Greece: Papandreou: National Interests Are the Key
Greece’s Prime Minister is touchy about ties with the U.S ., but pragmatic about, foreign policy and economic problem-solving
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IN OCTOBER OF 1981, Andreas Papandreou’s Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok) won an overwhelming victory in Greece’s national elections, ending thirty-five years of nearly uninterrupted conservative rule in Greece. Papandreou had campaigned on a platform advocating many changes in Greek domestic and foreign policies, including a withdrawal of Greece from NATO, removal of U.S. bases from Greece, an end to Greece’s ties with the European Economic Community (EEC), the elimination of all nuclear weapons from Greek soil, and a tougher stand toward Turkey. His victory, therefore, led to uncertainty about the direction Greece’s domestic and foreign policies might take in the next few years.
Any shift away from Greece’s traditional pro-Western stance would have important implications for U.S. and NATO strategy in the eastern Mediterranean. Greece borders on Turkey, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. Its position in the eastern Mediterranean makes it crucial to the control of naval and air routes in the area. Moreover, its proximity to the Middle East increases its strategic value to the United States. For instance, air bases in Greece proved particularly useful during the evacuation of American nationals from Iran early in 1979.
Andreas Papandreou is an unlikely radical. The son of a former prime minister, George Papandreou, he was arrested for leftist activities under the Metaxas dictatorship and fled in 1939 to the United States. He served in the U.S. Navy during World War II, and became a U.S. citizen in 1944. After obtaining his doctorate in economics at Harvard, he held a variety of academic posts, including the chairmanship of the economics department at the University of California at Berkeley, before returning to Greece to enter politics in 1964.
Arrested by the military during the coup in 1967, he was later released as a result of pressure from U.S. friends close to the Johnson Administration. Thereafter, he went into exile in Sweden and Canada, where he taught, and organized the resistance to the junta. While in exile, he became increasingly bitter toward the United States for what he saw as its support of the dictatorship, and, as leader of the opposition after the restoration of democracy in Greece in 1974, he became an outspoken critic of U.S. policy and Greek ties to NATO. Many observers therefore feared that his election would lead to a drift toward neutralism and a sharp deterioration of U.S.-Greek relations.
During his first year as prime minister, Papandreou has proven to be far more pragmatic and moderate than many of his critics had thought would be the case. Once in power, he found that he, like other politicians, has relatively little room for maneuver, especially in foreign policy. As a consequence, he has had to postpone or moderate many of the radical positions that he had staked out in his campaign.
Papandreou has not been a docile and obedient ally, however. At a meeting of NATO defense ministers in December of 1981, he demanded guarantees of Greece’s frontiers against Turkish agression and held up the publication of the meeting’s final communiqué. And he refused to go along with sanctions against the Soviet Union after the imposition of martial law in Poland. He has also been wooing Yasir Arafat, and one of his first acts after coming to office was to upgrade the status of the PLO office in Athens. On the whole, however, these assertions of Greek independence have not been of major significance. They have been designed primarily for domestic consumption and have been put forward at least in part in order to deflect attention from the fact that on the crucial issues—such as NATO integration, Greece’s ties to the EEC, and relations with the United States—Papandreou’s policy has not differed radically from that of his predecessors.
Where change has occurred, it has been of tone and style rather than of substance. This is as true for policy toward the Balkans and the Middle East as it is for policy toward the United States and Western Europe. In many of these areas, Papandreou is building on what was begun by his predecessors, Constantine Caramanlis and George Rallis, but giving it new accents.
The political significance of this change of tone and style should not be overlooked, however. In a small country that traditionally has been dominated by one outside power or another—that owes its very birth to the intervention of outside powers—and in which pride and dignity play an important political and social role, Papandreou’s willingness to stand up for Greek interests has struck a responsive chord and earned him the respect of even those Greeks who disagree with him on many issues.
PAPANDREOU’S AMERICAN connection has been both a political liability and a political asset. During his first few years in Greek politics, he struggled to live down his reputation as a “parachutist”—a Johnny-come-lately who had risen to political prominence because of family connections. (His father, prime minister from 1964 to 1965, had appointed Andreas minister of economic coordination not long after his return to Greece.) But as prime minister, Andreas has found that the time he spent in the U.S. is probably an asset. Having lived and taught in the U.S. for twenty years, he is at ease with Americans. He was able to establish a good working relationship with Alexander Haig, the former secretary of state, during the latter’s visit to Athens last May, and Caspar Weinberger, the secretary of defense, was reportedly surprised by Papandreou’s businesslike and nonpolemical manner during their meeting in Brussels in December of 1981. Other high-ranking American government officials have also been struck by the contrast between Papandreou’s private demeanor and his public image as a rabblerouser and demagogue.
To some extent this ability to adapt to his audience is just good showmanship, but it also reflects a recognition on Papandreou’s part that to achieve his longterm goals he needs to avoid unnecessary conflict with Washington, particularly in the early stages of his government.
Thus far the Reagan Administration has assumed a posture of “watchful waiting,” wisely judging Papandreou more on his performance in office than on his past rhetoric. For his part, Papandreou has by and large eschewed the disputatious language and scathing criticism of the United States that was his stock-intrade while in opposition. As a result, though Washington and Athens do not agree on many issues, relations between them are much better today than might have been expected.
Much of the credit for the success to date of U.S. policy toward Greece belongs to Alexander Haig, and to Lawrence Eagleburger, now undersecretary for political affairs. Haig took an active interest in Greek-Turkish issues, and needed little briefing on the technical aspects of the disagreements between the two countries because of his earlier responsibilities as head of NATO. Also important has been the U.S. ambassador to Greece, Monteagle Stearns. A career diplomat who speaks Greek fluently and has served several tours of duty in Greece, Stearns has won high praise in Athens for his knowledge of Greek affairs and his broad range of contacts. He has the added advantage of having a long-standing relationship with Papandreou, whom he has known for nearly twenty years.
THE REAL TIME of testing lies ahead, however. Of particular importance is the future status of the four U.S. bases in Greece. Unlike the facilities in Turkey, which are predominantly used for intelligence gathering, those in Greece provide direct support for the Sixth Fleet. Loss of these facilities, especially the deepwater port and air base at Suda Bay, on Crete, would inhibit the ability of the Sixth Fleet to operate in the eastern Mediterranean, and make the defense of Turkey more difficult if it should be attacked by one of the Warsaw Pact nations.
Papandreou regards the bases as a symbol of Greece’s outmoded “client” relationship with the United States. He argues that they serve predominantly U.S. interests and provide few direct benefits to Greece. This view reflects his belief, shared by the Greek military and the vast majority of Greeks, that the primary threat to Greece comes from Turkey, not from the Soviet Union. However, while Papandreou would like to see the bases removed, he also wants to avoid a nasty confrontation with the U.S. Thus, he is likely to tolerate their continued presence on Greek soil if some means can be found to make them serve Greek national interests more fully than in the past.
Talks on the future of the bases, which began last October, are currently in progress. While little has been revealed about the position taken by the Greek government, several issues will no doubt play an important role in the negotiations. One is the future of the Hellenikon air base, outside of Athens. The base is used, among other things, for surveillance of activities in the Middle East, including, particularly in recent years, in volatile Libya. In the past, Papandreou has maintained close relations with Libya (unsubstantiated rumors have circulated in Athens for years that Papandreou received financial support from Libya while he was in opposition), and he will probably demand that such surveillance be curtailed, and may insist that the base be closed.
Another issue likely to figure prominently in the negotiations is the question of military assistance. Papandreou sees a buildup of Greece’s military strength as the best guarantee against Turkey, and he may well tie the future of the bases to an increase in U.S. military assistance, which would enable Greece to modernize its armed forces, particularly its air force. (The Greeks are currently shopping around for an advanced fighter to replace the F-4; they appear to have narrowed the choice to the F-16 and the Mirage 2000, with the F-16 the preferred aircraft.) The problem is that Greece apparently wants a bigger aid package than the U.S. is prepared to give—or can give.
Papandreou will also probably insist on some sort of annual review process, which would allow him to argue to the Greek public that the bases were under greater Greek control. Finally, there is the issue of a guarantee of the country’s frontiers, which Greece has sought in the past. While Papandreou has lately tended to down-play the issue, stating that “only satellites require guarantees,” it is bound to figure in the negotiations in some way. Greek concerns could possibly be assuaged by a reiteration of the principles set forth in 1976 in a letter from Henry Kissinger, then the U.S. secretary of state, to Greek Foreign Minister Dimitri Bitsios, which stated that the U.S. would “actively and unequivocably oppose” any effort on the part of Greece or Turkey to impose “a military solution” in the Aegean. (By what means the U.S. would oppose any such solution was deliberately left vague.)
Papandreou’s position on NATO has also shifted. While he continues to insist that he would eventually like to see Greece out of NATO, he stresses that he views such a withdrawal within the framework of a dissolution of European power blocs, not as an immediate goal. As long as blocs exist—and as long as Greece perceives a threat from Turkey—a go-it-alone strategy is unfeasible. “We are realists,” he emphasizes.
THE KEY TO the shifts in Papandreou’s policy over the past year is his concern with Turkey. Withdrawal from NATO would leave Greece more exposed, both diplomatically and militarily, vis-a-vis Turkey. Moreover, once Greece was outside of NATO, the U.S. would probably tilt more heavily toward Turkey, committing even more resources to modernizing Ankara’s armed forces. Recognizing this, Papandreou has retreated from his previous threats to withdraw from NATO and has sought instead to gain support for Greece’s position within the councils of the Alliance. His efforts have been undercut, however, by Greece’s tendency to footnote NATO communiqués and to depart from agreed Alliance positions. For instance, Papandreou supported Soviet proposals to include the French and British independent nuclear forces in the negotiations in Geneva on medium-range missiles—a move that brought a protest from Paris and London. And whereas most NATO members reacted with reserve to the disarmament proposals made by the Warsaw Pact in its meeting in Prague in January, Greece welcomed them warmly. Such moves may be good domestic politics, but they have done little to win Papandreou friends among NATO members who could be supportive on issues of vital concern to Athens.
The major source of Papandreou’s discontent with NATO is the question of command responsibilities. Under an agreement worked out by General Bernard Rogers, supreme allied commander in Europe, and the Rallis government, Greece rejoined the military structure of NATO in 1980 (it withdrew from the military structure in 1974, in protest over the Turkish invasion of Cyprus). Though the terms of the agreement have never been made public, the Greeks understood that two NATO commands would have responsibility for control of the Aegean: one at Izmir, in Turkey, and a new one at Larissa, in Greece. Both were to be under the command of NATO’s southern European headquarters, in Naples. Specific responsibilities were to be negotiated later.
These responsibilities have never been set out, however, because Greece and Turkey cannot agree on how to divide their air and naval responsibilities. The Greeks want to go back to the pre1974 situation, when the Greek air force had operational responsibility up to the FIR (“flight information region”) line that runs midway between the Greek islands and the Turkish coast. The Turks have wanted the NATO command line to be moved out to the center of the Aegean. This is unacceptable to the Greeks, because it would give Turkey control over Greek territory.
For the Alliance, the issue is simply one of boundaries. For the Greeks, it is an issue of national sovereignty. They fear that any acceptance of Turkish control over Greek airspace will set a precedent for negotiations between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean. As a consequence, they have refused to establish the command headquarters at Larissa until the question of operational responsibilities has been clarified to their satisfaction, though they have shown some willingness to participate in certain NATO exercises.
Another important constraint on Papandreou’s room for maneuver has been the Greek military. While Papandreou was once a sharp critic of the military, over the past several years he has made a concerted effort to court its support. In the 1981 election campaign, for instance, he consistently praised the important role played by the armed forces, and since becoming prime minister he has given several speeches to the officer corps, in an effort to win their support and ensure their loyalty.
One indication of the importance Papandreou attaches to keeping a firm hand on the military is his decision to maintain the defense portfolio for himself. At the same time, over the past year he has introduced a number of measures designed to curry favor with the military, such as higher pay for recruits, increased housing allowances for officers, health benefits for military personnel, and an acceleration of the promotion process for junior officers. He has also backed off his campaign promise to reduce the length of military service for recruits, saying that a reduction would be possible only after the threat from Turkey had declined.
Another point that has earned Papandreou approval from the military has been his hawkish stand towanl Turkey. At first he refused to renew the bilateral negotiations with Ankara that were begun by Caramanlis and Rallis, arguing that negotiations over the continental shelf and airspace in the Aegean involved questions of Greek sovereignty, which were “non-negotiable,” and he made clear that he would give top priority to strengthening Greece’s defense capability. He also undertook a number of other moves, such as a highly publicized trip to Cyprus (the first visit by a Greek prime minister to the island), which irritated the Turks and contributed to tension between the two countries early last year.
Apparently recognizing that his hardline approach has been counterproductive, last summer Papandreou proposed a moratorium (a cessation of polemics and provocative acts by both sides), which was promptly accepted by Turkey. For a while relations between the two countries seemed to have improved. The truce was broken in November, however, when NATO proved unwilling to include the Greek island of Lemnos in its “Apex 82” exercises. This refusal was seen by the Greeks as implying acceptance of the Turkish view that the island should be demilitarized, and Greece withdrew from the exercises at the last moment. Turkey responded by sending its military aircraft into disputed airspace, which led Athens to cancel a scheduled meeting between the countries’ foreign ministers.
The renewal of tension last fall emphasizes the importance of finding a diplomatic solution to the Aegean dispute. The root of the problem is that hundreds of Greek islands are scattered throughout the Aegean, some of them within a few miles of the Turkish coast. The difference of view over territorial rights is at the heart of the Greek-Turkish dispute over the continental shelf, civil airspace, and the two countries’ roles in the NATO command structure.
These strategic issues are exacerbated by deep-seated cultural, historical, and psychological factors that color the perception of each side and make compromise difficult. But none of the issues is irresolvable. What is needed is an act of political will and courage similar to that exhibited by the great Greek statesman Eleutherios Venizelos, who, together with Kemal AtatÜrk, laid the foundation for Greek-Turkish reconciliation in the interwar period. Ironically, because of his tough stand toward Turkey in the past and his image as a staunch nationalist, Papandreou could pursue such a course more easily than any other Greek politician. Moreover, the chances that Papandreou could reach an accord with Turkey are probably better now, while the country is under military rule, than they will be later, if the country is governed by a weak parliamentary coalition, as was the case throughout most of the 1970s.
ON THE DOMESTIC front, too, Papandreou has moved with relative caution. He has resisted pressure from the left wing to implement a program of broad social and economic reform. Instead, he has proceeded slowly, in a series of small steps, to introduce a policy of limited reform. Unlike France’s president, Francois Mitterrand, for instance, he has not tried to nationalize key industries.
Nonetheless, during his first year a number of small but important reforms were introduced. Civil marriage was legalized; adultery was decriminalized; the voting age was lowered from twenty to eighteen; and the contribution of the left to the national resistance against the Germans in World War II was officially recognized.
Perhaps the most important reform, however, has been Papandreou’s effort to decentralize the government administration. Greece, like France, is a highly centralized state, and almost all administrative decisions, even the most minute and trivial, are made in Athens. This has often resulted in long bureaucratic delays and mountains of red tape that have seriously hindered administrative efficiency and provoked frustration at the local level. Papandreou has sought to make the process manageable by streamlining the bureaucracy and giving more power to local authorities.
Papandreou’s principal weakness, however, remains the economy, which lately has been facing mounting problems. The economic boom that Greece experienced in the 1960s and 1970s, based on an expansion of shipping and tourism as well as high industrial growth, has come to an end. Growth slowed visibly in 1980, and in 1981 the country’s GNP actually fell. Inflation is currently just above 20 percent, and urban unemployment has risen to 8 percent, double that of 1981. In January, Papandreou was forced to devalue the drachma by 15 percent and to restrict imports from the EEC.
To be sure, many of these problems were inherited from his predecessors. Nonetheless, Papandreou’s election generated a widespread expectation that, as an economist, he would produce a rapid turnaround of Greece’s economy. But while inflation has dropped slightly and the public debt has been reduced, little overall improvement has been achieved since he took office.
In spite of growing dissatisfaction with his economic performance, Papandreou remains popular. He has been aided, moreover, by the lack of effective opposition. More than a year after its defeat in the national elections, the party formerly in power, New Democracy, remains in disarray and unable to provide a plausible alternative. The party is badly in need of rejuvenation. Evangelos Averoff, the head of the party, is too old (seventy-two) and too associated with the right to provide the dynamic, forward-looking leadership the party needs in order to attract voters from the center. If it is to recapture power, the party must appeal to the “new Greece”—the mass of voters under forty, which voted overwhelmingly for Pasok in 1981. Averoff and his entourage, however, are markedly reluctant to make way for younger leaders who could instill vigor and make the party attractive to this critical segment of the Greek electorate.
The only real opposition to date has come from the KKE, the Moscow-oriented communist party, which has hammered away mercilessly at Papandreou’s failure to live up to his campaign promises. Over the past year it has called a series of strikes in public transportation and banks, designed to pressure Papandreou into abandoning his moderate course. But while the KKE did make some gains in the municipal elections in October, Pasok’s strong showing seems to suggest little serious erosion of support.
The coming year is likely to be a time of testing for Papandreou—and for U.S.-Greek relations. Much will depend on the state of the economy and Papandreou’s domestic performance. If the economy does not improve, support for Papandreou could begin to erode. Faced with growing economic problems and increasing social discontent, the prime minister could be tempted to seek external scapegoats. In such a case, the U.S. would become a convenient target and the bases a ready-made issue. If these perils can be avoided, however, the U.S. has an opportunity to remove one of the main irritants in U.S.-Greek relations and to move to a more stable, though hardly trouble-free, relationship with Athens.
—F. Stephen Larrabee