features include hardened benches, lampposts, litter bins, planters and other elements that provide a hostile vehicle mitigation functionality. Small bends or turns in the road in the vicinity of crowded locations are also instrumental in reducing vehicles speed. Cities are also engaging with local artistic and cultural communities to decorate aesthetically unpleasant security objects with artwork.

not be aesthetically enticing but can be put in place as swiftly as possible. In most cases, municipalities are likely to resort to a combination of the two sets of measures based on the evaluation of threat levels, budget availability and the geographical limitations of the site to be secured. In part, the choice of one approach over the other depends on the message that municipal authorities want to send. The current trend is clearly to give priority to soft measures, which aim to emphasize the open nature and accessibility of urban centres and maintain pleasant sightseeing spots. It cannot be excluded, however, that visible security measures be chosen in some cases to convey the visual impression that

a place is under protection and to reassure residents.³⁴

Whatever security approach is followed, it is critical for urban planners to involve law enforcement agencies from the early stages of their urban development projects. It is also vital to ensure that the designs are informed by reliable assessments of the threat landscape and the intent and capacity of the terrorist groups who may operate within the urban centre in question. The implementation of security-by-design concepts can only be regarded as a multi-disciplinary process that relies on the advice of terrorism risk mitigation experts.



Box 6.

Leveraging climate and health emergencies to make cities more secure

Among its wider consequences, the COVID-19 pandemic may radically change the way in which urban areas and related facilities will be used in the years to come. For example, to the extent that remote working arrangements will remain in place after the health emergency is over, city districts which have been developed to host company offices and supporting businesses³⁵ may need to find new uses. Traffic patterns and transport network routes may have to be adjusted as a consequence. Post-pandemic cities may require radical interventions in addition to those driven by the need to make cities more environmentally friendly and climate resilient. The ecological drive is already engaging municipalities in the design and implementation of various urban interventions, from boosting green spaces to creating bike paths and providing heat insulation for public buildings.

Urban planners should approach the current climate and health crises as an unprecedented opportunity to renew city landscapes with strong in-built security features.

While the health and environmental policies of the twenty-first century – with attached incentives and funding opportunities – are not, and should not be, seen as counter-terrorism tools, they can definitely become instruments to support ongoing efforts to make cities more secure.

34 Based on empirical data gathered in Denmark, some researchers contest the idea that visible security measures have an intimidating effect on urban residents. They suggest, instead, that such measures may actually make people feel safer (Monaghan and McIlhatton, 2020, p. 742).

35 A recent study by the National Bureau of Economic Research estimates that 20% of workdays in the United States will be supplied remotely after the pandemic, which is lower than the 50% figure during the pandemic, but significantly higher than the pre-pandemic figure of 5% (Barrero, Bloom and Davis, 2021).



Case study 3.

Security planning meets aesthetics – Cardiff, United Kingdom

In 2009, Cardiff City Council began plans for a major development scheme to help boost shopping facilities and tourism in the city centre. In line with the national strategy of encouraging urban planners

and designers to integrate counter-terrorism features into projects for vulnerable and high-profile crowded locations, the planning and design team at Cardiff City Council focused on how security could be blended into the ongoing renewal effort.

In addition to eighteen 50-litre capacity planters, other street furniture was installed, including bench-type seating made from robust and durable materials which complied with national quality standards while fitting into the surrounding city landscape.

Source: GCDN, 2018, p. 14.





Case study 4.

Turning counter-terrorism barriers into pieces of art – Milan and Palermo, Italy

In 2017, based on repeated warnings from Da'esh that Italy was on its hit list, major urban centres in the country stepped up security in crowded areas. The building of concrete barriers at several iconic tourist places, however, triggered a public reaction and a debate about how to balance security considerations with the need to preserve the sites' accessibility and aesthetic features.

In Milan, protective security was initially increased in late 2016 following the shooting near that city of the chief suspect of the vehicle attack on the Christmas market in Berlin. After the incident, the municipality worked with local artists to soften the military-style look of the existing concrete barriers by painting them. The initiative started at Piazza del Duomo, the city's central square and spread throughout the urban territory in an attempt to turn anti-terrorism barriers into pieces of street art.

Similarly, in Palermo, city authorities called on painters, sculptors and designers to create artworks to cover the concrete blocks that had been erected as protective security in the wake of the terrorist attack on Las Ramblas in Barcelona, Spain, in 2017.

Source: GCDN, 2018, pp. 19–20.






Tool 7.

Crime prevention through environmental design: guidelines for Queensland – Queensland Government, Australia, 2007

(www.mercops.org/Vigentes/64.%20100_Promising_practices_safer_cities.pdf)

Designed for Queensland urban areas, these Guidelines can be used as a blueprint by urban planners in other urban centres as they encourage local councils to incorporate the principles of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) into the planning, design and management of urban development. The Guidelines advocate seven key principles: activation, surveillance, legibility, territoriality, ownership, stakeholder management and vulnerability. These principles are considered in their application to specific urban environments, notably the design of neighbourhoods and precincts, buildings, public places, centres, pedestrian and cyclist services.




Tool 8.

Beyond concrete barriers: innovation in urban furniture and security in public space – Global Cultural District Network, 2018

(https://gcdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/GCDN-Urban-Furniture-Study-A4-FINAL-highres_web.pdf)

This report shares several good practices on how street furniture has been used most effectively for safety in public spaces. It discusses how relevant furniture operates in situ, the design process and lessons learnt since its installation. It also provides a brief account of how it has served its purpose from users' perspectives.

It features technical specifications and examples of creative and innovative projects that are aesthetically pleasant and unintrusive without compromising on security. The technical characteristics of each of the 20 featured pieces or projects are examined and compared against specific criteria to help gauge their effectiveness.



Furniture /device

Giove — Protective Planter

The Bellitalia PAS rated Large Giove Protective Planter provides an elegant solution for security in the public realm with the additional benefit of adding greenery to the space.



Image courtesy of
Marshalls

3.1.2.2 Community outreach and social services

In 2016, the signatories of the New Urban Agenda committed to “integrate inclusive measures for urban safety and the prevention of crime and violence, including terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism. Such measures will, where appropriate, engage relevant local communities and non-governmental actors in developing urban strategies and initiatives, including taking into account slums and informal settlements as well as vulnerability and cultural factors in the development of policies concerning public security and crime and violence prevention, including by preventing and countering the stigmatization of specific groups as posing inherently greater security threats” (UN-Habitat, 2016).

Implementing policies that take into account the positions and concerns of all genders, social, ethnic or religious groups is a prerequisite to ensuring that individuals perceive themselves as members of the same community and feel responsible in the face of security threats affecting the city as a whole.

In practice, municipal authorities can address issues of community segregation and alienation in urban areas by investing in education, employment, youth services and community development and planning, for example.³⁶ Degraded neighbourhoods and/or the segments of the urban population that are most affected by violence and unemployment should be seen as priority areas of intervention to mitigate the risk of them becoming breeding grounds for extremism and, potentially, homegrown terrorists.³⁷

36 In many parts of the world, the economic and social impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic have been felt more acutely by vulnerable communities, including urban ones.

37 Research conducted in 2017 (Odierno and O'Hanlon) identified several innovative projects implemented by municipal authorities around the world which seek to find effective ways of reaching out to disadvantaged communities or dangerous neighbourhoods. One such project leverages fire departments in places where police forces may not be easily trusted. Another one engages former inmates or rehabilitated members of violent groups to reach out to disenfranchised communities.

Municipalities should also consider how to involve urban residents and community groups in decision-making processes in accordance with the right to development, which includes the right to active, free and meaningful participation in development and the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom.³⁸ Depending on the issues at stake and local circumstances, public participation in the security domain does not need to be overly

complicated or bureaucratic. It may occur in the form of consultations whereby residents and community members are asked to provide their feedback on a certain project. The simple fact of encouraging residents to provide their opinion, for example by making a specific text-messaging service available – and then making the results of the consultation public – may go a long way towards developing a sense of ownership of urban spaces.



Case study 5.

Urban community outreach programmes – Liege and Brussels, Belgium

A key component of the City of Liege's approach to securing its public spaces focuses on addressing the social factors that increase the terrorist risk.³⁹ Its radicalization prevention strategy is based on the following five elements:

- Prevention by teaching: to strengthen youth resilience towards radicalization, educational activities are organized in schools, neighbourhood and sport associations;
- General public awareness-raising: to inform urban residents about the values of peaceful coexistence, tolerance and dialogue, several actions are encouraged, such as civic debates;
- Training for first-line agents: to train educators and people working directly with vulnerable youth, a number of courses are co-organized with the University of Liege and focused on sensible information management and vigilance indexes;
- Psychosocial follow-up of radicalized youth: the City collaborates with the Faculty of Psychology of the University of Liege in the implementation of a follow-up programme, based entirely on voluntary work, to promote disengagement from radical behaviour; and
- Dialogue and information exchange: the City participates in several data exchange initiatives with partner entities at the national and international level.

Since 2010, the City of Brussels has been implementing the “Bravvo project”, whereby guards patrol hotspots at night. Their role is to meet both victims and perpetrators of incidents with the aim of settling conflicts peacefully. The guards also collect reports from urban residents about problems experienced with public equipment, shortcomings of public services, etc.

(continued)

38 Declaration on the Right to Development, 1986, www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/righttodevelopment.aspx.

39 The initiative is being implemented in the framework of PACTESUR, a European Union-funded project in which the City of Liege partners with Nice and Turin. PACTESUR aims to empower cities and local actors in protecting urban public spaces against terrorist threats (www.pactesur.eu/).

The project is supported by a dedicated municipal department made up of one manager, three coordinators, seven team leaders and 130 street guards. External partners include street educators, day-shift street guards, social housing associations, police and local non-governmental organizations.

Source: <https://bravvo.bruxelles.be/les-gardiens-de-la-paix-de-nuit>.

3.1.2.3 Leveraging technology (smart cities)

Cities around the world are increasingly adopting technological solutions powered by artificial intelligence (AI) to help keep their vulnerable sites secure in the face of terrorist threats. In matters of security, a smart city is one that embraces big data analysis and machine learning to sharpen policymaking and predictive capabilities for a range of tasks, from threat identification and early warning to supporting decisions about the risk of offenders' recidivism.

Over the past few years, various municipal authorities have been experimenting with a range of smart city applications. Developments in video analytics, for example, have enabled the creation of cameras with algorithms that can recognize if someone has been in a certain area for more than a certain time and if their movements follow a pattern. If a bag or other object is left unattended, the system will automatically inform security operators. AI has also been used in gunshot detection technologies.⁴⁰

A potentially interesting smart city application is the ability to change its operational modalities depending on threat levels and scenarios in place in a particular area. In response to a bomb threat against a vulnerable city building, for example, a sensor-rich environment could trigger a number of responses to prevent the attack or make it more difficult. Once the bomb has exploded, the system would move to post-detonation mode, activating a different set of alarms and features, aimed for example at directing people away from the location of a potential secondary attack.

The smart city concept has the potential to translate into several critical solutions to protect vulnerable city targets.⁴¹ In the long term, if smart city applications deliver on their promise to prevent and mitigate security threats, the costs associated with the purchase of often expensive technologies could be offset by lower medical costs for victims, lower insurance premiums for high-risk urban areas, savings on private security budgets, etc.

The concrete introduction of smart city applications, however, requires careful assessment. Important considerations include the following:

⁴⁰ Working through multiple collaborative acoustic sensors, gunshot detection technologies enable law enforcement and first responders to quickly identify the location of gunfire incidents and reduce the interval between crisis and intervention times. They can also empower control room operators to review live CCTV footage of the gunshot incident, potentially providing them with key information about ongoing dynamics. The most advanced technologies rely on sensors that are capable of distinguishing gunshots from fireworks, thunder or car backfires.

⁴¹ Some municipalities have experimented with participatory web-based applications that residents can use to bring safety-related concerns (e.g., garbage issues, street light outage) to the attention of municipal authorities. The responsiveness of the latter has the potential to build positive relationships between city residents and local levels of government.

- *Impact on human rights:* Without robust safeguards in place, technology-enabled security solutions can erode civil liberties, both online and offline, including the risk of underlying algorithms reproducing human bias, such as gender and racial biases, and reinforcing discrimination against marginalized groups. Smart city applications need to be rolled out in a way that ensures compliance with national and international obligations on human rights, in particular the rights to privacy, data protection and gender equality;
- *Cyber vulnerabilities:* While providing unprecedented opportunities for predictive analysis, risk mitigation and crisis management, the technologies underpinning smart cities are subject to their own vulnerabilities as they may themselves be exposed to cyberattacks. These may potentially turn a smart city into a weapon against itself, its residents and related infrastructure;
- *Human factor:* Most smart city technologies are not plug-and-play tools and need time before they can be adequately understood and used by trained operators. Technological innovation should be seen as a complement rather than a replacement for human-centred solutions;⁴²
- *Resource considerations:* Technologies underpinning smart city applications, as well as their installation, may be expensive, particularly for those countries experiencing conflict and commensurate costs associated with providing and prioritizing protection to civilians. Also, technologies often rely on synergies between institutional departments that are not adequately equipped to adopt them, or that require training that is not readily available. Urban centres that feature ageing – albeit critical – legacy structures and systems may also face challenges in introducing new technologies.



Tool 9.

Use of digital technologies for the protection of public spaces – European Commission

(<https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/pps/items/686830/en>)

This report contains:

- A succinct overview of technologies – including AI-powered ones – that most commonly serve urban authorities and site operators for the protection of public spaces; Tips for choosing the appropriate solutions; and
- Considerations related to the use of technology for the protection of public spaces.

Insights are provided into the following clusters of technologies:

- Video surveillance, sound detection and collection of biometric data;
- CBRN-E sensors;
- Access control;

(continued)

42 Based on interviews with several practitioners, a recent report (Odierno and O'Hanlon, 2017, p. 3) found that "where technology has been effectively deployed, it has not been at the expense of officers on patrol. We found no examples of cities that were successful in fighting crime and terrorism unless they simultaneously maintained or increased police personnel and focused intensively on the quality and training of those personnel!"



- Internet of things, data from smart city sensors;
- Real-time data mining and data analytics; and
- Mobile phone applications.

The above-mentioned technological solutions are examined against:

- Issues of data protection, particularly in light of the relevant European Union regulatory framework (General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Directive for the protection of personal data processed for the purpose of criminal law enforcement);
- Societal impacts of technologies, such as the bias of AI systems, which tend to present broader error margin for non-Caucasian individuals and women; and
- The need to protect such technologies against the risk of system breaches.



Tool 10.

Empowering Municipalities to Assess Available Security Solutions Through a Technology Evaluation Framework – PRoTECT Project

(https://protect-cities.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/PRoTECT_Deliverable-3.2-Technology-Evaluation-Framework_v1.0.pdf)

The Technology Evaluation Framework (TEF) is the flagship tool developed in the framework of the European Union-funded PRoTECT project.⁴³ TEF seeks to facilitate municipal authorities' task of acquiring knowledge on existing technological solutions and validating their applicability in the context of specific threat and vulnerability scenarios.

⁴³ The PRoTECT project aims to strengthen local authorities' capability in the protection of public spaces by applying an overarching concept where tools, technology, training and field demonstrations will lead to enhanced situational awareness and improved direct responses before, during and after a terrorist attack. Five European cities are members of the PRoTECT consortium, namely: Eindhoven (Netherlands), Brasov (Romania), Vilnius (Lithuania), Malaga (Spain) and Larissa (Greece). See <https://efus.eu/tag/protect-2/>.

The rationale for TEF is the observation that local authorities often do not possess the required conceptual tools to adequately identify, evaluate and select



the technological solutions available on the market. TEF envisages eight steps through which a municipality can solicit information on solutions from multiple providers, evaluate such solutions based on the acquired information, carry out operational exercises in table-top sessions and conduct live demonstrations. This methodology can be used to evaluate any form of technology (e.g., technological and social innovative solutions).

Although TEF was developed to suit the needs of the five municipalities involved in the PRoTECT project, it would be useful to any city wishing to gather information on and evaluate technologies for protecting public spaces. Before using TEF, however, municipalities need to have completed a specific vulnerability assessment of the site for which a technological solution is sought. This can be done by following the methodology proposed by the European Union Vulnerability Assessment Tool (EU-VAT). See D2.1 - Manual for vulnerability assessment (protect-cities.eu).

As part of the PRoTECT project, EFUS organized a web conference on 17 March 2021 on the considerations that cities should take

into account when choosing technologies to protect their public spaces.⁴⁴



⁴⁴ See <https://efus.eu/topics/public-spaces/how-to-choose-the-most-relevant-technologies-to-protect-urban-public-spaces-a-web-conference-of-the-protect-project/>.



Tool 11.

TACTICS: Recommendations for responsible use of counter-terrorism technology – European Commission

(<https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/285533>)

TACTICS was a European Union-funded project which stands for “Tactical Approach to Counter Terrorists in Cities”. The initiative aimed to create a more effective counter-terrorism system that incorporates mechanisms to prevent any cognitive biases and avoids false negatives or positives when assessing threats or attacks.

Research under the project produced the following recommendations for policymakers on how to manage technology for security purposes in urban areas:

- Deploy appropriate counter-terrorism technologies that enhance decision-making, but continue to pay attention to ongoing changes in the technology landscape. There is a need, in particular, to overcome potential technical limitations against new threats or terrorists’ exploitation of any limitations associated with existing technologies;
- Apply a structured approach to deployment of counter-terrorism technology. This ensures that the technology that is procured and deployed meets the capability need and is in line with applicable legal frameworks;
- Carefully consider the extent to which data collection and data-sharing in the context of counter-terrorism is proportionate, necessary and justified. There is a need to identify and address potential privacy issues as early as possible in the capability assessment and procurement process;
- Carry out regular audits and evaluations on the system used. Such exercises allow for the flagging up of potential system performance issues or operator/manager training needs.



Tool 12.

Agile cities: preparing for the fourth industrial revolution – World Economic Forum, 2018

(www.weforum.org/whitepapers/agile-cities-preparing-for-the-fourth-industrial-revolution)

Using city-specific case studies sourced through the World Economic Forum’s Global Future Council on Cities and Urbanization, this report illustrates how urban areas can apply new ways of using data, and showcases best practices for improving urban liveability. It employs the “agile security” concept – broadly understood as the ability to quickly adapt to changing needs – as the analytical framework through which a set of recommendations is identified:⁴⁵

⁴⁵ The document emphasizes the need for all recommended measures to be accompanied by clear protocols, ethical standards and data protection rules to reduce unintentional harm and infringement on civil liberties.

- Introduce measures transparently and in consultation with residents, with appropriate safeguards on data protection;
- Harness machine learning to predict crime and analyse hotspots using data from, for example, social media analytics, crowd-sourced crime alerts and networked surveillance cameras, and monitor measures such as changes in fatalities due to homicides and terrorism, the prevalence of violent crime, and the response rate of first responders; and
- Address social and economic factors that influence crime and terrorism, such as concentrated disadvantage, high rates of youth unemployment and income inequality.

The report also provides a matrix with broad guidelines on how urban security can be strengthened through innovative applications in both the physical and digital spheres:

Physical	Defence and design	Urban planning	Communication
	Combine defensive infrastructure such as anti-vehicular and loitering systems and blast walls with “designing-out” strategies such as low-rise buildings, open markets and parks to increase “eyes on the street” and promote social cohesion.	Targeted urban planning measures to reduce spatial segregation, increase opportunities for reporting suspect individuals or behaviour, and improve social efficacy.	Interoperable communications and ICT infrastructure and smart building communication strategies to minimize exposure to crime and terrorism.
Digital	Dashboards	Interpreted response systems	Smart sensors
	AI-enabled dashboards to digitize, monitor and predict crime (real-time crime mapping, predictive policing, crowd-source alerts, gunshot detection).	Installation of digitized communications, storage and dispatch system with cloud-based management to integrate all emergency responders.	Deployment of smart CCTV cameras, body-worn cameras, smart lighting and sensor networks, and other platforms to detect crime and terrorism risks, reduce violence, and increase response times.
Environmental	Intervention	Citizen input	Smart monitoring
	Data-driven interventions focused on areas of concentrated disadvantage.	Digital systems to ensure citizen inputs to design, implementation and evaluation.	Deployment of smart technologies to monitor and prevent crime and reduce the prison population.



Tool 13.

Information Commissioner’s Opinion: The use of live facial recognition technology in public places – Information Commissioner’s Office, United Kingdom, 2021

(<https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2619985/ico-opinion-the-use-of-lfr-in-public-places-20210618.pdf>)

While this Opinion examines the use of live facial recognition technologies in relation to the United Kingdom’s legal framework, it raises issues and challenges of general relevance with the potential to inform policy discussions in other countries that have introduced or are planning to introduce similar technologies.

Live facial recognition (LFR) is understood as a specific application of facial recognition technology (FRT) aimed at capturing the biometric data of all individuals passing within range of a camera automatically and indiscriminately. As data is collected in real time and potentially on a mass scale without individual persons’ being aware or controlling the process, LFR has greater potential to be used in a privacy-intrusive way.

The document argues for LFR to be employed in a way that ensures the public has confidence about its lawful, fair and transparent use and that all applicable data protection standards are met. It identifies a number of issues worthy of specific attention, notably:

- The governance of LFR systems, including why and how they are used;
- The automatic collection of biometric data at speed and scale without clear justification, including of the necessity and proportionality of the processing;
- The lack of choice and control for individuals;
- Transparency and data subjects’ rights;
- The effectiveness and the statistical accuracy of LFR systems;
- The potential for bias and discrimination on the basis of sex, gender, ethnicity, race, impairment or disability, age or other demographic characteristics;
- The governance of watchlists and escalation processes;
- The processing of children’s and vulnerable adults’ data; and
- The potential for wider, unanticipated impacts for individuals and their communities.

For the use of LFR to be lawful, controllers are expected to identify, inter alia, the existence of a legal basis and ensure that data processing is necessary, fair and proportionate to the objective sought. They should also take steps to mitigate any potential biases in their systems and ensure a statistically sufficient level of accuracy.

The 2021 Opinion expands and follows up on a previous Opinion, issued in 2019, that addressed the use of live facial recognition technology by law enforcement authorities. The 2019 Opinion specifically emphasized the need for law enforcement to implement a solid Data Protection Impact Assessment and to ensure that all those involved in LFR projects have sufficient data protection training to appreciate the effects of such projects on those subject to the use of LFR.

The 2019 Opinion can be found at <https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2616184/live-frt-law-enforcement-opinion-20191031.pdf>.

3.1.2.4 Crisis preparedness and management

Municipal authorities are currently expanding their areas of responsibilities in crisis preparedness and management. The range of city services engaged in response to an urban terrorist attack spans from the deployment of local first responder units to the arrangement of long-term psychological assistance to victims.

As municipal services are often among the first to intervene at the scene of a disaster, the timeliness and effectiveness of their response is likely to substantially impact the subsequent stages of the crisis management and recovery process. During the unfolding of a crisis, for example, it is paramount for local authorities to communicate with residents in a quick and coordinated manner. Some technology providers have been providing solutions specifically designed to alert urban residents in case of an imminent or ongoing crisis, whether natural or human made.

Depending on each country's division of labour across its levels of government,

municipal authorities may need to set up early warning systems and establish specific emergency and crisis management organizational structures and plans. It is important for these structures and plans to function based on interoperable communication systems. In some cases, a review of existing mandates, chains of command and resource allocation will be required to streamline processes and avoid, as much as possible, situations where institutional uncertainties and/or operational inefficiencies stand in the way of proper crisis management.

Municipalities also have a pivotal role to play in preventing and mitigating possible escalations of social tensions triggered by terrorist attacks, thus seeking to reduce damage to a city's social fabric. In sensitive and emotionally charged contexts, the already strained relationship between different urban groups may spiral into fully fledged violence against members of the social, ethnic or religious communities perceived to be associated with the perpetrators. Media outlets can be instrumental in de-escalation efforts.



Case study 6.

Streamlining emergency responders' action: the SALOC project – Portugal

From 2010 to 2013, the city of Lisbon implemented the SALOC project with the aim of bringing all civil protection and security forces together in the design, planning and execution of operational security tasks through a single communication system. This represented a shift from the previous organizational model whereby the Lisbon fire brigade, municipal police, forest fire department and the Department of Civil Protection had been working in different physical places and in a compartmentalized fashion. The implementation of a single communication and operational system used by all agencies fostered more proactive crisis management. The main results included the establishment of a common strategy for the mitigation of the consequences of disasters and shorter delays in responding to emergency situations.

The integration of the city of Lisbon's emergency communication system into the National Integrated System of Security and Emergency Networks in Portugal (SIRESP) testified to the success of a project that was first implemented at city level.

Source: Global Network on Safer Cities, 2014, p. 191.



Case study 7.

Urban Supervision Centre – Nice, France

Located in the heart of Nice, the Urban Supervision Centre (CSU) is an inter-agency command centre shared by the national police, the gendarmerie, the prosecution service and the local fire brigades. It employs enhanced video protection capabilities. Composed of a room for incoming emergency calls and a room for command and decision-making, CSU relies on a geo-localization system to identify which municipal police teams are closest to the site of an incident.

Overall, CSU's video protection capabilities enable the following:

- On-the-ground law enforcement coordination to increase the chances of conducting stop-and-search activities;
- Real-time monitoring of major events; and
- Automatic and real-time detection of unusual behaviour through an Intelligent Video Protection System.⁴⁶

By the end of 2021, the CSU was expected to be connected to 200 emergency call terminals (the first ones were installed in 2019). By allowing the public to instantly call for help,⁴⁷ the terminals are aimed at decreasing law enforcement and first responders' response time in the event of an accident or dangerous situation. The terminal from which a call is made, as well as nearby security cameras, are automatically located.

Sources: UNOCT Expert Group Meeting (EGM), 14-15 June 2021; www.nice.fr/fr/securite/le-centre-de-supervision-urbain; www.themayor.eu/de/a/view/nice-installs-emergency-call-terminals-3914?trans=fr-FR.



⁴⁶ From 23 March 2010 to 11 April 2021, 5,678 stop-and-search actions were performed.

⁴⁷ The instructions for using the terminals are provided in French, English and Mandarin.



Case study 8. Alerte Événement – France

Some technology providers have been providing solutions to support local authorities in quickly communicating with residents before or during the unfolding of a crisis. “Alerte Événement” is one such solution as it was tailor-made for use by French mayors based on their legal obligation to warn local populations in the event of a risk (see Decree No. 2005-1156 of 13 September 2005). In addition to being an SMS and VMS routing platform, the service enables residents to register for alerts sent by their municipalities.



Source: www.alerte-evenement.fr/.



Créer une campagne SMS d'Alerte

Ecrire le message

Nom de la campagne: Campagne SMS Alerte du 09/07/2019 15:21

Emetteur: VotreMairie

Message: Bonjour, la commune est placée en Alerte Orange jusqu'à 15/09. Risque de violents orages. Soyez vigilants. Votre Mairie.

124 caractères 1 SMS

Type d'envoi: Envoi immédiat Envoi programmé

Enregistrer comme modèle

Choisir les contacts

Liste de contacts: Les Habitants Collecte de numéros - 12/12/201

0 contact dans la liste d'envoi

Etape suivante




Tool 14. How to make cities more resilient: A handbook for local government leaders – United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), 2017

(www.undrr.org/publication/how-make-cities-more-resilient-handbook-local-government-leaders-0)

The Handbook supports public policy and decision-making by local government leaders to improve their disaster risk reduction capabilities. It sets out practical guidance for putting into action the “10 essentials for making cities resilient”.

The Handbook showcases the knowledge and expertise of several cities involved in the Making Cities Resilient campaign, which was launched by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) (former United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR)) in May 2010. It also contains links to tools, resources and examples from partner cities. A web-based information platform where cities and local governments can share their own tools, plans, regulations and practices complements the Handbook. The platform is available at www.unisdr.org/campaign.



Tool 15.

Disaster resilience scorecard for cities – United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR)

(www.unisdr.org/campaign/resilientcities/toolkit/article/disaster-resilience-scorecard-for-cities)

Disaster management at the city level is a complex endeavour that requires extensive engagement by various stakeholders based on strong collaborative, operational and information-exchange approaches. To help municipal authorities understand their cities' degree of preparedness, in 2014, UNDRR developed a tool that measures performance levels on the basis of the standards set by the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. The Sendai Framework outlines the following four priorities for action to prevent new, and reduce existing, disaster risks: (1) understanding disaster risk; (2) strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk; (3) investing in disaster reduction for resilience; and (4) enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response, and to "build back better" in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

This Disaster Resilience Scorecard for Cities offers a numerical and visual assessment of the status quo, supporting local governments in establishing a baseline for the city of how resilient it is today relative to foreseeable hazards – where it is strongest, and where it is weakest, thus requiring time and attention, and potential resources required towards reducing risks. The biggest single contribution that the Scorecard can make is exposing the gaps that may exist but may have been overlooked, the conflicts hidden in assumptions and plans that could derail a response to a disaster.



Tool 16.

Responding to a terror attack: A strong cities toolkit – Strong Cities Network (SCN), 2020

(www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/responding-to-a-terror-attack-a-strong-cities-toolkit/)

The Toolkit supports mayors, their cabinets and city officials in developing a framework for action in the wake of a terrorist attack. It draws on a series of interviews with city members from across SCN membership, desk-based research and the expertise of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue in addressing hate, polarization and extremism at the local level.

Using worksheets and a variety of resources, the Toolkit addresses the following topics:

- How authorities can leverage existing networks to determine the impact of an attack, identify the most appropriate victim support mechanisms and promote social cohesion for the community at large;
- Developing outreach plans that de-escalate any rising tensions and strengthen a city's sense of identity, morale and cohesion;
- Psychosocial support for affected communities; and
- Dealing with the immediate aftermath of an attack, when tensions are at their highest.

3.1.2.5 Communication management⁴⁸

The need for municipal authorities to craft a proper communication strategy emerges at all stages of the security cycle centred on risk and crisis management. Key elements that need to be considered as part of the overall institutional communication effort include:

- Informing members of the community about the nature of the threat in a way that does not create panic, reinforce stereotypes or intercommunal tensions, and encourages preventive action on their part (e.g., to report suspicious or unusual behaviour);
- Developing channels of communication with operators of vulnerable urban sites to ensure that they are aware of

security-related obligations, opportunities for improving security-related standards (including locally available funding options) as well as avenues for liaising with law enforcement and first responders on a preventive basis;

- Developing effective awareness-raising campaigns and programmes (including through the identification of the appropriate channels, means and places) for educating incoming visitors about security risks (and precautions to be taken) at city hotspots, especially when cities are key tourist destinations. A communication strategy in this regard should deliver a coherent and coordinated message by leveraging the various intertwined

⁴⁸ The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre is leading a project on “preventing violent extremism through strategic communications”, which could be of interest and assistance in this context. See www.un.org/counterterrorism/cct/strategic-communication

networks, services and nodes in which the urban space is articulated, from transport hubs to leisure facilities and open spaces;⁴⁹

- Establishing a crisis communication plan within a broader crisis management team, with overall responsibility for managing the flow of information from and towards all stakeholders as well as countering the spread of misinformation in a crisis situation; and engagement with the media, including reinforcing the need to avoid creating additional panic or confusion, or reinforcing divisions by relying on stereotypes of perpetrators, among other examples.
- Using the Internet and social media to provide critical security-related information before, during and in the aftermath of a crisis, in line with robust guidelines on the sharing of information and sensitive to local dynamics.

3.1.3 Law enforcement in urban areas

There is no single organizational model for policing urban areas. In some countries, municipalities retain substantial control over many safety and security issues;⁵⁰ in others, law enforcement is centralized at the national level.⁵¹ In between these two models lies a variety of arrangements⁵² (EFUS, 2007). Also, within a same country, multiple police forces are often entrusted with responsibilities over the same territory, but for different categories of crime. The result is that several law enforcement agencies, with sometimes overlapping mandates and responsibilities, may operate simultaneously in urban areas. It is thus critical for them to coordinate their actions. The creation of some form of inter-agency coordinating structure may help overcome jurisdictional and organizational divisions that inhibit a rapid response.



Box 7.

Law enforcement organizational models and their impacts on urban policing

“Different policing structures mean that police forces may have distinct relationships to cities. In the United States, for example, police force identity is integrally tied to local civic pride, practices and culture. Police are drawn from the local population and have often spent their entire lives in a metropolitan area; direct opportunities for advancement exist only within a particular force or, on occasion, within the forces of the towns immediately around a city. Moving to a different city would entail having to pass a separate civil service exam. As a result, police develop a tight culture with a deep knowledge of a city and a close relationship with the city’s political establishment.

(continued)

49 Communication issues also play a critical role in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, especially when the affected urban centre is a magnet for tourists and represents a significant share of the local or national economy. To a significant extent, recovery depends on cities’ ability to draw visitors back based on honest, transparent and well-targeted communications campaigns.

50 For example, the United States.

51 For example, Ireland and Nigeria.

52 In Argentina and Brazil, for example, state and provincial authorities are the primary policing authorities. In Germany, responsibility for internal security is shared between the national government and the Länder. Similarly in Belgium, police forces fall within the competence of the federal government and directly under that of the mayors.

When a police force is administered nationally, a different relationship emerges. Police have the opportunity to advance by moving to different cities around the country and, as a result, may have less in-depth knowledge of the particularities of the city in which they are working but have a wider breadth of knowledge about law enforcement issues. In addition, police working in a national force are likely to be directly accountable to officials in the national government. Relations with local political officials in these cases are complex and challenging to manage. There are some distinct advantages to national forces, including economies of scale, greater coordination between police in different jurisdictions and a greater degree of agility in developing and implementing broad-based changes in national policing strategies.

In considering the role of police reform in urban areas, police and policymakers need to be aware of which police forces have the authority to act in those spaces and how to best use their capabilities to promote reforms. Nationally organized forces are likely to have expertise in a broad range of urban contexts as well as more extensive international contacts. As a result, they are likely to have access to the most up-to-date information on new policing strategies. If a national force is directly responsible for local policing, it should find ways of developing that expertise and disseminating it to local commanders. The local commanders would then need to work with the relevant local political officials responsible for issues such as urban design to implement policies. ... Alternatively, when national forces have little responsibility for local policing, national police need to develop specific strategies for disseminating urban reform ideas to local police. These can involve training programmes or meetings between national police and local police such as those undertaken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation”.

Source: UNODC and UN-Habitat, 2011, p. 89.



Regardless of how law enforcement agencies are structured, effective policing of urban contexts requires building trust with cities' residents, community groups and businesses. Community policing models are often mentioned among the foundational approaches to develop such links of trust.⁵³

Promoting transparency and accountability in policing action is another lever that can be used to entrench habits of active collaboration between law enforcement agencies and urban residents. It has been pointed out, for example, that "simple steps like installing

close circuit television cameras in police stations and recording interviews with suspects have raised the quality of police work substantially, meaning that the public are better served. If you improve accountability in a way that demonstrates integrity, that has a profound effect on community trust and therefore the ability of the police to protect citizens ... When police focus on accountability, you see higher levels of citizens reporting crime as well as supporting and facilitating police work. There is a direct correlation between being more transparent and higher levels of security itself."⁵⁴



Case study 9.

Law enforcement initiatives – Paris, France

Over the past few years, the City of Paris has been adopting a variety of law enforcement techniques and approaches to secure its vulnerable sites, including the following:

- Patrol on foot or bicycle

600 security inspectors carry out 24-hour patrols of municipal facilities (green spaces, nurseries, stadiums, gymnasiums, museums, libraries, conservatories, social facilities, cemeteries, etc.) for preventive and dissuasive purposes. The inspectors mainly walk or use bicycles. In 2014, they carried out 61,328 missions, patrolled for a total of 153,220 hours and carried out 2,172 interventions (upon request). Missions are prioritized on a daily basis according to requests from district mayors, municipal services and reports of breaches of public tranquility identified by the Parisian Observatory of Public Tranquility.⁵⁵

(continued)

53 The implementation of a community policing approach can start with very specific and concrete measures such as: avoiding frequent rotations of police officers assigned to certain neighbourhoods; ensuring that the composition of a community police force reflects the diversity of the communities within their territory, factoring in identity factors such as gender, ethnicity, race, etc.; increasing the chances that officers are perceived as being supportive rather than threatening, for example by deploying them in casual dress with police labels as opposed to full patrol gear and weaponry; ensuring that police officers are adequately trained to perform their tasks in close contact with urban residents, including by acting in a gender-responsive and human rights-compliant manner.

54 Interviews with Bernard Hogan-Howe, Former Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police, and Elisabeth Johnston, Executive Director of the European Forum for Urban Security (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019, p. 28).

55 Set up in 2006, the Observatory measures and analyses acts likely to disturb public tranquility, occurring in municipal buildings and facilities. It is a local decision-making tool supporting the action of central/decentralized services and districts. Data collected by the Observatory are periodically transmitted to the Operational Watch Centre and to the Directorate of Prevention and Protection so that they can be taken into account when designing patrol circuits.

- Reception and surveillance

Reception and surveillance agents are in contact with users at the entrance of district town halls or administrative buildings, in gardens and green spaces or in cemeteries. Nearly 1,000 agents welcome and guide the public and intervene in the event of difficulties.

- Use of external security providers

As a complement to the action of municipal agents, the City of Paris uses external service providers to carry out safety or fire safety duties in a large number of municipal facilities (associations' premises, municipal halls, social centres, libraries, conservatories, leisure centres, gymnasiums made available to the homeless as part of the Winter Emergency Plan, etc.).

- Video protection

The City of Paris is involved in installing video protection cameras alongside the Prefecture of Police. Several site plans have been approved in recent years:

- Under the 2009 Video-Protection Plan for Paris (PVPP-1), also called the “1,000 Cameras” plan, the City co-financed some 1,105 cameras, costing around €5 million;
- A second plan, called “PVPP-2”, was adopted in 2015 to co-finance the installation of 165 additional cameras in particular in new districts, for a total of around €6.3 million;
- In order to ensure respect for public freedoms, in 2009, a Video Protection Ethics Charter was adopted, and the City set up an Ethics Committee in the wake of “PVPP-1”.

Source: www.paris.fr/pages/la-protection-des-equipements-et-des-espaces-verts-4796.



Case study 10.

Connecting levels of government: Fusion centres in the United States

Fusion centres serve as focal points in states and major urban areas for the receipt, analysis, gathering and sharing of threat-related information between state, local, tribal and territorial, federal governments and private-sector partners. This goal is accomplished by providing partners with a unique perspective on threats to their state or locality and being the primary conduit between front-line personnel, state and local leadership and the rest of the Homeland Security Enterprise.

In the United States, fusion centres reflect the shared commitment between the federal government and the state and local governments who own and operate them. Individually, each is a vital resource for integrating information from national and local sources to prevent and respond to all threats and hazards. The enhanced collaboration between the federal, state, local, tribal and territorial governments, and private-sector partners represents the new standard through which homeland security is viewed.

Source: www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers.



Case study 11.

**SHIELD programme: connecting law enforcement to the private sector
– New York , United States**

The purpose of the SHIELD programme is to strengthen the partnership of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) with private security professionals and to serve as NYPD's programme for communication with all private-sector entities on counter-terrorism matters. The programme provides a venue for the private-public sectors to access information and resources from NYPD in order to address emerging and evolving conditions within New York City. By engaging and sharing information with the private-public sector, NYPD seeks to create additional eyes and ears as a force multiplier in the fight against urban terrorism.

(continued)

Information exchange through SHIELD occurs via several platforms, including SHIELD website; real-time email alerts; security association meetings; conferences; intelligence and analysis briefings; facilitated tabletop exercises; resource library; counter-terrorism presentations.

Following its establishment by NYPD after the 9/11 attacks, several police departments in the United States set up a SHIELD network of their own. Over the years, the network has grown to become a global one. The Global SHIELD Network now links together police services from all over the world for the sharing of publications, reports, analyses and best practices.

Sources: www.nypdshield.org/public/; www.policechiefmagazine.org/nypd-shield-and-the-global-shield-network/.



Case study 12.

Project Servator – City of London Police, United Kingdom

Launched in 2014 in reaction to increased levels of crime and the threat of international terrorism, Project Servator is an initiative of the City of London Police based on a strong partnership approach with local communities and businesses, including pubs and retailers, bus, rail or taxi firms and their drivers.



The initiative is based on an inclusive collaborative strategy that leverages media engagement and uses poster advertisements in transport hubs as well as leaflets placed in shops and cafes to encourage urban residents and workers to be vigilant and to report anything suspicious. Highly visible police officers are deployed at unpredictable times and locations, and following different patterns each time. One day the police may wear uniforms and another day they may be plain-clothed. They may show up with dogs on a leash or on horseback.

Project Servator also relies on specially trained undercover officers engaged in behavioural analysis to identify people who might be preparing a terrorist attack, for example when they appear to be conducting site surveillance or act as if under stress or anxiously.

Source: www.cityoflondon.police.uk/projectservator?__cf_chl_captcha_tk__=Xtd_11rXFdbbKrTfrF4iQ01AhAZKbaA1LUR.XXnCmA0-1636131427-0-gaNycGzNCNE.



Case study 13.

Urban policing models – Japan and Chile

- Japan's "police box" system

A high percentage of the Japanese community police force works out of "police boxes", which are placed in communities throughout the country. By posting police in the communities they serve, officers have a better understanding of the security conditions in the community as well as the perceptions, needs and concerns of the residents. Police boxes in urban areas are staffed around the clock with shift services. Police boxes in rural and semi-rural areas are staffed by a single officer, who lives with his/her family in residential housing attached to the office. Police boxes vary widely in their sizes. In addition to an office area, a police box has a kitchen and a room for officers to take breaks. A community room, which is a reception room for community residents, has recently been added. Small police cars are assigned to many police boxes for use in patrols and trips to and from police headquarters. Police boxes are easily identified by residents by a red



(continued)



lamp above the entrance door. The basic duties of officers posted at a police box include standing watch in front of the police box, sitting watch from inside the box and performing field duties that involve patrols and door-to-door visits to homes and businesses. These duties are performed according to a schedule. While on patrol, officers question suspicious persons, make arrests, give warnings, respond to crime reports, and provide residents and tourists with guidance.

- Chile's Quadrant Plan⁵⁶

The Preventive Security Quadrant Plan is the operational strategy defined by the Chilean Police Force to fulfil the demand for police services in urban contexts. Its general aim is to achieve greater efficiency in police action by ensuring that the police have greater knowledge of the territory under their responsibility and the local population. The basic premise of the Plan is that a more direct relationship with citizens facilitates the exchange of relevant law enforcement information. This is achieved by:



56 Extracted from: Programa Plan Cuadrante de Seguridad Preventiva, Chile, Ministry of Finance, June 2007 (www.dipres.gob.cl/597/articles-140457_r_ejecutivo_institucional.pdf).

- Dividing the jurisdictional area of each police unit into smaller surveillance sectors called “quadrants”; and
- Longer police presence in the police units and the creation of special positions to deal with community relationships.

To determine which municipalities are eligible to join the Plan, they are first screened to establish whether 70 per cent of their population is urban (without making any distinction with respect to sex, age, socioeconomic level or other variables). The next step consists of ranking those municipalities based on the following criteria:

- Demand for police services (10 per cent of the overall weighting);
- Level of police resource deficit in the municipality (20 per cent of the overall weighting);
- Unemployment rate in the municipality (10 per cent of the overall weighting);
- Victimization index (40 per cent of the total weighting); and
- Prevalence of drugs (20 per cent of the total weighting).

The result of the screening process is presented to the Ministry of the Interior, which makes the final decision regarding the municipalities that will benefit from the Plan.

The Plan is structured around four components: (1) focused preventive patrols; (2) responding to requests from members of the population; (3) undertaking controls of premises in accordance with applicable laws and regulations (e.g., on alcohol); and (4) execution of court orders.

The above-mentioned services are also provided to municipalities that are not eligible to join the Plan. A distinctive feature of the Plan is that, prior to the delivery of those services, the territory is divided into quadrants for the purpose of focusing police information stemming from higher-risk locations.

Source: Chile, 2017; www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/japanese-community-police-and-police-box-system#additional-details-0.




Tool 17.

Introductory handbook on policing urban space – UNODC and UN-Habitat, 2011

(www.unodc.org/documents/congress/background-information/Crime_Prevention/Introductory_Handbook_on_Policing_Urban_Space.pdf)

The Handbook deals with issues of urban security in cities in low- and middle-income countries. It aims to provide law enforcement policymakers, front-line officers, urban planners and other city authorities with basic information about an array of strategies in good governance practices. These strategies follow the basic guidelines contained in the United Nations Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice⁵⁷ and include community-oriented policing; problem-oriented policing; intelligence-led policing; situational crime prevention; broken windows theory; and crime prevention through environmental design.



The Handbook draws specific attention to the role of women in public spaces, and to efforts to create secure environments for women and girls in the urban space in which they live and work. Section III of the guidelines sets out eight basic principles underpinning the development of crime prevention strategies for urban contexts:

1. Government leadership

All levels of government should play a leadership role in developing effective and humane crime prevention strategies and in creating and maintaining institutional frameworks for their implementation and review.

2. Socioeconomic development and inclusion

Crime prevention considerations should be integrated into all relevant social and economic policies and programs, including those addressing employment, education, health, housing and urban planning, poverty, social marginalization and exclusion. Particular emphasis should be placed on communities, families, children and youth at risk. Moreover, women also face particular security challenges and concerns that may be effectively addressed through collaborative restructuring of urban space and police services

3. Cooperation/partnerships

Cooperation/partnerships should be an integral part of effective crime prevention, given the wide-ranging nature of the causes of crime and the skills and responsibilities required to address them. This includes partnerships working across ministries and between authorities, community and non-governmental organizations as well as the business sector and citizens.

⁵⁷ Economic and Social Council resolution 2002/13, Annex, Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime.

4. Sustainability/accountability

Crime prevention requires adequate resources, including funding for structures and activities, in order to be sustained. There should be clear accountability for funding, implementation and evaluation and for the achievement of planned results.

5. Knowledge base

Crime prevention strategies, policies, programmes and actions should be based on a broad, multidisciplinary foundation of knowledge about crime problems, their multiple causes and promising and proven practices.

6. Human rights/rule of law/culture of lawfulness

The rule of law and those human rights which are recognized in international instruments to which Member States are parties must be respected in all aspects of crime prevention. A culture of lawfulness should be actively promoted in crime prevention.

7. Interdependency

National crime prevention diagnoses and strategies should, where appropriate, take account of links between local criminal problems and international organized crime.

8. Differentiation

Crime prevention strategies should, when appropriate, pay due regard to the different needs of men and women and consider the special needs of vulnerable members of society.

3.1.3.1 Local/municipal police

Local/municipal police are locally organized and funded law enforcement structures whose primary duties typically revolve around the enforcement of local regulations and the protection of public spaces and buildings such as city hall, schools and parks.

While the local/municipal police may be unarmed and have more limited powers than national law enforcement agencies, they nevertheless undertake several key preventative guard activities on behalf of municipal governments. These activities may include security education and awareness-raising among urban residents, supporting and overseeing the work of neighbourhood watch groups, participating in urban planning processes and advising or assisting operators of vulnerable

sites on the design and implementation of site/event security plans. As local/municipal officers are in close contact with urban residents, it should be ensured that they are adequately trained to perform their tasks in a gender-responsive and human rights-compliant manner.

Ideally, the local/municipal police also play the role of intermediary between different levels of government. This can work in two directions. On the one hand, they can help bring the concerns and recommendations of national law enforcement agencies to the attention of municipal authorities. On the other hand, through their knowledge of local realities, they can act as informed and reliable messengers to help convey the concerns of city officials to police agencies at the national level.



Case study 14.

Lisbon Municipal Police – Portugal

The Municipal Police of Lisbon (PML) is a municipal service specifically dedicated to the exercise of administrative police functions. PML's actions are founded on principles of community policing, notably:

- Empowering the community for participatory citizenship in security matters at the local level;
- Raising awareness among urban residents on the adoption of safety behaviours;
- Reducing and preventing antisocial behaviours;
- Increasing levels of trust between the police and the urban population; and
- Increasing the population's sense of security.

The adoption of this community policing model by PML has been internationally recognized as good practice that could be applied to other cities and countries. PML is a partner in various international projects.

Source: Policia Municipal de Lisboa, 2019.





Case study 15.

Intercultural representatives in the local police – Emilia-Romagna, Italy, and Dearborn, United States

A project implemented in Emilia-Romagna, Italy, involved personnel from various cultural and ethnic backgrounds assisting local police forces. By acting as translators, interpreters and facilitators to enhance mutual understanding in urban contexts, this mixed support staff brought about major changes in the police cultural model. Their presence contributed to breaking down communication barriers and overcoming stereotypes based on ethnicity and group identity. Feedback from activities carried out under the project showed that support from native-speaker operators fostered empathy among the ethnic groups involved and was instrumental in framing the role of local police as not being punitive. Although it was not unanimous, the local community broadly supported the project.

A similar experiment took place in Dearborn, Michigan (USA), where police forces recruited individuals of various ethnic and religious backgrounds. Specific groups, such as from India, and Eastern Europe, were represented within local law enforcement agencies and ensured close outreach to their respective immigrant communities. The provision of cultural training to police forces also ensured that immigrant behaviour patterns were correctly understood.

Sources: Global Network on Safer Cities, 2014, p. 157; Odierno and O'Hanlon, 2017, p. 29.



Case study 16.

Guidance on “grey spaces” – London Metropolitan Police, United Kingdom

The London Metropolitan Police consider “grey spaces” as “spaces or areas that have disputed risk ownership or no identified owner. Including areas and spaces that have shared usage and risk ownership but continue to sit outside of existing security planning. These can also be areas and spaces that can have gaps in security or blind spots”. In handling “grey spaces”, the London Metropolitan Police follow a set of basic principles, notably:

- Recognition and understanding of “grey spaces” as part of a complex security environment;
- Multi-agency involvement;
- Acceptance of a joint responsibility principle;
- Leveraging existing legislative frameworks, e.g., pavement licenses; and
- Preparedness through exercising to ensure a coordinated response and understanding.

Source: Presentation by the London Metropolitan Police at an UNOCT Expert Group Meeting (15 June 2021).



3.2 Non-government actors

3.2.1 Urban residents

Far from being mere recipients of security services designed by central or local authorities, urban residents are indispensable actors in shaping cities' security landscapes. Urban residents have the most accurate and nuanced knowledge of the "street". They are in a privileged position to spot anomalies in local dynamics, observe suspicious movements of people and notice unattended objects. Within the framework of relevant institutional and CSOs programmes, they can be instrumental in conducting neighbourhood watch activities. They can also be key resources in initiatives reaching out to individuals who may be self-radicalizing with the aim of including them in local educational and recreational activities. Similar efforts may help to mitigate a looming terrorist threat

and provide law enforcement authorities with important insight.

To a large extent, the contribution of urban residents depends on the degree to which public authorities decide to involve them in creating secure cities through local policy-making processes. Also, residents may be in a position to make their voices heard by taking a pro-active role in the work of neighbourhood committees, local branches of civil society organizations or through membership of religious congregations. These bodies may not have an explicit mandate to handle security issues as such, but they are often incubators of ideas and promoters of grassroot programmes that eventually produce improvements in the security landscape. Successful initiatives originally developed at a micro level may then gain visibility and inspire broader city-wide initiatives.



Case study 17.

SGSecure and the role of urban residents – Singapore

SGSecure seeks to leverage the contribution of Singapore's multi-racial and multi-religious community to developing urban resilience in the face of terrorist threats. The initiative is structured around the following three core actions:



- Staying **Alert** to prevent a terrorist attack and to keep oneself safe in the event of an attack;
- Staying **United** to help one another, especially after an attack; and
- Staying **Strong** to safeguard our social fabric and bounce back as one people.

(continued)

Urban residents are encouraged to actively report any suspicious activity or behaviour that may be indicative of a terrorist threat by using a dedicated online form, calling the police or submitting the information via a secure app. A dedicated counter-terrorism hotline has been created for reporting information on persons who may have become radicalized.

In case of an attack, Singapore’s residents are invited to follow the “Run, Hide, Tell” model:

- **RUN:** Move quickly and quietly away from danger using the safest route. Do not surrender or attempt to negotiate.
- **HIDE:** Stay out of sight, be quiet and switch your phone to silent mode. Lock yourself in and stay away from the doors.
- **TELL:** Provide information to the police. Provide details about the attackers and their location.

The SGSecure website provides resources for both individuals and organizations, such as advisory posters, contingency planning checklists and basic instructions about helping others through the use of improvised first aid techniques.

I-Witness is a parallel community-related initiative implemented in Singapore. It works as an online platform that helps the public connect directly with the police, via text or multimedia files, on crime incidents, traffic offences, security crises, etc. The online application is available to the public on their smartphones. Reporting persons may choose to remain anonymous or provide their contact details.

Sources: SGSecure (www.sgsecure.gov.sg/); I-Witness (www.police.gov.sg/iwitness).



3.2.2 Operators of vulnerable urban targets

Depending on the applicable legal frameworks, the operators of vulnerable urban sites can be individual businesspeople, companies, public entities or mixed public-private consortiums. Although different categories of operators are subject to different regulatory

requirements, they all have a role in ensuring that those present on sites’ premises (e.g., the public, personnel, performers at a sport or cultural event) can benefit from a safe and secure environment. In doing so, site operators need to carry out meticulous threat and vulnerability assessments with respect to current and emerging threats to their facilities based on security requirements, policies and

recommendations issued by relevant governmental authorities, business and sector-specific associations, etc.⁵⁸

Any vulnerability assessment should then be used as a basis for the development and implementation of facility and/or event-related risk and crisis mitigation plans in coordination with plans and guidelines issued at the State or local level. These plans need to be adjusted to the local context, for example, by taking into account the size and specific uses of each individual place as well as users' profiles. A focal point responsible for plan implementation – as well as for initiating and coordinating necessary revisions and updates – needs to be designated and trained.

At the same time, site or event security is best guaranteed through the creation of active partnerships between private operators and law enforcement authorities. By drawing on the knowledge of site characteristics and event dynamics that only private operators can provide, for example, law enforcement agencies can plan to optimally mobilize their

force. They can also understand how their intervention is likely to have an impact on operators' crowd management efforts, with a view to coordinating different aspects of overall site or event security.

Conducting emergency drills and crisis management exercises involving both site operators and law enforcement/first responders is also an invaluable opportunity to test procedures, identify coordination gaps, refine the mutual understanding of roles, and develop or update crisis management plans and protocols.

Operators (e.g., shopping malls) that rely on private guards for security purposes should also strive to forge a collaborative relationship with law enforcement authorities. This may be critically important, especially where the roles and responsibilities of private security guards are not clearly or sufficiently covered by applicable legal frameworks, or resources impact the capability of these companies to effectively prevent or respond to incidents.



Case study 18.

Security-by-design certification programmes

Administered by the SAFE Design Council, a non-profit organization, the Safe Design Standard is the first international environmental crime reduction certification programme focused on achieving security through functional architectural and landscape design. The Standard evaluates site access points, wayfinding and signage, pathways and roadways, barriers and fencing, visibility and illumination, mechanical and computerized security technologies and other design elements intended for controlling access and movement within and around a building or site. Certification is only granted to property that has undergone a rigorous and comprehensive multi-phase assessment showing that reasonable and prudent risk mitigation steps have been taken.

(continued)

58 In its Conclusions on the Protection of Public Spaces, adopted on 7 June 2021, the Council of the European Union specifically invited member States to “screen their national legislation and local regulation with a view to ensuring that it contains clear provisions with regards to administrative requirements and responsibilities for those who plan and manage the security of public spaces” (para. 30).

The certification concept has potentially valuable applications to facilitate proof by operators of vulnerable urban sites about their compliance with applicable regulatory frameworks on urban management and security.

Source: www.safedesigncouncil.org/.



Tool 18.

Terrorism risk assessment of public spaces for practitioners – European Commission, 2020

(<https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/pps/items/674909/en>)

The report details the various steps and practical considerations that operators of vulnerable urban sites are recommended to follow in conducting terrorism-related risk assessment for public spaces. Threat identification, in particular, is regarded as a process that needs to consider the following:

- Political and sociological developments at the international, national and local levels;
- Analysis of past incidents (attacks, foiled or failed events); and
- Attack scenarios for a specific public space at a particular moment or period of time.

Risk analysis is interpreted as an evaluation of the likelihood of an attack, its potential consequences as well as threat-, setting- and time-specific vulnerability assessments. In carrying out vulnerability assessments, the European Commission recommends using the EU Vulnerability Assessment Checklist as a support tool.



Tool 19.

Vulnerability Assessment Tool (EU-VAT) and Manual – European Commission

(https://protect-cities.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/PRoTECT_Deliverable-2.1-Manual-EU-VAT_v2.0.pdf)

Vulnerability Assessment Tool (EU-VAT)

EU-VAT is part of the European Commission’s package of initiatives to support protection efforts by operators of vulnerable public places (PRoTECT project). Its objective is to help assess the vulnerability of specific public spaces with regards to different types of terrorist attacks.

EU-VAT is a Microsoft Excel workbook containing six spreadsheets, each of which relates to a “phase” that people go through starting with the moment they approach the main site, i.e. sports stadiums, outdoor concert halls, hotels, schools or other public gathering areas. The six phases include

- Phase 1: Access to the Venue
- Phase 2: Parking and Transport
- Phase 3: Approach to Venue
- Phase 4: Arrival at Venue
- Phase 5: Venue Security – No Access Control
- Phase 6: Venue Security – With Access Control.

In determining levels of vulnerability, EU-VAT uses crowd density as a highly relevant factor and includes information to help classify crowd density on a scale from two to five persons per square metre.

(continued)



Vulnerability Assessment Manual

Based on the concept and structure of EU-VAT, the Vulnerability Assessment Manual was developed by TNO of the Netherlands and the European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS)⁵⁹ as part of the European Union's PRoTECT project.⁶⁰ The Manual is addressed to municipal staff from various departments which are to some degree involved in and/or responsible for the safety and security of people in their municipalities.




Tool 20.

Guide to the integration of security systems in public spaces – Brussels Capital Region, 2019

(<https://bps-bpv.brussels/en/guide-integration-security-systems-public-spaces>)

The purpose of the Guide is to familiarize operators, managers and designers of public spaces with the principles governing physical security and the related administrative procedures. The Guide focuses on terrorist and extremist threats and, more specifically, on ram vehicle attacks by reviewing four types of public spaces – streets, pedestrian areas, squares and parks – and recommended design principles for each.

Following a brief introduction to the key principles of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (Security by Design), which provide a comprehensive understanding of security issues in public spaces, it discusses each of the successive steps necessary for the successful integration of security systems.



3.2.3 Private-sector entities (non-site operators)

Even when they are not operators of vulnerable targets, individuals involved in economic activities in urban contexts may be

instrumental in identifying and reporting suspicious behaviour. This is certainly true of traditional shopkeepers who are familiar with the districts in which they carry out their commercial activities and are therefore in a good position to spot unusual street dynamics.

⁵⁹ EFUS is the European network of local and regional authorities dedicated to urban security. It includes nearly 250 local and regional authorities from 16 countries (<https://efus.eu/>).

⁶⁰ The PRoTECT project aims to strengthen local authorities' capabilities in protecting public spaces by putting in place an overarching concept where tools, technology, training, and field demonstrations will lead to situational awareness and improve direct responses to secure public places before, during and after a terrorist threat (<https://protect-cities.eu/>).

At the same time, in recent years there has been a proliferation of technology companies that provide a variety of web-powered services such as ridesharing and food delivery. Law enforcement agencies are beginning to partner with some of these businesses by leveraging the tens of thousands of associated drivers who can observe and report suspicious patterns.⁶¹

As an overwhelming number of recent city-based terrorist attacks have taken the form of vehicle ramming, car rental agencies can also play an important role by performing enhanced due diligence on their customers and entering into partnering agreements with law enforcement authorities.⁶²

The business sector may also explore ways – together with municipal authorities – to revitalize certain degraded urban areas with concrete steps, potentially in exchange for tax breaks or other forms of incentives offered by municipal authorities.

3.2.4 Civil society organizations (CSOs)

Whether they perform relief work, carry out educational programmes for disadvantaged communities or support specific religious congregations, local CSOs are key intermediaries between urban residents and municipal authorities. On the one hand, they can help residents bring to the attention of public authorities their grievances and/or proposals on a variety of security-related matters. On the other hand, they can offer their premises and outreach programmes as channels to convey critical information to urban residents, conduct awareness-raising campaigns, etc. Depending on the circumstances, this connecting role can either be played on an informal/ad hoc basis, or it can be formalized with the establishment of arrangements with relevant municipal services outlining the conditions, timing and content of the information exchange.

61 One such company is present in over 10,000 cities globally and has 3.5 million drivers.

62 In its Conclusions on the Protection of Public Spaces, adopted on 7 June 2021, the Council of the European Union encouraged Member States to “continue studying and analysing security guidance and tools for rental vehicle operators to prevent and mitigate the risk of vehicle attacks in public spaces” (para. 29).



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For more information, please visit:
www.un.org/counterterrorism/vulnerable-targets

