Uranium report RBC 21.11.24

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Nuclear revival is going to need a lot more uranium

Deep dive into our uranium S&D outlook through to 2040
EQUITY RESEARCH | NOVEMBER 21, 2024

For Required Non-U.S. Analyst and Conflicts Disclosures, see page 32
EQUITY RESEARCH
November 21, 2024 RBC Dominion Securities Inc.
Andrew D. Wong (Analyst)
RBC Imagine™: Nuclear revival is going to need a lot more uranium (416) 842-7830,
[email protected]
Harrison Reynolds (Associate)
Deep dive into our uranium S&D outlook through to 2040 (647) 504-7192,
[email protected]
Our view: As the world re-embraces nuclear energy to meet rising demand for clean electricity, we forecast global uranium requirements grow +50%
by 2040. Uranium is currently in short-supply through the late-2020s as a supply response takes time, while increased supply into the early-2030s
will only be just enough to cover uranium forecasted needs and comes with significant execution risk. Into the mid-2030s, we see a significant
uranium deficit forming due to resource depletion, with projected supply covering just 80% of demand. Given significant tailwinds in nuclear energy,
we also see a realistic upside demand scenario that would require nearly every advanced uranium project in development to come online. In our
coverage, Cameco (Outperform) appears well-positioned to benefit as a proven uranium producer with tier 1 assets and diversified exposure across
the nuclear sector, while NexGen (Outperform) is developing the strategically important Rook I project needed to meet the coming long-term deficit.
In this report, we explore our in-depth uranium S&D outlook through 2040. This report builds on our prior research diving into nuclear energy (RBC
Imagine™: Climate of change for nuclear energy) and Cameco (RBC Imagine™: A nuclear champion for the energy transition).
Global uranium S&D set to remain tight as demand outpaces supply: Given steady demand growth and long lead-times to bring on new supply,
we see the uranium market in deficit through 2030, with Western markets most vulnerable to a supply-side shock during this period given >50% of
supply coming from Kazakhstan, Niger, Russia, and Uzbekistan. While we forecast rising supply into the late-2020s/early-2030s that is just enough
to meet demand, there is significant uncertainty and execution risk with just three projects accounting for ~65% of new supply during this period
— two of them yet to-be-permitted and one located in Niger which presents additional risk. Beyond 2035, assuming all our projected supply comes
online as expected, we still project a significant deficit with supply covering only 80% of uranium requirements by 2040.
Just moderate upside nuclear growth would need every pound available: We think our post-2035 forecast is subject to demand upside, given
strong global momentum to grow nuclear energy, and our realistic upside scenario could see demand +12% above our base case. This may seem like
a relatively moderate increase in uranium demand, but would result in a very significant +60% increase to our forecasted 2040 deficit to >80Mlbs
that would effectively require all advanced stage projects and new projects to be developed. Even in our downside scenario, we still project a
significant uranium deficit of >25Mlbs by 2040 due to resource depletion over time — a deficit equivalent to what we saw in the early-2020s that
sparked the recent multi-year price rally.
Uranium prices set to remain elevated through next decade, higher incentive prices needed: We forecast ~$90/lb average uranium prices from
2025-2028 (vs. $80-85/lb today) and see potential upside from supply-side risks, especially for Western-aligned utilities, as geopolitical tensions
create friction in the global nuclear fuel supply chain and new supply takes time to ramp-up. A supply response by the late-2020s/early-2030s could
provide a temporary reprieve and temper prices, but downside is likely limited given still tight markets, execution risk with new mine ramp-ups,
and a long-term deficit into the mid-2030s that should support elevated contracting activity. Long-term, we forecast a significant deficit starting
in the mid-2030s that will likely require higher incentive prices at ~$100/lb to encourage an appropriate supply response. We are also biased to
the upside given new supply ramp-up risks and potential for stronger demand given global nuclear energy tailwinds that could result in a more
severe deficit that requires much higher incentive prices.
Priced as of prior trading day's market close, EST (unless otherwise noted). All values in USD unless otherwise noted
Disseminated: Nov 21, 2024 00:15EST; Produced: Nov 20, 2024 23:52EST
For Required Non-U.S. Analyst and Conflicts Disclosures, see page 32
RBC Imagine™: Nuclear revival is going to need a lot more uranium
Table of Contents
Global uranium S&D set to remain tight as demand outpaces supply 4
Western S&D vulnerable to supply shocks, especially near-term 5
Medium-term late-2020/early-2030s reprieve not guaranteed, relies on supply execution 6
Forecasted supply comes with significant uncertainty 7
Long-term deficit widening, will require significant new supply to be developed 8
Just moderate upside nuclear growth would need every pound available 9
Even in downside nuclear scenario, would still see a significant long-term deficit 10
Uranium prices set to remain elevated and higher incentive prices needed 11
Uranium demand set to grow, driven by nuclear revival 12

Nuclear set for steady growth through next decade to meet rising clean energy demand 13
Potential upside from re-starts, up-rates, and policy reversals 14
Further layer of potential demand from AI datacenter build-out 15
SMRs and advanced reactors offer promise post-2035 if adopted quickly 17
Shift away from Russian enrichment a structural uplift to demand 18
Nuclear plans by country 19
Uranium supply response will take time, comes with execution risk 23
Canada – Production set to rise with potential new mine start-ups 25
Kazakhstan – Near-term production limited, with long-term upside uncertain 26
Australia – A steady major producer to Western utilities, with upside if prices stay high 27
Africa – Political instability, rising influence from China/Russia a threat to Western access 28
Other regions – Higher prices teasing out some additional supply, but not enough 29
Secondary supply – Still important, but likely remains well-below historical levels 30
Glossary 31
November 21, 2024 3

Global uranium S&D set to remain tight as demand outpaces supply

 Near-term deficit means upside price potential in next several years: We forecast the uranium market remaining in deficit through 2030 as supply takes
time to respond to increased demand. We see this period as most vulnerable to a supply-side shock (geopolitical tensions, mine ramp-up delays),
especially for Western markets, while demand is already set given a significant reactor base and long-lead times needed to bring on new nuclear reactors.
 Medium-term late-2020s/early-2030s to see bigger supply response, but with uncertainty: We expect stronger prices result in a supply response
given attractive returns for many projects, likely by the late-2020s and into the early-2030s. However, even with this new supply, the market would at best
be balanced while there is significant risk these projects are delayed, resulting in tighter-than-expected market conditions during this period.
 Long-term severe deficit starting mid-2030s: We project a very significant deficit forming by the mid-2030s, due to a combination of rising demand and
resource depletion, with projected supply covering just 80% of forecasted demand, requiring higher prices to incentivize new supply. We also see potential
for demand upside during this period due to rising clean energy demand and renewed enthusiasm for nuclear energy globally, which would result in a deficit
that requires almost all advanced projects currently in development to come online.
Uranium S&D to remain tight through next decade with severe deficit forming by mid-2030s
Mine Supply Secondary Supply Demand Long-term major deficit due to

Medium-term supply response may provide continued demand growth and
300
temporary reprieve, but comes with significant mine depletion
uncertainty and execution risk
250
Near-term deficit as supply
Global Uranium (Mlbs U3O8)
response takes time

200
150
100
50
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024E
2025E
2026E
2027E
2028E
2029E
2030E
2031E
2032E
2033E
2034E
2035E
2036E
2037E
2038E
2039E
2040E
Source: UxC, WNA, IAEA, Company reports, RBC Capital Markets estimates
November 21, 2024 4

Western S&D vulnerable to supply shocks, especially near-term

 Western uranium S&D in deficit, vulnerable to supply shocks: We
see the Western uranium market in a significant deficit, with >50% of Western uranium S&D to remain in significant deficit
supply coming from non-aligned countries – we consider the Western
nuclear fuel market as North America, West & Central Europe, South Western Supply Kazakh, Western-owned Kazatomprom Western Demand
Korea and Japan. In 2023, only ~50% of US uranium requirements and 150
~30% of EU requirements were covered by Western-aligned supply,

with Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Niger making up the vast 120
Uranium (Mlbs U3O8)

majority of remaining supply.
90
 Major supply risk near-term, but also longer-term: We believe this
situation leaves Western markets vulnerable, especially in the next
60
several years as Western supply takes time to ramp-up. Even as
Western supply rises through the late-2020s/early-2030s, the Western
S&D will remain in deficit and heavily reliant on Kazakhstan where 30
Western influence is waning. Longer-term, due to mine depletion, the

deficit widens significantly starting in the mid-2030s and could be a 0
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024E
2025E
2026E
2027E
2028E
2029E
2030E
2031E
2032E
2033E
2034E
2035E
2036E
2037E
2038E
2039E
2040E
potential risk to long-term nuclear build plans if not addressed with more
investment.
Western supply covered just 30-50% own needs in 2023 Western influence in Kazakhstan waning over time
United States, uranium supply origin EU, uranium supply origin Kazatomprom Kazakh, China/Russia-owned Kazakh, Western-owned
Australia
3% 100%
Canada US
% of total Kazakhstan production

33% 0% 90%
Canada Australia
20%
25% 80%
70%
Other
Other
Domestic 0%
Kazakhstan
60%
5%
2% 21%
50%
Niger Niger
3% 14% 40%
Kazakhstan
Namibia 30%
3% Uzbekistan 21%
S. Africa &
9% Namibia
4%
20%
Russia Russia
Uzbekistan
12%
2%
23% 10%
0%
2015 2020 2025E 2030E 2035E 2040E
Source: UxC, US EIA, ESA, Company reports, RBC Capital Markets estimates
November 21, 2024 5

Medium-term late-2020/early-2030s reprieve not guaranteed, relies on supply execution

 Supply expected to rise as new projects and expansions come online…: We believe higher prices have spurred a supply response to meet rising
demand, although this will likely take until the late-2020s/early-2030s to make a meaningful impact on the current S&D deficit. In particular, we view
NexGen’s Rook I project, Denison’s Wheeler River project, the combined effort of several re-start projects in the US, and Kazatomprom’s efforts to grow
production as key supply factors in the medium-term S&D through the early-2030s.
 …but new supply comes with uncertainty and any delays could tighten the market unexpectedly: While we forecast rising supply into the late-
2020s/early-2030s, there is significant uncertainty and execution risk. We highlight recent challenges re-starting production in the Africa, Australia, and the
US due to technical, labour and inflationary hurdles, Kazakhstan struggling to find enough sulphuric acid, geopolitical tensions that have delayed the Dasa
project and resulted in expropriation of the Imouraren project in Niger, and general challenges ramping up new mining projects that could impact Rook I
and/or Wheeler River. If these issues persist in the coming years, there is potential the medium-term outlook could be tighter than anticipated and result in
higher-than-expected prices.
Supply response expected into the late-2020s/early-2030s, but comes with execution risk
Base Supply Dasa McArthur Expansion US re-starts Kazatomprom Increase Phoenix Rook I Demand
300 Many projects need to be
executed well to meet
medium-term demand
Uranium supply & demand (Mlbs U3O8)
250
200
150
100
50
0
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024E
2025E
2026E
2027E
2028E
2029E
2030E
2031E
2032E
2033E
2034E
2035E
November 21, 2024 6

Forecasted supply comes with significant uncertainty

 Only moderate supply response possible in next several years, with potential re-start delays: We believe only a moderate supply response is
possible in the near-term, mainly from re-start projects (Africa, Australia, and the US) and increased production in Kazakhstan, as new mine builds take time
given permitting, financing, and construction delays. Even with these nearer-term supply sources, there could be delays and ramp-up challenges given
some projects have been idled for many years, resulting in technical hurdles and labour constraints.
 More supply coming online late-2020s/early-2030s, but with execution risk: We forecast a more robust supply response in the late-2020s/early-2030s
as new mine projects come online, but we see significant execution risk that could result in delays or lower-than-expected production. Of the ~50Mlbs new
supply we forecast coming online between 2027-2033, just three projects (NexGen’s Rook I, Denison’s Phoenix, Global Atomic’s Dasa) account for ~65% of
this new supply. We note Rook I and Phoenix are yet to be permitted and Dasa is in Niger, which has seen delays since a government coup in mid-2023.
 Long-term supply set to drop off due to resource depletion, but Kazakhstan also a risk: Beyond 2035, we forecast a supply deficit of >50Mlbs due to
rising demand and declining supply resulting from resource depletion in Canada and Africa. We also see risk in Kazakhstan as we model steady annual
production at ~75Mlbs, but this assumes successful exploration and development needed to replace ~30Mlbs at-risk annual production due to long-term
resource depletion.
Supply needed to address market deficit comes with significant uncertainty

Reliable Supply Supply at risk Demand
300
Uranium supply & demand (Mlbs U3O8)
250
200
150
100
50
0
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024E
2025E
2026E
2027E
2028E
2029E
2030E
2031E
2032E
2033E
2034E
2035E
2036E
2037E
2038E
2039E
2040E
November 21, 2024 7

Long-term deficit widening, will require significant new supply to be developed

 Significant long-term deficit projected beyond mid-2030s: We forecast a significant and widening deficit starting in the mid-2030s that could reach
>50Mlbs by 2040 as demand steadily grows at 3% CAGR, while supply is set to decline given resource depletion post-2035. We also see potential for this
projected deficit to be wider than anticipated due to potential demand upside from strong global tailwinds driving nuclear energy growth while the supply we
already forecast in our outlook comes with some uncertainty.
 Need a lot of new supply to be developed: We believe addressing the long-term supply deficit will likely require higher incentive prices to call on many
projects currently in advanced development and to support the progression of new projects. Some of this deficit will likely be met by new secondary supply
developments (i.e. Global Laser Enrichment, Moroccan phosphate processing) and state-backed projects (i.e. China, Uzbekistan), but we think a majority of
the coming deficit will need new publicly-backed mine production to meet the coming supply challenges. Depending on the amount of state-backed and
secondary supply that is developed in coming years, our current S&D outlook could see need for between 30-50Mlbs of new mine supply to come online by
the end of the next decade. The average incentive price for a supply response of 30-50Mlbs with 15-30% IRR is ~$95/lb.
Long-term deficit projected at >50Mlbs by 2040 Many mining projects will need to be developed
Shootaring Canyon
$150
40
Imouraren
Patterson Lake South
Etango
Uranium surplus/deficit (Mlbs U3O8)
Tumas
20
Madaouela
Roca Honda
Wiluna
$120
Sheep Mountain
Samphire
Waterbury Lake
Tiris
0
Uranium incentive price (US$/lb)
Rabbit Lake Restart
Gryphon
Cameco US ISR
$90
2024 term price
-20
-40 $60
Projected long-term
-60 30% IRR deficit will require higher
2015 2020 2025E 2030E 2035E 2040E incentive prices to
$30
15% IRR support development of
30-50Mlbs new mine.
$0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Cumulative production (Mlbs U3O8)
Note: Incentive price calculations are based on most recently published technical data, but account for potential cost
inflation by increasing capex and opex estimates by +10% for projects with a DFS, +20% with a PFS, and +30% with a
PEA or scoping study. We apply our own estimates for Cameco US ISR, Rabbit Lake re-start, and Imouraren.
Source: UxC, Company reports, RBC Capital Markets estimates
November 21, 2024 8

Just moderate upside nuclear growth would need every pound available
 Demand upside from nuclear growth momentum…: We think our
Upside scenario sees +12% uranium demand by 2040
post-2035 forecast is subject to demand upside, given strong global
momentum to grow nuclear energy, and our realistic upside scenario
Demand Upside demand Supply
could see our demand forecast reach ~300Mlbs by 2040, +12% higher
than our base case forecast. In this scenario, we assume proposed 300
nuclear energy targets are partially met, phase-out plans are reversed,
250
and some countries deploy nuclear energy for the first time, but are not
Uranium (Mlbs U3O8)

including much potential upside from co-location with AI datacenters. 200
 …could lead to a very severe uranium deficit: While a realistic
150
upside demand scenario sees a moderate increase in uranium demand,
this would result in a very significant +60% increase in our forecasted 100
2040 deficit to >80Mlbs. We think to meet this moderate increase in
demand would likely require uranium incentive price well above $100/lb 50
to effectively call on all advanced stage projects and incentivize new
0
projects to be developed.
2015 2020 2025E 2030E 2035E 2040E
Upside scenario could see ~70GWe extra nuclear capacity

Country RBC Base Case Upside Scenario GWe Which has an outsized impact on the projected deficit
US Restart 2 reactors, add 4 SMRs Re-starts, uprates, and new nuclear, add 10 GWe 10.0
China 8 new reactors annually China targeting 200GWe by 2035, assume achieved by 2040 12.0
Sweden Add 2 reactors Gov't considering up to 10 new reactors, add 2GWe 2.0 Base Case Upside demand
UK Hinkley/Sizewell and 2 SMRs Targeting 24GW by 2050, assume reach 12GWe by 2040 3.3
40

France 4 new EPRs built Committed to 6 new EPRS, maybe another 8, add 4 to upside 6.6
India Reach 18GWe by 2040 Targeting 22GWe by 2031, assume achieved by 2040 4.5
Belgium Doel/Tihange close by 2035 Assume Doel/Tihange extended 2.1 20
Poland Build 2 AP1000 by 2040 Targeting >10GWe nuclear adds, assume 2GWe 2.0
Slovakia No new reactors Various efforts to add more capacity, add 2GWe 2.0 0
Slovenia Maintain current 1 reactor Gov't considering adding up to 2.4GWe, assume 1GWe 1.0
Switzerland No new reactors Gov't considering lifting new nuclear ban, add 2GWe 2.0 -20
Bulgaria Assume 1 AP1000 by 2040 Gov't announced plans for 2 AP1000 by 2040 1.0
Romania Complete Cernavoda 3/4 Add NuScale reactors w/ US funding support, add 0.5GWe 0.5 -40
Ukraine 1 new VVER reactor Gov't considering up to 9 new AP1000, add 1 AP100 1.0
Iran Complete Bushehr 2 Plan to pour concrete for Bushehr 3 in Q4/24, add 1GWe 1.0 -60
Japan Assume 20GWe by 2040 Either re-start 2 extra or build new 2.0
Pakistan Complete 2 HPR reactors Strong build relationship with China, add 1 Hualong One 1.0 -80
Bangladesh Complete 2 VVER reactors Long-term 7GW target by 2040, add 1 VVER reactor 1.0
Kazakhstan No new reactors Gov't and population supportive, add 2GWe 2.0 -100
Italy No new reactors Gov't considering to reverse nuclear ban, add 2GWe 2.0
2015 2020 2025E 2030E 2035E 2040E
Norway No new reactors Gov't considering to reverse nuclear ban, add 2GWe 2.0
Taiwan Phase-out by 2025 Opposition gov't supportive, assume re-start/extension 3.8
Spain Phase-out by 2034 Nuclear can help meet energy needs, assume extensions 7.1
Total 71.9
November 21, 2024 9

Even in downside nuclear scenario, would still see a significant long-term deficit
 If nuclear momentum slows, demand could be moderately lower…:
Downside scenario sees -11% uranium demand by 2040
We believe momentum supporting growth in nuclear energy is strong,
but there are risks of delay given potential regulatory hurdles and Demand Downside demand Supply
financial challenges related to new nuclear reactor builds. In our
downside scenario, demand could stall at ~240Mlbs by 2040, still +25% 300
compared to 2025 demand given new reactor construction plans already
250
in place and a significant base level of demand from the existing reactor
Uranium (Mlbs U3O8)

fleet, but -11% below our base case forecast. 200
 …but would still result in a significant uranium deficit: Even if 150
uranium demand growth slows in our downside scenario, we would still
likely see a significant uranium deficit of >25Mlbs by 2040 due to 100
resource depletion over time – this deficit would be similar in scale to
the recent early-2020s deficit that drove the recent uranium price rally. 50
As such, we think new production would still require incentive prices of
0
at least $70-80/lb to address the deficit. We also note there is risk that 2015 2020 2025E 2030E 2035E 2040E
new supply currently included in our base case forecast does not come
online or is delayed given potentially lower prices in a downside
scenario, which would result in a still significant long-term deficit despite But would still result in a significant deficit >25Mlbs
slower demand growth.
Downside could see ~60GWe less nuclear capacity Base Case Downside demand
Country RBC Base Case Upside Scenario GWe 40

US Restart 2 reactors, add 4 SMRs Only add 1 SMR at Clinch River -1.2
Canada Add 4.8GW Bruce, 1.2GW SMRs Only add 1.2GW at Bruce and 1 SMR at Darlington -4.5
Argentina Add 1 Hualong One by 2040 No new reactors -1.1 20
Brazil Complete Angra 3 Angra 3 not complete -1.3
China 8 new reactors annually 6 new reactors annually -20.0
Czech Republic
2 new APR1000 reactors Only complete 1 new reactor -1.0 0
Sweden Add 2 reactors Only complete 1 new reactor -1.0
UK Hinkley/Sizewell and 2 SMRs Only complete Hinkley build -4.0
France 4 new EPRs built Only complete 1 new EPR reactor -5.2 -20
India Reach 18GWe by 2040 Reach 14GWe by 2040 -4.0
Poland Build 2 AP1000 by 2040 Build 1 AP1000 by 2040 -1.0
-40
Romania Complete Cernavoda 3/4 No new reactors -1.4
Ukraine 1 new VVER reactor No new reactors -1.1
South Africa 1 new reactor No new reactors -1.0 -60
Saudi Arabia 3 new reactors No new reactors -3.0
UAE 2 new reactors No new reactors -2.0 2015 2020 2025E 2030E 2035E 2040E
Japan Assume 20GWe by 2040 No significant new restarts, stall at 16GW -4.0
South Korea 4 new APR1400 reactors Only complete 2 new APR1400 reactors -2.8
Total -59.6
November 21, 2024 10

Uranium prices set to remain elevated and higher incentive prices needed
 Price upside through 2028 from supply-side risks: We forecast ~$90/lb average uranium prices from 2025-2028 and see potential supply-side risks over
the next several years, especially for Western-aligned utilities, as geopolitical tensions create friction in the global nuclear fuel supply chain and new supply
takes time to ramp-up. We highlight risks related to mine re-starts, ramp-up in Kazakhstan, and Russian uranium deliveries.
 Late-2020s/early-2030s supply response may calm prices temporarily, but already partially priced in and see execution risk: We think a supply
response by the late-2020s/early-2030s could moderate prices toward ~$80/lb during this period, but do not see significant downside as we think these
volumes are already partially priced into current contract discussions (uranium markets are forward looking), there is execution risk with new mine ramp-
ups, and a long-term deficit into the mid-2030s should support elevated contracting activity. If new supply sources are delayed for this period, the market
could be tighter than expected and keep prices elevated above our forecast.
 Significant deficit beyond mid-2030s requires high incentive price: Long-term, we forecast a significant deficit starting in the mid-2030s that will likely
require higher incentive prices at ~$100/lb to encourage an appropriate supply response. We also see the potential during this period for upside to demand
given strong global nuclear energy tailwinds, which could result in a more severe deficit and require much higher incentive prices.
N-T upside from supply risks, potential reprieve in late-2020s/early-2030s, but higher prices needed to address L-T deficit
Surplus/deficit Term Price Spot Price

60 $120
Estimates
40 $100
Uranium Surplus/Deficit (Mlbs U3O8)
Uranium Price (US$/lb)

20 $80
0 $60
-20 $40
-40 $20
-60 $0
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024E
2025E
2026E
2027E
2028E
2029E
2030E
2031E
2032E
2033E
2034E
2035E
2036E
2037E
2038E
2039E
2040E

Uranium demand set to grow, driven by nuclear revival

Nuclear set for steady growth through next decade to meet rising clean energy demand
 Nuclear capacity set for steady long-term growth: We forecast global nuclear generating capacity grows at 3% CAGR through 2040, driven by an
increasing need for clean, carbon-free electricity. Our forecast is supported by renewed global interest in nuclear energy, with governments and industry
embracing nuclear and reversing phase-out decisions from the prior decade. Many of the nuclear reactors in our forecast through 2035 are already in
construction or in the final stages of pre-construction, giving us high confidence in forecasting the next 10 years.
 Potential upside beyond mid-2035: We also see potential for upside to our nuclear capacity forecast post-2035. We have taken a measured approach to
include only projects with significant certainty and government backing. However, given building momentum for new nuclear builds, we see potential for new
construction announcements, especially in the West, that could add upside to our post-2035 forecast.
 Every new reactor adds sticky uranium demand: We also think it is important to highlight that almost every reactor running today and every new
additional reactor will stay online for a long time, and therefore uranium demand is very sticky. We forecast almost every currently operating reactor to
remain online through our forecast period while new nuclear reactors can operate for upwards of 60-80 years.
Nuclear energy growth set to drive higher uranium demand through the next decade
United States West Europe Russia Other East Europe

China Japan India Other Asia
Other Uranium demand
600 300
500 250
Uranium demand (Mlbs U3O8e)

Nuclear Capacity (GWe)
400 200
300 150
200 100
100 50
0 0
2012
2018
2010
2011
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024E
2030E
2025E
2026E
2027E
2028E
2029E
2031E
2032E
2033E
2034E
2035E
2036E
2037E
2038E
2039E
2040E
Source: WNA, IAEA, Company reports, RBC Capital Markets estimates

Potential upside from re-starts, up-rates, and policy reversals

 Combination of reactor re-starts, up-rates, and policy reversals could add +4% to 2035 forecast: We see potential to reinvest into the current reactor
fleet to meet rising clean energy demand in the medium-term, which could result in upside to our demand forecast. We currently include 4GWe from re-
starts, but could see an additional 16GWe from further re-starts, up-rates and policy reversals.
 Re-starts: In addition to already announced re-starts in the US (Palisades, Three Mile Island) and India (Tarapur), we see potential for further re-
starts in the US (Duane Arnold, Indian Point) and Taiwan (Maanshan, Kuosheng), with an outside chance of restarts in Germany. In New York
State, Republican State Senators have sponsored legislation to re-open Indian Point. In Taiwan, the island’s last reactor is set to be
decommissioned in 2025, but opposition parties support nuclear energy and could call for a re-start in the future as the energy mix shifts toward
increased fossil fuel use. Even in Germany, the opposition party has called for restarting of shuttered reactors, although the possibility is remote.
 Uprates: In the US, uprates have resulted in an additional 8GWe of nuclear capacity since 1970 and are being considered as an economical
pathway to add more capacity to meet growing energy needs. Constellation announced two uprates at the Braidwood and Byron facilities in 2023
and have stated potential for up to 1GWe additional capacity through future uprates (roughly 5% additional capacity). If the US nuclear fleet was
uprated by just 2.5%, that could add 2GWe to our forecast, equivalent to two new large reactors.
 Could Spain reverse phase-out plans? Nuclear energy accounts for 20% of Spain’s electricity generation, but is still set to start phasing out from
2027 through 2034. The current government is opposed to nuclear energy, but opposition parties and businesses are supportive given the large
contribution to the country’s energy needs, which could result in a policy reversal not unlike that seen in other European countries (i.e. Belgium,
France). A reversal in policy could add up to 7GWe to our forecast through reactor life extensions.
Reinvesting into existing reactor fleet could add +4% to our demand forecast through 2035
Base case forecast w/ re-starts & extensions included in forecast w/ re-starts, uprates, reverse phase out not included in forecast
550
500
Global nuclear capacity (GWe)
450
400
350
300
2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E 2029E 2030E 2031E 2032E 2033E 2034E 2035E

Further layer of potential demand from AI datacenter build-out

 Datacenter build-out needs clean energy and nuclear could be a  Scaleable, reliable, and carbon-free are the keys to the game: We
solution: We see growing datacenter capacity, and the need for more see gaining momentum for nuclear as a potential solution for power
power to support computing and cooling may be a transformational demands brought on by the buildout of datacenters. Nuclear energy
growth vector for the power generation and transmission industry provides an attractive solution to datacenter power demand given
(detailed further in prior RBC research: RBC Datacenter Download, consistent baseload electricity with a relatively small footprint that also
Powering Global Datacenter Growth, Sector Views on GenAI). While meets decarbonization objectives of hyperscalers and datacenter
estimates vary on exact power consumption growth, it is clear there is owners. Nuclear can also be deployed as captive power, or a “behind-
immense capital flowing to the sector while power availability is a key the-meter” solution, which can avoid the politics or potential
constraint. We think this presents upside potential vs. our current intermittency of grid connections.
uranium demand and nuclear capacity forecasts as nuclear is well-
positioned in our view to solve for the significant power demand  Hyperscalers, datacenter owners, and utilities starting to embrace
increase. the nuclear option: Given the ostensible power requirements of
ramping up datacenter capacity and challenge of sourcing both clean
and reliable power at scale, technology companies, utilities, and
Global compute demand from AI driving datacenter growth datacenter operators are opening up to nuclear solutions which we are
3,000 increasingly seeing in the headlines:
Data Center Power Data center CAGR: 8%  October 2024: Google and Kairos Power partner to build a US
Consumption fleet of advanced nuclear power projects (totaling 500MWe).
2,500  Amazon lead anchor on $500M financing of X-Energy to
support funding/development of Xe-100 SMR technology while
2,000 committing to finance construction of several small nuclear
Terawatt Hours
reactors in Washington and Virginia.

 September 2024: Constellation Energy investing $1.6B to
1,500 restart Three Mile Island (site of partial domestic nuclear
AI CAGR: 25% meltdown in 1979) supported by Microsoft signing a 20Y PPA
at $100/MWh.
1,000  Oracle plans to build three SMRs to power a 1GW AI-focused
datacenter.
 April 2024: Equinix (colocation datacenter REIT) agreement
500 with Oklo for 500MWe of nuclear energy.
 March 2024: Amazon purchased 960MW datacenter campus
- powered by 2.5GWe nuclear power plant.
2026E
2027E
2028E
2029E
2030E
2031E
2032E
2033E
2034E
2035E
2036E
2037E
2038E
2039E
2040E
Source: RBC Capital Markets estimates, AvidThink, DigitalBridge, IEA

Quantifying the potential uranium demand upside in an AI datacenter blue-sky scenario

 Incremental uranium demand from AI datacenter build-out will depend on uptake of nuclear as energy source, but the power needs for
datacenter growth are clear: We think the recent financial and verbal commitments to nuclear energy from hyperscalers and datacenter operators are
constructive for the underlying nuclear complex, but the impact on longer-term uranium demand will depend on the adoption of nuclear to meet rising
power needs. In the near-term, the impact will likely be minor given the long lead times required to build new nuclear capacity, but there is clear upside if
nuclear is widely adopted given our current uranium demand forecast of 3% CAGR through 2040 while RBC research projects an 8% CAGR for
datacenter power consumption over the same period.
 Nuclear currently represents ~10% of global electricity supply (~19% of US), but could be a significantly greater % of new incremental supply, both due to
carbon-free targets and beneficial use-cases such as datacenters. Based on our datacenter power forecasts, each ~10% of the energy mix coming from
nuclear could correspond to ~15Mlbs (+6%) of incremental uranium demand by 2040 not included in our base case. If significant regulatory and financial
hurdles can be cleared, higher adoption of nuclear use in the datacenter energy mix represent a blue-sky scenario that demonstrates the magnitude of
potential demand in an already tight uranium market. Additionally, while the upfront cost and risk of overruns in building nuclear power presents a sharp
headwind to bringing capacity online, small advanced modular reactor technologies and unprecedented capex budgets being allocated by hyperscalers for
the upcoming AI arms race could help ease these challenges challenge.
Potential uranium demand scenarios based on nuclear uptake to fuel datacenter power consumption needs
Base Case U3O8 Demand 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

400
Potential upside to uranium demand from datacenter power consumption depends on
350 future % of nuclear in the energy mix
Uranium Demand (Mlbs)
300
250
200
150
100
2030E 2031E 2032E 2033E 2034E 2035E 2036E 2037E 2038E 2039E 2040E
Source: RBC Capital Markets estimates, Company reports, IEA, US EIA

SMRs and advanced reactors offer promise post-2035 if adopted quickly

 Many projects being considered with backing from government Canada
and industry: SMRs and advanced reactors offer potentially more cost-  SaskPower selected BWRX-300, FID in 2029
effective and faster reactor builds, with theoretically greater safety and  OPG planning four BWRX-300, site preparation started Summer 2024
more efficient operations that could stretch refueling cycles. We see
United States
strong momentum in SMR development, with rising involvement from
 Tennessee Valley Authority planning up to four BWRX-300 reactors at
governments and industry (see right for recent North American
Clinch River
developments), and ~50 different designs being tracked by the IAEA.
 Holtec planning two SMR-300 reactors at Palisades
 Likely a modest contributor by 2040, but with upside: We currently  TerraPower starts Natrium reactor non-nuclear construction June 2024
forecast ~6GW nuclear capacity from SMRs by 2040, given the new  Dominion Energy issues RFP for proposals from SMR vendors for
reactor designs may take time to develop and commercially deploy. We potential deployment at North Anna July 2024
also expect initial SMR builds will be biased toward pressurized water  Oklo 1.35GW customer pipeline as of August 2024
reactor designs based on existing reactor technology that has been  Google signs agreement with Kairos to purchase nuclear energy from
proven for >50 years, while more advanced technologies using HALEU SMRs planned for 2030-2035
and molten salt could take longer to deploy. However, given the  Amazon invests $500M in SMRs with X-Energy, Energy Northwest and
significant promise from SMRs/advanced reactors and the backing from Dominion
government and industry, we see potential for upside surprise to our
2035 forecast if SMRs/advanced reactors are adopted quickly.
Many SMR designs in development around the world
SMR deployment expected to rise in late-2030s
Development Construction Operation
Canada US UK South Korea Russia Uzbekistan China 20
# of reactor designs
15
SMR nuclear capacity (GWe)
5
10
4
3 5
2
0
PWR SFR LFR HWR BWR GCR IWCR SCWR GFR MSFR
1
PWR = Pressurized water reactor; SFR = Sodium-cooled fast reactor; LFR = Lead-cooled fast
0 reactor; HWR = Heavy water reactor; BWR = Boiling water reactor; GCR = Gas cooled reactor;
2020 2025E 2030E 2035E 2040E IWCR = Integral water cooled reactor; SCWR = Supercritical water cooled reactor; GCR = Gas-
cooled fast reactor; MSFR = Molten salt fast reactor

Shift away from Russian enrichment a structural uplift to demand

• Russia/Ukraine war a key inflection point in market with long-
Increased uranium demand from higher tails assay
lasting structural changes: Russia accounts for ~40% of global
enrichment capacity and moving away from this enrichment source and Prior Change in tails assay
relying on enrichment capacity in Western regions requires more
Global uranium Demand (Mlbs U3O8)

uranium – we estimate this should increase Western uranium demand
250
by 10-15% through the late-2020s before tempering to a 5% increase as
more Western enrichment is built. We think given enrichment contracts
and supply decisions are long-term in nature, and there has been a
200
broader global shift toward self-sufficiency, this structural change will
remain in place even if the Russia/Ukraine war is settled.
 Western enrichment strained even with planned supplies: While 150
Western enrichers, Orano and Urenco, have committed to adding
capacity, we believe this will take time and not be enough to completely
replace historical reliance on Russian enrichment. Orano has committed 100
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024E
2025E
2026E
2027E
2028E
2029E
2030E
2031E
2032E
2033E
2034E
2035E
2036E
2037E
2038E
2039E
2040E
to increasing enrichment capacity by +30%, but first production is not
expected until 2028. Urenco has also stated plans to increase capacity
in the US by +15% by the mid-2020s. In total, the combined plans could
add 3M SWU enrichment capacity by the early-2030s, but Russia
currently accounts for ~5-6M Western SWU requirements. Western enrichment remains tight
Swapping uranium for SWU
France Urenco EU Urenco USA
U3O8 (M) Prev. uranium requirement SWU demand @ 0.20% tails 0.25% tails 0.30% tails
2030 uranium requirement w/o new enrichment 2030 uranium requirement 40
SWU (M) Prev. SWU Use w/ Russia
250 50
Enrichment capacity (M SWU)
200 40 30
Prev. SWU Use w/ Russia
2030 Western SWU Capacity
Uranium (U3O8 Mlbs)
150 2025 Western SWU Capacity 30

SWU (M)
20
100 2030 uranium requirement 20

w/o new enrichment
2030 uranium requirement
Prev. uranium requirement 10
50 10
0 0
0
0.150%
0.175%
0.200%
0.225%
0.250%
0.275%
0.300%
0.325%
0.350%
0.375%
0.400%
0.425%
0.450%
0.475%
0.500%
2020 2025E 2030E
Tails Assay

Nuclear plans by country

% of
electricity Nuclear Capacity (GW)
generation
Country
(2023) 2010 2020 2030E 2040E Pre-2021 Policy Post-2021 Policy
North America
• Revised Green Bond Framework to include nuclear energy • Plans to build
• Plans to refurbish 10 reactors at Darlington and Bruce • SMR Roadmap
Canada 14% 12.6 12.7 9.3 16.8 4.8GW new nuclear capacity at Bruce, deploy SMRs at Darlington and in
outlines first SMR units to come online by late-2020s
Saskatchewan
• Nuclear expected to double its contribution in advance of Mexico's 2050
• Plans to add three units by 2029-2031 • Laguna Verde Unit 1 operating
Mexico 5% 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.6 targets • Policy target for clean energy to account for 35% of electricity; no firm
licence renewed for another 30 years to 2050
plans yet
• Maintain existing capacity, but no major plans to build new nuclear capacity • • Target 35GW new capacity by 2035, 200GW by 2050 • ADVANCE Act,
United States 19% 101.0 96.5 98.8 100.6 Some premature reactor shut-downs due to economics or local opposition supporting development of new advanced reactors • Reactor life extensions,
(Indian Point, Diablo Canyon) reverse prior shut-down plans, re-start shut-down reactors
West & Central Europe
• Delay closing nuclear plants, extend Doel 4 and Tihange 3 to 2035 • Among
Belgium 41% 5.9 5.9 2.1 0.0 • Policy to close all nuclear plants by 2025
11 EU member states to sign the Declaration on Nuclear Energy
• Add 2.5GW nuclear capacity and transition to majority nuclear energy by 2040 • Plans for SMR development in State Energy Policy • Selected KHNP
Czech Republic 40% 3.9 3.9 3.9 6.1
• Extend reactor lives to 60 years APR1400 for up to four new reactor builds
• Extend reactor lives and uprate capacity • Commission new reactors to • Extend reactor lives beyond 60 years and uprate capacity • Terminated
Finland 42% 2.8 2.8 4.4 4.4
replace coal phase-out Hanhikivi 1 new build with Rosatom, considering other new nuclear options
• Build up to fourteen new NPPs (six announced in 2022, eight announced in

France 65% 63.1 63.1 63.0 69.6 • Plans to reduce nuclear's share of electricity generation to 50% by 2035
2024) • Abandoned target to reduce nuclear's share of energy to 50%
• Germany shut down its three remaining nuclear plants in April 2023 •
• Re-introduced nuclear phase-out and immediately shut down eight reactors •
Germany 1% 20.5 8.1 0.0 0.0 Opposition parties calling for reactor re-starts, but utility operators say this
All nuclear reactors scheduled to close by end-2022
would be technically challenging
• Hungary to close last coal plant in 2025, offset by nuclear • Plans to expand • Parliament approved plans to further extend the lifespan of Paks 1-4 • Signed
Hungary 49% 1.9 1.9 1.9 4.3
Paks NPP with two new units of 1.2GW each a nuclear cooperation roadmap with Belarus, defining main areas of joint work
• Government approves plans to reintroduce nuclear into energy mix • Plans to

Italy 0% - - - - • Nuclear development plans halted after Fukushima
construct up to 8 GW nuclear capacity by 2050
• Reversed decision to phase out nuclear • Plans to build two new nuclear • New government supports building four new nuclear reactors • Among 11 EU
Netherlands 3% 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.5
reactors member states to sign the Declaration on Nuclear Energy
• In June 2024, government commissioned a committee to evaluate deployment

Norway 0% - - - - • No plans to deploy nuclear energy
of nuclear energy and deliver a report by April 2026


% of
generation
Country
West & Central Europe cont.
• Nuclear part of plan to diversify away from coal • Plans to open six nuclear • Selected Westinghouse AP1000 and KEPCO APR1400 for new builds,
Poland 0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4
units (6-9GW) from 2033-2043 construction start 2026
• 2008 energy strategy aimed to generate 50% of electricity from nuclear energy • Government approved plan to construct a new reactor with expected output of
Slovakia 61% 1.8 1.8 2.8 2.8
• Commissioning of 1.2GW reactor delayed until after 2035 1.2GW
• Plans for new reactor project for up to 2.4GW, with Croatia and Serbia as
Slovenia 37% 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 • Government to decide whether to proceed with second unit at Krško by 2027 potential partners • Referendum to be held in the future on construction of new
nuclear
• Plans to phase out all seven nuclear reactors by 2035 • Aims to generate all • Maintain plans to phase out nuclear energy by 2035, with first shut-down in
Spain 20% 7.6 7.1 5.1 0.0
electricity from renewable sources by 2050 2027
• New legislation allows nuclear in more regions and operation of >10 reactors •
Sweden 29% 8.8 7.8 6.9 8.9 • Four nuclear reactors shut down prematurely from 2017-2022
Plans to expand nuclear capacity with 2-10 new, large-scale reactors by 2045
• Plans to phase out remaining nuclear capacity gradually, confirmed by • Reactor lives extended to 60 years and considering extension to 80 years •
Switzerland 32% 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.0
referendum in 2017 Government considering lifting ban on new nuclear development
• Aging gas-cooled reactors set to retire by 2025 • Challenges funding • Targeting 24GW nuclear generating capacity by 2050 (representing ~25% of
UK 13% 10.2 8.9 5.7 8.7
construction for new nuclear to replace retiring reactors projected electricity demand)
Eastern Europe
• Cooperate with Russian nuclear industry for support • 2.4GW nuclear capacity • Plans to build a second NPP; signed MOU with Russia to enhance nuclear
Belarus 29% 0.0 0.0 2.2 2.2
under construction cooperation
• Ratified an agreement with the USA for the construction of new reactors and
Bulgaria 40% 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.2 • Government approved plans for a new unit with two reactors at Kozloduy
selected Westinghouse AP1000 for two new reactor builds
• Plans to refurbish Cernavoda Unit 1 in 2026 and extend Units 1 and 2 by 30 • Plans to add two CANDU reactors by 2031 • Plans to build NuScale SMR,
Romania 19% 1.3 1.3 1.3 2.7
years each investment decision in 2025
• Extend reactor lives, improve utilization rates, replace aging RBMK reactors • • Plans to build 29 new reactors and decommission 18 reactors by 2045 • Pivot
Russia 18% 22.1 28.4 28.9 31.5 Export nuclear reactor builds to strengthen international relations • Develop nuclear reactor exports to Russian-friendly countries • Continue development of
closed-loop nuclear fuel cycle, focus on fast reactors and reprocessed fuel closed-loop nuclear fuel cycle
• Maintain nuclear at 50% contribution to electricity demand, build 5-7 GW • Immediate pivot to Western nuclear fuel and services following
Ukraine 55% 13.2 13.1 14.2 13.4 capacity by 2030 • Gradually diversify nuclear fuel and services, pivot from Russia/Ukraine war • Plans to build 9 Westinghouse AP1000 reactors and
reliance on Russian develop Holtec SMRs


% of
generation
Country
East Asia
• 14th Five-Year Plan outlined goal to reach 70GWe gross nuclear capacity by • Targeting nuclear capacity of 200GW and 10% of electricity generation by
China 5% 10.1 48.0 97.4 186.0 the end of 2025 • Plan to grant construction licenses for 6-8 reactors annually • 2035 • Aim to increase nuclear fuel cycle self-sufficiency along with developing
Develop and deploy domestic HPR-1000 reactor design a closed loop cycle and fast reactors
• All nuclear reactors shut down for inspections and upgrades post-Fukushima • • Government indicating increased support for nuclear in 2040 energy plan •
Japan 6% 47.1 5.6 20.2 20.2 Gradual re-start of reactors as part of policy to maintain nuclear at 20-22% of Policy shift to maximise use of existing reactors and allow reactor lives beyond
generation by 2030 60 years
• Plans to retire 11 reactors by the end of 2030 and phase out nuclear by the • In 2022, new government rejected prior plans to phase out nuclear energy and
South Korea 32% 17.7 23.1 30.0 34.8 2050s • Cancelled plans for new reactor builds and suspended construction of set a plan for nuclear capacity to account for 30% of electricity generation •
Shin Kori 5&6 Plans to boost nuclear technology exports
• Newly elected President Lai and his party have made indications of softening
Taiwan 7% 5.1 3.8 0.0 0.0 • Plans to phase out nuclear energy by 2025 on anti-nuclear stance while pro-nuclear opposition party won a majority in
Parliament
South Asia
• Plans to build two more reactors at the Rooppur NPP site • Plans to generate
• Two new 1.2GW nuclear reactors under construction by Rosatom, scheduled
Bangladesh 0% 0.0 0.0 2.4 2.4 12% of electricity from nuclear by 2041
for completion by mid-2020s
• Plans to grow nuclear capacity with focus on domestic designs as liability laws • Plans to grow nuclear capacity to 22.5GW by 2031-2032 and to account for
India 3% 4.2 6.1 14.1 17.6 discourage international supplier participation • Government approved ten new 9% of energy by 2047 • US and India in discussions on civil nuclear co-
domestic-designed 700MW reactors operation
• Significant co-operation in nuclear industry with China, which supplies all
• Start construction on new reactor at Chashma 5 based on HPR-1000 design •
Pakistan 17% 0.4 1.3 4.6 5.6 reactors and fuel • Plans to build five 1.1GW nuclear reactors and target total
Plans for nuclear to represent ~14% of energy mix by 2048
8.9GW nuclear capacity by 2030
South America
• Plans to double nuclear capacity, based on discussions with China to finance
• Develop domestic reactor technology and fuel capabilities • Engaged with
Argentina 6% 0.9 1.6 1.6 2.8 and build an HPR-1000 reactor and plans to domestically build a new CANDU
China to finance and build a new reactor
reactor with support from Canada
• Construction of third reactor, Angra 3, suspended due to corruption probe and
• Angra 3 construction restarted in 2022, but suspended again in 2023 due to
Brazil 2% 1.9 1.9 3.2 3.2 financing issues • Extend reactor lives, uprate existing plants, and add new
dispute with municipality • Plans to add 10GW nuclear capacity by 2050
capacity


% of
generation
Country
Africa
• Considered plans for nuclear energy as early as 1983 • Signed agreement • Strategy to grow nuclear capacity to 4.8GW by 2035 (20% of current demand)
Egypt 0% 0.0 0.0 2.1 4.2
with Russia in 2015 to finance and build four nuclear reactors • Construction in progress for four Rosatom VVER reactors
• Plans to add 6.8GW nuclear capacity between 2037-2041 • Extend existing • Plans to add 2.5GW new nuclear capacity, but paused a procurement process
South Africa 4% 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
reactor lives and develop SMR options in August 2024 for more public consultation
Central Asia & Middle East
• Extend reactor life of single reactor in operation, consider development of new • Approved a 10-year operating lifetime extension for Metsamor 2 to 2036
Armenia 31% 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
reactor to add new capacity and replace old reactor in the future • Ongoing negotiations to construct a new reactor with Russia and the US
• Engaged with Russia to support plans to grow nuclear capacity • Second

Iran 2% 0.0 0.9 2.0 2.0 • Plans to build five new NPPs to reach 20GW capacity by 2041
reactor started construction in 2019, third reactor planned
• Various plans discussed to deploy nuclear energy with partners including • Public referendum in October 2024 supports construction of nuclear power •
Kazakhstan 0% - - - -
Rosatom, EDF, Nuscale, GE Hitachi, and KHNP Government plans to generate 5% electricity from nuclear by 2035
• In discussions with the US to cooperate on development of civil nuclear

Saudi Arabia 0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 • Plans to construct 16 reactors by 2031-2036 and potentially SMRs industry • Plans to build two 1.4GWe reactors, with long-term goal to increase
capacity to 17GWe by 2040
• Plans to construct three NPPs (total of 12 reactors, all online by 2035),
• Plans to grow nuclear capacity to over 20GW with mix of large-scale reactors
Turkey 0% 0.0 0.0 4.8 9.6 engaging with diversified suppliers from Russia, China, the US, and South
and SMRs • Four reactor Akkuyu NPP set to be commissioned 2025-2028
Korea
• Aims to deploy nuclear energy to diversify energy sources and reach net zero • Aims to have 14GW of clean energy capacity by 2030; net zero by 2050
UAE 20% 0.0 1.3 5.3 8.0
goals • Constructing and commissioning four new KHNP APR1400 reactors • Discussions with KHNP to build two additional APR1400 reactors
• Plans for nuclear to contribute 15% of electricity generation by 2030 • Signed • Plans to increase uranium production by 50% • Signed deal with Russia to
Uzbekistan 0% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
agreement with Russia to build two reactors by 2028 construct six SMR NPPs (330MW of total capacity)

Uranium supply response will take time, comes with

execution risk

Uranium supply set to rise, but market remains tight with major deficit looming long-term
 Uranium supply poised to through 2035, led by Canada: We forecast global uranium supply rises to 226Mlbs and 246Mlbs by 2030 and 2035, up from
181Mlbs in 2025, as the industry responds to higher demand and prices. However, this increase will only just keep pace with demand, which we also see
rising given new reactors and re-starts coming online. We also see significant execution risk given much of this forecasted production comes from projects
that have yet to be constructed and/or permitted (three new projects account for ~15% of 2035E supply) or rely on regions with significant geopolitical risk
(Kazakhstan, Niger, Russia account for ~40% of 2035E supply). Production growth will likely be led by Canada, which accounts for ~60% of our projected
supply increase through 2025 as production in the country doubles due to expected new mine start-ups (Rook I, Phoenix) and expansions (McArthur River).
 Long-term supply set to decline due to resource depletion: Post 2035, we expected supply to decline without more investment as mines are depleted
and forecast 2040 supply at 216Mlbs, which would be below our 2030 supply estimate. The projected decline will be mainly due to resource depletion in
Africa, Canada, and the US unless new deposits are developed over the next decade. We also note Kazakhstan is set to see a potential decline of up to
30Mlbs due to resource depletion, but our 2040 supply forecast assumes Kazakhstan is able to develop new mine areas to maintain production at 75Mlbs. If
Kazakhstan has difficulties developing new resources to replace depletion, the supply deficit in 2040 could be larger than anticipated.
Uranium supply needs to continue rising to keep up with steady demand growth
Secondary Supply
Supply Demand
Other Regions
Kazakhstan
275
Africa
Other Regions
United States
United States
250
Canada
Canada
Uranium (Mlbs U3O8)
Africa
Kazakhstan
Secondary Supply
225
Other Regions
United States
Australia
Canada
Secondary Supply
200
Other Regions
United States
Kazakhstan
Canada
Kazakhstan
Africa
Secondary Supply
Australia
Australia
175
Africa
Canada
Africa
150
125
2025E
2030E
2035E
2040E
2015
2020
100

Canada – Production set to rise with potential new mine start-ups

 Production expected to rise, with potential for new mine start-ups:
Major projects in Canada
We forecast uranium production in Canada to rise through as Cameco
has re-started production and considers an expansion at the McArthur Avg. Production
Project M&I Resource Mine
River mine, and new mine projects are progressing toward the final (Company)
Location Stage Type
(Mlbs U3O8) Life
(Peak Production)
stages of permitting and could start production by the late-2020s/early- (Mlbs U3O8)
2030s. However, production could see a step-down post-2035 if
Gryphon (DML) Sask. PFS UG 62 7 7.1 (9.0)
resource depletion is not replaced by new supply.
 Cameco back to nameplate, looking to extend Cigar and expand Millennium (CCO) Sask. On hold - 76 - -
McArthur: Cameco returned to full production in 2024, with McArthur
River and Cigar Lake back to nameplate after the former was idled in Phoenix (DML) Sask. FS ISR 71 11 5.2 (9.2)
2018 and the latter operated at reduced rates since 2019. The company
is working on extending production at Cigar Lake until 2036 and we PLS (FCU) Sask. FS UG 115 11 8.5 (14.4)
expect the McArthur River mine to be expanded to 25Mlbs (from
18Mlbs, 100% basis) by the late-2020s. Cameco also owns the Rabbit Rook I (NXE) Sask. FS UG 257 11 21.2 (29.7)
Lake mine (~4Mlbs nameplate) that was idled in 2016 and the large
Waterbury (DML) Sask. PEA ISR 13 6 1.6 (2.1)
high-grade Millennium deposit, while exploration is highlighted by high-
grade mineralization at the Dawn Lake property.
 NexGen developing world-class Rook I project: Rook I hosts the
high-grade Arrow deposit and is in advanced development . The project
Canadian uranium supply set to rise into the 2030s
is nearing the final stages of permitting and could start construction in McArthur River Cigar Lake Rabbit Lake McClean Lake Rook I Phoenix
2025/2026, followed by annual production up to 30Mlbs by late-
2020s/early-2030s (we assume 2031). The project officially has an 11 80
year mine life based on reported reserves, but we see resource upside Uranium supply (Mlbs U3O8) 70
to Arrow. Recent exploration drilling has also yielded promising high-
grade mineralization just 3.5KM east of Arrow that could be incorporated 60
long-term to either grow annual production or extend the mine life.
50
 Denison and Fission also advancing major projects: Denison is 40
developing the Wheeler River project that hosts the high-grade Phoenix
and Gryphon deposits. The company plans to deploy in-situ recovery to 30
first mine Phoenix with initial production up to 8-9Mlbs, (avg. 5-6Mlbs, 20

10-year mine life) and is in advanced permitting with potential
10
production by late-2020s/early-2030s (we assume 2030). Fission is
developing the Patterson Lake South project that could produce up to 0
2015 2020 2025E 2030E 2035E 2040E
9Mlbs annually for 10 years from the high-grade Triple R deposit.

Kazakhstan – Near-term production limited, with long-term upside uncertain

 Near-term production constrained by sulphuric acid availability:
Sulphuric acid situation should improve by late-2020s
We expect uranium production in Kazakhstan to remain constrained
near 65Mlbs through at least 2027, as it will take time to construct new
Supply Demand
sulphuric acid capacity to meet recent increased domestic demand from Base KAP TQZ EuroChem Kaz Minerals Uranium Fertilizer Copper/Other
uranium and fertilizer production. Kazakh uranium producer 5.0
Kazatomprom has also noted challenges importing acid due to logistical
constraints and limited availability in neighbouring countries. 4.0
Sulphuric acid (M tonnes)

 Acid supply may ease into late-2020s, but still tight while ops
3.0
uncertain: In addition to sulphuric acid supply challenges,
Kazatomprom has also dealt with significant management turnover in
2.0
the past several years as Russian influence in the country grows, which
raise concerns regarding operational stability and execution. We expect
1.0
sulphuric acid supply may improve in 2027/2028 when new capacity is
set to come online and could support a moderate increase in uranium
0.0
production, but operational question marks remain. 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024E 2025E 2026E 2027E 2028E 2029E 2030E
 Long-term uranium production up moderately: As domestic

sulphuric acid supply improves and new mine areas are developed, we
forecast Kazakh uranium production rises gradually to ~75Mlbs by 2030.
Kazakhstan needs to develop new mine areas
We expect production may stabilize at this level due to a combination of
sulphuric acid capacity limitations and a desire to extend mine lives. Base Production Budenovskoye 6/7 Inkai 3 Inkai 2 Zhalpak
More significant production growth will depend on further acid imports
80
which may be challenging while operations and execution with new
project areas remains uncertain. Uranium supply (Mlbs U3O8)
70
 Need to develop new mine areas to grow production and replace 60

depletion: The company is gradually ramping up production at the 50
Budenovskoye 6/7 deposits, but the project has been challenged by
40
construction delays and sulphuric acid availability that resulted in
downward revisions to production targets with full production now 30
targeting 2027 at the earliest (previously 2026). Kazatomprom is also
20
actively developing the Inkai 2 and 3 deposits for future production that
will be needed to offset depletion from other mining areas starting in the 10
2030s that would result in the loss of >30Mlbs annual production, but 0
developing these new areas brings additional execution risk. 2015 2020 2025E 2030E 2035E 2040E

Australia – A steady major producer to Western utilities, with upside if prices stay high
 A major uranium producer with potential new supply if prices stay
Major projects in Australia
elevated: We expect Australia to remain a major uranium producer with
current operations producing well through the next decade. The country Avg. Production
also hosts several potential projects in development that could be Location Stage Type (Peak Production)
(Company) (Mlbs U3O8) Life
brought into production if prices remain elevated and add up to 5Mlbs (Mlbs U3O8)
annual production into the next decade.
Honeymoon (BOE) S.A. Ramp Up ISR 33 11 2.0 (2.4)
 Olympic Dam depends on BHP copper plans, investment in new
Renewing
hydromet plant: Olympic Dam produces uranium as a by-product of Mulga Rock (DYL) W.A. OP 61 14 3.4 (3.5)
DFS
copper production from BHP’s South Australia operations. BHP has
outlined plans to almost double copper production in South Australia into Samphire (AGE) S.A SS ISR 13 12 1.0 (1.2)
the early-2030s, but two prior efforts to expand operations in the past
decade were shelved and current plans are in the early-stages. Wiluna (TOE) W.A. SS OP 60 18 1.2 (1.8)
Additionally, even if copper production were expanded, BHP would need On hold,
to also expand capacity of the hydrometallurgical plant to increase Yeelirrie (CCO) W.A. OP 128 - -
permitted
extraction of uranium by-product from tailings. We currently assume
uranium by-product production is bottlenecked by the hydrometallurgical
plant at 9Mlbs annually.
 Heathgate and Boss likely to produce well into the future: Australian uranium supply steady through 2030s
Heathgate resources currently produces uranium from the Beverley and
Four Mile projects in South Australia. We understand consensus Ranger Olympic Dam Beverley Honeymoon
uranium supply forecasts assume production from Heathgate ends in
18
the early-2030s due to resource depletion, but the company recently
upgraded processing capabilities and maintains a robust exploration 16
Uranium supply (Mlbs U3O8)
program, which we think can extend production well into the 2030s. 14
Similarly, Boss Resources is set to re-start production at the 12
Honeymoon mine in H2/24, with a resource that could support
10
production long-term.
8
 Many potential projects in the works if prices stay high: Australia
6
features the world’s largest resource of uranium (~28% according to the
IAEA) and hosts several major uranium development projects. Higher 4
incentive prices could support the development of advanced projects 2
that cumulatively add annual production of up to 5Mlbs – Mulga Rock 0
(Deep Yellow), Samphire (Alligator Energy), and Wiluna (Toro Energy). 2015 2020 2025E 2030E 2035E 2040E

Africa – Political instability, rising influence from China/Russia a threat to Western access
 Namibia a major producer with significant influence from China:
Major projects in Africa
We forecast Namibia produces ~21Mlbs annually by 2025, up from
~14Mlbs in 2020, following the ramp-up of Husab in the early-2020s Avg. Production
(~11Mlbs), a mine life extension at Rossing (~5Mlbs), and the re-start of Location Stage Type (Peak Production)
(Company) (Mlbs U3O8) Life
Paladin Energy’s Langer Heinrich (~5Mlbs) mine. We note significant (Mlbs U3O8)
Chinese-ownership in Namibia’s uranium mines that could present
Kayelekera (LOT) Malawi FS OP 37 10 1.9 (2.5)
supply-side risks to Western utilities – Husab (100% owned by China),
Rossing (69% owned by China), and Langer Henrich (25% owned by
Tiris (AEE) Mauritania DFS OP 30 15 1.9 (2.3)
China). We forecast production to decline long-term as Rossing is
depleted based on current resources, but China has outlined plans to Etango (BMN) Namibia FS OP 150 15 3.5 (4.3)
develop new mining areas and extend production past 2036.
 Niger future production uncertain due to political instability: Niger LHM (PDN) Namibia Ramp Up OP 120 17 4.5 (6.1)
was historically a major uranium supplier, especially to Europe,
Tumas (DYL) Namibia FS OP 121 23 2.8 (3.6)
accounting for ~20-25% of imports. However, mine depletion and
political instability from a mid-2023 government coup has hurt uranium
Dasa (GLO) Niger FS OP 109 24 2.8 (4.9)
production. Following the coup, Russian influence in Niger has grown
with deployment of troops in the country while forces from the US and
Muntanga (GXU) Zambia PEA OP 43 10 4.0
France have pulled out. Niger’s mining minister has also publicly stated
a desire for Russia to invest in Niger’s uranium mining industry. French
miner Orano’s majority-owned Arlit mine suspended operations in 2024. African uranium supply could be up in medium term
Global Atomic continues to advance the Dasa project toward planned
Akouta (Niger) Arlit (Niger) Azelik (Niger)
production in 2026, but financing uncertainties have caused delays. In
Dasa (Niger) Rossing (Namibia) Langer Heinrich (Namibia)
mid-2024, the government revoked mining permits to the Imouraren
Husab (Namibia) Kayelekera (Malawi) Moab Khotsong (South Africa)
(Orano) and Madaouela (GoviEx) projects. Imouraren was shelved in 35
the 2010s due to high costs, but could produce up to 13Mlbs annually
for 30+ years and Orano had begun investigating the potential use of in- 30
situ recovery at Imouraren before the mine was expropriated. 25
 Several projects in development that could add to future supply: 20
We assume renewed production from Malawi, with Lotus Resources
working toward a restart at the Kayelekera mine that had been idled 15
since 2014, with targeted production by late-2025/early-2026. There are 10
also several projects in advanced development including Etango
(Bannerman, Namibia), Tumas (Deep Yellow, Namibia), Mutanga 5
(GoviEx, Zambia), and Tiris (Aura Energy, Mauritania). 0

2015 2020 2025E 2030E 2035E 2040E

Other regions – Higher prices teasing out some additional supply, but not enough
 US re-starting production after going dormant for 5 years:  Morocco set to produce uranium from phosphates: Uranext,
Producers in the US are re-starting production in response to higher supported by state phosphate producer OCP Group, has developed a
prices and rising demand for domestic supply, but challenges with process using ion-exchange resins to economically extra uranium from
labour and logistics have resulted in delays. We expect continued phosphoric acid. The company is constructing four uranium extraction
development could see US production of 4Mlbs by 2025 (from zero in units integrated with OCP’s phosphoric acid facilities with total targeted
2023), rising to 8Mlbs by 2027, in time for when the Russian uranium production of 1.5-2.0Mlbs (~0.4Mlbs per unit). The first unit is expected
import ban to come into full effect. We are risk-adjusting our forecast to ramp-up starting in 2026, with potential for an additional 12 units in
due to execution challenges, but see potential long-term production up the future if phase 1 is successful. Historically, uranium was extracted
to 10Mlbs given nameplate capacities, historical development, still-idled from phosphate in the US, but the practice ended due to high costs.
assets, and potential government support.
 Sweden and Kyrgyzstan removing uranium mining moratoriums:
 Uzbekistan has plans to further raise production, but nothing Sweden passed a ban on uranium mining in 2018, but in 2024 the
concrete: Uzbekistan is a major producer at 10-11Mlbs in 2023/2024 government announced an investigation to remove the ban. The country
(up from 9Mlbs in 2022), but this has come from increased wellfield is looking to lift a ban on uranium mining to support the current six-
development that may not be sustainable. The country has stated aims reactor fleet and plans to significantly expand nuclear capacity by up to
to grow production by 50-100% and has received interest from France 10 additional reactors in coming decades. In Kyrgyzstan, the
(Orano) to develop new ISR mines and China (China Nuclear Uranium government lifted a uranium mining ban in 2024 that had been enacted
Corp.) to develop black shale deposits, but low grades and high-costs in 2019. Kyrgyzstan currently has no nuclear power, but is in
have historically limited development. Japan has also been involved in discussions with Russia to deploy small modular reactors.
Uzbekistan, with trading companies ITOCHU and Marubeni selling
production from the country via offtakes and investing in exploration. Other regions expected to see only moderate rise in supply
 China developing new supply to meet rising domestic use: Despite
Russia Ukraine Uzbekistan United States China Other
China’s big nuclear growth ambitions, the country currently produces
just 4Mlbs annually (~7% of 2030E requirements). The China Atomic 45
Energy Authority announced in mid-2024 development has started on a 40
demonstration project at the Ordos deposit (~200Mlbs resource) in Inner 35

Mongolia to produce uranium via ISR, but details on production and
30
costs were unavailable.
25
 Mongolia partnering with France to build new supply: Mongolia is
20
partnering with France (Orano) to develop the Zuuvch-Ovoo deposit
(~240Mlbs), with both countries initially agreeing to a $1.7B 15
development deal in 2023. However, finalization of the deal has been 10
delayed by disagreement within the Mongolian government on
5
development of the asset and there is no specific timeline to production.
0
2015 2020 2025E 2030E 2035E 2040E

Secondary supply – Still important, but likely remains well-below historical levels
 Russian government stocks and enricher uranium sales likely  GLE a potential new secondary supply source into 2030s: We
down: We admittedly have limited visibility into the Russian uranium believe GLE has the potential to produce ~5Mlbs U3O8e annually in the
supply situation, but our industry channel checks suggest availability form of UF6 with natural uranium assays at the proposed PLEF
from commercial stockpiles are likely diminished and note more active (Paducah Laser Enrichment Facility) by re-enriching depleted uranium
Russian participation in uranium purchases, efforts to develop a closed- tails. GLE would re-enrich depleted uranium tails purchased from the
loop fuel cycle, and greater efforts to develop uranium supply in other US DOE (Department of Energy) via an agreement signed in 2016 that
countries. We also expect reduced secondary supply from allows GLE to purchase over 200,000 tonnes of depleted tails for 30
underfeeding, given higher enrichment demand and prices, and less re- years. Silex Systems estimates operating costs at <$30/lb U3O8e and
enrichment of tails, due to lack of available depleted tails as previous capex significantly less than current gas centrifuge enrichment
Western sources terminate relationships with Russia. technology.
 US government sales no longer a major feature: US government  We see potential for an increase in production if GLE can secure access
stockpiles of natural uranium are low (<10Mlbs) and sales from to more depleted tails and/or negotiate an increase in the annual
inventory were suspended in 2018 to support the domestic uranium production limit. The US DOE has ~700,000 tonnes of depleted UF6
industry. The US government also supplies a small amount of highly tails and GLE has expressed interest in acquiring access to more tails.
enriched uranium that is downblended to low enriched uranium for use However, we note the US GAO (Government Accountability Office) has
by the Tennessee Valley Authority to produce tritium for defense raised questions on the legal authority of the US DOE to sell the
requirements – the deal is set to run through 2027, but we assume will depleted tails, which brings some uncertainty to the US DOE agreement
continue in future years. The US DOE also has a large stockpile of with GLE and may need to be clarified by Congress.
depleted uranium tails assays (<0.3% U-235) that could be re-enriched
via the GLE (Global Laser Enrichment) program (see right). Secondary uranium supply likely continues trending lower
 Western enricher sales decline as underfeed fades: We expect
Western enrichment markets to remain tight even with new capacity Russia Western enricher sales US Government inventory Reprocessed Uranium/MOX
additions in late-2020s/early-2030s, resulting in significant declines to 45
secondary uranium supply from underfeeding. We still model some
40
enricher sales into the 2030s given legacy contracts and lack of UF6
35
feed necessitating some technical underfeed relative to raised contract
tails, but this amount will likely be minimal. 30
25
 Reprocessed uranium and MOX should remain steady: We think
use of reprocessed uranium and MOX (mixed oxide) fuel, primarily in 20
France, Japan, and Russia, will likely continue, but efforts to increase 15
use have historically been hampered by costs, technical challenges, and 10
societal hurdles. A renewed focus on nuclear energy and security of 5
supply could renew efforts to develop closed loop fuel cycles, but this
0
will take time, require significant capital, and come with execution risk. 2015 2020 2025E 2030E 2035E 2040E

Glossary
EUP: enriched uranium product
GLE: Global Laser Enrichment
GW: gigawatt
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
ISR: In-situ recovery
SMR: small modular reactor
SWU: separative work unit
US DOE: US Department of Energy
WNA: World Nuclear Association

Companies mentioned
Cameco Corporation (TSX: CCO CN; C$80.57; Outperform)
NexGen Energy Ltd. (TSX: NXE CN; C$11.65; Outperform; Speculative Risk)
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A member company of RBC Capital Markets or one of its affiliates managed or co-managed a public offering of securities for Cameco Corporation in the past 12 months.
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A member company of RBC Capital Markets or one of its affiliates expects to receive or intends to seek compensation for investment banking services from NexGen Energy
Ltd. in the next three months.
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An analyst involved in the preparation of this report has visited material operations of Cameco Corporation, and more specifically, the facilities of Cameco Corporation, which
includes but is not limited to mines, distribution centres, warehouses, production plants and/or other facilities related to the day-to-day operation of Cameco Corporation
as applicable.
An analyst involved in the preparation of this report has visited material operations of NexGen Energy Ltd., and more specifically, the head office or other administrative offices
of NexGen Energy Ltd..
An analyst involved in the preparation of this report has visited material operations of NexGen Energy Ltd., and more specifically, the facilities of NexGen Energy Ltd., which
includes but is not limited to mines, distribution centres, warehouses, production plants and/or other facilities related to the day-to-day operation of NexGen Energy Ltd.
as applicable.
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Ratings
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For the purpose of ratings distributions, regulatory rules require member firms to assign ratings to one of three rating categories - Buy, Hold/Neutral, or Sell - regardless of
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Distribution of ratings
RBC Capital Markets, Equity Research
As of 30-Sep-2024
Investment Banking
Serv./Past 12 Mos.
Rating Count Percent Count Percent
BUY [Outperform] 858 57.39 290 33.80
HOLD [Sector Perform] 599 40.07 153 25.54
SELL [Underperform] 38 2.54 3 7.89
Rating and price target history for: Cameco Corporation, CCO CN as of 19-Nov-2024 (in CAD)
01-Nov-2021 09-Feb-2022 11-Apr-2022 05-May-2022 13-Oct-2022 13-Nov-2023 01-May-2024
Rtg:SP Rtg:SP Rtg:O Rtg:O Rtg:R Rtg:O Rtg:O
Target: 29.00 Target: 30.00 Target: 50.00 Target: 45.00 Target: NA Target: 70.00 Target: 75.00
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
Q3 2022 Q1 Q2 Q3 2023 Q1 Q2 Q3 2024 Q1 Q2 Q3 2025
Legend:
O: Outperform; SP: Sector Perform; U: Underperform; R: Restricted; I: Initiation of Research Coverage; D: Discontinuation of Research Coverage;
NR: Not Rated; NA: Not Available; RL: Recommended List - RL: On: Refers to date a security was placed on a recommended list, while RL Off: Refers to date
a security was removed from a recommended list; Rtg: Rating.
Created by: BlueMatrix

Rating and price target history for: NexGen Energy Ltd., NXE CN as of 19-Nov-2024 (in CAD)
11-Apr-2022 27-Nov-2023 12-Aug-2024
Rtg:O Rtg:O Rtg:O
Target: 10.00 Target: 11.00 Target: 10.00
14
12
10
4
Q3 2022 Q1 Q2 Q3 2023 Q1 Q2 Q3 2024 Q1 Q2 Q3 2025
Legend:
O: Outperform; SP: Sector Perform; U: Underperform; R: Restricted; I: Initiation of Research Coverage; D: Discontinuation of Research Coverage;
NR: Not Rated; NA: Not Available; RL: Recommended List - RL: On: Refers to date a security was placed on a recommended list, while RL Off: Refers to date
a security was removed from a recommended list; Rtg: Rating.
Created by: BlueMatrix
References to a Recommended List in the recommendation history chart may include one or more recommended lists or model portfolios maintained by RBC Wealth
Management or one of its affiliates. RBC Wealth Management recommended lists include the Guided Portfolio: Prime Income (RL 6), the Guided Portfolio: Dividend Growth
(RL 8), the Guided Portfolio: ADR (RL 10), and the Guided Portfolio: All Cap Growth (RL 12). The abbreviation 'RL On' means the date a security was placed on a Recommended
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Cameco Corporation
Valuation
Our $90 price target supports our Outperform rating. We value the company by applying a 1.5x P/NAV multiple to our NAV estimate. Our target multiple is above the historical
average but in line with multiples during periods of strong investor interest and rising uranium prices. Our DCF uses an 8% discount rate.
Risks to rating and price target

We highlight several key risks and sensitivities that could be potentially material to our thesis on Cameco including: 1) a negative outcome in the ongoing CRA transfer pricing
dispute; 2) contract cancellations; 3) potential production disruptions; 4) weaker-than-expected uranium prices; 5) currency volatility, primarily CAD/USD; and 6) a decline in

uranium investor sentiment resulting in lower valuation multiples.
NexGen Energy Ltd.

Valuation
We value NexGen based on a NAV analysis using an 8% discount and a 1.2x P/NAV multiple. The discount rate is in line with the rate used to evaluate other developing mine
projects. The P/NAV multiple is above a historical multiple for a pre-construction developing mine project, reflecting both the quality of the asset and embedded optionality
and higher valuation for uranium equities as a result of positive sentiment in the uranium sector. Our $15 (rounded) price target supports an Outperform rating. We assign a
Speculative Risk qualifier, as NexGen is a development-stage company that is not expected to start production until the 2030s.
Risks to rating and price target

1) Permitting delays, especially with respect to uranium mine development due to heightened sensitivities and concerns regarding nuclear material and radiation. 2) Technical
challenges and construction delays given the limited uranium mine development in the Western Athabasca region and lack of infrastructure. 3) Financing risk, as a pre-
production company. 4) Uranium price, which has a significant impact on valuation. 5) CAD/USD exchange rate, as operations are located in Canada while uranium sales are
primarily in USD.
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Nuclear revival is going to need a lot more uranium

EQUITY RESEARCH | NOVEMBER 21, 2024

Uranium demand set to grow, driven by nuclear revival 12

November 21, 2024 3

Global uranium S&D set to remain tight as demand outpaces supply

Mine Supply Secondary Supply Demand Long-term major deficit due to

response takes time

November 21, 2024 4

Western S&D vulnerable to supply shocks, especially near-term

~30% of EU requirements were covered by Western-aligned supply,

Uranium (Mlbs U3O8)

Western influence is waning. Longer-term, due to mine depletion, the

% of total Kazakhstan production

November 21, 2024 5

Medium-term late-2020/early-2030s reprieve not guaranteed, relies on supply execution

November 21, 2024 6

Forecasted supply comes with significant uncertainty

Supply needed to address market deficit comes with significant uncertainty

November 21, 2024 7

Long-term deficit widening, will require significant new supply to be developed

Uranium incentive price (US$/lb)

Rabbit Lake Restart

November 21, 2024 8

Uranium (Mlbs U3O8)

Upside scenario could see ~70GWe extra nuclear capacity

Uranium surplus/deficit (Mlbs U3O8)

November 21, 2024 9

Uranium (Mlbs U3O8)

Country RBC Base Case Upside Scenario GWe 40

Uranium surplus/deficit (Mlbs U3O8)

November 21, 2024 10

Surplus/deficit Term Price Spot Price

Uranium Price (US$/lb)

November 21, 2024 11

Uranium demand set to grow, driven by nuclear revival

November 21, 2024 12

United States West Europe Russia Other East Europe

Uranium demand (Mlbs U3O8e)

November 21, 2024 13

Potential upside from re-starts, up-rates, and policy reversals

November 21, 2024 14

Further layer of potential demand from AI datacenter build-out

reactors in Washington and Virginia.

Source: RBC Capital Markets estimates, AvidThink, DigitalBridge, IEA

November 21, 2024 15

Quantifying the potential uranium demand upside in an AI datacenter blue-sky scenario

Base Case U3O8 Demand 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

November 21, 2024 16

SMRs and advanced reactors offer promise post-2035 if adopted quickly

Canada US UK South Korea Russia Uzbekistan China 20

Source: WNA, IAEA, Company reports, RBC Capital Markets estimates

November 21, 2024 17

Shift away from Russian enrichment a structural uplift to demand

Global uranium Demand (Mlbs U3O8)

150 2025 Western SWU Capacity 30

100 2030 uranium requirement 20

2020 2025E 2030E

Source: WNA, IAEA, Company reports, RBC Capital Markets estimates

November 21, 2024 18