Domestic Protests and Foreign Policy - An Examination of Anti-China Protests in Vietnam and Vietnamese Policy Towards China Regarding The South China SeaAp2019

Article
Domestic Protests Journal of Asian Security

and International Affairs
and Foreign Policy: 6(1) 1–29, 2019
the Author(s) 2019
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Anti-China Protests DOI: 10.1177/2347797019826747
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in Vietnam and
Vietnamese Policy
Towards China Regarding
the South China Sea
Phuong Hoang1
Abstract
The Sino-Vietnamese relationship is characterized by asymmetry, yet Vietnam’s
post-Cold War foreign policy towards China encompasses three paradigms: (a)
internal and external balancing against China, (b) greater international integration
to prevent political and economic dependence on China and (c) ‘cooperation’
with China on mutual interests while ‘struggling’ against China’s encroachment
on Vietnam’s sovereignty. The ongoing dispute in the South China Sea presents
a primary security concern for Vietnam as well as a challenge to its bilateral rela-
tions with China, particularly as maritime tensions provoke nationalist and anti-
China protests among the Vietnamese public. This article presents an analysis
of anti-China protests in Vietnam that resulted from South China Sea tensions
between 2007 and 2017 in order to examine whether the protests—which are
rare in Vietnam—had any effect on Vietnam’s foreign policy towards China. The
findings reveal that the protests did not result in a change in Vietnam’s foreign
policy towards China both during the maritime crises or in the long term.
Keywords
China, South China Sea,Vietnam, protest, foreign policy
1
National Intelligence University, Washington, DC, USA.
Corresponding author:
Phuong Hoang, National Intelligence University, Washington, DC, USA.
E-mail: [email protected]
2 Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 6(1)
Introduction
Vietnam’s foreign policy towards China has evolved throughout history in
response to both external power dynamics and internal political change. In the
present day, the ongoing dispute between Vietnam and China in the South China
Sea poses a primary security challenge for Vietnam and is a key factor influencing
Vietnam’s foreign policy towards China. Recent Chinese efforts to solidify
sovereignty over its South China Sea claims have reaffirmed Vietnam’s
longstanding perception of China as an assertive and expansionist northern
neighbour, while stirring anti-Chinese unrest among the Vietnamese public. The
anti-China backlash was first evident in 2011 after a Chinese surveillance vessel
cut the cables of a Vietnamese ship conducting seismic research in the South
China Sea. As a result, hundreds of Vietnamese took to the streets in sustained
protests against China. Large-scale and violent anti-China demonstrations
occurred again in Vietnam in 2014 after China stationed the Haiyang Shiyou 981,
an oil rig operated by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, in Vietnam’s
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) near the disputed Paracel Islands.
In authoritarian Vietnam, where political demonstrations are repressed, the
occurrence of these rare protests during Sino-Vietnamese confrontations on the
South China Sea begs the question: What, if any, impact did anti-China protests in
Vietnam have on Vietnamese foreign policy towards China regarding the South
China Sea in both the short and long term? To examine whether anti-China
protests have shifted Vietnamese foreign policy towards China, this article
consists of three sections. The first section discusses the evolution of Vietnamese
foreign policy towards China and engages the existing research on the relationship
between domestic protests and foreign policy. The second section analyses the
incidents in which anti-China protests erupted in Vietnam between 2007 and 2017
as a result of the South China Sea disputes. Through a comprehensive analysis of
media coverage, this section traces the protests and provides a detailed timeline of
(a) the initial maritime confrontation that precipitated the protests, (b) the
development of anti-China protests in Vietnam, (c) the Vietnamese government’s
reaction to the protests, (d) the Vietnamese government’s reaction to the dispute
with China and (e) the mutual resolution or agreement ending the incident between
Vietnam and China. Finally, the article concludes with a discussion on the
implications of anti-China protests on Vietnam’s foreign policy towards China
regarding the South China Sea.
The Evolution of Vietnamese Foreign Policy

Towards China
Ever since Vietnam gained independence in 939 AD after about a millennium of
Chinese rule, Vietnamese foreign policy has centred around its larger and more
powerful northern neighbour. The immutable asymmetry in size and capacity in
favour of China has inevitably defined the Sino-Vietnamese relationship
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(Womack, 2006). To manage this asymmetrical relationship, Vietnamese statecraft

has primarily consisted of an internal balancing strategy in which Hanoi developed
domestic capabilities to repel a potential Chinese invasion (Vuving, 2006; Waltz,
1979). Because China was the sole dominant power in Vietnam’s periphery for
much of Vietnamese history, Hanoi’s foreign policy towards Beijing did not
involve external balancing until the twentieth century.
From the founding of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in 1930 until the
end of the Cold War, Marxist–Leninist ideology provided the foundation for
Vietnamese politics and propelled socialist internationalism as the dominant
strategy underpinning Vietnam’s foreign policy towards China and the rest of the
world. At this time, Vietnam viewed its alliances with the world’s ‘three
revolutionary currents’—(a) socialist states (notably China and the Soviet Union),
(b) the Third World and (c) the advanced capitalist countries—as crucial to its
military victories over France and the United States (Palmujoki, 1997). Benefiting
from significant military and economic aid from Beijing, Hanoi de-emphasized the
historical threat posed by China and characterized the Sino-Vietnamese relationship
‘as close as lips and teeth’ because of their common Marxist–Leninist ideology
(Thayer, 2002; Vuving, 2006). However, Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorated in
the 1970s as China normalized its relationship with the United States, which drove
Vietnam to externally balance against China by entering into a formal military
alliance with the Soviet Union in 1978 (Hiep, 2013; Thayer, 2002). Bilateral
relations fully disintegrated in 1979 when the two countries went to war after
China attacked six Vietnamese provinces along the Sino-Vietnamese border.
In 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the normalization of Sino-
Vietnamese relations dramatically shifted Vietnam’s foreign policy. The Soviet
collapse deprived Vietnam of a major economic, military and political ally,
leaving Hanoi regionally and globally isolated. On the other hand, renewed Sino-
Vietnamese relations reflected the congruent interests between Vietnam and
China in the post-Cold War era as both countries sought to maintain Communist
Party rule while pursuing economic growth and diversification (Hiep, 2013;
Thayer, 2016; Vuving, 2006). Since these twin developments in 1991, Vietnam’s
foreign policy towards China has consisted of three paradigms: (a) balancing, (b)
international integration and (c) cooperation and struggle.
After the end of the Cold War, Vietnam has consistently pursued a policy of
both internal and external balancing against China. To develop its military into a
credible deterrent force against Beijing, Hanoi began to update its naval and air
capabilities in the 1990s and accelerated its modernization efforts in the 2000s
(Hiep, 2013; Thayer, 2016, 2017). Between 2000 and 2017, notable arms
acquisitions by Hanoi included 36 Su-30MK multirole jet fighters, 4 Gepard
guided-missile frigates with over 500 anti-ship missiles and 6 Kilo-class
submarines—all of which improve Vietnam’s ability to monitor its maritime
zones and occupied features in the South China Sea (Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, 2018; Thayer, 2017; Vuving, 2017). In addition to these
internal balancing efforts, Vietnam has also pursued multipolar external balancing
by establishing strategic partnerships with five major powers: China, India, Japan,
Russia and the United States (Thayer, 2017). Yet to avoid becoming entangled in
great power rivalries—especially between Beijing and Washington—Hanoi has
maintained a national defence policy of three nos: no to joining any military
alliance; no to permitting foreign military bases on Vietnamese soil; and no to
allowing a foreign country to use Vietnamese soil to carry out military activities
against other countries (Hiep, 2013; Thayer, 2017; Vuving, 2006).
The second prong of Vietnam’s foreign policy towards China—international
integration—is rooted in the theory of complex interdependence and consists of
the multilateralization of Vietnamese foreign policy and economic development,
particularly greater integration into supranational political and economic
organizations (Keohane & Nye, 1977; Thayer, 2017; Vuving, 2006). The Seventh
National Congress of the CPV began to pursue political and economic
multilaterization and diversification in 1991, which prompted Vietnam to
normalize relations with China in the same year and with the United States in
1995. By then, Hanoi had diplomatic relations with 163 countries, up from only
23 in 1989 (Thayer, 2017). To further enmesh itself politically and economically
into the regional architecture, Vietnam joined the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) in 1995 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC) in
1998. More recently, Hanoi became a member of the World Trade Organization in
2007 and a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for the
2008–2009 term. These efforts towards greater international integration are
intended to prevent Hanoi from excessive political and economic dependence on
any country, particularly China.
In the post-Cold War era, a third paradigm emerged in Vietnam’s strategic
approach to foreign policy. Rather than developing close relationships with
uniquely Marxist–Leninist countries—as was Hanoi’s policy during the Cold
War—Vietnam pursued a more flexible strategy of ‘cooperation and struggle’, a
concept that began to appear in CPV foreign policy documents by 1994 (Hiep,
2013). In 2003, the CPV issued a resolution entitled ‘On defence of the homeland
in the new situation’, which provided greater detail on the twin concepts of
‘objects of cooperation’ and ‘objects of struggle’ (Thayer, 2016). In this paradigm,
Vietnam’s policy is to cooperate with all countries in areas of convergent interests,
while struggling against any country that attempts to undermine Vietnam’s
national interests (Thayer, 2016). Yet the two categories of ‘cooperation’ and
‘struggle’ are not mutually exclusive. Vietnam envisions its foreign policy towards
China as one of both struggle and cooperation: struggling against China’s
expansionist maritime goals while cooperating with China on economic
development and other mutual interests.
The Linkages Between Domestic Protests and

Foreign Policy
Much of the scholarly research on the relationship between public opinion and
foreign policy focuses on the United States and other liberal democracies and can
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be categorized into two major schools of thought (Knecht, 2010; Risse-Kappen,

1991; Sobel, 2001; Wittkopf, 1990). The ‘bottom-up’ approach argues that the
pluralist nature of democracies allows the domestic public to shape the foreign
policymaking of leaders (Risse-Kappen, 1991). In liberal democracies, elected
officials are beholden to their citizens—who have the ability to vote them out of
office—and therefore are more inclined to change their foreign policy when faced
with significant public protests (Aldrich, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler, & Sharp, 2006).
The second school of thought assigns the public a more limited and indirect role
in the foreign policymaking of democratic states, particularly during interstate
crises, and argues that domestic protests and movements are more likely to
influence domestic policy than foreign policy for two reasons (Giugni, 2004;
Neack, 2008; Taras, 2015). First, a host of external and uncontrollable factors
limit the decisions of national leaders regardless of domestic opinion (Giugni,
2004). Second, domestic protests that undermine the key interests of the state are
less likely to result in foreign policy concessions by national leaders (Giugni,
2004). Although democratic structures allow for greater public displays of
opposition to foreign policy decisions, the extent to which domestic protests
shape foreign policy in democratic states remains a fundamental question debated
in academic research.
The scholarly research on the relationship between public opinion and foreign
policy in non-democratic states identifies two sets of circumstances in which
domestic protests could influence a state’s approach to external actors. Public
opinion on foreign policy can matter in non-democratic states where a regime’s
political legitimacy depends on public perception of the regime’s ability to stand
strong in the face of regional competition and interstate disputes (Chubb, 2018;
Neack, 2008). In particular, domestic protests that are nationalist in nature are
more likely to influence the foreign policymaking of authoritarian states because
they are directly linked to the regime’s legitimacy (Reilly, 2012, 2017). Regimes
that disregard or repress nationalist domestic protests risk being perceived by the
public as weak and unpatriotic, which could cause the protests to evolve into a
political movement that undermines the regime. In authoritarian China, leaders
have been promoting nationalist sentiments among the population in order to
maintain the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and
could be compelled to respond to domestic nationalist pressure with a more
aggressive foreign policy (Christensen, 2004; Reilly, 2012, 2017; Ross & Li,
2016; Shirk, 2007). One analysis of widespread nationalist protests in China after
the 2005 publication of a Japanese textbook on a Japanese textbook on Japanese
war crimes during World War II reveals that the protests did cause China to reverse
its outreach policy towards Japan (Reilly, 2017). In the South China Sea, Beijing’s
coercive maritime activities could be rooted in the need to reinforce nationalist
sentiments among the domestic Chinese audience by signalling that the CCP was
willing and able to defend challenges to Chinese sovereignty (Heath, 2012;
Medcalf & Heinrichs, 2011; Swaine & Fravel, 2011; Zhang, 2015). Although the
literature on the relationship between public opinion—particularly nationalist
domestic protests—and foreign policy in Vietnam is rather scarce, there are
indications that public opinion has gradually played a greater role in Vietnam’s
foreign policy because it has the potential to undermine the political legitimacy of
the CPV (Thayer, 2017).
The second mechanism through which nationalist sentiments could affect the
foreign policy decisions of authoritarian states arises when political divisions
exist among the ruling elite. Public opinion is less likely to influence a cohesive
elite that could quickly reach a consensus on addressing both the foreign policy
crisis and domestic nationalist demands (Fewsmith & Rosen, 2001; Reilly, 2012,
2017). However, a divided elite could split into competing factions that exploit
the nationalist fervour to consolidate political power or advance more aggressive
foreign policy preferences (Fewsmith & Rosen, 2001; Weiss, 2014). In this
scenario, the factions are disincentivized from pursuing reconciliation during the
interstate crisis—and from advocating for the suppression of nationalist protests—
so as not to appear weaker and less patriotic than their rivals, creating a situation
in which nationalist protests drive the divided authoritarian regime to adopt a
more confrontational foreign policy stance (Fewsmith & Rosen, 2001; Reilly,
2012, 2014, 2017).
Yet much of the literature indicates that nationalist protests have little impact
on the foreign policy decisions of authoritarian states. In fact, authoritarian
regimes may permit nationalist protests during an interstate crisis in order to use
domestic public opinion as a diplomatic bargaining tool. Because protests are rare
in autocratic societies, they allow the regime to justify an uncompromising stance
during diplomatic negotiations and assert that concessions would not be acceptable
to the domestic public (Weiss, 2014). However, authoritarian states may be more
inclined to suppress nationalist protests if the demonstrations involve political
dissidents and other opposition forces that could destabilize the political system
(Ciorciari & Weiss, 2016). Even in instances of elite fragmentation, escalating
nationalist mobilizations that have the potential to jeopardize the stability of the
regime actually drive elites to unite to address the public unrest (Reilly, 2012,
2014). Any potential short-term impact of nationalist sentiments on the foreign
policy decisions of competing elite factions could quickly recede as the top-level
elites reach a consensus on a strategy to address the interstate dispute (Reilly,
2012, 2014).
An analysis of China’s maritime policy in the South and East China Seas
during interstate contentions reveals that public opinion had limited impact on
Beijing’s foreign policymaking (Chubb, 2018). During the 2012 Scarborough
Shoal stand-off, China exerted control over the atoll before stirring nationalist
sentiments among the Chinese population in an effort to coerce the Philippines to
relinquish its claims (Chubb, 2018). Scholarly accounts differ regarding the
origins of the anti-Japan protests that materialized in China during the 2012
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands disputes. One study argues that the nationalist fervour
led Chinese leaders to allow the demonstrations and adopt a more assertive stance
towards Japan in order to maintain political legitimacy, while others maintain that
the CCP permitted the protests to alleviate public anger and acquire diplomatic
leverage (Chubb, 2018; Gries, Steiger, & Wang, 2015; Reilly, 2014; Weiss, 2014).
As with the 2012 Scarborough Shoal stand-off, the Chinese state’s deliberate
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publicity of its aggressive maritime actions preceded the largest nationalist

mobilizations in China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes, indicating that the
government fomented nationalist protests to its diplomatic favour (Chubb, 2018).
Over the course of the Haiyang Shiyou 981 dispute with Hanoi in 2014, Beijing’s
propaganda authorities diligently managed state media coverage of the incident
and deliberately downplayed both China’s aggressive maritime actions and the
resulting deadly riots in Vietnam, which suggests that nationalist public sentiments
did not affect China’s initial decision to place the oil rig in Vietnam’s EEZ (Chubb,
2014, 2018). These cases reveal that China’s coercive maritime activities in the
East and South China Seas were driven by enhanced military and technological
capabilities rather than nationalist domestic expectations and lend support to the
argument that public opinion has not had a demonstrable impact on China’s short-
and long-term foreign policy decisions (Chubb, 2018; Reilly, 2012).
Research on Southeast Asian states also casts doubt on whether public opinion
influences the foreign policymaking of authoritarian regimes. One case study
featuring Vietnam reveals that nationalist protests do not increase the risk of
escalation by an authoritarian regime during an interstate crisis (Ciorciari &
Weiss, 2016). Although an authoritarian regime may initially permit nationalist
protests to signal resolve or gain leverage during diplomatic negotiations, public
demonstrations may quickly escalate and destabilize the political system. The
political risks to regime stability could outweigh any diplomatic benefits acquired
from allowing the protests to continue (Ciorciari & Weiss, 2016). In the case of
the Haiyang Shiyou 981 crisis, the widespread and deadly public demonstrations
did not result in Vietnam’s pursuit of more aggressive policies towards China in
the short term because the Vietnamese government was able to promptly curtail
protests (Ciorciari & Weiss, 2016). Hanoi moved to suppress the demonstrations
before they could raise the risk of interstate escalation and produce further
domestic instability, and because they did not result in any concessions from
China (Ciorciari & Weiss, 2016).
Media Analysis of Vietnamese Protests and

Maritime Disputes
The existing body of research does not adequately address whether sustained or
violent nationalist protests shape an authoritarian regime’s foreign policy towards
the rival state after the interstate dispute. This article attempts to rectify this gap
in the literature by examining whether anti-China protests in Vietnam led to a shift
in Vietnamese foreign policy—as exemplified by the three paradigms of balancing,
international integration, and cooperation and struggle—towards China regarding
the South China Sea disputes both during and after the interstate crises that
prompted the protests. The author conducted an extensive media search of protests
in Vietnam on the South China Sea disputes from January 2007—when Vietnamese
authorities first authorized such protests—until the conclusion of data collection
in January 2017. In the first phase of the media analysis, the author searched for
the English-language keywords ‘Vietnam’, ‘South China Sea’, ‘protest’, ‘China’,
‘Spratly Islands’ and ‘Paracel Islands’ on several platforms: (a) LexisNexis, which
provides a comprehensive database of media articles, (b) Radio Free Asia and
Voice of America, which offer more detailed coverage of developments in Asia
and (c) Vietnamese state-owned media outlets Vietnam News, Nhan Dan and
Vietnam Plus.
Using the data collected from the media reporting, the author created a detailed
timeline capturing the daily developments of each protest, focusing on the
following five categories:
1. Chinese activity towards Vietnamese entities in the South China Sea that
precipitated the protests: This includes administrative decisions intended to
strengthen Chinese authority over the South China Sea, as well as coercive
activities that led to physical interaction between Chinese and Vietnamese
entities in the South China Sea.
2. Vietnamese protests resulting from Chinese activity regarding the South
China Sea: this study did not include the many protests outside of
Vietnam—whether by Vietnamese nationals living abroad or other
members of the Vietnamese diaspora—because overseas protests have less
potential to threaten the Vietnamese regime than domestic protests that
could quickly accelerate and evolve into demonstrations against Vietnam’s
political system. For this category, the author collected available data on
the date, location, duration, number of participants and organizing
mechanisms for each protest.
3. Vietnamese authorities’ response to protests: this includes actions taken by
Vietnamese authorities before, during and after the protests to manage,
direct, prevent or end the protests.
4. Official Vietnamese government’s reaction to China during and after each
incident: this category includes public statements by Vietnamese
government entities and officials, as well as diplomatic, military and other
methods taken by the Vietnamese government to manage the incident.
5. Mutual resolution of each incident: this could include public statements,
agreements or resolutions between Vietnam and China to end the incident,
mend relations or prevent a similar incident from occurring in the future.
Although researchers studying maritime disputes in the South China Sea have
described the major Vietnamese protests, none have published a detailed day-to-
day timeline of the demonstrations. In addition to providing insight into the
relationship between anti-China protests in Vietnam and Vietnam’s short- and
long-term foreign policy towards China, this article aims to contribute a
comprehensive timeline of Vietnamese protests against coercive Chinese activities
in the South China Sea for future researchers.
The first phase of the media analysis revealed that the last anti-China protests
in Vietnam regarding the South China Sea occurred over the course of the Haiyang
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Shiyou 981 crisis in 2014, during which up to 21 people died and another 100
were injured (Hodal & Kaiman, 2014; Reuters, 2014a). In the second phase of the
media analysis, the author collected data on media coverage of South China Sea
incidents between Vietnam and China after 2014, searching for the English-
language keywords ‘Vietnam’, ‘South China Sea’, ‘China’, ‘Spratly Islands’ and
‘Paracel Islands’ on the same platforms. Because protests did not transpire during
these incidents, the data collection focused on two categories: (a) assertive
Chinese activities towards Vietnamese entities in the South China Sea and (b)
Vietnamese government’s reaction to Chinese activities. The author then analysed
Hanoi’s response to Beijing during the post-2014 incidents in order to discover
whether Hanoi’s approach revealed a shift from the three foreign policy paradigms
of balancing, international integration and ‘cooperation and struggle’ that has
characterized Vietnam’s strategy towards China since the end of the Cold War.
Anti-China Protests in Vietnam Resulting from

Incidents on the South China Sea
Over the course of 2007, China steadily asserted its power in the South China Sea
through a series of actions, including detaining four Vietnamese fishing boats in
the Spratlys in April, opening fire on Vietnamese fishing boats and injuring five
Vietnamese fishermen in the Paracels in July, and establishing a new administrative
region with jurisdiction over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in December (The
Economist, 2007; Wong, 2010). These developments exacerbated the Vietnamese
public’s long-simmering antagonism towards China—particularly perceived
Chinese aggression in the South China Sea—and led the Vietnamese government
to authorize the first protest against China’s South China Sea activities. On 9
December, several hundred protesters gathered near the Chinese Embassy in
Hanoi and were allowed to protest for about one hour before Vietnamese police
began to disperse the crowd (Associated Press International, 2007). A second
demonstration occurred one week later on 16 December, with 300 protesters in
Hanoi and another 100 in Ho Chi Minh City (Agence France Presse, 2007).
However, hundreds of police prevented these protesters from rallying outside
Chinese diplomatic compounds in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. China objected
to these demonstrations and claimed they weakened bilateral ties, which combined
with Vietnamese authorities’ fear of the presence of pro-democracy dissidents
among protesters, and led to the government’s decision to suppress the protests
(Vuving, 2008).
Eleven Weeks of Protests in the Summer of 2011

The first sustained protest in Vietnam regarding Chinese activity in the South
China Sea occurred in the summer of 2011. On 26 May, Chinese maritime
surveillance vessels cut the exploration cables of the Binh Minh 02—a ship
belonging to the state-owned oil and gas company PetroVietnam Group—about
80 miles from Vietnam’s south-central coast (BBC News, 2011a). Three days
later, Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded that China stop violating
Vietnamese sovereignty in its EEZ (Việt Nam News, 2011). On 5 June, 10 days
after the initial maritime incident, approximately 400 protesters marched to the
Chinese Embassy in Hanoi and several hundred others rallied outside the Chinese
Consulate in Ho Chi Minh City (Radio Free Asia, 2011). The demonstrators were
mostly young and used blogs, Facebook, online forums and social media to
organize the protests. Authorities allowed protesters to rally before dispersing
the crowds and cordoning off areas around the Chinese Embassy (Voice of
America, 2011a).
Four days later, on 9 June, a Chinese fishing boat cut the cables of the Viking
II, a seismic survey ship registered in Norway and chartered by PetroVietnam, as
it was operating in Vietnam’s EEZ (Reuters, 2011a; Timberlake, 2011). Later that
day, China’s ambassador to the Philippines demanded that Vietnam and the
Philippines end their oil exploration in the South China Sea, which contributed to
the Vietnamese perception that China was accelerating its efforts to exert full
control over the South China Sea (Gomez, 2011). On the following day, Vietnam
announced its plan to hold live-fire drills in the South China Sea as a rebuke to
China (BBC News, 2011b).
A second week of protests began on 12 June as hundreds of protesters rallied
in front of the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi (Ruwitch, 2011a). Hundreds more
protested in Ho Chi Minh City (Associated Press, 2011a). In Hanoi, police initially
allowed demonstrations around the Chinese Embassy. After 20 minutes, security
forces ordered protesters to leave the premises, but still permitted demonstrators
to rally around Hoan Kiem Lake in central Hanoi. On the following day, 13 June,
Vietnam conducted at least six hours of live-fire exercises within its EEZ (The
Telegraph, 2011). Although the Vietnamese government initially announced that
it had made the live-fire drill decision on 7 June—two days after the first round of
protests—Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Nguyen Phuong Nga said
the exercises were ‘part of routine annual training’ (Agence France Presse, 2011a;
BBC News, 2011b). Even though Vietnam intended to use the live-fire exercises
to signal to China that it would protest assertive Chinese behaviour in the South
China Sea, it also softened the nature of the exercises by characterizing them as
routine to avoid a serious escalation with China.
Nearly one week later, on 19 June, a third round of protests occurred as several
dozen demonstrators rallied once again in front of the Chinese Embassy (Ruwitch,
2011b). As with the previous protests, security forces allowed the demonstrators
to rally for about half an hour before dispersing the crowd. Police reportedly told
the protesters that ‘their protest had been heard and that staying could complicate
diplomacy’, revealing Vietnamese authorities’ concerns that lingering anti-China
protests would impact the Sino-Vietnamese relationship (Ruwitch, 2011b). On 19
June—the date of the third round of protests—the Vietnamese and Chinese navies
began a two-day joint patrol of the Gulf of Tonkin, which was intended to
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‘maintain security and order at sea…share experiences between the two navies
and promote the friendship between the two navies, armies and peoples’ (Nhan
Dan Online, 2011). Even though the South China Sea skirmishes had not yet been
resolved, Vietnam continued joint military endeavours with China. This revealed
that the two cable-cutting incidents and ensuing protests were not pressing enough
to cause Hanoi to halt all bilateral collaborations with Beijing, and showed the
extent to which Vietnam was willing to ‘cooperate’ with China during high-profile
maritime incidents.
High-level diplomatic discussions began on 25 June when Vietnamese Vice
Foreign Minister Ho Xuan Son met with State Councillor Dai Bingguo in Beijing
(People’s Daily Online, 2011). Two days before the meeting, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs spokeswoman Nguyen Phuong Nga used the demonstrations to bolster
Vietnam’s position during diplomatic discussions by emphasizing that the
protests were evidence that the Vietnamese people have ‘become very frustrated’
about the South China Sea situation (Agence France Presse, 2011b). On the
following day, 26 June, a fourth wave of protests occurred in Hanoi with 100
demonstrators rallying to show their opposition to China (Agence France Presse,
2011b). Unlike the previous three protests, authorities barricaded two streets to
prevent protesters from approaching the Chinese Embassy, possibly to avoid
angering China and hindering the ongoing diplomatic negotiations. On the same
day, Vietnam and China issued a joint press release in which both countries
agreed to ‘peacefully solving the two countries’ disputes at sea through
negotiation and friendly consultation’ (VietnamPlus, 2011). Notably, the joint
press release highlighted ‘the need to steer public opinions along the correct
direction, avoiding comments and deeds that harm the friendship and trust of the
people of the two countries’, illustrating that both countries acknowledged the
political significance of the protests in Vietnam, as well as the danger that such
protests could bring to bilateral relations.
Despite the joint press release’s criticism of inflammatory public opinions,
Vietnamese authorities did not curtail protests and permitted about 100
demonstrators to rally in Hanoi on 3 July for the fifth consecutive week (Voice of
America, 2011b). On 10 July, more than a dozen protesters once again rallied
near the Chinese Embassy for a sixth week of protests in Hanoi (Associated
Press, 2011b). For the first time since protests began on 5 June, police arrested
the demonstrators, hauling them onto buses. Police also detained journalists
working for the Associated Press and two Japanese media outlets (Associated
Press, 2011b). According to one detained journalist, armed police held and
questioned him along with some protesters for approximately three hours
(Associated Press, 2011b). Security forces employed similar tactics when the
seventh round of protests began on 17 July, arresting more than a dozen protesters
near the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi and taking them away in buses (Voice of
America, 2011c). When a second group of protesters rallied there later that day,
security forces in riot gear disbanded the crowd.
Four days later, on 21 July, ASEAN and China agreed to a draft of guidelines
for a code of conduct on the South China Sea (Quiano, 2011). China had initially
resisted participating in drafting the code of conduct, but relented after high-level
meetings with senior ASEAN officials. Despite this diplomatic breakthrough, an
eighth wave of protests occurred in Vietnam on 24 July. Authorities decided to
permit as many as 300 demonstrators to rally in central Hanoi because the
repression during the previous two protests—on 10 and 17 July—stirred online
anger after photographs and video footage of police violence against demonstrators
circulated on blogs and other websites (Agence France Presse, 2011c).
Protests did not take place the following Sunday, 31 July, as rally organizers
decided to spend the cold and rainy day in coffee shops across Hanoi to plan their
strategy (Song & Zou, 2014). When the ninth round of protests resumed on 7
August, authorities permitted around 200 demonstrators to rally around Hoan
Kiem Lake—but not the Chinese Embassy—in Hanoi (Ruwitch, 2011c).
Organizers had decided to avoid the Chinese Embassy and focus their protest on
China—rather than including demands for political reform into their platform—to
dissuade authorities from repressing the demonstration. However, participants in
the 7 August protest stated that Vietnamese authorities had pressured them into
abstaining from the demonstration, revealing that the Vietnamese government had
begun to curtail the protests as progress was being made in diplomatic negotiations
(Ruwitch, 2011c). As with the protests that had occurred since the issuance of the
joint press release on 26 June, Vietnamese police used force to end the 7 August
protest. Video footage of an undercover policeman kicking a protester in the face
while forcing him onto a bus was quickly circulated and widely viewed on
YouTube, leading to renewed online outrage (Ruwitch, 2011c).
The circulation of the video led authorities to allow a tenth protest on 14
August, during which 100 demonstrators gathered around Hoan Kiem Lake in
Hanoi (Brown, 2011; Macau Daily Times, 2011). Yet four days later, the Hanoi
city government issued an order calling for the end of ‘gatherings, demonstrations,
and spontaneous marches’ (Reuters, 2011b). Claiming that ‘opposition forces’
were using the protests to undermine ‘national unity’ and that such demonstrations
were complicating diplomatic efforts with China—which reiterates the language
used by police as they dispersed protesters on 19 June—the notice warned that
authorities would ‘take necessary measures’ against those who disobeyed the
order (BBC News, 2011c; Ruwitch, 2011b ). On 21 August, some protesters defied
the order and marched in the eleventh anti-China rally in Hanoi. As soon as the
demonstration began, police arrested about 40 protestors, hauling them onto buses
and driving them away (Reuters, 2011b). According to one activist, police had
also subdued the rally by preventing certain activists from attending the
demonstration, either by confining them to their homes or through other methods
of limiting their movement (Reuters, 2011b). This was the last anti-China rally in
Hanoi following the South China Sea tensions in the summer of 2011. Sino-
Vietnamese diplomatic negotiations continued and culminated in the signing of
the ‘Agreement on Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement of Maritime Issues’
nearly two months later on 12 October, ultimately resolving this particular incident
(Xinhua News Agency, 2011).
Hoang13
Two Minor Protests in 2012 and 2013

Although 2012 and 2013 saw relative calm between Vietnamese and Chinese
entities in the South China Sea, a few minor maritime incidents sparked small
protests in Vietnam. On 29 November 2012, China announced that police based
in Hainan Province would have the authority to board and capture foreign ships in
the South China Sea for committing illegal entry in Chinese waters (Reuters,
2012). In response, Vietnam condemned the decision as a violation of Vietnamese
sovereignty and increased civilian-led patrols reinforced by maritime police to
defend its fisheries in the South China Sea (BBC News, 2012). Tensions flared on
30 November when a Chinese fishing boat cut the survey cables of the Binh Minh
02—a repeat of the 6 May 2011 incident that resulted in 11 weeks of anti-China
protests in Vietnam—as the ship was conducting seismic surveys for PetroVietnam
in Vietnamese waters (Tuoi Tre, 2012). However, the CEO of PetroVietnam
attempted to diffuse the situation by stating that the Chinese ships cut the
Vietnamese ship’s cables by accident (Bloomberg News, 2012). Nonetheless, the
ongoing friction led authorities to allow protests. On 9 December, approximately
200 protesters rallied in Hanoi for about 30 minutes before police dispersed the
crowd (The Guardian, 2012). Those who disobeyed authorities and continued to
protest were quickly detained and bused away, similar to tactics employed by
authorities during the summer 2011 protests. About 20 demonstrators were
arrested and briefly detained before being released. As with the 2011 protests, the
security forces told protesters that the demonstrations ‘cause disorder and affect
the party’s and government’s foreign policy’, once again highlighting Vietnamese
officials’ belief that anti-China public protests damage Sino-Vietnamese relations
and negotiations (The Guardian, 2012). A similar but smaller protest occurred in
Ho Chi Minh City, where approximately 100 demonstrators gathered for 10
minutes before authorities disbanded them.
Two incidents in the South China Sea in the spring of 2013 also led to small
anti-China protests in Vietnam. On 20 March, a Chinese patrol boat fired on and
set ablaze a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Paracel Islands (BBC News, 2013).
Although Vietnamese officials had noticed an increase in Chinese patrols in the
preceding months—notably an incident in early March when Chinese marine
surveillance ships chased two Vietnamese fishing boats from disputed waters—
the 20 March skirmish was perceived as an escalation because of China’s decision
to use lethal weapons on Vietnamese fishermen (BBC News, 2013). China denied
that it started the fire while defending its right to take action in its claimed waters,
but the developments further stoked anti-China sentiments in Vietnam (Associated
Press, 2013a). The situation was exacerbated two months later when a Chinese
vessel damaged a Vietnamese fishing boat in the South China Sea (Associated
Press, 2013b). In response to these recent skirmishes, about 150 protesters
gathered around Hoan Kiem Lake on 2 June to demonstrate against China
(Associated Press, 2013c). Vietnamese security forces reacted quickly to disperse
the crowd, scuffling with some protesters while busing others away (Reuters,
2013). Police also detained two Vietnamese journalists.
Violent Riots in Summer 2014

The most forceful Chinese challenge of Vietnam’s South China Sea claims thus
far began on 1 May 2014 when China deployed the Haiyang Shiyou 981 to
Vietnamese waters (Perlez, 2014; Taylor, 2014). The oil rig was accompanied
by a flotilla of escort vessels, some of which were armed (Associated Press,
2014a). China also announced that foreign ships were not permitted to come
within a three-mile radius of the oil rig (Brummit, 2014). After the Haiyang
Shiyou 981 arrived at its intended location 70 miles within Vietnam’s EEZ on 2
May, Vietnam immediately demanded that China relocate the oil rig and
deployed as many as 29 maritime police and fishery protection ships to the area
to prevent the oil rig from establishing a fixed position to drill (Associated
Press, 2014a; Brummit, 2014; Perlez, 2014). However, the Chinese flotilla
outnumbered the Vietnamese ships, ramming into and firing high-powered
water cannons at the Vietnamese vessels from 3 to 7 May, which resulted in
several damaged Vietnamese ships and at least six injured Vietnamese citizens
(Associated Press, 2014a). On 7 May, Vietnamese officials showed video
footage of these incidents during a news conference to publicize China’s
aggressive actions. At its own press conference on 8 May, China justified its
activities as legitimate and lawful, arguing that it was operating in its own
waters and that Vietnam was actually violating China’s sovereignty by
dispatching 35 vessels to ram Chinese ships (Associated Press, 2014a; Kaiman,
2014a). Yet despite deploying maritime police and fishery protection vessels to
disrupt the oil rig’s operations, Vietnam took a more conciliatory approach than
China. Hanoi did not dispatch naval ships to the area and reiterated its wish for
a peaceful resolution to the crisis (Kaiman, 2014a). On 7 May, a Vietnamese
Foreign Ministry official suggested that international arbitration—referring to
the case brought by the Philippines against China to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea—was a possible option to resolve the crisis
and reaffirmed that Vietnam was only interested in a peaceful process to end
tensions (Nguyen & Martina, 2014). To reiterate Hanoi’s defensive position, a
Vietnamese naval official said, ‘Vietnam won’t fire unless China fires first’
(Nguyen & Martina, 2014). This approach is indicative of Vietnam’s strategy of
struggle and cooperation, in which it struggles with China by protesting Chinese
infringement on its EEZ, publicizing Chinese provocations to the international
audience, and resisting Chinese attempts to drill in Vietnam’s EEZ. At the same
time, Vietnam signals its desire to cooperate with China by voicing its wishes
for a peaceful solution and avoiding the deployment of naval vessels to prevent
further escalation.
Protests began in Vietnam on 10 May when 100 people rallied outside the
Chinese Consulate in Ho Chi Minh City under the watch of security forces
(Associated Press, 2014b). On 11 May, about 1,000 protesters marched and
demonstrated again in front of the Chinese Consulate as hundreds of other
demonstrators rallied in front of the Chinese Embassy (Radio Free Asia, 2014a).
Protests also occurred in smaller cities in Vietnam, notably Da Nang and Hue. Yet
Vietnamese authorities did not arrest, harass, assault or disperse protesters and
Hoang15
journalists covering the event, although police did erect barriers to prevent
protesters from getting too close to the Chinese Embassy compound (Agence
France Presse, 2014; Brown, 2014a). The state-owned media even provided
extensive coverage of the anti-China protests throughout the country (Radio Free
Asia, 2014a). As these large protests were occurring, the state-owned media
reported that China had dispatched fighter jets and other military aircraft to protect
the oil rig, an escalatory step signalling that China was not planning to yield to
Vietnam’s requests to withdraw the rig (Tuoi Tre, 2014a). Despite China’s earlier
claim of wanting to resolve the crisis through diplomacy on the condition that
Vietnam remove its vessels from the area, China rejected an offer by the Chairman
of the CPV, Nguyen Phu Trong, to visit Beijing to discuss matters with President
Xi Jinping (Blanchard & Nguyen, 2014; Bradsher, 2014).
Meanwhile, 12 May was the third consecutive day of anti-China protests in
Vietnam. According to Vietnamese state media, approximately 10,000 people
participated in demonstrations throughout the country, including more than 2,000
in front of the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi (Ito, 2014). About 5,000 people rallied
in downtown Ho Chi Minh City and marched towards the Chinese Consulate (Việt
Nam News, 2014). Another 2,000 protesters marched in Can Tho despite heavy
rains (Tuoi Tre, 2014b). Other demonstrations were held in Da Nang and Hue (Ito,
2014). As with the previous day’s protests, security forces were present at the
demonstrations but did not interfere. State media provided coverage of the
nationwide rallies because the Vietnamese government wanted to signal to
China—and the world—that the Vietnamese people were united against Chinese
intrusions in Vietnamese waters.
In addition to the thousands of protesters who rallied in cities across Vietnam,
about 7,000 footwear and garment workers demonstrated in front of Chinese
businesses in the industrial zones of Binh Duong and Dong Nai provinces in
southern Vietnam on 12 May (Reuters, 2014b). This particular demonstration
developed into riots by the early morning of 13 May, as partakers rallied outside
Chinese- and Taiwanese-owned factories at the Vietnam Singapore Industrial
Park in Binh Duong (Reuters, 2014c). By mid-morning, the crowd leaders
persuaded factory workers to join them in attacking Chinese and Taiwanese
factories in the vicinity. As many as 20,000 workers joined the riot, destroying
Chinese-owned factories and mistakenly targeting Taiwanese and South Korean
factories throughout the industrial park (Kaiman, 2014b; Reuters, 2014c). By
evening, the unrest had spread to neighbouring Dong Nai province, also home to
many foreign-owned industrial parks (Reuters, 2014c). Factory owners reported
that the police either did not attempt to protect the factories or were incapable of
dispersing the mobs of hundreds and thousands of people. To prevent attacks,
those barricaded inside the besieged factories removed Chinese characters from
their factory buildings and hung banners proclaiming support for Vietnam in the
South China Sea dispute (Reuters, 2014c). Rioters also threw rocks at the police,
injuring at least 40 policemen.
In the early morning hours of 14 May, Vietnamese authorities deployed military
vehicles and riot police to end the turmoil in Binh Duong and Dong Nai, while
armoured vehicles were dispatched to guard the Chinese Consulate in Ho Chi

Minh City (Kaiman, 2014b; Radio Free Asia, 2014b). By the end of the two-day
riot, at least 15 factories were destroyed and more than 460 others were looted or
vandalized (Kaiman, 2014b). Police also arrested 600 people in Binh Duong and
another 100 in Dong Nai (Radio Free Asia, 2014b).
Yet this did not end the violent unrest in Vietnam. In Ha Tinh province in
northern Vietnam, a small group of Vietnamese protesters entered the complex of
a Taiwanese steel mill on 14 May to pressure workers to join them (Reuters,
2014c). Fuelled by false rumours that Chinese workers had beaten two Vietnamese
workers to death, the group grew into a crowd of 1,000 people by the early
morning of 15 May (Hodal & Kaiman, 2014). They stormed the steel mill, burned
factories, beat Chinese workers and attacked the police. A total of 21 people were
killed and approximately 100 were injured during these riots (Hodal & Kaiman,
2014; Reuters, 2014a). By the afternoon of 15 May, then Prime Minister Nguyen
Tan Dung ordered national and local authorities to restore order. Ha Tinh police
had arrested 76 people for participating in the violence (Reuters, 2014a, 2014c).
Between 15 and 17 May, the Vietnamese government sent a series of text
messages to all Vietnamese cell phone users to inform them that Prime Minister
Nguyen Tan Dung had instructed security forces to ‘stop illegal actions’—
referring to the deadly violence that had occurred over the past few days—and to
warn Vietnamese people against participating in ‘illegal protests’ (Brown, 2014b;
Reuters, 2014d). On 18 May, authorities deployed large contingents of police to
major cities to deter anti-China protests (Reuters, 2014d). Protesters who
attempted to rally in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City were quickly arrested, and at
least one protester was assaulted by police (Brown, 2014b; Reuters, 2014d).
Security forces were dispatched to major intersections in both cities to inform
people that such gatherings were ‘illegal’ and instructed onlookers to disperse
(Brown, 2014b; Reuters, 2014d). In the meantime, China deployed chartered
flights to transport about 300 people from Vietnam, after having previously
evacuated more than 3,000 Chinese nationals (Reuters, 2014d).
After the 18 May government crackdown on anti-China protests, demonstrations
against the oil rig placement within Vietnam’s EEZ no longer occurred. One
month after Vietnamese authorities repressed the last attempted anti-China protest,
Vietnam and China held the first high-level bilateral meeting on the oil rig dispute.
On 17 June, Chinese State Councillor Yang Jiechi arrived in Hanoi to meet with
the General Secretary of the CPV, Nguyen Phu Trong; Prime Minister Nguyen
Tan Dung; and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh
(Associated Press, 2014c). The negotiations quickly reached an impasse as Yang
Jiechi reproached Vietnamese officials for publicizing and internationalizing the
dispute, reasserted that the oil rig’s placement was legal, and warned Vietnam not
to disrupt the oil rig’s activities (Ho & Blanchard, 2014; Lipes, 2014). Yang did
add that both countries should hold bilateral talks to resolve the situation (Ho &
Blanchard, 2014). As was the case during the cable-cutting incidents in the
summer of 2011, Vietnamese officials were more conciliatory in their approach
with China. They emphasized the need to communicate to prevent conflict,
Hoang17
highlighted the two countries’ friendship, and even released a statement saying
that Vietnam was always ‘grateful for the support and great help from China’ (Ho
& Blanchard, 2014; Lipes, 2014). Nonetheless, Hanoi remained firm on its
position regarding the oil rig and continued to request that Beijing withdraw the
Haiyang Shiyou 981 from Vietnam’s EEZ.
On 16 July, China withdrew the oil rig from its location in Vietnam’s EEZ one
month ahead of schedule (Denyer, 2014). Beijing said it was removing the oil rig
because it had completed operations earlier than expected and wanted to prevent
potential damage to the rig from the approaching typhoon season. It is possible that
Beijing made the early withdrawal decision to defuse the situation with Hanoi,
especially as the crisis had brought China near-unanimous criticism from the
international community and diplomatic pressure from the United States (Thayer,
2014). On 26 August, Vietnam sent Politburo member Le Hong Anh, acting as a
special envoy from the General Secretary of the CPV, to Beijing for two days of
bilateral talks with President Xi Jinping and Liu Yunshan, a member of the Politburo
Standing Committee (Tiezzi, 2014a, 2014b). The parties reached an agreement to
return to the October 2011 guidelines for managing disputes in the South China
Sea. However, as this agreement did not prevent the oil rig crisis of 2014, tensions
between the two countries regarding the South China Sea continued to linger.
Implications for Vietnamese Foreign Policy

Towards China
During crises with China regarding the South China Sea disputes, Hanoi’s
response towards Beijing mostly followed the ‘cooperation and struggle’ hedging
strategy. The developments during the first major and sustained anti-China
protests in the summer of 2011 revealed that Vietnamese authorities only allowed
protests near the Chinese Embassy during the first three weeks—on 5, 12 and 19
June—to signal to China that the Vietnamese government was partly constrained
in negotiations by popular anger. This decision reflects Hanoi’s strategy of
‘struggling’ against Beijing’s coercive maritime activities that undermine
Vietnam’s national interests in the South China Sea. This is consistent with the
scholarly literature indicating that authoritarian states could deliberately permit
nationalist demonstrations to gain diplomatic leverage and is strikingly similar to
China’s own strategy during the Scarborough Shoal stand-off and Senkaku/
Diaoyu dispute of 2012 (Chubb, 2018; Ciorciari & Weiss, 2016; Gries et al., 2015;
Reilly, 2014; Weiss, 2014). After 19 June, Hanoi began to cooperate with Beijing
and only permitted protests away from the Chinese Embassy so as not to offend
its northern neighbour during negotiations. Despite the sustained nature of the
protests, Vietnam was acutely aware of its asymmetrical relationship with China
and cooperated and reconciled with its northern neighbour to end the stand-off.
This illustrates that the nationalist demonstrations did not impact Hanoi’s
policymaking towards China during the 2011 crisis and lends support to research
showing that nationalist protests do not compel authoritarian regimes to adopt a

more aggressive or uncompromising stance during interstate disputes (Ciorciari
& Weiss, 2016). As soon as Vietnam and China reached a preliminary agreement
to resolve the dispute on 23 June, Vietnamese security forces used coercive tactics
to detain and remove protesters and journalists covering the protests. However,
the Vietnamese government does appear to acknowledge the negative optics of
completely suppressing protests during heightened tensions with China—
particularly if China had behaved aggressively towards Vietnamese entities in the
South China Sea—which reflects the argument that repressing nationalist protest
could undermine the political legitimacy of an authoritarian state (Neack, 2008;
Reilly, 2012; Weiss, 2014). Hanoi also allowed protests if photo or video footage
of state repression had previously circulated online in order to provide the people
with an outlet to vent their anger and to avoid the perception that the regime was
restricting expressions of patriotism.
The second major anti-China protests during the Haiyang Shiyou 981 crisis in
the summer of 2014 revealed that even violent demonstrations did not appear to
have an effect on Vietnam’s ‘cooperation and struggle’ strategy towards China.
Initially, Hanoi pursued a strategy of ‘struggling’ against Beijing’s infringement
on its sovereignty by directing state media to provide extensive coverage of anti-
China protests to signal Vietnamese resolve to China and the international
community. As with the 2011 protests, Hanoi’s decision show that authoritarian
states exploit nationalist protests to acquire diplomatic leverage (Chubb, 2018;
Ciorciari & Weiss, 2016; Gries et al., 2015; Reilly, 2014; Weiss, 2014). Hanoi also
‘struggled’ against Beijing by sending vessels to disrupt the oil rig’s operation,
issuing official statements protesting China’s action and publicizing the dispute to
the international community. However, authorities used forceful tactics to quickly
suppress protests as soon as deadly riots targeting Chinese nationals and Chinese-
owned businesses began on 12 May. The riots resulted in at least 21 deaths and
100 injured people and had the potential to endanger negotiations and damage
relations with China. The unrest also occurred in industrial zones and led to the
destruction of foreign-owned property, which could have disrupted Vietnam’s
manufacturing-dependent economy. Hanoi’s decision to swiftly curtail nationalist
demonstrations lends support to the argument that the political risks—and
economic risks in this particular case—caused by escalating protests outweigh the
potential benefits of diplomatic leverage, driving authoritarian leaders to quell
disruptive protests (Ciorciari & Weiss, 2016; Weiss, 2014). Even as the Haiyang
Shiyou 981 stand-off continued, there were no additional anti-China protests in
Vietnam. The first high-level talks during the crisis were not held until 17 June,
one month after the last attempted protest. The asymmetric Sino-Vietnamese
relationship, as well as Vietnam’s strategy of cooperation, were especially evident
during negotiations when State Council Yang Jiechi scolded Vietnam while
Vietnamese officials were much more conciliatory in their approach to China.
However, Hanoi did maintain a core aspect of its ‘struggling’ strategy by remaining
firm on its request that Beijing remove the oil rig from Vietnam’s EEZ, which has
been Vietnam’s position since the crisis began. This demonstrates that even the
Hoang19
deadly riots did not have a demonstrable effect on Vietnamese policy towards
China. In fact, China did not withdraw its oil rig until 16 July, about two months
after the last anti-China protests in Vietnam.
Since the last sustained and violent anti-China protests in 2014, Vietnam has
not shown any evidence of reshaping its long-term foreign policy towards China
regarding the South China Sea, which continues to reflect the three paradigms of
(a) balancing, (b) international integration and (c) hedging through ‘cooperation
and struggle’. A primary aspect of Vietnam’s internal balancing strategy towards
China consists of the continued modernization and improvement of its military
and particularly maritime capabilities (Vuving, 2017; Nguyen & Truong, 2018).
In 2015, Hanoi unveiled its largest indigenous drone to patrol the South China Sea
(Gady, 2015). The new drone, in conjunction with Vietnam’s agreement with
India to build a satellite tracking station in Ho Chi Minh City, would significantly
expand Hanoi’s intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in
the South China Sea (Collin, 2016). In 2016, Vietnam not only procured more
Kilo-class submarines to improve its naval capabilities, but also expanded a
runway on Spratly Island to accommodate ISR and combat aircraft. To further
enhance its deterrent capabilities, Vietnam installed mobile rocket launchers
capable of striking China’s runways and military installations in the South China
Sea (Nguyen, 2016; Reuters, 2016; Torode, 2016). These endeavours are intended
to build up a credible deterrent to potential Chinese attempts to capture Vietnamese-
occupied South China Sea features.
Hanoi’s continued security and economic outreach with outside partners and
institutions demonstrates the second paradigm of international integration.
Since the 2014 oil rig crisis and ensuing protests, Vietnam has strengthened its
relationship with the United States, which it views as necessary to balance
China’s increasing security and economic clout in the Indo-Pacific (Nguyen &
Truong, 2018; Thayer, 2017). In 2015, Nguyen Phu Trong became the first CPV
General Secretary to visit the United States and the White House to discuss
growing tensions in the South China Sea, among other shared security concerns
between Hanoi and Washington (P. Nguyen, 2018b; Petty & Wroughton, 2015).
Another milestone in bilateral relations occurred in 2016 when the United States
lifted its lethal weapons embargo on Vietnam (Spetalnick, 2016). Yet one more
historic event occurred in 2018 when a U.S. aircraft carrier, the USS Carl
Vinson, visited Vietnam for the first time since the end of the Vietnam War (M.
Nguyen, 2018a). In addition, Japan and India have also emerged as key security
partners for Vietnam. As Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has adopted a more
assertive security and foreign policy for Japan, Hanoi has procured maritime
and other defence equipment from Tokyo to bolster its capabilities in the South
China Sea (Hiep, 2017; The Japan Times, 2018). Similarly, Prime Minister
Narendra Modi’s ‘Act East’ policy has led to enhanced security ties between
New Delhi and Hanoi, which include increased personnel training, equipment
procurement and other defence- and maritime-related cooperation
(Parameswaran, 2018).
Vietnam’s pursuit of international integration also involves developing robust
economic ties with partner nations and institutions to lessen its economic
dependence on China, which is Vietnam’s largest trading partner (Nguyen &

Truong, 2018). In 2016, Vietnam’s exports to China accounted for 13 per cent of
all exports and roughly 10 per cent of Vietnam’s total GDP, exposing it to
economic vulnerabilities vis-à-vis its northern neighbour (Observatory of
Economic Complexity, 2018). Fearing that China could use sanctions and other
economic punishments during a South China Sea stand-off, Vietnam has
attempted to attenuate its economic reliance on China by pursuing a number of
free trade agreements (FTAs) (Nguyen & Truong, 2018). Although Vietnam’s
preferred FTA was the original Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) which included
the United States, Hanoi nonetheless worked with the remaining TPP members
to reach an agreement on a Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TPP,
which was ratified by Vietnam’s National Assembly in November 2018
(Jegarajah, 2017; Luong, 2016; Vu, 2018). In addition, Vietnam finalized an
FTA with the European Union in 2018 and is in negotiations to conclude the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, all of which integrate Vietnam’s
economy with that of multiple regional and extraregional states, thereby
lessening its economic dependence on China.
Finally, the third paradigm of ‘cooperation and struggle’ has been especially
evident during more recent conflicts with China over their maritime disputes.
Since the Haiyang Shiyou 981 crisis of 2014, there have not been any high-profile
skirmishes between Vietnam and China over the South China Sea. Vietnam has
cooperated with China by continuing to engage with its northern neighbour at the
working group level, senior official level and in high-level bilateral meetings
(Chubb, 2017). In January 2017, Prime Minister Nguyen Phu Trong visited China
and met with President Xi Jinping over four days, after which both countries
issued a joint communiqué that highlighted their mutual trust and commitment to
peacefully managing maritime disputes (Quang, 2017). Despite these
improvements in bilateral relations, Vietnam reportedly ended its gas-drilling
expedition in a disputed area of the South China Sea after China threatened to
attack Vietnamese outposts (Hayton, 2017; Rodríguez, 2017). A similar incident
occurred in early 2018 when Vietnam once again cancelled an oil project in the
South China Sea after Chinese pressure (Hayton, 2018). Despite Vietnam’s
fortifications of it South China Sea outposts, economic losses from forfeiting
natural resource exploration and potential domestic backlash, Hanoi still opted for
cooperation with Beijing rather than risk significantly escalating a conflict that
would inevitably and asymmetrically favour China. In addition, the lack of anti-
China nationalist protests in Vietnam over these two incidents reveal the extent to
which the Vietnamese party-state has the ability to control the dissemination of
information to the Vietnamese people and suppress protests that could endanger
the goals of the state.
Yet at the same time, Vietnam has consistently pursued the ‘struggle’ segment
of its hedging strategy towards China. After China began large-scale land
reclamation on its South China Sea features in mid-2013, Vietnam began land
reclamation on its own features in 2014. Between 2014 and 2016, Vietnam
reclaimed at least 120 acres on its South China Sea outposts, establishing
Hoang21
infrastructure that could accommodate a military presence (Asia Maritime

Transparency Initiative, 2016, 2017). Although Vietnam’s reclamation activities
comprise a fraction of China’s—China reclaimed over 3,000 acres between 2014
and 2016, compared to Hanoi’s 120 acres—Vietnam has conducted more land
reclamation in the South China Sea than any other Southeast Asian claimant. The
disproportionate reclamation efforts by Beijing and Hanoi not only reflect the
asymmetry between the two countries, but are also indicative of Vietnam’s
strategy of ‘struggling’ against China, as Hanoi seeks to entrench its maritime
claims and maintain a robust enough South China Sea presence to deter a potential
Chinese attempt at seizing Vietnamese-occupied outposts. Vietnam also ‘struggles’
against China by issuing public rebukes of Beijing’s more assertive South China
Sea actions. After China landed a plane on Fiery Cross Reef in 2016, Hanoi
protested Beijing’s violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty (BBC News, 2016).
Similarly, Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued official statements
accusing China of infringing upon Vietnam’s sovereignty after Chinese bombers
appeared in the Paracel Islands in May 2018 and after China began construction
on a new building in the Paracel Islands in November 2018 (Reuters, 2018a,
2018b). In May 2018, Hanoi also asked Beijing to remove its military equipment
from the South China Sea (Reuters, 2018c). Although these official statements are
intended for Hanoi to voice its discord with Beijing, Vietnam also realizes that the
other aspects of its strategy—including balancing, interdependence and
cooperation—are all key to its management of the South China Sea disputes and
its overall relationship with its asymmetrically larger northern neighbour.
In conclusion, despite the unprecedented and at times violent anti-China
protests in 2011 and 2014, there is no evidence that these nationalist demonstrations
led to a demonstrable shift in Vietnamese foreign policy towards China, both
during the particular incidents and in the long term. Since the end of the Cold War,
Vietnam has and continues to consistently pursue a strategy of balancing,
international integration and ‘cooperation and struggle’ in order to manage the
South China Sea disputes and its relations with China. Because Vietnam is bound
by geography, history, economics and politics to its asymmetrical relationship
with China, Hanoi will continue to employ a multifaceted strategy to maintain its
national interests in the South China Sea while striving to sustain amicable
relations with Beijing. Nationalist protests in Vietnam have yet to impact that
calculation as tensions continue to linger in the South China Sea.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests

All statements of fact, analysis, or opinion are the author’s and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the National Intelligence University, the Department of Defence or
any of its components, or the U.S. government.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of
this article.
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Domestic Protests Journal of Asian Security

The Evolution of Vietnamese Foreign Policy

(Womack, 2006). To manage this asymmetrical relationship, Vietnamese statecraft

The Linkages Between Domestic Protests and

be categorized into two major schools of thought (Knecht, 2010; Risse-Kappen,

publicity of its aggressive maritime actions preceded the largest nationalist

Media Analysis of Vietnamese Protests and

Anti-China Protests in Vietnam Resulting from

Eleven Weeks of Protests in the Summer of 2011

Two Minor Protests in 2012 and 2013

Violent Riots in Summer 2014

armoured vehicles were dispatched to guard the Chinese Consulate in Ho Chi

Implications for Vietnamese Foreign Policy

showing that nationalist protests do not compel authoritarian regimes to adopt a

dependence on China, which is Vietnam’s largest trading partner (Nguyen &

infrastructure that could accommodate a military presence (Asia Maritime

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

Vuving, A. L. (2006). Strategy and evolution of Vietnam’s China policy: A changing

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