Anatomy of A Division - The 1st Cav in Vietnam PDF

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ANATOMY OF
A DIVISION
1st Cav in
Vietnam
Shelby L. Stanton
A new approach to the analysis of a
military Shelby L. Stanton de-
unit:
scribes the 1st Cavalry Division (Air-
mobile) in terms of its distinctive fight-
ing concepts and its role as modem
cavalry.
As the 1st Cav goes into action in

Vietnam, it demonstrates:
The striking potential of helicop-

tered infantry.
Transport capability. A major task

force is lifted into unfamiliar terri-
tory on short notice — Operation

LEJEUNE.
Clearing operations. Operation

PERSHING involved combat and
the exercise of judgement and diver-
sified skills.
Flexible response. Operation JEB

STUART showed the ability of mod-
em aerial cavalry to displace units
between combat theaters and to
penetrate enemy base areas.
Tactical response. The fighting at

Quang Tri illustrated the "devastat-
ing firepower of air cavalry.''
(continued on back flap)
Book Club
Edition
^
Anatomy of a Division
The 1st Cav in Vietnam
Shelby L. Stanton
•
PRESIDIO
Copyright © 1987 by Shelby L. Stanton
Published by Presidio Press

31 Pamaron Way, Novato, CA 94947
All rights reserved.No part of this book may be reproduced or uti-

lized inany form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including
photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval
systems, without permission in writing from the Publisher. Inquiries
should be addressed to Presidio Press, 31 Pamaron Way, Novato, CA
94947.
Printed in the United States of America

y
To the memory of my father

Samuel Shelton Stanton
1914-1986
Contents
Preface ix
1. "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses!" 1
Aerial Cavalry Evolution

2. From Test to Battle 23
Progression from Air Assault to Cavalry Division
3. Air Assault 45
Techniques, la Drang Valley Campaign
4. Sustained Pursuit 69
Techniques, 1966 Coastal Campaign
5. Clearing Operations 91
6. Flexible Response 111
Techniques, Tet-68
7. Cavalry Raids 133
Techniques, Khe Sanh and A Shau
8. Cavalry Screen 151
Safeguarding a Capital
9. Cavalry Exploitation 173
The Cambodian Invasion
10. The First Team 195
Division Structure in Vietnam
11 . The Skytroopers 217
Division Performance in Vietnam
12. The Total Battlefield 235
From Airmobility to Armor
Appendix 253
Division Order of Battle
Sources and Bibliography 260
Index 263
viii STANTON
Maps
la Drang Valley 48
1966 Coastal Campaign 81
Operation PERSHING 95
Tet-68 and A Shau Valley 1 17
Operation PEGASUS 137
Operation LIBERTY CANYON 157
Cavalry Screen in III Corps Tactical Zone 163
The Cambodian Invasion 179
1st Cavalry Division Presence in Vietnam 245
Preface
Historically, the majority of U.S. cavalry served as dragoons. They

rode into battle but fought on foot. The airmobile 1st Cavalry Division
continued this cavalry tradition by riding helicopters into battle. The
division cavalrymen employed automatic weapons, and were sup-
ported by aerial rocket artillery —
the airmobile equivalent of the famed
horse artillery — but dismounted to fight.
This book is mechanism and composition
a critical analysis of the
of the airmobile cavalry division, from its inception through the end
of the Vietnam conflict (when its airmobile status was terminated).
How the airmobile cavalry division was raised, managed, functioned,
performed, and was supported are the important themes of this work.
The book compares the division's utilization of helicopters which gave
vertical dimension to such cavalry missions as reconnaissance, pur-
suit, raids, screening, exploitation, and the flexible shock action of
mounted attack.
The book is not intended as a conventional division history, and
therefore does not attempt to recount every divisional encounter of
the Vietnam war. Although the main course of the division's service
in Vietnam is given as a necessary prelude to understanding its unique
combat role, specific actions were chosen to represent certain cavalry
techniques as applied in an airmobile environment. Since the book is
arranged chronologically, with special topics treated last, the missions
and organization of the division's various components are not ad-
dressed until Chapter 10. However, the reader is encouraged to read
this chapter preparatory to the battle sections, if more clarity is desired
in intradi visional unit relationships.
X STANTON
Throughout this volume's treatment of division performance in

Vietnam, the reader should remember that the airmobile division was
still being developed when thrust into combat. The tactical and op-
erational warfare parameters which determined the airmobile divi-

sion's employment were also in the experimental stage. The division
was sent into a remote, geographically hostile environment, burdened
with many political restrictions in an increasingly unpopular war against
a strong and cunning enemy, and was expected to demonstrate the
value of combat airmobility by securing battlefield victory. It reflects
great credit upon the personnel of the 1 st Cavalry Division that this
airmobile doctrine was implemented successfully under such circum-
stances.
The author received encouragement and assistance from several
people in the writing of this book. Of these, the author is especially
grateful for the excellent guidance of Colonel Rod Paschall, Director
of the U.S. Army Military History Institute, and he outstanding
professional resources which this important facility offered. Special
thanks are owed to my Adele Horwitz, and my wife, Kathryn,
editor,
for their dedicated support. The author must also pay tribute to the
government military historians of the Vietnam era, who insured that
a valuable record of the Army's role and internal action was available
for future scholars.
Shelby L. Stanton
Captain, U.S. Army, Retired
Bethesda, Maryland
CHAPTER 1
Cavalry, and I Don't Mean

Horses!"
Aerial Cavalry Evolution
The 1st Cavalry Division's arrival on the battlefields of Vietnam was

not presaged by the sound of trumpets or thundering hooves, but rather
by the close suppressive fires of aerial gunships and fighter-bombers
escorting waves of assault helicopters. After being transported over
miles of normally inaccessible jungle terrain, the airmobile cavalry-
men were inserted into their remote landing zones by dismounting
from their troopship skids into the midst of enemy positions below.
For the first time in military history, a combat organization was de-
signed and structured to rely on the shock and fury of vertical heli-
copter attack to deliver its frontline soldiers. However, these bold
airmobile strikes represented only the mailed fists of a larger Army
machine. How this machine was conceived and created, the interre-
lationship of its component parts, and how it functioned and per-
formed are the substance of this book.
The air assault itself represented the very raison d'etre of the air-
mobile cavalry division and the culminated focus of its resources to-
ward battlefield domination. The dangerous art of infantry attack from
the sky demanded a carefully conceived and synchronized orchestra-
tion of all division elements of the greater body. Scout and recon-
naissance aircraft and pathfinders served as the eyes which found and
marked the landing fields and their approaches. Airlifted artillery
howitzers and cannon, the muscle power manned by artillerymen but
supplied and maintained by ammunition and ordnance teams, fired
the necessary preparatory barrages.
2 STANTON
The assault helicopter formations were an integral part of division

aviation, the legs of the division, and the troops they carried were the
hardened workhands with the essential tools of war. Fire support was
continued during final helicopter descents by shifting artillery to one
side, conducting simultaneous airstrikes with napalm, bombs, and 20-
mm cannon strafing on the opposite flank, and using armed helicop-
ters with rockets, miniguns, and automatic grenade launchers to cover
the rest of the target area. Navigation for the airmobile columns had
to be precise and tightly controlled in order to avoid Air Force flight
paths and artillery shell trajectories. This rigid fire control was insured
by commanders and observation officers, the directing brains, in con-
trol helicopters linked by signalmen with sophisticated radio and com-
munications equipment.
Once on the ground, the air assaulted troops relied on the inte-
grated efficiency of all other organizational segments for their sur-
vival and replenishment. If the hands were cut off and eliminated,
the remainder of the divisional body was denuded of its main pro-
tection and directly threatened with destruction. The successful con-
duct of the air assault was the responsibility of the primary and special
staffs, the heart of the division, which planned and coordinated of-
fensive action with all constituent segments. Engineers provided the
building muscle required to clear the ground, construct airstrips and
helipads, and furnish defensive positions. Their skilled enterprise could
cover body parts with a shell of protection or shield of defense. Dis-
cipline within the body of troops was enforced and regulated by an
organic military police corps. The entire divisional structure was
nourished by a host of supply troops, serviced by support technicians,
and repaired by maintenance personnel.
Together, these diverse but integral elements composed the total
division fighting machine. Without them the division lacked the fabric
of life; without the fusion of their combined energy the division was
crippled in its performance; without the direction offered by aggres-
sive leadership the division remained blinded and handicapped in its
ability. When property led and interconnected, these components forged

a powerful division that became a major instrument of national will.
Divisions are a recent development in the history of organized
warfare, being initially employed by France in the late 1700s. They
became an accepted part of peacetime European military establish-
ments during the next century. In the United States, divisions were
Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses 3
temporarily raised during the Civil War, but did not become primary
formations within the army structure until the passage of the National
Defense Act of 1916, just prior to America's entry into World War
I. Divisions now constitute the basic framework of most world ar-
mies.
The division is essentially the modem equivalent of the ancient
Roman legion. In both cases, infantry, engineer, artillery, signal, and
service troops are combined into permanent organizations capable of
independent and sustained combat operations. Divisions, like legions,
are self-sufficient combat commands capable of influencing direction
of battle with only normal support. As Rome safeguarded her empire
with a vanguard of fighting legions, the modem United States pro-
tected its global interests with a number of combat divisions. In the
post- World War II era, the United States usually fielded an average
of sixteen Army and two Marine divisions.
In the mid-twentieth century, divisions were still landbound. Al-
though marine divisions had amphibious ability, and airbome divi-
sions could enter desired territoryby parachute descent, actual bat-
tlefield maneuver was restricted to the timeless pace and terrain
limitations of marching infantry. Mechanized and armored divisions

were faster, but were confined by terrain restrictions. In the 1950
Korean War even vehicular speed, which promised to reset the clock-
work of modem battle during previous lightning war campaigns, was
effectively slowed by mgged landscape and improved antitank weap-
ons to the step of escorting foot soldiers. Aerial transport of divisions
was rare, since airlift was expensive and required assembly in secure
end of the trip.
airport staging areas at either
At the same time, helicopter technology was producing machines
of increasing size and dependability. In the immediate post-Korean
decade, the technical basis was built for a series of helicopters which
could deliver hovering firepower and vertical lift dimensions to the
battlefield. These newly introduced designs were improved and uti-
lized to create an organization destined to radically alter forever both
the mode and rate of ground combat.
Under the farsighted guidance of a few select leaders, the United
States engineered a novel set of tactics based on newly devel-
Army
oped weaponry and air assault principles. This effort was initiated
during the summer of 1962, when a board of officers headed by Gen.
Hamilton H. Howze studied the promise of tactical airmobility with
4 STANTON
a few trial units at the infantry school post of Fort Benning, Georgia.
Following their recommendations for fiirther formal testing, the Army
raised the 1 1th Air Assault Division and its associated 10th Air Trans-
port Brigade. After three years of testing, an entirely new type of
division was created. This unit, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile),
represented the first airmobile combat force in history and ""a land-
mark in the evolution of U.S. Army organization."'
In 1965 the 1st Cavalry Division was deployed to the war-torn
highlands and jungles of Vietnam. There for the next seven years,
this highly mobile and aggressive formation proved the validity of the
airmobile concept. The division contained more than twenty thousand
men peak combat strength, but its real firepower was forged by
at
fusing its manpower, weapons, and transportation with cavalry doc-

trine. Maximum shockpower was maintained by joining the division's
light infantrymen and supporting artillery with an aerial armada of

helicopters. A host of command ships following a vanguard of scout
helicopters led the troop-filled utility helicopters into battle. They were
escorted by waves of attack gunships and rocket helicopters, while
medical evacuation and resupply helicopters stood ready to assist. From
the smallest scout helicopters brazenly circling over enemy targets to
the largest crane and cargo helicopters whirling howitzers and sup-
plies into forward positions, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) rep-
resented the essence of modem, mobile Army striking power. From
the field its wartime commander Maj. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard
"^
declared to Newsweek that he was "freed from the tyranny of terrain.
The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was one of the most pow-
erful war machines ever fielded, and certainly one of the best-trained
and best-equipped American units sent into combat. The division suc-
cessfully merged the infant doctrine of vertical aerial assault with tra-
produce a revolutionary new style of war-
ditional cavalry functions to
however, was conceived a decade earlier in
fare. Its actual genesis,
the frozen hills of Korea as a result of one of the worst battlefield
defeats suffered by American arms, a loss occasioned by the lack of
cavalry.
1. Ney, Evolution of the U.S. Army Division, 1939-1968, CORG

Virgil
Memorandum M-365, Headquarters, United States Army Combat Devel-
opments Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 1969, p. 92.
2. Newsweek, 13 December 1965, p. 28.
In the American tradition, cavalry had always signified the fast

light cavalry: horse troopers capable of covering the wilderness dis-
tances of a vast continent. Light cavalry excelled in scouting and re-
connaissance, providing a mobile screen for the slower infantry, and
riding dispatches as messengers. Mounted militia volunteers, rangers,
and light dragoons served a vital role in frontier warfare, tracking
down and pursuing Indian marauders. During the Mexican War, horse
soldiers performed important reconnaissance and pursuit missions. Later
mass migration west into unexplored territory brought the need for
mobile protection of the settlers, and mounted riflemen answered the
call.
In the United States, cavalry became a force to be reckoned with

during the Civil War. Cavalry activity often closely conformed to
traditional experience. For instance, mounted riders gathered infor-
mation about opposing forces, destroyed bridges and engaged in other
harassing actions, and provided general messenger and mobile guard
details. The dash and cunning of a few imaginative cavalry leaders
also gave a new, expanded dimension to cavalry service. Their names
rang like rattling sabers across the pages of history: Jeb Stuart, Custer,
Sheridan, and Forrest. They grouped cavalrymen into independent
formations equally capable of executing swift attacks or decisive de-
laying actions and sent reinforced units of riders patrolling through
the broken easternwoodlands to cover the flanks of entire armies
marching on campaign.
One of the most important tactical results of this heightened cav-
alryemphasis was the cavalry raid. Cavalry raids overran outposts
and disrupted lines of communication, created havoc and confusion
in the opponent's camp, captured or destroyed supplies, secured re-
liable long-range information about enemy dispositions, and shielded
larger troop movements.
After the Civil War, cavalry was again fragmented as a result of
the fluid warfare required in securing the Far West. Cavalry regiments
were dispersed across the thinly garrisoned frontier. The end of the
bidian Wars and the reduced need to police the western interior spelled
the doom of the traditional American cavalry, although several later
Mexican border incidents temporarily created a need for cavalry on
mounted patrol duty. In the next few conflicts preceding World War
II, American cavalry troops were generally limited to courier service
or fighting as dismounted infantry.

6 STANTON
Renewed bandit and other illegal activity along the desolate

boundary between Mexico and the United States necessitated contin-
uous patrolling of the region by horse soldiers. Under the new Na-
tional Defense Act, the 1st Cavalry Division was formed on 12 Sep-
tember 1921 to safeguard the southwestern borders and to prevent
gunrunning, cattle rustling, and the smuggling of narcotics, liquor,
and other high-duty items. The economic depression of the 1930s
spawned the Civilian Conservation Corps, and the division was soon
relegated to providing logistical and administrative cadre for CCC
companies in theArizona-New Mexico district.
Prior to and during the Second World War, there was little agree-
ment on the proper employment and function of Army cavalry on the
armored- infantry battlefield, so the cavalry compromised, adopting a
little of both. The basic problem was the advent of improved motor-
ization in thescheme of modem warfare, and the resulting demise of
the horse on which the cavalry was largely reliant and traditionally
attached to. Cavalry adopted new doctrines premised on light mech-
anized reconnaissance, converted into infantry, or perished. This led
to a postwar consensus that cavalry had either been misused altogether
or lacked enough combat striking power to properly fulfill its assigned
reconnaissance roles.
in 1941 the entire 1st Cavalry Division was assembled at Fort
Bliss, Texas, for extensive field training. Its authorized personnel
strength jumped from 3,575 to 10,1 10 troops. News of the Japanese
anack on Pearl Harbor, which thrust the United States into active
hostilities, found many members of the division on furlough or back
in civilian life, but men poured into Fort Bliss from all over the coun-
try to rejoin their units. The cavalry troopers remained horse soldiers
until February 1943, when the division received orders assigning it
overseas. The changeover from horses to jeeps commenced. Since the
division was intended for amphibious assault duty in the southwest
Pacific, was transformed by special equipment allowances and its
it
cavalrymen retrained as foot soldiers. Finally, on 20 July 1945, in the

Philippines, the division was completely reorganized as an infantry
formation. At that point the division's only association with its proud
cavalry heritage was the honorary retention of its cavalry designators.
While the 1st Cavalry Division fought as infantry, other smaller
cavalry units struggled across Europe in armored cars and light tanks.
Their tactical reconnaissance functions were lost in a war where big
Cavalry, and 1 Don't Mean Horses 7
armored divisions were relied upon to punch through enemy lines,

and strategic cavalry functions were replaced by aircraft. Even Lt.
Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.'s, own Third Army '^Household Cavalry,"
the 6th Cavalry Group, was relegated to messenger service between
his speeding armored divisions; he officially redesignated the group
as his Army Information Service.
Armor emerged from the conclusion of World War II as the de-
cisive ground arm of mobility. The eminence of armor was sealed by
the Army Organization Act of 1950, which combined armor and cav-
alry into one branch, designated as armor. The armor branch was
technically to be a continuation of cavalry, but actual cavalry func-
tions were quickly eroded by the mainstream armor philosophy that
massed tank formations would dominate the atomic battlefield of the
future. Many armor officers believed that future wars would witness
the mailed fists of armored giants hammering each other into capit-
ulation under a rain of nuclear warheads and held little regard for the
traditional American cavalry mode of fast raids, light reconnaissance,
and mobile security. In the immediate postwar years the only cavalry
that existed was the U.S. Constabulary in occupied Europe and the
1st Cavalry Division, an infantry outfit stationed in Japan.
Cavalry was conceptually a different arm of mobility from armor.
The cavalry mobility differential was based on shock effect through
firepower, which also screened both time and information. Cavalry
existed to deny the enemy that talisman of success — surprise — while
providing friendly forces with the means to achieve the same result.
Cavalry had ceased to be associated with horses, crossed sabres,
crumpled wide-brimmed campaign hats, and carbines slung from the
hip, but no one seemed to know where modem cavalry fitted. "Fight-
ing Joe" Hooker's famous Civil War adage, "Who ever saw a dead
cavalryman?" had been sadly shortened to simply "Who ever saw
cavalry?" By June 1950, when invading North Korean armies surged
over the 38th parallel into the south, the United States military had
lost its real cavalry ability. The gallant arm of decision which Forrest
had once described as arriving "fustest with the mostest" was now,
in terms of mobility and firepower, "lastest with the leastest."
On 18 July 1950, fifteen years before entering Vietnam, the 1st

Cavalry Division was sent to the rugged peninsula of South Korea to
reinforce Lt.Gen. Walton H. Walker's Eighth Army. The division
was one-third understrength and infantry in all but name. It was
8 STANTON
committed to the rapidly shrinking Pusan perimeter as Walker's allied

contingents retreated farther south. Obviously, the tactical situation
called for a cavalry force to be committed at once, to screen and delay
while the heavier infantry and armored forces built up a more sub-
stantial defense. Neither Walker, United Nations Command General
Douglas MacArthur, nor the United States military had any true cav-
alry available. Inmany cases Walker's infantry was outpaced by North
Korean armored columns. The Eighth Army fell back with wide-open
flanks, desperately trading space, weapons, and even lives for time.
On Walker's left a gap of a hundred miles extending to the sea could
have been readily penetrated, a situation begging for cavalry, but none
was around. The "cavalry" division on hand was composed of foot
soldiers in foxholes grimly defending the main road from Seoul to
Pusan.
By mid-September Walker's army was compressed into a dan-
gerously small pocket in the extreme southeastern portion of the Ko-
rean peninsula. GeneralMacArthur broke this stalemate on 15 Sep-
tember with a daring amphibious assault behind North Korean lines
at Inchon, just west of Seoul. The successful surprise landing left the
North Korean army stunned and cut off. The return to fluid warfare
on American terms of mobility promised both a rapid breakthrough
to the north and a fast linkup between the invading X Corps and
Walker's army advancing from the south. The situation was ripe for
highly mobile cavalry forces which could exploit the opening, but
none was forthcoming. The rear of the Naktong River line could have
been seized in hours by daring cavalry, but instead nearly two weeks
elapsed before the American forces linked up.
The move north to destroy the remnants of the North Korean army
was not preceded by "flying columns" of swift cavalry, but advanced
at the tortuous road-bound pace of a mechanized column twisting
through the jagged Korean mountains. This column was composed of

mixed tanks and trucks, all moving forward at the pace of foot sol-
diers groping blindly from road bend to road bend and from hill to
hill. In October the entire Korean peninsula was wide open, but Walk-
er's divisions were forced by the lack of adequate long-range cavalry

reconnaissance to advance in ignorance of enemy dispositions.
The lack of cavalry prevented the scouting of likely enemy as-
sembly areas throughout the advance. In late October the 6th Republic
of Korea Division was surprised and broken by a sudden attack east
of Unsan. On 1 November a battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division's

8th Cavalry Regiment was suddenly surrounded and smashed by an-
other carefully prepared trap, leaving the Americans bewildered as
the enemy melted into the mist-shrouded mountains. T. R. Fehren-
bach aptly described the situation in his classic treatise on the Korean
conflict. This Kind of War: "In the frightful terrain such patrolling
was dangerous. It could not be supported by wheels, and where wheels
could not go, neither could sizable units of Americans. And in such
horrendous terrain a vast army could be — —
and was hidden in a very
small area, observing perfect camouflage discipline, waiting."^
During the last week of October, the Americans reached the Yalu
River, but the absence of any properly balanced cavalry force con-
tinued to invite disaster. Adequate ground surveillance of the Yalu
River crossings was manifestly impossible. The American divisions
were struck with complete and overwhelming surprise by thirty Chinese
divisions on 26 November 1950. Without cavalry to patrol or cover
the steep maze of mountain peaks and razorback ridges. Walker was
doomed to a crushing piecemeal defeat as unit after unit stumbled
into Chinese ambush.
The question Where was Walker's cavalry?" was answered bluntly
**
four years later by Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin (West Point, 1929),
an enthusiastic cavalry supporter and highly respected commander of
the crack 82d Airborne Division during World War II, in his land-
mark Armor article, "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses!" Gavin found
that Walker simply had no adequate cavalry, since real cavalry had
ceased to exist throughout the Army, and offered a startling but tech-
nically feasible solution to the tragic Yalu debacle. He stated, "Where
was the cavalry? and I don't mean horses. I mean helicopters
. . .
and light aircraft, to lift soldiers armed with automatic weapons and
hand-carried light antitank weapons, and also lightweight reconnais-
sance vehicles, mounting antitank weapons the equal of or better than
the Russian T-34s [tanks]. ... If ever in the history of our armed
forces there was a need for the cavalry arm —
airlifted in light planes,
helicopters, and assault-type aircraft —
this was it.
w4
3. T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (New York: Macmillan Company,

1963) p. 296.
4. Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses!" Ar-
mor, Volume LXIII, No. 3, p. 18.
10 STANTON
General Gavin was a paratrooper, a light infantryman well ac-

quainted with the mobility potential of aircraft. Like many hardy World
War 11 army parachute volunteers, he felt paratroopers were the mod-
em heirs to the boldcavalrymen of yesteryear, since the emphasis on
heavy armor excluded most tankers from the fast raiding and slashing
agility of the old light dragoons. In the 1943 invasion of Sicily, Gav-
in's 505th Parachute Regimental Combat Team drew the tough as-
signment of parachuting between the German reserves and the allied

assault beaches. Although their method of entry called for parachutes
instead of saddles, their actual missions were all historically typical
of cavalry — to screen larger troop movements (the landings), to delay
enemy use of critical terrain, and to secure several crossroads.
Gavin considered most parachutist missions conducted during the
war to be cavalry-style operations. For example, a battalion of the
509th Parachute Infantry jumped into Avellino, Italy, to secure a key
road center leading to the allied landing site at Salerno. In the in-
vasion of France, the 82d and 10 1st Airborne Divisions were directed
to block all enemy attempts to reinforce the beaches and to attack
from the rear, another classic cavalry mission. Gavin was convinced
that **what we needed next was a closer integration with the inheritors
of the cavalry role, the armored forces, without loss to the highly
mobile and aggressive character of the airborne forces, the Mean and
mean' philosophy."*^
Gavin felt that the armor branch was unresponsive. Instead of
reducing the weight of mechanized equipment so that aircraft could
be developed and produced to carry the new light armored forces into
battle, vehicles got only heavier. He refused to give up, and when
promoted to Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Gavin walked
the halls of the Pentagon, pleading for the cause of airmobility. He
had several staff studies prepared on the subject and summarized these
in his article which first appeared in Harper's magazine, but it did
not receive widespread professional military attention until reprinted
in the May-June issue of Armor magazine, itself the retitled contin-
uation of the older esteemed Cavalry Journal. Gavin wrote urgently,

''Cavalry-type screening missions will have to be conducted at much
greater distances, and with much greater rapidity, than have hitherto
5. Ibid., p. 21
1
been considered acceptable. The mobility differential to make this

possible must be achieved. It is within our grasp, fortunately, in the
air vehicles now being developed —assauh transports, light utility

planes, helicopters, and convertaplanes. Forces so organized and
equipped will have a predominant influence on future warfare."^
Gavin's article reflected the vision of a few cavalry and helicopter
enthusiasts and proved to be the catalyst which sparked the imagi-
nation of several other forward-thinking officers. These capable men
represented diverse backgrounds, ranging from old horsemen-tumed-
armor-commanders to light infantrymen who doubled as aviators, but
they all shared Gavin's conviction that modem aerial cavalry was nec-
essary. They eventually implemented the revolutionary air assault phi-
losophy, but the realization of airmobility still faced the prospects of
a long, uphill struggle through the restrained Army bureaucracy.
After the Korean War, in the mid-1950s, the Army was axed by
budget cuts. Big bombs and massive retaliation were the rage in mil-
itary thought. Maj. Edwin L. "Spec" Powell, who would later be-
come the Director of Army Aviation, listened to many analysts pro-
claiming, **Well, the only purpose for an army in the future is to
defend strategic air bases. "^ Within the Army there was widespread
sentiment that the Korean War was the cause of current disfavor and
that the conflict had been "fought on Asian soil on Asiatic terms,"
where restricted combat in the hellish mountain ranges forced the Army
to trade rifleman for rifleman, without benefit of America's technical
edge in mobility and supporting firepower.
The Army possessed airplanes and primitive helicopters, but had
no conception of their true value. Many officers with Korean expe-
rience under their belts vividly remembered the fragile light obser-
vation helicopters darting up and down sheer mountainsides carry-
ing litter patients and emergency supplies. Only a very few foresaw
the future possibility of waves of sturdier helicopters ferrying whole
battalions across such ranges. The natural inertia of the military
6. Ibid., p. 22. Emphasis cited in the original article.
7. U.S. Army Military History Institute, Senior Officers Debriefing Pro-

gram, conversations between Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Powell and Col. Bryce
R. Kramer and Col. Ralph J. Powell, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1978,
p. 31. Hereafter cited as USAMHl, Powell Debriefing.
12 STANTON
institution confined embryonic aviation development to practices

everyone was used to, such as spotting artillery fire with light Cub
observation planes.
The Director of Army Aviation 1955 was a distinguished ex-
in
horse cavalryman. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, who became one of the

driving forces in airmobile development. A West Point graduate who
was qualified as both an airplane and helicopter pilot, Howze had seen
World War II action with the 1st Armored Division in North Africa
and Italy. He recalled that the ''army hadn't grasped at all, from its
experience in Korea, the real utility of the light aircraft and what
could be done by really integrating them into the tactics and combat
support of the army. There was really very little knowledge in the
army that the Marines, during one very small operation in Korea, had
lifted a small party of Marines to the top of an unoccupied mountain,
and had found this to be a useful thing to do."^ Still, the Korean
conflict had produced a general awareness of the need to strengthen
Army aviation.
In the absence of formal Army policy, officers in several scat-
tered posts began experimenting with whatever material was avail-
able. They often worked without official guidance and in spite of
high-echelon disapproval and even ridicule. In June 1956 Col. Jay
D. Vanderpool, the energetic chief of the Army aviation school's
combat development office at Fort Rucker, Alabama, assembled an
armed helicopter platoon, mounting weapons and other hardware
scrounged, borrowed, or stolen from junkyards and other units. Jay's
^'Sky-Cav" platoon soon gained a notorious reputation for jerry-rigged
rockets and hair-raising treetop-level aerial firing demonstrations. Two
was legitimized as the Army's provi-
years later this unlikely outfit
sional 7292d Aerial Combat Reconnaissance Company, but Vander-
pool was already conceiving "armair" formations up to division in
size. Col. John J. Tolson took over the Army infantry school's air-
borne department at Fort Benning, Georgia, and created an airmo-
8. U.S. Army Military History Institute Research Collection, Senior Officer

Debriefing Program: History of Army Aviation, conversations between Gen.
Hamilton Howze and Col. Glenn A. Smith and Lt. Col. August M. Cian-
ciolo, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, p. 8. Hereafter cited as USAMHl,
Howze Debriefing.
Cavalry, and I Don*t Mean Horses 13
bility section which included a field experiment helicopter company.'

This formative stage of airmobility reflected the continuing dis-
jointed nature of the Army aviation effort. In October 1959 the Army
Chief of Research and Development, Lt. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau,
initiated the Army development plan to seek firm guidance in
aircraft
bridging the gap between Army and
Air Force responsibilities and to
permit aircraft development in harmony with projected Army require-
ments. Although Trudeau felt that light observation aircraft remained
the "bread-and-butter" mission of Army aviation. Army expectation
studies in two other areas (manned surveillance and tactical transport)
were also presented to industry at Fort Monroe, Virginia, on 1 De-
cember 1959. These studies allowed exploration of technical ap-
proaches by the aircraft manufacturers, and two months later forty-
five companies submitted 119 design concepts in response.'^
The Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, established
a board of officers on 15 January 1960 to consider the Army aircraft
development plan and to receive the industry proposals. The board
was chaired by Lt. Gen. Gordon B. Rogers, the deputy commanding
general of the Continental Army Command, and included several air-
mobility enthusiasts. The guiding genius behind the board was its
secretary, Col. Robert R. "Bob" Williams, who was the first pilot to
be designated Master Army Aviator. The Rogers Board advocated
immediate development of a new helicopter capable of observation,
target acquisition, reconnaissance, and command and control func-
tions. Although the Rogers Board was primarily interested in deciding
on aircraft types, it also recommended that a study be prepared "to
determine whether the concept of air fighting units was practical and
if an experimental unit should be activated to test feasibility and de-
velop material requirements."'*

The Rogers Board review was almost completely confined to de-
velopment in aviation material. The board still suggested the possible
9. Lt. Gen. John J. Tolson, Vietnam Studies: Airmobility, 1961-1971

(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973), pp. 5-6.
10. Army Aircraft Requirements Review Board booklet, Fort Monroe, Vir-
ginia, dtd 29 February 1960.
11. Ltr, Army Aircraft Requirements Review Board to CofSA, dtd 10 March
1960. Subj: AACFT Rqr Rev Bd, commonly referred to as the Rogers Board
Report.
14 STANTON
aviation means needed on the battlefield

to reposition fighting forces
using aerial lift on ground maneuver. The
instead of relying solely
board was soon outpaced by events which gripped the Army and al-
tered its aviation outlook after 1 960: the reorganization of Army di-
visions (ROAD), the Berlin and Cuban emergencies and the reserve
call-up, the rapid unit expansion in response to a multitude of inter-
national crises, and Military Advisory Group Army aircraft require-
ments in many countries — including the prospect of combat needs in
Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. Cols. John Norton, the chief of the
Continental Army's aviation section, and Alexander J. Rankin of the
aviation board at Fort Rucker, clearly recognized that a fresh ap-
proach was needed.
When Robert S. McNamara became Secretary of Defense in 1961,
he ushered in sweeping changes aimed at completely reorganizing the
Department of the Army and its methods of warfare. He was highly
displeased with Army Secretary Elvis J. Stahr, Jr.'s, report on the
status of Army aviation plans. McNamara realized that the current
Army procurement program was hopelessly inadequate in every cat-
egory of aircraft and considered it dangerously conservative. Fur-
thermore, McNamara felt that the Army failed to exert any strong,
unified aviation effort and was plagued by reticence and budgetary
restraint which were blocking the adaptation of necessary aircraft and
equipment. Most important, he believed that officers with progressive
ideas about airmobility were not being heard.
McNamara' s team of civilian experts in the Systems Analysis Of-
fice was determined to allow modem ideas to get to the secretary
without being stifled by reactionary bureaucratic resistance. Several
officials of that office arranged for McNamara to consult privately
with Brig. Gen. Clifton F. von Kann, the Director of Army Aviation
(who was a parachutist as well as a pilot and former Rogers Board
member), and another Army airmobility enthusiast, Maj. James J.
Brockmyer, the Army Aviation Action Officer, who was one of the
original Cub pilots. McNamara was convinced that a breakthrough in
airmobility was possible with the new Bell helicopter models. He was
given a list of officers who also believed that Army aviation needed
new and the substance for
direction, letters which he sent to the Sec-
retary of the Army.'^
12. Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shap-
ing the Defense Program. 1961-1969 (New York: Harper & Row) p. 1(X).
Cavalry, and 1 Don't Mean Horses 15
Defense Secretary McNamara sent two strong directives to Stahr

on 19 April 1962, summarizing his extreme dissatisfaction with Army
aviation posture. Furthermore, McNamara took the radical step of
directly naming Lt. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze and other pro-airmo-
bility officers to a task force to re-examine the Army's posture, in
McNamara ordered the Army to implement airmobility, told

effect,
theArmy how to do it, and who should run it. While both memo-
randums opened new horizons, the second proved to be the birthright
of the new airmobile division, and is reproduced here in its entirety:'^
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Washington, D.C.
April 19, 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. STAHR

I have not been Army program submissions
satisfied with
for tactical mobility. do not believe that the Army has fully
I
explored the opportunities offered by aeronautical technology for

making a revolutionary break with traditional surface mobility
means. Air vehicles operating close to, but above, the ground
appear to me to offer the possibility of a quantum increase in
effectiveness. I think that every possibility in this area should
be explored.
We have found that air transportation is cheaper than rail or
ship transportation even in peacetime. The urgency of wartime
operation makes air transportation even more important. By ex-
ploiting aeronautical potential,we should be able to achieve a
major increase in effectiveness while spending on air mobility
systems no more than we have been spending on systems ori-
ented for ground transportation.
1 therefore believe that the Army's re-examination of its
aviation requirements should be a bold "^new look" at land war-

fare mobility. It in an atmosphere divorced
should be conducted
from and past policies. The only objective
traditional viewpoints
the actual task force should be given is that of acquiring the
maximum attainable mobility within alternative funding levels
and technology. This necessitates a readiness to substitute air
13. Memo, SECDEF for SA, 19 Apr 62, Subj: AAVN, w/lncl, with com-
ments from USAMHl; Powell Debriefing.
16 STANTON
mobility systems for traditional ground systems wherever anal-

ysis shows improve our capabihties or effec-
the substitution to
tiveness. It new ideas which the task
also requires that bold,
force may recommend be protected from veto or dilution by con-
servative staff review.
In order to ensure the success of the re-examination I am
requesting in my official memorandum, 1 urge you to give its
implementation your close personal attention. More specifically,

1 suggest that you establish a managing group of selected indi-
viduals to direct the review and keep you advised of its progress.
If you choose to appoint such a committee, I suggest the fol-
lowing individuals be considered as appropriate for service thereon:
Lt. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, Brig. Gen. Delk M. Oden, Brig.
Gen. Walter B. Richardson, Col. Robert R. Williams, Col. John
Norton, Col. A. J. Rankin, Mr. Frank A. Parker, Dr. Edwin W.
Paxson, and Mr. Edward H. Heinemann.
Existing Army activities such as Fort Rucker, RAC, STAG
(Strategic and Tactics Analysis Group, Washington, D.C.), CDEC
(Combat Development Experimental Center, Ft. Ord), and CORG
(Combat Operations Research Group, Ft. Monroe), combined
with the troop units and military study headquarters of CON-
ARC, and in cooperation with Air Force troop carrier elements,
appear to provide the required capabilities to conduct the anal-
yses, field tests and exercises, provided their efforts are properly
directed.
The studies already made by the Army of air mobile divi-
sions and their subordinate air mobile units, of air mobile re-
connaissance regiments, and of aerial artillery indicate the type
of doctrinal concepts which could be evolved, although there has
been no action to carry these concepts into effect. Parallel stud-
ies are also needed to provide air vehicles of improved capabil-
ities and to eliminate ground-surface equipment and forces whose
duplicate but less effective capabilities can no longer be justified
economically. Improved V/STOL (Vertical /Short Takeoff or
Landing) may also be required as optimized weapons
air vehicles
platforms, command and communications vehicles, and as short-
range prime movers of heavy loads up to 40 or 50 tons.
I shall be disappointed if the Army's re-examination merely
produces logistics-oriented recommendations to procure more of

the same, rather than a plan for implementing fresh and perhaps
unorthodox concepts which will give us a significant increase in
mobility.
(Signed) ROBERT S. McNAMARA

Gen. George H. Decker, the Army Chief of Staff, was infuriated
that inside insurgents had circumvented proper channels.- The mem-
orandums caused consternation in the military staff, sending shock
waves throughout the upper echelons of the Army establishment, but
they allowed recommendations to reach the top without being watered
down. Within a week Lieutenant General Howze, commander of the
XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, was directed to head the task
force, formally called the U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements
Board. The Army accorded the undertaking the highest possible prior-
ity, second only to operations in active combat areas. The Army's
new Director of Aviation, Brig. Gen. Delk M. Oden, a 2d Armored
Division war-hero-tumed-pilot, was very pleased, while Howze called
McNamara's memorandum the "best directive ever written.""^
McNamara was handing the Secretary of the Army deadlines so
fast that there was little time to do anything but say yes. The Howze
Board was instructed to submit its final report within foui^ months of
actual working time, and its dynamic officers were determined to make
it a success. Some, like chairman of the security committee Brig.
Gen. Frederic W. Boye, Jr., the assistant commandant of the armor
school, had distinguished themselves as armor leaders in World War
II and were sons of horse cavalry officers. Many, like Brig. Gen.
Edward L. Rowny, who headed the critical field test committee, were
paratrooper graduates of the Army airborne school. The administra-
tive workhorse of the Howze Board was the Secretariat, composed
of rising stars of airmobility such as Cols. Norton, Putnam, Rankin,
and Beatty.
The board was headquartered in Fort Bragg's Erwin School build-
ing, since it was empty during summer vacation, where the lights
14. USAMHI, Howze Debriefing. It is important to remember that the Ar-

my's Combat Developments Command, which would normally conduct such
a study, was not organized until June 1962; thus the need for a special board
under Howze.
18 STANTON
burned past midnight every night as officers argued, wrote, and strug-
gled through files and reports. They worked at a feverish pace as
committee members constantly shuttled all over the country, and

brainstorming sessions lasted until all One recalled, '^Many of
hours.
us just ran ourselves into the ground; we worked so darned hard we
almost couldn't think straight.'' The documents were ** roughly knee
deep on the floor" of one large room, and staff sections had to be
limited in generating paperwork. Even so, by September more than
six hundred footlocker loads of paperwork were produced.'^
There were precious few aviation assets to work with, and a dis-
pute arose between staffs at Fort Rucker and Fort Knox concerning
the constitution of the provisional 17th Air Cavalry Group, since Gen-
eral Howze insisted on having the best-qualified personnel and best
equipment available. However, some units, like the 1st Aviation
Company (Caribou transport), were already being sent overseas, where
Army Secretary Stahr believed it could still be part of the study "in
the operational laboratory of Vietnam." This proved impossible. A
smattering of other units, like the 8305th Aerial Combat Reconnais-
sance Unit (Provisional) at Fort Rucker, were employed.'^
The Howze Board studied the application of Army aircraft to the
traditional cavalry role of mounted combat, especially in reconnais-
sance, security, and target acquisition. They examined possible Army
operations in Southeast Asia, Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle
East. One of most innovative concepts was the proposal
the board's
for an Air Cavalry Combat Brigade (ACCB) to fight from an aerial-
mounted position and perform the historical role of cavalry in ex-
ploitation, pursuit, counterattack, delay, and flank protection. This
brigade was designed for the offense, seeking out and destroying the
enemy while carrying out traditional cavalry missions. An even larger
Combined Arms Air Brigade was envisioned to "flesh out" the ACCB
and provide the commander with a decisive combat tool.'^
15. Frederic A. Bergerson, The Army Gets an Air Force (Baltimore and
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p. 112.

16. U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, The Origins, Delibera-
tions,and Recommendations of the U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Require-

ments Board, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1969, pp. 19, 47, 60.
17. Ibid., pp. 50-51.
For divisional purposes the committees began with the simplest,

lightest, and most airmobile force they could develop, looking first
at Southeast Asia. For this purpose an Army Reorganized Airmobile
Division (RAID) was proposed along with a corps task force, which
was army supported by a special sup-
actually a small airmobile field
port brigade. The RAID could provide enough aircraft to sustain com-
bat by aerial reconnaissance and fire support, simultaneously airlifting
one-third of itself for distances of more than sixty miles. Since three
RAID divisions were claimed to be as effective in Southeast Asia as
Army and two Marine divisions combined, they needed to be
four
fielded as quickly as possible. For European fighting the board de-
veloped an aviation-enhanced armored division, which was termed
the Reorganized Universal Division.
General Howze felt that completely new organizations such as
RAID were unrealistic, but in keeping with his directive to implement
**bold, new ideas" had the board redesign the standard infantry di-
vision, replacing wheels with aviation wherever possible. This re-
sulted in an airmobile division with slightly less manpower than a
standard division, but with 2,751 fewer vehicles and some four hundred
aircraft.'^The board agreed that fast, hard-hitting troops were needed
to destroy an enemy quickly, to seize an objective, and then to deploy
to areas from which they could make the most of their gains. The
organization needed to be light, but effective, in firepower, com-
munications, and mobility.
The test force at the board's disposal included one battle group,
engineers, and artillery from the 82d Airborne Division and 150 air-
craft of the 6th Aviation Group (Provisional).'^ Forty field tests were
18. The Howze Board proposed airmobile division contained 14,678 per-
sonnel compared to the standard 15,799; 920 vehicles compared to 3,671;
and 400 aircraft compared to 103 in the standard infantry division.
19. The 6th Aviation Group was board-generated and built around the 3d
Transportation and the 82d Aviation Battalions, reinforced by the 31st
Transportation Company (Light Helicopter), 61st Aviation Company (Light
Fixed Wing), 123d Medical Company (Helicopter), 82d and 101st Aviation
Companies (Airmobile), 54th Transportation Company (Medium Helicop-
ter), 22d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment, and Troop C of the 17th
Cavalry (Air). The 138th, 154th, 544th Transportation Detachments (Field

Maintenance), 6th Aviation Operating Detachment, 25th Transportation
20 STANTON
conducted, but only three were of week-long duration, pitting air-

mobile troops against mock irregulars in the Appalachian Mountains
(which simulated Laotian territory). Fort Bragg, and Fort Stewart.
The board finally proposed several new organizations: an air as-
sault division, a division with increased mobility through its 459 air-
craft; an air cavalrycombat brigade totaling 316 helicopters to de-
stroy or neutralize mechanized enemy forces by aerial firepower; a
corps aviation brigade (207 aircraft) to allow rapid movement of re-
serves; an air transport brigade (134 aircraft) to support the air assault
division logistically; and a special warfare aviation brigade of 125
aircraft to render immediate aviation support to units in combat. The
board also considered the future, where the air cavalry combat brigade
would be succeeded by the armair brigade, a self-sustaining unit of
all arms smaller than a division, which could be used for rapid strike,
economy of force, mobile reserve, and fire brigade actions. A more
lethal airmobile division was foreseen as the outgrowth of the air as-
sault division.
The board recommended that the mix of forces best suited to mod-
ernize the Army would, within six years, give four infantry, four
mechanized, and three armored divisions; five air assault divisions
with their five associated air transport brigades; and three air cavalry
combat brigades. One air assault division was to be based in Korea;
another stationed in Hawaii with a brigade forward on Okinawa; and
of the three envisioned for United States assignment, two would be
additionally paratrooper-qualified. One air cavahy combat brigade was
to be sent to Europe for availability in the Middle East or North Af-
rica, and two brigades placed in the United States were to replace the
armored cavalry regiments there. The special warfare brigade, which
the board urgently recommended be activated the following year at
Fort Bragg, would have five operational squadrons — four of them
organized for Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Aftica, and Latin
America. Over $5.4 billion (in 1962 dollars) would have to be spent
to procure the 10,565 total aircraft required.
General Howze knew that the Army would probably react nega-
Company (Direct Support), and Simmons Army Air Field Command were
also involved. USATMRB, Annex O — Field Tests, and Howze Board cor-
respondence.
lively toward the increased cost of airmobile units over conventional

forces. The initial investment for more complex aircraft, as well as
the higher costs for operation and maintenance, was quite high. The
estimated $987 million cost of an air assault division was somewhat
offset by its favorable ratio of effectiveness over a standard division,
priced at $742 million. The frightfully expensive $366 million air
cavalry combat brigade was considered absolutely necessary for Lao-
tian and Vietnam duty, where indigenous troops could not secure
overland supply routes. The board recommendations that the Army
terminate development of both the main battle tank and rough-terrain
vehicle, to allow financing of airmobility programs, were bound to
^^
cause hostility.
Dr. Stockfisch, the Defense Secretary's representative, was very
pleased with the way the Howze Board studies were progressing. He
was particularly enthusiastic over the board's concept of the final pre-
sentation, which would include a two-page letter, a twenty-page sum-
mary, a two-inch-thick report, and a two-foot- thick backup in a foot
locker. He believed Secretary McNamara should be furnished every-
thing, including the footlocker.^' In keeping with the 1 September
1962 deadline imposed by the Secretary of Defense, the board sub-
mitted its report to the Department of the Army on 20 August. Gen-
eralHowze's conclusion was direct and simple: "Adoption of the Army

of the airmobile concept —
however imperfectly it may be described
and justified in this report —
is necessary and desirable. In some re-
spects the transition is inevitable, just as was that from animal mo-
bility to motor."
The Howze Board was in operation from May through August
1962, working in five different U.S. locations. Consisting of 199 of-
ficers, 41 enlisted men, and 53 civilians, it involved more than 3,500
20. USCONARC/USARSTRIKE, Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1962-

30 June 1963, p. 99. Costs are cited from U.S. Army Combat Developments
Command, The Origins, Deliberations, and Recommendations of the U.S.
Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
1969, p. 104. Comparative costs of other proposed organizations were the
corps aviation brigade, $329 million; air transport brigade, $464 million;
and the special warfare brigade, $149 million.
21. MFR, COL A. J. Rankin, 7 Jun 62, Subj: FONECON Between Mr.
Fred Wolcott and COL Rankin, 7 June 62, 0930 hours. AJCG-AB.
22 STANTON
personnel in direct support. The eight working committees had one

purpose: to free the ground soldier from the restrictions of battlefield
movement by replacing conventional ground transportation with air-
The study was conducted on a high-priority basis in an atmo-
craft.
sphere divorced as far as possible from current viewpoints and doc-

trine.
Many of the board's conclusions were never acted upon. The Army
never fielded a special warfare or corps aviation brigade. Only one
air transport brigade was formed, to support one experimental, un-
derstrength air assault division. The Army formed only two airmobile
divisions, both to fight in Vietnam, one — the 1st Cavalry — an out-
growth of the test air assault division in July 1965; the other — the
101st Airborne Division — three years later. No combat
air cavalry
brigade was officially organized, although an ad hoc formation was
created temporarily on the Cambodian front during the Vietnam War
by a former Howze Board officer.
The Howze Board charted new horizons in airmobility and rep-
resented the turning point in providing the Army with aerial cavalry.
The board's recommendations led to further experimentation with the
raising of the 1 1th Air Assault Division, but its ultimate legacy be-
came the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). This division was the ma-
jor outcome of the board's hard work and deliberations. When the
divisionwas dispatched to Vietnam in 1965, it would ultimately change
the conduct of land warfare. The division's bold air assault and sus-
tained pursuit operations made it, six months after arriving in Viet-
nam, in Defense Secretary McNamara's words, "ûnique in the history
of the American Army": there was "no other division in the world
like it."
CHAPTER 2
From Test to Battle

Progression from Air Assault to Cavalry Division
The new Secretary of the Army, Cyrus R. Vance, agreed with the
Howze Board that helicoptered infantry offered unprecedented com-
bat striking potential and that the Army should test airmobility at the
earliest opportunity.He forwarded these recommendations to Defense

Secretary McNamara on 15 September 1962. The Air Force was op-
posed to rapidly expanding Army aircraft utilization, especially in the
armed helicopter and larger transport categories. However, Mc-
Namara wholeheartedly agreed that the Army required internal heli-
make airmobility work and endorsed immediate
copter assets to field
testing of the concept.'
When the final Howze report reached McNamara in September,
the Army was escalating overseas operations and reorganizing its in-
ternal structure. Beginning that same month. Special Forces teams

from the United States arrived in Vietnam to reinforce contingents
from Okinawa. These increasing Green Beret" troop commitments
**
were at the forefront of additional aviation, combat support, and ad-

visory elements. The situation in Vietnam was not the only factor
causing the Army to endorse more flexible response. On 1 October
racial troubles in the South required General Howze to leave his air-
mobile testing considerations and command ten paratrooper battle groups
1. Memo, SA to SECDEF, 15 Sep 62, Subj: Preliminary Army Review of

the Report of the Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board.
24 STANTON
rapidly deployed to Mississippi and Tennessee. Just fifteen days later,

major Army forces were alerted for a possible invasion of Cuba.
The Army ordered the new airmobile and evaluation
test force
group to be formed at the infantry school post of Fort Benning, Geor-

gia, in the beginning of 1963. Although the project was given top
priority, competing demands for aviation and personnel resources in-
terfered with the trial airmobile unit throughout its existence. The
programmed assembly and testing of the experimental unit continued
to be affected adversely by Vietnam developments, domestic distur-
bances, and Cuban emergency contingencies, as well as the high level
of activity at Fort Benning. The 2d Infantry Division stationed on post
was planned for conversion to the new ROAD (Reorganization Ob-
jective Army Divisions) structure in January because of its planned
rotation toEurope that April. The division's reorganization was al-
ready a year behind schedule because of the Berlin crisis.^

In accordance with McNamara's desires to commence airmobile
testing in early 1963, Army Chief of Gen. Earle K. Wheeler,
Staff,
approved the activation of a reduced-strength air assault division and
supporting air transport brigade just before the end of December. Maj.
Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard was handpicked to command the air-
mobile unit and summoned to the Pentagon. Kinnard was a vigorous
and athletic paratroop commander, who served with particular esteem
during World War II under Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor. Taylor later
became President Kennedy's military advisor and was the current
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Wheeler's guidance to Kinnard
was straightforward: reconfigure the division so that all material could
be flown by air, replacing as many wheels with helicopters as pos-
sible. Kinnard would have completely free reign, even in the selection
of key personnel. Wheeler's final instructions were equally succinct:

''You are going to run the organization. want you to find out how
I
far and fast the Army can go, and should go in the direction of air
mobility."^
2. USCONARC/USARSTRIKE, Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1962-

30 June 1963, Fort Monroe, Virginia, dtd 1 Jan 65.
3. DCSUTR Avn Div, Semiannual Hist Kept, 1 Jul-31 Jul 62, pp. 1-3,
and USAMHI, Senior Officer Debriefing Program, Lt. Gen. H. W. O. Kin-

nard, by Col. Glenn A. Smith and Lt. Col. August M. Cianciolo, Carlisle
From Test to Battle 25
Harry William Osbom Kinnard was bom into an Army family on

7 May 1915 at Dallas, Texas. An avid sportsman and the captain of
the fencing team at West Point, he graduated as an infantry lieutenant
in 1939. Kinnard served initially with the Hawaiian Division and was
sent to Fort Benning after America entered World War II. He com-
pleted jump school in late 1942 and joined the 501st Parachute In-
fantry Regiment, which was sent to Europe as part of the 101st Air-
borne Division. He parachuted into Normandy during the 6 June 1944
invasion of France and took over the regiment's 1st Battalion six days
later. During the September 1944 airdrop into Holland, the division
operations officer was severely wounded, and Major General Taylor

promoted Kinnard to the job. At twenty-nine Kinnard was a full colo-
nel. During the Battle of the Bulge, he served in the division's heroic
defense of Bastogne. After the war, Kinnard held a succession of
posts which included command of the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 501st
Infantry (101st Airborne Division), and executive to the Secretary of
the Army just prior to the assembly of the Howze Board. On 21 July
1962 he became assistant division commander of the 101st Airborne
Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. In accordance with Wheeler's
directive, Kinnard arrived at Fort Benning to take over the newly
created 1th Air Assault Division (Test) on 1 February 1963 and re-
1
ceived his aviator wings that July.

Kinnard knew that he faced a tough job. Part of the training scheme
required joint testing with the Air Force, including long-range airlift
support. The fact that the Air Force expressed open displeasure over
"airmobility," which it considered an Army intrusion into the skies,
was only one of his problems. The Army
remained unconvinced
staff
that the frightfully expensive was actually worth
air assault division
the extra cost over a regular division. From that aspect alone Kinnard
faced an uphill fight, since the military budget was being rapidly de-
pleted by the global tempo of increased Army operations. Fortu-
nately, for testing purposes at least, McNamara's blessing insured that
enough money was available. As Col. George P. Seneff, who com-
manded the division's 1 1th Aviation Group, later summed up the sit-
uation, '^For the first time in the history of the Army, a bunch of
Barracks, Pennsylvania: 1977, p. 12. Hereafter cited as USAMHl, Kinnard

Debriefing.
26 STANTON
people had been turned loose with high priority on personnel and
own budget, and told, O.K., here's the dough,
equipment, given their
we'll get the people and equipment; lyou] come up with a concept
and prove it.''^
General Kinnard was an infantryman with a solid airborne back-
ground who firmly believed that the airmobile division should con-
form to the light paratrooper infantry mold. He felt that the innovative
science of airmobility must be linked to the flexible, tough airborne
spirit rather than to the **old" Army aviation mentality, which he con-
sidered typified by Army and cargo transport duty.
aircraft liaison
Kinnard believed 'âirmobile parachute people were ideally suited to
bring in the air mobile concept" since "airmobility required a frame
of mind that paratroopers best adapted to," and emphasized that all
combat arms of the test unit should be parachutist-qualified. As a

result, the new formation was redesignated from the 11th Airborne
Division, "The Blue Angels" of World War II fame in the Pacific.^
One of Major General Kinnard's first selections for his division
staff was Col. John M. Wright, Jr., a distinguished soldier captured
on Corregidor Island and held as a prisoner by the Japanese during
World War II. Wright was assigned to Seventh Army at Stuttgart,
Germany, when he received orders to the newly forming 11th Air
Assauh Division at Fort Benning, and remembered his assignment as
a "bolt out of the blue." When Wright asked for information about
the unit from his fellow operations officers, only a handful had even
heard of it, and they guessed that it was some type of aviation outfit.
The Seventh Army Chief of Staff told Wright, "It's an experimental
division at Fort Benning, and you're lucky to be assigned there rather
than anywhere else, because nobody knows anything about it, which
means that you should know very quickly as much about it as any-
body!"^ Brigadier General Wright was appointed as Kinnard 's Assis-
4. USAMHI, Senior Officers Debriefing Program, Lt. Gen. George P. Se-

neff, by Lt. Col. Ronald K. Anderson, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
Hereafter cited as USAMHI, Seneff Debriefing.
5. USAMHI, Kinnard Debriefing, p. 11.
6. USAMHI, Senior Officers Oral History^ Program, Project 83-5, Lt. Gen.
John M. Wright, Jr., USA, Ret., interviewed by Lt. Col. David M. Fish-
back, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: 1983, p. 364. Hereafter cited as
USAMHI, Wright Interview.
From Test to BaUle 27
tant Division Commander-B responsible for the logistics and aviation

side of the division. After repeated requests for the aviator training
that he deemed necessary, Wright was finally permitted to attend
aviation school.
Kinnard chose Brig. Gen. Richard "Dick'' T. Knowles as Assis-
tant Division Commander-A employment and field
to control tactical
operations. Kinnard's chief of staff was Col. Elvy B. Roberts, who
commanded the 1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam six years later. In
the meantime the Army nominated Brig. Gen. Robert R. "Bob'' Wil-
liams to head the Test and Evaluation Group at Fort Benning, which
was responsible for developing tests and for submitting progress re-
ports. Williams's group reported directly to Lt. Gen. Charles W. G.
Rich, who became overall test director for Project TEAM (Test and
Evaluation of Air Mobility) on August 1964 at Third Army head-
1
quarters. Fort McPherson. TEAM attempts to get hard data from Kin-
nard often led to acrimonious sessions, since the concept's rapid de-
velopment often blurred distinctions between critical system flaws and
simple training headaches. Kinnard was more interested in making
the division go than in collecting statistics.
On 18 January 1963 the Army formally announced a three-phase
testing program. Phase I would begin with Kinnard' s infant air assault
"division" at one-fourth strength, as available resources limited the
force to one reinforced battalion and an equivalent small air transport
"brigade" to support These elements would intensively train in
it.
airmobile operations and serve as a nucleus for progressive expansion

in November. In Phase II, projected to last through most of 1964, the
initial test unit would be expanded to a full brigade, still one-third
the actual size of a division. Further training would culminate in a

joint Army- Air Force testing program. During Phase III, starting in
October 1964, the division would be brought up to full strength and
undergo one year of advanced training. This phase would focus on
the division's feasibility in all three levels of warfare; limited, me-
dium, and all-out nuclear conflict. This final phase was never actually
completed because of the need to expedite an airmobile force to Viet-
nam.^
7. Ltr OPS CDDC, DA dtd 7 Jan 63, Subj: Plans for the Initial Organi-
zation, Training, and Testing of Air Mobile Units.
28 STANTON
Major General Kinnard's 11th Air Assault Division (Test) was

activated along with its associated 10th Air Transport Brigade under
Col. Delbert L. Bristol at Harmony Church, Fort Benning, Georgia,

on 7 February 1963. The Phase I test force was initially authorized
291 officers, 187 warrant officers, and 3,114 enlisted men. The 1st
Brigade under Col. George S. Beatty, Jr., consisted of a single bat-
talion, Lt. Col. John T. ''Jack'' Hennessey's 3d Battalion, 187th In-
fantry, which was formed by levying officers and sergeants through-
out the service and filling the ranks with soldiers from the 2d Infantry
Division and paratrooper school on post. The 2d Battalion, 42d Ar-
tillery, was gathered from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Fort Sill,
Oklahoma, and contained a battery each of howitzers, Little John mis-

siles, and aerial rocket helicopters. Support, engineer, and mainte-
nance units were created by gutting the 3d Missile Command at Fort

Bragg. The aviation resources were created by stripping units scat-
tered across the country from Fort Benning, Georgia, and Fort Riley,
Kansas, to Fort Lewis, Washington. Factory production was stepped
up in an effort to meet helicopter shortfalls.^
Fleshed out by this crusading cadre, who collectively referred to
themselves as "Sky soldiers," the unit entered the field almost im-
mediately in a series of grueling training and experimental exercises.
Both ground troops and air crews forged a close-knit bond in their
common zeal to prove that airmobility could work. Only limited he-
liports and training areas existed at Fort Benning, and the unit fre-
quently went to Fort Stewart for more maneuver room. In September
the reinforced infantry battalion moved there and began initial testing
in Exercise AIR ASSAULT L The command emphasis and continual
observation that typified test force operations were already evident.
8. The 11th Air Assault Division (-) was initially composed of the 11th
Aviation Group (Cos A and B of the 226th Avn Bn; Cos A and B of the
227th Avn Bn; Co A, 228th Avn Bn; 1th Avn Co; Co A, 61 1th Aircraft
1
Maim & Support Bn; Tp B, 3d Sqdn, 17th Cav); 2d Bn of the 42d Artillery;
3d Bn of the 187th Infantry; Co A, 127th Engineer Bn; Co A, 51 1th Signal
Bn; and the nucleus of the division general staff and support command (408th
Supply & Service Co; Co A, 1th Medical Bn; and part of the 71 1th Main-
1
tenance Bn). On October 1963 the 1st Bn, 187th Inf; Co A, 127th Eng
1
Bn; and Co B, 6th Bn, 81st Arty, were officially designated as airborne
units.
The scrutiny became so Major General Kinnard retorted

intense that
by punning Churchill's famous Battle of Britain tribute and quipped,
Never have so few been observed by so many so often." By Oc-
**
tober, when the exercise was completed, the bulk of personnel for
the unit's Phase II expansion had been received.
The 1 1th Air Assault Division (Test) faced several serious prob-
lems, ranging from inadequate signal equipment to insufficient man-
ning tables, but the most critical always remained aviation. Each air-
craft type presented unique difficulties. The Air Force was very
displeased about the Army's use of larger fixed-wing Caribou trans-
port and Mohawk reconnaissance aircraft, which the division and air
transport brigade considered essential. Kinnard's attempts to put ma-
chine guns on the OVl Mohawk, a high-performance aircraft de-
signed to seek out and provide immediate intelligence on the enemy
regardless of terrain or weather conditions, caused a major interser-
vice dispute. General Johnson finally withdrew the division's twenty-
four armed Mohawks as "a sacrifice on the altar of accord with the
Air Force." Later the Army was also forced to give up its valuable
support CV2 Caribou transport planes.^
The UH-series Iroquois helicopters, popularly called Hueys by the
soldiers, provided the majority of the unit's helicopter transport and
gunship capability. The Huey carried eight combat-equipped soldiers
along with a crew of two to four personnel, hauled equipment and
supplies, and could be upgunned as an aerial weapons platform. Sev-
eral production varieties insured better performance throughout the
Vietnam era, and the Huey became the legendary mainstay of both
the air assault test unit and its descendant, the 1st Cavalry Division.
The airmobile division depended on the twin-rotor CH47 Chinook
helicopter, the principal Army air cargo transporter, to airlift its es-
sential artillery and heavier supplies forward. Capable of carrying either
forty-four troops or ten thousand pounds of cargo, the Chinook's im-
portance was reflected in the division motto, "If you can't carry it in
a Chinook, you're better off without it." Unfortunately, the Chinook
was proving to be a first-rate disaster. Its producer, Vertol, had just
sold out to Boeing, and extreme quality control and management
problems plagued the entire Chinook program. The Chinook battalion
9. USAMHI, Kinnard Debriefing, p. 16.

30 STANTON
skipper, Lt. Col. Benjamin S. Silver, considered it a sterling day if
only half of his helicopters were flying. The Chinook was not only
unreliable, but the division could not get spare parts. Rotor blades
that spun off in flight caused an increasing number of fatal crashes.
Colonel Seneff, the flight boss of the 1 1th Air Assault Division, con-
sidered the aircraft a nightmare.
The disastrous Chinook
situation became so alarming that it en-
dangered the entire program, forcing Brigadier General Wright
test
to meet face-to-face with Bob Tharrington of Boeing Company and

its Vertol Division. Both agreed to do everything possible to correct
the situation. Working in close cooperation, both division mainte-
nance personnel and manufacturing employees struggled deter-
minedly to improve CH47 helicopter performance. Finally, every
Chinook could be put into the air at once, enabling Lieutenant Colonel
Silver to begin formation exercises. Although the Chinook still faced
problems, the division began to rely on this essential medium-size
helicopter which served throughout the Vietnam War.
The Pentagon realigned the entire airmobility program in March
1964 to accelerate testing of the 11th Air Assault Division, so that
separate Army and Air Force evaluations could be completed by the
end of the year. The division continued to build as the training effort
was redoubled. Aviation was stabilized at one aerial surveillance and
escort (226th Avn) battalion, one Chinook assault support helicopter
(228th Avn) battalion, and two Huey assault helicopter (227th, 229th
Avn) battalions. The infantry brigade contained three battalions (1st
Battalions of the 187th, 188th, and 51 1th Infantry), but Kinnard needed
more riflemen and cannoneers. The following month Col. William R.
Lynch's reinforced 2d Brigade of the Fort Benning-based 2d Infantry
Division (2d Bn, 23d Inf, and 1st and 2d Bns, 38th Inf ) was attached,
allowing Kinnard to reorganize his division into three miniature bri-
gades of two infantry battalions each, supported by one aerial rocket
battalion (3d Bn, 377th Arty), one John missile battalion (2d
Little
Bn, 42d Arty), and three howitzer battalions(1st Bn, 15th Arty; 5th
Bn, 38th Arty; and 6th Bn, 81st Arty). The division expanded its
support components proportionately as preparation intensified for the
important fall testing.
The main arguments brought against the Army's air assault unit
were the supposed vulnerability of its helicopters in actual combat,

under adverse weather conditions, and at night. To disprove these
From Test to BaUle 31
contentions, division flight operations needed to be as realistic as pos-

sible. Stateside safety considerations threatened to preclude the re-
quired experience, since night flying and aerial gunnery were severely
restricted, and low-level, nap-of-the-earth helicopter techniques were
only taught instead of practiced. Col. Jack Norton, the head aviator
of Continental Army Command (CON ARC), and Seneff threw away
the book and "relaxed" safety standards.
Under such strenuous training, aircraft losses resulting from new-
model teething problems or pilot error or plain bad luck were inevi-
table. On 22 April 1964 a low-flying 226th Aviation Battalion ob-
servation plane hit wires and crashed into Fort Benning's Juniper Lake,
killing both pilot and copilot despite parachute-equipped ejection seats.
One of most frightful incidents, which transpired during a para-

the
chute jump, miraculously produced no injuries. On 21 July a light
OH 13 Sioux helicopter of the 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry, became
entangled with a descending canopy ten feet off the ground, imme-
diately slamming both paratrooper and aircraft into the earth.
The division constantly rehearsed formation flying regardless of
time or weather as it learned to deliver troops over long distances.
Improved searchlights were used for group movements at night. For-

mation flight was emphasized to the point that the aviators began jok-
ing, "If two of you need to go to the can, be sure to fly in formation!"
During one exercise, Lt. Col. John B. Stockton's 227th Aviation Bat-
talion (Assault Helicopter) went from Camp Blanding, Florida, to Fort
Benning despite a wall of thunderstorms. The massed helicopters pushed
forward in the driving rain, but the formation was inevitably broken
apart by the weather front. The whole battalion was forced to sit down
its craft in ones, twos, and threes, scattered over four Georgia coun-
ties, where the hapless crews spent the night with their helicopters
mired in muddy fields or along sandy farm lanes.

The continuous formation training, night flying, and weather flight
practicedemanded hard work, but produced promising results. At the
same time, incessant Army demands for pilots and advisors in Viet-
nam threatened much of the progress. Priority activation of aviation
units kept stripping elements out of Kinnard's command, and tem-
porary-duty replacements could not make up for the loss of some of
his best aircraftand well-trained people. Throughout the test period
the division suffered from an acute shortage of helicopters and ex-
perienced pilots.
32 STANTON
Major General Kinnard believed that the testing program was being
severely jeopardized by the turbulence and tight scheduling, but the
Pentagon insisted on staging the fall testing as planned. In September
1964 the division moved into North and South Carolina on Exercise
HAWK BLADE, actually a dress rehearsal for the big test. Exercise
AIR ASSAULT II, to be conducted 14 October to 12 November across
the same two states. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to allow the Air
Force to field-test its own alternate concept, GOLDFIRE I, at the
same time (29 October to 13 November), using the 1st Infantry Di-
vision with the Ninth and Twelfth Air Forces in the Fort Leonard
Wood, Missouri, area under the U.S. STRIKE Command. The re-
quirement for additional joint testing would be determined after com-
paring results. Kinnard was keenly aware that the case for Army air-
mobility had to be successfully proven at this juncture.'^

On the morning of 14 October 1964, the 1 1th Air Assault Division
was scheduled to lift off in a massed 120-helicopter flight at 9:00 a.m.
and assault objectives one hundred nautical miles away (the range of
the Chinook). Hurricane Isbell offshore in the Atlantic blanketed the
entire eastern seaboard with storms and low cloud ceilings, and the
Air Force had already grounded most of its planes in that portion of
the United States. Many distinguished visitors, in addition to the usual
crowd of test observers, were present to witness the exercise. Those
who wanted to see air cavalry defeated once and for all were rubbing
their hands in anticipation.
Kinnard sent three aerial reconnaissance forces aloft, probing for

holes in clouds laden with fierce winds and heavy rainstorms. John
Stockton's assault helicopter battalion on the coast was flat on the
ground, his Hueys awash in torrential rain, gusts snapping at the rotor
blade tie-down ropes. The 229th Aviation Battalion (Assault Heli-

copter) under Earl Buchanan struggled through the middle route, while
Seneff led his helicopters high on the hilltops. Skirting through tow-
ering thunderheads, the 120 troop-carrying helicopters followed his
lead and planted a full battalion on the landing zones only one hour
behind schedule.
10. ODSUTR Avn Div, Semiannual Hist Rept, July-Dec 64, pp. 2-3, and
Hq TEC Op, Fort Banning, Final Report, Project Team, dtd 15 Jan 65,
Volume 1, p. ix.
The rash of predicted accidents failed to materialize during the

next four weeks, although foul weather, pilot fatigue, and mechanical
difficultiesdowned a number of aircraft. One of the worst losses oc-
curred when two 10th Air Transport Brigade Caribou transports crashed
head-on twelve miles from Fort Gordon over Hephzibah, Georgia, on
the last day of October, killing all aboard. On 5 and 6 November two
armed Hueys of the 3d Battalion, 377th Artillery, suffered engine
compressor failures near Cheraw, South Carolina, resulting in either
death or crippling vertebral fractures among all crew members. Power
lines, terrain miscalculations, and futile attempts to switch over to
instruments in sudden cloudbursts littered still more helicopters across
the Carolina backcountry, but fortunately most injuries were not se-
rious.
In one month the test division conclusively demonstrated that its
elements could seek out the enemy over a wide area despite unfa-
vorable weather conditions, find him, and then rapidly bring together
the necessary firepower and troops to destroy him. Army airmobility
passed its most crucial test. A month after AIR ASSAULT II was
concluded, test director Lieutenant General Rich presented his final
evaluation to Army Combat Developments Command, which for-
warded it on 5 January 1965 with favorable comments to Army Chief
of Staff Harold K. Johnson. Johnson recommended to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff that no aspect of the Army airmobility concept warranted
further joint testing by U.S. STRIKE Command."
The Army's success with its test air assault division was a direct
result of the innovative manner in which the unit was created and
allowed to operate. Kinnard was given great latitude in making nec-
essary changes in doctrine, techniques, and organization. In this man-
ner the revolutionary airmobile concepts advanced by the Howze Board
received continued vitality. Brigadier General Wright considered the
experiment a brilliant exception to the usual bureaucratic path toArmy
modernization and adaptation. He later stated, ''If you want to get
someplace in a hurry with a new concept, new developments, or new
ideas, then find a responsible individual, give him a mission, turn
11. USCONARC/USARSTRIKE, Annual Historical Summary, 1 July 1964

to 30 June 1965, Fort Monroe, Virginia.
34 STANTON
him him alone, and let him report back when he is ready.
loose, leave
And what General Kinnard was permitted to do."'^
that's just
Kinnard was immensely proud of his men and rewarded their hard
training and sacrifice with a special air assault badge, designed to
duplicate the esprit that the paratrooper and aviator wings achieved.
The Army turned down all his attempts to make the badge official,
but the test unit awarded it to all 1st Brigade members. On 3 Decem-
ber 1964 the badge was presented to the men of the 2d Brigade, for-
merly of the 2d Infantry Division, as a result of their performance in
AIR ASSAULT II. Although the badge was terminated when the test
unit was discontinued, it finally gained official sanction fifteen years
when revived
later for the airmobile infantrymen of the modem post-
Vietnam Army.
In the spring of 1965, the general atmosphere within the 1 1th Air
Assault Division was one of rueful resignation to expected disband-
ment rather than wartime preparation. No one visualized that in a few
short months the division would be cranked up to combat strength
and sent over to Vietnam. Most airmobile doctrinists actually pre-
dicted a dull period in Army aviation while reports of the test division
were reviewed and torn apart, only to be ripped up again at Army
and Defense Department level, all to be followed by a couple of years
of debate.
The division originators felt there was ample evidence to support
thisgloomy conclusion, even though Lieutenant General Rich's report
strongly recommended against losing two years of test effort expe-
rience and equipment by dissipating the personnel or fragmenting the
tested units. Division members considered actual Army interest in the
unit fairly low. Overall support for the test unit was spotty as a result
of competing demands, and many important outsiders were still vo-
cally adamant in their opposition to the airmobile force. Kinnard 's
division had been formed only for trial purposes in the first place and
remained at cadre status.
Officially, of course, the 11th Air Assault Division was never
specifically intended for the war that was heating up in Vietnam. The
airmobility test was designed to cover the tactical usefulness of the
12. USAMHI, Wright Interview, p. 373.

unit in any region. In Vietnam the difficult terrain and elusive enemy
presented a perfect opportunity for employing a division with rapid,
integrated helicopter transport and firepower, but the Army budget
and contingency plans were not programmed for an airmobile divi-
sion. Brigadier General Powell recalled the general consensus of opinion
what McNamara told us to do and tested the division, now
as **we did
we'd send people off to other assignments and file the reports."
A confluence of several events joined to send the division to Viet-
nam was the worsening military
instead of disbandment. Foremost
situation inside South Vietnam, where coups and battlefield defeats
were giving the communist insurgency an upper hand against the Army
of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). The United States decided to
intervene with regular forces to prevent communist takeover of this
allied country, but lacked light divisions capable of operating effi-
ciently in the tropical wilderness and mountain hinterland. Both 82d
and 101st Airborne Divisions had limited mobility once on the ground;
normal infantry divisions were either mechanized or very reliant on
motorized equipment; and armor divisions were too heavy. Another
strategic consideration favored airmobile conversion. One of the most
threatened areas in South Vietnam was its rugged central highlands,
dominated by the politically important highland city of Pleiku. The
road leading inland (Highway 19) to Pleiku had been closed for years,
preventing the expeditious arrival of any conventional division.
After the Marines landed to safeguard South Vietnam's northern-
most airfield, followed by an Army paratrooper brigade to secure the
southern airfield near the capital, the decision was made to send the
new helicopter formation into the central section of South Vietnam.
Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, the Vice Chief of Staff, presided over
a particularly bitter March Army policy council meeting concerning
the deployment feasibility of such a move. Abrams, a staunch armor
officer,had had initial misgivings about the airmobility concept, but
these had been erased during an earlier visit to Kinnard's outfit at
Fort Benning. Major General Kinnard had personally flown Abrams
around in his helicopter, touring the dispersed, fast-paced test ma-
neuvers and had shown him ^'exactly what the hell was going on."
At the conclusion of the helibome command briefing, Abrams had
confided to him, **! have to say, I'm considerably impressed." After
much discussion at the council meeting, Abrams flatly stated, **I feel
it is extremely propitious that we happen to have this organization in
36 STANTON
existence at this point in time, and we will deploy it to Vietnam."'^

Because of programming considerations, the 11th Air Assault
Division (Test) would be inactivated and its assets merged into an
already-budgeted regular Army division, which would be converted
to airmobile status. Major General Kinnard felt that his own 101st
Airborne Division should be the first converted to airmobile status
and that another parachute division be used next. However, Army
Chief of Staff General Johnson was a former 1st Cavalry Division
trooper and had greater affinity for his own unit currently serving on
border duty in Korea. General Johnson also believed that the cavalry
title fitted better with swift, airmobile pursuit and was more suitable
for counterinsurgency operations. The cavalry term appealed to many
government officials who felt it very appropriate for an anti-insurgent
campaign in Vietnam.
For low- to mid-intensity warfare operations, such as Vietnam,
the new division was designed
to provide stability and area control
for both population and crop resources through the increased military
advantages of aerial reconnaissance and helibome security. After fe-
verish preparation, the Army Combat Developments Command rushed
brand-new test airmobile division tables of organization and equip-
ment (TOE 67T) to Department of the Army (DA) headquarters on
1 May 1965, where they were approved before the end of the month.
Out of respect for Kinnard's heartfelt desire for paratroopers, the Army
Vice Chief of Staff directed that the 1st Brigade remain parachute-
qualified."^
As a result of these recommendations, on 15 June 1965 Defense
Secretary McNamara approved the incorporation of an airmobile di-
vision into the Army force structure with the designation of the 1st
Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Since the present 1st Cavalry Division

was serving as a standard ROAD infantry division at Tonggu, Korea,
its assets were used to form a new Korea-based 2d Infantry Division.
The cavalry colors were flown to Georgia for conversion beginning

1 July 1965. This swap of flags permitted the new division to draw
13. USAMHl, Kinnard Debriefing, p. 16, and Seneff Debriefing, p. 37.

14. Because of the nature of combat operations, paratrooper replacement
difficulties, and the presence of other airborne units in Vietnam, the airborne
capability of the 1st Cavalry Division was officially terminated on Sep- 1
tember 1967.
on all resources at Fort Benning, but these provided only partial troop
fill and material. Yet the newly formed division was ordered to be
ready for combatant deployment, at full personnel manning and
equipment levels, by 28 July 1965.'^
Airmobile cavalry would be sent to war after years of conceptual
and field testing. However, General Kinnard seem-
still faced one last
wartime
ingly impossible hurdle: to raise his air assault unit nucleus to
division status in less than one month. The deadline appeared espe-
cially unreasonable since it ignored the extent of needed reorgani-
zation and training. A minimum of three months' preparation was
mandated if a division required major restructuring prior to movement
into a combat zone. Resulting short-fuse time pressures, major equip-
ment shortages, and personnel problems threatened to cripple the air-
mobile enterprise even before it departed the United States. The lack
of firm national policy direction toward Vietnam was primarily re-
sponsible for such an arbitrary deadline, but the Army also deliber-
ately disregarded themost elementary time allowances involved in
accomplishing such a major task.
Organizationally, the division was authorized eight airmobile in-
fantry cavalry battalions, three light artillery battalions, one aerial rocket
artillery battalion, a cavalry reconnaissance squadron, an engineer

battalion, and supporting units. Several battalions had to be raised
from scratch. Additional equipment procurement in excess of $28
million was estimated to outfit the new division. All stateside depots
and supply points were frantically combed to locate and deliver thou-
sands of required major and secondary items in the compressed time
remaining. The logistical burden and high cost of displacing emer-
gency equipment resources throughout the country created great waste
and multiplied expenditures. Fortunately, sufficient prewar stockage
and material shortcuts, such as helicopter depot rebuilds, enabled the
division to reach projected levels.
The division was authorized 15,890 men upon activation. Only
9,489 were assigned, and more than 50 percent of this original com-
plement was ineligible for overseas deployment under peacetime ser-
vice criteria. Replacements were brought into the division around the
15. USCONARC/USARSTRIKE, Annual Historical Summary, I July 1965

to 30 June 1965, p. 187.
38 STANTON
clock, immediately ted a hot meal, processed, assigned, and trans-

ported to their units. Continual personnel turbulence effectively shut
down most unit training, since indoctrination and basic soldiering
consumed the limited time available. The impending division move
to Vietnam was secret, and many reporting soldiers arrived at Fort
Benning with their families. Civilian dependents were turned away,
creating severe individual financial and dislocation hardships which
further disrupted troop programming.'^
There was an acute shortage of aviators, paratroopers, and support
personnel. Entire aviation companies were sent to Fort Benning from
other commands, but more than three hundred newly assigned avia-
tors (most of whom arrived after 15 July) still required transition on
entirelynew models of aircraft. The division training capacity was
hopelessly swamped and, despite the full help of the aviation school,
more than fifty division pilots still sailed without completing transi-
tion. The division initially contained 900 paratroopers, but needed
3,470. To secure manpower, the airborne-designated 1st and 2d Bat-
talions of the 8th Cavalry resorted to "extreme pressure for volun-
teers"and a flurry of abbreviated jump courses. Support components
never received their proper allocation of maintenance and supply ex-
perts.'^
The most serious problem remained the large number of troops
ineligible for overseas duty. Both DA and CON ARC anticipated an
emergency presidential announcement permitting the Vietnam-bound
division to retain all essential troops. Divisional strength might even
be supplemented by calling up selected reserve components. CON-
ARC received word of the "no call-up" decision during Saturday
afternoon, 24 July. Four days later President Johnson publicly an-
16. 1st Cavalry Division, Quarterly Command Report, OACSFOR-OT-RD

6501101, Dec 65. Until 31 December 1965 personnel deploying with a
I
unit to Vietnam had to have sixty days remaining on active duty from the
date of departure from the port of embarkation, in addition to other peace-
time criteria.
17. 1st Cavalry Division, Quarterly Command Report, OACSFOR-OT-RD

650110, 1 Dec 65, pp. 8, 9. Aviation companies attached to the division
included the 1 lOth Avn Co; Co A, 4th Avn Bn; Co A, 5th Avn Bn; 6th
SFG Avn Co; and 7th SFG Avn Co. See also Shelby L. Stanton, Vietnam
Order of Battle, rev. ed. (Millwood, N.Y.: Kraus Reprints, 1986), p. 72.
nounced that he was sending the 1st Cavalry Division to Vietnam,

but chose not to issue the emergency decree. Major General Kinnard
was "glued to the television set" during the national broadcast and
was horrified to realize that his division would lose hundreds of highly
skilled pilots, crew chiefs, mechanics, and other essential people at
the worst possible time.'^
Major General Kinnard departed Fort Benning on 16 August 1965
to be briefed by Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the commander of
Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). Kinnard was fear-
ful that Westmoreland, who was in Vietnam during the 1 1th Air As-
sault tests at Fort Benning, might be out of touch with airmobility

developments. These fears were confirmed as General Westmoreland
announced a new plan of divisional utilization and moved to a large
wall map. Pointing to widely scattered areas of the chart, he stated
that he was breaking up the 1st Cavalry Division into three brigades:
**!
am going to put one here, and one here, and all over the country."
Kinnard was aghast that his division, which depended upon massing
fire- and shockpower, might be scattered all over the nation. He re-
sponded, "Please, can't I discuss that?" and countered that the Army
Chief of Staff had specified the division's main task was prevention
of a military split of South Vietnam by an NVA/VC thrust across
critical east- west Highway 19 from Pleiku to Qui Nhon. Kinnard added
that he needed the greatest concentrated mobility to insure this goal

and concluded, "If you penny pocket them all over the country, you've
lost it.""
General Kinnard actually wanted to base his division in Thailand

and operate up and down Laos and Cambodia, breaking into the North
Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh Trail —
logistical and reinforcement lifeline
into South Vietnam —
at will. While this course of action would have
caused maximum disruption and destruction of enemy forces, the United

States politically limited the war's boundaries to operations inside South
Vietnam only. Under the circumstances, Kinnard felt the next best
thing was to keep the division together with a definite objective.
18.USAMHI, Senior Officers Oral History Program, Interview of LTG

W. O. Kinnard by LTC Jacob B. Counch, Jr., 1983; USACONARC/
Harry
USARSTRIKE, Annual Historical Summary, 1 Jul 65-30 Jun 66, Fort
Monroe, Virginia, pp. 79-81, 136-37.
19^ USAMHI, Kinnard Debriefing, p. 34.
40 STANTON
Westmoreland relented, and the division was assigned intact to secure

themain line of communications into the western highlands.
Brigadier General Wright was already at Qui Nhon with a small
thirty-one-man contingent, acquainting the MACV staff with division
support needs and scouting a site for the future main base camp. He
wanted enough space for a sizable rectangular heliport and the pro-
tective infantry and artillery which would be positioned around it, all
on terrain suitable for a strong perimeter barrier. Since the cavalry
division helicopters were its most vital resource, Wright was very
concerned about a possible North Vietnamese or Chinese fighter-bomber
attack on such a lucrative target. The MACV operations officer, Maj.
Gen. William '^Biir DePuy, assured him, "Don't worry about an air
attack on your base. If you should get that, we'll just wipe Peking
off the map!"^^ Enemy airstrikes against the airmobile division's
sprawling airfield complex represented the primary threat, but true to
DePuy's word this vulnerability was never exposed during the Viet-
nam War.
Wright's contingent wore civilian clothes and traveled across the
highlands, visiting Special Forces camps, regional outposts, and val-
ley hamlets. They finally selected a centrally located area with good
flying weather along Highway 19 at An Khe, a Green Beret campsite
near two mountain passes. The French lost an entire mobile
critical
group along this strategic stretch of winding road in 1954, and dev-
astating Viet Cong ambushes still interdicted the route. The An Khe
Special Forces garrison had been defeated in a bloody contest for
control of the road near Mang Yang Pass in February.
The 1 ,030-man division advance element was airlifted from Rob-
bins Air Force Base, Georgia, to Cam Ranh Bay beginning 14 August
1965. On 27 August they were flown by CI 30 aircraft to the Special
Forces An Khe camp airstrip, where they pitched pup tents along the
runway. Brigadier General Wright did not want heavy earth-moving
machinery clearing the airfield site, since the scraped ground would
create severe dustand wreak havoc on helicopter operations. He walked
over to the tents, machete in hand, and selected twenty-five senior
officers and sergeants to follow him into the adjacent scrub brush.
Wright's experience as a Japanese prisoner had taught him that a lot
20. USAMHI, Wright Interview, p. 389.

could be accomplished if enough men worked with their bare hands.

As the assembledgroup watched curiously, Wright cut a twenty-foot
circle of short-cropped, green grass out of the foliage with his ma-
chete and stated, "If each of us swung a machete enough times, and
if we enough of those twenty- to twenty-five-foot circles, then
cleared
they would all finally fit together, and we would have a rectangle two
kilometers by three kilometers where there would be nothing but this
beautiful green grass . . . like a fine golf course."^'
Not long afterward, a staff officer trying to find Col. Allen M.
Burdett, Jr., was told that the colonel was out working on the "Golf
Course." The name stuck, and the airfield's title became official for
the duration of American presence in Vietnam. Over the next few
weeks, the division base camp slowly took shape. Several deep gul-
lies and boulder-strewn outcrops crisscrossed the landscape, but the
longest sections of the new runway were laid out perfectly straight to
enable better gunship firing passes against attacking infantry. Al-
though initial base camp construction commenced without the divi-
work of the advance element
sion engineer battalion, the determined
and borrowed construction troops made An Khe's Golf Course the
world's largest helipad by the end of September.
While the division's advance party staked out and cleared the main
camp, the majority of the division outloaded at Mobile, Alabama, and
Jacksonville, Florida. The division embarkation was complicated by
overcrowding problems and last-minute accommodation transfers at
dockside. Several vessels, such as the poorly rehabilitated MSTS Kula
Gulf and Card, were rapidly pressed into service for the journey. Steam
pipes were leaking, machinery was broken, and conditions aboard
were extremely uncomfortable. When Kinnard insisted on moving his
aviators from the hottest bowels of the vessels to unused portions of
the shiphand billeting area, the uncooperative Military Sea Trans-
portation crews refused to sail. After some last-minute high command
intervention, he secured better quarters and the threatened strike was
averted. On 28 July 1965 the 1st Cavalry Division began its main
overseas movement.
The task of moving the division across the Pacific was almost as
momentous as getting it combat-ready in the first place. Six passenger
42 STANTON
vessels, eleven cargo ships, and four aircraft carriers were required
to move more than 15,000 soldiers, 3,100 vehicles, 470 aircraft, and
19,000 long tons of cargo to Vietnam. The division continued training
hundreds of new recruits even as it sailed. For example, the soldiers
conducted familiarization and marksmanship training with new M16

automatic rifles by firing at apple crates pitched over vessel fantails
into the ocean.
The undeveloped midcountry Qui Nhon was chosen as the
port of
division's destination because of its An Khe.
relative proximity to
However, Qui Nhon's unsophisticated facilities and shortage of ser-
vice personnel led to predictions of a tedious over-the-beach unload-
more than a month. One brigade was originally
ing process lasting
Cam Ranh Bay, but directives changing it to
slated for offloading at
Qui Nhon were received en route. Amendatory instructions were re-
ceived throughout the voyage. Consequently, the arrival of cargo,
personnel, and aircraft was disjointed.
The unloading process was complicated and backbreaking as caiô
was lightered ashore from a distance of two to five miles at sea, Viet
Cong attacks interrupted traffic on the access road to the final delivery
area, and bad weather intervened, but the actual debarkation of the
move to An Khe) was com-
division (including the forty-mile inland
pleted in a mere fifteen days. However, the logistical inefficiency
surrounding division support arrangements incountry led the Army to
abandon properly conceived airmobile supply channels and simply
adopt the ''dumping ground resource conditions of Qui Nhon and
'^
An Khe. This not only led to chronic supply mismanagement, but

also created a crucial aviation gasoline shortage in the division's fall
la Drang Valley campaign. Strategically the mobile 1st Cavalry Di-
vision became pinned to base security of the "An Khe logistical hub."^
The supply and medical difficulties were secondary to the fact that
a powerful, reinforced division capable of aerial assault was emplaced
in Vietnam ready to assist the allied cause. Westmoreland had the
flying cavalry that Walker lacked, and it was located along a vital
22. I Field Force Vietnam, Operational Report: Lessons Learned, 1 Oct-

31 Dec 65, p. 24. Some of these problems are also highlighted in Lt. Gen.
John J. Tolson, Vietnam Studies: Airmobility, 1961-1971 (Washington, D.C.:
Dept. of the Army, 1973), pp. 67-73.
communications zone one of the most threatened and remote re-

in
gions of the country. Despite all the obstacles to the rapid assembly
of the 1st Cavalry Division and the massive scope of its cross-Pacific
move, the first elements of the division were engaged in combat on
18 September 1965 —
just ninety-five days after the reorganization of
the 1th Air Assault Division into the 1st Cavalry Division had been
1
^^
approved.
In retrospect the formation and testing of the initial air assault
division concept were successful because most normal bureaucratic

service obstacles were removed at the insistence of Defense Secre-
tary McNamara. However, even with the highest national priorities
attached to the airmobile program, competing requirements almost
defeated the project. Only the diligence and sustained faith of the
testing cadre, coupled with all-out industrial support, enabled Kin-
nard's experimental unit to flourish. The upgrading of this formation
to a full-fledged division and its movement to Vietnam were nothing
short of miraculous in view of last-minute deployment decisions and
actions.
Army command, from the top
Every at DA through STRIKE
Command down to the local Fort Benning post garrison, contributed
to the extraordinary effort in making the st Cavalry
which succeeded 1
Division (Airmobile) a battlefield reality. The division enjoyed the

great advantages of an adequate continental manpower base, a suf-
ficiently experienced NCO cadre, and the necessary supply stockage
that existed at this early stage of the Vietnam buildup. Even so, in
the final analysis the mission was accomplished because the high mo-
rale, well-drilled cooperation, extremely good training, and leader-
ship of the pre-Vietnam Army allowed the division to surmount the
worst difficulties. The prevailing soldiers' attitude was that, regard-
less of the drastic time, manpower, and material limitations, they were
going to make the division work. The spirit of the First Team be-
gan to take hold. In one month, the small band of air as-
less than
sault Skysoldiers was turned into an entire division of airmobile Sky-
troopers.
23. 1st Cavalry Division, Quarterly Command Report, dtd 1 Dec 1965, pp.
11-14.
CHAPTER 3
Air Assault
Techniques, la Drang Valley Campaign
The arrival of the 1 st in South Vietnam

Cavalry Division (Airmobile)
was American combat role in the Second In-
part of an increasing
dochina War. During the Vietnam era, the official mission of an air-
mobile division was to provide reconnaissance for larger field force
commands, participate in stability operations short of all-out nuclear
war C*low- and mid-intensity operations"), and provide security and
control over the population and resources of an assigned area. In ac-
cordance with this general mission statement, the 1st Cavalry Divi-
sion was assigned the responsibility of protecting its own base. Camp
Radcliff at An Khe, reopening Highway 19 from the coast to Pleiku
and safeguarding its traffic, and guarding specific coastal lowland rice
harvests from Viet Cong disruption. These represented extremely lim-

ited geographical objectives of a static security nature.
The 1st Cavalry Division, however, was designed and destined
for offensive action. Airmobility offered such great vertical maneuver
and firepower advantages that events soon thrust the division into a
predominate mode of aerial attack. The airmobile division entered the
acrid crucible of combat Drang Valley of Vietnam's western
in the la
border, where it marshaled its air assault assets to locate and battle
North Vietnamese Army regulars. There were grave blunders in the
execution of this campaign, some of which led to decimation of entire
cavalry companies and battalions, but the airmobility concept was still
new and needed refinement. The basic air cavalry combination was
sound and proved so during the next ten years of battlefield appli-
cation in Vietnam. No single engagement demonstrated the basic va-
lidity of air assault as strikingly as the 1st Cavalry Division's la Drang
Valley campaign.
46 STANTON
To an Army largely ground oriented, the rapid and flexible re-

sponse inherent in airmobile operations over the wide expanse of the
la Drang Valley was almost beyond comprehension. In the thirty-
seven-day period beginning late in October, divisional helicopters
conducted twenty-two infantry battalion moves and sixty-six artillery
battery displacements across distances as great as seventy-five miles
at a time. While this new style of airmobile warfare used modem heli-
copters to overfly difficult terrain and leap beyond enemy defenses
to strike deep into targeted objectives, its most successful application
was in the traditional cavalry mode. The division excelled in assign-
ments to reconnoiter, screen, delay, and conduct raids over wide fronts.
By December 1965 division operations extended from the South China
Sea to the Cambodian border along the axis of Highway 19, and from
Bong Son to Tuy Hoa along the Vietnamese coast.'
The air assault reigned supreme in the attack phase of airmobility.
Once contact was made, troops could be flexibly extracted by heli-
copter from less critical situations and quickly concentrated at the
point of battle. Instant radio communications enabled commanders,
who themselves were often aloft in helicopters, to monitor scoutship
transmissions and to direct responsive airlandings in the midst of the
most As the infantrymen poured out of helicopters
fluid situations.
with and machine guns blazing, hovering gunships rendered im-
rifles
mediate, close-in covering fire with rockets and other weapons. Rapid
helicopter airlift of howitzers and ordnance assured that sustained ar-
tillery support was available for infantry fighting for remote and iso-
lated landing zones. The NVA opposition was stunned and over-
whelmed by this swiftly executed initial aerial onslaught, gaining the
division an immediate reputation for tactical success.
When the North Vietnamese attacked the small Special Forces
Plei Me camp near Cambodia on 19 October 1965, they were not
anticipating any American airmobile response. Even from the allied
standpoint, the encounter seemed to be an unlikely prelude for the
most famous divisional airmobile retaliation in history. Camp Plei Me
was located along the western highland border, an area outside direct
1st Cavalry Division responsibility, and the attack was disregarded as
1. 1st Cavalry Division, Quarterly Command Report for Second Fiscal

Quarter FY 66, dtd 30 Nov 65, p. 1
Air Assault 47
a mere regimental baptism-of-fire "shakedown" exercise. Such at-
tacks of opportunity were not unusual as North Vietnamese forma-

tions traveled to permanent base areas inside South Vietnam. How-
ever, three days after Plei Me was besieged, allied intelligence estimated
that at least two freshly infiltrated NVA regiments, spearheaded by
VC shock troops, were involved in a determined bid to overrun the
campsite. Since Plei Me guarded the southwestern approach to Pleiku,
an enemy victory was a direct menace to Pleiku, which the 1st Cav-
alry Division had been sent to Vietnam to protect.^
The South Vietnamese II Corps commander gathered his available
mechanized reserves within Pleiku City and began a road march to
relieve Camp Plei Me. Usually NVA/VC attack plans included elab-
orate measures to entrap and destroy forces attempting to reach a be-
sieged garrison, and the 1st Cavalry Division was requested to render
artillery support in case of ambush. Col. Elvy B. Roberts's 1st Bri-
gade was flown into the Pleiku vicinity on 23 October. The next day
the South Vietnamese relief column was mauled by a major ambush
which threatened to block further road movement. A divisional artil-
lery control team was sent on one of the medical evacuation helicop-
ters to the stranded convoy. The forward observers scrambled into the
lead vehicles, and the advance resumed behind a rolling curtain of

massed artillery fire.
The relief force reached Plei Me under this umbrella of shellfire
at dusk on 25 October, breaking the siege. General Westmoreland
believed that regimental-size NVA formations still endangered South

Vietnam's entire central region. The intensity of the attack on Plei
Me verified that the North Vietnamese might contest other critical
locations, storm Pleiku, or even attempt to militarily slice the country
across the middle. Westmoreland helicoptered to the 1st Brigade's
forward command post at LZ (Landing Zone) Homecoming, where
the ^howitzers of the 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery, were still shelling
the jungles around Plei Me. The division already forestalled the NVA
drive by helping to turn back enemy elements committed against Plei
Me, but Westmoreland wanted the North Vietnamese decisively de-
feated. He ordered that the division "must now do more than merely
2. DA AGM-P(M) ACSFOR Report, Operations Report 3-66— The Pleiku

Campaign, dtd 10 May 66, p. 10.
^"r.'^,^^^V>rV.^;r.U>r e-<^
-
•r- ''r'-r 'r' -Vr Cateckia Tea Plantation
50 STANTON
contain the enemy; he must be sought out aggressively and de-

stroyed."^
The NVA units which had participated in the Plei Me action were
suspected to be regrouping in a 2,500-square kilometer area of rolling
flatland between Plei Me
and Cambodia. General Kinnard was con-
combined resources with
fident that bold orchestration of his division's
air assault tactics would result in absolute domination of such a large
battle arena. The region was not well mapped and contained few roads.
The existing maze of trails could easily confuse normal ground ori-
entation, but aerial observation promised accurate direction regard-
less. While a conventional division might be ineffective in seeking
out and closing with the enemy in this vast and unfamiliar wilderness,
the territory was ideal for long-range airmobile cavalry thrusts and
flight operations.
Weather and terrain conditions were almost perfect. Only a few
clouds were scattered high in the skies; night humidity was low; and
temperatures ranged comfortably between 76 and 86 degrees Fahr-
enheit. Months of unrelenting heat had baked the red clay throughout
the valleys and ridgelines into suitably hard earth for helicopter land-
ings. Rivers and streams were seasonably dry. Only lush tropical veg-
etation and giant anthills protruded above the high elephant grass. The
most thickly jungled sector existed on and around the prominent Chu
Pong massif, which straddled the Cambodian border and loomed over
the southwestern portion of the region's la Drang Valley.
The campaign, which existed under a series of operational code
words (LONG REACH, SILVER BAYONET, GREEN HOUSE), but
became historically designated after the main la Drang Valley west
of Plei Me, began on 27 October 1965. The 1st Brigade —
consisting
of four infantry battalions, one light artillery battalion, most of the
divisional cavalry reconnaissance squadron, and one aerial rocket ar-
tillery battery of gunship helicopters —
fanned west of Pleiku toward
Cambodia in classic cavalry pursuit of the enemy. Somewhere in the
grasslands and forests below, bands of elusive 3 Set NVA Regiment
infantrymen were traveling back to their assembly areas. They were
packing only light bedrolls, minimal personal gear, and sidearms as
they dodged through woods and man-high grass.
3. Ibid., p. 42.
Air Assault 51
Lt. Col. John B. Stockton's reconnaissance 1st Squadron, 9th

Cavalry, led the aerial drive. The small scoutships and armed gun-
ships darted over the landscape, spotting and strafing small groups of
fleeing North Vietnamese riflemen. The line battalions followed in
dozens of Huey helicopters crammed with men and equipment. The
first mission was to find the enemy. To effect the widest search as
rapidly as possible, infantry battalions were ft-agmented into com-
pany-size increments. The troops were deposited over a multitude of
selected landing sites; they cut their way out of the fields and into
surrounding woodlines with machetes and axes and began patrolling
their assigned sectors in the blistering sun. Fortunately, light leafy
forestspredominated, and foot movement was not unduly hampered
by dense vegetation. Individual companies were deliberately placed
in danger of clashing with larger enemy units, but the brigade was
depending on its helicopters to speedily react and reinforce any con-
tact which developed.
The brigade was soon dispersed over the entire area northwest of
Plei Me, but the North Vietnamese had seemingly disappeared like
phantoms. Nightly ambush positions and daily cloverleaf patrolling
were exhausting and disappointing. Over the next few days Stock-
ton's helicopters were reporting more fire passes and return automatic
rifle fire, but there was no way to assess results. The various cavaky
companies roaming the bush were inevitably trapping a few prisoners.

These revealed that the North Vietnamese were growing tired and
afraid of this unexpected helicopter harassment, but the main North
Vietnamese contingents were still unlocated.
A band of enemy soldiers was observed by aerial scouts midway
between Plei Me and Chu Pong mountain on the morning of 1 No-
vember. One of the reconnaissance squadron's three ground platoons,
the Troop B Rifles, was already in flight and diverted to the scene.
They skirmished across a small streambed and uncovered a fully stocked
regimental hospital. The sweating cavalrymen spent most of the day
dumping heaps of captured medical supplies aboard outgoing heli-
copters. Another squadron rifle platoon landed to help destroy the rest
of the site. The squadron maintained a screen of scoutships overhead
looking for more enemy soldiers, and that afternoon they detected
hundreds of North Vietnamese soldiers approaching from the north-
east. Gunships roared down to blast the advancing enemy with rockets
and automatic weapons fire, but failed to slow down the counterattack
52 STANTON
on the hospital position. While aerial firepower rated high test scores
with its appearance of utter devastation, the explosions and bullets
seemed only to be tearing off tree limbs and killing a few clusters of
men.
The defending ground cavalry force at the hospital was quickly
compressed into a very small perimeter. The last rifle platoon was
inserted at the height of this intense firefight and was forced to leave
the bullet-riddled helicopters under a hailstorm of gunfire. The hos-
pital was beyond the range of division artillery, and close-quarters
combat soon rendered aerial support impractical. The North Vietnam-
ese assault faltered under the volume of return automatic and grenade
fire and was discontinued when additional reinforcements of the 2d
Battalion, 12th Cavalry, were airlanded later that day. The cavaky
scored an opening success in its first confrontation with the NVA,
although the enemy had not pressed its counterattack once it became
evident that the hospital's condition was no longer worth fighting for.
Two days later Stockton's squadron probed deeper into the la Drang
River Valley, where numerous trails leading into Cambodia were dis-
closed by aircraft reconnaissance. The squadron's same trio of rifle
platoons established a hasty overnight patrol point south of the river
and set up ambushes along a major east- west trail. Troop C Rifles at
the southernmost ambush position sighted a full NVA company car-
rying supplies down the trail at 7:30 that evening. The North Viet-
namese were talking and laughing loudly. Just before they entered the
actual ambush site, the enemy commander decided to take a rest break.
The Americans froze into their positions, not making a sound. This
ordeal lasted an hour and a half, during which time various unaware
NVA soldiers strayed close to the hidden cavalrymen, but failed to
detect them.
Finally, the North Vietnamese re-formed into a single file and
resumed marching down the trail. The cavalrymen breathlessly waited
until the lead platoon passed the prepared kill zone and sprung the
trap against the following weapons carriers. A deafening explosion
of claymore-mine and automatic-rifle fire ripped through the main
portage party, which was carrying machine guns, mortars, and re-
coilless rifles. The lead enemy platoon, which had been allowed to
pass the main ambush, was simultaneously annihilated by cross fire
from the cavalry ambush flank security element and another string of
preset claymore mines. The firing lasted only two minutes and was
Air Assault 53
executed with such violence and precision that every enemy soldier
was cut down without firing a shot in return.
The cavalry platoon leader wisely decided that the destroyed com-
pany might be the vanguard of a larger force. The Troop C Rifles
immediately returned to the main patrol base without counting bodies
or collecting captured equipment. The base was set up just inside the
treeline which surrounded the landing zone and was occupied by the
other two 9th Cavalry rifle platoons and a mortar section. Within an
hour the entire 8th Battalion of the 66th NVA Regiment surrounded
the cavalry perimeter. The first mass attack against the patrol base
was shattered by concentrated defensive fire. Numerous NVA snipers
climbed into the trees and began to pick off cavalrymen exposed by
the bright moonlight flooding the forest.
The North Vietnamese mounted another major assault against the
weakening American lines at 11:15 p.m. For the first time in division
history, aerial rocket artillery was employed at night in a close support
role. Gunships hovering overhead responded with volleys of rocket
salvos which careened through the foliage and detonated with lethal
precision a scant fifty yards from friendly positions. The situation was
becoming desperate, and urgent calls were made for reinforcements
and medical evacuation craft. Incoming helicopters were buffeted by
NVA gunfire during their descent; seriously wounded troopers were
rushed aboard, and the helicopters pulled away. One crashed just be-
yond the landing zone, but another helicopter quickly dipped down
to rescue its crew and radios before the North Vietnamese could reach
the wreckage. One helicopter was so riddled by shrapnel and bullets
that it almost disintegrated upon touching down with its load of wounded
at the Special Forces Due Co camp airstrip.
Twenty minutes midnight reinforcements began to arrive at
after
the patrol perimeter,marking the first time that divisional helibome
infantry reinforced a nocturnal military engagement. The available
landing field was so small that only thirty men at a time could be
inserted, but Company A of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, was em-
placed alongside the squadron riflemen when the third major North
Vietnamese assault smashed into the American lines at 3:30 a.m. The
cavalry grimly held their positions. Just before dawn they repulsed
the final and most determined NVA attack. One of the most gallant
heroes of the firefight was Troop C Rifles Platoon Sgt. Florendo S.
Pascual, who was killed at his post during the thick of combat.
54 STANTON
During the entire firefight an attached Special Forces-led Rhade

tribal reaction platoon had manned a separate ambush position just
outside the main patrol perimeter. However,added support could
this
not be effectively utilized during the night action. The Troop B Rifles
commander was hesitant about recalling them from their ambush po-
sition to reinforce, lest they be caught in NVA cross fires or become
mistaken by their own troops for the enemy. He radioed the Special
Forces-led Rhade platoon to move carefully and slowly toward the
fight and to prepare to infiltrate into the defensive perimeter before
dawn. Throughout the war, such elementary difficulties as native and
Special Forces attire (causing uniform complications), language prob-
lems, and different tactical methods often precluded effective team-
work between regular Army and irregular troops.
The last brigade clash in the la Drang campaign's opening rounds
occurred on 6 November near LZ Wing. Company B of the 2d Bat-
talion, 8th Cavalry, stumbled across trenchlines containing North
Vietnamese infantry and immediately attacked with two platoons. The
entrenched 6th Battalion, 33d NVA Regiment not only pinned both
y
platoons, but countered by moving to surround the entire company.

The battalion's Company C hacked through dense jungle to reach its
stranded sister unit and smashed into the rear of the North Vietnamese
force at a stream crossing. As the new company tried to press a flank-
ing attack, it became locked in heavy combat and stalled.
also
Although a profuse amount of supporting air and artillery strikes
was delivered, the two companies were unable to crack the NVA po-
sitions. After dark the companies linked up to establish one defensive
perimeter, which was raked by NVA automatic weapons fire for the
remainder of the night. During darkness the North Vietnamese with-
drew, leaving snipers behind to mask their departure. The firefight
was the bloodiest division confrontation in Vietnam to date, costing
the cavalry twenty-six dead and fifty-three wounded. More ominous
to division staffwas the disheartening realization that the North Viet-
namese were excellent jungle fighters and masters of light infantry
tactics. They maintained their aggressive spirit despite battlefield losses
or sudden shifts in local advantage because of airmobile response.

For the next three days the 1st Brigade conducted company sweeps
which netted only stragglers and evidence that the 33d NVA Regiment
had been split apart and chased from the area. By 9 November the
region west of Plei Me was considered largely clear of enemy troops
Air Assault 55
since the missing 32d NVA Regiment, which had not been encoun-
tered, was now suspected of having sHpped east of Plei Me. Col.
Thomas W. Brown's 3d Brigade took over the 1st Brigade's search
mission, but intended to move east toward the central highlands in-
stead. However, field force command believed that the NVA
were
still concentrating along the western Cambodian Rob-
border. Since
erts's brigade had just completed twelve days of airmobile hopping
through mostly empty territory, Brown decided to reinvestigate a sec-
tor where previous combat had flared up but no follow-up ground
sweep was conducted: the heavily jungled la Drang Valley. Although,
"having drawn a blank up to this point, I wasn't sure what we would
"'^
find or even if we'd find anything. Colonel Brown possessed in-
telligence that an enemy base camp might exist there and thus give
opportunity for decisive battle.
The North Vietnamese conveniently confirmed their continued
presence west of Plei Me by mortaring Brown's 3d Brigade head-
quarters at the Cateckia Tea Plantation (southwest of Pleiku) just be-
fore midnight on 12 November. The brigade maneuvered its three
fresh infantry and two artillery battalions westward, spearheaded by
Stockton's ubiquitous 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry. Lt. Col. Harold G.
Moore's 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry was directed to begin search-
ing the area around the la Drang near Chu Pong mountain on 14
November.
Lieutenant Colonel Moore was confident of NVA activity in the
la Drang Valley. Suspecting possible trouble, Moore wanted his ini-
tial airlanded company to rapidly consolidate and the entire battalion
landing expedited. He needed a field big enough to hold ten helicop-

ters at once, and he personally conducted a reconnaissance flight over
the rain forestcanopy early on the designated morning of the air as-
sault. Only two fields of that size existed, and one was full of jagged
tree stumps. Moore quickly selected the other grassy clearing, coded
LZ X-Ray, at the base of Chu Pong massif, and alerted supporting
howitzers at nearby LZ Falcon to commence bombarding it.
Part of standard airmobile doctrine was breaking up possible en-
emy defenses around landing zones by firing artillery preparations on
4. Ltr, Col. Brown, Chief, CINCPAC J3 Current Ground Ops Branch, to

Cpt Cash, DA Office of the Chief of Mil History, dtd 8 Aug 67, p. 2.
56 STANTON
the chosen locations. To maintain a heavy volume of fire against the

target, attack helicopters made rocket and machine gun runs across
the LZ as the artillery fire was stopped or shifted. Troopships whirled
in to land the infantry as the gunships made their final passes. Captain
John Herren's Company B was air assaulted onto LZ X-Ray at 10:50

A.M. The cavalrymen did not meet immediate resistance as they moved
through the grass and around the six-foot-high anthills to enter the
woodline beyond. However, Lt. Al Deveny's 1st Platoon came under
intense NVA fire in the scrub brush just after it crossed a dry creek.
Henry Herrick's 2d Platoon tried to link up with Deveny's
Lt.
pinned men, but was suddenly engulfed by intense fire from all sides
and cut off. One four-man American machine gun team was wiped
out, and North Vietnamese quickly turned the M60 weapon against
the surrounded cavalrymen. Bullets clipped at grass-high level and
slammed into the crumpled heaps of dead and wounded troops. The
platoon survivors returned fire with their rifles flat against the dirt.
Lieutenant Herrick and his platoon NCO, Sergeant First Class Palm-
er, were killed. By midaftemoon, when squad leader Sgt. Clyde E.
Savage assumed command after the other NCOs had been either killed
or disabled, the original twenty-seven-man platoon had been reduced
to only seven un wounded soldiers.
Within minutes after the Battle for LZ X-Ray began with the dec-
imation of Herrick's platoon, it was apparent that Moore's battalion
had tripped a hornet's nest. The majority of both 33d and 66th NVA
Regiments was located on the Chu Pong. Artillery and airstrikes pum-
meled the jungle with smoke-filled explosions, but failed to check the
North Vietnamese infantrymen surging down the mountain slopes to-
ward Company B's two platoons on the ridge. A steady rain of North
Vietnamese mortar fires sent geysers of red dirt across the landing
zone, and the thick pall of dust and smoke hindered fire support di-
rection. Lieutenant Deal's reserve platoon was ordered to try to reach
the trapped soldiers, even as Captain Herren heaved grenades at ad-
vancing NVA appearing in the high grass and streambeds on and around
LZ X-Ray itself.
Lieutenant Colonel Moore set up his command post next to the

emergency aid station at a large anthill in the center of the LZ and
immediately called for the rest of his battalion. Helicopters darted in
with Company C, doubling the number of Americans on the ground.
When Capt. Ramon A. Nadal's Company A arrived next, Moore used
Air Assault 57
them to reinforce the escalating firefight at the creekbed. Unfortu-

nately, the situation deteriorated too fast to permit airlanding of Capt.
Louis R. "Ray" Lefebvre's Company D. Accurate NVA automatic
weapons fire swept the entire landing zone and even peppered the
command anthill. Several Company D troopers were killed or wounded
before their helicopters touched down, and Moore was forced to wave
off further troopships.
Company B was embroiled in the most desperate fighting on the
high ground just beyond the stream. Captain Nadal of Company A
sent one of his platoons under Lt. Walter J. ''Joe" Marm, Jr., to assist
the breakthrough attempt by Deafs platoon of Company B, which
was already advancing toward its isolated comrades. Lieutenant Marm
formed his men in a line of skirmish to catch up, but the gap between
him and Deafs platoon proved most fortuitous. By following behind
Company B in the dense tropical vegetation, Marm's troops were able
to mow down scores of fresh NVA soldiers who were moving around
Company B's rear and unaware his platoon was closing the gap.
The North Vietnamese turned to charge Marm's platoon and flank
his unit by scrambling past them into the creekbed, but succeeded
only in running into the rest of Nadafs Company A, which was taking
up positions in the gully. The sudden clash surprised both sides, and
firing erupted at extremely close range. Lt. Bob Taft of the forward
platoon was killed instantly, and radio communications silenced. The
cavalrymen in the creekbed shoot-out reeled from the shock of the
firefight, leaving Taft's body and a wounded trooper behind. Captain
Nadal and his radioman. Sergeant Gill, jumped into the creek channel
and pulled out the fallen men.
Farther uphill the violence of the North Vietnamese attack de-
feated all attempts to reach the shattered 2d Platoon. Increasing num-
bers of NVA reinforcements used frontal assaults and encircling
movements to force the rest of Company B
to fall back on Marm's
platoon and retreat toward the creek. Both Companies A and B com-
bined to form a defensive line facing the Chu Pong mountain, em-
ploying the waist-high creekbed as a trench. With these two depleted
companies tied in to cover the LZ's western perimeter, Moore sent
Capt. Robert H. Edward's Company C to defend the southern sector.
His men had just assumed positions when they were charged by massed
North Vietnamese infantry attempting to overrun the landing zone from
a new direction. This attack was broken up, but another NVA group
58 STANTON
between the two companies at the creek. Moore sent

tried to penetrate
in his last reserves, thefew troops of Company D under Captain
LeFebvre, who had managed to land before the other helicopter in-
sertions had been canceled. The NVA were blocked, but American
losses were high. S. Sgt. George Gonzales took over the company
remnants after LeFebvre was severely wounded.
Lieutenant Colonel Moore took advantage of a midaftemoon re-
spite to airland the rest of his battalion with the loss of only two
helicopters. He emergency reserve and parceled out
reconstituted the
replacements throughout the perimeter. At the creek bonom Com-
panies A and B took advantage of the slackening combat level to
launch another counterattack aimed at reaching the isolated 2d Pla-
toon. The cavalrymen surged forward at 4:20 p.m., but were fiercely
opposed by well-camouflaged NVA soldiers occupying spider holes
dug into the slope's dense tangle of shrubbery and bamboo thickets.
Many troops were hit at point-blank range as they continued to strug-
gle uphill.
Lieutenant Marm men forward by personal example,
inspired his
valiantly destroying one NVAmachine gun nest with grenades (an
act which earned him the first Medal of Honor awarded the division
in Vietnam), but he was shot through the head and critically wounded.
Several key forward observers were killed, and soon the entire artil-
lery liaison radio frequency was swamped by undisciplined and fran-
tic calls for urgent fire support. With crucial artillery direction ham-
pered and casualties mounting in the face of more NVA crew-served

weapons pits, the momentum of attack was lost. Lieutenant Colonel
Moore resorted to an old Korean War trick, calling in white phos-
phorus rounds on top of the leading cavalrymen to enable the com-
panies to break contact and regroup at the creek before twilight.
One of the foremost dangers of air assaulting infantry into un-
known territory was the chance that units would be projected too close
to larger enemy formations under unfavorable circumstances. This
concern was counterbalanced by the division's need to force combat
against an enemy reluctant to engage on other than his own terms.
Therefore, airmobile commanders were trained to act boldly, even if
such action meant risking adverse battle situations. Airmobile doc-

trine was to strike hard and and reserves were counted on to
fast,
redress the inevitable lack of proper but time-consuming battleground

Air Assault 59
preparation. The trouble at LZ X-Ray resulted from the fact that Colo-
nel Brown had insufficient reserves available to assist Moore's be-
leaguered battalion.
The rest of Colonel Brown's brigade was widely scattered in other
ongoing sweep operations, and only one company was ready for rapid
commitment to LZ X-Ray. This was the brigade's own base security
element —Company B, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, under Capt. Myron
Diduryk. The company was airlifted to bolster Moore's battalion that
evening, but this move only provided some extra manpower if bat-
talion survival was jeopardized during the night. To provide enough
strength to reverse the North Vietnamese battlefield initiative, other
battalions were required. Beginning that afternoon, the rest of Lt.
Col. Robert A. McDade's 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, was airmobiled
west to LZ Macon, closer to X-Ray, but marshy ground there forced
the helicopters to land on more-distant LZ Columbus instead.
In the meantime Lt. Col. Robert B. Tully's 2d Battalion of the
5th Cavalry was put back together at LZ Victor, but the assembly
required time and led to other complications. The lack of helicopters,
impending nightfall, and Brown's desire to avoid landing troops on
a small LZ under fire after dark delayed Tully's departure until the
next morning. The battalion was ordered to march overland to LZ
X-Ray at first light, instead of using helicopter movement, because
Brown ** moving a steady stream of helicopters
didn't relish the idea of
into an LZ X-Ray," and he "was sure a foot move would
as hot as
"^
be unobserved and the battalion might come in behind the enemy.
Company C of Tully's battalion, under Capt. Edward A. Boyt,
was searching through dense forest late that afternoon when word was
received to cease operations and prepare the company for immediate
helicopter extraction. Boyt was told they would be shuttled to LZ
Victor overnight and form part of the relief expedition to X-Ray. His
attached engineers frantically cleared a small landing zone out of the
woods before sunset, using thirty pounds of explosives and breaking
seventeen entrenching tools in the process. As the company was lifted
out by helicopter, Boyt glimpsed the ongoing Battle of LZ X-Ray in
the distance. It resembled a heavy ground fog with dancing splotches
5. Ibid., p. 3.
60 STANTON
of colors, which he knew were produced by the discharge of dyed

smoke grenades. He recalled thinking, 'Ôh hell, this is it!"^
Moore's men endured a restless but uneventful night on LZ

X-Ray, and at dawn on 15 November patrols were sent forward be-
yond the foxholes. On the perimeter's southern side these cavalrymen
were suddenly struck and overwhelmed by an NVA human-wave as-
sault. The North Vietnamese soldiers charged across the elephant grass
and through a series of multiple explosions as final defensive artillery

shells and rockets pounded the earth. Cavalry grenadier and automatic
rifle fire joined in hammering the NVA ranks, but the attack closed
The screaming North
too fast to be defeated in front of the foxholes.
Vietnamese infantrymen bounded into the cavalry lines with bayonets
fixed to their AK47 rifles. The melee of hand-to-hand combat was
punctuated by rifle bursts fired from the hip. Individual struggles
sometimes ended in mutual death as soldiers of both sides were sent
spinning into the dirt. Captain Edwards was struck down as he radioed
urgently for help.
A heavy cross fire ripped across the entire landing zone. Sergeant
First Class McCawley led Company A's 2d Platoon out of the creekbed
and tried to cross over the field to reinforce the southern side. His
counterattack was by a hail of gunfire near an anthill midway
stalled
The North Vietnamese stormed the extended frontage held by
there.
Company D, an attack which threatened to overrun the nearby bat-
talion mortars. Several perimeter sectors were under simultaneous at-
tack, and the entire situation became and
chaotic. Supporting fires
airstrikes were brought in as close as possible and ordnance spilled
into friendly lines. In many instances combatants were intermixed and
any distinguishable edge of battle ceased to exist. The array of colored
marking smoke mixed with thick clouds of powder and haze drifting
over the battlefield.
Lieutenant Colonel Moore exerted a forceful, professional cool-
ness in the midst of the confusion and near panic. One A IE Skyraider
misdropped napalm close by his central command post, setting all the
stacked rifle ammunition and grenade reserves on fire. Air Force F4C
Phantoms and FlOO fighter-bombers streaked in low over the horizon
to hurl bomb clusters into the midst of massing North Vietnamese
6. Ltr, Capt. Boyt, Co D, USAINTS, dtd 20 Nov 67, p. 1

Air Assault 61
infantry. The NVA attack waves disintegrated under this prompt air
support, enabling the fatigued and hard-pressed cavalrymen to hold
their positions during the most critical hours.
and a half away, at LZ Victor, Tully's relief battalion

Just a mile
began marching toward the din of battle at 8:00 a.m. Captain Boyt's
company led one of the two columns as they advanced over a small
ridgeline and brushed past a few sniper teams. Effective support fire
was kept close by, and artillery rounds were lobbed into the woods
around them. Tully's troops reached LZ X-Ray at noon. Although the
movement failed in Brown's optimistic desire to trap NVA units be-
tween Moore's defending battalion and Tully's advancing one, the
linkup relieved much of the danger. The North Vietnamese pulled
back shortly after the reinforcing battalion arrived.
Lieutenant Colonel Moore's first task was to rescue the isolated
platoon. The decimated unit was charged three times during the night,
but each assault was defeated by the close-in shellfire directed by
Sergeant Savage. The platoon position was reached and the wounded
survivors and dead evacuated downslope. The rest of the day was
spent consolidating positions, while Major General Kinnard dis-
patched another battalion, Lt. Col. Frederic Ackerson's 1st Battalion
of the 5th Cavalry, to Colonel Brown's brigade base.
During the night, the NVA made two probes against LZ X-Ray
On the morning of 16 November, Diduryk's company be-
positions.
came engaged in a firefight while searching the broken ground outside
the perimeter. The company broke contact under covering artillery
fireand called in airstrikes. A later sweep of the battlefield satisfied
one of Moore's last major concerns, when the bodies of three missing
battalion members were discovered. Although pesky North Vietnam-
ese sniper fire continued, the Battle for LZ X-Ray was over. No at-
tempt was made to go into the Chu Pong after the North Vietnamese,
because B52 bombing strikes were now planned against the mountain.
The men of Moore's were airlifted to Pleiku for rest and
battalion
reorganization. LZ X-Ray was
occupied by both Tully's and Mc-
Dade's battalions for another night and then abandoned on 17 No-
vember.^
7. U.S. units present at the Battle for LZ X-Ray were 1st Battalion, 7th
Cavalry; Company A and B, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry; Company C, 8th
62 STANTON
LZ Columbus while McDade's bat-

Tally's battalion went back to
talionmoved overland to meet helicopters at a field coded LZ Albany,
six miles away. McDade's order of march was led by Company A,
followed by the battalion reconnaissance platoon. Company C, Com-
pany D, the battalion command group, and Company A from Ack-
company replaced McDade's
erson's recently arrived battalion (this final
own Company B, which fought hard at LZ X-Ray and was airlifted
to Pleiku with Moore's personnel). The long, winding column pushed
northwest through the tropical forest and high elephant grass.
The first elements had already reached LZ Albany when the 8th
Battalion, 66th NVA Regiment, attacked the length of the column.
The ferocity and scale of the ambush split the battalion in two. Ma-
chine gun, grenade, and automatic rifle fire raked the cavalry ranks
down leaders and radiomen. The middle of the column
as snipers shot
caved under the force of the attack as North Vietnamese soldiers
in
charged completely through the cavalry lines in several places. As the
column was shattered, the battle disintegrated into a largely leaderless
gel of individual melees and skirmishes between splintered groups.
Some were in a state of shock, running and firing at
soldiers
everything. Others were locked in a vortex of close-quarters fighting.
Arriving North Vietnamese reinforcements were sent straight into bat-
tle without discarding their heavy combat packs. Dead and wounded
men were strewn across fields littered with military accoutrements

and smashed brushwood. There were hardly any field dressings, water,
or transmission of orders. To many, it seemed that the air was filled
with a sleet of bullets.
Throughout the action, groups of cavabymen rushed toward nearby
patches of open grassland, mistaking them for the landing zone and
thereby actually running deeper into the ambush. The terrified troops
were either frozen to the ground or crawled on their elbows, pistols

and rifles propped up in wildly shaking hands. Slithering along the
grass, they pushed aside clumps of foliage to fire directly into the
Engineer Battalion, and three demolitions teams; 229th Pathfinder Team

(Provisional), 11th Aviation Group; artillery liaison and forward observer
sections of the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery. Losses were KIA: 79, WLA:
121. NVA by body count were 634 with more than 1,000 more cas-
killed
ualties estimated; 6 were captured.
Air Assault 63
faces of enemy soldiers also wriggling through the same singed and
cratered earth. Grenade explosions and the incessant rattle of small
arms fire never drowned out the shrill cries for medics and the chilling
screams of death. One veteran remembered the battle only as **a mas-
sacre."^
For hours the amorphous battle prevented artillery and tactical air
support, but by midaftemoon two large, ragged pockets of American
resistance had formed. The stunned remnants of Company C joined
McDade's command group, which combined to fight west toward the
clearing where both Company A and the recon platoon were making
their stands. Company D and the 5th Cavalry's Company A were
separated and pushed to the east by the flow of battle. This gave
enough semblance to the battlefield to enable rocket-firing helicopters
to sweep across the front, followed by close-range napalm bombing.
The roaring fireballs spewed across the burning grass and through
onrushing NVA riflemen, although some Americans trapped outside
the treeline were also burned to death.
Once again brigade reinforcing options were found wanting. Colonel
Brown at the brigade's tea plantation base possessed only a single
company available for immediate deployment. This was Company B
of McDade's original command, already depleted at X-Ray and re-
cuperating at Pleiku. At dusk the unit was flown into the main LZ
Albany pocket of resistance. The tempo of fighting tapered off at
nightfall, and Company B of Ackerson's battalion marched from LZ
Columbus toward the other defensive pocket. The company reached
the eastern perimeter, which was held by sister Company A (at the
tail of McDade's original column), at 10:00 p.m. A continuous ring
of artillery shellfire and aircraft flare illumination around the sur-

rounded perimeters discouraged further mass NVA attacks.
The killing continued outside the perimeters as NVA soldiers
combed the woods seeking out lost or wounded Americans. Auto-
matic gunfire lashed through the forests, sending rounds ricocheting
off d^kened trees. Shadows crossed and wobbled under parachuted
flares sinking to earth. Volunteers made repeated forays beyond the
main lines into this eerie, artificial half-light to bring in wounded
8. Sp4 Jack P. Smith, ** Death in the la Drang Valley," Saturday Evening

Post.
64 STANTON
comrades from the open. Sometimes the cavalry rescue parties and
stretcher teams encountered so many wounded that only a few could
be carried back. The wounded dragged themselves after full litters
until they collapsed or lost consciousness.
The North Vietnamese retreated as daylight approached, and
McDade's battalion was assembled around LZ Albany on 18 Novem-
ber. The other main pocket of soldiers, consisting mostly of 5th Cav-
alry troops, withdrew to LZ Columbus under Ackerson's control.
McDade's troops spent the rest of the day searching the battlefield to
find the wounded and missing, recover the dead, and collect equip-
ment. Although an NVA attack was made against LZ Columbus that
evening, the sanguinary Battle of LZ Albany was the last major action
of the la Drang Valley campaign.^
On 20 November Col. William R. Lynch 's 2d Brigade relieved
Brown's brigade, but the fresh airmobile battalions made only meager
contacts as the NVA retreated into Cambodia. North Vietnamese
cohesion and battlefield staying power had been destroyed by weeks
of unrelenting division air assault pressure and heavy losses. Below
the division's wide-ranging Huey helicopters, the fields and patches
of woodland were finally clear of North Vietnamese troops. A 9th
Cavalry scoutship rescued Pfc. Toby Braveboy (Co A, 2d Bn, 7th
Cavalry), who had been twice wounded in the LZ Albany battle on
17 November, when he was sighted waving his T-shirt from a jungle
clearing on 24 November. Two days later Operation SILVER BAY-
ONET was officially terminated. The la Drang Valley campaign was
over.
During a month of sustained action, the 1st Cavalry Division (Air-
mobile) sought out, located, and met the regular NVA on the field
of battle and won some of its fiercest Vietnam encounters. Helicopter-
delivered infantry dominated the zone of operations, setting the future
pace of wartime airmobility and validating the revolutionary role of
aerial cavalry as originally perceived by General Gavin. Many sus-
pected doctrinal truths about airmobility were verified. Airmobile op-
erations had to be characterized by careful planning and followed by
9. LZ Albany on 17 November 1965 were KL\:

Casualties in the Battle of
151, WIA: MIA: 4. NVA losses were 403 killed and confirmed
121, and
by body count with many more losses suspected.
Air Assault 65
deliberate, bold, and violent execution. While the division could he-
licopter its troops throughout the battle zone, regardless of terrain
restrictions, faster than any other organization and decisively engage
distant enemy units by vertical air assault, this flexible striking power
placed a very high premium on thorough preparation and the avail-
ability of sufficient reserves.
Numerous problems arose in the course of the bitterly fought cam-
paign. Unexpected levels of combat outstripped division capability to
reinforce adverse situations, especially in the Battles of LZs X-Ray
and Albany, where the lack of properly assembled reserves almost
The inability of aerial firepower alone to effec-
resulted in disaster.
tively stop NVA close assaults was manifested in the Battle of LZ
Albany and a number of other firefights. The October division logis-
tical crises produced severe shortages of essential supply stocks, such
as aviation fuel, during the entire period. There were initial difficul-
ties maintaining radio communications over the long distances in-
volved, although orbiting CV2 radio relay aircraft offered a partial

solution. The division spent the month of December rebuilding its
logistical posture, extensively overhauling its overworked helicopters
and equipment, and replacing personnel.
The frightful casualty levels seriously eroded division strength. In
the two months of October and November the division suffered 334
killed, 736 wounded, 364 nonbattle injuries, and 2,828 cases of ma-
laria, scrub typhus, and other serious diseases. This total represented
more than 25 percent of the division's authorized strength (15,955).

Even though many men were eventually returned to their units, the
division used 5,211 replacements to complete rebuilding by the end
of the year. Division assigned strength thus stood at 16,732 in De-
cember, but nearly a third (31 percent) were newly assigned. Such a
high turnover rate invariably created turmoil and reduced overall ef-
ficiency.'^
Despite the significant problems and high cost, the division's la
Drang Valley campaign remained a magnificent military accomplish-
ment. An initial North Vietnamese victory over Camp Plei Me was
prevented by the 1st Cavaky Division's presence in the region. The
10. Personnel statistics from 1st Cavalry Division, Quarterly Command Re-
port for Second Fiscal Quarter FY 66, pp. 5, 25.
66 STANTON
Strategic provincial capital of Pleiku was the key to the central high-
lands and could not be stripped of protection. No South Vietnamese
force would have been spared to help Plei Me without divisional as-
surance that the city would be safeguarded in its absence. When the
relief column was ambushed, division artillery coordination kept the
advance moving and insured the breakthrough into Plei Me.
Once the siege was broken, MACV ordered Major General Kin-
nard's division to locate the NVA forces and render them ineffective.
Three brigades were sent in close succession to search out a vast,
normally inaccessible territorial wilderness. The North Vietnamese
forces withdrawing from Plei Me were unprepared to cope with the
division's new style of airmobile warfare. Nothing in NVA training
or experience had taught its soldiers how to deal with close helicopter
pursuit. The 33d NVA
Regiment was hounded from the area and routed
from its normal hiding places. However, the largest enemy units were
located through unintended meeting engagements.
The Battles of LZs X-Ray and Albany were both initiated by un-
expected North Vietnamese troop concentrations in hostile terrain. The
division's campaign losses in large part reflected the severity of such
encounters. The ratio of killed to wounded was 334 to 736, or 1 :2.2.
considerably higher than the 1:4 experienced in World War II and
Korea. Most of the battle wounds were caused by small arms fire,
with a very large number of head and chest hits, and very few wounds
resulted from Most of those killed suffered multiple
shell fragments.
bullet impacts. The outcome of both actions was decided by massive
air and artillery support, as well asby the individual courage and
fighting stamina of the division's ground troops.
In the final analysis the la Drang Valley campaign was military
history's first division-scale air assault victory. The 1st Cavalry Di-
vision accomplished all of its assigned objectives. Airmobile rein-
forcement insured the survival of a remote but critical outpost; cavalry
surveillance followed and found the enemy, and cavalry air assault
brought the enemy into battle and pinpointed his strongpoints. Major
General Kinnard resorted to strategic B52 bombing to shatter these
jungled redoubts once they were identified, as in the Chu Pong after
LZ X-Ray. In the process two regular North Vietnamese Army reg-
iments were largely annihilated and had to be completely reformed
in Cambodia.
Air Assault 67
The 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry returned to LZ X-Ray in

April 1966. It wasn't a sentimental visit, as the battalion was pro-
viding security for two artillery batteries and preparing to air assault
onto the Chu Pong massif. Most of the original battalion members
had departed, but there were still quite a few veterans of the original
X-Ray battle serving with the unit. Sgt. Steven Hansen had been a
forward observer in Captain Nadal's Company A on that fateful day.
Now he was a mortar sergeant in Company D.
Sergeant Hansen paced the old perimeter line and gently stepped
across the open field. He
remained uneasy standing in the peace-
still
ful, grassy clearing where so many troopers had fallen under a hail-
storm of bullets. Signs of the battle remained: lots of discarded gear
from both sides, a set of American dog
and even bone fragments
tags,
in front of the overgrown foxhole line. engage-
In contrast to later
ments, the North Vietnamese had not bothered to bury their dead at
LZ X-Ray.
To Sergeant Hansen, the sight of so many howitzers pointing their
muzzled tubes at the sky, with their crews lounging nearby, looked
out of place on the curled grass of LZ X-Ray, almost as an affront
to the sacred soil he stood upon. He remembered the heroism of his
comrades, the bone weariness and mental fatigue of the heavy fight-
ing, and how men's speech became halting and hardly audible, if
anyone spoke at all. He gazed at the anthill used as Moore's command
post; the same mound was being used by his new battalion com-
mander, Raymond Kampe. When Captain Coleman asked
Lt. Col.
about his feelings, Hansen replied slowly, **It gives me a funny feel-
ing to walk around a place where so many died. In a way I'm glad
we came back, but I'd still just rather forget the whole thing.""
11. Army Times, 11 May 1966, p. 32.

CHAPTER 4.
Sustained Pursuit
The 1st Cavalry Division's hard- won victory in the la Drang Valley
was especially important to the allied cause. Before the introduction
of the airmobile division to central South Vietnam, MACV was largely
powerless to counteract growing Viet Cong influence in this critical
region. In harmony with the 1966 allied buildup and burgeoning of-
fensive activity, General Westmoreland ordered Major General Kin-
nard's division to help clear II Corps Tactical Zone from the border
to the coast.
Throughout the new year the airmobile cavalry continued to sweep
the rugged central highland interior and strike at North Vietnamese
regiments venturing out of Cambodia. However, as the 4th Infantry
Division became established in the Pleiku vicinity and took over re-
sponsibility for western II CTZ, the 1st Cavalry Division concentrated
its major efforts against the Viet Cong-dominated ricelands and ad-
jacent mountain strongholds of Connecticut-size Binh Dinh Province
along the South China Sea. MACV's ultimate goal was to break the
VC grip over the densely populated and agriculturally important east-
em portion of the province and to return this National Priority Area
to government control, but this was impossible as long as the region
remained unsecure to South Vietnamese authorities.
The geography of the central highlands compressed the fertile,
extensively cultivated lowlands into a series of valleys surrounded by

jagged ridgelines crowding toward the ocean. Clearing the VC/NVA
out of their maze of fortified hamlets and hidden jungle bases through-
out the region required the continual application of multidirectional
pressure. This style of area warfare differed radically from the linear
70 STANTON
frontline tactics of conflicts in other wars. Most objectives had to be

res wept several times, and troops fought over familiar battlefields.
The directionless nature of area warfare often frustrated conventional
military solutions, but it offered ideal circumstances for an airmobile
division to exercise a basic cavalry task. From late-January Tet-66
through mid-February Tet-67, the 1st Cavalry Division waged a re-
NVA/VC forces throughout eastern
lentless year-long drive against
Binh Dinh Province. The succession of operations included MASHER/
WHITE WING, JIM BOWIE, DAVY CROCKETT, CRAZY HORSE,
THAYER I, IRVING, and THAYER II, and they represented the first
airmobile application of sustained cavalry pursuit.
Pursuit is an offensive action against a retreating enemy. Rapid
helicopter mobility favored fluid pursuit operations. Throughout the
1966 coastal campaign the 1st Cavalry Division sought to push NVA/
VC units out of their areas of influence, using aerial reconnaissance
to disclose enemy
locations and then triggering their retreat with he-
licopter assaults and superior firepower. Ideally, airmobile infantry
would envelop the retreating enemy and block escape routes. The
division realized that terrain and distance presented serious obstacles,
but counted on massive helicopter employment to minimize these
problems. Airmobility enabled the attack to be carried into the remote
tropical valleys and mist-shrouded canyons which served as the main
Viet Cong bases. The division hoped to turn these previously imper-
vious VC redoubts into chokepoints, where the retreating enemy could
be and eliminated.
finally entrapped
The opening blow of this campaign was Operation MASHER/
WHITE WING, which commenced immediately after the Vietnamese
Tet holidays on 25 January 1966. The 3d Brigade, commanded by
newly promoted Col. Harold G. Moore, was directed to find and de-
stroy a major enemy regimental recruiting and rice supply center near
Bong Son. The cavalrymen became embroiled in heavy combat against
a well-defended Viet Cong village at the outset, and this initial con-
frontation escalated into intense fighting across the brigade front. Air-
mobile pursuit was and within three weeks the majority of
initiated,
the 1st Cavalry Division was committed against a full NVA/VC di-
vision consisting of the JSth NVA, 22d NVA, and 2d VC Regiments.
On the misty foggy morning of 28 January, a phalanx of heli-
copters combat assaulted Lieutenant Colonel McDade's 2d Battalion,
7th Cavalry, onto the shoreline four miles north of Bong Son. McDade's
Sustained Pursuit 71
battalion was having unusually bad luck. His battalion was largely
rebuilt after the unfortunate battle at LZ
Albany, but a C123 crash
outside An Khe caused forty-two deaths in one line company being
transported to the Bong Son area before the operation even started.
The battalion's first air assault of MASHER was violently opposed
as Viet Cong machine gunners hidden in the clusters of beachfront
hootches fired into the low-flying The
helicopters broke for-
aircraft.
mation to avoid the automatic weapons and scattered Capt. John

fire
Fesmire's Company C in small groups across one thousand yards of
open sand in close proximity to Cu Nghi. The village, which sur-
rounded much of the landing zone, was staunchly defended by VC
entrenched in earthworks, palm groves, and bamboo thickets. This
concealed network of VC mortars, snipers, and machine gun bunkers
prevented the separated company from maneuvering.
McDade's other air assault element, understrength Company A
commanded by Capt. Joel Sugdinis, landedsome distance south of
Fesmire. The unit moved overland through numerous hamlets to reach
the isolated landing zone, but was stopped just short of its objective.
Colonel Moore's brigade was soon mired in combat throughout its
axis of advance. Within an hour four CH47 Chinooks were shot down
and twelve UHID Huey troopships badly damaged; by midaftemoon
twenty-eight helicopters were grounded. One Chinook sling-loading
a 105mm howitzer was forced down, and Company B of Lieutenant
Colonel Kampe's 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, contested the crash site
with the Viet Cong. The company finally secured the location by
manhandling the artillery piece into firing position, leveling its tube,
and firing rounds directly into the charging VC.
At Cu Nghi, Fesmire's men grimly held their positions as the light
rain turned into a cold, soaking drizzle. Artillery support was ordered
stopped for fear of hitting friendly troops. Captain Sugdinis 's advance
to reach Fesmire was stalled byVC machine gun nests covering the
wet ricepaddy between the two companies. The leading troops of
Company A could see colored signal smoke from Fesmire's com-
mand, but VC automatic weapons fire prevented them from linking
up. After an extended firefight in the flat ricefield, both VC weapons
positions were destroyed and the drenched American reinforcements
reached the main battlefield. Lieutenant Colonel McDade attempted
to bring in additional men from Company B late that afternoon, using
an artillery barrage to seal off the LZ's eastern perimeter, but all six
72 STANTON
helicopters were hit by VC fire from positions not masked by the

shellfire. He waited until after dark to bring in desperately needed
ammunition and medical supplies, but another incoming helicopter
was shot down. During the night the exhausted cavab^men regrouped
behind the village's sand burial mounds in the howling wind and rain
as enemy grenadiers and snipers intensified their volume of fire.
The air cavalry's mainstay, tactical air support, became available
after daybreak. The low overcast lifted enough to permit low-level
bombing runs by jet aircraft. Air Force fighter-bombers napalmed vil-
lage dwellings and trenches, detonatingenemy ammunition stocks and

causing large fires. Artillery bombarded the front throughout the rest
of the morning as Colonel Moore arrived with Lieutenant Colonel
Ingram's 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, and Kampe's battalion airmo-
biled into blocking positions north of the village. The cavalrymen
overmastered some of the interlocking fortifications and tunnels, but
spent another night under close-range fire from the uncleared village.
The next day Colonel Moore's combined battalions forced the 7th and
9th Battalions, 22d NVA Regiment, to retreat from the village. The
three-day action in the Cu Nghi vicinity was costly and confused and
generally marred by poor coordination between cavalry elements as
a result of the weather and unanticipated ferocity of enemy resistance.
The battle cost the cavalry 121 killed and another 220 wounded (660
enemy bodies were counted), but division pursuit operations could
now be initiated.'
On 4
February 1966, as Colonel Moore's 3d Brigade prepared to
press pursuit operations to the southwest into the An Lao Valley, the
division reinforced the drive with Colonel Lynch 's 2d Brigade. On
the same day, the cavalry offensive was renamed WHITE WING after
President Johnson angrily protested that the original operational title,
MASHER, did not reflect "pacification emphasis." The An Lao Val-

ley had been controlled by the Viet Cong since South Vietnam had
been created. The valley was one of the most fertile agricultural ba-
sins of central South Vietnam, but also one of the most rugged and
1 . 1 St Cav Div, Seven Month History and Briefing Data, September-March

1966, dtd 9 June 67; 1st Cav Div, Operational Report on Lessons Learned,
dtd 5 May 66.

dangerous. Several reconnaissance teams of Special Forces elite Proj-

ect DELTA (Detachment B-52) were inserted into the valley in con-
junction with the division's search pattern, but were quickly over-
whelmed and destroyed.
The opening brigade airmobile assault was delayed two days by
monsoon storms, marking the first time in division airmobile expe-
rience that a major cavalry operation was precluded by adverse weather.
The NVA/VC forces used the opportunity to effect an unimpeded
retreat as heavy clouds cloaked the densely forested mountainsides
and disgorged torrential rains. Pursuing cavalry entered the valley only
to find recently abandoned defensive positions.
Opponents of aerial cavalry most often cited its susceptibility to
enemy anti-air weapons and weather conditions as valid reasons to
discourage the concept. In Vietnam the absence of enemy aircraft and
sophisticated antiair defenses meant that weather extremes rep-
resented the only real detriment to divisional mobility. However, these
opponents considered Vietnam's tropical climate severe enough to un-
dermine airmobile divisional effectiveness. During Operation
MASHER/WHITE WING the division deliberately continued to rely
on its helicopters and persevered with cavalry pursuit operations de-
spite unfavorable wind and rain conditions. Major General Kinnard
proved his division capable of maintaining pressure against an elu-
sive, retreating enemy despite periods of forced inactivity.
Major General Kinnard used Colonel Lynch 's newly introduced
brigade to search the An Lao Valley mountains. He shifted the
division's major pursuit effort farther south by diverting Colonel
Moore's brigade into the Kim Son C*Crow's Foot") Valley region. The
area was named the Crow's Foot after the shape of the surrounding
valley hills on a military contour map. The eight twisting ridgelines
around the Crow's Foot compress the bottomland into seven valleys
which contain numerous streams and a fast-flowing river. Like the
An Lao Valley, this secluded area was an ideal Viet Cong base. It
provided concealment and innumerable hiding places for food and
weapons caches, controlled entrances and numerous escape routes,
excellent water and rice-growing resources, and complete absence of
government control over the pro-VC local populace.
Colonel Moore altered his tactics upon entering the Kim Son, de-
liberately fragmenting his brigade and utilizing terrain in an attempt
74 STANTON
to outmaneuver any Viet Cong evasion. Helicopters first searched out

the many natural valley avenues. Then, using deceptive landings and
other flight patterns to confuse enemy scouts, company-size forces
with two days' rations were carefully emplaced on the hills and ridges
dominating the valley exits. On February the splintered brigade
1 1
began maneuvering from the hilltops toward the valley floor, while
supporting artillery pummeled ravines and trails. Many dead Viet Cong
were found downslope where they had been caught by the shower of
artillery and rocket fire. The brigade continued its pursuit mode
throughout the nights as patrols sortied under flare illumination, at-

tempting to flush out the VC
toward prepared ambush positions. The
fire missions and ambuscades netted 249 enemy dead at the cost of
only 6 cavalrymen killed. One VC battalion headquarters was located

through documents found on a fallen enemy soldier, and Captain Di-
duryk's company of McDade's battalion was airlifted near the Soui
Run River to pinpoint the unit before it could escape.
Captain Diduryk's company clashed against prepared VC posi-
tions along the densely jungled streambank on the morning of 15 Feb-
ruary. Accurate defensive fire stalled two of his platoons, and deci-
sive action was essential to prevent Viet Cong withdrawal before
airmobile reinforcements arrived. An airstrike was promptly called
for,and just before noon, as the last bombs were falling, the 3d Pla-
toon fixed bayonets and charged the entrenched Viet Cong across the
stream. The fury of this frontal assault at bayonet point unnerved the
defenders, who fled their lines directly into the pathway of rocket-
firing helicoptersand company machine guns. The elan and courage
of the cavalrymen carried the field, enabling Diduryk's men to thor-
oughly defeat two VC main force companies before evening. This
First Team spirit fused the dash of cavalry enterprise with modem
airmobile lethality to power the 1st Cavalry Division war engine
throughout the Vietnam conflict.
The persistent pace of pursuit was maintained the next day as
Colonel Moore's brigade was switched with Colonel Roberts's fresh
1st Brigade. The new brigade rapidly helicoptered into the virtually
inaccessible lower portion of the Kim Son Valley. Lt. Col. Edward
C. Meyer's 2d Battalion of the 5th Cavalry helicoptered into the nar-
row jungle bottom between densely forested mountain crags,
river
and shortly afterwardCompany B was engulfed by devastating fire
from an upslope heavy weapons battalion of the 1 8th NVA Regiment.
The machine gun fire temporarily

intense recoilless rifle, mortar, and
wiped and
out artillery liaisonlocked the entire battalion into a gruel-
ing standoff. The engagement was decided that evening when air-
mobile reinforcements were flexibly inserted behind the enemy lines,
and the NVA were driven from their commanding positions.
On same day, interrogation of a captured NVA battalion com-
the
mander by Colonel Lynch 's brigade staff revealed the location of the
22dNVA Regiment on the eastern edge of the Kim Son Valley. Lieu-
tenant Colonel Ackerson's battalion (l/5th Cav) led the attack, but
became deadlocked in combat against entrenched NVA defending the
main camp. Frontal assaults against the formidable earthworks were
mired in the thick tropical foliage as hidden machine gun bunkers
built flush to the ground suddenly opened fire and cut apart the ad-
vancing platoons. Casualties had to be left where they fell, and fight-
ing raged for days around the extensive jungle stronghold. The stale-
mate was punctuated by attacks and counterattacks on both sides. One
of the most serious North Vietnamese sallies was defeated on 20 Feb-
ruary after Company A's command post was nearly overrun by three
different assault waves. During this period, thirty-three separate bat-
talion attacks, each supported by massive artillery and rocket expen-
ditures, failed to breach the enemy bastion.
North Vietnamese forces trapped in the Kim Son Valley by the
sustained cavalry pursuit desperately defended their base, and MACV
decided to employ strategic B52 bombers to finish the job. Acker-
son's battalionwas pulled back on 21 February as the objective area
was subjected to high-altitude bombing and then saturated with riot
gas. The battalion moved back unopposed into leveled forests and
cratered remnants of the NVA position. They found shattered trees
tossed through wooden blockhouse ruins, interconnecting tunnels, and
even underground stove facilities. The encounter amply demonstrated
the futility of defending territory against a determined aerial cavalry
onslaught to the North Vietnamese. Contact became increasingly spo-
radic during the following week. The division terminated its Kim Son
(Crow's Foot) Valley sweep at the end of the month. The valley claimed
nearly a battalion's worth of American casualties (107 dead and 561

wounded compared to 710 NVA/VC bodies counted), but airmobile
pursuit successfully penetrated and led to the elimination of a major
enemy redoubt.
The division completed forty-one days of hard campaigning as
76 STANTON
Colonel Lynch 's brigade scoured the reputed VC stronghold of the

seaside Cay Giep Mountains before coming full circle back into the
Bong Son Plains. The troops were lowered onto the forested Cay Giep
hillmass by CH47-dropped Jacob's ladders suspended through bomb-
created clearings, but found few Viet Cong. Operation MASHER/
WHITE WING, the harshest test of airmobile durability to date,
ended
on 6 March 1966.^
Major General Kinnard reaffirmed the airmobile division's stay-
ing power in a harsh environment, contrasting sharply with the gently
rolling, uninhabited landscape and favorable climatic conditions of
the fall 1965 la Drang Valley campaign. The 1st Cavalry Division
pressed through monsoon rainstorms and fortified NVA/VC defenses
to drive the enemy out of villages and mountain hideouts in four main
base areas. The effectiveness of modem cavalry pursuit was verified
as the division cut a wide circle through a formerly uncontested, densely
populated swath of Viet Cong
territory. During this time, division
aviation flew 77,627 sorties, which included airlifting 120,585 cav-
ahy troops (data includes multiple lifts of the same personnel).^
The 1st Cavalry Division's operations were less successful when
conducted in response to faulty allied intelligence, a common problem
throughout the Vietnam War. For instance. Major General Kinnard
retaliated against a Viet Cong raid on the division's An Khe base
camp by sending two brigades into the suspected 3,000-strong "Kon
Truck" VC staging area during the rest of March (Operation JIM
BOWIE). The expedition forced the 1st and 3d Brigades to conduct
a fruitless search through very difficult tropical terrain containing few
landing zones. Lt. Col. Robert J. Malley's 8th Engineer Battalion
airliftedteams with minidozers to carve out fragile clearings on the
edge of steep ridgelines and rocky pinnacles. Helicopters swarmed
over the sun-baked valleys and deployed a multitude of ambush pa-
trols, which only confirmed that the Viet Cong had executed an or-
derly withdrawal several days prior to the operation.

The division incurred a large number of losses in spite of the
scant opposition. The brigades suffered 380 casualties, mostly from
2. 1st Cav Div, Combat Operations After Action Report, dtd 28 Apr 66.
3. 1st Cav Div, Operational Report on Lessons Learned, dtd 5 May 66,
Aooendix 4-3. Aviation Data.
punji-stake wounds and a series of fire-related mishaps. The elephant

grass near one landing zone was set ablaze by and
aerial rocket fire,
the firewas almost extinguished when a hovering Chinook fanned the
flames anew. The raging inferno raced two hundred yards through
the grass and engulfed an entire mortar platoon. While Operation JIM
BOWIE was a marked failure at finding the VC, claiming only 27
confirmed dead, it proved a valuable exercise in refining airmobile
doctrine under adverse terrain conditions."^
The division was now firmly established in Vietnam, and its rec-
ord of battlefield success was evident by Viet Cong avoidance of the
unit wherever possible. Much of the division's success was directly
due to Maj. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard, who created the first air
assault force in military history and tranformed it into the Army's first
airmobile fighting division. He relinquished command of the 1st Cav-
alry Division to Maj. Gen. John "Jack" Norton on 6 May 1966.
Major General Norton, the son of Col. Augustus Norton, was
bom 14 April 1918 at Fort Monroe, Virginia. He graduated as first
captain of the Corps of Cadets at West Point in 1941 and joined the
505th Parachute Infantry Regiment after paratrooper school a year
later. He fought through Europe with the 82d Airborne Division in
World War and served as Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr.'s,
II
Korean conflict. In 1955 Colonel Norton

military assistant during the
began a series of assignments in the Office of the Chief for Research
and Development, which placed him in the forefront of airmobility
development. As chief of the Air Mobility Division, Norton became
qualified as both fixed- wingand helicopter pilot. He commanded the
2d Battle Group, 4th Cavalry, of the 1st Cavalry Division in Korea
before returning to the United States in 1960 as the aviation officer
of CON ARC. He was on several high-level boards engaged in Army
reorganization and airmobile doctrine, including the Howze Board.
On 1 April 1963 Norton was promoted to brigadier general and be-
came assistant commandant of the Army infantry school at Fort Ben-
ning. He was sent to Vietnam two years later, where General West-
moreland handpicked him to command the 1st Cavalry Division after
4. 1st Cav Div, Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-
32), dtd 8 May 66; 1st Cav Div, Critique of Operation JIM BOWIE, dtd
15 April 66.
78 STANTON
a stint of duty commanding U.S. Army Vietnam support troops. Ma-

jor General Norton led the 1st Cavalry Division with a firm under-
standing of both airmobile development and the Army logistical struc-
ture inVietnam, an important resource to the highly technical and
equipment-dependent airmobile division.
Major General Norton continued res weeping Binh Dinh Province
on 4 May 1966 in Operation DAVY CROCKETT. Colonel Moore's
3d Brigade reentered the Bong Son Plains during the seasonal weather
transition, which brought clear weather and high humidity. Flight
conditions were enhanced, but troops marched and fought under an
unrelenting tropical sun with temperatures of 94 to 110 degrees Fahr-
enheit. Aerial pursuit was initiated by Lt. Col. James C. Smith's 1st
Squadron, 9th Cavalry, which attacked northward, seeking a reported
Viet Cong battalion. The chase led to skirmishing the next day at Bing
Di, where two battalions of the 7th Cavalry airmobiled to encircle the
rapidly moving VC force. A furious artillery barrage inflicted heavy
losses, but the VC managed to elude the encirclement during the night.
Contact was reestablished when a squadron helicopter was shot down
at Than Son village on 6 May, and the division quickly implemented
an airmobile response.
The 7th Cavalry's 2d Battalion air assaulted to seal off the vil-
lage's southern exits while the 1st Battalion moved toward the hamlet
from the other direction. Ground reconnaissance troops from the 9th
Cavalry, reinforced with mechanized ARVN vehicles, blocked off the
east. Twelve F4C Phantom sorties rained high explosives on the VC-
occupied hamlet, and both 7th Cavalry battalions advanced toward
VC trenchlines from two sides. At one point, with only
the fortified
three hundred yards separating the advancing cavalrymen, one VC
company defensive position was demolished by well-placed 750-pound
Air Force bombs, bringing Colonel Moore's accolade that it was ''the
most accurate display of tactical air precision bombing I have ever
seen."^ The 1st Cavalry Division was most effective when its air-
ground teamwork was functioning smoothly throughout the pursuit
and final entrapment of the enemy. The battalions made visual contact
late in the afternoon, spent the night in vigilant encirclement, and
5. 1st Cav Div, Seven Month History and Briefing Data: April-October
1966. dtd 1 May 67, p. 79.
overran the VC battalion and village after a sharp skirmish the next
day.
The brigade began searching the Kim Son (Crow's Foot) Valley
on 1May, but few contacts developed, and the mission was being
1
terminated five days later when cavahymen patrolling the nearby Vinh
Thanh Valley clashed violently with the Viet Cong. A cavalry bat-
talion had been dispatched to that area after evidence captured earlier
revealed that the Special Forces Vinh Thanh camp might be attacked
on 19 May, Ho Chi Minh's birthday. Many major operations in Viet-
nam were triggered by such small incidents, and the division was
"backed into (Operation) CRAZY HORSE by the virtue of the un-
usual intelligence that was developed.'' The Viet Cong were discov-
ered in force on the eastern rim of the Kim Son Valley, causing Colo-
nel Moore to remark bluntly at a later operational critique, "How the
hell did we finish DAVY CROCKETT without knowing that he [2d
VC Regiment] was in the CRAZY HORSE area?"^
The clash occurred on the afternoon of 16 May 1966. Capt. John
D. Coleman's Company B of the 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, landed
one helicopter at a time on LZ Hereford near Camp Vinh Thanh,
climbed a ridgeline, and encountered the VC in prepared positions.
One squad moving forward was annihilated by a sudden Viet Cong
counterattack. Attempts to retrieve American dead and wounded only
increased casualties and disclosed further VC strongpoints in the dense
undergrowth. An afternoon thunderstorm unleashed sheets of rain across
the jungle canopy and dimmed the faint sunlight reaching the forest
floor. The VC took advantage of the darkened conditions to make
repeated attacks, which compressed Coleman's men into a small de-
fensive perimeter under automatic weapons fire from all sides.
The fighting continued into early evening under conditions too

close for tube artillery support. The rainstorm seemed to prevent aeri-
al rocket assistance, which was the last-resort weapon available to
save an isolated airmobile ground element in trouble. Two armed he-
licopters of the 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery, led by commander Lt.
Col. Morris J. Brady, carefully edged up the ridgeline down-
in the
pour. Guided by radio instructions from the beleaguered company.
6. 1st Cav Div, Critique Summary—Operation CRAZY HORSE, dtd 27 June

66, p. 16.
80 STANTON
both helicopters loomed over the trees and fired rockets directly into
the charging Viet Cong. The massed explosions from their closely
delivered salvos shattered the VC assault.
Airmobile reinforcements were dispatched to LZ Hereford, and
during the night Capt. John W. Cummings's Company A of the 1st
Battalion, 12th Cavalry, reinforced Coleman's lines. The next morn-
ing both companies were attacked by a battalion of the 2d VC Reg-
iment. For two hours throngs of VC surged out of the jungle at in-
tervals and rushed the foxholes, many being brought down and killed
just outside the perimeter. Ammunition was so low that many troopers
were down to their last rifle magazines and had already fixed bayo-
nets. Another relief force from Lt. Col. William B. Ray's 1st Bat-
talion of the 5th Cavalry airmobiled to the rescue, and these additional
reinforcements prompted the Viet Cong to withdraw.
Col. John J. Hennessey's 1st Brigade commenced pursuit with
Lieutenant Colonel Ray's battalion and the 2d Battalion of the 12th
Cavalry under Lt. Col. Otis C. Lynn. Both units swept east into the
mountains in an effort to cut off suspected VC escape routes. The
jagged ridges were blanketed by triple-canopy jungle, which sloped
into deep heavily vegetated ravines laced with cascading waterfalls
and swift streams. Suitable spots for landing zones were so scarce
that the Viet Cong were able to keep most under constant surveil-
lance. Adverse skirmishes often erupted in close proximity to them,
as Hill 766 (LZ Horse) and when a cavalry mortar platoon was over-
run on 21 May (LZ Hereford). On the latter date elements of Lt. Col.
Levin B. Broughton's 1st Battalion of the 8th Cavalry also fought a
pitched engagement against hillside VietCong machine gun bunkers.
The summit was stormed and the VC positions eliminated in
knoll's
an unusual American night assault. In some of these battles the thick
jungle caused grenadiers to cease using their weapons, as the M79
projectiles bounded back to explode in friendly lines (later this de-
ficiency was corrected by setting the rounds to arm at a distance from
the firer).
By this time Major General Norton had committed the majority
of his division to the operation. The bulk of the 2d VC Regiment
remained within the mountains between the Soui Ca and Vinh Thanh
valleys, where the difficult terrain effectively masked its movement
and location. The division adopted a new tactical methodology on 24
May, when helicopter troop insertions were replaced by massed fire-
1966 Coastal Campaign Map by Shelby L Stanton
^^ '? ,r^ DucPho
^ vmn inann ^\ "J^Jl-^-^s. X \ - *-
%1A
82 STANTON
power in an effort to drive the VC out of valley pockets. Ground units

were pulled back into a ring of company-size ambush points outside
the strike zone, but the area was so large that it could not be patrolled
adequately. One large gap had to be covered with a CS gas barrier.
Tactical airstrikes, B52 bombing, and artillery concentrations pounded
the hillmass interior for three days in an attempt to stampede the Viet
Cong out of targeted sectors.
The closest air-ground coordination was required. Flight pattern
advisories were constantly radioed in an attempt to prevent aircraft
from inadvertently intermixing with artillery shellfire, but the entire
sector remained a rather mad target area," characterized in the best
**
terms as a **nip-and-tuck proposition." Major General Norton himself

accompanied Army Secretary Resor on a helicopter from the battle-
field to Saigon. During the flight '*our chase ship said that artillery
out there is awful close —we were lucky not to get hit. When we got
back to Tan Son Nhut we found out another Huey had been shot out
of the air just five minutes behind us by our own artillery."^
Such attempts to dislodge the enemy through firepower neglected
the real value of dismounted cavalry (infantry) to the total airmobile
cavalry package. The 1st Cavalry Division was a triad of powerful
—
weapons systems helicoptered infantry, armed aircraft, and mobile
artillery. The enemy suffered little sustained damage from artillery
and airpower unless infantry followed up to actually seize the ground

and completed his destruction. In this case the infantry follow-up really
consisted of mere exploratory sweeps to ascertain damage.
Airmobile pursuit efforts in CRAZY HORSE were stymied after
the initial fierce firefights. Retreat was triggered, but the rugged ter-
rain, severe heat and humidity, and heightened enemy activity else-
where precluded a relentless follow-up. The remainder of the oper-
ation spunered into a semisearch through the valley wilderness, which
garnered only sporadic contact with the Viet Cong. Although consid-
erable quantities of foodstuffs and supplies were uncovered, results
were rapidly diminishing. Renewed NVA activity in the western por-
tion ofII CTZ required division presence elsewhere. Major General
Norton was forced to decide how long such a large and logistically
expensive effort in a rough area like the Vinh Thanh Valley was
7. Ibid., p. 11
worthwhile. The division kept its aerial reconnaissance squadron and

four rotating battalions in the area until 5 June 1966, when he ordered
CRAZY HORSE, with its toll of
the operation terminated. Operation
79 KIA, 1 MIA, and 356 WIA (compared to 350 enemy killed by
body count and another 330 estimated), was a costly lesson in the
limits of sustained pursuit.^
The 1st Cavalry Division turned its attention to enemy threats
elsewhere for the next several months. Two operations were con-
ducted around Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen Province, followed by engage-
ments in the central highlands and a return to old division haunts in
the western la Drang-Chu Pong region. In the meantime Binh Dinh
Province remained only partially subdued by the Korean Capital Di-
vision, which occupied its southeastern portion. Reliable intelligence
indicated that the 3d NVA Division (also known as the 610th) was
still using the An Lao, Soui Ca, and Kim Son (Crow's Foot) valleys
as important assemblyand supply base areas. In mid-September 1966
from the Cambodian border to begin
the division returned to the coast
an extended seventeen-month campaign to pacify northeastern Binh
Dinh Province. Major General Norton reinitiated cavalry pursuit by
launching Operation THAYER I, the first stage of this renewed cam-
paign.
For three days prior to the oj)eration, numerous 352 bombing runs
were made to separate the NVA/VC from their various havens and
neutralize or drive them toward the Kim Son region. Colonel Smith's
1st Squadron of the 9th Cavalry provided aerial surveillance on all
strikes, but was unable to render the necessary ground observation

because of the lack of landing zones in six of the targeted areas. The
exact dispositions of the North Vietnamese remained largely un-
known.
On 13 September 1966 the division conducted its largest air as-
sault to date as more than 120 Hueys and Chinooks lifted five bat-
talions of Col. Archie K. Hyle's 1st Brigade and Col. Marvin J. Ber-
enzweig's 2d Brigade into a circular configuration on the ridges around
8. Cav Div, Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-
1st
32), dtd 10 Sep 66; 1st Cav Div, Critique Summary— Operation CRAZY
HORSE, dtd 27 Jun 66; various 14 MH Det opns chronologies and summary
fact sheets.
84 STANTON
the Crow's Foot. The J 8th NVA Regiment quickly split up, side-
stepped the advance, and slipped away. For the next two weeks the
brigades made only scant contact as troop-laden helicopters leap-
frogged battalions in airmobile pursuit of the fleeing enemy columns.
Several food and clothing caches, a major hospital, and even a gre-
nade and mine factory were uncovered, but the only significant per-
sonnel claim was one song-and-dance troupe specializing in musical
propaganda, captured while traveling between villages.
Although progress seemed disheartening, an NVA regiment had
been displaced from the Kim Son Valley base area and forced to re-
treat an even greater distance from its supply sources. The relentless
cavalry drive apparently caused considerable consternation among the
7th and 8th Battalions of the J 8th NVA Regiment, which decided they
had to fight theirway out of the situation. The NVA force exposed
its location by making an unsuccessful nighttime attack against an
ARVN regimental command post on 23 September and then moved
The division maintained its mo-
farther east onto the coastal plain.
mentum of pursuit and entrapped both battalions there four days later.
The two identified NVA battalions were pocketed into an area
bounded by the South China Sea, the Phu Cat Mountains to the south,
and the Nui Mieu hillmass to the north. Aggressive airmobile cavalry
maneuvering blocked all routes of egress back west into the valley
regions. Major General Norton tightened his cavalry screen to make
enemy exfiltration more difficult and exchanged the Berenzweig bri-
gade for Col. Charles D. Daniel's fresh 3d Brigade. Additional South
Vietnamese and Korean forces were brought in to complete the en-
circlement, and THAYER I was declared terminated as preparations
for Operation IRVING began.
Operation IRVING, actually an extension of THAYER I, com-
menced on October 1966 as five battalions air assaulted into the
1
seacoast pocket. Colonel Hyle's 1st Brigade fought an opening two-

day battle at Hoa Hoi, which became a classic demonstration of com-
bined airmobile tactics. In true cavalry fashion, aerial reconnaissance
started the battle as 9th Cavalry "White" scoutships spotted several
9. Hq 1st Bde Cav Div, Combat Operations After Action Report, dtd
1st
29 Oct 66; Hq 2d Bde 1st Cav Div, Combat Operations After Action Report,
dtd 28 Oct 66.
enemy on the sandy northern tip of the Hung Lac peninsula.

soldiers
Lt. Col. George W. Mcllwain's Troop A of the 1st Squadron, 9th
Cavalry, aggressively exploited the initial contact with ''Red" gun-
ships and its "Blue'' rifle platoon to determine the size of the opposing
forces. A sizable North Vietnamese contingent was confirmed oc-
cupying the hedgerows, dikes, and natural defensive bulwarks of
beachside Hoa Hoi village.
Colonel Hyle's brigade responded with optimum airmobile flex-
ibility. The situation was relayed to Lt. Col. James T. Root, com-
manding 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, who dispatched Company B un-
der Capt. Frederick Mayer, already in flight to another mission, to
the scene of action. Captain Mayer's men air assaulted onto the open
beach and were mortared as they maneuvered into line formation.
Two exploding rounds wounded Mayer, who, despite profuse bleed-
ing, in charge and directed the company through the well-
remained
prepared enemy bunker and trench system crisscrossing in front of
Hoa Hoi. The rest of the battalion was rapidly airmobiled into nearby
blocking positions. The line companies then fought closer toward the
village's main defenses in carefully phased and coordinated attacks.
One advancing platoon was momentarily stopped by intense fire,
but the men quickly recovered, stood up with rifles blazing, and charged
the first trench. The gallantry of two privates, one (Pfc. Roy Salazar)
killed leading a squad to breach a strongpoint and the other (Pfc.

Francis Royal) mortally wounded carrying a wounded comrade to
pace of action for the duration of the battle.
safety, established the
Throughout the action the cavalrymen adhered to the Rules of En-
gagement, when the easier and safer course would have been to ignore
them. Lt. Donald Grigg of 3d Platoon, Company A, was leading his
men across an open field when he saw several civilians suddenly walk
aimlessly onto the field in the direct line of fire between the two
forces. Immediately Lieutenant Grigg threw down his weapon, web
gear, and helmet and raced more than fifty yards through enemy au-
tomatic weaponsfire to carry two small children back to his own
lines, followed by the rest of the old men and women.
The fighting in the village outworks raged throughout the day. At

dusk the battalion pulled back from the village to form a tight cordon,
preventing enemy exfiltration during the night. A continuous naval
and field artillery bombardment was conducted under flarelight. Sev-
eral bands of NVA soldiers tried to probe and shoot their way out of
86 STANTON
the encirclement, but each attempt was repulsed. The battalion made
its final assault against the village the next morning. Fighting was
heaviest in the final trenches, but continued unabated through the
bunker-studded hootches themselves. Several times the cavalrymen
were temporarily halted by the desperate resistance of heavy weapons
strongpoints, but each time the soldiers rallied and carried the attack
forward, sometimes in hand-to-hand combat. Elements of the 7th and
8th Battalions, I8th NVA Regiment, lost 233 killed by body count
and 35 captured at Hoa Hoi, compared to the relatively slight cavalry
casualties of 6 killed and 32 wounded.'"
While the coastal pursuit continued, the division also realized that
continual military presence was required to discourage enemy return
to long-held base areas. By 13 October the division reconcentrated in
the Soui Ca and Kim Son region, where fast reconnaissance sweeps
were interspersed with artillery raids. more sig-
These tactics yielded
nificant cache discoveries and denied the NVA/VC any unimpeded
opportunity to reconsolidate. When Operation IRVING was termi-
nated at midnight on 24 October, the division's aviation had again
rendered remarkable mobile service, airlifting the equivalent of forty-
six infantry battalions and thirty-six artillery batteries during Opera-
tions THAYER I/IRVING."
THAYER II, which commenced
Operation 25 October 1966 with
the return of the northeast monsoon season and continued into 1967,
was a two-brigade sustained pursuit effort to exploit the success of
the previous five weeks of almost continuous contact with the NVA/
VC in the rich coastal plain and the Kim Son and Soui Ca valleys to
the west. Strong surges of monsoon weather dominated the operation
with turbulent, wind-driven rainstorms and excessive humidity. Di-
vision aviation struggled though the dense morning fogs and after-
10. 1st Cav Div Unit Historical Rpt #6, The Battle of Hoa Hoi\ 1st Cav
Div, Report of Action 2-3 October 1966. As a sidenote, the first platoon,
under Lt. Joe Anderson, had a French film team attached under producer
Pierre Schoendoerffer. The film later produced. The Anderson Platoon, de-
votes a significant portion to the Hoa Hoi battle.
11. 1st Cav Div, Combat Operations After Action Report, dtd 13 Jan 67;
and Operational Report on Lessons Learned, dtd 22 Nov 66, Appendix
5-3.
noon thunderstorms to lift the equivalent of 142 infantry battalions

and 70 artillery batteries during the operation.
The I8th NVA Regiment was critically short of food because of
the incessant cavalry offensive, since many rice-gathering details were
destroyed, captured, or surrendered. Several firefights erupted in the
flooded valleys as the fractured enemy battalions desperately sought
to replenish their caches with the recently harvested lowland rice.
While most encounters were cavalry victories, two large battles were
fought under confusing and tactically unsound circumstances, par-
tially reflecting the unfavorable impact on the division of personnel
turbulence and the long strain of campaigning.
On 16 December 1966 Colonel Daniel's brigade was replaced by
Col. James C. Smith's 1st Brigade, while Col. George W. Casey's
2d Brigade continued operating. The next day seven cavalry companies
from the newly inserted brigade responded to a 9th Cavalry clash with
two NVA companies in the Crow's Foot near Thach Long, but control
difficulties between elements nullified the vital coordination required
in all fast-moving airmobile operations. Poor scheduling led to heli-
coptered units arriving at the same time as airstrikes, so that rein-

forcements were kept circling while the battle was raging below. Some
platoons sat idle for hours on pickup zones, and entire companies
were fed piecemeal into the battle. Time and time again arriving forces
walked straight into the killing fields of well-camouflaged enemy
hedgerow bunker positions, some of which were previously detected,
and were decimated in lethal cross fires. Only the courage of indi-
vidual cavalrymen allowed units to push forward, but ironically this
further locked depleted cavalry forces in adverse situations from which
extrication was very difficult. The Viet Cong ended the battle by with-
drawing virtually unhindered after dark. Lt. Col. George D. Eggers's
1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, suffered heavy casualties, and its Com-
pany D ended the day with only thirty-five troops left.'^

The division's supporting howitzers were concentrated on two large
landing zones in the Crow's Foot, LZs Pony and Bird, which could
fire supporting artillery anywhere in the Kim Son Valley. They were
obviously prime targets for enemy action, and Division Artillery warned
12. 1st Cav Div, The Battle in the 506 Valley, 17 Dec 66, Unit Historical
Rpt#15.
88 STANTON
them to expect an attack immediately following the Christmas Truce

on 26 December. Almost unbelievably, the 22d NVA Regiment was
able to emplace supporting fire weapons and stage a massive surprise
close assault which nearly overran LZ Bird in the early morning dark-
ness of 27 December 1966. Approximately 700 North Vietnamese
regulars crawled to within fifteen feet of the landing zone perimeter
without being discovered. Covered by well-placed machine guns and
recoil less rifles, they surged forward with bayonets fixed, screaming,
**G1, you die!" as a sudden mortar barrage swept through the Amer-
ican lines.
The perimeter cavalrymen of Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th
Cavalry, were quickly overwhelmed, and the NVA charged through
all five 155mm howitzer positions of Battery C, 6th Battalion, 16th
Artillery, as well as half of the 105mm howitzers of Battery B, 2d
Battalion, 19th Artillery. The waves of NVA soldiers became inter-
mixed with Burning ammunition bunkers were
retreating cavalrymen.
exploding, communications were knocked out, and all cohesion dis-
appeared under the weight of attack. Some of the most violent hand-
to-hand fighting transpired as gun crews were killed making last stands
around their howitzers.
The executive officer of the light howitzers, ILt. John D. Piper,
frantically loaded a Bee Hive round into the lowered tube of one of
his last remaining weapons and aimed it at hundreds of NVA swarm-
ing around an overrun 155mm howitzer. The Bee Hive round, com-
posed of more than 8,500 steel flechettes, had been specifically de-
signed to stop mass infantry assaults. Lieutenant Piper was unable to
find the flare to alert possible friendly troops in its pathway and yelled,
'^Bee Hive!" repeatedly. Sergeant Graham, who had been forced out
of the targeted position and was now in a drainage ditch out front,
screamed back, **Shoot it!" He recalled that it sounded like "a million
whips being whirled over my head." Piper could see the resulting
carnage in the flarelight, yelled, ''Tube left," quickly chambered an-
other Bee Hive round, and pulled the lanyard. The North Vietnamese
attack was stopped.'^
The combination of Bee Hive rounds and overhead aerial artillery
13. 1st Cav Div, The Attack on LZ Bird, Unit Historical Rpt #2, p. 13.
rocket fire caused the North Vietnamese attack to falter, and the en-
emy withdrew before daylight. Landing Zone Bird was left in sham-
bles, and the 266 dead North Vietnamese were interspersed with 58
dead and 77 wounded Americans. While the defending units were
later awarded the Presidential Unit Citation in recognition of their
valiant defense of LZ Bird and the individual valor exhibited there,
disturbing questions over proper security were left unresolved. The
1st Cavalry Division immediately launched pursuit operations, which
continued for the next several days as the 22d Regiment attempted to
withdraw north to the An Lao Valley, but meaningful contact was
never regained. Even so, the division could justifiably point to the
severe losses inflicted on the regiment, which temporarily knocked it
out of action.
On 3 January 1967 the 3d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division
was placed under the operational control of the 1st Cavalry Division
own engaged six battalions oriented against the National
to support its
PriorityArea of eastern Binh Dinh Province. The continuous battering
rendered the 18th NVA Regiment mostly combat-ineffective. The unit
suffered heavy losses, which included all original company com-
manders, and an intercepted message of 10 January revealed that the
enemy division commander considered the unit unreliable because of
itslow morale. Scattered by several large engagements and uncounted
bush contacts, the regiment fragmented into small groups which at-
tempted to escape northwest into the An Lao Valley to reequip. Cav-
alry patrols continually brushed with these exfiltrating elements.''*
Operation THAYER II, which ended after the Tet truce of 8 to
12 February 1967, was typified by long periods of relatively unop-
posed search operations punctuated by sharp contacts, and marked the
final stage in the 1st Cavalry Division's year of sustained pursuit.
There were negative aspects campaign. It was uneven and
in the total
often hampered by insufficient intelligence and competing require-
ments to reinforce other fronts, especially battles in the western high-
lands. In certain areas the high cost of continued search ruled out
continued expenditure of effort for large blocks of time. Some battles
14. 1st Cav Div, Operation THAYER II Combat After Action Report, dtd
25 Jun 67.
90 STANTON
were tactically mishandled, and a critical division artillery firebase

was even surprised and almost destroyed. The highly proficient and
elusive NVA/VC units were often able to take advantage of adverse
weather and the rugged jungle to evade many airmobile thrusts and
to avoid absolute annihilation. Above all, the division's human cost
was staggering. From 31 January 1966 end of January 1967,
to the
the division suffered 19,512 casualties in all operations: 720 killed in
action; 3,039 wounded; 2,304 nonbattle deaths and injuries; and 13,449
as a result of disease.'^
Yet the positive military gains were most impressive. The cu-
mulative effect of sustained cavalry pursuit greatly reduced NVA/VC
control in most provincial sectors by wearing down effective resis-
tance. The campaign disorganized the Viet Cong control structure,
creating havoc among VC tax gathering, recruiting, medical services,
and administration. Viet Cong government members evading death or
capture were forced to work less openly and with much less effec-
tiveness.
In summation the cavalry pursuit of the 1966 coastal campaign
established the basis for the cavalry clearing operations of 1967. In
many ways this campaign also marked the final evolution of Major
General Kinnard's airmobile doctrine into a battlefield staple of the
Vietnam War. The 1st Cavalry Division exerted persistent airmobile
pressure, foundand engaged strong enemy forces, maintained a steady
pace of extended helicopter operations, and triumphed over weather
and enemy adversity.
p. 40; dtd 15 Aug 66, p. 8; dtd 22 Nov 66, pp. 8-9; dtd 15 Feb 67, p. 8.
CHAPTER 5
Clearing Operations
The Cavalry Division began the campaign for military control of

1st
Binh Dinh Province's coastal plains, narrow valleys, and rugged

mountains in 1966. During 1967 the division still had the job of find-
ing and destroying the NVA/VC military and support network, but
it emphasized pacification as a part of clearing operations as MACV
expanded Major General Norton's priority list.

Great political emphasis was being placed on doing more than just
killing Viet Cong. Ellsworth Bunker replaced Henry Cabot Lodge as
ambassador and insisted that the military get more forcefully involved
in pacification efforts. In May President Johnson's special ambassa-
dor for pacification, Robert Komer, created CORDS (Civil Opera-

tions and Revolutionary Development Support) directly under West-
moreland's chain of command to consolidate the previously disjointed
Allied efforts. Komer was anxious to eliminate the VC infrastructure
and tax-collection system, and recognized that divisions might serve
as excellent vehicles for security duty.
The 1st Cavalry Division, designed as a swift and powerful for-
mation able to influence battles by dint of its airmobility, was hardly
formulated for occupation tasks. Its cannons, aircraft, and automatic
weapons were hands of skilled personnel trained to seek out
in the
and annihilate NVA/VC main force units. Nevertheless, with a min-
imum of guidance, but a great deal of confusing high command di-
rectives, the 1st Cavalry Division found itself intimately involved in
trying to help the South Vietnamese government assert administrative
control over the rich agricultural eastern area of Vietnam's most pop-
ulous province.
92 STANTON
The 1st Cavalry Division's clearing offensive in the 1 ,600 square

miles of Binh Dinh Province was labeled Operation PERSHING, and
it would last from 11 February 1967 until 21 January 1968. It might
have continued indefinitely, except that the regular North Vietnamese

Army divisions, which the politicians consistently underrated or ig-
nored (and which would actually blitzkrieg South Vietnam into de-
struction during 1975), forced the cavalry's redeployment to I CTZ.
In themeantime, with his troops committed to endure another annual
cycle of heavy northeast monsoon rains and dry southwest monsoon
heat along the central coast. Major General Norton set up his com-
mand post at LZ Bong Son.
English outside
The burden of implementing a pacification program that supple-
mented combat operations with meaningful civic action fell on the
shoulders of the cavalry provost marshal, Lt. Col. James P. Oliver.
As a military policeman, he simply combined the divisional 545th
Military Police Company with the 816th South Vietnamese National
Police Field Force (NPFF) to form an ad hoc cavalry-advised NPFF
battalion which became operational the same day CORDS became
official: 26 May 1967. The police battalion would seal off selected
hamlets and search them for tunnels and caches while interrogating
the residents. Colonel Oliver strictly enforced the Rules of Engage-
ment, since everyone at least agreed that proper troop conduct was
basic to winning the respect and cooperation of the local population.
Operation PERSHING was essentially a clearing operation em-
phasizing population control and area security. Most of it consisted
of slow and tedious searches aimed at breaking VC village-level power.
To the soldier's eye this part of the operation was deceptively unglam-
orous — consisting of searches day after day through homes and com-
post piles, often in pouring rain or searing heat — and tedious, since
he was keenly aware that he was under constant observation by an
enemy quick to capitalize on his slightest mistake. The innumerable,
monotonous cordon-and-search missions could be marred by sudden
and violent hamlet firefights, and the NVA/VC defended enough for-
tified villages and valley passes to kill and maim cavalrymen in num-
bers surpassing all division operational losses of 1966.
Regardless of allied pacification intentions, the fact was that the
1st Cavalry Division still faced a viable enemy main force threat in
Binh Dinh Province and adjacent areas. Therefore, Operation
PERSHING contained numerous platoon actions, brigade emergency
Clearing Operations 93
displacements, long-range airmobile raids, and some of the hardest-

fought engagements of the division's Vietnam service. The 1st Cav-
dky Division's massed helicopter airlift, vertical air assault muscle,
and swift and artillery firepower were all significant in subduing
aerial
the province's pro- Viet Cong population and its armed units. To this
air-oriented dimension, the 1st Cavalry Division added armor and
mechanization for the first time. Tanks provided essential fortifica-
tions suppression and gave the psychological edge in ground attacks.
The 1st Battalion of the 50th Infantry (Mechanized), attached to the
division in September, was used either way. The armored personnel
carriers were employed either as fighting vehicles in a mounted role
or as mobile gun platforms with minimum crews as the companies
were helicoptered into combat as airmobile infantry.
The division's 1st Squadron of the 9th Cavalry remained in the
forefront of all coastal campaign action. The aerial recon squadron
was the sole Army unit of this type at the time, but already its unique
scout and gunship composition was proving a deadly effective com-
bination over the battlefield. The squadron's mission was direct and
simple: find the enemy. To avail the widely separated brigades of its
valuable service, the squadron parceled out one air cav troop to each.
The ground troop (Troop D) was composed of fast-riding gunjeeps
backed up by attached M42 Duster self-propelled flak guns and was
used as a mobile light infantry reserve that protected the engineers
who were sweeping mines and replacing blown bridges along High-
way 1.
The 9th Cavahy thrived on speed in the hunt and quick reaction
to any contact. Typical of its utilization was the June action at An
Quang near Dam Tra-O Lake, a tidewater basin connected to the South
China Sea. Troop C of the squadron was scouting for Col. Fred E.
Kaitiohs's 2d Brigade, and a pair of light H13 observation "White
team" helicopter pilots buzzing An Quang at treetop level spotted
suspiciously fresh diggings and field work but no farmers. The sector
was normally quiet, but had seen action in the past, and the troop
commander decided to investigate with his "Blue" rifle platoon. The
ground cavalrymen landed, found a large boulder whitewashed with
"Welcome to the VC and NVA" in Vietnamese, and were fired upon
when approaching the village. They called for several aerial rocketing
runs by armed "Red team" helicopters and withdrew to block the
southern exit from the village.
94 STANTON
Colonel Karhohs arrived overhead in his command helicopter and

immediately ordered the 2d Brigade quick reaction force platoon, 1st
Platoon of Company B from Lt. Col. Joseph C. McDonough's 2d
Battalion, 5th Cavalry, to land in support. The company was air as-
saulted beyond the village to block the northern direction, and its
helicopters were fired upon while descending. The 9th Cavalry squad-
ron commander, Lt. Col. R. H. Nevins, Jr., kept a swarm of armed
and scout helicopters circling over the lake to the west. Judging from
the amount of enemy return fire. Colonel Karhohs estimated that ele-
ments of two NVA companies were in the village complex and ra-
dioed for reinforcements. Even the "Blue" platoon was bolstered by
a platoon of riflemen from Troop D that was airlifted to its assistance.
What had started as a scouting report by the Troop C leader was now
an opportunity for decisive brigade action. When Lieutenant Colonel
McDonough arrived to take charge on the ground less than two hours
after the initial contact, he had four and a half cavalry battalions sur-
rounding An Quang.
Preparatory to his ground attack, McDonough massed a liberal
diversity of fire support to soften the village defenses. Working with
several controllers and observers, he coordinated the firepower of ar-
tillery, aerial rocket helicopters, regular gunships. Navy and Air Force
tactical airstrikes, naval gunfire, medium battle tanks, M42 Duster
40mm self-propelled guns, and even CH47 '^Guns A-Go-Go" mini-
gun-armed Chinooks. Despite the destruction wrought by this heavy
explosive ordnance, both Companies B and D were hit midway through
the smoldering village. Two Viet Cong suddenly dashed out from
spider holes and heaved grenades into the cavalry ranks, and machine
guns and snipers swept the companies with accurate close-in fire. Dead
and wounded Americans littered the open ground where they had been
cut down next to weapons in tunnel entrances. A pair of tanks moved
forward to blast the treetops with canister Bee Hive discharges, al-
lowing the cavalrymen to pull back their wounded and get out of the
village. They left behind one burning M42 Duster which had been
knocked out in the fighting.
With evening approaching and regular brigade troops in position,
the aerial squadron would have normally extracted its elements to
continue reconnoitering or block other possible exfiltration routes. In
this case, however, it was necessary for the two squadron ground
platoons to stay situated and help seal off the village complex. The
Operation PERSHING Map by Shelby L Stanton
To Song Re Vairey^>;r^ >-^ /^-^^^H^
I
96 STANTON
North Vietnamese decided to evade during the night despite the bright
moon and continuous illumination flares. They left a rear guard in
An Quang which still had to be destroyed.
The following day thirty-three airstrikes and several artillery bar-
rages were directed against the village complex. Lieutenant Colonel
McDonough's battalion assaulted through the interlocking fire of the
remaining bunkers and secured the hamlet. A total of 89 NVA bodies
were found, and more were believed to be buried in the collapsed
bunker ruins. Later a prisoner claimed that his 18th NVA Regiment's
9th Battalion lost 150 of its 250-man complement in the action and
that the survivors reached the Cay Giep Mountains only by slipping
through the water and reeds around the northern edge of the lake.'
Throughout the 1967 coastal campaign, the aerial reconnaissance
squadron sparked the majority of division contacts in the same fash-
ion. "White scout team helicopter sightings of NVA/VC activity
""
were followed up by rocketing and strafing from the "Red" aero

weapons teams and exploited by "Blue" aero rifle platoons. The con-
tacts produced a variety of brigade-size battles, platoon firefights, and
firings recorded only in flight logs, but the work was always ex-
tremely dangerous. All contacts, regardless of their length or signif-
icance, were likely to be challenged by some type of enemy antiair-
craft fire with weapons up to 12.7mm AA machine guns in size.
Over the course of the squadron's 343 days in the PERSHING

campaign, its forward reconnaissance role exacted such a heavy toll
that its were replaced twice over. The 1st Squadron, 9th Cav-
aircraft
alry, which operated with 88 helicopters and 770 personnel, was taken
under fire 931 times, resulting in 250 helicopters being hit. Of these,
102 helicopters were so badly damaged that they had to be stricken
from inventory, and 14 were shot down and fully destroyed. During
this same time, the squadron lost 55 killed, 1 missing, and 264 wounded
members in aerial and ground combat.^
Behind this advance umbrella of 9th Cavalry aerial scoutships.

Major General Norton's three cavalry brigades and one attached in-
fantry brigade from the 25th Infantry Division fanned out through
1. 1st Cav Div, The Battle of Dam Tra-0, Unit Historical Rpt #16.
2. Hq 1st Sqdn, 9th Cav, Memorandum for Record, Operation PERSHING.
dtd Feb 68, pp. 6-7, 24.
Binh Dinh Province. Operation PERSHING began as Colonel Smith's

1st Brigade and Colonel Casey's 2d Brigade slashed into the Bong
Son Plains in a wave of air assaults that took several hamlets by storm
and flushed large numbers of hiding enemy soldiers from tunnels,
wells, and concealed underground bunkers. Col. Jonathan R. Bur-
ton's 3d Brigade reconnoitered the forbidding An Lao Valley, and the
attached 3d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division covered area de-
velopment chores of the ARVN22d Division and Korean Capital Di-
vision as far south as the Soui Valley and Phu My Plains.
Ca
Learning from its bitter lessons at la Drang and other early en-
counters, the division reserved one full battalion as a ready reaction
force (RRF). The RRF conducted normal operations, but was pre-
pared for swift consolidation and pickup by division helicopters spe-
cially earmarked for emergency utilization. The division RRF stood
ready to land a company quick reaction force anywhere in the
PERSHING area within just thirty minutes. This lead strike unit could
be followed by the rest of the battalion RRF in three to four hours.
Each brigade maintained a miniature company-size RRF, with one
platoon designated as its quick reaction force. Throughout the up-
coming campaign the airmobile reaction reserves offered the 1st
Cavalry Division an unprecedented flexibility in dominating the
battlefield.
The and 2d Battalions of the 5th Cavalry battled across
sister 1st
the village-studded Bong Son Plains through February as they wres-
tled more villages from the 22d NVA Regiment. Two large engage-
ments overshadowed a rash of platoon skirmishes and countless booby-
trap and mechanical ambush device incidents. Engineer dozers were
used to level any structures potentially useful as fortified strongpoints,
but contact dwindled as search operations intensified. The division
adopted a new stratagem to keep NVA/VC activity low in its old
haunts of the mountains west of the coastal plains.
The 1st Cavahy Division instituted drastic clearing measures against
the most troublesome VC base areas. The Kim Son (Crow's Foot),
Soui Ca, and An Lao valleys were all written off as too remote and
too hazardous to be effectively occupied. Classified as "denial areas,"
the divisionmade final sweeps of them and forcibly removed the re-
maining inhabitants. Once depopulated, the valleys were smothered
with Agent Orange by the Vietnamese Air Force, which flew repeated
crop-destruction missions. The division hoped that liberal application
98 STANTON
of this toxic chemical would poison all future rice production in the
valleys, ruining their usefulness as enemy havens. The mass roundups
also denuded the land of VC labor and military recruits, but produced
more than 93,000 refugees. The displacement problem became so acute
that plans for other denial areas had to be dropped.^
The small sweeps and patrols became routine, but they always
required a mastery of basic soldiering and leadership. Contact was
normally light, but numerous mines, booby traps, snipers, and sudden
firefights continued to decide the cavalrymen's survival. The frag-
mented division was waging a platoon-level war in its clearing cam-
paign, which demanded the highest degree of judgment, discipline,
and tactical expertise. Action on the Bong Son front simmered in
March, but Colonel Casey's brigade engaged the 18th NVA Regiment
in several skirmishes around the Cay Giep Mountains and Dam Tra-
O Lake. One encounter resulted in a brigade-size battle against well-
defended NVA village defenses from 19 to 22 March near Tam Quan.
With Operation PERSHING well underway, and in keeping with
MACV's annual rotation of division commands during the Vietnam
War, Major General Norton relinquished command of the 1st Cavahy
Division to Maj. Gen. John J. Tolson III on 1 April 1967. General
Tolson, the Commandant of the U.S. Army Aviation School since
1965, fulfilled all the prerequisites shaping the airmobile division
command ticket. He was a paratrooper veteran and a seasoned avia-
tor,and he had long been in the forefront of airmobility development.
Bom 22 October 1915 in North Carolina, he graduated from West
Point in 1937 and participated in the first tactical air movement of
Army ground forces two years later. During World War II, Colonel
Tolson served with the paratroopers in the Pacific, making combat
jumps into New Guinea, Corregidor Island, and the Philippines with
the 503d Parachute Infantry. In 1957 he became an aviator and later
served as Director of Army Aviation.
Major General Tolson continued divisional searches in the coastal
region and mountain valleys, but was also directed immediately to
assist Marine Operation LEJEUNE in the Due Pho region, just north
of the Bong Son Plains. Major General Norton had been urging cav-
3. 1st Cav Div, Combat After Action Report, dtd 29 Jun 68, Tab 30; Ltr
dtd 14 Jul 68, Incl. 7, Significant Contacts.
airy pursuit north of the Bong Son Plains for some time before his
departure, and the division was anxious to explore the area. MACV
commander General Westmoreland also deliberately slated this "fire
brigade" reaction as a model exercise to test changes of operational
direction with minimal advance warning. Assistant division com-
mander Brig. Gen. George S. Blanchard was placed in charge of the
sudden flurry of activity accompanying Colonel Karhohs's 2d Brigade
airmobile expedition. Fortunately, April was a transition month of fair
weather between the northeast and southwest monsoons, and the bri-
gade enjoyed optimum atmospheric and sea conditions.
The entire brigade was airlifted into Due Pho in a day and a half
to permit rapid Marine redeployment. The rushed timetable and hectic
helicopter shuffling caused some loss of air traffic control, mostly
because of the lack of coordination between Marine and Army aircraft
channels. Helicopters continually roared across unit boundaries in the
confined beach area, dropped off gear and personnel in unsatisfactory
locations, and then moved them around again. Rotor blades kicked
up sand, knocked down tentage, and scattered equipment. The radio
waves were cluttered with irate transmission outbursts typified by, "If
you blow my tent down one more time, I'm going to shoot you out
of the air!" but everything was soon in place without serious mishap.
The most impressive display of division capability during Oper-
ation LEJEUNE was the 8th Engineer Battalion's incredible airfield
construction feat. More than two hundred tons of heavy equipment
were airlifted by CH54 Rying Crane and CH47 Chinook helicopters
to build a forward combat airfield in just twenty-four hours. The
"Sky beaver" engineers worked around the clock for two more days
making the field acceptable for CI 23 cargo transport aircraft. The
Marines were awestruck by the lavish amounts of cavalry equipment
and helicopter support, but expressed open concern about snipers as
the airmobile engineers toiled nightly under floodlamps and vehicle
headlights. Working with great skill in record time, Lt. Col. Charles
G. Olentine's engineer battalion proved that the airmobile division
could promptly build the airfield facilities necessary for its own sup-
port.
The 2d Brigade helped to build another airfield, secured the beach

landing site as the Marines departed, conducted numerous search-and-
destroy sweeps, and policed the Vietnamese as they harvested VC-
planted rice.
100 STANfTON
The 1st Cavalry Division also touted a geographical first, since

the move placed the division outside II CTZ for the first time since
itsarrival in Vietnam nineteen months before: Due Pho was in Quang
Ngai Province of I CTZ. On 19 April, with his mission accomplished.
Colonel Karhohs turned over the Due Pho sector and its recently con-
structed airfields to the 3d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division, which
was released from division control three days later. The excursion
demonstrated the airmobile division's ability to transplant quickly a
major task force into an unfamiliar area on short notice. This was one
of the most valuable advantages of the aerial cavalry division to the
MACV command.'^
The Cavalry Division's clearing operations began driving the
1st
NVA/VC main force units out of northeastern Binh Dinh Province

and into the mountain ranges beyond the coastal valleys. To reach
them. Major General Tolson mounted cavalry raids, which were time-
honored cavahy tactics in a new airmobile mode. Fast and light, the
cavalry battalions struck northwest of the An Lao Valley and stabbed
into distant NVA/VC base areas. In early May, airmobile cavalry
staged out of the remote Ba To Special Forces camp and searched for
the suspected headquarters of the 3d NVA Division. In August the 3d
Brigade leapfrogged northward from the An Lao Valley in a series
of airmobile thrusts which carried it into the long-suspected VC haven
of the Quang Ngai Province's Song Re Valley. The twisting valley
floor was suspiciously free of visible inhabitants, but filled with fertile
ricefields between the jungle hillocks.
The 2d Battalion of the 8th Cavalry, under Lt. Col. John E. Stan-
nard, had just completed a month's tour of duty guarding the division
main base at Camp Radcliff. His battalion was attached to 3d Bri-
gade and became part of a cavalry raid into the Song Re Valley. Once
in the valley. Lieutenant Colonel Stannard planned to sweep his bat-
talion toward blocking positions set up by one company airmobiled
ahead onto a small ridge near the abandoned airstrip of Ta Ma, which
would then move downslope and establish its positions.
On the morning of 9 August 1967, following five minutes of pre-
paratory light artillery fire on the grassy ridgeline, Capt. Raymond
K. Bluhm, Jr.'s, Company A was air assaulted into LZ Pat. The last
helicopters were descending with the weapons platoon when heavy
4. 1st Cav Div, Operation LEJEUNE, Unit Historical Rpt #10.

North Vietnamese antiaircraft guns suddenly opened fire from two
higher dominating the ridgeline on either side. Two 9th Cavalry

hills
helicopter gunships orbiting overhead were immediately shot down.

An H13 observation helicopter and the brigade command and control
ship were also quickly put out of action. The enemy flak guns turned
to sweep the exposed ridge with intensely accurate fire, pinning Cap-
tain Bluhm's 120-man company close to the ground.
The company was unable to maneuver, and Viet Cong troops hid-
den in spiderholes and log bunkers on the ridgeline itself began firing
into the cavalry lines. Several cavalrymen were killed in quick succes-
sion. One trooper was mortally wounded by a 12.7mm AA round that
tossed him back five feet. Medical Sp5 Andrew Conrad became the
first aidman killed when he was struck in the forehead by a bullet
while trying to assist a wounded comrade. The increasing number of

wounded could not be evacuated because the heavy antiaircraft fire
blanketed the landing zone.
SSgt. John Stipes, the weapons platoon leader, quickly emplaced
his 81mm mortar to fire against the muzzle flashes on the neighboring
hillsides, but the tube stuck up like a stovepipe at such close range.
The enemy returned a volley of mortar rounds against the obvious
target, forcing Stipes to cease firing. Extra mortar ammunition was
scattered in discarded packs, lying all over the LZ. Ammunition bearer
Pfc. Prentice D. Leclair was shot through the head while trying to
collect them.
With all recoilless rifle and mortar ammunition either expended
or unreachable, the company's few M60 machine guns rattling de-
fiantly at the adjacent its main firepower.
jungled slopes constituted
One by one they were knocked out. Gunner Sp4 Michael Hotchkiss
had already lost several crew members when a mortar shell landed
on his back and disintegrated the entire position. Platoon Sgt. Frank
M. Theberge, who suffered a broken ankle after leaping eight feet
from a helicopter when the firing started, crawled to a small knoll
and took charge of the machine gun crew there. While trying to direct
the gun, he was struck in the back of his head by a bullet and knocked
unconscious.
A IE Skyraiders dived along the enemy-held ridges and spilled
clusters of bombs directly against the enemy flak positions. Three
medical evacuation helicopters braved concentrated fire to lift out the
most seriously wounded. Close bombing passes by F4C Phantoms
102 STANTON
and FlOO Supersabres blasted the surrounding hills. After forty-two

sorties and an expenditure of 82,500 pounds of bombs, 28,500 pounds
of napalm, and 22,600 pounds of 20mm cannon fire, enemy AA fire

slackened enough to allow helicopter extraction of Bluhm's battered
company before nightfall.The Battle of LZ Pat was a dour lesson in
raiding a formidable enemy strongpoint with only light artillery and
limited helicopter support. The Song Re Valley expedition served as
a valuable dress rehearsal for stronger, division-size cavalry raids in
the coming year.^
The 1st Cavalry Division continued to battle the NVA/VC across
the Bong Son Plains and into the An Lao Valley during September.
In early October the 3d Brigade was transferred to southern I CTZ to
permit further Marine redeployments northward, and the division posted
more emergency task forces to other fronts. By November, when Col.
Donald V. Rattan's 1st Brigade was airlifted into the western high-
lands because of the raging Dak To campaign. Operation PERSHING
had become essentially a holding action. I Field Force Vietnam com-
mander Lt. Gen. Stanley R. Larsen expressed open concern over the
worsening situation in the PERSHING area on 16 December 1967.
While recognizing the fact that the 1st Cavalry Division had been
assigned, for the time being, an economy of force role, he indicated
that any further draw-down of his forces could have an adverse effect
on the clearing operations in Binh Dinh Province. Whenever contain-
ing pressure weakened, the North Vietnamese slipped out of the hills
and attempted to reestablish themselves in the coastal plains and rice-
lands. The NVA/VC resurfaced whenever the cavalry division dis-
patched fire brigades to Kontum Province or other locations.
The 1 St Cavalry Division did not complete its clearing operations
in Binh Dinh Province until 21 January 1968, but the coastal cam-
paign culminated in the mid-December victory over a fortified sea-
coast village complex near Tam Quan. The action began on 6 De-
cember as a routine sighting in the midst of a dozen squad and
platoon-size incidents throughout the PERSHING area. Aerial scout-
ships of the 9th Cavalry observed a communications antenna toeing
pulled in near the village of Dai Dong, and shortly afterward enemy
machine guns opened fire on an H 1 3 observation helicopter.
5. 1st Cav Div, The Battle of LZ Pat, 14 MHO.

Troop A's rifle platoon was air assaulted into the vicinity late that
afternoon, but became embroiled in combat and unable to disengage.
A platoon of the squadron's Troop D inserted to assist became stranded
as well. The North Vietnamese occupied an extensive network of spi-
der holes and fortified strongpoints built into trenchlines around the
terraced rice paddies and hamlets. The enemy positions were embed-
ded in thick hedgerows formed by cacti and dense underbrush, and
also interwoven into the numerous dwellings, bamboo thickets, and
palm groves on a sandy barrier island.
Colonel Rattan dispatched several units to reinforce and rescue
the isolated recon troops before dark from their untenable positions.
One of the first in was his quick reaction force. Company B of Lt.
Col. Christian Dubia's 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, which was air as-
saulted into the engagement. Shortly after landing, the reaction force
was struck by extremely close-range automatic weapons and grenade
fire erupting from positions concealed in the nearby hedgerows and
shrubbery. The fighting was at such close range that the North Viet-
namese surged out of their trenches to loot American wounded. The
2d Platoon clubbed its way out to prevent their mortally wounded
lieutenant from being choked to death by NVA soldiers. In another
area four armored personnel carriers sent from Company A, 1st Bat-
talion of the 50th Infantry, were stopped by a dike at the edge of the
barrier island. One of the mechanized vehicles became mired in paddy
mud just short of the enemy trenchline and received a direct hit from
a B40 rocket.
The battered reaction company pulled back and reorganized with
the remaining three armored personnel carriers. After nightfall, as
and helicopter gunships pounded and rocketed the enemy de-
artillery
fenses, one of the vehicles sped over to extract the trapped recon-
naissance troops. The artillery bombardment was maintained through-
out the night under aircraft searchlights and flare illumination. Colonel
Rattan used the time to move the 40th ARVN Regiment into blocking
positions around the general area and ordered in more mechanized
support to include flamethrowing carriers. The rest of Lieutenant
Colonel Dubia's battalion moved onto the battlefield.
Although the weather was cool and overcast, with intermittent
rain showers and early morning ground haze, it never interfered with
aerial support. In the morning helicopter gunships rocketed the village
then doused it with riot gas. Four Duster self-propelled flak guns clanked
104 STANTON
dense foliage covering the enemy

into position to fire through the
lines.Dozers from the 8th Engineer Battalion pushed up a causeway
across the muddy paddy water so that additional armored personnel
carriers could fully support the renewed attack.
At 9:00 A.M. the cavalrymen started across the marshy ricefields,
supported by several armored personnel carriers. They were met by
a hail of machine gun, rifle, and grenade fire. Company A's advance
was stopped in a heavily overgrown area, and on the left flank a
platoon of Company B was pinned down by a heavy machine gun
nest. Snipers were registering extremely accurate fire on the mech-
anized carriers, and many vehicle commanders and drivers were killed.
This first assault was called off shortly after one of the mechanized
vehicles was destroyed by a mine while carrying wounded to the rear.
The units pulled back, allowing more artillery and airstrikes to be
placed on the enemy fortifications.
The two companies assaulted the NVA lines later that morning
with seven armored personnel carriers in front. The advancing cav-
alrymen had gained only one hundred yards when they were hit with
a fusillade of devastating sniper, automatic weapons, and grenade fire.
Almost one vehicle driver was killed and three armored

instantly,
vehicle commanders were severely wounded. Company A lost twenty
men trying to cross over one low hedgerow, and the open field was
covered with dead and wounded. The battalion was forced to retreat
and reorganize under the cover of artillery fire, while twelve heli-
copter loads of wounded were medically evacuated.
That afternoon another attack was launched. As the cavalrymen
moved forward, the armored personnel carriers slowly proceeded in
front of them with shielded machine guns blazing. One armored
flamethrowing carrier accompanied the advance. Although there were
two mechanized flamethrowing carriers during the battle, only one
could be used at a time. The other mechanized flamethrower was to
the rear taking on a fresh mixture of napalm, and they rotated in this
fashion throughout the action. As recoilless rifle fire and rocket-pro-
pelled grenades slammed into the advancing troops, one carrier ex-
ploded and stopped Company B's drive. The gush of smoke rising
from the antitank weapon backblast revealed the enemy position, and
itwas scorched by the flamethrower.
Company A was also having difficulty, as one of the tracked ve-
hicles in front of the unit threw a track and became immobilized. The
Qearing Operations 105
enemy fire intensified, but the remaining three carriers suddenly put
on a burst of speed fifty yards from the main trenchline. The engines
sputtered from a walking rate to fifteen miles per hour, enabling the
machines to smash into the trench. The unexpected violence of this
maneuver completely disorganized the North Vietnamese, who tried
to flee the onrushing vehicles. Several groups tried to climb the ar-
mored carriers only to be crushed under their steel tracks or shot down
by the machine guns and rifles of the crew members. The infantry
quickly caught up, and by evening the first trench was in cavalry
hands. The limit of advance had been reached for the day.
Lieutenant Colonel Dubia airlifted Company C of his battalion
into the line on the morning of 8 December to relieve Company B.
The attack was continued, but opposition was already considerably
weaker. The armored personnel carriers were followed by engineer
dozers and demolition teams destroying emplacements and clearing
lanes as the infantry pushed ahead. Hard fighting transpired in other
nearby hamlets, and the entire engagement lasted several days. Every
night the Americans pulled back to night laagers ringed with armored
vehicles. The 1st Battalion of the 12th Cavalry was brought in as
reinforcement from Dak To, and more NVA pockets of resistance
were eradicated throughout the area. On 19 December 1967 the final
action was fought by a company of Lieutenant Colonel Stannard's
battalion against a Viet Cong force dug into the northern bank of the
Bong Son River.
The Battle of Tam Quan was fought over a relatively large area
on the Bong Son Plains between the towns of Tam Quan and Song
Son from 6 to 20 December 1967. Colonel Rattan's brigade used its
attached mechanized forces to optimum advantage in mauling both
the 7th and 8th Battalions, 22dNVA Regiment. With the battle's con-
clusion, organized enemy regular forces were largely finished in
northeastern Binh Dinh Province. The Battle of Tam Quan was costly
to both sides. The 1st Cavalry Division lost 58 soldiers killed and 250
wounded, while more than 600 North Vietnamese bodies were found
in the smashed trenches and charred strongpoints. The engagement
was considered one of the most significant encounters fought during

Operation PERSHING, and it represented the successful air cavalry
utilization of mechanized support on a well-defended battlefield.
Operations in Vietnam placed the 1st Cavalry Division in the se-
curity business for the fu^t time since its initial inception as a border
106 STANTON
patrol division in the southwestern United States. Clearing operations

in Operation PERSHING brought a new dimension to airmobility as
well. Traditionally favored air assaults, aerial surveillance,
and rapid
reaction capabilities were tailored to meet new division needs. The
airmobile techniques most commonly used in PERSHING were either
specifically innovated or refined for the clearing campaign: cordon
and search, swooper, snatch and selective snatch, bushmaster, light-
ning bug, hunter-killer, minicav, artillery ambush, trail running, and
artillery raids.
Cordon-and-search missions applied to temporary village occu-

pation. Under the cover of early morning darkness, a cavalry rifle
company marched to a selected hamlet and surrounded it before dawn.
Just after first light a South Vietnamese field police platoon was air-
lifted in to thoroughly search the village. One police team set up a

screening and collection point for the villagers while the rest of the
platoon searched each home and questioned its inhabitants. Persons
detained during the search were whisked out by helicopter to a sep-
The other villagers were as-
arate collection center at brigade level.
sembled and listened to a propaganda team explain the U.S. presence
and South Vietnamese government aims, and were encouraged to give
information about the Viet Cong. At the same time, division medical
personnel established a MEDCAP medical clinic in the hamlet.
At division and brigade level the provost marshal established po-
lice operations centers jointly staffed by the division military police,
NPFF, special branch police,and officers from the ARVN 22d Di-
vision G2 and G5 Here village detainees were subjected to
sections.
closer scrutiny, and division military intelligence experts produced the
feared counterintelligence **Black Lists '^ in the division police oper-
ations center. The magnitude of this effort was reflected by the 10,407
detainees processed by the 545th Military Police Company's drag- **
net" screening points at division and brigade level. They ranged from
individual farmers scooped up while tilling rice in selective snatch
missions to whole regional populations forcibly evacuated from zones
such as the An Lao Valley. From 26 May 1967, when the joint cav-
alry-NPFF force conducted its first cordon and search, the division
conducted 946 such missions, which checked 319,313 undetained
^'innocent" civilians.
Speed and surprise were essential in cordon-and-search missions
because the Viet Cong quickly fled villages being approached by al-
Skytroopers of the 1st Cavalry Division prepare to disembark from a UH-
series Huey helicopter during the la Drang Valley Campaign in November
1965 (Army News Features).
1st Cavalry Division pathfinder guides a gaggle of UH-ID Huey helicopter

troop transports into a Vietnam landing zone (U.S. Army).
The CH-47 Chinook helicopter was used for a variety of cargo missions and
could deliver troops using Jacob's ladders into difficult jungle terrain, as
demonstrated here (Army News Features).
ai
A heavy Hunter-Killer team consisting of oneOH-6A "white" observation

helicopter and two AH-IG "red" Cobra gunships on a reconnaissance mis-
sion over III CTZ, 21 February 7969 (U.S. Army).
The giant CH-54 Flying Crane allowed the 1st Cavalry Division to airlift
medium 155mm howitzers onto remote mountaintop landing zones in Viet-
nam (U.S. Army).
Air Force C-130 aircraft, here preparing to fly 1st Cavalry Division advance
troops from Nha Trang to An Khe on 25 August 1965, were used to transport
division elements throughout the war (593d Signal Company Audio Visual
Detachment).
The division aviation resources included six OV-1 Mohawk reconnaissance

aircraft, but theirVietnam performance was disappointing (U.S. Army).
4 41
I*.' . -*.
Dismounted cavalrymen cautiously advance through a coastal village near

Bong Son during Operation PERSHING on 15 March 1967 (U.S. Army).
Suppressing NVA bunkers was one of the many dangerous tasks conducted
by crack "Blue" cavalry reconnaissance troops of the 1st Squadron, 9th
Cavalry, in Vietnam (U.S. Army).
The 7.62mm machine gun was one of the most valuable infantry weapons
of the airmobile cavalry and each line company was authorized six of them
(Author's Collection).
Heavy jungle slowed cavalry movement on the ground in Vietnam, and de-
manded constant teamwork in crossing innumerable water obstacles (U.S.
Army).
A 155mm howitzer of the divisional 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery, renders
medium fire support from a forward position in War Zone C (U.S. Army).
;/•"
The 8th Engineer Battalion contained a variety of heavy construction equip-

ment used for building airfields, such as this one at Due Pho prepared dur-
ing Operation LEJEUNE in April 1967 (1st Cavalry Division PIO).
Helicopter losses in Vietnam were less than expected, but still took a heavy
toll. This AH-IG Cobra of Battery A, 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery, crashed
near Tay Ninh on 13 January 1970 (Author's Collection).
Combat infantrymen of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, at a forward aid

station with female medical personnel attached to the division (Author's Col-
lection).
lied military units.The timing and methods of surrounding villages

were constantly changed to avoid setting patterns. Companies were
often airmobiled around villages on swooper missions. Considerable
surprise could be achieved by sudden swooper airmobile insertions if
the time of daywas varied sufficiently to throw VC guards off bal-
ance. Sometimes the cavalry even amphibiously landed near seaside
hamlets from naval craft covered by swift boats.
Snatch missions tried to capture Viet Cong among the people
working in the fields outside the villages. Developed in late July, a
typical snatch mission used a pair of scout helicopters and a third
helicopter, which carried the battalion operations officer. He ran-
domly surveyed the ricefields for large groups of people and called
for a snatch mission by radioing the standby airmobile rifle platoon
and Vietnamese police team. Escorted by two gunships, the troop
helicopters corralled any selected group of people by landing around
them. The platoon riflemen got out of the helicopters and compressed
the surrounded farmers, who were usually men, women, and children
of all ages, toward one spot for screening and inspection by the po-
lice. Since snatch missions could be conducted in one hour and netted
many VC suspects, they were considered very successful.
Within a few weeks, however, people no longer gathered in groups
largeenough to make a snatch mission worthwhile. The division re-
sponded by developing the selective snatch. These missions normally
involved two Huey troopships with three riflemen from battalion
headquarters on each, escorted by two gunships and a pair of scout
helicopters. The battalion operations officer flew above the ricefields
looking for anybody who appeared suspicious and directed the two
Hueys descend swiftly on both sides of suspects to allow appre-
to
hension by the six cavalrymen. The selective snatch mission generally
terminated when the lift ships were full of suspects.
Division bushmaster missions were night infantry ambushes along
suspected NVA/VC infiltration routes, employed by platoon-size ele-
ments. Multiple ambush forces were usually fielded within reinforc-
ing distance of their company forward base and were mutually sup-
porting. During Operation RICE GRAIN, a suboperation guarding the
October rice harvest, bushmaster missions were conducted to prevent
night harvesting for possible VC consumption.
Lightning bug missions were another nighttime activity to detect
and inhibit enemy travel, using special searchlight-fitted helicopters
108 STANTON
at division level. Since helicopter-mounted spotlights were almost

useless if dense foliage existed, these ^'firefly" aircraft usually probed
the darkened coastal region. A bug team consisted of one
lightning
searchlight helicopter, a team of two helicopter gunships, and a flare-
dropping helicopter. The gunships fired on targets revealed by the
powerful spotlight beams of the searchlight helicopter. Alternatively,
the lights could be turned off and targets spotted with starlight scopes,
in which case the flare-dropping helicopter provided target illumi-
nation for the gunships. Often a SLAR-equipped aircraft flew ahead
of the lightning bug team to scan for likely searchlight targets such
as sampans.
The hunter-killer missions were battalion-level night helicopter
searches. One Huey helicopter carried a starlight scope operator, who
was chosen by battalion headquarters, and he marked targets with
tracer rounds for the two helicopter gunships which made up the rest
of the hunter-killer team. All nightly surveillance was kept deliber-
ately on an irregular basis.
Minicav missions were small airmobile search operations which
normally air assaulted a rifle platoon onto an objective, with other
airmobile reinforcements on standby in case of contact. The minicav
mission differed somewhat from ordinary platoon sweep operations
because the platoon was under the control of a flight leader overhead
in an observation helicopter. He moved the platoon to check out his
visual sightings and could rapidly extract and reinsert the platoon with
great flexibility to search wide areas.
Artillery ambushes and trail-running missions were division ar-
tillery night firings. Artillery shelling was used in Vietnam for ha-
rassing and interdiction purposes on a nightly basis. To find targets

automatically, artillery ambushes were triggered by seismic intrusion
devices or field-expedient trip flares along trails and suspected path-
ways. An artillery section or battery was prepared to fire a barrage
on signal and could switch to firing illumination rounds for helicopter
surveillance or additional aerial rocketing if desired. Artillery ambush
effectiveness was enhanced during 1967 by electronic Sandia De-
vices, miniature seismograph sensors capable of detecting footsteps,
which transmitted the signals to receiver sets. Trail running was sim-
ply the placement of artillery fire along the length of trails or ridge-
lines.
Artillery raids were conducted if worthwhile NVA/VC targets were

reported beyond the range of normally positioned division artillery.

Airmobile infantry secured a forward location, and CH47 Chinooks
brought in an artillery battery to the new landing zone. Observers in
scout helicopters spotted targets for the artillery raiding battery. Lu-
crative sightings could be engaged also by the infantry as the howit-
zers switched to a fire support role. The artillery raid was brief, usu-
ally being completed within six hours, and offered Division Artillery
an ability to react rapidly to targets of opportunity.
Searching, swooping, and raiding across half a province for an
entire year demanded large amounts of manpower. The 1st Cavalry
Division was always up to strength, but there were critical shortages
of infantry, aviation, artillery, and medical personnel during certain
periods. These occurred because of Army- wide shortages, peak ro-
tational times, and other personnel management problems. From Oc-
tober through December, for example, serious shortages of artillery-
men and medical personnel developed. Since replacements in those
fields were not forthcoming from the United States, the divisional
artillery firepower was significantly diminished, while medical sup-
port was only hindered (medical service could be increased by cutting

out hamlet MEDCAP clinics).^
The 1st Cavalry Division casualties in Operation PERSHING to-
talled 852 troopers killed in action, 22 missing in action, 286 killed
in noncombat circumstances, and 4,119 wounded, which exceeded
all division operational losses during 1966. With actual division strength
averaging 19,571 personnel throughout Operation PERSHING, these
casualties amounted 27 percent of available manpower, not count-
to
ing injuries or disease. Most losses were taken by the infantrymen,
and USARV responded quickly to send infantry replacements, but
loss rates were still too high to permit smooth transition in training
and experience among division personnel.^
The success of the division's clearing campaign in Operation
PERSHING was difficult to measure. There was no precise way to
gauge whether the Viet Cong were being ferreted out of the hamlets
6. 1st Cav Div, Combat After Action Report, dtd 29 Jun 68, Tab 13: MOS
Shortages.
7. Ibid., Tab 12, and Incl. 4 to cover Itr dtd 14 Jul 68, Subj: Recommen-
dation for PUC.
110 STANTON
or were simply lying low. The pacification effort's success in winning

over the people in Binh Dinh Province to the South Vietnamese gov-
ernment was impossible to ascertain. The division offered consider-
able tangible evidence to show that its airmobility enhanced the se-
curity process. Highway 1 was opened for commercial traffic through
Binh Dinh Province for the first time in years, and government-spon-
sored elections were held for the first time on 3 September. The di-
vision claimed 2,029 NVA killed and 3,367 VC killed in Operation
PERSHING, with another 236 NVA and 2,123 Viet Cong captured.
However, perhaps the most telling evidence supporting the 1st Cav-
alry Division's claim to victory was one inescapable military reality.
During the major NVA/VC Tet-68 offensive, which engulfed the en-
tire country only a week after PERSHING ended, the former com-
munist stronghold of Binh Dinh Province was one of the least-affected

regions in Vietnam.
CHAPTER 6
Flexible Response
Techniques, Tet-68
At the beginning of 1968, allied concerns about clearing Binh Dinh

Province were cast aside as events worsened in the northernmost part
of South Vietnam. While the 1st Cavalry Division was waging a slow-
paced double war of search and pacification in the sandy hamlets and
jungle valleys along the central coast, the Marines were combating
North Vietnamese divisions driving across the DMZ. The major
entire
Marine border bastion at Khe Sanh was being challenged by freshly
infiltrated NVA and there were disturbing signs of increased
forces,
NVA northernmost Quang Tri and Thua Thien
activity throughout
provinces. On 15 January 1968 MACV deputy commander Gen.
Creighton W. Abrams ordered Major General Tolson to move his
airmobile division northward to reinforce 1 Corps Tactical Zone at
once.
When Tolson received notice to transplant his flag to Gia Le in
upper I CTZ immediately, his division was still embroiled in Oper-
ation PERSHING. Although the bulk of the airmobile cavalry was
concentrated in the central highlands on this major clearing operation,
a number of secondary MACV missions had elements scattered from
Phan Thiet, northeast of Saigon, to the Que Son Valley below Da
Nang. The division had not been together under a single commander
for nearly two years. As an airmobile formation, the 1st Cavalry Di-
vision was designed for flexible battlefield mobility, but it was sent
to Vietnam before concept tests on such a vast scale could be con-
ducted at Fort Benning.
The emergency movement north, coded Operation JEB STUART,
1 12 STANTON
was the first actual test of rapid airmobile division displacement be-
tween combat theaters. This was also the first MACV undertaking of
such magnitude, and the transfer would have been extremely difficult
even in fair weather and the best of circumstances. Each zone had to
be independently supplied in the absence of secure north-south com-
munications lines, llie overtaxed Navy supply system which gov-
erned I CTZ was woefully unprepared to cope with the arriving air-
mobile division's high rates of supply consumption. The incomplete

logistical arrangements were further aggravated because the unprec-
edented relocation was made in direct response to a major battle zone
crisis and had to be executed with great rapidity. Uprooting the 1st
Cavalry Division and moving it two hundred miles to an entirely new
military zone demanded optimum flexibility, quick reaction, and mas-

tery of adverse weather conditions.
The 1st Cavalry Division, like all American formations in Viet-
nam, was an extremely large organization. It was tied to a huge, so-
phisticated main base complex which provided the vast amounts of
necessary support and sustenance. Once emplaced, allied divisions
rarely moved from their assigned geographical sector because of the
expense and time required to shift the support base. This need to keep
divisions within the logistical operating radius of their base camps
inevitably transformed them into static security formations. Returning
the 1st Cavalry Division to a flexible response posture meant cutting
the An Khe umbilical cord. Such action would unfortunately reduce
divisional combat power during the transition period.
PERSHING was immediately curtailed as the division
Operation
scaled down offensive activity in Binh Dinh Province to local pa-
trolling. The widely separated units packed up their gear and streamed
back to either the main An Khe garrison or Landing Zone English.

Fleets of transport aircraft shuttled troops from An Khe in the central
highlands and LZ English on the Bong Son Plains to Quang Tri and
Hue-Phu Bai along the northern coast. Long truck convoys crowded
the winding road from An Khe to the Qui Nhon docksides where the
division cargo was transferred to Navy ships streaming toward Da
Nang. Overhead, flights of division helicopters droned through over-
cast skies to their new helipads.
General Tolson moved his command post into a graveyard north
of Phu Bai called LZ El Paso, but the barren landing zone was un-
satisfactory for division headquarters. On 23 January General Abrams
Flexible Response 1 13
agreed that the 1st Cavalry Division should be relocated to Camp

Evans, a former Marine regimental base. This move also fortuitously
displaced Colonel Rattan's 1st Brigade to LZ Betty, just outside the
key communications hub of Quang Tri, as the Marines withdrew on
25 January. The 3d Brigade under Col. Hubert S. Campbell was al-
ready in I CTZ, having spent four months fighting the 2d NVA Di-
vision in the Que Son Valley, twenty-five miles south of Da Nang.
Campbell's brigade was recalled to Quang Tri the same day, and the
2d Brigade was left in Binh Dinh Province to guard the old PER-
SHING area.
General Westmoreland wanted Tolson to have a full division of
three working brigades in his new operational area. MACV attached
Col. John H. Cushman's 2d Brigade of
the 101st Airborne Division,
which had Vietnam, to the cavalry and transferred the
just arrived in
new brigade from Cu Chi, west of Saigon, to Gia Le. General Tolson
sent this brigade to LZ El Paso on 27 January, and it began trans-
forming the innocuous site into Camp Eagle. The camp was destined
to become one of the largest military field posts in the world after it
became the main base of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile).
Operation JEB STUART I officially began on 21 January 1968.
Unaware of the impending NVA/VC storm of Tet-68, which would
sweep through Vietnam within a week, the division's original purpose
was to help III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) safeguard the stretch
of territory between Quang Tri and Hue-Phu Bai. Colonel Rattan
began helicoptering search parties west of the cities into the moun-
tainous enemy base areas. These longstanding strongholds were known
to be honeycombed with fortifications, supply bunkers, hospitals,
training sites, and even recreation facilities. While the 1st Cavalry
Division was preparing to thrust into the enemy-held jungles, the NVA/
VC were maldng their own preparations for attack.
The NVA/VC targeted the city of Quang Tri, the capital of South
Vietnam's northernmost province, as part of a country-wide wave of
attacks aimed at capturing important population centers and provoking
a general uprising against the Saigon regime. The enemy offensive
was timed for the Tet Nguyen Dan, lunar new year, holiday celebra-
tions to achieve as much surprise as possible. MACV's military forces
were observing the Tet-68 truce period, and many ARVN soldiers
were absent from their units. Allied intelligence was generally un-
aware of any unusual enemy plans or dispositions.
1 14 STANTON
The original plans to capture Quang Tri were made long before
the 1st Cavalry Division moved into I CTZ but never altered. Enemy
planners knew that the division was present, but watched as its bri-
gades engaged in mountain search efforts some distance to the west.

The NVA/VC apparently discounted the airmobile cavalry's ability
to reorient one of these brigades in time to affect the battle for Quang
Tri.
The assumed inability of the 1 st Cavalry Division quickly to shift
internal resources was not unreasonable. The airmobile division's poor
logistical posture was further impaired by the unexpected onslaught
of Tet-68, engulfing the formation's new operational area just days
after its arrival.Although many supplies for the division were pre-
positioned in the new zone, they were placed in anticipation of allied
directives prior to Tet and not where the division was actually sent.
When the enemy offensive suddenly sliced the road networks, many
essential logistical items — especially aviation fuel and artillery mu-
nitions — were reduced to fractional amounts delivered by CI 30 air-
craft parachute drops.
The 1st Cavalry Division's logistical nightmare compounded itself
in a vicious cycle. The troops were still building fuel storage revet-
ments at Camp Evans when the Tet offensive started, and the limited
containers on hand required daily refilling. The absence of a written
requisition (an administrative error) prevented this resupply the day
before Tet started, leaving the division with only ten thousand gallons
of JP4 aviation fuel. A lack of helicopter fuel and the foul weather
conditions limited availableairlift to emergencies, so that stock levels
remained dangerously low. This critical situation was aggravated by

the marginal condition of overworked division aircraft trying to build
up supplies and respond to tactical field missions, since insufficient
maintenance elements accompanied them to I CTZ.
The cold northwest monsoon period of drizzling ^'crachin" rain
presented the worst possible weather for airmobile operations. The
low, misting clouds and dense ground fogs lasted for twenty-seven
days straight, limiting aircraft-controlled airstrikes to five hours daily
and forcing much artillery fire to be adjusted by sound alone. The
bad flying weather frequently canceled helicopter gunship support and
interrupted critical aerial replenishment, medical evacuation, and troop
airiift.
Flexible Response 115
The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong intended to take joint con-
trol of Quang Tri by infiltrating a sapper (engineer demolition) pla-
toon of the 10th NVA Sapper Battalion into the city before the main
attack. The sappers would create as much confusion as possible with
explosives and sabotage, weakening the town defenses for the pri-
mary assault by the 812th NVA Regiment and two VC main force
battalions from the outside. The battle began at 2:00 a.m. on 31 Jan-
uary 1968 as the sappers destroyed communications lines and attacked
other critical points precisely on schedule. Fortunately for the allies,
the North Vietnamese regimental advance was delayed more than two
hours by rain-swollen streams and lack of terrain familiarity. This gap
in timing later proved fatal, for the 1st ARVN Regiment in and around
the city was quickly alerted once the sappers revealed themselves.
The South Vietnamese battalion posted within Quang Tri eliminated
most of the infiltrators before the main attack struck in the predawn
darkness at 4:20 a.m.
The 814th VC Battalion stormed through the outlying hamlet of
Tri Buu, where the 9th ARVN Airborne Battalion was monitoring a
revolutionary development program. The South Vietnamese para-
troopers were pushed back into Quang Tri and desperately tried to
shore up the inner defenses. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
infantrymen rushed the city walls from several directions. The ARVN
soldiers slowed the combined attack, but heavy fighting continued
unabated throughout the morning. The 812th NVA Regiment pene-
trated the city defenses at several points and advanced toward the
sector headquarters. By noon on 31 January the outcome of the battle
was still uncertain.
Shortly after noon the Quang Tri senior province advisor, Mr.
Robert Brewer, urgently conferred with Colonel Rattan to assist the
thin ARVN lines. Mr. Brewer briefed him that the situation at Quang
Tri was "highly tenuous," with at least one enemy battalion already
inside the city, and might not be able to hold out.
that the defenders
Since the NVA/VC firing positions were located on the eastern and
southern fringes of the city, it appeared that he was reinforcing for
the final blow from the east. Colonel Rattan hastily called division
headquarters for authority to counterattack at once from the air, even
though it was already late afternoon. General Tolson granted him the
authority to use the limited division helicopters on hand.
16 STANTON
The lead elements of Rattan's brigade had been in the Quang Tri
area for only two weeks, and much of his command for only six days.
Since then, he had tackled the southwestern approaches to Quang Tri
by sending his brigade to a suspected enemy mountain base area nine
miles away, with one firebase as far as twelve miles out. LZ Betty
and the other fire support bases had been under rocket and mortar
attack since dawn, as the North Vietnamese attempted to lock the
cavalry in place. Despite the problems imposed by lack of advance
reconnaissance, unfamiliar terrain, distance, and harassing fire. Rat-
tan felt he could quickly airmobile two battalions to the aid of the
city. The battle plans were drawn in one hour with the help of Mr.
Brewer, who pointed out the most probable enemy infiltration and
support routes. Selected assault areas were planned with the idea of
blocking the enemy from reinforcing troops already engaged in the
city, eliminating enemy fire support by landing on top of his sup-
porting guns, and trapping whatever enemy forces were already in

Quang Tri.
Additional helicopters were requested from Division Aviation, the
aerial reconnaissance squadron and the aerial rocket artillery battalion
were alerted, and the 1st Brigade issued its attack order at 1:45 p.m.
Lt. Col. Daniel W.
French's 1st Battalion of the 12th Cavalry, which
was given on airlift, executed its lightning air assault into the
priority
middle of the North Vietnamese heavy weapons sites. The helicopters
carrying Company C skimmed low underneath the clouds and banked
sharply to land the Skytroopers among the mortars, recoilless rifles,
and AA machine guns of the NVA fire support center for the K'4
Battalion, 812th NVA Regiment.
The North Vietnamese machine gunners frantically shifted their
guns to fire directly into the descending helicopters, but were unable
to stop the aerial assault from overwhelming the position. The cav-
alrymen leaped off the skids of the lowering helicopters as bullets
peppered the doorframes and jumped into action with their Ml 6s blaz-
ing. The cavalry squads quickly maneuvered forward as the enemy
gunners turned more weapons against the surprise air assault. Com-
pany B also became engaged in heavy fighting as it landed on the
other side of the enemy positions. After hours of bitter fighting, re-
sistance tapered off after twilight as the North Vietnamese began
abandoning the field. By landing two companies against the K-4 Bat-
talion's heavy weapons support and destroying it, one-third of the
Tet-68 and A Shau Valley Map by Shelby L. Stanton
South China Sea

118 STANTON
NVA regiment was pinned and rendered combat-ineffective between

Colonel Rattan's airmobile troops in their rear to the east and the
Quang Tri defenders in front to the west.
Shortly after Lieutenant Colonel French's battalion launched its
attack, Lt. Col. Robert L. Runkle's 1st Battalion of the 5th Cavalry
air assaulted southeast Quang Tri into the rear of another one of
of
the NVA regiment's battalions. Company C was airmobiled onto one
side of Highway as Company A landed just south of the road to set
1
up blocking positions. Runkle's troopers scrambled toward the raging

battle and smashed into the rear guard of the K-6 Battalion, 812th
NVA Regiment. Supporting helicopter gunships rocketed and strafed
the enemy lines as the Skytroopers pressed forward. Like its sister
K-6 Battalion found itself wedged between ARVN forces
battalion, the
and advancing cavalrymen and was quickly destroyed as an effective
fighting unit.
The cavalry thrust was so demoralizing to the NVA regiment that
its attackon Quang Tri was discontinued after nightfall. All enemy
efforts turned to using the darkness to get off the battlefield. Unable
to conduct an orderly withdrawal, the North Vietnamese broke into
small groups. Sporadic combat flared throughout the night as these
elements sought to avoid the allied forces. Many North Vietnamese
and Viet Cong escaped by mixing in with crowds of refugees stream-
ing away from the town.
The next day the 1st ARVN Regiment completed clearing Quang
Tri as Colonel Rattan's cavalrymen swept into close pursuit of the
fleeing enemy. The cavalry forces helicoptered in ever-increasing
concentric circles around the city, seeking to engage any NVA reg-
imental remnants. The attached 1st Battalion of the 502d Infantry found
a North Vietnamese contingent holed up in a cathedral south of Quang
Tri. Aerial gunships were summoned, and Company D of Lieutenant
Colonel French's battalion air assaulted into the firefight to insure
numerical superiority. Similar but smaller firefights flared up for the
next ten days, long after the city was cleared.
The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were confident and su-
perbly equipped when the battle opened, but their battle experience
against the Marines had offered them only limited opportunity to wit-
ness airmobile tactics. Marine helicopters were comparatively rare and
used as transports rather than as an integrated armada of aerial war
machines. The NVA/VC were completely unprepared to cope with
Flexible Response 1 19
the dazzling pace and devastating firepower of air cavalry tactics. Not
realizing their vulnerability if caught in the open, the North Vietnam-
ese often "played dead'' and seldom returned fire as helicopters ap-
proached. This primitive response cost them dearly as division heli-
copters swarmed over the fields and cut loose with rockets, cannons,
machine guns, and grenade launchers into the prone enemy ranks.
The Battle for Quang Tri was a resounding allied victory which
not only denied the NVA/VC an important Tet-68 objective, but also
cost the enemy 914 killed along with 86 men and 331 weapons cap-
tured. The 1st Brigade, situated in the western highland foothills when
the battle commenced, had wheeled its battalions around and heli-
coptered them to the rescue in the finest traditions of historic Amer-
ican cavalry.
For the first time in airmobile division history, vertical air assault
was used to decide a major
by conducting a classic surprise
battle
pincer counterattack. It was amaneuver previously only
"textbook''
dreamed of in military tactical planning sessions. The sudden air-
mobile blitz straddled the North Vietnamese heavy weapons positions
and eradicated the fire support needed by the Quang Tri attackers.
Trapped between the newly airlanded cavalrymen and the defending
garrison of Quang Tri City, five enemy battalions were forced to quit
the battlefield in complete disarray. The flexible response of modem
aerial cavalry at Quang Tri gave MACV one of its most decisive suc-
cesses during the long, discouraging weeks of Tet-68.
As Colonel Rattan's 1st Brigade was mopping up the last enemy
resistance around Quang Tri, a much larger battle was shaping up in
Hue. The enemy had over seven thousand troops in control of large
portions of the ancient imperial capital when the Tet offensive started.
The available airmobile cavalry in the area consisted of Colonel
Campbell's 3d Brigade, which had just deployed around Camp Ev-
ans. Like Colonel Rattan's brigade, it was constructing firebases to
the west, preparing to search out remote enemy base areas. Again a
major was attacked while the cavalrymen were carrying out as-
city
signments orienting them in the opposite direction. This failure of
allied intelligence to appraise properly enemy intentions forced the
cavalry brigade to make a complete turnabout with very limited he-
licopter resources in extremely poor weather conditions.
As the Marines and South Vietnamese struggled to recapture the
city itself. Colonel Campbell's brigade attacked toward Hue from the
120 STANTON
northwest on 2 February. The brigade was assigned the mission of

interdicting the northern and western approaches into Hue. If the bri-
gade could cut off NVA/VC supply lines, further enemy access to
the city would be denied, and would be prevented
his reinforcements
from reaching the raging battle. Estimates of the enemy situation were
mostly guesswork, but it was suspected that five battalions were en-
gaged in Hue, an unknown force probably occupied the hamlet of
Thon La Chu just outside Hue, and other regiments or battalions were
deployed to the west or southwest to protect enemy supply channels.
Ambushes along Route 1 indicated that the enemy intended to block
the main highway.
The 2d Battalion of the 12th Cavalry, commanded by Lt. Col.
Richard S. Sweet, was given the mission of moving toward Hue,
contacting the enemy, fixing his location, and destroying him. The
battalion was helicoptered from Camp Evans, where it was providing
base security, to a landing zone just outside PK-17, a South Viet-
namese army camp six miles from Hue City. Early the next morning
Sweet formed a diamond-shaped battalion formation with his line
companies and began the advance parallel to and south of Highway
1 toward Hue. The low rural area consisted of continuous rice pad-
dies, with slightly rolling hills and sparse scrub brush, interrupted
only by scattered stone tombs and peasant houses composed of mud
and straw.
At 10:30 A.M. Colonel Sweet halted his battalion after lead ele-
ments passed through a patch of woodland and spotted enemy soldiers
milling about on the other side of a broad rice paddy in front of Thon
La Chu. The hamlet had been captured at the outset of Tet-68 and
was being used as the support and staging base of the 7th and 9th
Battalions, 29th Regiment, 325C NVA Division, which had just marched
into the area from the Khe Sanh front. Thon La Chu was an elongated
settlement surrounded by thick vegetation and, as a model Revolu-
tionary Development project, contained sophisticated defenses de-
signed by U.S. Army advisors.
During the next several hours, the battalion assaulted across the
ricefieldtoward the far woodline. Capt. Robert L. Helvey's Company
A led the attack, but the rolling ground fog and rainy haze prevented
the usual helicopter support. Most division gunships were grounded.
Two aerial rocket helicopters from the 2d Battalion, 20th Artillery,
braved the dense fog to spew 2.75-inch rockets in front of the cav-
alrymen. This extra measure of support allowed some of Captain Hel-

vey's men to reach the woodline and clear an area along the northern
edge of the settlement. The formidable North Vietnamese machine
gun, recoil less rifle, and mortar positions prevented any further ad-
vance. Helvey recalled, 'În the Que Son [Valley] we fought the 2d
NVA Division in several knock-down, drag-out fights, so we knew
what we were getting into. We reacted the way we should have re-
acted, butwe were outnumbered and outgunned."'
Lieutenant Colonel Sweet pleaded for artillery support throughout
the day, but the dismal weather prevented howitzers from being air-
lifted into range of the battle. Finally, two CH47 Chinook helicopters
flew under the low overcast during the afternoon and brought two
105mm howitzers of the 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery, into PK-17. The
cannoneers wrestled their artillery pieces into action despite enemy
mortar fire, but the cavalrymen needed more than one section of two
tubes in support.
As darkness fell, the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, established a
tight perimeter to better maintain control in close proximity to the
enemy low visibility. During the cold
village because of the extremely
night of 3 February, the cavahymen received only a few mortar rounds
in their positions, but they were forced to sit miserably awake in fight-
ing positions without packs, ponchos, or poncho liners to ward off

the damp chill.
At dawn the North Vietnamese regiment launched a mass coun-
terattack.Hundreds of mortar shells smothered the shrunken Ameri-
can perimeter, which measured only 150 yards across. It quickly be-
came apparent that the enemy was making an all-out effort to eliminate
the American force and regain his lost positions. The cavalry gren-
adiers and riflemen hurled back waves of NVA soldiers who were
running at them firing AK47 automatic rifles from the hip as machine
gunners laid down grazing cross fires in the fog. Enemy mortar rounds
exploded through the compact battalion and scored several direct hits
against crowded weapons pits and foxholes. By noon the 12th Cavalry
lines were surrounded. Losses were heavy, and only a few medical
evacuation helicopters were able to penetrate the intense, close-range
fire to retrieve the seriously wounded.
1. 14th MHD Report on Tet-68, dtd 15 Apr 68, p. 17.

122 STANTON
With an Hue, Colonel Campbell

entire banalion isolated outside
air assaulted Lt. Col. James B. Vaught's 5th Banalion, 7th Cavalry,
into a landing zone south of PK-17 and astride Highway 1. The bat-
talion prepared to move toward the stranded cavalrymen the following
day, and more artillery was brought forward. However, Colonel Sweet
realized that his men couldn't stay where they were another night.
They had had less than six hours of sleep in the past forty-eight hours
and were double fatigued by two days of desperate fighting for their
survival. Ammunition, food, and canteen water were almost ex-
hausted, and the troops were already skimming muddy rainwater from
the wet clay to drink.
Late in the afternoon Sweet huddled with his battle-hardened of-
ficers and senior sergeants to devise a plan to extricate the battalion
before it was annihilated. They decided to slip past the enemy after
dark by going three miles deeper behind his lines to a hill overlooking
the surrounding lowland, rather than pulling back as expected. It was
a bold gamble and would require the entire night, but the poor visi-
bility and misty cold conditions would assist the deception.
The troopers began gathering their equipment together singly at

different times so that nothing unusual could be observed by the en-
emy. Loose gear was tied down and padded. Stretchers were impro-
vised to carry wounded if action occurred during the march. Excess
equipment belonging to the dead and injured was centrally collected
in each company area and buried in a pit for timed detonation. Many
of the troops rigged dummies in their foxholes, using sticks, spare

clothing, and broken weapons.
The daring night march commenced at 8:00 p.m. Only six light
howitzers were available to support the battalion, but their concen-
trated fire providedenough diversion to allow the battalion to assem-
ble discreetly moving out. Smoke grenades were popped to
and start
create a smoke screen as the most reliable point man, Pfc. Hector L.
Comacho, carefully led the battalion through the ankle-deep water of
the rice paddies. "It was dark,'' Private Comacho said, "but I trust
myself. The hardest part was finding some place where everyone could
go, and making sure that everyone could keep up."^
The troopers were instructed not to fire under any circumstances.
2. 14th MHD, The Battle for Hue, undtd, 1st Cav Div files, p. 4.
and if fired upon to just drop to the ground and remain silent. Only
company commanders could give the orders to return fire, and if this
was necessary, only machine guns would be used. The battalion pro-
ceeded in a column of files with two companies abreast. The night
was so dark that individuals moved within an arm's length of each
other. The men trudged slowly west across the muddied ricefields.
The enemy remained quiet and unaware of the escape. At one point
the five-hundred-yard-long column froze when someone forward
thought he heard an enemy rifle bolt slam fonârd. but when nothing
happened, the cavalrymen began moving again. The battalion silently
snaked through the quiet landscape.
As approached the river, the ground became boggy,
the battalion
and soon both were sloshing noisily through the wet mud. The
files
river was twenty feet wide and four to five feet deep, with a bottom
of spongy mud. The troopers crossed individually, helping each other
up the slippery far bank. As they were crossing the river, the equip-
ment left behind and set for detonation exploded in a huge ball of
fire. The cavalr>'men at the rear of the column saw trip flares around
the perimeter go off, and rifle fire started barking in the distance.
An artiller>' barrage was used to discourage any North Vietnamese
probing.
It was raining, and the bone-penetrating cold pierced the rolling
ground fog. Everyone was extremely tired, and several wounded sol-
diers were trying keep up. The battalion became noisier as the
to
troops waded through the flooded ground, and sergeants occasionally
lost contact with elements in front as they worked their squads around
various obstacles. Whenever the lead element halted to let the column
close, some of the exhausted men fell asleep on their feet, while oth-
ers fell to the ground v,ith a muddy splash. The sleeping soldiers were
jostled awake column began moving again.
as the
As soon was across the stream, the battalion swung
as everyone
south and traveled across the remaining two and a half miles of ter-
raced paddies and rough pastureland. Along their route many noticed
numerous combinations of signal lights flashing at them from woods
and hamlets as they progressed southward. Later they surmised that
these lights were part of some enemy regular route-marking system
used on all passing NVA/VC units. The drowsiest soldiers were jarred
awake stumbling across submerged dikes and looked up to see ghostly
flares illuminating the skyline over Hue itself.
124 STANTON
Finally, as full daylight flooded the landscape shortly after 7:00

A.M. the next morning, the ordeal ended. The weary, shivering cav-
alrymen climbed the hill which offered them defensible terrainand
temporary respite from close-by NVA forces. Lieutenant Colonel Sweet
stated, **We had men who had refused to be medevaced that after-
noon. They hid their wounds so they could stay with the battalion.
. . . And we found guys who were moving along; you'd see them
limping; there was no talk. No noise at all. I've never seen such dis-
cipline in a unit. Little by little these guys started popping up — you'd
find that the man up ahead of you who was dragging a foot had a
and had it there for almost 24 hours. That's why the
bullet in his leg,
night march worked."^
By daybreak on 5 February, as Sweet's men safely reached their
objective. Colonel Campbell realized that there was a multibattalion
enemy force and perhaps a regimental headquarters at Thon La Chu.
Radar-controlled bombs and naval gunfire pounded the North Viet-
namese positions every day. The fresh troops of Lieutenant Colonel
Vaught's reinforcing battalion moved against the northern edge of the
village. In the meantime Sweet's men were rested and resupplied and
then moved northwest through the sniper-filled hamlet of Thon Bon
Tri to reach the enemy's southern flank. After attacking successive
treelineson 9 February, the battalion was forced to halt in front of
Thon La Chu's inner defenses that night. The actual extent of the
enemy preparations in the fortified village was still unknown.
Captain Helvey led a fourteen-man volunteer patrol to scout the
enemy positions that night. They crossed the darkened field between
the enemy and cavalry lines until Helvey reached a graveyard with a
deserted cement house. The patrol occupied the structure in the mid-
dle of no-man's-land, allowing him to scan the area with a starlight
scope while the other patrol members fired M79 grenade launchers
into the far treeline. There was no return fire, as the North Vietnam-
ese refused to disclose their positions. The cavalry patrollers made
two trips to the other side of the field past enemy lines.
On the second trip the patrol was spotted by a North Vietnamese
soldier who unwittingly thought that Sp4 Michael Oberg, a short
3. 1st Cav Div Rpt on Tet-68, dtd 15 Apr 68, p. 19.

American, was a fellow Oriental. When the NVA soldier tried to en-
gage him in conversation, Oberg shot him. About the same time, Sp4
David Dentinger stepped on something which started moving. He
glanced down in horror to see the muzzle of an AK47 rifle and the
firer frantically trying to pull it from underneath his foot. Dentinger
emptied his M16 magazine into the soldier at point-blank range, and
the patrollers scrambled back toward their own lines. A recoilless rifle
shell slammed into the cement building as they moved past it, has-
tening their departure, but Captain Helvey's patrol arrived in friendly
lines unscathed.
Lieutenant Colonel Sweet postponed a planned dawn
attack based
on the patrol's findings. Helvey's men discovered entrenched posi-
tions complete with 57mm recoilless rifles, B40 rocket launchers, and
heavy machine guns in a double treeline, which meant that any at-
tacking force reaching the first treeline would still have another to
penetrate. The Company A executive officer, Tony Kalbli, remarked,
**To attack would have been suicide. In that sense alone, the fourteen
volunteers saved the battalion from almost complete destruction."'*
Early that morning Lieutenant Colonel Vaught's battalion as-
saulted the northern side of the fortified hamlet. Company C poured
flanking fire into one NVA company shifting positions to reinforce
the main defensive line, dropping numerous bodies into the river.
However, the battalion was forced to pull back as more mutually sup-
porting bunkers opened up. Airstrikes throughout the rest of the day
hit the village with sixteen tons of bombs and five tons of napalm.
Major General Tolson moved Col. Joseph C. McDonough's 2d

Brigade north from Bong Son in II CTZ to rejoin the division. This
additional reinforcement freed Colonel Campbell's brigade from all
security duty and allowed him to concentrate it against Thon La Chu.
Four battalions made the final attack on 21 February 1968. Lieutenant
Colonel Vaught's battalion hit Thon La Chu from the north, with Lt.
Col. Joseph E. Wasiak's 1st Battalion of the 7th Cavalry on the right
flank, while the attached 2d Battalion, 501st Infantry, swung in from
the west, and Lieutenant Colonel Sweet's battalion attacked northeast
from their southern positions.
4. 1st Cav Div Rpt on the Banle for Hue, dtd 15 Apr 68, p. 6.
126 STANTON
Lieutenant Colonel Vaught's men pushed into a fiercely defended

treeline near the northwest comer of the hamlet. To destroy the NVA
cavalrymen maneuvered troops with M72 antitank
fortifications, the
rocket launchers onto the berms. They fired just ahead of the ad-
vancing platoon point men, keeping the bunker occupants pinned down.
Light H13 observation helicopters darted overhead, raking the back-
sides of the bunkers with machine gun fire to prevent enemy use of
blind spots and to isolate entrances or adjacent earthworks. The ground
point men coordinated with smoke grenades and radios and, on signal
to cease supporting fire, rushed forward to push pole charges and
satchel charges into bunker openings to explode and cave them in.
Two platoons were pinned down in a shallow ditch under mortar
fire in front of one sniper-filled concrete bunker. Point man Pfc. Al-
bert Rocha slowly crawled forward along the ditch toward the bunker
as bullets clipped the dirt around him. One bullet smashed the hand-
guard of his rifle. He reached the bunker and slithered on top of it,
where he was joined by ILt. Frederick Krupa of Company D. While
Rocha lowered his rifle to fire into the bunker ap)erture, Krupa jammed
a ten-pound shaped pole charge into the bunker slit. The snipers inside
frantically tried to push the charge back out, but the lieutenant kept
it there until it exploded. One North Vietnamese soldier suddenly raced
out the back exit, spotted Rocha, and broke into a broad grin as he
aimed his rifle. Rocha quickly shot him.
Once the outer strongpoints were destroyed, the battalion swiftly
continued its advance through the hamlet to the east and linked up
with Lieutenant Colonel Wasiak's battalion as it drove south and
Lieutenant Colonel Sweet's battalion advancing north. When the bri-
gade consolidated, the fight for Thon La Chu was over. That night a
soldier sp)otted a bypassed enemy tunnel position, grabbed a .38-cal-
iber pistol and flashlight and went into the hole and returned with an
NVA captive. The prisoner stated that throughout the battle the thou-
sand North Vietnamese defenders rarely left their fighting positions.
They were replenished with food, water, and ammunition in their
bunkers by the Viet Cong, who suffered the bulk of the constant ar-
tillery and aerial pounding.
The action at Thon La Chu was the turning point in the division's
battle atHue. Colonel Campbell's brigade fanned out to scour the
western approaches and sever NVA logistical lifelines into the city.
At the same time, the 1st Cavalry Division's own supply difficulties
Rexible Response 127
were eased as supply convoys began rolling down Highway 1 from

Quang Tri to Camp Evans. More Chinooks and Huey helicopters
brought supplies to the field battalions. The Skytroopers were able to
secure adequate rest and eat hot meals flown in each day at breakfast
and supper. Morale peaked as the drive toward Hue resumed.
The cavalry brigade's determination was reinforced by a grim dis-
covery made by an attacked battalion from Colonel Cushman's bri-
gade. The soldiers found the bodies of fifteen women and children
who had been savagely executed in a tiny hamlet only two miles west
of Hue. The civilians had been herded into a trench by the North
Vietnamese occupiers and shot at close range. Later a significantly
larger NVA massacre inside Hue, involving thousands of slain civil-
ians, would be uncovered.
On the night of 22-23 February, Sweet's battalion made another
night march closer to Hue. This time they got within two miles of
the city before the North Vietnamese opened up with automatic weap-
ons, rockets, recoilless rifles, and mortars from solidly constructed
ARVN positions captured at the beginning of the Tet offensive. The
extensive fortifications and trench networks were over a mile long
and nearly as deep and emplaced in thick jungle. The battalion spent
three days clearing the well-defended obstruction.
Hue was attacked from the north by Lieutenant Colonel Vaught's
battalion, which was stopped just a half-mile short of the city walls.
A cleverly concealed NVA roadblock shattered the lead squad and
engaged Capt. Michael S. Davison, Jr.'s, Company C in locked com-
bat. When the firing started, Sp4 William Phifer edged his way through
a cemetery on the right flank of the stranded company and tossed two
grenades into a bunker. Both detonated, but had little effect. Phifer
fired point-blank into the firing port with his pistol and pitched in
another grenade. His grenade struck a Chicom grenade being thrown
out at him, and they both exploded, lifting him about two feet off the
ground. Miraculously, he was only shaken, but the four-man NVA
heavy weapons crew was wiped out. The battalion fought past the
roadblock and reached Hue's outer wall the next day.
On 23 February Lieutenant Colonel Wasiak's battalion, also ad-
vancing upon Hue from the north, ran into a mortar barrage just out-
side the city. NVA grenades and machine guns lashed the cavalrymen
struggling forward through the waterlogged rice paddies. Sensing a
slackening of enemy fire to the right, the lead company attacked in
128 STANTON
that direction. The North Vietnamese promptly shifted their troops

and began digging new positions. Rocket-firing helicopters
frantically
darted through the low overhanging clouds to discharge volleys of
rockets directly into the North Vietnamese soldiers. The intensive re-
turn automatic weapons fire still kept the cavalrymen flat on their
stomachs in the freezing paddy water. Wounded were extracted by
inflating air mattresses, rolling bloodied comrades over onto them,
and then pulling the floating mattresses out behind crawling volun-
teers.
During the night the battalion spotted large numbers of North
Vietnamese soldiers trying to exit Hue. They called in artillery bom-
bardment on top of the enemy files and shelled the trails all night,
producing terrific carnage. During the morning, Wasiak's men joined
Vaught's battalion along the city walls. The North Vietnamese con-
ducted one last-ditch counterattack against the 3d ARVN Regiment
within the city, which was destroyed by concentrated artillery fire.
At 5:00 A.M. on 24 February, the Viet Cong banner, which had flown
over the Hue citadel since the beginning of the month, was torn down
and the red-and-yellow flag of the Republic of Vietnam was hoisted.
On the morning of 25 February, Lieutenant Colonel Sweet's bat-
tered battalion reached the west wall and assaulted the final enemy
trenchline. He chose companies to clear the last oppo-
his strongest
sition in front of them, but each of the depleted companies sallying
forward had been reduced since the drive started to a mere forty-eight
men. The bloody battle for Hue was declared over, although mopping
up continued for the next several days. Although the major brunt of
the city combat was taken by U.S. Marines and South Vietnamese
fighting block by block inside Hue, the 1st Cavalry Division brought
tremendous pressure to bear against the NVA staging and reinforce-
ment areas, stifling the enemy's capacity to hold out.^
After the Battles of Quang Tri and Hue, the NVA/VC forces
sought to avoid contact and gain time to regroup their shattered forces
by withdrawing far into mountain base areas. The 1st Cavalry Divi-
5. Cav Div Rpt on the Battle for Hue, dtd 15 Apr 68; 2d Bn 12th Cav,
1st
Battle forHue: 2-5 Feb 68; 3d Bde 1st Cav Div, Operational Report-
Lessons Learned, dtd 1 1 Mar 68; 14th MHD, Combat After Action Interview
No. 5-68, dtd 4 May 68; and Maj. Miles D. Waldron and Sp5 Richard W.
Beavers, 14th MHD Study No. 2-68, Operation Hue City, dtd Aug 68.
sion maintained its flexible response through airmobility and pursued

the enemy into their most remote strongholds. Actually, this pene-
tration of enemy base areas was the original concept of Operation JEB
STUART.
Colonel Campbell's brigade redeployed back through Camp Ev-
ans, reopened LZ Jack in the mountains, and began helicopter sweeps
of the rugged jungle. During the month of March, the brigade con-
ducted forty-eight reconnaissance missions and fourteen search-and-
destroy operations in the region. Colonel Campbell's main clearing
effort, however, was directed against the bunker-studded lowlands
and rice cache areas of the northern coastal plains.
Colonel Rattan's brigade established LZ Pedro and swept into the
mountains west of Quang Tri. The brigade used search-and-clear, cor-
don-and-search, and swooper operations to pursue the NVA/VC dur-
ing the day and hunter-killer teams and night ambushes after dark.
Like the 3d Brigade, the 1st Brigade also devoted considerable at-
tention to the sandy coastal plains and cleaned out the remnants of
the enemy units which attacked Quang Tri.
The last elements of Colonel McDonough's brigade arrived in I
CTZ as the Battle of Hue was ending. The conmiand post was set up
at LZ Jane between the other two brigades, and on March the fresh
1
2d Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division

unit relieved the attached
in the same sector. The two 2d Brigades had carried out ninety-nine
reconnaissance missions and seventy-seven search-and-clear opera-
tions in the JEB STUART area by the time the operation was over
at the end of the month.
Operation JEB STUART, which encompassed the division's hard-

fought Tet-68 response, had lasted only forty-two days when it was
cut short to enable the 1st Cavalry Division to relieve the beleaguered
Marines at Khe Sanh. During this short time, the division lost 276
killed in action, 18 missing, and 1,498 wounded in I Corps Tactical
Zone. The high casualty rates easily surpassed 1967 levels, and the
personnel situation was worsened by great turnover in the ranks. Also,
2,484 division members were rotated routinely to the United States
within this period; the division received 5,345 replacements from 22
January until the end of March alone.
6. 1st Cav Div, Combat Operations After Action Report, dtd 2 Jul 68, Tab
L (Adjutant General Services) and Tab T (Casualty and Medevac).
130 STANTON
The tremendous toll on aviation resources was reflected in the fact

thattwenty-four helicopters were totally destroyed after being shot
down and seventy-six aircraft were dropped from accountability, most
of them as a result of battle damage, during Operation JEB STUART.
The strain of combat, marginal weather, and lack of ready helicopter
maintenance reduced aircraft availability to all-time lows.^
In exchange the 1st Cavalry Division's flexible response was in-
strumental in crushing several NVA/VC units, recapturing key cities
and towns, and clearing critical territory during the large-scale enemy
Tet-68 offensive. The airmobile division's success probably killed more
than 3,200 NVA/VC troops (the actual body count was 313). The
division secured a vital stretch of Vietnam's most valuable overland
supply route, Highway 1 . More important, the division assisted Ma-
rine and South Vietnamese forces engaged in battles of great political
significance to the United States. For the first time in airmobile his-
tory, aerial cavalry proved its true worth as a national investment on
a foreign battleground.
The 1st Brigade, miles from Quang Tri City when it was attacked
on 31 January- 1 February and moving in the opposite direction to-
ward another objective, executed a complete turnabout and air as-
saulted troops into the battle within hours of notification. The Sky-
troopers landed between the enemy forces fighting inside Quang Tri
and the enemy reserve, trapping considerable numbers of NVA and
VC between the airmobile infantry and the South Vietnamese town
garrison. The shock of this sudden countermove completely disrupted
the enemy bid to overrun Quang Tri, enabling the city to be resecured
within twenty-four hours. In the ensuing pursuit, cavalry artillery and
helicopter gunships decimated the demoralized enemy and drove them
into the mountains.
The 3d Brigade, advancing south along Highway 1 in February,
fought a determined month-long battle for the critical northern and
western approaches to Hue. Since the foggy, rainy weather impeded
airmobile operations, the cavalrymen often switched to a conventional
infantry foot advance. They defeated large enemy forces composed
of elements of nineteen battalions, severed enemy reinforcement and
supply lines, and insured the encirclement of the greater battlefield.
7. Ibid., Tab AE (Logistics).

The courage, adaptability, endurance, and fighting skill of this bri-

gade underlined the highest expectations which MACV accorded the
airmobile cavalry. Some of the most bitter Army fighting in Vietnam,
under the most stressful conditions, was waged by the veteran bat-
talions on this one prolonged drive.
Having seized the initiative, the 1st Cavalry Division relentlessly
consolidated its gains and kept the enemy retreating from the popu-
lation centers. The division pushed into the NVA/VC staging areas
in the rugged mountains west of Hue and Quang Tri. Throughout
March the airmobile battalions carved out firebases and prowled the
dense jungles, uncovering vast quantities of weapons, ammunition,
and food in formerly secret enemy sanctuaries. These operations were
supplemented by division activity in the northern coastal plain, spe-
cifically designed to deny the enemy rice or recruits and to weed out
the Viet Cong infrastructure. The division was called upon to deploy
rapidly to another combat sector as the month ended and to undertake
yet another highly critical mission: to reach the besieged Marine for-
tress of Khe Sanh in Operation PEGASUS.
CHAPTER 7
Cavalry Raids
Techniques Khe Sank and
y A Shau
The cavalry raid has been one of the most valuable functions of mounted
horsemen throughout history, and the 1st Cavalry Division brought
this ability to Vietnam with helicopter-riding cavahymen. Raids can
be defined as rapid attacks into enemy territory to carry out specific

missions. Without the intention of holding terrain, the raiding force
promptly withdraws when its mission is accomplished. Like screening
and scouting, fast raiding is a natural attribute of the airmobile cav-
ahy.
Although most raids are carried out by small forces with very
limited objectives, the 1st Cavalry Division executed two classic di-
vision-scale cavaby raids just after Tet-68. The first was the airmobile
drive to raise the siege of Khe Sanh, and the second was the airmobile
strike into the remote A Shau Valley enemy base area. Both cavalry
raids were expedient attacks with precise objectives, completely
divorced from terrain occupation, and involved expeditious with-
drawals.
After reaching Khe Sanh, the division was immediately with-
drawn to air assault into the A
Shau Valley because long-range weather
forecasts predicted April as the last month of favorable weather before
monsoon rains would prevent helicopter flight in the valley. The di-
vision scheduled withdrawal accordingly. However, the most impor-
tant cavalry raid in Vietnam was the division's attack to reach the
isolated Marine fortress at Khe Sanh.
The Marine combat base at Khe Sanh was established in the far
northwest comer of South Vietnam close to Laos as the most westerly
strongpoint of the main Marine defensive lines facing North Vietnam.
134 STANTON
Formerly a small Army Special Forces camp, the Marines built up

the Khe Sanh bastion on the strategically located plateau and hills just
north of Route 9 and garrisoned it with the reinforced 26th Marines.
During January 1968, a series of violent around Khe Sanh
hill fights
disclosed that at least two NVA moved into the area

divisions had
and surrounded it. The battle for Khe Sanh mushroomed into a major
confrontation between the United States and North Vietnam. Control
of the citadel acquired overriding political importance as a test of
national willpower under President Johnson.
Throughout the weeks that the 1st Cavalry Division was battling
the NVA/VC Tet-68 offensive at Quang Tri and Hue, the besieged
26th Marines fought for Khe Sanh's survival under heavy bombard-
ment and periodic ground attack. Enemy approach trenches extended
to within a few yards of the outer wire, which was already breached
in places by the bangalore torpedoes of NVA sappers. The few patrols
sent out by the defenders were ambushed and destroyed. NVA heavy
cannon, artillery, mortars, and recoilless rifles pounded Khe Sanh daily,
and often more than a thousand rounds impacted within the perimeter
every twenty-four hours. The airstrip was in shambles, and the Ma-
rines were soon cut off from both overland and airlanded supplies.
The North Vietnamese ringed the Marine lines with entrenched
infantry and a multitude of antiaircraft weapons. Dense fogs and rain-
swollen overcasts shrouded the jungled mountains. During February,
679 parachute drops were flown to keep the garrison alive. On the
night of 7-8 February 1968, North Vietnamese tanks overran the out-
lying Special Forces fort at Lang Vei. On 23 February the beleaguered
Marines endured their heaviest barrage of the siege and six days later
hurled back a major North Vietnamese assault. Khe Sanh achieved
paramount importance in American wartime direction because of
President Johnson's fixation over its possible loss. He considered the
situation completely desperateand demanded immediate MACV re-
sponse. The Marines hung on through March as General Westmore-
land mustered the powerful forces needed to achieve a breakthrough.
The MACV call for help went to Major General Tolson's 1st Cav-
alry Division as early as 25 January 1968, when the airmobile division
was flown into I CTZ and prepared contingency plans for either the
relief or reinforcement of Khe Sanh. The unexpected blows of Tet-
68 interrupted the allied scheme as divisions and brigades were shifted
Cavalry Raids 135
to recapture and safeguard lowland cities and towns. The brunt of this
enemy offensive in the northern zone was shattered by 2 March. At
the same time. Hue was officially declared back in South Vietnamese
hands. However, the Marines at Khe Sanh were still in danger, and
Deputy MACV Commander General Abrams was anxious to send a
relief expedition to their rescue at once.
On March, he summoned Tolson to Da Nang
the second day in
to brief III Marine Amphibious Force commander General Cushman
on division concepts to break the siege. General Tolson suggested a
lightning airmobile assault which would slash through enemy lines,
over terrain and defensive obstacles, much like a division-size cavalry
raid. The momentum of this aerial offensive would greatly assist the
two Marine and ARVN divisions expected to advance on Khe Sanh
up Route 9. After listening to Tolson's presentation. Generals Abrams
and Cushman told him to commence final preparations for the attack.
The operation would be labeled PEGASUS, named for the flying horse
of mythology.
The 1st Cavalry Division began detailed planning on 11 March.
Although the mission to Khe Sanh, reopen Route 9, and
strike into
destroy all enemy way was simple, the amount of
forces along the
coordination and meticulous planning involved was staggering. As
division chief of staff. Col. George W. Putnam supervised the staff
sections producing the tacticaland logistical arrangements; Tolson he-
licoptered several times into surrounded Khe Sanh to confer directly
with Marine defense commander Col. David E. Lownds.
Within three days of the division being alerted to orient toward
Khe Sanh, the 8th Engineer Battalion was near Ca Lu, alongside Navy
Seabees and Marine engineers, building the massive airfield and stor-
age facilities required for the upcoming attack. Under the personal
direction of Assistant Division Commander-B, Brig. Gen. Oscar E.
Davis, Landing Zone Stud was transformed major airfield stag-
into a
ing complex and supply depot. In only eleven days the construction
included a 1,500-foot runway, anmiunition storage bunkers, aircraft
and vehicle refueling facilities, a conmiunications center, and a so-
phisticated air terminal. Still retaining its landing zone designation,
although larger than many bases, the compound became the advance
operations center for PEGASUS.
On 25 March (D-Day minus six) the countdown to attack began.
136 STANTON
For the next six days Lt. Col. Richard W. Diller's 1st Squadron of
the 9th Cavalry was unleashed over the planned offensive axis of ad-
vance, along and on both sides of Route 9, toward Khe Sanh. Allied
intelligence of enemy dispositions was vague and often unreliable,
forcing the division to rely almost exclusively on its own 9th Cavalry
scoutships to develop accurate data about actual ground conditions,
find suitable landing zones, chart enemy defenses, and destroy po-
tentially devastating AA positions.
The reconnaissance helicopters and gunships found the targets,
destroyed what they could, and reported the rest. The division moved
8-inch and 105mm artiller>' batteries to Ca Lu and LZ Stud to sup-
plement the 1 75mm-gun and howitzer units already pounding the newly
located enemy. Tactical airstrikes by fighter-bombers, rocket and
strafing runs by armed helicopters, and Arc Light heavy bombing by
B52s blasted known and suspected enemy concentrations and field-
works. Landing zones were selected and hit with tactical airstrikes
using specially fused " Daisy-Cutter bombs and other explosive ord-
*"
nance to clear potential resistance.

As D-Day approached, division reconnaissance and construction
efforts were stepped up. On D minus one, the day prior to the attack,
Tolson moved his command post to LZ Stud, and Colonel Campbell's
3rd Brigade initial assault elements helicoptered to their final mar-
shaling areas. On the morning of the attack, thick ground fog and
low-hanging clouds merged to blanket the landscape in total overcast.
The rows of helicopters up along the landing zone runway were

lined
shrouded in haze, but hub of activity as trooploads were sorted,
still the
instruments checked, and fuel topped off. However, they appeared
idle to the Marines, whose reservations about airmobility seemed con-
firmed as their infantrymen stepped off the line of departure in full
battle gear and began advancing toward Khe Sanh.

At noon the tropical sun began baking away the mists, the veteran
cavalrymen clambered aboard their Hueys, and the shrill whine of
starting helicopter engines surged into a deafening roar as hundreds
of rotor blades whirled into life. At 1:00 p.m. sharp the first waves
of dozens of troopships soared into the air as the largest cavalry raid
in American history commenced. The Marines silently trudging along
the road under the strain of their heavy packs heard an increasing
drone in the distance over the clatter of their equipment. They lifted
•^
SSSs
^ ^
1- K
'J
Sip y^'xt if f
t
I
138 STANTON
theirheads as the throbbing pitch of helicopters resonated overhead.

The overcast sky was filled with swanns of helicopters racing ahead
with all three battalions of the 7th Cavalry.
Lieutenant Colonel Wasiak's 1st Battalion roared over the Ma-
rinesmarching on the road below and continued flying toward LZ

Mike, alongside Route 9 halfway to Khe Sanh. The 2d Battalion,
under Lt. Col. Roscoe Robinson, Jr., came directly behind it, while
Lieutenant Colonel Vaught's 5th Battalion airmobiled into LZ Cates
two miles to the north. The spectacular 7th Cavalry air assaults were
breathtaking to the aerial observation pilots, who circled their little
scoutships out of the way as the troopship formations approached.

The pilots reported seeing as many as thirty Hueys and Chinooks si-
multaneously descending onto an LZ, seemingly filling the air with

machines and men.
The division's initial reconnaissance confirmed North Vietnamese
Army intentions of blocking or delaying any allied attempt to reach
the beleaguered Marine fortress at Khe Sanh. Elaborate enemy strong-
points occupied key hilltops and terrain features both north and south
of Route 9. However, the NVA defenders were completely stunned
and outwitted by the swift aerial intrusion of cavahy troops in front
of, behind, and around the flanks of their positions.
The combined power, speed, and surprise of an airmobile division
also became obvious to the Marines as a startling demonstration of
combat accomplishment: in one afternoon a full infantry brigade was
projected within five miles of Khe Sanh. The thoroughness of the 9th
Cavalry's reconnaissance and target work became instantly evident.
Not one round was received by any incoming helicopter, and this was
in an area that had been bristling with AA positions just seven days
earlier. The flak guns which greeted the first division scout helicop-
ters had been put out of action during the ensuing week.
Operations escalated as more cavalrymen were airlanded at LZ

Stud in Chinook and Caribou transports, shifted to Huey troopships,
and air assaulted to open new landing zones. Operation PEGASUS
was proceeding so successfully that schedules were accelerated, and
Colonel McDonough's 2d Brigade was sent into the drive a day early
on 3 April. Two days later Colonel Stannard's 1st Brigade was air-
lifted onto the battlefield. A South Vietnamese task force of three
battalions was also air assaulted by the division south and west of
Cavalry Raids 139
Khe Sanh. In one week Major General Tolson had deployed fifteen
thousand combat soldiers into action.
The 1st Cavalry Division blasted open seven new landing zones
in five days, each bringing the allies closer to Khe Sanh and driving
more enemy soldiers from their defenses. Each air assault was pref-
aced with withering fighter-bomber passes, and final
artillery fire,
aerial rocketing against the field below, ending just seconds before
the Sky troopers leaped from the open cabins and skids of their Hueys.
The cavalrymen dashed out to form a quick perimeter. Within minutes
Chinooks lumbered overhead with howitzers and slingloads of am-
munition. The artillery was quickly unlimbered, ammunition crates
were smashed open, and minutes later the sharp boom of howitzer
fire echoed through the vegetation. The artillery tubes either shelled
enemy defenses closer to Khe Sanh or sent final barrages into other
fields chosen as LZs for the bounding infantry.
For the first time the cavalry artillery was answered by North
Vietnamese artillery. As the fire support bases were set up on landing
zones, artillery duels began. LZ Wharton was hit by twenty rounds
from long-range 130mm cannon after it was established on 3 April.
The division's quick-draw batteries lashed back by pumping out
hundreds of rounds in counterbattery fire. The Chinooks of the 228th
Aviation Battalion were soon hauling five hundred tons of ammuni-
tion a day to the forward tubes. LZ Stud was bombarded once by
enemy artillery, but the forward observers were spotted on a nearby
ridgeline and killed, and the base was not threatened again.
Typical of the fire support that paved the way for the cavalry
advance were the exploits of 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery, forward
observer ILt. Stephen Esh on 7 April. Lieutenant Esh flew in an OH6
Cayuse light observation helicopter. On the first mission of that day,
he spotted four NVA and called in artillery, which resulted
soldiers
in two confirmed kills and two probables. His second mission took
him over gently rolling hills two miles south of Khe Sanh and less
than a mile from Laos. He spotted twenty NVA soldiers trekking
through the elephant grass. The light helicopter made two passes over
the enemy, coming in low and fast as the lieutenant hurriedly plotted
the positions on his folded map and radioed for artillery. On the third
pass he pinned down the enemy with M16 rifle bursts, lifting away
just as the artillery shells began to hit the area.
140 STANTON
While the artillery barrage swept the NVA, Esh scanned the vi-
cinity further and spotted an NVA convoy of five trucks and one Rus-
sian-built tank on a nearby road. He immediately called for rocket-
firing helicopters, and Cobra gunships swiftly arrived to demolish all
six vehicles. Lieutenant Esh directed his helicopter low over the burn-
ing wreckage to count the clusters of dead North Vietnamese and
noticed stenciled markings on some of the backpacks. Suspecting
that they contained valuable intelligence, he ordered the pilot to land.
The crew chief leaped out to get the packs as the lieutenant stood
guard and shot down two North Vietnamese soldiers charging from
the brush.
After stopping at LZ Stud and grabbing a quick meal. Lieutenant
Esh picked up a fresh helicopter and crew and flew farther south. He
directed the helicopter to circle an area only four hundred yards from
the Laotian border and soon spotted another NVA truck convoy parked
beside a road in a nearby valley. He directed artillery fire which de-
stroyed seven trucks and killed large numbers of enemy troops. Sec-
ondary explosions rocked the jungle as a petroleum dump and two
ammunition dumps suddenly detonated as well. The explosions and
fires raged for hours, and Esh departed the burning target area as the
helicopter fuel ran low. Such remarkably effective use of artillery
observers in helicopters allowed the airmobile division to extend its
artillery capability well beyond advancing ground troops.

As the advance continued and the enemy showed increasing signs
of disorganization. General Tolson took advantage of the airmobile
division's inherent flexibility to rapidly shift his battalions onto LZs
and in directions not part of the original attack plan.On 2 April Lieu-
tenant Colonel Robinson's battalion air assaulted into LZ Thor, a key
position along Route 9 closer to Khe Sanh, and began moving west.
Everywhere the cavalrymen went they were astonished to find huge
piles of weapons and equipment littering the battlefield. This was un-
usual behavior for an enemy which just weeks earlier during JEB
STUART had taken great risks to pick up any fallen man's weapon
(where one weapon was retrieved for every five NVA killed). Around
Khe Sanh the cavalry and Marines captured 763 individual and crew-
served weapons that had been left on the ground, and it was apparent
the North Vietnamese were in full retreat.
The next day Lieutenant Colonel Sweet's 2d Battalion, 12th Cav-
aky, seized LZ Wharton on a critical hilltop only four miles southwest
Cavalry Raids 141
of the Marine fortress. Between LZ Wharton and Khe Sanh was an

old French fort, and its defenses were upgraded and held by what was
estimated to be an NVA battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Runkle's 1st
Battalion, 5th Cavalry, was stopped below the fort by heavy mortar
shelling which caused many casualties and mortally wounded the bat-
talion commander. The battalion was extracted and replaced by the
2d Battalion of the 5th Cavalry under Lt. Col. Arthur J. Leary, which
flanked the fort from the west. The North Vietnamese fled, and the
fort was taken without resistance.
In the meantime Lieutenant Colonel Robinson's battalion was
steadily pressing forward along Route 9, but was stopped 7 April by
a final NVA defensive line. The enemy bunkers were on a ridge over-
looking the road, only two miles short of the beleaguered Marine
base. After bombarding the ridge with artillery and helicopter rockets,
Robinson at once air assaulted four of his companies onto the enemy
positions. Three companies touched down around the enemy position,
while the fourth landed behind the blocking force like a hammer against
an anvil. The North Vietnamese were routed from their positions in
a sharp battle, and the road to Khe Sanh was finally opened.
At 8:00 A.M. on 8 April 1968, the cavalrymen linked up with the
Marine garrison after walking the final two miles up the twisting nar-
row road into the Khe Sanh fortress. Pfc. Juan Fordoni, from Puerto
Rico, was the first trooper to make contact as he clasped hands over
the barbed wire with a Marine lance corporal, one of the defenders
who had weathered the heaviest siege of the war. The simple hand-
shake was sealed as Lt. Joe Abodeely blew a triumphant blast on a
tarnished North Vietnamese bugle found during the final march along
the roadside with other discarded NVA equipment. The siege of Khe
Sanh was ended, exactly one week after the cavalry raid commenced.
Mopping up continued, and two days later the 1st Cavalry Di-
vision recaptured the overrun Lang Vei Special Forces camp against
light rearguard resistance on 10 April. That same morning. General
Tolson was suddenly ordered, without previous notification, to extract
the entire division and prepare to air assault into the A Shau Valley.
Operation PEGASUS formally terminated on 14 April 1968.
Tolson 's swift and powerful cavalry raid had smashed through the
enemy lines and broken the siege of Khe Sanh in the first division-
scale air assault in history. Every line battalion was helicoptered di-
rectly onto the battlefield in the first airmobile division attack to use
142 STANTON
all three brigades. The raid's success can be anributed to many fac-
tors: the excellence of its aerial reconnaissance, the coordination of
its elements, and the logistical improvement in division operations.
The cavalry raid was spearheaded throughout by the st Squadron 1
of the 9th Cavalry. For a week prior to the upcoming division assault
toward Khe Sanh, the dauntless squadron closely integrated its re-
connaissance skills with the firepower of tactical airstrikes, artillery,
and B52 strategic bombing to locate and destroy targets in the inter-
vening enemy-held territory. The cavalry reconnaissance squadron
brilliantly demonstrated its ability to prepare a divisional axis of ad-
vance despite the absence of higher command information about the
enemy. The intelligence gathered by the division's aerial reconnais-
sance arm not only added immeasurably to the success of PEGASUS,
but raised air cavalry to a new level of military acceptance.
The 1st Cavalry Division effectively coordinated an airmobile drive
of eight cavalry battalions with a ground advance by seven Marine
and four South Vietnamese infantry battalions. The pace of the di-
vision's aerial onslaught was set by waves of helicopters catapulting
battalions of Skytroopers over successive enemy barriers. The mul-
tiple airmobile infantry prongs were both preceded and screened by
rocket-firing Cobras and helicopter gunships directed by the recon-
naissance squadron's observation craft. The combination of air as-
saulting infantry, aerial rocket attack, and scoutship harassment forced
the NVA to abandon carefully prepared defenses and to retreat with-
out regard to his planned directions of withdrawal The hasty enemy.
departure was evidenced by the staggering amounts of munitions, em-

placed weapons, and equipment left in defensive positions.
The division renewed emphasis on its supporting foundation, in-
cluding the proper pre-positioning of supplies, as a result of lessons
learned in the divisional transfer to I CTZ and Tet-68 battles during
Operation JEB STUART. This favorable logistical posture enabled
the division to increase the tempo of the drive despite continually
unfavorable weather. Eleven complete battalions were helicoptered
onto the battlefield by the seventh day of the raid (D plus six).
During Operation PEGASUS, the 1st Cavalry Division scored a

decisive airmobile victory by quickly reaching the besieged Marine
Khe Sanh bastion without setback or heavy losses, all within fifteen
days. The careful planning and preparation preceding the raid was
backed up by aggressive and innovative tactics during its execution.
Cavalry Raids 143
At a cost of 315 casualties (including 59 KIA and 5 MIA), the di-

vision chased the North Vietnamese forces off the battlefield into Laos,
forcing them to leave behind at least 638 dead soldiers and much
valuable equipment.' Rarely has the potential of airmobile cavalry
been more brilliantly applied.
Operation PEGASUS was summarily concluded in order to start
Operation DELAWARE, the code name for General Tolson's next
cavalry raid into the heart of the remote North Vietnamese-held A
Shau Valley. The tropical valley was a mile- wide slash of flat bot-
tomland covered by rain forest and elephant grass, wedged between
mist-covered mountain ranges on the Laotian border. The North Viet-
namese wrested control of the forbidding region from the allies by
overrunning the A Shau Special Forces camp in 1966 and then turned
the valley into their primary staging area for the assault on Hue during
Tet-68. Because of its location and jagged topography, both Viet-
nam's northeast and southwest monsoons brought heavy rains, hail,
and unpredictable storms raging through the valley's primeval jungle.
This combination of terrain and weather made it inaccessible by road
and difficult to navigate by air, but General Westmoreland was de-
termined to strike deep after Tet-68 and eliminate the NVA bases
located there.
General Westmoreland believed the 1st Cavalry Division was ide-
ally suited to penetrate the A Shau for two simple reasons. First, the
division was the only formation in the allied inventory that could air-
lift large numbers of troops into relatively inaccessible areas on short
notice. Time was essential if the allies were to search the valley in
1968, because the brief transition period of mid-April to mid-May
(between monsoons) offered the only respite in valley weather. (Un-
fortunately, this proved erroneous: as events were to prove, the pre-
monsoon and low clouds in the valley produced worse
interval of fog
flying weather.) Secondly, no one knew what reception the NVA had
prepared for allied intrusion. The 1st Cavalry Division was considered
to be one of the toughest MACV divisions, able to triumph over what-
ever might be encountered.
Allied knowledge of enemy dispositions in the A Shau Valley was
1 . 1st Cav Div, Combat Operations After Action Report, dtd 1 1 Jul 68, Tabs
DandK.
144 STANTON
even scantier than the intelligence provided prior to PEGASUS. Al-

lied ground forces stayed out of the A Shau Valley, and aerial re-
connaissance was nearly impossible. MACV could only guess at NVA
dispositions inside the valley by judging the enemy forces which came
out the south end. This estimate was very discouraging; whenever
North Vietnamese units emerged from the valley, they were well or-
ganized, well equipped, and ready to fight. Although the extent of
enemy fortifications inside the valley was unknown, aircraft over-
flights were challenged by extensive antiaircraft positions.
Lieutenant Colonel Diller's 9th Cavalry scouting squadron was
sent into the valley to report all they could see or find, but almost
immediately bad weather curtailed their activity. The raid was post-
poned two days to allow the reconnaissance craft more time to gather
information. The swept along the steep
light observation helicopters
mountain slopes and rocky outcrops, using their nimble craft as bait
to locate and chart the positions of dug-in batteries of heavy and light
antiaircraft guns. The squadron paid a price —
50 aircraft hit, of which
5 were destroyed and 1 8 damaged beyond repair, but fighter-bombers
and strategic bombers responded by hitting the pinpointed targets with
209 tactical airstrikes and 21 B52 bombing runs preparatory to the
raid.'
The cavalry raid into the A
Shau Valley was much bolder than
the PEGASUS expedition. The would not only be raiding
division
under marginal weather conditions, but also its forces would initially
air assault beyond the supporting artillery fires of division howitzers.
General Tolson wanted to achieve surprise and believed that this would
more than offset the advantages of close artillery at the start of the
raid. He gambled that aerial rocket artiller>' and other air support would
suffice until the Chinooks airlifted howitzers in right behind the as-
saulting infantry.^
To conduct the raid. Tolson utilized seven of his nine line bat-
talions (the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 5th Cavalry under 2d Brigade
were temporarily attached to the Marines), but reinforced his division
with a South Vietnamese brigade-size task force. All other division
2. 1st Sqdn 9th Cav, Combat After Action Report, dtd 4 Jun 68, p. 4.
3. 14th MHD Interview with MG
John J Tolson by Cpt JWA Whitehome,
dtd 27 May 68. p. 4.
Cavalry Raids 145
components were committed. The original plan envisioned Colonel

Stannard's 1st Brigade making the initial assaults in the central A
Shau Valley to secure the overgrown airfield of the lost Special Forces
A Loui camp, which had been destroyed three years earlier. However,
I
unsuppressed antiaircraft fire in this region led Tolson to open the
raid instead by air assaulting Colonel Campbell's 3d Brigade into the
extreme northern part of the valley. This switch destined Colonel
Campbell's lead brigade of PEGASUS to be in the forefront of the
second air cavalry division raid in history as well.
The cavalry raid commenced on 19 April 1968 as swarms of
troopships and their gunship escorts lifted high into the clouds from
Camp Evans. The helicopters crossed west over the highlands, bathed
in a cloudy froth exposing only the highest peaks, and, once past the
near mountain chain of the A Shau Valley, descended into the gloomy
mists of the overcast valley. Capt. John Taylor, who commanded
Company A of the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry, described the opening
air assault: "The feeling the majority of the men had upon first com-
ing into the valley was a sort of fear, distinctly different from that
felt at Hue or Khe Sanh. We had heard so many stories about A Shau,
like the possibilities of running into large concentrations [of flak]. We
had a fear of the unknown. We thought that just around any comer
we would run into a battalion of North Vietnamese.""^
A wall of red antiaircraft tracers suddenly ripped through the low-
ering helicopter formation. Well-camouflaged mobile 37mm antiair-
craft guns blazed continuously at thirty rounds every ten seconds. The
shower of steel tore through twenty-tlu-ee helicopters of two battalions
and sent ten spiraling in flames to crash on the valley floor. The first
two battalions air assaulted through the flak to establish landing zones
on twin peaks overlooking the northern end of the valley. Lieutenant
Colonel Vaught's battalion landed on LZ Tiger, but the unit suffered
numerous casualties, including the battalion commander. Chinook he-
licopters managed to place a battery of light howitzers on LZ Tiger
immediately following the assault. Lieutenant Colonel Wasiak's bat-
talion landed on LZ Vicki, but deteriorating weather, the late hour of
the assault, and intensified AA fire prevented artillery from being set
down to reinforce them.
4. 1st Cav Div Ltr, Subj: Recommendation for PUC, dtd 15 Apr 69, p. 30.
146 STANTON
one of the most daring opening episodes of the attack, the di-
In
vision's Company E, 52d Infantry (Long Range Patrol), accompanied
by combat engineers of the 8th Engineer Battalion and volunteers from
the 13th Signal Battalion, rappelled from helicopters to establish a
vital radio relay site on a five thousand-foot mountain peak which
they dubbed Signal Hill. They worked frantically to complete the

communications facility, which was needed to link the division com-
munications at Camp Evans with its units on the valley floor. Bad
weather set in, supplies stopped, and the North Vietnamese quickly
used the opportunity to probe the defenses on the night of 20 April,
killing four cavalrymen and wounding three others. The next day the
clouds began to part, dozers and howitzers were lifted in by Flying
Cranes, and Signal Hill was soon in full operation.
The thundering storm which masked Signal Hill swept through
the entire valley for several days. The flashing lightning, severe wind
gusts, and torrential rains confirmed the worst division apprehensions
about A Shau weather. Visibility dropped to near zero and threatened
logistical support of LZ Tiger. Despite the low cloud ceiling and al-
most blind flying conditions, division aviators were able to transport
one company of Lieutenant Colonel Robinson's battalion farther south
along the same ridgeline to LZ Pepper, to give the cavalrymen a better
chance at resupply. Unfortunately, the lead Huey was shot down on
the landing zone, and the wrecked helicopter blocked further lifts until
engineers were able to cut out a larger clearing.
Wasiak's cavalrymen on LZ Vicki were in the worst predicament,
as the battalion could not be lifted out, and attempts to sustain them
on Vicki had to be abandoned. Their position was untenable, and
Colonel Campbell was left with no choice but to direct Wasiak to
march his men overland to LZ Goodman, a more favorable spot four
miles south on the valley's eastern edge. Colonel Wasiak personally
led the difficult trek for three days as the troopers struggled through
the broken triple- and double-canopy jungle, following the ridge's
tortuous terrain as it twisted and doubled back on itself. The drenched
marchers became chilled and sick. They subsisted on ration tins and
went without sufficient sleep. Late in the afternoon of 22 April they
finally reached and secured the map location marked Goodman. Along
the way they were amazed to find two Soviet-built dozers driven up
into the hillside and carefully concealed. The equipment was the first
significant find of the operation.

Cavalry Raids 147
In spite of the marginal weather, the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry,

began pushing downhill and crossed a major branch of the Ho Chi
—
Minh Trail emptying into South Vietnam Route 548 running through
the middle of the A Shau Valley out of Laos. They found the NVA
highway to be a hardened dirt road, reinforced by sections of corduroy
logs and mud as well as steel planking, with trees along each side
tied together at the top to form a concealing canopy overhead. Colonel
Campbell's entire brigade was soon ranging throughout the northern
valley, but the unsatisfactory weather continued.
Helicopter pilots were forced to leave Camp Evans by climbing
individually through ceilings of nine thousand feet on instruments,
reforming over the cloud layer broken only by the highest peaks, and
fly into the valley through holes in the overcast. Switching back over
to instruments, the young aviators probed through the murky gloom
at near-zero visibility to find the cavalry positions. The normal ten-
minute flight from Camp Evans in clear weather took at least an hour,
and only the sheer flying heroics of the division's 1 1th Aviation Group
made the raid possible.
On 24 April Colonel Stannard's brigade began air assaulting into
the central valley around the abandoned A Loui airstrip, the original
insertion area of the raid's planning. Despite intensive gunship prep-
aration over LZ were opposed by considerable
Stallion, the landings
antiaircraft fire and a number of machine guns on the field itself. Lt.
Col. John V. Gibney's 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry —
the first brigade
battalion in —lost two CH47 Chinooks and a Huey, and only three
howitzers could be landed the first day. The commander of the 8th
Cavalry's 2d Battalion, Lt. Col. Christian Dubia, was medically evac-
uated during his unit's air assault the next day.
The seizure of A
Loui permitted the 8th Engineer Battalion to
begin airfield rehabilitation on 29 April. Rying Cranes lifted in the
heavy construction equipment, and by 2 May the first C7 Caribou
transport aircraft were landing. Logistical problems were greatly eased
by the establishment of this division airhead. In the meantime the
cavalry companies reconnoitering the valley found large quantities of
abandoned trucks, wheeled 37mm AA guns, and other weapons. Con-
tact remained light as Company D of Lieutenant Colonel Stockton's
battalion brushed with an NVA platoon trying to evade the area on
the night of 27 April.
The next day Company D of Lt. Col. George C. Horton's 1st
148 STANTON
Battalion, 8th Cavalry, discovered a mile-long depressed corduroy

road containing huge storage bunkers and defended by an entrenched
NVA company with one tank in support. The cavalrymen pressed
forward, wearing gas masks to ward off North Vietnamese chemical
grenades, and Sgt. Hillery Craig wriggled forward to destroy the tank
with two well-aimed M72 antitank rocket rounds. The North Viet-
namese retaliated by trying to outflank the company, forcing it to
withdraw. The cavalry reinforced, and the Punchbowl" area was taken
**
on 3 May after several days of fighting.

The Punchbowl turned out to be a large logistical center complete
with hospitals and a headquarters site of a regiment-sized component
of the 559th NVA Transportation Group. During the first few days
of May, the two cavalry brigades crisscrossed the valley and uncov-
ered numerous well-stocked caches of tools and equipment. On 5 May
the North Vietnamese began to strike back with increasing amounts
of 122mm rocket, artillery, mortar, and recoilless rifle fire. The nearby
border with Laos enabled the enemy to strike cavalry positions in the
A Shau Valley by accurate indirect fire attacks with complete im-
munity from cavalry pursuit.
The cavalry raid was planned for termination in accordance with
the northward advance of the monsoon. On 7 May, with the weather
front fast approaching, Tolson decided to begin withdrawing his cav-
alry raiding force three days later. On 1 1 May the valley was deluged
with torrential rains which quickly washed out the improved dirt A
Loui airstrip. The division was forced to withdraw its raiding force
by helicopters alone. As the last battalions were extracted under heavy
rainstorms. Operation DELAWARE terminated on 17 May 1968.
Operation DELAWARE was conducted under far more arduous
circumstances than PEGASUS; yet it was successfully confirmed that
the large cavalry raid was a viable tactical role for employment of an
airmobile division. The raid into the A Shau Valley achieved its ob-
jectives admirably. The raid determined enemy dispositions and area
utilization, disrupted a principal supply area and infiltration route, and
harassed NVA forces. The tangible success of this division cavalry
raid was evidenced by the incredible amounts of enemy equipment
captured, including 1 tank, 73 vehicles, 2 dozers, more than a dozen
37mm antiaircraft guns, 2,319 rifles and submachine guns, 31 flame-
throwers, and 1,680 hand grenades. The cavalry raid was conducted
under adverse weather and in the face of sophisticated antiaircraft
Cavalry Raids 149
defenses, and its casualties reflected these conditions: 86 killed, 47

missing, and 530 wounded troopers.^
Like the PEGASUS drive to relieve Khe Sanh, the division-scale
cavalry raid to scour the A Shau Valley was a classic manifestation
of the airmobile division's ability to conduct a traditional cavalry mis-
sion of great value to modem warfare. Both division-scale cavalry
raids were further milestones developing airmobile doctrine and
in
further testaments to the proper wedding of airmobility and cavalry
in the marriage of the cavalry division (airmobile) during the Vietnam
War.
5. 1st Cav Div, Combat Operations After Action Report, dtd 11 Jul 68,
Tabl.
CHAPTER 8
Cavalry Screen
Safeguarding a Capital
The 1st Cavalry Division had completed three and a half months of
unremitting combat by the time its helicopter-conveyed raiding forces
departed the AShau Valley on 17 May 1968. Fighting from Hue to
Quang Tri into Khe Sanh and the A Shau, Major General Tolson's
spectacular division had served as the backbone of the Army's ver-
satile striking power in Vietnam. Airmobility was largely responsible
for the allied spring victory in I Corps Tactical Zone.

The division regrouped and performed clearing operations through
the rice-growing coastal lowlands and NVA/VC mountain strong-
holds in eastern Quang Tri Province until the last month of the year.
The brigades opened new firebases, invaded the enemy jungle havens
of Base Areas 101 and 114, and found large supply and food caches
in Operations JEB STUART III and COMANCHE FALLS. Although
sharp firefights and sudden clashes sparked throughout the sunmier
and fall campaigns, the pace of these "rice and salt hunts" was slower,
and the division needed the rest. The 1st Cavalry Division, deployed
to I CTZ as an emergency mobile reaction force, was withdrawn from
the northern region of the country after the situation stabilized and
other Army formations were well emplaced in the area.
During its stay in I CTZ, the division's flexible response, raiding,
and clearing operations cost combat casualties of 745 killed, 4,063
wounded, and 138 missing troopers in slightly more than eleven months.
The incessant problem of personnel turbulence within division ranks
was underlined by the loss of 18,681 veterans through rotation (in
addition to combat casualties, injuries, disease, or nonbattle deaths)
152 STANTON
and the absorption of 23,202 new replacements. With an average as-

signed strength of 19,717 personnel during its service in I CTZ, the
1st Cavalry Division was completely refilled at least once within the
span of less than a year.

The Army temporarily retitled airmobile divisions as air cavalry
divisions when the 101st Airborne Division was taken off paratrooper
status and began conversion into an airmobile configuration. The air
cavalry division was a term that the 1st Cavalry Division unofficially
bestowed upon itself in Vietnam, especially by widespread use of the
common abbreviation 1 ACD. On 27 June 1968 DA directed that the
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and the 101st Airborne Division be
redesignated as the 1st and 101st Air Cavalry Divisions (Airmobile).
The provoked a great amount of dissatisfaction among the
directive
traditionalists, sinceboth were proud divisions with independent her-
itage. As a result of extensive complaint, the Army officially revoked
the terminology on 26 August 1968. The 1st Cavalry and 101st Air-
borne Divisions reverted to their original titles, using (Airmobile) as
a mere cognomen.^
The leadership of the 1st Cavalry Division changed as well, as
Major General Tolson departed on 15 July 1968, temporarily turning
over the formation to his Assistant Division Commander- A, Brig. Gen.
Richard ''Dick" L. Irby. The new commander, Maj. Gen. George 1.
Forsythe, was already selected, but undergoing aviator training prior
to assuming command. In fact, Forsythe actually expected to lead an
infantry division because he lacked aviator wings. When Westmore-
land told him that he was taking over a division, Forsythe was sur-
prised because ail the infantry divisions were filled. He replied, "Well,
that's great news, sir. Which one?" Westmoreland smiled, "The First
Cav."
1 Divisional averages assigned strengths determined by following total as-

signed strengths of the division: Opns JEB STUART 1, 18,943; PEGASUS,
19,877; DELAWARE, 20,294; JEB STUART UI, 19,757; Source: 1st Cav
Div Recom for PUC, dtd 15 Apr 69, Incl 4; Casualties determined from
Cav Div COAAR dtd 15 Apr 69,
figures in the following documents: 1st
Tab G; COAAR dtd Jul 68 DELAWARE, Tab 1; COAAR dtd
1 1 Jul 68 1 1
PEGASUS, Tab K; COAAR dtd 2 Jul 68, Tab L; OREL dtd 26 Aug 68.
TabL.
2. MACV, Command History, 1968, Volume I, p. 245.
Cavalry Screen 153
Forsythe was momentarily unable to respond because he knew

that command of the elite airmobile division was considered one of
the plum assignments within the Army and that the traditional ticket
to the position included pilot qualification. He replied, "Well, that's
great news, but I guess you know, sir, that Vm not an aviator."
West-
moreland responded easily, "Oh, that's easy. We'll make you an
aviator." With that authority, Maj. Gen. Forsythe dashed back state-
side to complete a rush aviation course at Fort Rucker, Alabama, and
returned to Vietnam to assume command of the 1st Cavalry Division
on 19 August 1968 at Camp Evans.
George I. Forsythe was bom in Butte, Montana, on 21 July 1918
and graduated from the University of Montana with a degree in busi-
ness administration in 1939. A reserve officer ordered to active duty
with the 30th Infantry Regiment at the Presidio of San Francisco in
1940, he became a Regular Army officer in February 1942 and par-
ticipated in the invasions of Aleutian Kiska Island and Kwajalein
Atoll in 1943 and 1944. Promoted to lieutenant colonel in March 1944,
Forsythe spent the rest of the war as the operations officer with XIX
Corps in Europe. In 1954 he was promoted to colonel, later became
paratrooper-qualified, and took over the reactivated 502d Airborne
Infantry. After graduation from the Air War College in 1958, Colonel
Forsythe was posted to Vietnam as the first senior advisor to the South
Vietnamese Army's Field Command. Returning to Vietnam as a ma-
jor general in June 1967, he served as General Westmoreland's dep-
uty for CORDS until chosen to lead the 1st Cavalry Division.
While the NVA/VC menace decreased in I CTZ, substantial en-
emy force developments inside Cambodia threatened the South Viet-
namese capital of Saigon in late 1968. Earlier that year Saigon was
penetrated by sizable Viet Cong and May
units in both February (Tet)
(mini-Tet), resulting in great political embarrassment to the American
government. The new MACV commander. General Abrams, was de-
termined to block future enemy stabs into the capital. Allied intelli-
gence reported at least four North Vietnamese divisions building up
strength along the Cambodian border of northern III CTZ during Oc-
tober and estimated that a major attack against Saigon was imminent.
3. USAMHI, Senior Officers Oral History Program, Lt. Gen. George I.
Forsythe Interview, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, p. 435. Hereafter cited

as USAMHI, Forsythe Interview.
154 STANTON
The and 25th Infantry Divisions normally covered the enemy

1st
approaches between Cambodia and Saigon by guarding War Zones D

and C, respectively. However, as part of General Abrams's emphasis
on increased pacification efforts, both divisions were being pulled back
from the frontier wilderness to support South Vietnamese military units
and to assist pacification in more heavily populated regions. Since
Abrams did not want to upset the progressive stability that this ar-
rangement brought to his "One War Plan," he decided to shift the 1st
Cavalry Division south and to use it as a corps covering force for II
Field Force Vietnam which would screen and safeguard the capital.
On the afternoon of 26 October 1968, General Abrams ordered
the cavalry moved into northern III CTZ immediately. General Abrams
was keenly aware of the division's past record of air assault, sustained
pursuit, clearing operations, flexible response, and cavalry raids. He
now wanted the airmobile division in a screening role to meet the
North Vietnamese on the border if they came across. Military screen-
ing missions are assigned to provide timely warning of enemy ap-
proach, maintain visual contact and report on enemy movement, de-
stroy or repel small enemy forces, and impede the advance of larger
enemy forces.
General Abrams did not expect that one division spread over such
a vast area could stop a determined multidi visional NVA attack, but
he knew that the cavalry's airmobile infantry and firepower could
chew it up. He ordered Forsythe to get his cavalry into position on
the Cambodian front at once and if the North Vietnamese came across,
to **ride them with your spurs all the way down, down to the point
where, if and when they do get to the populated areas, they will be
!""*
a relatively ineffective fighting force
Ninety minutes after notification that the move would start within
twenty-four hours, Forsythe and selected staff members flew south to
Long Binh. The U.S. Army Southeast Asia Signal Training Facility
was placed at their disposal and became the advance command post.
Continuous communication would have to be maintained between all
units, as the division would be participating in three major operations
on two fronts simultaneously.
When Forsythe inquired about special precautions to keep the move
4. USAMHI, Forsythe Interview, p. 443.

Cavalry Screen 155
secret, such as taking off cloth insignia, reinforcing NVA/VC un-

certainty about the extent of division redeployment, Abrams would
have none of that. He told Forsythe that he specifically wanted to
show the North Vietnamese that ^'you could move a division 600 miles
overnight," and to ** leave the cav patch painted on their [helicopter]
noses to show them" the tremendous flexibility the airmobile division
afforded the MACVcommand.
The moving the 1st Cavalry Division, coded Operation
task of
LIBERTY CANYON, represented the largest allied intratheater com-
bat deployment of the Second Indochina War. The division withdrew
its scattered battalions from the jungled mountains at one end of the
country and moved them more than 570 miles by air, land, and sea
for commitment into flat territory against an unfamiliar enemy at the
other end. Operation LIBERTY CANYON commenced 27 October
1968 as Brigadier General Irby began sending the cavalry battalions
south at the rate of one per day.
Frank L. Henry's 2d Battalion of the 8th Cavalry '^Moun-
Lt. Col.
tain Boys" began packing on 27 October. After stashing all their
equipment into CONEX containers, which were trucked to the dock-
sides in Hue for shipment by sea, the troops camped on the Quang
Tri airstrip with only their combat gear. Two days later CI 30 trans-
port aircraft ferried them into Quan Loi, where they spent two days
preparing to air assault into LZ Joe on Halloween, the last day of the
month. Rocket-firing gunships and artillery pounded the woodlines as
the battalion conducted the first cavalry division air assault in III CTZ.
Waves of supply helicopters followed with materials as a new fire

support base was hastily constructed.
Addison Davis's 2d Battalion of the 7th Cavalry was
Lt. Col.
flown to Quan Loi, paused for breath, and airmobiled onto LZ Billy
in the forested borderland on November. The order of the day was
1
simply "Dig down or build up, but hurry." Reinforced by a battery

from the 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery, and two squads of engineers,
the troops felled trees with chain saws, cleared fields of fire with
explosives, dug foxholes in the swampy
up observation posts,
soil, set
and started building bunkers with steel planking, sandbags, logs, and
sod. The bunker walls were stacked with hundreds of dirt-filled am-
munition crates, quickly rendered excess as the light howitzers pumped
shells into the nearby forest. In two days 181 helicopter sorties lifted
in food, ammunition, fortification materials, light vehicles, radios.
156 STANTON
tents, and other equipment to establish the new fire support base.
Rockets slammed nightly into the perimeter, and local patrols were
already clashing with the Viet Cong. Company D's probe of a nearby
woodline embroiled the battalion on its first southern firefight against
a VC battalion just days later, on 6-7 November 1968.
On 27 October Lt. Col. James W. Dingeman learned that he would
be moving his 2d Battalion of the 12th Cavalry south in approximately
a day and a half and began planning to pull his companies in from
the mountains. By noon on 29 October, his troops were assembled.
Whipped by dust and pebbles from the twin rotors of descending Chi-
nooks, they clambered aboard and were whisked to the Quang Tri
airport for transport by CI 30 cargo planes into their new territory.
With three battalions locked into III CTZ, the 3d Brigade relo-
cation was complete, and Col. Robert J. Baer's 1st Brigade began
arriving to take over the southeastern portion of the former brigade's
area. The inherent airmobile division flexibility allowed the screen to
be adjusted wherever needed. For instance, Lt. Col. John F. Mc-
Graw, Jr.'s, 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry, was originally ordered to Phuoc
Vinh, but was shifted to "The Fishhook" area, a sharp bend in the
border, where Lieutenant Colonel Henry's battalion encountered the
enemy. The 2d Brigade lingered in I CTZ on COMANCHE FALLS
until the operation was terminated 7 November and moved south the
next day, where it was taken over by Col. Conrad L. Stansberry be-
fore the end of the month.
The 11th Aviation Group flew its own four hundred aircraft and
2,164 men down from Da Nang
the coast to Bear Cat. From there
the helicopters were flown to helipads and fire support bases being
built near Army Special Forces campsites along the border. This ar-
rangement provided some mutual security, allowed aircraft to operate
out of prepared airstrips, and enabled battalions to be briefed on their

individual areas by Special Forces teams. The 1st Cavalry Division
headquarters deployed to its new main camp at Phuoc Vinh, a former
1st Infantry Division brigade base, on 7 November. Operation LIB-
ERTY CANYON was concluded as the last essential combat equip-

ment of the division arrived in III CTZ on 15 November 1968.
The amount of personnel and material moved during the transfer
was staggering. During sixteen days of frantic Air Force aircraft shut-
tling, the 834th Air Division's 437 CI 30 transport sorties carried 1 1 ,550
troops and 3,399 tons of cargo from Quang Tri, Camp Evans, and
DMZ
ouang Tri I Corps Tactlcal Zone
":JfV Tan My
Map by Shelby L. Stanton
Operation LIBERTY CANYON

158 STANTON
Phu Bai and landed them at Tay Ninh, Quan Loi, Phuoc Vinh, Bien
Hoa, and Long Thanh North. At the same time, the Navy mustered
a flotilla of ships ranging from the carrier Princeton (LPH-5) to aux-
iliary landing vessels and sailed 4,037 troops and 16,593 tons of cargo
from Hue to the Newport dock at Saigon.^

The 1st Cavalry Division stretched its screen across 4,800 square
miles of the northern III CTZ frontier by establishing a belt of fire
support bases, similar to the forts used in fighting American Indians,
to provide surveillance and armed reconnaissance astride the principal
NVA/VC infiltration lanes from Cambodia toward Saigon. In this
fashion the nine cavalry battalions on one side of the international
boundary were squared off against several secure North Vietnamese
divisions on the other side. The cavalry picket line extended from the
rolling, jungled plains of the "Sheridan Sabre" area, covering The
Fishhook and northern approach routes, to the flat ricefields and marshy
Plain of Reeds "Navajo Warhorse" area, covering the western
in the
Saigon corridor facing The Angel's Wing and Parrot's Beak. The screen
was patrolled by infantry and buttressed by helicopter reconnaissance
flights day and night.
As division helicopters began skimming over the grassy wood-
lands, they encountered far greater NVA/VC antiaircraft fire than that
encountered previously in the northern coastal lowlands of I CTZ.
Aerial operations were immediately adjusted to lessen the threat of
this frequently heavy flak. Whenever possible, attack Cobra gunships
flying "high bird" escorted scoutships to provide suppressive fire and
to guide them around dangerous firing sites and clearings in their flight
paths. Rifle companies pushed observation posts and patrols well be-
yond their landing zones to insure maximum security for resupply
helicopters.
marshes and rice paddies of the Navajo Warhorse area,
In the flat
a dangerous slice of territory saturated with enemy booby traps and
trip-wire explosives, aerial reconnaissance over the sparsely vege-
tated, open landscape usually limited NVA/VC activity to the hours
of darkness. Roving cavalry ambush patrols maintained vigilance at
night. The plentiful waterways around the Parrot's Beak, jutting within
5. 14th MHD, Operation Liberty Canyon, dtd 30 Jan 69.

Cavalry Screen 159
thirty miles of Saigon, were screened with cavalrymen on Navy river

patrol boats in joint"Nav-Cav" operations. The Nav-Cav search pa-
trols swept through the Plain of Reeds and often crossed into the ad-
jacent IV Corps Tactical Zone of South Vietnam's delta region. The

1st Cavalry Division became the only Army division to serve in all
four Vietnam corps tactical zones.

Search operations in War Zone C's tropical rain forests pitted the
cavalry against well-fortified, superbly camouflaged bunkers built for
mutually interlocking and always designed in unique arrange-
fire
ments. Fields-of-fire, invisible to the advancing cavalrymen, were cut

in the thick overgrowth only a few feet off the ground. Caught in
such killing zones, entire platoons could be wiped out in a matter of

seconds. The bunker complexes could be mastered only by us-
lethal
ing carefully coordinated, overwhelming fire support and airpower.
Even in the absence of such fieldworks, maneuvering cavalry was
targeted by increased use of close-range enemy B40 rocket launchers.
The companies reduced this danger by changing locations daily, ag-
gressively sweeping the flanks of moving units, staking out night am-
bush sites, and establishing listening posts around perimeters at night.
The cavalrymen, accustomed to combating NVA entrenched into
the monsoon-laden mountains who concealed their signal lines, found
enemy communications wire simply strung along the trails. In one
instance the wire was tapped as the enemy was relaying traffic. How-
ever, the troops quickly learned that following the wire often led to
disaster for the point unit. Safe wire tracking required that units move
in arcs every fifty yards, relocating the wire farther down the trail,
then repeating the procedure until the wire's source was discovered.
The joint aerial cavalry reconnaissance and fire support base pa-
trolling screen inhibited the flow of enemy supplies. At midnight on
14 November 1968, theenemy made its first determined bid to smash
the cavalry screen in the comer of War Zone C. The 95 C Regiment
struck Fire Support Base Dot, held by the ARVN 36th Ranger Bat-
talionunder the division's operational control and backed up by 2d
Brigade gunships, artillery, and scout helicopters. Preceded by a heavy
mortar and rocket barrage, thousands of NVA infantrymen surged for-
ward, trying to overrun the base. The South Vietnamese rangers low-
ered their artillery tubes to fire point-blank into the massed charges,
which were also mauled by defensive artillery, helicopters, and FlOO
160 STANTON
fighter-bombers. The attackers retreated with heavy losses, and di-

vision gunships rocketed and strafed the defeated remnants for four
miles as they streamed back to Cambodia.
During the month of December, the allies gained evidence that
the North Vietnamese were planning a multidivision repeat attack
against Saigon during the Tet-69 period. The 5th VC Division was
assigned the task of moving down Adams Road (the Song Be corri-
dor) to eliminate the allied command's strategic Bien Hoa-Long Binh
complex outside Saigon. This division's movement was the linchpin
of the enemy's battle plan. The closer Jst, 7th, and 9th Divisions
would continue to reconnoiter and stash forward caches, but would
not move toward Saigon until the 5th VC Division was in position on
the eastern flank. The 1st NVA Division was given the diversionary
mission of marching out of War Zone C to draw the allied reserves
from their positions. The two other divisions would then advance on
the capital itself, the 7th NVA Division from the north down the Sai-
gon corridor and the 9th VC Division from the west directly out of
The Angel's Wing.
All NVA/VC offensives required high levels of supplies pre-
stocked in advance depots. In anticipation of the upcoming offensive
against Saigon, the enemy increased his flow of materials into Viet-
nam. Supply lines such as the X-Cache Route, Saigon corridor, Serge's
Jungle Highway, Adams Road, and Jolley Trail were shifted or
strengthened to pierce the airmobile screen. Although December was
generally a period of light, sporadic contact, the 1st Cavalry Divi-
sion's battalions opened and closed fire support bases in rapid succes-
sion as they tried to remain ahead of the NVA forces infiltrating into
attack positions.
Col. Karl R. Morton took over the 3d Brigade on 15 November
and shifted brigade efforts to cover Serge's Jungle Highway, a critical
enemy midzone infiltration lane, on 1 December 1968. That same
day, Lt. Col. George D. Hardesty, Jr., assumed command of the 2d
Battalion, 7th Cavalry. Captain Fitzsimmons's Company D had been
moving northwest of Quan Loi for several days, engaging only small
pockets of resistance and occasional sniper fire. The field first ser-
geant, Sfc. John Allison, a veteran of the same company during his
previous Vietnam tour in 1966-67, noticed that the scant contact was
making the troops restless and that they were becoming lax. On the
Cavalry Screen 161
December, Captain Fitzsimmons announced that the com-

night of 2
pany would be air assaulted into a new area. He turned to Sergeant
Allison and said, ''Six Mike (Allison's call sign), we are going in
without a prep or chopper gunships working over the LZ prior to the
troopscoming in on helicopters." Sergeant Allison was aghast. Fitz-
simmons quickly replied that he was only joking, and everyone sighed
with relief.
On the following morning the 116-men company airmobiled by

increments into LZ Eleanor. Artillery and armed helicopters ceased
pounding the horseshoe-shaped woodline around the landing zone as
the first troopships glided toward the LZ. Helicopter door gunners
raking the trees and dense undergrowth were not challenged during
the final descent, and the signal "LZ Green!" (meaning safe or se-
cured) was given. The first troopers nonchalantly moved through the
waist-high grass and around small anthills on the two-hundred-yard-
wide field. An hour before noon the helicopters returned with the rest
of the troops, and the company began final preparation to consolidate
the perimeter.
The cavalrymen were unaware that their landing zone was ringed
by bunkers set twenty-five yards or less into the treeline and sur-
rounded by four hundred North Vietnamese soldiers. The enemy troops
were silently watching and waiting with automatic weapons, heavy
machine guns, mortars, and B40 rockets at the ready. Dozens of sni-
pers were tied into the trees to prevent their falling, even if hit. The
North Vietnamese leaders quietly observed the Americans begin or-
ganizing search teams to probe the woodline, but held their fire as a
single Huey descended into the clearing.
Lieutenant Colonel Hardesty stepped out of his command heli-
copter, briefly conferred with Captain Fitzsimmons, then returned to
the Huey. As the command ship was clearing the treetops, the NVA
suddenly opened fire. The landing zone was swept by a devastating
hailstorm of bullets, mortar explosions, and rocket detonations. Dead

and wounded cavalrymen fell everywhere, and the majority of the
company never had a chance. The surviving troopers desperately tried
to dig in, but the ground was like rock underneath the parched cracked
crust, leaving them completely exposed.
The first B40 rocket burst into a raging grass fire on the field.
The troops frantically attempted to beat out the blazing grass with
162 STANTON
their tunics as they returned fire into the trees, and many were killed
or wounded in the effort. Some men were wounded so badly that they
were unable to crawl away, and the fire burned them alive as their
ammunition pouches discharged from the heat.
Sergeant Allison considered the scene a nightmare where every-
thing was going wrong, and foolish heroism was compounding the
slaughter. The artillery forward observer, who had celebrated his
twentieth birthday on the eve of the assault, stood up and began call-
ing in artillery fire as everyone shouted, ''Get down. Thirty!'' (his
call sign). He was killed almost instantly. The dead lieutenant ob-
server slumped over the radioman, who struggled to push the body
off and use the radio. Finally, the radio operator was able to start
directing fire support through the smoke into the forest.
Captain Fitzsimmons's radioman, "Buzz," dropped his radio,
grabbed a machine gun, and disappeared into the grass as he moved
all over the field firing bursts of return fire. Sergeant Allison furiously
grabbed the abandoned radio and tried to stay in contact with battal-
ion, but communications kept fading. Each time he set the radio up-
right, the North Vietnamese concentrated their fire on the antenna,
so Allison laid the backpack radio flat on the ground and put the whip
antenna over his shoulder to keep it off the ground. A sniper round
slapped dirt in the sergeant's face, but miraculously he wasn't hit.
He called for immediate resupply of water, ammunition, and medical
evacuation support.
The medical helicopter whirled onto the burning, fire-swept field,
but was riddled with machine gun bullets as it landed. The pilot, door
gunner, and all the medical aidmen on board were shot, and the co-
pilot lifted the stricken helicopter out at once. Other
of the maelstrom
helicopters darted overhead as their crews tossed outammunition con-
tainers, but they were dropped too high and landed beyond reach. A
number of troopers tried to secure the precious cargo, only to be killed
or wounded in the process. Men were lying all over the landing zone,
crying for water and help, and three medics were killed trying to treat
the growing number of casualties.
After five hours of combat, the enemy fire ceased in volume and
Sergeant Allison reasoned that the enemy was preparing to overrun
the field. He shouted for everyone to gather what ammunition and
grenades he could and crawl to his position, thus forming a small
perimeter with the thirty-six cavalrymen who were still able to fight.
Cavalry Screen in III Corps Tactical Zone
A - Adams Road
C- Saigon Corridor
J - Jolley Trail
P - Parrot's Beak
S — Serge's Jungle Highway
W - Angel's Wing
X - X-Cache Route
Map Scale in miles
IV CT2
Vung Tau<

164 STANTON
However, the North Vietnamese were withdrawing as cavalry rein-

forcements reached the battlefield to rescue the dehydrated survivors
of Company D. Lieutenant Colonel Hardesty helicoptered onto the
blackened, shattered landing zone. He went over to Sergeant Allison
and patted him on the back, saying, "Fine job you did. Six Mike,"
but his eyes expressed only, "What a hell of a mess.''^
The decimation of Company D, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry, was
a relatively minor encounter in the division's covering operations, but
it demonstrated the high price that a screening force paid to detect
and harass large, advancing enemy formations. In effect, valiant air-

mobile companies such as Fitzsimmons's were exposing themselves
to North Vietnamese divisions to safeguard the capital, Saigon.
The 1st Cavalry Division was flexible enough to send its battal-
ions hopping over great distances, but they often fragmented into smaller
elements to cover the vast operational area. With a screening mission
to provide timely warning of enemy approach and to report on enemy
movement, these small airmobile forces often landed in unsecured
territory and sometimes suffered reverses. However, the total power
of an airmobile division was greater than the sum of its parts, and
powerful responsive forces could be rapidly shifted to battle the en-
emy wherever he was found. This capability to change directions and
skirmish along a wide front was effectively impeding and frustrating
enemy make headway through the war zones.
attempts to
moved into the Saigon corridor to interdict
Colonel Baer's brigade
the movement of the 9th VC Division from The Angel's Wing on 15
December. Using airmobile and riverine techniques, the brigade slashed
through the Navajo Warhorse area and captured so many munitions
and caches that it was credited with finding a large percentage of the
total amount infiltrated into III CTZ
by the enemy division. On 19
January 1969 Colonel Baer reentered War Zone C, leaving only two
companies to monitor Navajo Warhorse. The brigade combed jungles
and ambushed trails in a successful screen which killed forty NVA/
VC a night and uncovered additional material.
Colonel Stansberry's brigade continued its interdictory operations
south of The Fishhook. One of the largest caches was found by its
6. Ltr fm Sfc. John Allison in ref to Div investigation, undtd, frm Eliza-
bethtown, Ky, contained in 1st Cav Div Opn TOAN THANG II files.
Cavalry Screen 165
attached South Vietnamese 3d Marine Battalion. Containing 250 large

rockets. 324 assault 22 crew-served weapons, and a ton of mu-
rifles.
nitions, the cache could have supplied an entire NVA battalion for a
sizable attack. In the meantime Colonel Morton's brigade air as-
saulted into War Zone D to head off the 5th VC Division. This mobile
screening increased the distance from the border on the western flank,
giving the air cavalry reconnaissance squadron more time to detect
the enemy approach and use long-range division artillery against it.
The NVA/VC were forced to break their units into smaller com-
ponents to pass through the screen and to divert combat troops to
move additional supplies in order to replace critical material losses.
The cavalry continued to batter enemy rear service elements strug-
gling to protect and move their caches, and these support units took
the actual brunt of casualties. The main enemy divisions inexorably
worked their way forward: the Jst and 7th NVA Divisions into the
area just north of Michelin Rubber Plantation, and the 5th and 9th
VC Divisions on both sides of Saigon in The Angel's Wing and south-
western War Zone D, respectively.^
The enemy offensive began on 23 February 1969 after the con-
clusion of the Tet-69 truce, as flreflghts and rocket or mortar barrages
erupted over a wide front. The strength of the 5th VC Division push-
ing toward Saigon was steadily eroded. One regiment of the 5th VC
Division, repeatedly hit by ambushes and artillery, aborted its mission
and returned to War Zone D. By the time the weakened division at-
tacked the allied gates and bunker line at Bien Hoa airbase, it was
stopped cold by the 199th infantry Brigade. The 1st Infantry Division
weakened enemy prong at
repelled a regimental assault of the other
Dau Tieng and counterattacked through the Michelin Rubber Plan-
tation to finish off the attackers.
In War Zone C the Jst NVA Division had been bottled up by the
1st Brigade, under the command of Col. Joseph P. Kingston since 3
March 1969. Cavalry operating out of Fire Support Base Grant, oc-
cupied by Lt. Col. Peter Gorvard's 2d Battalion of the 12th Cavalry,
kept interdicting the enemy division's lines of communication and
prevented it from conducting the assigned diversion mission. Shortly
after midnight on 8 March 1969, the base was hit by intense rocket
7. 1st Cav Div, Combat Operations After Action Report, dtd 2 Sep 69.
166 STANTON
and mortar and stormed by the 95C Regiment. The battalion head-
fire
was destroyed by two 120mm rockets in the opening

quarters bunker
bombardment, killing Colonel Gorvad and numerous other key per-
sonnel.
The massed enemy attack on Fire Support Base Grant was smashed
by concentrated defensive fires and airstrikes. Quad .50-caliber ma-
chine guns sliced through the onrushing NVA soldiers with four-bar-
reled ribbons of fire. Capt. Bill Capshaw of Battery C, 1st Battalion,
77th Artillery, directed his troops as they manhandled a 105mm
howitzer forward to rake the North Vietnamese with Bee Hive rounds.
While the main assault was finally destroyed in the perimeter wire,
enemy regimental reserves were smothered by artillery concentra-
tions. The shattered remnants fled the battlefield only two hours after
the attack commenced.
Two D Regiment tried to overrun Fire Sup-
battalions of the 101
port Base Grant
in the predawn hours of March 1969, but were
1 1
quickly repulsed. Fast pursuit by 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, heli-

copters further diminished the retreating enemy. The successful de-
fense of Fire Support Base Grant insured the continuity of the cavalry
screen in War Zone C, and Colonel Baer shifted his brigade flag to
take over the Navajo Warhorse area. During March the Navajo War-
horse area also flared with action as the cavalry intercepted elements
of the 9th VC Division attempting to drive east into Saigon.^ The 2d
Brigade became responsible for War Zone C, while Colonel Morton's
brigade continued hunting expeditions in War Zone D.
With the NVA/VC offensive timetable wrecked and combat
its
formations in obviously depleted condition, II Field Force Vietnam

went over to the offensive in Operation ATLAS WEDGE during mid-
March. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment fought through the
Michelin Rubber Plantation and pushed the 7th NVA Division out of
its staging area. end of March 1969, it was apparent that the
By the
North Vietnamese threat to Saigon was over. The airmobile division
accomplished its screening objectives by impeding the advance of four
8. A detailed account of a particularly bitter night firefight by the 1st Cav-

alry Division in The Angefs Wing sector can be found in the author's The
Rise and Fall of an American Army, (Novate, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985),
pp. 308-13.
Cavalry Screen 167
NVA/VC divisions, causing large enemy cache and material losses

throughout northern III CTZ, and breaking the core of the projected
enemy sweep into Saigon during the enemy post-Tet 1969 spring of-
fensive.
Cavalry screening was largely uneventful during April. The di-
vision initiated the MONTANA SCOUT/MONTANA RAIDER se-
ries of operations, seeking the NVA/VC forces which were refitting
in III CTZ. Colonel Morton's brigade screened War Zone D to locate
and intercept the 5th VC Division. In early May the 9th VC Division
initiated an attack toward Tay Ninh in coordination with the Jst NVA
Division, while the 7th Division held the Saigon corridor open. With
all four enemy divisions once again on the move, the 1st Cavalry
Division retracted its mobile screening net to assume an interdictory
posture, typified by small patrols and ambushes, across the southern

portion of War Zone C.
Maj. Gen. Elvy Benton Roberts brought a wealth of veteran air-
mobile knowledge and combat paratrooper background when he took
command of the 1st Cavalry Division on 5 May 1969. Roberts was
bom in Manchester, Kentucky, on 21 August 1917. He graduated
from West Point in January 1943, then completed infantry, parachute,
and airborne school demolitions courses before joining the 501st Par-
achute Infantry Regiment of the famous 101st Airborne Division at
the end of the year. He jumped into Normandy during D-Day 6 June ,
1944, and served with the regiment throughout the rest of World War
II, participating in five major campaigns, including the parachute as-
sault of Holland and the defense of Bastogne.

After the war, Roberts served on various assignments in the United
States, Germany, and Iran, including the command of the 1st Air-
borne Battle Group, 506th Infantry, at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, from
June 1961 through January 1963. At that point Colonel Roberts was
assigned as Chief of Staff of the 1 1th Air Assault Division and be-
came one of the prime developers of the modem airmobile division
concept. He brought the 1st Cavalry Division's 1st Airbome Brigade
to Vietnam and led it through the central highlands until March 1966,
when he was assigned to MACV and promoted to brigadier general
that September. Retuming to Vietnam as deputy commander of the
9th Infantry Division in June 1968, Roberts moved up to USARV
Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations before taking com-
mand of the 1st Cavalry Division. Possessing an intimate knowledge
168 STANTON
of airmobile application. Major General Roberts acted aggressively

and without hesitation in shifting division forces to interdict and de-
stroy enemy elements throughout northern III CTZ.
The day after Roberts assumed command, the 1st Cavalry Divi-
sion scored one of its hardest-fought screening victories during the
battle of Landing Zone Carolyn. Lt. Col. Richard W. Wood's 2d
Battalion of the 8th Cavalry had opened LZ Carolyn two weeks earlier
in a large open area near the abandoned Prek Klok Special Forces
camp as a forward command and firebase inside War Zone C. Two
batteries of artillery were located inside the perimeter: Battery B of
the 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (155mm), on the northern side; and
Battery A of the 2d Battalion, 19th Artillery (105mm), along the western
perimeter. The cavahy operating out of LZ Carolyn quickly became
a thorn in the side of enemy forces, engaging NVA/VC forces in
sixty-two separate contacts within the period of twenty-four days. The
North Vietnamese decided to annihilate the post because of its pres-
sure on X-Cache Trail traffic.
In the early morning darkness of 6 May, the North Vietnamese
retaliated with an intensive rocket and mortar barrage, followed by a
massive 95th Regiment pincer ground assault against two sides of the
base an hour later. LZ Carolyn's garrison was reduced by the absence
of several line companies on patrol, and the withering defensive fires
of the battalion's Company C and E were unable to prevent the on-
rushing battalions from storming through the wire and into the landing
zone from both directions. Six perimeter bunkers were overrun, one
of the medium howitzers was captured, and the enemy threatened to
slice through the center of the base.
The Americans counterattacked with all available personnel, the
officers involved being killed at thehead of their troops. Artillery-
men, supply and signal personnel, and engineers fought and died as
emergency infantry reserves. The counterattacks were hurled against
both enemy penetrations, but the most violent fighting occurred on
the northern side, where a seesaw battle raged for possession of the
155mm howitzer position. During the course of the battle, this weapon
exchanged hands three times in hand-to-hand fighting decided at close
range with rifles and entrenching tools.
Overhead, rocket-firing AHIG Cobra helicopters rolled in, ig-
noring heavy flak, and blasted the NVA with rockets and miniguns.
Air Force AC47 "Spooky" and ACl 19 "Shadow" aircraft, supported
Cavalry Screen 169
by fighter-bombers, were employed against the numerous enemy an-

tiaircraft weapons ringing the perimeter.
Controlled and uncontrolled fires were raging everywhere, and it

seemed that LZ Carolyn was ablaze throughout its entire length. Waves
of North Vietnamese infantry charging into the southern lines were
met by defending troops who took advantage of the aviation gasoline
storage area. They shot holes in the fuel drums and ignited them to
create a flaming barrier, which effectively blocked further enemy pen-
etration. In the LZ's opposite sector, a medium howitzer gun pit re-
ceived three direct hits which touched off a fire in its powder bunker,
yet the crew calmly stood by its weapon and employed it throughout
the night.
Both 105mm ammunition points were exploded by en-
artillery
emy fire around 3:30 a.m., and shrapnel from more than six hundred
disintegrating rounds in the two dumps sprayed the entire landing zone
continuously for four hours. LZ Carolyn appeared threatened with
total destruction as the thundering conflagration tossed detonating ar-
tillery projectiles to shower men and equipment with flying rounds
and burning shell fragments.
The defending artillerymen and mortar crews fought in despera-
tion heightened by the loss of communications between most weapons
and (FDC). The initial enemy barrage de-
their fire direction centers
stroyed communications from the 155mm gun sections to their PDC,
forcing crews to individually engage targets on their own volition by
leveling tubes full of Bee Hive or high-explosive charges. When tele-
phone lines from the mortar tubes to their FDC were severed, the
direction personnel switched to a bullhorn to relay fire commands
across the deafening noise of the battlefield. The battalion mortar pla-
toon's four tubes fired fifteen hundred rounds, ranging from critical
illumination to searing white phosphorus. In all cases effective fire
support was maintained.
Ammunition shortages quickly developed. As on-hand mortar am-
munition beside the weapons was exhausted, volunteers dashed through
fire-swept open areas to retrieve more rounds from storage bunkers.
The destruction of the 105mm ammunition points caused an imme-
diate crisis in the light howitzer pits. The cannoneers were forced to
redistribute remaining ammunition by crawling from one gun section
to another under a hail of enemy direct fu-e and spinning shrapnel
from the exploding dump. The crews continued rendering direct fire.
170 STANTON
even though they were often embroiled in defending their own weap-
ons. One light howitzer section was caught in an enemy cross fire
between a heavy machine gun and rifles, until the artillerymen man-
aged to turn their lowered muzzle and pump Bee Hive flechettes
into the enemy. All automatic weapons fire against the howitzer was
instantly silenced. Cavalry counterattacks reestablished the perimeter,
and the enemy force began withdrawing, breaking contact at 6:00
The NVA/VC forces increased their activity throughout the war

zone, but the high point was reached between 12 and 14 May 1969
as Fire Support Bases Grant, Jamie, and Phyllis were hit by ground
attacks. Action tapered off almost immediately afterward as the cav-
alry screen effectively disrupted the flow of enemy logistical traffic
needed to sustain the enemy's advance. Now General Roberts air-

mobiled his division into the attack as he resumed its offensive role,
striking enemy formations and their assembly areas throughout central
War Zone C. Division forces conducted air assaults throughout the
thick jungles in the wake of massed B52 bombing runs. Extensive
use was made of large amounts of chemical gas crystal to channel
enemy movement and contaminate his supplies.
Division search operations and difficult "bunker busting" tasks
continued through the humid summer, reducing the next round of NVA/
VC attacks in August to feeble one-battalion thrusts against remote
provincial capitals near Cambodia. These attacks could be staged di-
rectly across the border from The Fishhook and other adjacent terri-
tory without having attacking units run the gauntlet of cavalry inter-
ception or relying on forward depots subject to destruction by cavalry
patrolling.
The 1 St Cavalry Division screen was stretched across northern III
CTZ from 15 November 1968, when Operation LIBERTY CANYON

ended, until 23 June 1969, the official termination date of the Op-
eration MONTANA SCOUT/MONTANA RAIDER series. During
this time the cavalry screening effort cost the lives of 567 troopers
killed in action and another 3,555 wounded.'^ In exchange, the di-
9. Hq 2d Bn, 8th Cav, Ltr dtd 1 Jun 69, Subj: Recomm for Awd of the
VUA w/spt papers.
10. Cav Div, Operational Report, dtd 15 Feb 69, Tab J; and 14th MHD,
1st
The Shield and the Hammer: The 1st Cav Div in War Zone C and Western
III Corps, undtd, p. 28.
Cavalry Screen 171
vision whittled down the offensive momentum of four NVA/VC di-

visions in the heart of war zone country and rendered them incapable
of inflicting damage on Saigon. For the 1st Cavalry Division, the
successful conclusion of this mission represented the airmobile ful-
fillment of a quintessential cavalry function throughout military his-
tory: the cavalry screen.
CHAPTER 9
Cavalry Exploitation
The Cambodian Invasion
Maj. Gen. E. B. Roberts's 1st Cavalry Division paired up its brigades

with ARVN airborne brigades in late 1969 to assist South Vietnam
to develop its Airborne Division into an airmobile strike force. The
cavalry conducted extensive joint field exercises to impart technical
airmobile doctrine and helicopter expertise to the South Vietnamese
units. This posture temporarily reduced division field screening, but
by early 1970 the division and its mated Vietnamese airborne brigades
were leapfrogging closer to the Cambodian border, giving the Viet-
namese practical combat experience in airmobile cavalry techniques.
The cavalry was traveling fast and light to actively interdict the
sparse enemy foot, cart, and truck traffic. The advance was preceded
by division ranger teams weaving and ambushing their way deep into
uncharted territory to scout out the trail networks and bunker com-
plexes for NVA/VC troops and to report rapidly on enemy move-
ments. Behind the rangers the airmobile companies and platoons fanned
out through the maze of forest trails, being resupplied twice a week
and using temporary firebases closed out every few days. An umbrella
of B52 bombers, helicopters, fighter-bombers, and aerial artillery re-
mained overhead.
This dangerous business was being pushed steadily forward in
northwestern War Zone C by Col. William V. Ochs, Jr.'s, 1st Bri-
gade and attached 3d ARVN Airborne Brigade. His command con-
sisted of two cavalry battalions, the 2d Battalions of the 7th and 8th
Cavalry (later replaced by the 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry), and the
174 STANTON
5th, 9th, and 11th ARVN airborne battalions, all reinforced by the
1st Squadron of the 1 1th Armored Cavalry Regiment.'
Fire Support Base (FSB) Illingworth was among a dozen hasty
forts built by the brigade, but it was placed extremely close to Cam-
bodia in the comer pocket of War Zone C, a rough patch of no-man's-
land that the troops rancorously called the "Dog's Head." Lt. Col.
Michael J. Conrad's 2d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, occupied FSB Illing-
worth on 18 March 1970. The command post, one line cavalry com-
pany, and the support company were placed alongside eleven howit-
zers and five combat vehicles. The rest of the battalion began scouring
the nearby jungle.
Company A
performed the garrison duty until a close-range B40
rocket and machine gun attack cut into the fire support base perimeter
in the evening ten days later, causing thirty-five casualties and the
company's withdrawal to rest and absorb replacements. That same
night in the "Dog's Throat" sector four miles directly south, a massed
NVA attack nearly overran FSB Jay of Lt. Col. Robert Hannas's 2d
Battalion, 7th Cavalry. The garrison of FSB Illingworth were told to
brace for assault next, and Company C became the perimeter com-
pany. Since it mustered only thirty-nine troops, the battalion recon
platoon was added so that three officers and seventy-four enlisted men
manned the berm.^
FSB Illingworth was a on the Cam-
typical late-war forward base
bodian front. The oval-shaped fort contained twenty squad sandbag
bunkers, each containing six or nine men, roofed with steel culvert
sections and three sandbag layers, built into the four-foot-high earth
berm. Foxholes were dug between bunkers. The company placed a
dozen claymore antipersonnel mines in front of each bunker, but only
set two machine guns on the perimeter because of recent losses. Four
armored personnel carriers and one Sheridan light tank backed up the
line, but the Sheridan was inoperative except for its .50-caliber ma-
chine gun. This weapon was pulled off and dug in beside the single
quadruple .50-caliber antiaircraft gun on the southwest berm comer.
1. 1st Cav Div, Operational Report, dtd 15 May 70.

2. Exact organization of FSB Illingworth CP and Companies
was Battalion
C and E of the 2d Bn, 8th Cav; Btty A, 1st Bn, 30th Arty; Btry A, 2d Bn,
32d Arty; Btry B, 1st Bn, 77th Arty; part of Tp A, 1st Sqdn, 1 1th Arm Cav
Regt.
Cavalry Exploitation 175
One 8-inch (another was unserviceable), three 155mm medium, and

six 105mm light howitzers were prepared with ** killer junior'' and
other antiinfantry rounds.
No barbed wire was placed around FSB Illingworth because it was
not intended as a permanent firebase, but rather one that could be
dismantled in a day. Barbed wire was ineffective in slowing enemy
sappers unless it was staked down and included tanglefoot, and the
battalion did not have sufficient personnel to build elaborate wire bar-
riers nor the needed to backhaul it. For the same reasons, all
airlift
relating to the temporary nature of the position and its hasty assembly,
chemical gas projectors, fougasse flame barrels, and other weapons
were not emplaced. The field first sergeant of Company C, Sfc. Charles
H. Beauchamp, was distressed about the condition of Company A's
previous fighting bunkers, which were not well constructed.
At precisely 2:18 a.m., 1 April 1970, the NVA/VC opened their
attack on the fort with a blistering rocket and mortar barrage, knock-
ing out the communications antennas. Groups of NVA troops charged
out of the woodline toward the firebase parapets. A heavy pall of
choking dust, raised by weapons firing on both sides, dropped visi-
bility to nearly zero and fouled many weapons. The cavalry defenders
were unable to see the North Vietnamese infantrymen until they were
nearly on top of them. The enemy soldiers, clad in shorts and sandals
and, sometimes, shirts, ran forward firing assault rifles and tossing
satchel charges, as the cavalry riflemen returned fire with Ml 6s until
their weapons jammed (between 2 and 3 magazines) and then threw
hand grenades. In seconds the NVA were up and over the berm in a
welter of hand-to-hand combat. Sp4 Gordon A. Flessner stabbed his
way through several enemy soldiers with a bowie knife, Sp4 Fred-
erick L. Sporar and SSgt. James L. Taylor strangled NVA with their
bare hands, and Sp4 Peter C. Lemon (later awarded the Medal of
Honor) used his rifle as a club.
The mortar platoon leader, ILt. Michael H. Russell, could hear
the screaming and firing, but it was impossible to see even muzzle
flashes through the cloud of dust enveloping the battle area. He fired
his mortars based on sound, but suddenly one mortar tube disinte-
grated as a satchel charge was heaved into it. Within minutes another
crew started shouting and dived behind the blast wall as their mortar
was detonated by a sapper. The ammunition stocks in both destroyed
mortar pits began burning and exploding intermittently.
176 STANTON
The reconnaissance platoon members under ILt. Gregory J. Pe-

ters made a fighting withdrawal to a secondary defensive line, where
they stopped the North Vietnamese who had broken through. The
howitzers were starting to fire, although one was destroyed by a direct
hit, and the 8-inch ammunition dump was on fire. The situation seemed
to improve as the berm was recaptured and cleared of the enemy.

Overhead, AC47 '^Spooky'' aircraft, tactical fighters, and armed he-
licopters were gaining firepower ascendancy.
Shortly after 3:00 a.m. the fires started to worsen at the 8-inch
ammunition point, which had not been dug in. The excessive amount
of projectiles, cannisters, and powder bags were heaped together in
ammunition carriers and on the ground.^ The point's controlling ar-
tillerymen of the 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery (attached to the division),
had witnessed their previous 175mm cannon ammunition dump ex-
plode with catastrophic results at FSB St. Barbara and shouted to
warn the recon troops and other cavalry to get away.
Lieutenant Peters and his men elected to stay at their positions to
prevent another breach of the line. Within ten minutes the entire am-
munition dump detonated in a single fiery blast which completely
demolished part of the fort, destroyed two full-tracked M548 ammo
carriers, ripped apart one 8-inch howitzer, and leveled much of the
berm line. Troops were hurled through the air (including Lieutenant
Peters, who survived), and flying shrapnel sliced through men and
material. All artillery stopped firing as the crews dropped, wounded
or stunned by ruptured eardrums. However, the tremendous explosion
stopped an enemy company —
the NVA fled from the field.
The attack on FSB Illingworth repeated many circumstances at
FSB Jay. In both cases the first enemy volley struck down the antenna
array and a heavy curtain of dust made observation nearly impossible.
Defensive deficiencies inherent in such hasty fortifications abounded.
The defending garrison lost twenty-four killed and fifty-four wounded
in the action, enemy bodies were counted,
while seventy-four complete
although doubtless many more were carried away by comrades re-
treating into Cambodia. In the final analysis it was probably the valor
of a few cavalrymen that saved the tiny fort from certain destruction.
As Sp4 Richard Whittier, a platoon radioman of Conrad's battalion.
3. 1st Cav Div, Operational Report, dtd 15 May 70, p. 49.

stated, "I had never seen so many enemy in the open. It is my

. . .
profound belief that Illingworth wasn't overrun because these people

stayed, probably in the knowledge of certain death and knowing that
the 8-inch ammo dump was about to go up. They held their posi-
""^
tions.
Prior to 1970 the North Vietnamese were able freely to occupy
and use parts of two neutral countries, Laos and Cambodia, adjacent
to South Vietnam for massive material and reinforcement routes and
division staging bases. MACV was politically restricted from maneu-
vering against these trail networks and base camps. The NVA/
enemy
VC developed increasingly sophisticated sanctuaries close to Viet-
nam, in which supplies could be stockpiled and armies refurbished
with immunity from allied intervention.
The 1st Cavalry Division troopers were understandably frustrated
by their inability to pursue North Vietnamese marauders into Cam-
bodian territory, but permission would be forthcoming shortly. The
communist military use of Cambodian sanctuaries had become so bla-
tantly menacing by the spring of 1970 that military action against
them was urgently required. President Richard M. Nixon wanted the
safety of both the Saigon area and the remaining American troops
guaranteed as U.S. troop withdrawals accelerated. Once the politi-
cally sensitive decision was made to conduct a limited spoiling of-
fensive, the tropical Cambodian environment mandated that action be
quickly taken during the brief April-May seasonal transition between
the northeast and southwest monsoons.
Detailed MACV combined planning for a multidivision Cambo-
dian attack was initiated on 27 March 1970, a day previous to the
FSB Jay attack. Lt. Gen. Michael S. Davison, the commander of II
Field Force Vietnam, received instructions from MACV to begin
preparations for a drive into The Fishhook area of Cambodia on 24
April. Two days later Major General Roberts was given the task of
planning and directing the major II Field Force Vietnam thrust into
The Fishhook area to disrupt the suspected enemy headquarters for
the Viet Cong Liberation Front and to eradicate his major depots.
The allied spring invasion of Cambodia would be the most dra-
matic and significant utilization of the division during 1970 and placed
4. 14th MHD, Combat After Action Interview Report, dtd 3 Jan 71 , p. 15.
178 STANTON
a capstone on its service in the Second Indochina War. At this stage

of the conflict, the Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was the un-
1st
questioned premier attack division of the allied command, and it would

spearhead the main Cambodian offensive. The division personnel pre-
pared for revenge after years of command-imposed restraint from
challenging the North Vietnamese in foreign base territory.
The 1st Cavalry Division's Cambodian operations exemplified the
essence of another historically vital cavalry function: mobile cavalry
exploitation. The 1st Cavalry Division was selected as the main ex-
ploitation force of the entire Cambodian operation. Military exploi-
tation is a role historically undertaken by cavalry to follow up success
in the attack. Cavalry formations exercising this mode of attack rely
on two overriding considerations: speed and violence. The attackers
bypass pockets of resistance to concentrate on the destruction of the
more vulnerable headquarters, combat support, and service support
units. They disrupt the enemy's command and control structure and
his flow of fuel, ammunition, repair parts, food, and other necessities.
This weakens or destroys the enemy defenses and makes it possible
for smaller (or less proficient, as was the ARVN) forces to overpower
a larger enemy.
The main assault on The Fishhook was coded TOAN THANG
(ROCKCRUSHER) 43. The Cambodian Fishhook was a raised hilly
area of rugged jungle and swamps which melted into the flat, wet
riceland plain to either side. As the rolling terrain faded both east and
west into the lowland, the dense patches of jungle became intermixed
with light, leafy forests and grassy fields, and finally with upland rice
and rubber plantations. Allied intelligence believed that the Com-
munist Supreme Command for the liberation of South Vietnam
(COSVN) lurked somewhere in the jungled morass of The Fishhook,
defended by the 7th NVA Division recently withdrawn from War Zone
,
C, and supported by various artillery and service regiments. Addi-

tionally, the 5th VC Division's right flank was tied in to the eastern
flank of The Fishhook region.
Brig. Gen. Robert M. Shoemaker, the brilliant airmobile tactician
and veteran of the 11th Air Assault Division, was given command
and control over The Fishhook drive. He arrived as Chief of Staff of
the 1st Cavalry Division on 21 April 1969, but the high point of his
tenure came on 12 August 1969, when the enemy launched an attack
The Cambodian Invasion v^^
Cambodia
Kratie
Neal O
Mekong River SreKhtum0
Mff^*^//. '
A
Snuol
^TOAN THANG #45 ^ ^\\
"^'fô^
• F.s^hSoki TOAN THANG #43 /
9
V^
Phuoc Vinh (Camp Gorvad)
'
Xuan Loc
^ Saigon Q j
'VungTau
South China
25
I L.
Map Scale in miles

180 STANTON
against Binh Long Province with supporting drives in two other prov-
inces.
On day Assistant Division Commander-A (Operations), Brig-
that
adier General Meszar, was in the Philippines on leave, and division
commander Major General Roberts became ill in the afternoon and
was medically evacuated to the 3d Field Hospital. This left Assistant
Division Commander-B, Brig. Gen. George W. Casey, in technical
command, but he had just arrived and relied on Colonel Shoemaker
as his right-hand man. Together they directed the 1st Cavalry Division
to victory in the repulse and destruction of NVA/VC forces in the
August battle for Binh Long Province. Colonel Shoemaker was quickly
nominated for star rank in September and elevated to Assistant Di-
vision Commander-B (Logistics) of the 1st Cavalry Division on 22
November 1969, being promoted to brigadier general on 1 December
1969.
As General Roberts planned and coordinated the operation, in-
suring that his officers and their Vietnamese counterparts developed
the final plans properly. Task Force Shoemaker began to take shape.
Col. Robert C. Kingston's 3d Brigade (1st and 2d Battalions, 7th
Cavalry, and 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry) and the reinforced 3d ARVN
Airborne Brigade formed the nucleus of the task force, reinforced by
a tank (2d Bn, 34th Armor) and mechanized battalion (2d Bn, 47th
and the entire 1 1th Armored Cavalry Regiment under cav-
Infantry)
Donn A. Starry.
alry expert Col.
Task Force Shoemaker's concept of attack in Operation TO AN
THANG 43 was to swing directly west into The Fishhook by air-
mobile assault, establishing three deep penetration airheads as anvils
hammering columns of armored cavalry and tank battalions
for three
tosmash against from the south, trapping COSVN between them.
One mechanized battalion would seal off the far western approaches
to The Fishhook, while the aerial reconnaissance 1st Squadron, 9th
Cavalry, intercepted any threat behind the cavalry strike force from
the far north.
The 1st Cavalry Division was initially informed that it must be
prepared to launch the offensive within seventy-two hours of notifi-
cation. On 28 April this lead time was shortened to forty-eight hours
after permission was received to extend the planning down to brigade
level. On 30 April, the original date for initiation of operations. Task
Force Shoemaker was established at Quan Loi as the control head-

quarters for the first U.S. cross-border operation. However, President
Nixon delayed the attack twenty-four hours, so that U.S. forces ac-
tually crossed the border on May 1970. 1
The allied Cambodian invasion commenced in the predawn dark-

ness, as 6 heavy B52 strategic bomber serials pummeled Cambodia's
thick jungle in front of the cavalry's lines. At 6:00 a.m., as the last
high-levelbombs were exploding through the layers of rain forest, a

massive preparatory artillery bombardment thundered across the bor-
der. For the next six hours, the 94 long-range cannon and heavy
howitzers of II Field Force Vietnam Artillery, placed in direct support
of Task Force Shoemaker, boomed incessantly and fired 2,436 shells
into preselected targets. Fighter-bombers roared through the morning
sky to deliver 48 tactical airstrikes. On the invasion day a total of
5,460 II FFV artillery rounds, 36 strategic B52 bombing strikes, and
185 tactical airstrikes supported the attack.^
The South Vietnamese airborne battalions helicoptered into two
landing zones, LZ East and LZ Center, which were carved out of
thick jungle by detonating Air Force Commando Vault fifteen thou-
sand-pound bombs seven feet off the ground. The scout helicopters
of Lt. Col. Clark A. Burnett's 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, dashed
above the rolling jungle and through drifting plumes of smoke to strafe
surprised NVA truck drivers and soldiers unexpectedly caught in the
cyclone of the airmobile advance. The Vietnamese 5th Airborne Bat-
talion helicoptered into LZ Center and immediately engaged a North
Vietnamese battalion. The twenty-two supporting Cobra gunships fu-
riously raked the NVA lines with rocket volleys and minigun fire,
shattering the enemy ranks and sending them fleeing from the aerial
onslaught.
Complete tactical surprise was achieved as the stunned NVA/VC
elements milled in confusion, then scattered in full retreat, pursued
by division armed helicopters and observation craft. More cavahy
battalions joined the attack as the cavalry penetration deepened. The
Cambodian offensive was politically limited to a depth of twenty miles.
5. Maj. Gen. David E. Ott, Vietnam Studies: Field Artillery (Washington,

D.C.: Dept. of the Army, 1975), p. 212.
182 STANTON
but numerous enemy depots and astonishing quantities of weapons,

ammunition, vehicles, and foodstuffs were discovered within this zone
during the first five days of the operation. At that point in the drive,
with more than six hundred enemy soldiers eliminated and the dis-
covery of several large storage and training areas. Task Force Shoe-
maker was dissolved.
On 5 May 1970 the
1st Cavalry Division headquarters assumed
direct control of the Cambodian drive, now consisting of thirteen al-

lied maneuver battalions. The division's 1st and 3d Brigades and 1st
ARVN Airborne Brigade drove deeper into the NVA/VC base areas
as the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment sped north to seize Snoul in
a series of sharp skirmishes. Col. Carter W. Clarke, Jr.'s, 2d Brigade
initiated the division's second cross-border drive, TO AN THANG 45,
by air assaulting two battalions into Cambodia northeast of Bu Dop
on 6 May. At the outset resistance was light and scattered. An early
evening contact on 7 May led to the discovery of a very large am-
munition and weapons storage area the next day by Lt. Col. Francis
A. lanni's 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry. The area was nicknamed ''Rock
Island East," after a major U.S. arsenal located at Rock Island, Il-
linois. Supporting engineers opened a road into the massive depot to
haul out the vastamount of seized material. Removing the contents

of theRock Island East complex required nine days.
The largest enemy depot was discovered by Troop B of the 1st
Squadron, 9th Cavalry, on 4 May 1970. The scoutships detected sev-
and structures in dense jungle, complete with paths
eral field positions
matted with bamboo between complexes. The next day elements of
Lt. Col. James L. Anderson's 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, airmobiled
into the area and found 182 large storage bunkers, 18 mess halls, and
a training area complete with an animal farm. One of the troopers
remarked that the enemy storage complex looked like a small city.
The depot, which supported the 7th NVA Division with provisions and
supplies, was promptly nicknamed ''The City." Supporting engineers
constructed a connecting road into Vietnam to facilitate overland
evacuation of the large quantities of new weapons, quartermaster sup-
plies, material, and rice.
Beginning on 6 May 1970, the Cavalry Division commenced

1st
its exploitation of the NVA/VC warehouse areas and supply mar-

shaling areas. Air cavalry elements wereemployed against small ve-
hicle convoys and enemy troop movements, while the cavalrymen
continued removing materials from the various caches and logistical

complexes. On 11 May 1970 the 5th Battalion of the 7th Cavahy
vacated FSB Brown in the TO AN THANG 45 sector, and the attached
5th Battalion of the 12th Infantry moved into the fort. The next night
FSB Brown was attacked by a large enemy force, marking one of the
first NVA counterattacks.
With the Cambodian invasion well underway, Maj. Gen. George
W. Casey took command of the 1st Cavalry Division on 12 May 1970.
A former brigade commander and chief of staff of the division from
1966 to 1968, Casey possessed experience as an airmobile wartime
leader and comprehended clearly both the unique missions and ca-
pabilities of the airmobile division. He was bom 9 March 1922 in
Maine and graduated from West Point in 1945, served as a para-
trooper officer with the 1 1th Airborne Division until 1948, and earned
the Silver Star in heavy combat with the 7th Infantry Division in 1952
during the Korean War.
The 1st Cavalry Division continued to uncover more weapons and
food storage areas, but by 29 May every battalion was reporting con-
tact with the enemy. The cache discoveries in the meantime had grown
in number faster than the committed units could evacuate or destroy

their contents. On 5 June 1970 Major General Casey air assaulted his
last remaining maneuver battalion into Cambodia. Aerial cavalry struck
lucrative personnel and material targets throughout this period, but

weather conditions were rapidly worsening. On 20 June the division
started a phased withdrawal from Cambodia as fog and rain increased.
B52 bombing runs were used to hinder enemy forces from interfering
with the cavalry withdrawal and to destroy the multitude of supply
sites found but not fully searched. The last cavalry elements withdrew
from Cambodia on 29 June 1970.^

The pace of the Cambodian offensive and exploitation can be best
judged by following one battalion into Cambodia. The 5th Battalion
of the 7th Cavalry under Lt. Col. Maurice O. Edmonds was flown
to Bu Dop on 5 May 1970, and the next morning Company B spear-
headed the battalion air assault into Cambodia. Contact remained light
as the advancing cavalrymen fired on small teams of North Vietnam-
ese evading the area. An air assault by Company A on 7 May, to
6. 1st Cav Div, 1st Cav Div, Operational Report, dtd 14 Aug 70.
184 STANTON
establish Fire Support Base Neal, was challenged by scattered anti-

aircraft fire, but the enemy
quickly dispersed. The cavalrymen began
finding increasing amounts of rice and weapons in their sweeps around
FSB Neal. Within ten days combat started to increase as the enemy
recovered and tried to defend his larger cache sites. Two days later
Company A fought for six hours to advance up one hill and found a
hospital complex on the summit.
Late in the afternoon of 23 May, Company B fought past stubborn
rearguard resistance on a small rows of ammunition bun-
hill to find
kers. The rising ground was called '^Shakey's Hill," in honor of the
first man killed on the hill, Pfc. Chris Keffalos of Albuquerque, New
Mexico, who was nicknamed "Shakey." Company D was inserted to

help empty the multitude of enemy munitions bunkers and tunnels
full of mortar rounds, B40 and B41 rockets, recoilless rifle shells,
and antiaircraft ammunition. The North Vietnamese tried to salvage

part of the stockpile, but avoided further combat. On the morning of
30 May, a platoon from Company D, moving forward to clear a bunker,
was engaged by enemy fire. Capt. Glenn Colvin moved the platoon
on line and swept into the attack, but the enemy force fled, leaving
behind a pistol belt, a small bag of rice, and two Chinese grenades.
The month ended as Company C found a motor pool containing ten
jeeps, twelve bicycles, and a maintenance shop.
In June ambush activity escalated throughout the battalion sector
as Company D continued the back-breaking chore of emptying out
the bunkers on Shakey's Hill. They were forced laboriously to haul
the boxes of munitions from the ammunition point back uphill, but
there was little complaint, as the troops explained. "Better to haul it
out of the bunkers and up the damn than to have Charlie shoot
hill
it at us!" The troops began calling the depot simply "Charlie's Rod
and Gun Club."

Their work was not only hard, butit was also extremely danger-
ous. Cache were normally booby-trapped, and the NVA im-

sites
planted mechanical ambush devices in several of the bunkers at Shak-

ey's Hill. One bunker was rigged with a Chinese grenade pull-string
tied to a stack of mortar boxes, with the grenade itself buried deep
in flamethrower fuel thickener. Fortunately for the cavalrymen, the
moisture had rotted the string, and it simply broke two inches above
the grenade when a trooper inadvertently tripped it. In another bunker
a blasting cap was set to detonate a mortar round and explode the
entire structure, but the trap was detected and disarmed. On 2 June
Company D turned over the task of completing the depot clearance
to another battalion.
The monsoon rains began in earnest the following day, and daily
thunderstorms intensified. The North Vietnamese were also reor-
ganizing, and combat became more frequent. On 7 June FSB Neal
started receiving ground probes. Two bodies of 199th Infantrymen
reported earlier as missing in action were found by Company C and
carried to the 5th Battalion of the 12th Infantry at FSB Myron. In the
meantime Company D suffered a small ambush by four enemy sol-
diers armed with B40 rockets and machine guns while moving into
their night defensive positions. Enemy hit-and-run raids increased,
and American casualties started to escalate. For example, a single
B40 rocket round exploded inside Company B's perimeter on 10 June,
wounding three cavalrymen. The company engaged the suspected en-
emy firing position with defensive fires, artillery, and rocket-firing
helicopters, but reported "negative enemy assessment."
The next day Company A reached Hill 315 and found a sixty-ton
rice cache. The battalion supply helicopter crashed on the afternoon
of 13 June, wounding the pilot. The crew was extracted, but the he-
licopter was stripped and burned as a total loss by the cavalrymen
before they left the area. The battalion continued to probe the general
area around FSB Neal, freely giving captured rice to Cambodian na-
tives who approached them riding elephants. After continued light
skirmishing and discovery of other scattered caches, the battalion pre-
pared to leave Cambodia. Several more members were seriously
wounded by an ammunition supply point fire at FSB Barry (when a
a box of mixed ammunition), and another battalion
trip flare ignited in
supply helicopter crashed. Led by Company B, Lieutenant Colonel

Edmonds's battalion helicoptered out of Cambodia at noon on 29 June
Bien Hoa, outside Saigon.^
for a three-day rest at
The Cambodian invasion became the supreme test of the cavalry
division's ability to maintain fast-paced communication, but the op-
eration outstripped its signal capacity. For example. Task Force Shoe-
maker in its jump-off position at Quan Loi was supported by elements
of the single division tactical signal battalion. Communications was
7. Hq 1st Bn 5th Cav, Unit History, 1970.

186 STANTON
barely adequate to support the division equivalent of one cavalry bri-

gade, one Vietnamese airborne brigade, and the armored cavalry reg-
iment. On the final day preparatory to the attack, this force expanded
with the addition of a tank battalion and a mechanized battalion, an-
other infantry battalion (5th Battalion, 12th Infantry, from the 199th
Infantry Brigade), and the division's 2d Brigade.
Signal difficulties quickly developed as the offensive began, es-
pecially among the frequency modulated (FM) radios which were the
primary means of communication. The scope and diversity of the of-
fensive overwhelmed FM radio communications, as radio interfer-
ence, channel duplication, and congested airwaves swamped signal
efforts. At one hundred FM radio nets existed within the task
least
force headquarters, and one signal tower belonging to the 3d Brigade
contained more than fifty antennas. The desire for secrecy greatly
hampered communication exchange between rapidly moving ele-
ments, which tightly guarded their signal operating instructions, cipher
key lists, code material, and channel frequencies.
By day of the Cambodian incursion, when the task force
the fifth
increased to the equivalent of two divisions and reverted to direct 1st
Cavalry Division control, communications was a signal nightmare.
The overworked divisional 13th Signal Battalion was operating well
beyond its intended capacity, and operations were simply ''hand to
mouth" on an emergency basis. Near-impossible feats of communi-
cations were performed by innovative cavalry communications spe-
cialists. However, the division suffered from an absence of required
signal resources because MACV apparently underestimated commu-

nication levels and requirements for such a large maneuver.
Throughout this period enemy action aggravated the adverse com-
munications situation. For example, on 14 June 1970 the North Viet-
namese hit Fire Support Base David from three directions, destroying
criticalforward signal transmissions equipment and severely wound-

ing the brigade signal officer and dozens of other signalmen. Acting
Sergeant Golds worthy, who was in charge of the variable high fre-
quency (VHF) equipment, valiantly maintained communications
throughout the battle and earned the Silver Star for gallantry in ac-
tion.^
8. Lt. Gen. Charles R. Meyer, Vietnam Studies: Division-Level Commu-

nications (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Army, 1982), pp. 55-59.
Despite such problems, the Cambodian invasion was an over-

whelming material success. While COSVN escaped destruction, the
NVA base depots suffered heavy damage and stock depletion. The
strategic cavalry exploitation in Cambodia stymied enemy offensive
capability and allowed South Vietnam to enjoy a prolonged respite
from NVA/VC Cambodian-launched activity into III CTZ for several
years afterward.
The overall invasion success was verified by the vast quantities
of foodstuffs and weapons captured by the allied forces. The NVA/
VC lost enough rice to feed more than twenty-five thousand soldiers
for one year, or nearly thirty-eight thousand soldiers on reduced ra-

tions for a year. Enough individual weapons were taken to equip fifty-
five full-strength Viet Cong infantry battalions, and enough machine
guns and other crew-served weapons were seized to outfit thirty-three
full-strength Viet Cong infantry battalions.^
Comparative statistics show that the 1st Cavalry Division (Air-
mobile) was responsible for the bulk of exploitive damage inflicted
on the NVA/VC in Cambodia. During Operation TOAN THANG 43
(the largest operation involving U.S. forces), the 1st Cavalry Division
killed 1 ,336 enemy, captured 3,009 individual weapons, and took 167
vehicles, compared to 664 enemy dead, 382 individual weapons, and
54 vehicles credited to the 25th Infantry Division. The differences in
ammunition stocks is even more revealing. The 1st Cavalry Division
seized 1,779,720 rounds of 7.62mm machine gun ammunition and
2,630 grenades, corripared to 17,316 MG
rounds and 1,040 grenades
taken by the 25th Infantry Division, out of a total of 2,21 1 ,836 rounds
and 4,230 grenades captured by the allies (the ARVN found 414,800
rounds and 560 grenades).'^
The Cambodian invasion offers a convenient set-piece battle, rare
in Vietnam, for mathematically assessing whether the 1st Cavalry Di-
vision was employing ''unbridled firepower" in the Second Indochina
War. The tremendous amount of ordnance utilized to support the di-
vision's Cambodian offensive is displayed by category in Table A.
During this time the 1st Cavalry Division claimed a total of 2,574
9. MACV, Command History, 1970, Volume I, p. C-106.

10. Ibid., pp. C-73, C-74.
188 STANTON
TABLE A
1st Cavalry Division Ammunition Expenditures, Cambodian Offensive
1 May to 30 June 1970'
Rifle and machine gun ammunition (Ml 6 and

M60) 6,167,645 rounds
Mortar ammunition (8 1 mm) 1 1 9 1 27 rounds
,
Light artillery ammunition (105mm) 241,294 rounds

Medium artillery ammunition (155mm) 65,028 rounds
Aerial rocket artillery ammunition (2.75-inch) 92,016 rounds
C-4 explosive demolition compound 75,418 pounds
Detonation cord 152,200 feet
TNT explosive compound 1 ,736 pounds
1. 1st Cav Div, Combat After Action Report for the Cambodian Campaign,
Annex B-IV, Logistical Operations in Support of Operations in Cambodia

(d) Class V Expenditures, p. B-13.
enemy personnel killed inside Cambodia. Additionally, 31 enemy sol-

diers were taken prisoner and 18 voluntarily surrendered (Hoi Chanh).''
The division used an average of 2,396 bullets and 201 shells or rock-
ets for every enemy soldier known to be killed, which reflected the
prodigious expenditures of ammunition in Vietnam, even by elite for-
mations.
The 1st Cavalry Division's exploitation mission exacted the high-
est price of any U.S. formation involved in the Cambodian opera-
tions. The division suffered 122 killed in action, 964 wounded, 10
taken prisoner, and 6 missing in action in the territory of Cambodia.
This represented nearly half of all U.S. casualties incurred in Cam-
bodia (284 lOA, 2,339 WL\, 29 POW, 13 ML\), despite the fact
that nearly three other division equivalents participated: 25th Infantry
Division, 3d Brigade of the 9th Infantry Division, 199th Infantry Bri-
gade, 1 1th Armored Cavalry Regiment, 12th Aviation Group, II Field
Force Vietnam Artillery, and various other II Field Force Vietnam
'^
units.
11. 1st Cav Div, Combat After Action Report for Cambodian Campaign,
dtd 15 Feb 71, p. 63-A.
12. MACV, Command History, 1970, Volume I, p. C-51.
The division casualty losses during the May-June 1970 period

were actually higher, since personnel (such as Major General Casey)
were killed inside Vietnam on Cambodia-related missions and there
was a considerable degree of incomplete casualty reporting. In fact,
this serious problem was addressed in the division operational report
of this period and was found to stem from subordinate unit noncom-
pliance with follow-up paperwork after casualties were sustained, as
well as missing casualty reports from lack of communication. Medical
evacuation helicopters from other aviation units simply whisked pa-
tients to the nearest field station or hospital, and the division relied
on input from internal units to keep posted.
Disregarding the unknown quantity of missing data, the total di-
vision losses for May and June were reported as 157 killed in action,
9 missing, and 1,124 wounded troopers. In addition, according to
personnel reports for May and June, the division sustained 32 deaths
and 247 injuries from noncombat causes. The division surgeon, again
acknowledging incomplete information, reported 1 ,530 cases of dis-
ease (1,167 from malaria or fevers of unknown origin). The increase
in serious disease rates was traced to increased exposure because of
"the higher number of troops in the field" and their "operations in
the hyperendemic malaria areas which were recently NVA sanctu-
aries,"'^ and seasonal increases associated with the monsoon shift.
Given the certainty that the lightly wounded (about 200 according
to the 15th Medical Battalion records) and many ill patients returned
to their units, the division still suffered high personnel losses during
two months' time. Of course, none of these loss statistics counts the
thousands of personnel departing the division on normal end-of-tour
rotation or those temporarily absent on R&R (Rest and Recreation).
In the latter category alone, 1,937 troops were absent in May and
another 1,877 during June, taking them to Hawaii, Sydney, Hong
Kong, Bangkok, Toyko, Taipei, and Manila. Perhaps the most telling
indicators of actual manpower drain are the replacement reports, which
show that the division had to absorb 1 ,762 replacements in May, 1 ,955
in June, and 2,101 in July
'"^
—a total of 5,818 new personnel in one-
quarter of a year.
13. 1st Cav Div, Operational Report, dtd 14 Aug 70, p. 93.
14. Ibid., Tab I (Gl Activities), Tab M (Surgeon Activities).
190 STANTON
Another salient aspect of the personnel situation, common to all

Army was the tremendous size of the
divisions serving in Vietnam,
division rear echelon support base compared to line fighting strength.
In this regard the 1st Cavalry Division was no exception. A graphic
illustration of who was actually bearing the burden of field service
and risk exposure is presented by the division's personnel daily sum-
mary for the evening of the Cambodian invasion on May 1970 (Ta- 1
ble B). On that date both the division assigned strength and numbers
deployed in frontline capacity were maximized, because of its offen-
sive stance as well as close command scrutiny by II FFV. On 1 May
1970, the critical opening day of the only major U.S. cross-border
attack in the Second Indochina War, the spearhead 1st Cavalry Di-
vision was assigned 20,211 personnel, but only 7,822 troops were
engaged in firebases and forward combat locations both in Vietnam
and Cambodia (as defined by the division itself, and separately cat-
egorized on the division report form).
This personnel situation report shows the large overhead which
sapped division "foxhole strength" throughout the war. The 1st Cav-
alry Division, with an assigned level of 20,21 1, was close to its au-
thorized strength of 20,154,'^ confirming that the division was in fact
fielding as many troops as possible for the opening of the Cambodian
attack. However, as Table B demonstrates, only a third of this number
was actually somewhere close to combat, and nearly 80 percent of
this one-third slice is in the cavalry maneuver (infantry) battalions.
In fact, the only unit totally committed to the frontline was the di-
vision ranger company! Thus, whatever losses occurred in the 1st
Cavalry Division must have come out of the thin crust of riflemen or
artillerymen actually doing the fighting, with some modification for
aviators discussed below.
Table B does not reflect aviation personnel exposed to combat,
since helicopters are staged out of helipads, LZs, or airstrips and only
spent transitory time over the combat area before returning. However,
the division possessed a total of 426 helicopters and 8 fixed-wing
aircrafton 1 May 1970,'^ and if we multiply this by three for the
average crew of each (assuming that all aircraft are flying), then we
can safely estimate that perhaps 1 ,302 more personnel were routinely
15. Ibid., Tab I-l.

16. 1st Cav Div, Combat After Action Report, dtd 6 Jul 70, Annex L-1
exposed to frontline service on a daily basis. Obviously, their ex-

posure would be of shorter duration than ground troops. The "Blue**
riflemen of the 9th Cavalry reconnaissance squadron (about 90 men)
should also be added, as these reaction troops on standby were often
in the thick of combat. Even counting these additional estimates, the
imbalance between rear and frontline allocation remains striking.
The division's Cambodian drive represented the only period
when the formation mustered as many troops as possible for a major
offensive involving a defined frontline on a conventional axis of
advance. This time frame provides one of the few opportunities to
compare objectively the ratio between division frontline and support
manpower in the Vietnam War. The frontline ratio did not vary ap-
preciably throughout the length of the campaign, but casualties were
making inroads on frontline numbers by June, despite constant in-
fusion of replacements. A close scrutiny of daily personnel summaries
shows the following division distribution between total assigned
strength /personnel at firebases and in forward combat locations: 20,21 1 /
7,822 (1 May 1970); 20,270/7,386 (15 May 1970); 20,003/6,813
(1 Jun 1970); 19,638/6,952 (15 Jun 1970); 19,417/6,674 (28 Jun
1970). In the final analysis the airmobile riflemen were the most en-
dangered troopers who shouldered the crushing weight of most di-
vision losses.
No one realized their sacrifice more than division commander Maj.
Gen. George W. Casey, who decided to fly across country into Cam
Ranh Bay wounded Skytroopers in the coastal hospital on
to visit the
the morning of 7 July 1970. The general was proud of these men and
the jobs they had done during the Cambodian campaign. Extremely
heavy monsoon weather precluded normal flight operations, and his
staff urged him to express his written congratulations already prepared
for the division. However, Casey knew that some of the most seri-
ously wounded were either dying or were already scheduled for med-
ical evacuation to the United States and Japan. He insisted on giving
them a personal report on their success.

The only way to reach Cam Ranh Bay from III CTZ in the mon-
soon front was by flying on instruments, using the notoriously un-
reliable DECCA low-level navigation system. DECCA was installed
and maintained by the Army, but rarely used because of nonaccep-
tance by the Air Force. Casey accepted the risk. Flying over the storm-
laden, rugged mountains of the central highlands, his helicopter en-
tered a thick cloud bank and disappeared. Search operations began
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194 STANTON
immediately to comb the cloud-wrapped peaks and triple-canopied

jungles. In the late afternoon of 9 July 1970, the wreckage of the
general's command helicopter was found. Maj. Gen. George W. Casey
and all those aboard had been killed instantly in the crash.
George W. Casey's final testament happened to be the congrat-

ulatory letter he drafted on the evening of his departure, 6 July 1970,
addressed "To the SKYTROOPERS of the 1st Air Cavalry Division"
about their accomplishments in Cambodia. After explaining that the
operations exceeded all expectations, citing results and examples of
team he closed by humbly honoring his
spirit, men and expressing a
special tribute to them:
This is your achievement. This is yet another demonstration

that you of the 1st Air Cavalry Division deserve —and have earned
again — the accolade of the FIRST TEAM. It is my honor to
have served alongside you during this crucial and historic period.
Congratulations and best wishes to each of you!'^
Both Major General Casey and Major General Roberts, who planned
the operation and led the division during the first two weeks of the
cross-border invasion, were among those rare officers who are truly
qualified to lead airmobile cavalry divisions. They possessed a com-
bination of the brilliance and professionalism that wins battles, cou-
pled with the deep love and respect for the division troopers who won
their devotion. Their leadership ability insured that the 1st Cavalry
Division excelled in meeting one of its most important challenges in
airmobile development: aerial cavalry exploitation during a strategic

offensive.
17. Hq 1st Cav Div AVDACG, Subj: The FIRST TEAM in Cambodia, dtd
6 Jul 70.
CHAPTER 10
The First Team

Division Structure in Vietnam
In the Vietnam-era United States Army, a division represented the

basic combat instrument capable of conducting large-scale indepen-
dent missions with its own resources and which contained all nec-
essary basic fighting and support components organically assigned.
The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was designed to concentrate
firepower and shock action on the battlefield while maintaining a high
degree of responsive vertical mobility to maneuver rapidly over large
areas. Theoretically "lean and light," wartime demands to sustain air-
mobile striking power over considerable distances transformed the or-
ganization into one similar to infantry divisions, with the addition of
an aviation group.
The 1 St Cavalry Division was composed of eight (later nine) cav-
alry ground maneuver battalions of infantry, five battalions of artil-
lery, three assault helicopter battalions, four support-type battalions,

one aerial reconnaissance squadron, one engineer battalion, one signal
battalion, and a host of independent specialized companies and de-
tachments. All division elements were usually attached to one of six
principal intermediary headquarters which the division commander used
and 3d Brigades, Division
to control his subordinate units: the 1st, 2d,
Artillery (''Divarty''); Division Support Command
("Discom**); and
the 1 1th Aviation Group. The division commander and his immediate
staff sometimes retained direct control over certain units.
The 1st Cavalry Division was commanded by a major general
with an average of 25 years' regular Army service. His immediate
retinue included two assistant division commanders (A and B), brig-
adier generals who respectively directed operations and logistics/
196 STANTON
aviation. The division headquarters provided the command, staff

planning, and supervision needed to administer and direct the division
and all its functions. Division headquarters gradually increased in size
during the war until it contained more than five hundred men, in-
cluding the attached 14th Military History Detachment.
The chief of staff, a colonel, presided over the division general
staff and division special staff. The general staff, as in other divisions,
included the personnel, intelligence, operations/training, logistics, and
civil affairs/psychological operations sections serialized as Gl, G2,
03, G4, and G5, respectively. The special staff included the surgeon,
inspector general, staff judge advocate, chaplain, adjutant general,
information office, finance, chemical, provost marshal, and head-
quarters commandant sections. Each G-section was headed by an as-
sistant chief of staff, a lieutenant colonel, who coordinated certain
special staff sections. For instance, sections such as finance, chaplain,
inspector general, judge advocate, provost marshal, and the infor-
mation office were usually under the assistant chief of staff, G 1
The 2d, and 3d Brigades were the primary subordinate head-

1st,
quarters which normally controlled the nine maneuver cavalry bat-

talions, and thus made up the tactical heart of the division. Com-
manded by colonels, these brigades flexibly attached cavalry battalions
and other units as needed, depending on the task at hand and battle-
field situation. Like a miniature division, the brigade contained a
headquarters and headquarters company which contained special staffs,
sequenced like division's but prefixed by "S** instead of "G." S-sec-
tions were often supplemented by subordinated units. For example,
the commander of an attached engineer company would also become
the brigade engineer. Brigade headquarters were ever-expanding, fi-
nally averaging 250 to 300 personnel.

The brigade usually contained three cavalry battalions and one of
the division's three light artillery battalions in direct support. This
match enabled each cavalry battalion to have one firing battery
in turn
in direct support. Each brigade also received a slice" of the total"*
combat support division ''pie." In this fashion the engineer and med-
ical battalions lent one company to each brigade, while Division Sup-
port Command provided forward supply platoons and other compo-
nents.
Although brigades freely exchanged cavalry battalions among them,
traditional associations developed over the course of the war. Thus,
The First Team 197
the 1st Brigade usually contained the and 2d Battalions of the

1st
'^Jumping Mustangs" 8th Cavalry and the Battalion of the "Charg-

1st
ers" 12th Cavalry. The 2d Brigade normally contained the 1st and 2d
Battalions of the "Black Knights" 5th Cavalry and the 2d Battalion
of the 12th Cavalry. The 3d Brigade contained the 1st, 2d, and later
5th Battalions of the "Garry Owen" 7th Cavalry (which joined the
division 20 August 1966 as its ninth maneuver battalion).
The nine maneuver cavahy battalions, organized as infantry, formed
the division's fighting edge. These battalions were composed of the
hardened infantrymen — riflemen, machine gunners, grenadiers, and
—
mortarmen who carried the main burden of the war. The battalions
were sent to Vietnam as heliborne components with less manpower
than infantry battalions in other divisions. In August 1967 DA initi-
ated a phased program of standardization between all line battalions
in the war zone, which brought cavalry battalion organization in line
with other infantry battalions serving in Vietnam. The 767-man cav-
alry battalions were boosted to 920-man levels, giving each battalion
a headquarters and headquarters company, four rifle companies, and
a combat support company.'
As in all military formations, manpower tended to dwindle where
the fighting was thickest, and battalions were hard-pressed to keep
up to strength. Speaking at a MACV conference in Nha Trang on 2
April 1966, Major General Norton bluntly stated, "We haven't been
doing well in keeping our strength in platoon leaders, key noncom-
missioned officers, and riflemen. Companies of 130 men and battal-
ions of 550 men are common, and this strength is too low."^
The ordinary squad rifleman was the backbone of the division.
He was armed with the lightweight Ml 6, a highly effective jungle
fighting weapon capable of spewing out rounds with such velocity
that even a shoulder hit could cause fatal heartbeat reversal. Univer-
sally referred to as "grunts," riflemen might be airlifted onto the bat-
tlefield, but then "humped" through dense jungle, jagged mountains,
broken ricefields, or brackish swamps. Commonly dressed in sweat-

soaked rip-stop tropical fatiques, with camouflaged helmet covers col-
orfully inked over with slogans and short calendars, these dismounted
1. Shelby L. Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle (Millwood, N.Y.: Kraus

Reprints, 1986), Chapter 3.
2. MACV, Command History, 1967, Volume I, pp. 141-42.
198 STANTON
cavalrymen displayed the tactical fire and movement expertise which

gave the division a near-perfect record of battlefield success.
The riflemen often
carried sixty-five pounds of equipment, mu-
nitions,and weaponry. These were stuffed into packs, rucksacks, and
pouches suspended from front and back straps, wrapped around waists,
and passed over shoulders. An individual's combat load consisted of
several days' rations, five to six quarts of water in plastic bladders
and canteens, two claymore mines, extra mortar rounds, two or three
bandoliers of bullets, an entrenching tool, and a machete. Little room
remained for personal items, and even a pair of spare socks found
interim utility full of C-ration tins suspended from aluminum ruck
frames.
Machine gunners carried the M60 ^^pig" slung from the shoulder
by bunji straps, with one starter belt of 7.62mm ammunition locked
in the weapon — ready to spit out that most vital burst of either open-
ing or return fire. Other men in the company carried spare belts of
more linked ammunition. The twenty-three-pound M60 machine gun
was heavy and its auto-gas operation required continual care and
cleaning. However, the handful of M60s in a line company repre-
sented more than half of its available firepower, and machine gunners
occupied an important and privileged position. As a rule, they were
excluded from walking point or checking bunkers.
Grenadiers were armed with the light, compact, and dependable
40mm M79 grenade launcher. This weapon allowed the infantrymen
to cover the area between the longest reach of a hand grenade and
the shortest range of a mortar. The M79 was popular and handy, being
both thoroughly reliable and virtually maintenance-free. The soft,
muffled thump of its round being discharged contrasted sharply with
the loud explosion of impact. Besides its considerable psychological
benefit, the explosion produced a shower of shrapnel often used to
shake sniper teams out of trees. Although the grenadier carried a heavy
load of ammo, about fifty rounds in vest pouches, he was a most
welcome companion. A grenadier routinely walked just behind the
point man with a buckshot round chambered in his break-open "thump
gun." In case of contact, the grenadier snapped his weapon shut and
blasted out **a fistful of ball bearings the size of early June peas."^
3. Sp5 George Vindedzis, "Grenadier," The First Team, Winter 1970,

p. 9.
The First Team 199
In Vietnam, where a cunning elusive enemy and difficult tropical

terrain placed a premium on division scouting, the division soon
raised special patrol units. The volunteer infantrymen of these small,
six-man long-range patrols were rangers dedicated to finding the en-
emy under the most dangerous circumstances, in unknown territory
far from friendly columns. Their effectiveness was so great that in
March 1968 a MACV study of Vietnam- wide Long Range Patrol (LRP)
efforts concluded that the division combination of ample helicopter
support "facilitated deception techniques for insertion, assured rapid
reaction to enemy contact, and provided an immediate responsive ex-
traction capability. The result was that the 1st Cav Div LRP Company
had a higher percentage of patrols lasting over 72 hours than any other
division or separate brigade except the 4th Inf Div unit.""*
Division long-range reconnaissance patrols (LRRP) were first of-

ficially organized on 2 February 1967, when two patrols of six men
each were formed under the jurisdiction of the 191st Military Intel-
ligence Company. That April LRRPs were placed under the con-
the
trol G2
of the division completed
section, the tough Special Forces-
run MACV Recondo School, and expanded. Before the end of the
year, on 20 December, this division recon element was formalized as
the 118-man Company E of the 52d Infantry "Ready Rifles." The
company became the basis of Company H, 75th Infantry (Ranger),
created by the division in conformity with DA directives placing all
ranger-type units throughout the Army
one parent regiment.
in
The 1 St Cavalry Division increased its scouting capability by em-
ploying Kit Carson scouts (KCS), the appellation given former NVA/
VC who defected to the allies under the Chieu Hoi "open arms"
program and assisted in patrolling and intelligence work. The first Kit
Carson scouts used by the division in April 1967 were former local
Viet Cong familiar with the terrain in Binh Dinh Province. The 191st
Military Intelligence Detachment formally initiated the Kit Carson
program in February 1968, and that November the division G5 took
control after all Kit Carson scouts were placed under the U.S. Army
local national direct hire program. The 1st Cavalry Division employed
72 KCS personnel at the end of 1968 and a year later possessed 161
Kit Carson scouts out of 219 spaces allocated.
War dogs also played their part in division operations. The di-
vision had three infantry platoons of scout dogs (25th, 34th, and 37th)
4. MACV, Command History, 1968, Volume 1, p. 244.

200 STANTON
normally attached one per brigade, and one combat tracker infantry
platoon (62d) attached to the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry. Scout dogs
were skilled at detecting mechanical ambush devices, tunnel systems,
enemy caches, and humans. Tracker dogs were Black Labradors spe-
cially trained for scent which followed retreating or evading enemy
groups to reestablish contact. Platoons normally consisted of at least
three teams, each having a team leader, a dog and his handler, a scout
or tracker, and two covering riflemen.
The main reconnaissance arm of the division was its crack 1st
Squadron of the 9th Cavalry, the '*cav of the cav,'' which carried out
the first stage of the division operating maxim that "aerial recon-
naissance found the enemy, gunships fixed him, and airmobile in-
fantry and artillery finished him." Widely considered the finest air
scouting unit in the Army, these modem descendants of the all-Black
''Buffalo" cavalrymen of the Indian Wars produced most division
contacts in Vietnam. The thousand-member squadron had eighty-eight
helicopters in three air troops (A-C), each organized into an aero
scout ''White" platoon, an aero weapons "Red" gunship platoon, and
an aero "Blue" platoon. The squadron also contained a ground
rifle
reconnaissance Troop D, outfitted with gunjeeps and upgunned 3/4-

ton vehicles.
Division aircraft totals remained rather constant. Comparing Jan-
uary 1969 aircraft strengths after division 1965 Vietnam arrivals, the
only big changes were replacements of Huey-model gunships with
improved Cobras and OH 13 light observation helicopters with im-
proved 0H6A LOH models as follows: 272/193 UH-series Huey util-
ity helicopters; 0/78 AHIG Cobra attack helicopters; 57/47 CH47
Chinook cargo helicopters, 107/86 light observation helicopters, 6/
6OVl Mohawks, 0/6 Ol Bird Dogs, and 0/2 U6 Beaver fixed-wing
aircraft.
The bulk of this aerial armada was under the wing of the 1 1th
Aviation Group, which airlifted the division's supplies, equipment,
and troops. The group was commanded by a colonel, and was chiefly
responsible for assigning support aircraft to operations ranging from
combat assault missions to logistical resupply. The group also pro-
vided division with its aviation special staff personnel. The permanent
integration of an aviation group into the division cemented air-ground
working relationships, bolstering airmobile efficiency well beyond di-
visions with only temporarily attached helicopters.
The First Team 201
The group was designed to provide enough internal aircraft ca-

pability to simultaneously airlift the assault elements of two airmobile
infantry battalions and three light howitzer batteries. To perform this
task, the group contained two assault helicopter battalions, one assault
support helicopter battalion, one general support aviation company,
and usually one heavy helicopter company attached. The group used
internal assets to form such special task elements as the An Khe Air-
field Command and was bolstered by various other units like the Air
Force detachment of the 5th Weather Squadron which gave twelve-
and twenty-four-hour forecast service, weather warnings and watch
advisories, and flight briefings.
The 227th and 229th Aviation Battalions (Assault Helicopter)
contained the 120 Huey lift helicopters which constituted the prime
vehicles of airmobility. The UHID Huey helicopter,
later replaced by
the UHIH model, was one infantry squad, but in Vietnam
built to lift
the added necessity for a door gunner and extra armor reduced this
capacity to six or eight men. Each battalion was divided into three
lift companies (A-C) of 20 Hueys each and a Company D devoted
to armed aerial escort. The latter company was composed of 12 armed

UHIB Hueys, later exchanged for AHIG Cobras, and shepherded the
lift companies, providing suppressive fire on the LZ immediately prior
to air assaults.
The 228th Aviation Battalion (Assault Support Helicopter) was
the division's heavy lift workhorse battalion and contained all forty-
eight divisional CH47 Chinooks, divided sixteen per company. De-

scribed by the troops as a '^big green school bus with no class," these
twin-rotored Chinooks were the prime movers of light artillery crews
and and ammunition. The Chinooks were also used
their howitzers
movements, but re-
extensively in logistical resupply and large troop
quired inordinate labor to keep them flying; about ten hours of work
for each hour of flight time.
The 11th Aviation Company (General Support) provided com-
mand and liaison helicopters for division headquarters. This meant
that the company cranked up at least seven Hueys daily to ferry around
the division commander and his two assistant commanders, the avia-
tion group commander, the division support commander, and the di-
vision's chief of staff. The light observation pilots carried liaison of-
ficers and transported visitors for the protocol and information offices.
The Aerial Target and Surveillance Acquisition (ASTA) Platoon of

202 STANTON
the company contained three side-looking radar (SLAR) and three in-
frared-equipped OVl Mohawk aircraft.
The largest helicopter within the division was the heavy cargo
CH54 much weight as
Flying Crane, which could transport twice as
the Chinook. The priority roles for division Flying Cranes were air-
lifting medium artillery and recovery of aircraft, followed by heavy
cargo lift. Flying Cranes were provided by the attached Hurricane" **
478th Aviation Company, which was replaced in 1969 by the Sky- **
crane" 273d Aviation Company.

Modem airmobility required rugged infantry scouts who doubled
as air traffic controllers, known as pathfinders or '^Blackhats" because
of their headwear. The group controlled a pathfinder company which
dropped or airlanded teams at objectives to determine the best heli-
copter approach and withdrawal lanes, scout out sites for helibome
forces, and establish landing zones. Division pathfinders were also
air traffic controllers, as an average of two hundred helicopters used
any new landing zone during its first forty-eight hours of operation.
By the spring of 1968, the 1 1th Pathfinder Company (Provisional)
conducted thirteen combat parachute jumps in Vietnam. These jumps
involved the infiltration of small teams into unsecured areas to pro-
vide navigational assistance and aircraft guidance in support of air-
mobile operations. The first was Capt. Richard D. Gillem's four-man-
team jump on a moonless night into the trees of a secret VC base
area near Kong Nhou Mountain southwest of Pleiku in December of
1965. Another eight-man pathfinder team was raked by VC machine
gun fire as it descended on an objective ten miles southeast of Bong
Son on the night of 25 January 1967. Afterward, the division changed
its jump altitudes from 950 feet to 600 feet to lessen exposure in the
air. These jumps accomplished great surprise in Vietnam because the
NVA/VC were accustomed to preparatory artillery fires or helicopter

noise prior to American movements.^
While aviation moved the division, artillery was relied on to pro-
vide most of the division's destructive power. The role of Division
Artillery (Divarty), commanded by a colonel, was coordinating tube
artillery, aerial rocket artillery, and airstrikes with artillery forward
observers to provide accurate, fast, and massive firepower. The mo-

bile artillery forward command post facilitated clearance procedures
5. 1st Cavalry Division, Airborne Operations of the Ilth Pathfinder Com-

pany (Airborne), dtd 5 Apr 68.
The First Team 203
and quick fire channels, insuring that prompt artillery support was
available to the fast-paced airmobile infantry. Since howitzers in transit
could not support maneuver forces, artillery had to be displaced rap-
idly to minimize loss of fire support. The swift tempo of artillery
op)erations was highlighted during 1966 Operation MASHER/WHITE
WING (discussed in Chapter 4), where artillery battery displacements
totaled 57 by air and 109 by road in just forty-one days.
The '^Blue Max" 2d Battalion of the 20th Artillery was an aerial
rocket battalion intended to substitute for the normally missing di-
visional medium howitzer battalion. The battalion rendered immedi-
ate and devastating fire support, especially for units operating beyond
the range of ground artillery, and became the usual savior of isolated
airmobile elements in trouble. Initially the battalion was equipped with
2.75-inch rockets and antibunker SS-11 missiles mounted on thirty-
six UHIB Huey helicopters, but during 1968 transitioned to thirty-
six AHIG Cobra helicopters, each with nineteen-tube 2.75-inch rocket
launchers and 7.62mm miniguns. Unlike the Hueys, the Cobras were
specifically designed for fire support and carried the firepower equiv-
alent to three conventional artillery batteries.
The three direct support 105mm light howitzer battalions were the
mainstay of division firepower, providing the bulk of artillery prep-
arations, time-on-target missions, and enemy contact responses. The
advantages of uninterrupted working relationships soon solidified spe-
cific artillery battalion assignments to certain brigades. The 2d Bat-
talion of the 19th Artillery usually provided direct support to 1st Bri-
gade. The 1st Battalion of the 21st Artillery normally served with the
3d Brigade. The 1st Battalion of the 77th Artillery rendered direct
support to 2d Brigade.
The 1st Battalion of the 30th Artillery, a general support 155mm
medium howitzer battalion, was assigned to the division as combat
theater augmentation. When operational planning precluded medium
artillery support because airlift was impossible. Col. John J. Hen-
nessey's Division Support Command fabricated special slings so the
155mm howitzers could be flown forward by Flying Crane helicop-
ters. After February 1966, the division was able to displace the bat-
talion in the same manner as the rest of its artillery.^
The "artillery's air wing" was Battery E of the 82d Artillery, which
6. Maj. Gen. David E. Ott, Vietnam Studies: Field Artillery (Washington,

D.C.: Dept. of the Army, 1975), p. 104.
204 STANTON
used an assortment of light fixed-wing Ol Bird Dogs and utility U6

Beavers as well as Huey and light observation helicopters to adjust
artillery fire and provide command liaison for Division Artillery. The
flying battery conducted visual reconnaissance, registered artillery fire,
relayed radio transmissions, and dropped flares and psychological op-
erations ("psyops") leaflets. Most cavalrymen warmly recalled their
constant overhead nighttime surveillance of division base camps and
firebases, watching the woodlines for mortar flashes.
Armor was generally a scarce commodity in the 1st Cavalry Di-
vision. The small assigned mechanized complement. Troop D of the
reconnaissance squadron (1st Sqdn/9th Cav) was known collectively
as the "Rat Patrol." By the fall of 1970, it contained twenty-seven
combat vehicles, ranging from turreted VI 00 security vehicles with
three machine guns to gunjeeps and armor-plated 3/4-ton trucks with
field-expedient machine gun pedestals. Rat Patrol platoons were used
extensively for convoy escort, protection of road checkpoints, and
limited ambush duties.^
General Westmoreland denied repeated division requests for tank
support during operations in 1966, exemplified by denial of a tank
company attachment even after the THAYER area revealed extensive
fortified bunkers which offered excellent tank targets. Reasons cited
for refusal of this request included the perceived insufficiency of the
area roads and the crop damage and other loss to civilian property
which might react unfavorably on civil affairs programs.^ Finally, in
1967, needed armor reinforcement was permitted, and the mecha-
nized 1st Battalion, 50th Infantry, arrived in Qui Nhon for divisional
employment in II CTZ, becoming operational on 29 September 1967.
The division was later reinforced with the entire 1 1th Armored Cav-
alry Regiment for extended periods beginning in 1969, and it invaded
Cambodia alongside the division a year later.
The division's "own private construction firm" was the 8th En-
gineer Battalion, which averaged just over 650 men in Vietnam. The
unit was smaller than most division engineer battalions because it lacked
the bridging company and its equipment was lighter for airlift pur-
poses. The battalion spent most of its time building firebases, air-
strips, and upgrading landing zones. CH54 Flying Cranes normally
7. Sp5 Jerry Norton, "Rat Patrol," The First Team, Fall 1970, pp. 23-26.
8. MACV, Command History, 1966, Volume I, p. 378.
The First Team 205
transported larger construction equipment such as graders and tractor-

scrapers disassembled into several loads and also carried the Chinook-
liftable dozers. CH47 Chinooks were used by the engineers to lift the
critical International-series of dozers and frontloader/backhoes, which
could be brought in under Chinooks complete and ready to work. As
a result, these machines were essential to most air assaults and did
the lion's share of early LZ clearance, artillery position construction,
and bunker building.
The communications required to coordinate all these division ac-
tivities was rendered by the ''Voice of Command'' 13th Signal Bat-
talion, which averaged about four hundred men. In Vietnam, FM
command nets were the lifeline of battle, and the battalion furnished
its vital FM communications with airborne FM radio relay in fixed-
wing aircraft. The system was expensive to maintain in manpower

and material, but necessary to keep fast-moving elements ''on the air."
The high frequency communications systems were used almost en-

tirely for radio teletypewriter operation and gave maneuver battalions
their only means of secure printed communications. At brigade and

division levels multichannel secure teletypewriter circuits were used
instead. The battalion also included very high frequency (VHF) sys-
tems, tactical operations center switchboards, telephone operations,
and multichannel trunkiiig and switching systems.
Unfortunately, the far-flung mobile nature of airmobile division
operations in Vietnam quickly disclosed the inadequacy of the signal
organization provided. Personnel and equipment were simply insuf-
ficient tomeet the division's need for responsive, sophisticated com-
munications. Numerous complaints were received by DA throughout
the war expressing the need for a stronger airmobile signal battalion.
During extended operations, the signal battalion's shortfalls became
especially pronounced, and only extensive supplementation by the 1st
Signal Brigade kept the division communicating. The wide dispersion
of the 1st Cavalry Division made it very difficult for the signal bat-
talion to maintain proper supervision and control.^
One unique battalion signal mode seeking to partially remedy sig-
nal deficiencies was unfortunately of short duration. In 1966 division
9. 1st —
Cav Div, Operational Report Lessons Learned, dtd 14 Nov 70, p.
37, with commentary by U.S. Army Pacific at p. 54.
206 STANTON
commander Maj. Gen. John Norton directed the reintroduction of car-

rier CWO James S.
pigeons with two birds, Ralph and Spuzy, under
Steven, Jr. One of Spuzy 's
combat missions involved bringing
first
a message capsule to 2d Brigade during Operation THAYER II, where

the bird was spotted on the wire by the brigade intelligence officer.
He mistakenly identified the pigeon as a probable Viet Cong mes-
senger and summoned a soldier, who shot it dead, ending the exper-
iment ingloriously.'^
The soldier shot Spuzy promptly went AWOL (absent with-
who
out leave) and became another case for the division's 545th Military
Police Company. This company of just over two hundred men pro-
vided basic police work to the division community of eighteen thou-
sand to twenty-one thousand people spread over an area as large as
four thousand square miles. The unit provided the provost marshal
section to headquarters; maintained traffic control and convoy pro-
tection; entered villages and checked and insured in-
identification;
ternal security by enforcing military laws through checkpoints and
patrols, crime investigation, and custodial control over offenders. The
military police also escorted high-priority shipments, guarded military
payment currency and sensitive items, and were used as infantry in
emergency situations.
The only support task more difficult than policing and providing
signal and construction service to such a large and scattered division
with more than 450 aircraft was supplying and maintaining it. This
was a job of Division Support Command (Discom), commanded by
a colonel, which had a supply and service battalion, two maintenance
battalions, and a medical battalion, as well as a headquarters company
and the Sky trooper Band. The command fulfilled its mobile battle-
field role by dividing assets into mobile logistical depots known as
Forward Support Elements (FSE). Each directly supported one bri-
gade at distances averaging twenty-five miles. These contained For-
ward Support Points, which were usually established along roads and
stocked by trucks. Flying supplies from such points lessened the strain
of logistical airlift.
10. Lt. Gen. Charles R. Myer, Vietnam Studies: Division-Level Commu-

nications (Washington, D.C.: Dept. of the Army, 1982), p. 45.
The First Team 207
The division used an average of 1 .6 million pounds of supplies

every day in Vietnam. Everything that the Skytroopers ate, wore,
built, or shot involved the 15th Supply & Service Battalion. The bat-
talion furnished almost anything in the division that moved or needed
moving, or that the division consumed or expended. This diversity
of activity was mirrored by the unit's dazzling array of subordinated
elements, from '^Redhat" riggers hooking cargo slings underneath he-
licopters to stock controllers filling normally routine requests which
always included the bizarre — such and snow chains. The
as antifreeze
battalion also supplied all foodstuffs. In Vietnam, military-issue ra-
tions were only a small part of the soldiers' diet. Most food was im-
ported, mostly from the mainland United States through such firms
as International Marketing, but the battalion also supervised procure-
ment of bananas from local plantations, tomatoes from Japan, fresh
fruit from Hawaii, and bread from the Long Binh bakery.
Maintaining the 1st Cavalry Division and its complex aviation
inventory required two battalions, which divided their workload ac-
cording to the division maintenance logo: "If it doesn't fly, the 27th
Maintenance Battalion handles it; if it does fly, the 15th Transpor-
tation Battalion keeps it that way." The smaller 27th Maintenance
Battalion had a headquarters and Company A, a main support de-
tachment, and three lettered detachments. These provided a range of
automotive, engineer, electronics, and artillery-small arms and in-
strument maintenance, but also completed jobs involving everything
from glass cutting to canvas repair. The battalion additionally sup-
plied most ground repair parts to the division.
The 15th Transportation Battalion (Aircraft Maintenance) had the
unenviable reputation of being perhaps the most overworked unit in
the division and had more than thirteen hundred personnel assigned.
In mid- 1969 the battalion was reorganized and streamlined under the
decentralized maintenance concept into a headquarters company, two
lettered support companies, and nineteen independent forward de-
tachments with individual aviation units. These detachments main-
tained the aircraft, effected minor repairs, and generally kept the di-
vision flying. Heavier jobs were sent to Companies A and B, which
contained the flight line chiefs, mechanics, and shopmen who re-
paired the difficult cases. Company A handled 60 percent of the he-
licopters, including the troublesome Chinooks, while Company B
208 STANTON
maintained the others. The battalion avionics section provided service

for aircraft electronics systems involving communications, stabiliza-
tion, and navigation instrumentation. The biggest headache was non-
availability of parts, forcing itinerant battalion personnel to expedite
critical item deliveries throughout Vietnam.
Division-level medical support was provided by the 15th Medical
Battalion. Specifically tailored for airmobile operations, its twelve
medical helicopters allowed aeromedical and air crash rescue support
over wide areas. The battalion also provided limited ground evacu-
ation of wounded personnel, medical treatment to include emergency
surgery, divisional medical supply and medical equipment mainte-
nance, and complete optometry service. A major part of unit efforts
was spent working in medical civic action programs (MEDCAPS),
visiting hamlets to treat local Vietnamese villagers. The battalion con-
sisted of a headquarters and support company and three lettered com-
panies, which usually operated in direct support of the brigades. Each
company contained a clearing aid station platoon, a ground evacua-
tion platoon, and two supporting air ambulance helicopters.
Installations of hoists on division medical evacuation craft al-
lowed the extraction of casualties from triple-canopy jungle and other
inaccessible areas, using either forest penetrators or rigid canvas lit-
ters with steel ribbing. The 250-foot hoist cables were color coded to
mark length of cable extensions, and detonator charges at the top of

the hoist cable permitted instant severing of the steel cord from the
was forced to quickly exit
ship in case the hovering rescue helicopter
the area.The dangers involved in hoist missions were demonstrated
during the Cambodian incursion of May 1970, when such missions
accounted for only 7.6 percent of the total division flights, but ac-
counted for 53 percent of the helicopters hit."
The 15th Administration Company, which comprised the division
headquarters rear echelon, was probably one of the largest companies
in theArmy. Authorized 380 personnel, the company mushroomed
800 by the time of the Cambodian invasion in May 1970.
to nearly
The company provided personnel for various staff sections throughout
the division, such as finance clerks, legal counsels, postal workers,
11. 1st Cavalry Division, The First Team in Cambodia, dtd 6 Jul 70,
App. L-3.
1st Cavalry Division
20,346 soldiers
418 aircraft
1969 Average Monthly Issues

G^ Foodstuffs 1,005 tons
m Rations 597,311 meals
% Milk 944,780 pints
^ Ice Cream 11,430 gallons
# Ice 2,777 tons
Clothing & Equipment 1,082 tons
Barrier Materials 749 tons
Fuel 4,010,700 gallons
Ammunition 4,609 tons
by Shelby L. Stanton
210 STANTON
personnel specialists, and information managers, and even the divi-

sion's 24 chaplains. The company became so large that it created the
1st Personnel Service Battalion (Provisional) out of its own resources,
to which it also attached the 41st and 42d Public Information De-
tachments.
The divisional Replacement Training Center was formed on 1 Oc-
tober 1966 to consolidate training of replacements at division level.
The center conducted a four-day replacement training course (RTC)
and a combat leaders course (CLC) in facilities including booby-trapped
pathways and a complete mock fortified village. The center became
the basis of the First Team Academy stationed at Bien Hoa after the
division moved south in 1968. The academy instituted a division snip-
er program and graduated its first snipers on 31 July 1969.
Combat intelligence and counterintelligence were handled by the
division's 191st Military Intelligence Company and its attached 583d
MI Detachment, which also supported the Deputy G2's combat in-
telligence center in the Division Tactical Operations Center. The com-
pany was compartmentalized into sections devoted to enemy order of
imagery interpretation, and coun-
battle, prisoner interrogation, aerial
terintelligence. The local intelligence service provided by the com-
pany's screening of NVA/VC prisoners, detainees, and ralliers (Hoi
Chanhs) was often significant; for instance, in July 1969 the debrief-
ing of a Hoi Chanh furnished timely information on enemy attack
plans against a fire support base at Quan Loi.
The 184th Chemical Platoon and its attached 26th Chemical De-
tachment were responsible for all chemical material within the divi-
sion, and its tasks ranged from delivery of riot gas and use of flame
weapons to spraying of insecticides and inspection of protective masks.
Chemical weapons included flamethrowers, incendiary fire drums filled
with jellied gasoline (fougasse barrels), and persistent gas Bunker **
Use Restriction Bombs" (BURBs), invented by division M. Sgt. Jack

Watts. Division Chemical also operated the helicopter-mounted "peo-
ple sniffer" personnel detectors and was extensively engaged in de-
foliation operations with Agent Orange and other agents, relying pri-
marily on four-hundred-gallon metal tanks fabricated for CH47
helicopters and one-hundred-gallon spray apparatus on UH-series
Hueys.
The combination of assigned components made the division quite
strong in manpower, not including all the attachments. In a normal
stateside mode an airmobile division was authorized 15,818 personnel
The First Team 211
(as of 31 December 1968). This compared very favorably with the

14,253 total present in a standard infantry division of World War II
in June 1944, and with the 14,843 men permitted the 1st Cavalry
Division in the Korean conflict in July 1951 . In comparison, a modem
cavalry division enjoyed a higher allowance of enlisted cavalrymen
than the entire U.S. Army of fifteen cavalry regiments at the turn of
the century (12,240 in 1902).^^
The actual strength of the 1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam fluc-
tuated during the war, but always exceeded its standard authorizations
by wide margins. The division's assigned strength of 16,732 at the
end of December 1965 steadily increased to 17,405 by mid- 1966 to
over 18,000 during the crucial years of 1967 and 1968 (18,194 on 31
January 1967; 18,309 on 31 January 1968-Tet). During its last two
years of fiill Vietnam service, in 1969 and 1970, the division ex-
panded to more than 20,(X)0 assigned personnel, containing 20,346
at the end of January 1969 and 20,211 on 1 May 1970, the start of
^^
the Cambodian offensive.
Comparison of personnel statistics at the end of 1968, chosen as
the high point in American Vietnam participation as well as division
overseas service, renders a typical summary of manpower allocations.
On 31 December 1968 the 1st Cavalry Division was authorized 15,818
men by TOE 67-Test, but was modified upward by MACV combat
augmentation to 19,465 men. On that date the division had 20,271
personnel actually assigned. This represented a 28 percent increase
in actual division strength over TOE While warrant of-
authorization.
ficer spaces reflected little variation and the number of pilots re-
mained about even, officers increased 22 percent (1,442 actual com-
pared to 1 179 by TOE) and enlisted strength jumped 30 percent (18, 168
,
12. TOE 7 (adjusted to Jun 44); DA Rpt CSCAP-13-R2, Strength in Troop

Program Sequence by Organization and Type of Personnel, Sec 1-A (31 Jul
51); TOE 67-T w/Change 1 (adjusted to 31 Dec 68); Hq of the Army Gen-
eral Orders No. 108, Organization of the Army as directed by the President,
dtd 24 Oct 1902.
p. 6; Shelby L. Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle (Millwood, N.Y.: Kraus
—
Reprints, 1986), p. 7; 1st Cav Div, Operational Reports Lessons Learned,
dtd 15 Feb 69, App. I-l; 1st Cav Div, Personnel Daily Summary, dtd 1
May 70.
212 STANTON
actual compared by TOE). Not counting aviators, the di-

to 13,965
vision officer-enlisted ratiowas actually 1:12, compared to 1:15 in
Korea and 1:17 in World War II. While increased officer proportions
partially mirrored increased technology, the division's Vietnam ratio
was still top-heavy.
The division was handicapped throughout the war by the DA-
imposed individual rotation system, which required all soldiers to serve
only one year in the combat zone. This policy constantly refilled the
formation with green troops and caused severe personnel turbulence.
The resulting instability was particularly disruptive in late 1966 op-
erations, because most division members were lost in a single block
of time as their twelve-month combat tours expired. MACV replace-
ment inexperience at this early juncture of the war could not properly
counterbalance such "hump periods." The division lacked leverage
over higher command's belated and insufficient infusion policies, and
devastating imbalances occurred in such key categories as aviation.
As the war continued, the Army adopted better methods of insuring
division refill with phased programs.
The enormity of the one-year combat tour problem was illustrated
by the numbers involved. From the beginning of 1966 through Jan-
uary 1967, the division absorbed 19,837 new enlisted replacements
and lost 16,173 enlisted veterans to outprocessing, injuries, or death."*
Since officer turnover also exceeded 100 percent the division under-
went complete recycling which actually accelerated in later years (af-
ter the casualties of Tet-68, for example). However, morale was most
threatened in the first "hump crisis," which the division command
took stem steps to counteract. Brigadier General Wright, then Assis-
tant Division Commander-A under Major General Norton, was aghast
to hear new division troops being referred to as the "Second Team"
as the initial "First Team" headed home. Internal command emphasis
stamped out such derogatory references, and instilled collective pride
of accomplishment as the First Team (actually a World War II term)
for all serving members.
Rampant personnel turbulence had the potential of greatly dimin-
ishing the combat proficiency of any unit. The 1st Cavalry Division
14. 1st Cavalry Division, Operational Reports —Lessons Learned, dtd 5 May
66, p. 6; 15 Aug 66, p. 6; 22 Nov 66, p. 5, and 15 Feb 67, pp. 4, 5.
The First Team 213
was fortunate in that pride of heritage and dedicated teamwork pro-

vided much wartime which lessened adverse turnover im-
stiffening
pact. Both the spirit of the predecessor 1th Air Assault Division and
1
determined sense of mission displayed by the airmobile 1st Cavalry

Division forged a strong bond of individual and unit identity. The
dash and daring which typified division operations in Vietnam di-
rectly resulted from the unusually high confidence and appreciation
that division members expressed for their teammates. Soldiers worked
hard and competently to earn the trust of their comrades and implicitly
felt that the whole division was behind their efforts. While teamwork
was the goal of any military organization, the 1st Cavalry Division
excelled in creating a special aura of cooperation and teamwork re-
flected in a favorite motto, "Anyone who isn't engaged is in reserve.**
The members of the st Cavalry Division were very proud of and
1
identified closely with their large shoulder sleeve insignia containing

a black horsehead and diagonal bar on a golden shield. This patch
was worn by assigned troops on their uniform's right shoulder sleeve,
and wartime division service was signified by its wear on the left.
Veterans returning for additional duty could display their patches
** sandwiched." The insignia was designed in response to an official
directive after the War Department authorized the division's estab-
lishment in September 1921 . The message outlined the design criteria:
that it bind men together in a common devotion, be an easily rec-
ognizable sign by which men could reassemble after battle, and be a
symbol of inspiration members.
to division
The resulting patchwas designed by Mrs. Ben Dorcy, the wife
of the 7th Cavalry Regiment's commanding colonel. She used the
bright yellow inner liner of one of her husband's old dress capes as
the cloth on which the design was first drawn. The choice of the
horse's head was made by the Dorcy s after they observed a mounted
trooper ride by their home on a beautiful shining black thoroughbred.
The shape of the patch represented the shield carried by knights in
battle, and the bar, or slash, represented a scaling ladder used to breach
castle walls. (On 7 January 1969 Mrs. Dorcy wrote the division a
letter suggesting that the ladder also represented the Chinook-dropped
Jacob's ladders of the Vietnam period.) Because of economic con-
cerns, theArmy specified that only two colors be used, and Mrs.
Dorcy chose blue and yellow, the traditional colors of the cavalry.
Over time the blue was changed to black. The patch was purposely
214 STANTON
oversize compared to other division insignia, according to Mrs. Dorcy,

because "^the patch had to be large enough to be seen through the dust
and sand at Fort Bliss." The 1st Cavalry Division shoulder sleeve
patch insignia remains the largest in the Army.
The First Team mystique was from its Army-
evident at all levels,
wide reputation of success to individual deeds of selfless team spirit

known only within the division. At the higher level the division quickly
gained an unsurpassed record of operational skill at finding and de-
feating NVA/VC forces. There were accounts of lightning airmobile
assaults so sudden that the Viet Cong were caught firing unarmed
mortar shells, the shipping plugs still inserted, at cavalrymen spilling
out of their helicopters. While MACV expressed open delight at the
uncanny willingness of division elements to search out and knock
heads with the enemy, division members were more impressed with
the unflinching reliability of their fellow soldiers.
Maj. Gen. George I. Forsythe, who commanded the division from
August 1968 until April 1969, recounted an incident which exempli-
Team spirit. The last platoon of the 1st Battal-
fied the internal First
ion, 12th Cavalry,was being picked up from a typical jungle landing
zone. The platoon radio-telephone operator (RTO) had already been
ordered aboard one of the helicopters lifting out. Suddenly four NVA
machine guns in the treeline raked the LZ, and the pilots pulled pitch
to clear the area. The young RTO took only an instant to realize his
platoon was being left without radio communications; grabbed his ra-
dio backboard from the helicopter cabin floor; and, forty feet from
the ground, jumped out. He broke both legs, but crawled back through
the fire-swept elephant grass, enabling his lieutenant to call in gun-
ships. When his actions were later rewarded with the Silver Star, he
stated that his dedication to the team had been an automatic re-
sponse.'^
The 1st Cavalry Division encouraged high morale in every way
possible. Communications call signs were not changed because over
time they became trusted bywords. The division was intensely proud
of its field and did not relish other commands
living conditions
with air-conditioned bunkers and velvet curtains over mapboards. The
15. USAMHI, Senior Officers Oral History Program, Lt. Gen. George 1.
Forsythe Interview, p. 448.

The First Team 215
division helicoptered slingloads of freshly laundered fatigues into re-

mote sectors to give troops clean clothes regardless of size or mark-
ings and dismissed complaints from higher headquarters about mixed-
up or missing name tags. While this emphasis on morale undoubtedly
reinforced division standards, the 1st Cavalry Division also enjoyed
many real advantages over other American formations in Vietnam.
The MACV commanders, Generals Westmoreland and Abrams,
displayed unabashed admiration for the division. This favoritism was
reflected in May 1967 when MACV force requirements were adjusted
to place the 1st Cavalry Division in the role of a special exploiting
force designed to penetrate and neutralize major NVA/VC base areas.
All other MACV divisions except the 1st Infantry Division (the other
exploiting force)were linked to specific provinces. In September 1967,
in view of increased NVA activity in northern I CTZ, General West-
moreland revised the force structure of MACV to establish the 1st
Cavalry Division as the sole "countrywide offensive force." These
heightened responsibilities were invariably matched by special MACV
command emphasis. In addition to priority on equipment, informal
guidance was issued to the 22d and, later, 90th Replacement Battal-
ions so that the division received the pick of nonparatrooper arrivals.
This MACV effort lavished the division with high-quality personnel
^^
and equipment to insure levels of performance excellence.
It is important to remember, however, that although the 1st Cav-
alry Division appeared magnificently endowed with aviation and per-
sonnel assets, the reality of Southeast Asian warfare greatly dimin-
ished its airmobile strike capability. Vietnam's higher air density and
thecombat necessity to add the weight of armor, emergency supplies,

and larger armament systems onto helicopters greatly reduced aircraft
power. Even if all its aircraft were flying, the division normally worked
with one-third less lift capacity than that projected by the airmobile
developers at Fort Benning.
Insufficient numbers of mission-ready aircraft further eroded air-
mobile potential. During 1966 aircraft availability averaged only 68
percent for UH-series Hueys, 63 percent for CH54 Sky Cranes, and
a mere 43 percent for CH47 Chinooks, attributed mostly to lack of
16. MACV, Command History, 1967, Volume I, pp. 144-45, 152.

216 STANTON
spare parts beyond effective MACV influence. By late 1968 the mis-
sion readiness of Huey helicopters had dropped to 60 percent and
Chinooks to 40 percent. Instead of the practically unlimited aerial
response that most people believed the airmobile division possessed,
the 1st Cavalry Division was continually forced to modify its tactical
operations with great economy and innovation.'^
17. 1st Cav Div, Operational Reports on Lessons Learned, dtd 5 May 66,
App. 4-9; dtd 15 Aug 66, App. 4-8; dtd 22 Nov 66, App. 5-4; dtd 15 Feb
67, p. 75; dtd 15 Feb 69, p. 68.
CHAPTER 1
The Skytroopers
Division Performance in Vietnam
More than 150,000 troops served in the 1st Cavalry Division during
eighty-two months of combat Second Indochina War. These
in the '
division personnel were primarily responsible for the wartime devel-

opment of the airmobile concept and for the aerial cavalry's success
or failure as a viable military instrument. How these troops fought
and behaved is an essential aspect of division operations in Vietnam
and an integral ingredient of the mobile cavalry's capability.
The hallmark of ground maneuver which dominated Army tactics
in Vietnam was the fire support base, often referred to simply as fire-
base. Conceptually, the fire support base functioned simply to provide

a secure but mobile artillery position capable of rendering fire support
to infantry operating in areas beyond the normal range of their main
base camp cannon and howitzers. This concept afforded infantry a
greater degree of flexibility without sacrificing artillery protection.
However, firebases quickly became targets for enemy counterattacks
and bombardments, and increased defensive measures were under-
taken. More sophistication meant less mobility. Over the course of
the war, firebases developed to the point where ground maneuver was
1 . 1st Cavalry Division service credited as commencing in Vietnam in Sep-

tember 1965 and ending with the withdrawal of 3d Brigade in June 1972;
its
personnel total taken from 1st Cav Div Vietnam Departure Ceremony bro-
chure dtd 26 Mar 71, p. 5. Considering that the separate 3d Brigade re-
mained in Vietnam another fifteen months, the totals of personnel were
doubtless much higher.
218 STANTON
hampered because of their size, elaborate construction, demand on

supply and protective resources, and troop reluctance to leave their
comforts and safety, a condition called "firebase psychosis."
The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), as the most tactically mo-
bile formation in Vietnam, gave priority to rapid firebase deployment
and construction. In order adequately to cover its large areas of op-

eration, the division was constantly opening, closing, and reopening
firebases throughout the war. The first division firebase was desig-
nated as Bill, built during October 1965 in Pleiku Province. However,
by 1969 they had blossomed from jungle clearings with unsophisti-
cated defenses into formidable semipermanent fortresses.
The typical cavalry fire support base was a defensive area roughly
250 yards in diameter with an 800-yard perimeter, which contained
howitzers and enough equipment and supplies to support the infantry
with artillery fire around the clock. The firebase also supplied logis-
tics, communications, medical, and rest facilities for the cavalrymen
within its area. The division's 8th Engineer Battalion was responsible
for initiating firebase construction. The engineer linecompanies, as-
signed one to a brigade, cleared the initial area, performed demoli-
tions work, established water points, and provided the supervisory
expertise, equipment, and manpower to build sophisticated field-
works.
Once the fire support base site was selected, usually by aerial
photographic reconnaissance at division level, the brigade and bat-
talion responsible for its sector began detailed construction planning.
Terrain and weather information were used to determine its size, shape,
and required facilities. Construction priorities were then issued, hope-

fully in a timely fashion. It was proven repeatedly that minutes spent
in coordinated planning by concerned units saved hours in actual
all
construction time. The normal order of construction was: temporary

helicopter pad for delivery of supplies, howitzer positions, perimeter
berm, artillery fire direction center (FDC), infantry tactical operations
center (TOC, the command post), ammunition supply point, **¥!?"
helicopter pad, garbage sump, defensive wire barrier, and, finally,
medium artillery positions if applicable.
The division prepared basic firebase kits, each designed for a bat-
talion-level fire support base and its supporting six light howitzers,
which contained all the necessary materials for construction. Nails,
spikes, metal culverts, chain-link fence rolls, tar paper, sandbags.
The Skytroopers 219
pickets, and lumber were all prepalletized or arranged in slingloads

for rapid helicopter delivery. The firebase kit required about twenty-
five CH47 Chinook cargo helicopter sorties to deliver to the field.
The amount of equipment needed to clear the area of the firebase
varied depending upon terrain. In dense jungle large Air Force bombs
were used to demolish enough vegetation to blast out a landing zone.
The more common bomb of this type was the 750-pound "Daisy Cut-
ter'' that detonated about ten feet above the ground, effectively de-
stroying all foliage for ten feet around and knocking down trees over
a considerably larger radius. The 10,000-pound "Instant LZ" opened
up larger swaths of demolished jungle, while late-war 15,000-pound
"Commando Vault" bombs offered the most destructive power. Na-
palm was a useful supplement if tropical forests were clogged with
bamboo or additional thick jungle growth.
The air assault to was the
secure and establish the firebase site
riskiest part of the construction task. was not large enough
If the site
to accommodate the landing of a single helicopter, combat engineers

with axes and explosives rappelled from a helicopter hovering fifty
to one hundred feet above the ground. They were escorted by small
parties of volunteer infantry which provided security while the en-
gineers cleared an area large enough for the CH47 Chinook and CH54
Flying Crane cargo helicopters. Using demolitions and chain saws,
,
the assault engineers could clear a landing zone for the larger heli-
copters within three hours. Of course, in most instances the selection
of open fields demanded only a small amount of advance clearing.
The foremost task of any firebase construction effort was to pro-
duce a tenable tactical position by nightfall on the first day, with over-
head cover for every man. This "tactical phase" was a time of heavy
helicopter traffic bringing in more engineers and their equipment, the
infantryand artillerymen, ammunition, barrier and bunker materials,
rations, fuel, water,and howitzers and other weapons. As soon as
the perimeter trace was cut out, defensive positions were started.
The normal construction site required the use of one engineer pla-
toon under the direction of a "project engineer" with two medium
D6B dozers, two Case and one backhoe. As engineers
light dozers,
worked with explosive charges, bangalore torpedoes, and chain saws
to expand the perimeter, the first vehicular machines were being flown
to the area. The invaluable light dozers could be airlifted in one piece
underneath Chinooks and were the first equipment in. They were used
220 STANTON
to clear fields of small trees and stumps and to level artillery posi-
tions.The backhoe dug emplacements for the TOC, FDC, medical
bunker, and perimeter bunker. Heavy dozers were lifted in two pieces,
the blades and tracks by Chinook and the tractor body by Flying Crane.
Once hauled in, the dozer had to be assembled, which required at
least thirty if the pilot did not set the machine down
minutes (more
on its tracks); then was immediately put to work pushing up earth
it
to create a four-foot berm completely around the perimeter.

As engineer dozers and backhoes carved out the main firebase
defenses, the infantry and artillerymen began emplacing wire entan-
glements, digging perimeter fighting holes, and emplacing perimeter
bunkers in backhoe excavations. ''Quick Fix" combat bunkers were
simply five-foot-by-eight-foot shoulder-high holes covered with lum-
ber or natural timber and sandbags. Standard perimeter bunkers pro-
vided better protection because they were covered by wooden string-
ersand steel mat decking. The simplest fighting positions were the
two-man foxholes, each covered by three sections of sixty-inch metal
culverts and topped by sandbags. In the meantime, once the first strand
of tactical wire was emplaced, the artillerymen returned to build ammo
storage bunkers and parapets around their weapons.
The final defensive phase of construction began when the Chi-
nooks had delivered enough kit material to permit the engineers to
build the main infantry TOC, artillery FDC, and medical bunker. These
were built using large dimensional timbers, precut to anticipated fire-
base requirements. The main bunkers were started at the end of the
first day or the beginning of the second day and finished by the end
of the fourth day. Construction time was often shortened by employ-

ing reusable TOC and FDC bunker modules. Bunker modules were
composed of two CONEX containers emplaced facing each other,
with the overhead gap between them covered by steel matting. Two
modules (four containers) sufficed for a battalion command center.
Using these containers allowed an operational TOC/FDC complex to
be completed within eight hours, including pushing earth fill around
the sides and sandbagging the tops.
The infantry and artillerymen continued improving the wire bar-
riers with tanglefoot and a second perimeter strand. Individual sleep-
ing positions were built using metal seventy-two-inch half-culvert sec-

tions. The improvement of firebases was a never-ending job, as all
structures were continually reinforced, surface drainage improved, and
The Skytroopers 221
fields-of-fire constantly maintained by additional clearance. One squad

of engineers was normally kept on any fire support base.
The life span of a fire support base depended on the tactical sit-
uation in its area. Since firebases were normally established to give

a battalion and its direct support howitzer battery a pivot of operations
to patrol the immediate vicinity, the firebase was closed when the
battalion relocated. When the decision was made to close out a fire-
base, the brigade engineer usually provided one platoon to assist the
infantry company tasked with dismantling it. Structural removal was
aimed at salvaging the timbers, culverts, steel matting, and chain-link
fencing in order to reconstitute division firebase kits, but holes were
filled and berms leveled at command discretion.^
The 1st Cavalry Division's fire support bases were another ex-
ample of adopting traditional frontier cavalry forts to the Vietnam
environment, fusing airmobility to enhance the process. The advent
of helicopter support and better material resources allowed these forts
to be established more quickly and more often and projected cavalry
battalions into hostile territory with greater assured safety. Once em-
placed, however, they effectively limited cavalry movement to the
radius of their guns. More
substantial firebases of a semipermanent
nature mushroomed major camps with recreation areas, snack
into
shops, mess halls, and elaborate living facilities, which actively hin-
dered field operations because of their large garrison requirements.
The infantry which swept through the trackless, arboreal wilder-
ness within range of fire support bases, usually found the NVA/VC
entrenched in well-constructed, mutually supporting bunker positions.
One outgoing battalion intelligence officer briefed his replacement on
enemy fortifications within his area of operations by merely flattening
his hands against the tactical wall map and saying, "Place your hand
anywhere on the map and you've got a thousand bunkers in the palm
of your hand." The myriad NVA/VC infiltration and supply trails
were randomly connected to base camps of various sizes which were
guarded by bunker complexes.
Reduction of fortified positions in World War II and Korea was
a matter of deliberate attack against a deliberate defense. Elimination
2. 1st Cav Div Document, Subj: The Construction of a Fire Base in the 1st
Cav Div, 7-69, dtd 10 Oct 69.
222 STANTON
of sophisticated enemy defense lines was accomplished by using heavy

concentrations of naval gunfire, artillery, and aerial bombing, fol-
lowed by mixed teams of infantry, armor, and engineers to destroy
successive enemy positions. After the initial fire support preparation,
artillery was fired as the assault teams approached in order to drive
the enemy soldiers out of lightly protected supporting positions and
back into their larger shelters. Then and as-
tanks, tank destroyers,
sault guns fired armor-defeating rounds bunker embrasures to
at the
suppress enemy defensive fires. Under the cover of these armored
vehicles, infantry and engineers moved up and used flamethrowers,
rocket launchers, and explosives to eliminate the enemy defensive
works. This method required large ground forces well versed in de-
molition techniques.
In Vietnam the 1st Cavalry Division encountered enemy bunkers
in sudden clashes, usually when enemy machine gun and rocket crews
occupying perfectly camouflaged bunkers opened fire on advancing
infantry at close quarters. The bunkers were built in mutually sup-
porting arrangements in dense bamboo groves or thick jungle under-
growth and constructed from locally available material. Although the
division encountered some concrete bunkers, these were the excep-
tion. NVA/VC fortifications were not designed for deliberate de-
fense, but only to disorganize and delay the attackers until withdrawal
could be effected. The enemy bunkers and spider holes ringed base
camps which contained living quarters, workshops, logistical depots,
rest areas, and other facilities. The base camps were constructed in
a circular pattern for all-around defense until prompt evacuation of
supplies could be effected.
The bunkers themselves were so well camouflaged that they re-
mained undetected until the enemy initiated fire on the unsuspecting
cavalrymen. Usually, the advancing troopers were allowed to ap-
proach within five or ten feet of bunkers before the enemy positions
cut loose with devastating cross fires. When the battle started, the
cavalry was often mired in confused fighting, with a number of casu-
alties.
Immediate retreatwas required to save the seriously wounded, but

intensely accurate automatic weapons fire ripped into troops trying to
reach and drag their comrades out of the hail of enemy bullets. Lead-
ing platoons were often able to pull back only by using helicopter-
dropped bangalore torpedoes. Once delivered, these exploded enough
The Skytroopers 223
vegetation to allow accurate counterfire with machine guns and light

antitank weapons. Positions were marked with smoke and white phos-
phorus to create smoke screens, which both covered the withdrawal
and enabled aircraft to spot the forward edge of the battlefield.
One of the best ways was by dropping
to break close contact
chemical gas canister clusters out of helicopters. The troops donned
gas masks as the command and control helicopter raced low overhead,
and crew members kicked riot gas bomblets directly on top of the
enemy positions. The 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, experienced several
hard bunker contests, but reported that the enemy was never able to
place effective fire on friendly troops after the gas was dropped.
At the outset of the action, the enemy usually not only blocked
further infantry advance, but forced a tactical retreat. However, the
enemy situation was extremely precarious. The cavalry had located
his positions, and by breaking contact the troops could call in air-
strikes and pound the base camp and prevent successful
artillery to
evacuation. Sometimes cavalry units were fortunate enough to know

their exact positions and were able to bring accurate artillery fire on
the rear and flanks of bunker complexes within minutes. Aerial scout
helicopter teams often sealed off exits by calling in artillery and aerial
rockets while they strafed escape routes. Physically blocking routes
of egress with additional infantry was not preferred because of fire
support coordination difficulties and the chance of encountering more
bunkers in masking positions.
The "bunker busting'' commenced as the Air
phase of the battle
Force dropped 500- and 750-pound bombs to clear the jungle canopy
and to blast large holes in the foliage. The explosive power of direct
bomb hits crushed many field positions and drove dazed enemy troops
into the impact areas. After enough of the overhead canopy was blown
away, and forward air controllers could direct pre-
aerial observers
cision fireson the bunkers and installations within the base camp.
The enemy bunkers were usually so solid that only 17-pound heli-
copter rockets and heavy bombs were effective against them. Light
105mm howitzer fire was ineffective against bunkers, while medium
155mm artillery fire could achieve only a low rate of destruction. The
heavy 8-inch howitzer was both accurate and destructive, but the time
and ammunition expenditures required made it impractical to use this
weapon against a cluster of only sixty bunkers.
Artillery and aircraft saturated the target area with a cloud of riot
224 STANTON
gas to force the enemy out of remaining defensive positions. After

giving time for the gas to take effect, cluster bomb units, Hght and
medium artillery barrages, and aerial rockets were used to annihilate
enemy soldiers in the open. In one instance, where the 1st Battalion,
77th Artillery, employed "firecracker" munitions mixed with quick-
fused high explosives in this manner, the helicopter pilot adjusting
artillery fire described the target as looking like an anthill that had
been kicked.
When the ground commander estimated that the bunker complex
was adequately "softened up," he directed that supporting firepower
be shifted to cover enemy withdrawal and reinforcement routes. The
cavalry troops then proceeded back into the area to finish the bunkers
at rifle point. If heavy enemy return fire was encountered, another
retreat was ordered and the preparatory fires resumed. Artillery and
tactical airstrikes were applied until the enemy defenses were suffi-
ciently weakened to allow the infantry to get into the bunker complex
and mop up individual pockets of resistance. In this final phase of
bunker destruction, the cavalrymen relied on .50-caliber machine guns,
M72 light antitank weapons, 90mm recoilless rifles, and lightweight
XM191 multishot flame projectors (FLASH). Regular flamethrowers
were used infrequently because of their weight and refilling problems.
The 1 St Cavalry Division rarely used tanks because of mine hazards
and poor avenues of approach. Tanks could not crash through dense
jungle for long distances without considerable drain on the vehicles
and crews.
The whole complexion of fighting fortifications in Vietnam was
totally different from previous conventional conflicts. Instead of a de-
liberately planned attack to get within range of enemy fieldworks, the
infantry was subjected to an unexpected clash at very short ranges.
Instead of a deliberate defense, the enemy tried to stay in action only
long enough to permit his base garrison to escape with supplies. In-
stead of using artillery and bombers to fix the enemy in place and
infantry-armor-engineer assault groups to destroy him, the cavalry used
infantry to fix enemy defenses and artillery and airpower to destroy
him. These tactical differences partially reflected area warfare attri-
tion versus linear warfare territorial advance, but both placed an equally
high premium on courage, tactical expertise, and calm leadership.
3. 1st Cav Div, Bunker Busting: Attack on Fortified Areas, dtd 18 Jan 71
The Skytroopers 225
**Bunker busting" became the norm of offensive cavalry combat after

1968, and this style of fighting proved to be one of the most difficult
tests of combat fortitude in Vietnam.
Throughout the mobile and fragmented war in Vietnam, a pre-
mium was placed on intelligence gathering to locate elusive enemy
forces, base areas, and trail networks. The 1st Cavalry Division's
long-range patrol (LRP) company, later designated as ranger infantry,
provided much of this dangerous work. Each patrol platoon was com-
manded by a lieutenant, who had eight six-man teams under him.
Each team was authorized a staff sergeant team leader, a sergeant
assistant team leader, a front scout, a rear scout, a radioman, and a
medic. However, most teams were led by buck sergeants or Spe-
cialists 4th Class during the war. All long-range patrol members were
volunteers, and the majority were parachutists.

Each long-range patrol mission was unique, and the experience
of one patrol of Company E, 52d Infantry, on 17 August 1968 is
presented as an example of the dangers and accomplishments of this
elite force. On that day SSgt. Stephen Tefft was told that his LRP
Team 32 would be inserted in the southern portion of Enemy Base

Area 101 a jungled mountain area of I CTZ. Staff Sergeant Tefft and
,
his assistant team leader, Sgt. George Kennedy, were taken on a he-
licopter reconnaissance over their area of operations that afternoon.
They familiarized themselves with the prominent terrain features that
could be used later as reference points should they become disoriented
or have need of an emergency extraction pickup zone. Upon their
return to the team's rear base location, Tefft called his men together
and gave them the patrol order.
In a small patrol, operating deep in enemy territory, it was nec-
essary that all team members clearly understood their mission, the
terrain, and the enemy situation. Since the mission entailed a two-
day patrol, no rucksacks were carried. All ammunition and basic ne-
cessities were placed in pouches on their combat hamasses or in their
bedrolls, which consisted of half a poncho per man. Full rubber pon-
chos reflected too much and made too much noise, but the half-
light
poncho was lightweight and kept the upper part of the body warm.
Also, if the team was hit at night, a man could quickly discard the
poncho half and be ready for action. Only two dehydrated LRP ration
meals were carried per man, and since the weather was cool no need
existed for water beyond the five quarts that each man carried.
226 STANTON
The insertion was scheduled for 6:30 p.m. the next evening, so
Sergeant Tefft gave his men time off until noon the following day.
This helped to counterbalance the high tension they would face during
the patrol. On the afternoon of 18 August, the team assembled again.
This time they were dressed in camouflaged fatigues and bush hats,
and their faces were streaked and darkened by charcoal sticks. They
were briefed once more, then they rehearsed immediate action and
contact drills for the rest of the day. These were automatic procedures
used in case of sudden contact with the enemy and were practiced
over and over until performance became instinctive. Since the patrol
was so small, they faced superior numbers in virtually any expected
encounter. Survival depended on teamwork and the instant, coordi-
nated reaction of the entire patrol.
At 6:30 P.M. the team was aboard the helicopter, part of a three-
troopship formation with two gunships flying escort, en route to its
landing zone. The insertion was made in an old bomb crater in the
middle of triple-canopy jungle at last light. The lift helicopters ap-
proached the landing zone in file with the patrol in the first troopship.
The was second, and an empty helicopter was last
control helicopter
in file. The first helicopter sat down quickly, and the team dashed
out, while the other two helicopters continued to fly at low level over-
head. At precisely the right moment, the team helicopter lifted off to
become third in file. By executing a number of hops in this fashion,
the NVA/VC remained unaware of the exact drop-off point for any
patrol.
Everything was quiet on the ground, and the team quickly left the
bomb crater and moved one hundred yards directly south into the jun-
gle, where they made communications check with the long-
their initial
range patrol control headquarters. It was becoming very dark as the
patrol moved a little farther and discovered a trail. The front scout,
Sp4 Clare Michlin, checked the pathway for signs of recent use. The
front scout fulfilled both point and tracking duties, looking for signs
such as recently broken brush or discarded material. After determin-
ing that the trail was probably cold, the team moved away from the
path and up a small hill. They set out claymore mines and prepared
an overnight position. Usually, after 9:00 p.m. Sergeant Tefft kept
one man awake, on half-hour shifts, but on occasion, depending on
the enemy situation, the whole patrol stayed awake.
Early the next morning the team moved farther south and traveled
The Skytroopers 227
down the hill into a valley. At 8:00 a.m. they tried another com-
munications check, but could not establish radio communication be-
cause of the low ground. Finally, they made contact with a friendly
station which acted as The team continued its cautious move-
relay.
ment through the jungle until 11:00 a.m., when they sat down for
''Pak time.'' This interval lasted until 2:00 p.m. and was observed to
conform patrol movement to enemy travel habits. The NVA/VC fre-
quently took a midday break during these hours.
At 7:00 P.M. that evening, the patrol trekked south into a gully
containing a stream. The men refilled their canteens and then silently
listened for any sounds of possible enemy presence. After waiting for
a while and hearing nothing unusual, the patrol continued. About two-
hundred years downstream they found a which ended at the bank,
trail
and Staff Sergeant Tefft believed that might be an enemy water

this
point. The patrol moved up the trail, but had proceeded only a few
feet when they saw a group of twenty North Viemamese soldiers
walking directly toward them. Before the team could jump off the
trail, the enemy opened fire with automatic rifles.
The patrol responded automatically with their reaction drill. Spe-

cialist Michlin, the point man closest to the enemy group, threw a
white phosphorous grenade in front of the North Vietnamese soldiers,
who were also taking evasive action. The patrol quickly maneuvered
back to the stream, the men giving covering fire to each other as they
bounded backward. This leapfrogging retreat soon placed the rear scout
closest to the advancing enemy troops, and he also tossed a white
phosphorous grenade in an attempt to discourage pursuit. The patrol
was equipped with claymore mines and time-capsule fuses, which it
usually carried for emergencies when contact had to be broken, but
the charges had a fifteen-minute delay period. The enemy was too
close.
The team ran across the stream and clambered up a steep slope
into a treeline along an upland rice paddy where they reassembled
into a hasty perimeter. Sp4 Plisch frantically called for aerial support
on had been spotted. Staff Sergeant Tefft de-
his radio. Since they
cided to try for an emergency extraction under the covering fire of
helicopter gunships. During Plisch 's radio transmissions for help, the
other team members saw another eight enemy soldiers moving across
a clearing to surround them. They fired on this new NVA element
with silencer-equipped M16 rifles. The enemy squad, unsure of the
228 STANTON
exact location of return fire, stopped forward movement and became

pinned down.
ACobra gunship and a scout helicopter from the 1st Squadron,
9th Cavalry, were quickly overhead. The Cobra was diverted from
another mission, and its low ammunition and fuel status allowed the
pilot to make only one firing pass. The light observation helicopter
remained at the scene, firing its M60 defiantly in support and guiding
the team to a suitable pickup point. The team used fire and movement
tactics to relocate for extraction. Two more Cobra gunships and a
second light helicopter appeared within minutes, and their rockets and
miniguns caused the North Vietnamese to retreat. A Huey troopship
quickly swooped down, and when it was three feet off the ground,
the team jumped aboard. Although their primary mission, reconnoi-
tering for enemy movement, was compromised, the patrol was cred-
ited with finding the enemy and directing aerial rocket fire on his
positions.
The long-range patrolmembers received no extra pay or privi-
leges for their work. Their satisfaction came from pride of comrade-
ship and the special contribution they made to the effectiveness of the
First Team. Throughout the Vietnam War the rifle scouts of the 9th
Cavahy, battalion and brigade recon forces, and the long-range/ranger
infantry of the division patrol company served the 1st Cavalry Di-
vision with confidence and valor. Their exploits more than made up
for their smallnumbers, because they operated over a wide area to
find the NVA/VC, report on his movements, disrupt his activities,
and pioneer areas for large-scale action by the airmobile battalions."*
While the combat performance of elite and line battalion com-
ponents of the 1st Cavalry Division was beyond reproach, the general
personal conduct of all personnel within the division was quite high.
Accurate assessments of such intangibles as morale and esprit de corps
are probably impossible, but quantitative evaluation can be made in
determining troop discipline and obedience to orders. Division troop

performance in these areas is examined by surveying general crime
rates, grenade incidents ("fragging"), and war crimes in Vietnam.
The personnel of the division demonstrated exemplary behavior
4. 1st Cav Div AVDAMH Doc, Subj: Long Range Patrols of the 1st Air
Cav Div, dtd 26 Dec 68.
The Skytroopers 229
compared to other formations stationed in Vietnam. The USARV

provost marshal quarterly summary reports for all major Army com-
mands confirm the high esteem in which the division was held. Two
sample quarters are statistically cited here, as they represent the final
three-month figures for 1969 and 1970, the most troubled period of
American troop service when all units were still incountry and before
strengths were eroded by major withdrawals.
During the period of October through December 1969, the 1st
Cavalry Division had only 37 persons confined in the USARV Long
Binh stockade, a rate of 1.85 per thousand, and the lowest of any
division or equivalent command. In crimes against persons and prop-
erty, where there was a 7.2 percent rise in other division crime rates
to include murder, manslaughter, and rape, the 1st Cavalry Division's
most serious crimes from October through December 1969 were six
aggravated assaults, eleven simple assaults, one robbery, and twelve
larcenies (most under fifty dollars). One year later, during the period
of October through December 1970, the 1st Cavalry Division had 96
persons in the USARV prisoner population at Long Binh, a rate of
4.68 per thousand, which resulted largely from increased division
crackdowns on drug offenders. The true measure of division troop
behavior again focuses on serious crimes against persons and prop-
erty, which at this point in the war had escalated to alarming levels
throughout USARV. However, the 1st Cavalry Division had only one
case of murder, twenty simple assaults, and fifteen petty larcenies.
These statistics are astonishingly low, even for a peacetime garrison
division in Europe or the United States, and a tribute to the leadership
and men of the division.^
In Vietnam, ''fragging" was a slang expression originally refer-
ring to the use of a fragmentation grenade to kill or injure another
person, usually as a measure taken against unpopular officers or ser-
geants. However, a great deal of fragging was directed toward fellow
enlisted men as a result of grievances and drug trafficking. Common
Army usage expanded the meaning of the term to encompass the use
of other varied explosive devices. The crux of the problem in Vietnam
was found in control and leadership at the company and battalion
5. USARV, Command Progress Reports, 2d Qtr FY-69, pp. 60.02, 60.08;

2d Qtr FY-70, pp. 70.05, 70.08.
230 STANTON
level. Most commanders and senior sergeants were rarely able to see
their entire unit at one time, because of widespread base camp ele-
ments and dispersed units in the field.
Fragging incidents rose sharply throughout Army divisions and
separate brigades in 1970, which represented the peak year for this
type of criminal activity. A close scrutiny of fraggings and shootings
during the second half of the year gives a good picture of how the
1st Cavalry Division compared During these six
in troop discontent.
months, the division had only five incidents of grenade fraggings and
twenty-two cases of shootings. At the same time there was a total of
thirty-eight grenade fraggings and ninety-seven shootings among the
five Army divisions and five separate combat brigades from July through
December 1970 (with two brigades departing country during this pe-
riod). Again, the 1st Cavalry Division has a conspicuously low rate
of grenade incidents, despite having the highest number of assigned
personnel and the largest area of operations with scattered firebases
in Vietnam.^
The 1 St Cavalry Division was also remarkably free from the taint
of war crime accusation during its service in Vietnam. This fact re-
flects great credit upon an organization that waged a very difficult
war in the midst of an often hostile civilian population.
There were only three main allegations of improper wartime ac-
tivity brought against units of the 1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam.
The first complaint stemmed from the alleged mistreatment of a Viet

Cong prisoner following the appearance of an Associated Press pho-
tograph in the 30 December 1965 issues of The Chicago Daily News
and Milwaukee Journal. The photo showed a seemingly nonchalant
cavalry major looking on while "a Vietnamese Popular Forces mili-
tiaman kicks a Viet Cong prisoner in the head at an interrogation point
. . . after being captured by U.S. troops of the 1st Cavalry (Air Mo-
bile) Division." The Army ordered a full investigation with the fol-
lowing results.
The 1st Cavalry Division received a report in December 1965 that

some VC were hiding in caves in the Binh Khe district. The Binh
Khe district chief appointed one of his policemen as a guide for a
6. DCS P&A DF TO C/OS Dept. of the Army, fm Maj. Woodbeck AVHDP-

MMW, DF, Subj: Grenade Incidents, dtd 14 Mar 71, w/supporting papers.
The Skytroopers 231
search expedition by the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry. No caves were

found, but a VC suspect was captured by Troop C of the squadron
and evacuated to the landing zone for immediate interrogation by the
3d Brigade intelligence officer (a major) prior to evacuation as a pris-
oner of war. About the same time that the helicopter arrived with the
major and AP photographer Mr. Huet, the Binh Khe policeman saw
the prisoner and recognized him as a fellow villager. The policeman
accused him of being a known Cong responsible for trouble in
Viet
the hamlet and ran over and kicked him before the cavalrymen could
react. The major rushed over and immediately stopped the civilian
policeman from kicking the prone VC suspect.
Mr. Huet later stated that he had already had his camera focused;
otherwise, he would have been unable to take the picture, since the
incident happened so quickly. He also agreed that the photo was mis-
leading because the major was about to rush over to stop the mis-
treatment. Unfortunately, the major seemed to be permitting, or merely
observing, the kicking at the instant the shutter clicked. The photo-
graph was that of an isolated incident whereby a civilian guide was
inadvertently allowed to get close enough to a village adversary to
vent his rage upon him. The was quickly remedied, but not
situation
before a chance photograph gave a completely erroneous impression
of the incident. The 1st Cavalry Division, which prided itself on ac-
cording prisoners proper treatment, ironically became associated with
harsh retribution by a national press eager for dramatic photographs.^
The next untoward division incident, the "Brooks Incident," did
not arise until 18 May 1971, when a "hunter-killer" team of three
helicopters from Troop A, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, performed a
visual reconnaissance mission over a small Cambodian village. The
scoutship crew observed a number of motorcycles and bicycles with
packs near the hamlet, which they suspected was an enemy convoy.
The villagers were signaled from the air to open the packs, and ma-
chine gun fire was used to force the inhabitants into the open after
the instructions were ignored. On another pass over the area, the pilot
of the observation helicopter heard gunfire behind his craft and no-
tiiied the Cobra gunship that he was taking fire. The mission com-
mander in the third helicopter saw automatic weapon muzzle flashes
7. MACJI Ltr Serial No. 3844 1st Ind, Subj: Complaint, Alleged Mistreat-
ment of a Viet Cong Prisoner, dtd 1 Mar 66, w/ investig papers.
232 STANTON
from a dike one hundred yards south of the village and so advised
the Cobra pilot. The attack helicopter rocketed the dike and adjacent
buildings, while the gunner aboard the scoutship sprayed the rest of
the village.
An ARVN platoon led by cavalry Capt. Arnold H. Brooks was
airmobiled into the contact area under the cover of gunship support
fires (this was a technical violation of standing orders not to enter
Cambodia at the time). The South Vietnamese raced into the village
with weapons blazing, gunning down several people, including chil-
dren, then looted the hamlet. The platoon was not fired on, did not
search for enemy positions, and did not treat any of the wounded
civilians. The Vietnamese troops left the area, taking large quantities
of tobacco, poultry, radios, and other booty, while Captain Brooks
helped himself to a motorcycle which he later presented to Lt. Col.
Carl C. Putnam, the squadron commander, as a war trophy. Several
days later Lieutenant Colonel Putnam decided to investigate.
The Army concluded that the 9th Cavalry had engaged in exces-
sive bombardment and pillage of a Cambodian village and had vio-
lated several rules of engagement. Letters of reprimand were issued
to Lieutenant Colonel Putnam and others, but court-martial charges
against Captain Brooks were dismissed at Fort Knox, Kentucky, on
21 April 1972. Division members felt that the cavalry actions were
appropriate, that the South Vietnamese were responsible for the actual
problems, and that the investigation was unfair. Air cavalrymen func-
tioned in a very dangerous flight pattern. A ''low bird" light obser-
vation helicopter was flown at slow speed as a carrot to make the
enemy reveal his location. The "high bird,'' an armed helicopter, cir-
cled the bait scoutship to render immediate protective response. To

stay alive, these aviators had to react instantly with deadly effective
firef)ower. This incident transpired in a ''hot area" full of enemy traffic,
where it was common NVA/VC practice to use motorcycles and bi-

cycles for transporting war materials and supplies.*^
The final war crime incident involving a 1st Cavalry Division unit
was commonly known as the "Woodcutters incident," since it alleg-
edly involved the murder of two Vietnamese woodcutters. On 7 Jan-
8. CO Third Regional Assistance Cmd Ltr AVDACG, Subj: Report of in-

vestigation: Firing Incident in Cambodia, dtd 12 Dec 71, and related pa-
perwork; DA Investigation summary #219, dtd May 72. 1
The Skytroopers 233
uary 1972 a Mr. Nguyen Xuan Tuyet from Binh Son hamlet near the
village of Long An reported that three days earlier an unidentified
helicopter fired upon some woodcutters in his district, hitting two of
them. He which time Army
stated that the helicopter then landed, at
soldiers got out and finished the woodcutters off with pistols, took
their chain saw and bicycle, and departed. MACV immediately ini-
tiated a full investigation.
The investigation revealed that the Vietnamese were actually killed
in a ground action by Ranger Team 73 of Company H, 75th Infantry
(Ranger) of the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, and that no heli-

copter weapons were fired during that mission. The ranger team was
in a special strike zone on a reconnaissance patrol when two armed
Vietnamese were spotted sitting beside a pile of brush. Both were

immediately ambushed and killed. The rangers stripped the bodies of
clothing, an AK47 assault rifle, two grenades, and some small tools,
but no identification was found on either. The rangers found a bicycle
twenty-five yards away and placed it aboard their helicopter. A small,
inoperative chain saw was sighted but not taken.
The Vietnamese officials were using a pass system for woodcut-
ters in the area. The Vietnamese in the hamlet insisted that the victims
had such passes and reiterated that the victims were merely innocent
woodcutters. However, the hamlet was rated as 70 percent VC sym-
pathetic in the latest MACV Hamlet Evaluation System rating report.
The MACV investigation concluded that there was insufficient evi-
dence to refute the ranger team's testimony, but concluded that they
violated the laws of war by taking the bicycle. This result was so
ludicrous, however, that after the brigade commander ''took appro-
priate action to preclude recurrence of such an act as the taking of
the bicycle," the Army dismissed the complaint.^
The combat and personal performance of the 1st Cavalry
excellent
Division troopers during its long service in Vietnam reflects very fa-
vorably on a formation which experienced great personal turbulence
and heavy action. The remarkable ability of this highly mobile di-
vision to retain its characteristic elan and combat spirit is especially
noteworthy in the final war years, when the rest of the Army had
entered a marked state of decline in morale, fighting efficiency, and
individual behavior.
9. DA Investigation Summary #214, dtd 7 Aug 72.

CHAPTER 12
The Total Battlefield

From Airmobility to Armor
After the summer of 1970, when 1st Cavalry Di-

contingents of the
vision returned from Cambodia Vietnamese soil, the American
to
withdrawal from Southeast Asia began escalating sharply. Pentagon
war plans were revised to hasten the extrication of remaining U.S.
ground forces and to turn the war's conduct over entirely to the South
Vietnamese regime. Partially in deference to these larger plans, Maj.
Gen. George W. Putnam, Jr., was selected to command the 1st Cav-
alry Division in the wake of Major General Casey's tragic death on
7 July. At that time Major General Putnam was in charge of the 1st
Aviation Brigade, which was heavily engaged in direct support of
ARVN operations against Cambodia and thoroughly familiar with both
airmobile doctrine and Vietnamese requirements.
George W. Putnam, Jr., was bom in Fort Fairfield, Maine, on 5
May 1920 and was commissioned in the field artillery from officer
candidate school during May 1942. During World War II, he was a
gunnery instructor and battalion operations officer, arriving in Europe
early in 1945. He transferred to the Regular Army in August 1946,
served in the occupation forces of Japan, and became aviator-quali-
fied ten years later. Appointed to the crucial airmobility development
Howze Board, Colonel Putnam served as executive to the Secretariat,
which was the administrative workhorse of the board. He was Deputy
Director of Army Aviation until May 1965, when he was named the
Assistant Commandant of the Army Aviation School at Fort Rucker,
Alabama. His next assignment took him to Vietnam, where he served
successively as the 1st Cavalry Division artillery commander, acting
assistant division commander, and division chief of staff. In 1968
236 STANTON
General Putnam became the Director of Officer Personnel in the Pen-

tagon and returned to Vietnam in January 1970 as the commanding
officer of the 1st Aviation Brigade and the chief aviation officer of
USARV.
Major General Putnam was anxious to implement one important
concept of the Howze Board that had not been tested because of lack
of funding and the events of the Vietnam War, the Air Cavalry Com-
bat Brigade (ACCB). The Howze Board's final report of 21 June 1962
had specified that the ACCB was one of the most original and de-
cisive combat tools of projected airmobile force structuring. The air
cavalry combat brigade was to be predominantly an offensive ma-
chine in the true spirit of swiftly mobile cavalry, designed to ^'seek
out and destroy the enemy and carry out traditional cavalry missions."
Two or more attack helicopter squadrons were to be grouped under
a tactical headquarters to form a brigade in the Howze Board scheme.
The 1 st Cavalry Division was given a new operational area to fill
the gap created by redeploying American units such as the 199th In-
fantry Brigade after the Cambodian incursion. The division was tasked
to cover an immense region of 4,536 square miles east of Saigon,
spanning the width of the entire country from the Cambodian border
through War Zone D all the way to the South China Sea. This in-
creased territorial responsibility presented Major General Putnam with

the need to stretch air cavalry assets and a reason to create his de
facto air cavalry combat brigade. August 1970 he directed a di-
In
visional aircraft productivity analysis which found that the attack Cobra
gunship platoons escorting the aviation lift battalions were not being
used correcdy and that many light observation helicopters could be
freed from general support duties.
Based on the findings of this internal aircraft resource investi-
gation, the assault weapons companies (Company D) were withdrawn
from both the 227th and 229th Aviation Battalions beginning on 1
September and transferred to the control of the 1st Squadron, 9th Cav-
alry, as lettered air cavalry troops. Combined with a sudden infusion
1. U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Combat Arms Group,
The Origins, Deliberations, and Recommendations of the U.S. Army Tac-

tical Mobility Requirements Board, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, April
1969, p. 51.
The Total Battlefield 237
of light observation helicopters garnered from other, division ele-

ments, the 9th Cavalry's aerial reconnaissance squadron (with air Troops
A, B, and C) blossomed overnight into a reinforced five-troop (A,
B, C, E, F) search-and-attack cavalry squadron. Several squadron
scout helicopters were even outfitted with miniguns. While this rep-
resented a powerful helicopter squadron, it constituted only half of
any projected air cavalry combat brigade.^
On 26 October 1970 Putnam secured the 3d Squadron of the 17th
Cavaby, an independent aerial reconnaissance unit from his former
1st Aviation Brigade, and attached it to the division. This squadron
was bolstered by an additional air cavalry Troop E (Provisional), cre-

ated by temporarily redesignating the separate 334th Aviation Com-
pany on 5 December. The reinforced 1 st Squadron of the 9th Cavalry
and 3d Squadron of the 1 7th Cavalry under division control gave Ma-
jor General Putnam the two search-and-attack helicopter squadrons
needed to form a provisional ACCB. The air cavalry combat brigade's
effectiveness was increased by assigning two elite airmobile ground
reconnaissance companies to help locate enemy forces and material:
Troop D of the 9th Cavalry's 1st Squadron and ranger Company H,
75th Infantry, with the 62d Infantry Platoon (Combat Tracker) thrown
in for good measure. Finally, the division's sole aerial rocket artillery
battalion, the Cobra-equipped "Blue Max" 2d Battalion of the 20th
Artillery, was placed in direct support. The 9th Air Cavalry Brigade
(Combat) was officially announced as a reality by division General
Orders on 5 December 1970.
The 9th Cavalry Brigade had a rather brief and confusing exis-
tence and was mostly scattered in support of various divisional and
ARVN parachutist or ranger elements. Each air cavalry troop was
assigned a zone of responsibility coinciding with a division or ARVN
airborne brigade sector. During the month of December alone, it re-
structured its task organization three times and conducted only one
independent operation.
On 29 December 1970 the brigade received a warning order to
locate and free allied prisoners supposedly located in the Razorback
vicinity of War Zone C. ACCB Task Force Nevins arrived at the
2. 1st Cav Div, Operational Report, dtd 14 Nov 70, p. 21

238 STANTON
abandoned Special Forces Camp Dau Tieng airstrip and on the morn-
ing of 31 December established a forward operating base with re-
fueling and rearming points. Task Force Nevins consisted of one in-
fantry battalion and two air cavalry troops. Although the mission started
NVA/VC were guarding
with heavy action, a promising sign that the
something worth defending, the operation was abruptly terminated
that afternoon because MACV insisted on strictly observing the hol-
iday cease-fire. All elements of Task Force Nevins were pulled back
from Dau Tieng airstrip by 7:30 that evening.^
The provisional air cavalry combat brigade was sent into Cam-
bodia to support four ARVN task forces along the Kampong Cham-
Snoul front on 22 February 1971. Two was augmented
days later it
further by the addition of the air cavalry troop from the 1 1 th Armored
Cavalry Regiment. Adverse modifications to normal air cavalry ma-
neuver were immediately imposed because of the stringent rules of
engagement concerning Cambodian operations. The results were gen-
erally unsatisfactory. Tortuous clearances for fire support rendered the
ACCB incapable of responding effectively with the prompt, devas-
tating firepower it was designed to deliver. ARVN airmobile ground
forces called ''Browns" replaced the experienced U.S. infantry "Blues"
employed by the brigade as quick reaction forces, since American
combatants were not allowed on the ground. The "Browns" not only
lacked rudimentary knowledge of helicopter tactics, but often were
not responsive to American control.
The exact date of disbandment of the 9th Cavalry Brigade is hard
to pinpoint. The ACCB was actually whittled away over a period of
months as components left to reinforce the Laotian battlefront during
Operation LAM SON 719, rejoin parent units, or depart Vietnam.
The provisional brigade's final report gives its own closure as 15 Feb-
ruary, but the quarterly division operation report (mentioning the un-
authorized ACCB under the guise of the 1 /9 Cav TF) claims reas-
signment to the 12th Aviation Group of 1st Aviation Brigade on 10
April 1971. General Putnam's air cavalry force was inside Cambodia
with at least six troops and an aerial rocket artillery battery at the
beginning of April.
The experimental air cavalry combat brigade was created as an
3. 1st Cav Div, Operational Report, dtd 13 May 71, p. 36.

The Total Banlefield 239
ad hoc enterprise to field-test Howze Board findings under combat

conditions. Its mission in Vietnam as stated was to: (1) perform re-
connaissance and security for the division or major subordinated
its
elements, (2) engage in combat "as an economy-of-force unit," and

(3) provide a limited air and ground antitank capability. Additionally,
the brigade was tasked to receive and employ other combat units, such
as the composite infantry and rocket artillery battalion later assigned.
The brigade was to serve as a senior command and control head-

quarters for a specific area of operations."^
The ACCB concept as outlined above was actually tailored to Eu-
ropean- and Middle Eastern-style warfare and could not be ade-
quately demonstrated in Vietnam or Cambodia because of political
constraints in the form of unique rules of engagement. General Put-
nam had the right idea, to create a true cavalry force by taking the
gunships out of the lift battalions and giving their escort mission to
the aerial artillery battalion. His ACCB harmonized with enlightened
Howze Board recommendations about creating special corps cavalry
reserves, but was still too advanced to be grasped adequately by the
Army. In the Vietnam theater the experiment was stifled. He merely
proved that the ACCB initiated 67 percent of all division actions against
hostile forces during the period of its existence, that an infantry bat-
talion would be a useful adjunct to the air cavalry combat brigade,
and that further testing was needed. Even the contact initiation sta-
tistic was suspect, since it was only slightly better than the perfor-
mance of the aerial reconnaissance squadron used as intended, but the

ACCB possessed twice the aerial capacity. Again, the most serious
and vexing problem was the lack of qualified maintenance personnel
to keep the air cavalry combat brigade flying.
Further experimentation with lingering Howze Board ideas or tac-
tical innovations was given lower priority after 20 December 1970,
when the men of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) were notified
of divisional selection as part of the sixth redeployment increment
from Vietnam, coded KEYSTONE ROBIN CHARLIE. From the be-
ginning of 1971 until the main division withdrawal at the end of April,
the division staff was occupied primarily with planning, coordinating.
4. 9th Cav Bde (Prov) ADVARS-3, Combat After Action Report, dtd 23
Mar 71, with attached Itr dtd 24 Oct 70.
240 STANTON
and implementing retrograde procedures. Fortunately, NVA/VC ac-

tivity within the region actually decreased during this period, enabling
the division to phase out smoothly with minimal enemy interference.
Small roving platoon and squad-size airmobile cavalry forces were
able to patrol their defensive sectors without difficulty.
Composite or were used to provide ade-
split artillery batteries
quate coverage, but these configurations were disadvantageous since

they increased helicopter support requirements and logistical prob-
lems. The lack of meaningful North Vietnamese confrontations en-
abled the 1st Cavalry Division to boast of using strike infantry flexibly
outside the range of tube artillery, armed only instead with Huey-
transportable 81mm mortars as close defense. This was largely a hol-
low doctrinal improvement because the intensity of the "big battle
years" in Vietnam (for the American Army, from 1966 to 1968) rel-
egated support weapons like 81mm medium mortars to either idle
storage or supplementary support in base camps. The intensity of the
la Drang Valley campaign of late 1965 offered early demonstrable
proof of mortar insufficiency compared to heavier artillery. Only the
lowered level of NVA/VC combat, coupled with the lack of contin-
uous frontline experience institutionalized by the Army rotation sys-
tem, allowed the 1st Cavalry Division to rely on and claim the ad-
vantages of mortar substitution.
Beginning in February, the division's operational area was re-
duced as more Vietnamese territorial forces were summoned to per-
form guardianship over roads and hamlets and line ARVN units were
moved into former cavalry firebases. The 1st Cavalry Division con-
tinued to function with high esprit throughout this difficult withdrawal
period. For example, the 1st Battalion of the 5th Cavalry fought fif-
teen skirmishes with the North Vietnamese during its last nine days
in the field, with every member of the battalion keenly aware of the
exact day scheduled for extraction from the jungle. The two-battalion
2d Brigade, charged with interdiction of NVA/VC supply channels
between Cambodia and War Zone D, completed its disengagement
by turning over Fire Support Base Buttons to the South Vietnamese
on 1 1 March 1971. The 1st Brigade with four battalions scoured War
Zone D until 24 March, when it commenced stand-down. These events
left the three-battalion 3d Brigade, slated to remain as a separate en-
tity in Vietnam after the rest of the division departed, with defense
of the central region just east of Bien Hoa and Saigon, protecting the
most crucial military installations from rocket barrage.^
On 29 April 1971 the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) furled its
guidons and left Vietnam for Fort Hood, Texas. Sixteen days pre-
viously, former Assistant Division Commander- A, Brig. Gen. Jona-
than R. Burton, took over the separate 3d Brigade "Garry Owen"
Task Force. His separate brigade was assigned a very large area en-
compassing thirty-five hundred square miles and defensive respon-
sibility for the eastern approaches toward vital Saigon and Long Binh.
As a result, the brigade was reconstituted with seven recycled bat-

talions as well as sixteen additional companies and platoons. The bri-
gade contained four infantry battalions (2/5 Cav, 1/7 Cav, 2/8 Cav,
1/12 Cav), one reinforced artillery battalion (1/21 Arty), one com-
posite 229th Aviation Battalion, and the 215th Support Battalion. The
eight separate companies or batteries included rangers (Co H/75 Inf),
aerial rocket artillery (F/79 Arty), howitzers (Prov F/26 Arty), avia-
tion target acquisition (F/77 Arty), signal (525th), engineers (501st),
military intelligence (191st), and aviation (362d). The 362d Aviation
Company was effectively converted into an air cav reconnaissance
troop to supplement the brigade's intrinsic Troop F, 9th Cavalry. The
brigade's platoons and detachments, ranging from chemical to mili-
tary police, gave the task force all the trappings of a miniature di-
vision. This formidable cavalry contingent had an assigned strength
of 7,632 men at the end of 1971.
General Burton had two concurrent main concerns, finding the
enemy and personnel management within the brigade. The NVA/VC
routinely avoided confrontation with the cavalry, and increased em-
phasis was placed on remaining abreast of enemy activity. The bri-
gade's two air cavalry troops gained the most information on enemy
dispositions and discovered new base camps or resupply routes.
Air cavalry missions were accomplished normally by using OH6A
scout "white bird" in a visual reconnaissance role to draw fire under
the covering support of an AHIG Cobra "red bird," which also pro-
vided suppressive fire, navigational control, and a conmiunications
5. 1st Cav Div, KEYSTONE ROBIN CHARUE After Action Report, dtd 15
Apr 71, Appendix 3 to Annex C.
242 STANTON
link to higher headquarters. Together, these "pink team" combina-

tions rendered 44 percent of all credited brigade kills from April through
December 1971.^
The outstanding success of the ranger company was attributed to
its extensive training, as well as individual ranger team knowledge
that the entire brigade stood ready to react rapidly in case of adverse
hostile contact. The strength of Company H, 75th Infantry (Ranger),
had been reduced to conform with 3d Brigade size, but Burton dou-
bled the number of teams from four to eight based on its battlefield
performance. All ranger volunteers were trained by the company staff,
and the rigorous training standards washed out three-fourths of all
candidates each training cycle. Qualified rangers became skilled in

rappelling and the use of McQuire rigs, which were Special Forces-
developed hoisting devices for penetration of difficult tropical terrain.
Brigade ranger teams were inserted into enemy-dominated territory
on missions of five-day duration primarily to gather intelligence, but
their skill at ambush accounted for approximately 30 percent of all
brigade kills from April through December.^
The brigade's internal military intelligence posture was enhanced
by close coordination between the Vietnamese Counterintelligence
Service and the dreaded Military Security Service (MSS) beginning
in September 1971. When four MSS agents were added to the bri-
gade, it marked the first time that MSS personnel were assigned to a
U.S. combat unit in Vietnam. Several female MSS agents were hired
in a drug-suppression role. General Burton implemented a strong drug
abuse intervention program centered around the special Brigade Drug
Rehabilitation Center. From 1 May to 31 October, 633 brigade per-
sonnel underwent detoxification and treatment at the center. Unan-
nounced urinalysis testing was conducted frequently, and often iden-
tified drug users were sent to the Drug Abuser Holding Center (DAHC)
for administrativeand judicial action.^

Troop welfare was also maintained through positive rewards, pri-
marily by the introduction of a rifle company rotation program. The
6. DAAG-PAP-A (M), Senior Officer Debriefing Report: EG Jonathan R.

Burton, dtd 3 May 72, p. 7.
7. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
8. Ibid., p. 13.
infantry companies operated independently to cover the wide expanse

of the brigade's area of responsibility, but each remained within the
artillery fan of at least one firebase. The general pattern kept com-
panies in the field for fifteen days, where they received helicopter
resupply of ammunition, rations, and water every three or four days.
If the landing zone conditions permitted, a hot meal and ice cream,
change of clothing, mail, and other comfort items were delivered.

When the company completed its fifteen-day field duty, it was rotated
to a fire support base to provide security for another five days. During
this time, the company was refitted, underwent bunker assault and
marksmanship training, and took care of personnel affairs. Every forty-
five days, on a rotational basis, each rifle company and recon platoon
was sent to the First Team R&R Center, opened at the beach resort
of Vung Tau in March 1971, for three days of rest and recreation.
The troops were given considerable latitude to unwind after six weeks
in the field. The maintenance of the center was a drain on brigade
material, personnel, and monetary assets, but the high effect on mo-
rale was considered worthwhile.
Brig. Gen. James F. Hamlet, another former Assistant Division
Commander- A, took over the separate 3d Brigade on 14 December
1971. The formation was infused with a rash of transferred soldiers
from other redeploying divisions, such as the 101st Airborne (Air-
mobile), at the rate of five hundred a week. Regardless of "bush time,"
these new arrivals were sent through the brigade Combat Training
Center. The cavalry brigade continued its fourfold mission of de-
fending the Saigon-Long Binh military complex, training Vietnamese
territorial forces, remaining ready to move into other military regions
as a security fire brigade, and preparing to execute various late- war
contingency plans.
The separate 3d Brigade was still involved occasionally in heavy
combat, despite continuing readjustment of operational areas to bring
it closer into the defensive arc of the Bien Hoa-Long Binh-Saigon
rocket belt (that area within range of NVA The bri-
rocket attacks).
gade's former forward operating base at FOB
Mace, beside Nui Chua
Chan, was closed, and a new rearmament and refueling facility was
9. 3d Bde (Sep) 1st Cav Div, Operational Report, dtd 1 May 72, p. 1
(Mission) and Tab I-l (Brigade Strength Report).

244 STANTON
opened at Xuan Loc airfield. On 3 January 1972 the 2d Battalion of

the 5th Cavalry was displaced to FSB Charger in conjunction with
this rearward move. A platoon of Company C was attacked by ele-
ments of the 33d NVA Regiment using a hasty U-shaped ambush. The
company maneuvered to link up with its trapped platoon and to attack
the ambush site from another direction. The North Vietnamese fled
the field after a fierce two-hour skirmish, during which the airmobile
cavalry reaction force, gunships, and medical evacuation helicopters
all suffered heavy return fire.
On 1 April 1972 the generally slow pace of the war in Military

Region 3 suddenly changed. Three NVA divisions attacked from the
Cambodian Fishhook vicinity after staging a diversionary assault north
of Tay Ninh. The enemy quickly overran Loc Ninh and besieged An
Loc. The 3d Brigade ground troops were not members of this fighting
force, but the two brigade air troops (F/9 Cav and D/229 Avn Bn)
and the aerial rocket artillery battery (F/79 Arty) were involved in
constant combat to stem the North Vietnamese advance. Despite in-
tense antiaircraft fire from 23mm, 37mm, and even some 85mm AA
guns, the brigade's AHIG Cobra gunships destroyed twenty-nine trucks
and five tanks and damaged a sixth.
Attempts to rescue American advisors at Loc Ninh were unsuc-
cessful, but several advisors were lifted by brigade helicopters from
the Cam LoBridge after being cut off and surrounded for three days.
The brigade aviators also evacuated ARVN soldiers and civilians from
Bu Dop and Song Be, helped repulse an NVA attack against the Nui
Ba Den radio relay site, and supported several South Vietnamese
counterattacks into An Loc.'^
The American withdrawal from Vietnam continued unabated even
though such renewed NVA/VC onslaughts threatened to destroy the
Saigon government without continued U.S. military presence. The 3d
Brigade (Separate) of the 1st Cavalry Division was redeployed from
South Vietnam as part of Increment XII KEYSTONE PHEASANT
on 26 June 1972 and returned to rejoin the rest of the 1st Cavalry
Division at Fort Hood, Texas. The division had been located there
since its own KEYSTONE ROBIN CHARLIE arrival the previous
year.
10. 3d Bde 1st Cav Div, Operational Report, dtd 1 May 72.
1st Cavalry Division Presence in Vietnam
A-AnKhe(CampRadcliff)
E - Camp Evans
P - Phuoc Vinh (Camp Gorvad)
Provinces
1-An Giang 23-Kontum

2-An Xuyen 24-Lam Dong
3-Ba Xuyen 25-Long An
4-Bac Lieu 26-Long Khanh
5-Bien Hoa 27-Ninh Thuan
6-Binh Dinh 28-Phong Dinh
7-Binh Duong 29-Phu Bon
8-Binh Long 30-Phu Yen
9-Binh Thuan 31 -Phuoc Long
10-Binh Tuy 32-Phuoc Tuy
11-Chau Doc 33-Pleiku
12-Chuong Thien 34-Quang Due
13-Darlac 35-Quang Nam
14-Dinh Tuong 36-Quang Ngai
15-Gia Dinh 37-Quang Tin
16-Go Cong 38-Quang Tri
17-Hau Nghia 39-Sa Dec
18-Kien Giang 40-Tay Ninh
19-KienHoa 41-Thua Thien
20-Kien Phong 42-Tuyen Due
21-Kien Tuong 43-Vinh Binh
22-Khanh Hoa 44-Vinh Long
Q Saigon
R • • • • c^. Jinr^^
• •
u • • • • • 1
I
1
C" rz
1 V
^3 Heavy Presence
Medium Presence
Low or no Presence

nton
246 STANTON
The United States military posture was extremely poor. The most
difficult Army task was reconforming its forces to meet national de-
fense priorities, especially the protection of North America and Eu-
rope in case of major conflict. This risk had been neglected during
the limited war in Indochina, and a long-overdue major reorientation
of Army structure was required. New tactical organizations were
mandated, but public dissatisfaction with the war had drastically re-
duced the Army's size and budget. The seemingly radical Modem
Volunteer Army Program with no draft was implemented with great
difficulty past 13 October 1970, and large quantities of war material
were still being siphoned off to Vietnam and other allies.
Lt. Gen. Harry W. O. Kinnard was now in charge of the Army
Combat Developments Command, and he still wanted to properly test
the air cavalry combat brigade. This organization remained a personal
favorite from the Howze Board deliberations, which he considered
one step further down the tactical development road than the air as-
sault division. The ACCBs envisioned by the Howze Board were ho-
mogeneous forces of air cavalry squadrons, each backed up by aerial
rocket artillery, that would be capable of performing the Army's cav-
alry mission (except the armored cavalry regimental ground mission).
—
An ACCB would contain everything required firing helicopters, scout
helicopters, and lift helicopters —
to provide each corps with its own
small, self-contained army. While the ACCB was not intended to be
a powerful group of shooting helicopters to block Soviet armor, it
still provided a swiftly mobile and balanced unit that could dominate
hundreds of square miles of Iranian desert or Russian Pripyat marsh-
land. Properly balanced and commanded, the brigade could harass
and destroy widespread enemy forces by using scouts to find enemy
mechanized and infantry forces, airmobile infantry to furnish am-
bushes and local security, and gunships to attack selected targets.
On 23 November 1970 Army Chief of Staff General Westmore-
land approved the creation of a "triple capability" division combining
armor, airmobile, and air cavalry brigades to test possible high-in-
tensity-warfare structural modifications. He programmed the 1st Cav-
alry Division to be the vehicle for this project upon its arrival at Fort
Hood, Texas, from Vietnam. On 5 May 1971 the cavalry division

was reorganized accordingly as the experimental Triple Capability
(TRICAP) Division. It used the personnel and equipment of the 1st
Armored Division, which in turn sent its flag to Germany.
The potential of the TRICAP and allied ACCB enterprise was

suffocated from the start by Army bureaucratic imcompetence. The
test division was placed at Fort Hood, an entrenched armor post full
of officers convinced that tanks would dominate future battlefields
and were only supplementary to tracked steel. Further-
that aircraft
more, both TRICAP and ACCB were buried in an institutional morass
under the unlikely direction of Project MASSTER (Mobile Army Sen-
sor Systems Test, Evaluation, and Review).
Project MASSTER was established in 1969 to manage the de-
velopment of surveillance, target acquisition, and night observation
(STANO) equipment and doctrine. The task apparently engendered
so little respect that the Army's Vice Chief of Staff was forced to
direct that "CONARC, USACDC (Combat Developments Com-
mand), USAMC (Material Command), and USASA (Security Agency)
establish visible STANO offices within their headquarters to serve as
points of contact for the coordination of STANO matters in intercom-
mand and Department of the Army Staff-command activities. " Nes- '
'
tled at Fort Hood since October 1969, MASSTER provided an al-

1
ready funded but suitably vague bureaucratic instrument available to

incorporate TRICAP,
The method that produced the highly successful 1 1th Air Assault
and airmobile 1st Cavalry Divisions had been the appointment of a
young brigadier open directives and wide latitude to re-
"tiger" with
port back with results. In this case, however, the Army followed its
usual nonprogressive path of testing and analysis, reports and more
reports. TRICAP was incorporated into the unwieldy MASSTER
management structure, which was expanded to oversee sensor and
night surveillance equipment development, the integrated battlefield
control system (IBCS), and, last, TRICAP/ACCB. On 25 June 1971
the MASSTER acronym was conveniently retained by changing the
organizational title to Modem Army Selected Systems Test, Evalu-
ation, and Review. The revised MASSTER charter was published on
2 September, designating the commanding general of III Corps and
Fort Hood to be the commanding general of MASSTER as an addi-
tional duty.'^
11. USCONARC, Annual Historical Summary: FY 71, p. 121-22.

12. Ill Corps and Fort Hood GO 275, dtd 25 Jun 71 and , CONARC, Annual
Historical Summary, dtd 15 Jul 72, p. 122.
248 STANTON
The charter's objectives were so hopelessly diversified as to be

almost ludicrous. MASSTER (nicknamed the '^Mass Management
Structure") was charged —
in this exact order —
with testing to im-
prove the Army's combat intelligence/reconnaissance and STANO
capabilities, improving the Army's tactical command and control ca-
pability within the IBCS framework, evaluating the air cavalry com-
bat brigade and the TRICAP division concept, and supporting the
development of other selected concepts, organizations, and material
systems which might be assigned for evaluation.
Confusion reigned supreme. The serious shortage of helicopters
initially prevented the air cavalry combat brigade from either con-
forming to the organization envisioned by the Army Combat Devel-
opments Command or commencing meaningful training. Although one
air cavalry squadron was present, the other envisioned attack heli-
copter squadron was instead a battalion of medium tanks.
Even more detrimental to evaluation of either ACCB or the
TRICAP testing was the fact that the resource-starved Army suddenly
decided to redress emergency war plans for Europe. The Army or-
dered the entire TRICAP/ACCB package to be made potentially
test
available as a combat-ready division. During the same month that the

1st Cavalry Division was redesignated as TRICAP, instructions were
received to fashion the new structure to facilitate quick conversion

into a standardarmored division which, by using reserve components,
could replace the already-departed armored division at Fort Hood. So
many variations on the possible employment of the 1st Cavalry Di-
vision began appearing that frustrated staff officers, drafting long-
range stationing alternatives for Army units, simply labeled it the
"Experimental Division" — with no particular numbering, title, or
imagined composition — under Fort Hood entries.'^
The 1st Cavalry Division, with3d Brigade still separated in
its
Vietnam, lost most of its airmobility under TRICAP. A 4th Brigade

was formed, and the armored commanders at Fort Hood brought over
their tanks and armored personnel carriers. The Johnny-come-lately
battalion to Vietnam (5th Bn, 7th Cav) was inactivated, and the how-
itzer battalion picked up overseas (1st Bn, 30th Arty) sent to Fort
13. CONARC/ARSTRIKE, Annual Historical Summary—FY J97L dtd 15

Jul 72, Table 8.
Sill, Oklahoma. This left the 1st Cavalry Division (TRICAP) with
four mechanized cavalry battalions from each of its traditional regi-
ments Bn, 5th Cav; 2d Bn, 7th Cav; 1st Bn, 8th Cav; 2d Bn,
(1st
12th Cav); two aviation units newly formed at Fort Hood (170th Avn
Co and 230th Avn Bn, later retitled as the 227th to preserve Vietnam
heritage); three tank battalions transferred from the armored division
(1st and 2d Bns, 13th Armor, and 1st Bn, 81st Armor); three artillery
battalions (the 1st Bn, 6th Arty, and 3d Bn, 19th Arty, arrived from
the armored division; the 1st Bn, 77th Arty, remained; and both 2d
Bn, 19th Arty, and 2d Bn, 20th Arty, were inactivated); and one
cavalry reconnaissance squadron (4th Sqdn, 9th Cav, previously the
armored division's 3d Sqdn, 1st Cav, which became the 1st Sqdn,
9th Cav, when the latter returned from Vietnam on 28 June 1971).
The support structure was revised as well."^
Numerous MASSTER tests were undertaken during the year. As
predicted by the airmobile pessimists, battalion organizational and
tacticaldevelopment models were jointly tested with such things as
STANO border surveillance/anti-infiltration devices, unattended ground
sensors, and battle information control centers. An attack helicopter
squadron was finally activated for both TRICAP and ACCB testing
at the end of February 1972, when the 4th Squadron, 9th Cavalry,
was reformed at Fort Hood. The unit was raised by folding down the
170th Aviation Company and inactivating Company C, 2d Battalion,
13th Armor, on temporary duty supporting tests at Hunter-Liggett
Military Reservation in California, and bringing back its personnel
and equipment. Only the personal intervention of Lt. Gen. George P.
Seneff Jr. now the III Corps commander, forced the Army to rescind
, ,
the attack helicopter title and authorize reorganization of the unit as

an air cavalry squadron on 22 March 1972.'^
14. The 1st Cavalry Division (TRICAP) support base contained the 8th En-
gineer Bn, 13th Signal Bn, 15th Medical Bn, 15th Supply & Transport Bn,
27th Maint Bn, 315th Support Bn, 545th MP
Co, 15th Admin Co, 15th
Finance Co, and 15th Data Processing Unit. Note the loss of the 15th Trans
Bn and 15th Supply & Service Bn, but the addition of two new battalions
(15th S&T Bn, 315th Spt Bn) in their places. Source of 1st Cav Div reor-
ganization from DA Msg 091810Z Apr 71, Subj: Reorg and Inactiv of Ar-
mored Div; and DA Msg 091930Z Mar 71, Subj: Reorg to TRICAP Div.
15. ODCSFOR, Semi-Annual Hist Report, January-June 1972, p. 4.
250 STANTON
While air cavalry proponents became more frustrated over the miring
of TRICAP and ACCB in the bureaucratic quagmire at Fort
Hood,
the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) was completely reorganized
and rebuilt at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, during 1972. The 101st Air-
borne Division was the second airmobile division raised by the Army
for Vietnam duty. On 4 October 1974 the division dropped its par-
enthetical airmobile identifier in exchange for air assault and became
the Army's second air assault formation. Although the **unique ca-
pability of its air assault resources" was not recognized as an official
part of its mission statement until 31 August 1977, the division's modem
rendezvous with destiny was clear. On that date the division's 477
helicopters and 16,600 well-trained light infantrymen and women, re-
plete with their silver air assault badges, placed the 101st Airborne
Division (Air Assault) in the dynamic future of airmobility forfeited
by the 1st Cavalry Division.'^
TRICAP and ACCB failed because their real purpose was simply
to justify as many troops in the force structure as possible, while re-
vitalizing the old Howze Board dream of an air cavalry combat bri-
gade in the early 1970s. The resulting division mix consisted of an

infantry brigade, an armor brigade, and an air cavalry brigade, each
'^
of which was too vastly different to form an integrated whole.
The overriding demand to conform scant Army resources to pro-
jectedwar plans forced the experimental division into an emergency
armored division mode for European contingencies. This was perhaps
a foreseeable result of placing cavalry units in the backyard of heavy
armor advocates at Fort Hood. Light and swift air cavalry could not
be nurtured in such an environment. Finally, the experiment was
doomed by its subjugation to the bureaucratic MASSTER beast.
Throughout the rest of the decade, the triplex surveillance-cavalry-
target acquisition relationship was solidified by the Armor and Mil-
itary Intelligence Centers. By 1 August 1980 this latter development
inevitably transformed the 1st Cavalry into a heavy armored division
with a target servicing air cavalry attack brigade.
Airmobile firepower relied not on tanks linked to target-seeking
16. 101st AbnDiv, 1975 Historical Summary, p. 7»\\ Fiscal 1977 Historical
Summary, pp. 9, 12.
17. US AMHI, Seneff Debriefing.
aircraft, but on fusing manpower, weapons, and aerial transport with

cavalry doctrine. Air assault integrates attack, transport, and obser-
vation aircraft with the fighting elements of a division. By maintain-
ing intrinsic helicopter and other aircraft resources, the air assault
division insures the continuous availability of proficient aviation re-
sponsive to its unique tactical requirements. Even an air assault avia-
tion cadre subjected to heavy battle loss and fatigue on a nuclear bat-
tlefield will sustain this advantage. While the 1st Cavalry Division
performed this role, it was termed airmobile. The 101st Air-
officially
borne Division (Air Assault) now wears the crown, and in many his-
torical respects this is proper, given the original preferences of Gen-
eral Howze and other paratroopers who formulated modem Army

airmobility principles. As long as the 101st represents a lean, light
infantry organization, the forward thinking and spirit that General
Kinnard considered essential for dashing airmobile operations will be
preserved.
The Army's cavalry normally consisted of either ground or aerial
reconnaissance units. Armored cavalry was used much like standard
armor in Vietnam. It was in the air that cavalry played such a unique
role. The 1st Cavalry Division, endowed with the great mobility and
flexible response offered by its organic aircraft, was the first orga-
nization to combine light infantry and artillery howitzer forces with
vertical assault, aerial firepower, and air reconnaissance capabilities
in combat. Deployed to Vietnam as early as was practical, the divi-
sion quickly demonstrated its skill and determination in finding and
eliminating the enemy through air assault and clearing operations.
Unleashed throughout the country as MACV's premier fighting for-
mation to locate and destroy the elusive NVA/VC, the First Team
insured battlefield domination with a dazzling array of cavalry tech-
niques ranging from sustained pursuit and cavalry raids to screening
and cavalry exploitation.
Unfortunately, the United States Army ultimately failed to grasp
thepermanent bond between fast raiding and other cavalry techniques
with modem airmobile and air assault doctrine. The fusion of the
Vietnam-era 1st Cavalry Division with helicopter mobility and fire-
power forged a powerful war machine, naturally attuned to optimum
performance of military tasks in the rich tradition of American light
cavalry. By allowing the 1st Cavalry Division to be retreaded into a
conventional armored division, the United States Army forsook the
252 STANTON
original foresight of Lieutenant General Gavin, the prophet of air-

mobility.
General Gavin's vision of modem aerial cavalry freed the Army
from the tyranny of terrain and sent Skytroopers over the cloud-banked
rim of Southeast Asia to battle the enemy from the air. His plea still
echoes through the vaults of the Pentagon, the grassy fields of Fort
Benning, the concrete helicopter pads of Fort Rucker, and the over-
grown foxholes of the lush la Drang Valley with a resounding, ''Cav-
alry, and 1 don't mean horses! I mean helicopters and light aircraft
to lift soldiers armed with automatic weapons and hand-carried light
antitank weapons, and also lightweight reconnaissance vehicles,
mounting antitank weapons the equal of or better than the Russian
[tanks]. ... If ever in the history of our armed forces there was a
need for a cavalry arm — airlifted in light planes, helicopters, and as-
sault-type aircraft — this was it!" The legacy of the ist Cavalry Di-
vision remains, and the need still exists.
APPENDIX 1
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

Assigned Units
Command
Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 1st Cavalry Division
Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade
Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 2d Brigade
Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 3d Brigade
Headquarters & Headquarters Company and Band, Support
Command
Headquarters & Headquarters Company, Rear (Provisional)
Infantry
1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry

2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry
5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry
Aviation
Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 11th Aviation Group

227th Aviation Battalion (Assault Helicopter)
228th Aviation Battalion (Assault Support Helicopter)
229th Aviation Battalion (Assault Helicopter)
254 STANTON
11th Aviation Company (General Support)

Air Traffic Control Platoon (Provisional)
Division Artillery
2d Battalion, 19th Artillery (105mni Howitzer)

2d Battalion, 20th Artillery (Aerial Rocket)
1st Battalion, 21st Artillery (105 mm
Howitzer)
1st Battalion, 30th Artillery (155mm Howitzer)'
1st Battalion, 77th Artillery (105mm Howitzer)
Battery E, 82d Artillery (Aviation)
Division Reconnaissance
1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry (Aerial Reconnaissance)

Company /Platoon (Provisional)
11th Pathfinder
Company E, 52d Infantry (Long Range Patrol)^
Company H, 75th Infantry (Ranger)^
Division Support
1st Forward Service Support Element
2d Forward Service Support Element

3d Forward Service Support Element
8th Engineer Battalion
13th Signal Battalion
15th Medical Battalion
15th Supply & Service Battalion
15th Transportation Battalion (Aircraft Maintenance & Supply)
27th Maintenance Battalion
15th Administrative Company
371st Army Security Agency Company
545th Military Police Company
1. The 1st Battalion, 30th Artillery, was attached to division 1 Jul 66 and
assigned 1 Jun 68-6 Apr 71.
2. Company E of the 52d Infantry was formed as the long-range patrol com-
pany of the division on 20 Dec 67; on 1 Feb 69 it was inactivated and its
assets were used to create Company H, 75th Infantry (Ranger).

Appendix 1 255
1st Personnel Services Battalion (Provisional)^

)"*
An Khe Airfield Command (Provisional
Replacement Training School/FIRST TEAM Academy
(Provisional)^
U.S. Army Special Security Detachment
Attached Units
Armored Cavalry and Infantry

1st Battalion, 50th Infantry (Mechanized) 22 Sep 67-15 Mar 68
1 Armored Cavalry Regiment, elements
1th 12 Apr 69- April 71
25th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) 20 June 66-20 Mar 71
34th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) 21 Nov 66-20 Aug 72
37th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog) 15 Nov 69-7 Mar 71
54th Infantry Detachment (Ground Radar) 27 May 66-17 Jan 68
62d Infantry Platoon (Combat Tracker) 15 Feb 68-15 Aug 72
Aviation
3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry (Air) 26 Oct 70- April 71

Troop F, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry April 71
Air Cavalry Troop, 1 1th Arm Cavalry 24 Feb 71 -Mar 71
17th Aviation Company (Fixed-Wing CV-2) 15 Sep 65-1 Jan 67
53d Aviation Detachment (Provisional) 1 Sep 66-30 Oct 66
273d Aviation Company (Heavy Helicopter) Nov 68-Mar 71

334th Aviation Company (Aerial Weapons) 5 Dec 70-17 Jan 71
on temporary duty as Troop E (Prov), 3d
Sqdn, 17th Cavalry
478th Aviation Company (Heavy Helicopter) Mar 66-28 Feb 69
3. The provisional 1st Personnel Services Battalion was formed by the di-
vision 1 Jul 69, when it became a
on 26 Jan 68 and was disestablished on
company in size.
4. The An Khe Airfield Command was created by internal division re-
sources on 15 Dec 65 and was under division control until Oct 67.
5. The Replacement Training School, later termed the FIRST TEAM Acad-
emy, was a provisional organization formed on 1 Oct 66, lasting until the
division left Vietnam.
256 STANTON
Aircraft Maintenance Transportation Detachments
1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry 98th, 151st, 166th, 545th

2d Battalion, 20th Artillery 80th, 171st, 329th
Battery E, 82d Artillery 564th
11th Aviation Company 150th
227th Aviation Battalion 166th, 390th, 394th, 400th
228th Aviation BaUalion 51st, 165th, 255th
229th Aviation Battalion 391st, 392d, 393d, 571st
3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry 369th, 575th, 576th
273d Aviation Company 652d
478th Aviation Company 382d
Artillery
Btry A, 5th Bn, 2d Artillery (40mm) Jan 69-Mar 71

6th Bn, 14th Artillery (175mm Gun) 29 Oct 65-1 Feb 66
2d Bn, 17th Artillery (105mm Howitzer) 25 Oct 65-1966
3d Bn, 18th Artillery (8-inch Howitzer) 26 Oct 65-1 Oct 66
Btry B, 29th Artillery (Searchlight) 23 Oct 65-6 Oct 66
268th Artillery Detachment (Radar) 14 Apr 69-2 Jan 71
273d Artillery Detachment (Radar) 5 May 69-15 Apr 71
Support
14th Military History Detachment 27 Dec 65-20 Mar 72
26th Chemical Platoon (CBR Center) 16 Oct 65-26 Mar 72
41st Public Information Detachment 21 Mar 67-30 Jun 71
42d Public Information Detachment 21 Mar 67-29 Apr 71
184th Chemical Platoon (Direct Support) 16 Oct 65-1Mar 71
191st Military Intelligence Company 25 Aug 65-29 Mar 71
583d Military Intelligence Detachment 20 Jul 67-16 Feb 70
(Interrogation)
American Red Cross Female Contingent
Air Force Weather Squadron Detachments
5th Weather Squadron, Dets 24 and 31 Dec 66-Mar 71

30th Weather Squadron elements Oct 65-Nov 66
APPENDIX 2.
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile)

Formation*
Division Unit Source
Headquarters & Headquarters Headquarters & Headquarters

Company, 1st Cavalry Divi- Company, 1 1th Air Assault
sion (Airmobile) Division (Test)
HHC, 1st Brigade, 11th Air

HHC, 1st Brigade Assault Division
1st Battalion (Airborne), 8th 1st Battalion (Airborne), 188th

Cavalry Infantry
2d Battalion (Airborne), 8th 1st Battalion (Airborne), 511th
Cavalry Infantry
1st Battalion (Airborne), 12th 1st Battalion (Airborne), 187th
Cavalry Infantry
HHC, 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry

HHC, 2d Brigade Division
1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry

2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry 2d Battalion, 38th Infantry
2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry
* Source: Hq 1 1th AAD AJVGT Ltr dtd 30 Jun 65, Subj: Reorganization
of Units, w/lncl 1, and USARPAC GO 325, dtd 22 Nov 65
(inactivation and activation of aviation units).
258 STANTON
HHC, 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry

HHC, 3d Brigade Division
1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry

2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry
5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry** 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry**
HHB, nth Air Assault Divi-

HHB, Division Artillery sion Artillery
2d Battalion, 19th Artillery 6th Battalion, 81st Artillery

(105mm) (105mm)
2d Battalion, 20th Artillery (Aer 3d Battalion, 377th Artillery
Rocket) (Aer Rocket)
1st Battalion, 21st Artillery 5th Battalion, 38th Artillery
(105mm) (105mm)
1st Battalion, 77th Artillery 1st Battalion, 15th Artillery
(105mm) (105mm)
HHC & Band, Support Com- HHC & Band, 11th Air As-
mand sault Division Spt Cmd
8th Engineer Battalion 127th Engineer Battalion
13th Signal Battalion 511th Signal Battalion
15th Medical Battalion 11th Medical Battalion
15th Supply & Service Battalion 408th Supply & Service Battalion
15th Transportation Battalion 61 1th Aircraft Maintenance &
Supply Battalion
27th Maintenance Battalion 711th Maintenance Battalion
15th Administrative Company 11th Administrative Company
15th Supply & Service Battalion 165th Aerial Equipment Support
Aerial Equipment Support Detachment
Company (Airborne)
** 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry, was activated 1 April 1966 at Fort Carson,
Colorado, and joined the 1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam. Source of
unit derived from Army Times, dtd 25 May 1966, "Carson Greets Air-
mobile Unit."
Appendix 2 259
545th Military Police Company 11th Military Police Company

191st Military Intelligence De- 11th Millitary Intelligence De-
tachment tachment
371st Army Security Agency Company C, 313th Army Secu-
Company rity Agency Battalion
HHC, nth Aviation Group HHC, nth Aviation Group

(Airmobile) (Test)
HHC, 227th Aviation Battalion HHC, 227th Aviation Battalion

Company A, 227th Aviation Company A, 227th Aviation
Battalion Battalion
Company B, 227th Aviation Aviation Company, 6th Special
Battalion Forces Group
Company C, 227th Aviation Aviation Company, 7th Special
Battalion Forces Group
Company D, 227th Aviation 110th Aviation Company (Aerial
Battalion Weapons)
Company A, 228th Aviation 132d Aviation Company (As-
Battalion sault Support Hel)
Company B, 228th Aviation 133d Aviation Company (As-
Company C, 228th Aviation 202d Aviation Company (As-
Company A, 229th Aviation Company A, 4th Aviation Bat-
Battalion talion
Company B, 229th Aviation Company A, 5th Aviation Bat-
Battalion talion
Company C, 229th Aviation 194th Aviation Company (As-
Battalion sault Helicopter)
Company D, 229th Aviation 131st Aviation Company (Aerial
Battalion Weapons)
1 1th Aviation Company 11th Aviation Company (Gen-
eral Support)
1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry 3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry
SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
The research for this book was primarily based on division documents
prepared during the Vietnam conflict, especially the quarterly operational
reports, as command histories issued on an annual
supplemented by higher
basis. The combat after action reports issued at the con-
internal division
clusion of most operations were very useful, as were the wartime division
magazine issues of the The First Team. Annual historical summaries of the
U.S. Continental Army Command and the reports of various Army testing
boards provided much information on the stateside service of both the 1 1th
Air Assault and 1st Cavalry Divisions before and after Vietnam service. One
important postwar source was the senior officer oral history program con-
ducted by the Oral History Branch, U.S. Army History Institute, Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania. The author also interviewed key participants with
the 1st Cavalry Division during the Vietnam era, and made extensive uti-
lization of the materials assembled for his earlier Vietnam Order of Battle
project.
The following is a listing of the more readily available resources, al-
though many reports and articles not listed below are cited for reader con-
venience in text footnotes.
The Air Cavalry Division, Vietnam: 1st Cavalry Division, 1969.

1st Cavahy Division, Quarterly Command Report, dtd 1 Dec 65, OACSFOR-
OT-RD650110.
1st Cavahy Division, Quarterly Command Report, dtd 10 Jan 66, OACSFOR-
OT-RD 650109.
1st Cavalry Division, Operational Report, dtd 5 May 66, OACSFOR-OT-
RD 6601 19.
1st Cavalry Division, Operational Report, dtd 15 Aug 66, OACSFOR-OT-
RD 660292.
1st Cavalry Division, Operational Report, dtd 22 Nov 66, OACSFOR-OT-
RD 660505.
1st Cavalry Division, Operational Report, dtd 15 Feb 67, OACSFOR-OT-
RD 670226.
RD 670473.
RD 670798.
RD 674236.
1st Cavalry Division, Operational Report, dtd 17 Mar 68, OACSFOR-OT-
RD 681288.
Sources and Bibliography 261
1st Cavalry Division, Operational Report, dtd 13 Jun 68, OACSFOR-OT-

RD 682337.
RD 683305.
1st Cavalry Division, Operational Report, dtd 6 Dec 68, OACSFOR-OT-
UT 684268.
UT 691 115.
1st Cavalry Division, Operational Report, dtd 15 Apr 69, OACSFOR-OT-
UT 692094.
UT 693030.
UT 694007.
UT 701072.
UT 702040.
UT 703016.
UT 704030.
1st Cavalry Division, Keystone Robin Charlie Redeployment Report, dtd 15
Apr 71, OACSFOR-OT-UT 71X006.
3d Brigade (Separate), Operational Report, dtd 13 Nov 71.
3d Brigade (Separate), Operational Report, dtd 1 May 72.
3d Brigade (Separate), Operational Report, dtd 20 Jun 72.
14th Military History Detachment, The First Team in Cambodia, dtd 15 Feb
71.
14th Military History Detachment, The Construction of a Fire Base in the
1st Cavalry Division, dtd 10 Oct 69.
14th Military History Detachment, Bunker Busting: Attack on Fortified Areas,
dtd 18 Jan 71.
Albright, John, John A. Cash, and Allan W. Sandsrum, Seven Fireflghts in
Vietnam, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.
Bergerson, Frederic A., The Army Gets an Air Force, Baltimore and Lon-
don: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980.
Brennan, Matthew, Brennan's War, Novato, Califomia: Presidio Press, 1985.
Coleman, J. D., Memories of the First Team in Vietnam, 1st Cavalry Di-
vision Information Office: Vietnam, 1969.
Enthovan, Alain C. and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough: Shaping
the Defense Program, 1961-1969, New York: Harper & Row, 1961.
262 STANTON
Fehrenbach, T. R., This Kind of War, New York: Macmillan Company,

1963.
Gavin, Maj. Gen. James M., "Cavalry and I Don't Mean Horses!", Armor,
Volume LXIII, No. 3.
Hymoff, Edward, The First Air Cavalry Division: Vietnam, New York: M.
W. Ladd Publishing Co., 1966.
Kinnard, Douglas, The War Managers, University of New England Press,
1977.
Marshall, S.L.A., Battles in the Monsoon, New York: Morrow, 1967.
, Bird: The Christmastide Battle, New York: Cowles Book Co., 1968.
1968.
Mason, Robert, Chickenhawk, New York: Viking Press, 1978.
Ney, Virgil, Evolution of the US. Army Division, 1939-1968, CORG
Memorandum M-365, Fort Belvoir, Virginia: U.S. Army Combat Devel-
opments Command, 1969.
Palmer, Gen. Bruce, Jr., The 25 -year War: America's Military Role In Viet-
nam, University Press of Kentucky, 1984.
Palmer, Brig. Gen. Dave R., Summons of the Trumpet, Novato, California:
Presidio Press, 1978.
Sharp, Adm. U.S.G. and Gen. W. C. Westmoreland, Report on the War
in Vietnam (as ofSOJun 68), Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1968.
Stanton, Shelby L., The Rise and Fall of an American Army, Novato, Cal-
ifornia: Presidio Press, 1985.
Summers, Col. Harry G., Vietnam War Almanac, New York: Facts on File
Publications, 1985.
Tolson, Lt. Gen. John J., Vietnam Studies: Airmobility, 1961-1971, Wash-
ington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973.
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, A History of Army 86, Vol-
umes I and II, Fort Monroe, Virginia: TRADOC Historical Monograph Se-
ries.
U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, The Origins, Deliberations,

and Recommendations of the U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1969.
Westmoreland, Gen. William C.,A Soldier Reports, New York: Doubleday
& Company, 1976.
INDEX
A Loui, 145, 147, 148 Engr, 28; 215th Spt, 241; 226th Avn,
A Shau Valley, 133, 141, 143-151 28, 30, 31; 227th Avn, 28, 30, 31,
Abrams, Gen. Creighton W., 35, 111, 201 , 236, 249; 228th Avn, 28, 30, 139,
112, 135, 153, 154, 215 201; 229th Avn, 30, 32, 201, 236, 241,
Ackerson, Lt. Col. Frederic, 61, 62-64, 244; 230th Avn, 249; 315th Spt, 249;
75 51 1th Signal, 28; 71 1th Maint, 28
Air Force, 11, 13, 16, 23, 25, 27, 29, Bear Cat, 156
32, 40, 60, 63, 65, 66, 71, 72, 75, Beatty, Col. George S. Jr., 17, 28
78, 82, 94, 96, 99, 101, 102, 1 12, 136, Beauchamp, Sfc. Charles H., 175
138, 144, 147, 155, 156, 159, 160, Berenzweig, Col. Marvin J., 83, 84
168, 170, 173, 176, 181, 183, 201, Bien Hoa, 158, 160, 165, 185, 241, 243
219, 223 Bing Di, 78
Allison, Sfc. John, 160-162, 164 Binh Dinh Province, 69, 70, 78, 83, 89,
An Khe, 40-42, 45, 71, 76, 112 91, 92, 97, 100, 102, 105, 110-113
An Lao Valley, 72, 73, 83, 89, 97, 100, Blanchard, Brig. Gen. George S., 99
106 Bluhm, Capt. Raymond K. Jr., 100-102
An Loc, 244 Bong Son, 46, 70, 71, 76, 78, 92, 97-
An Quang, 93, 94, 96 99, 102, 105, 112, 125, 202
Angel's Wing, 158, 160, 164, 165 Boye, Brig. Gen. Frederic W. Jr., 17
Armor Regiments, 13th Arm, 249; 81st Boyt, Capt. Edward A., 59, 61
Arm, 249 Brady, Lt. Col. Morris J., 79
Artillery Regiments, 6th Arty, 249; 15th Brigades, Air Cav Cbt (ACCB), 18, 20,
Arty, 30; 16th Arty, 88; 19th Arty, 47, 22, 236-239, 246-250; 1st Avn, 235-
88, 155, 168, 203, 249; 20th Arty, 79, 238; 3d (Sep), 241-244; 9th Air Cav,
120, 203, 237, 249; 21st Arty, 62, 203, 237, 238; 10th Air Transport, 4, 33;
241; 26th Arty, 241; 30th Arty, 139, 199th Inf, 165, 185, 186, 188, 236
168, 174, 203, 248; 32d Arty, 174, Bristol, Col. Delbert L., 28
176; 38th Arty, 30; 42d Arty, 28, 30; Brockmyer, Maj. James J., 14
77th Arty, 121, 166, 174, 203, 224, Brooks, Capt. Arnold H., 232
241, 249; 79th Arty, 241, 244; 81st Broughton, Lt. Col. Levin B., 80
Arty, 28, 30; 82d Arty, 203; 377th Brown, Col. Thomas W., 55, 59, 61,
Arty, 30, 33 63, 64
Bu Dop, 182, 183, 244
Ba To, 100 Buchanan, Lt. Col. Earl, 32
Baer, Col. Robert J., 156, 164, 166 Bunker, Ellsworth, 91
Battalions, 1st Pers Svc, 210; 8th Engr, Burton, Brig. Gen. Jonathan R., 97, 241,
61, 62, 76, 99, 104, 135, 146, 147, 242
193, 204, 218, 249; 1 1th Med, 28; 13th
Signal, 146, 186, 193, 205, 249; 15th CaLu, 135, 136
Med, 189, 208, 249; 15th S & S, 207, Cam Ranh Bay, 40, 42, 191
249; 15th S & T, 249; 15th Trans, 207, Cambodian invasion, 177-194
208, 249; 27th Maint, 207, 249; 127th Camp Evans, 113, 114, 119, 120, 127,
264 INDEX
129, 145-147, 153, 156 Cu Nghi, 71, 72

Camp Radcliff, 45, 100 Cushman, Col. John H., 113, 127
Campbell, Col. Hubert S., 113, 119, 120, Cushman, Lt. Gen. Robert E. (USMC).
122, 124, 125, 129, 136, 145-147 135
Capshaw, Capt. Bill, 166
Casey, Maj. Gen. George W., 87, 97, DaNang, 111-113, 135, 156
98, 180, 183, 189, 191, 194, 235 Dai Dong, 102
Cavalry Regiments, 1st Cav, 249; 4th Daniel, Col. Charles D., 84, 87
Cav, 77; 5th Cav, 59, 61-63, 74, 75, Dau Tieng, 165, 238
80,94,97, 118, 141, 144, 180, 182, Davis, Lt. Col. Addison, 155
192, 197, 240, 241 , 244, 249; 7th Cav, Davis, Brig. Gen. Oscar E., 135
55-64,67,70,71,78, 122, 124-128, Davison, Capt. Michael S. Jr., 127
138, 140, 145-147, 155, 156,
141, Davison, Lt. Gen. Michael S., 177
160-161, 163, 173, 174, 180, 183- Decker, Gen. George H., 17
185, 192, 197, 241, 248, 249; 8th Cav, DePuy, Maj. Gen. William, 40
9, 38, 53, 54, 79, 90, 100, 103-105, Detachments, 14th MH, 196; 26th Chem,
147, 148, 155, 156, 168-170, 173- 210; 41st PI, 210; 42d PI, 210; 583d
176, 192, 197, 241, 249; 9th Cav, 51- Ml, 210
55, 64, 78, 83-85, 87, 93, 94, 96, Deveny, Lt. Al, 56
101, 102, 136, 138, 142, 144, 166, Diduryk, Capt. Myron, 59, 61, 74
181, 182, 191, 193, 200, 204, 228, Diller, Lt. Col. Richard W., 136, 144
231, 232, 236-238, 241, 244, 249; Divisions, 1st Arm Div, 12, 246; 1st Cav
11th Arm Cav, 166, 174, 180, 182, Div, formation, 6, conversions, 22, 29,
186, 188, 204, 238; 12th Cav, 52, 72, 152, 246-250; 1st Inf, 32, 154, 156,
80, 85, 87, 88, 105, 116, 118, 120, 165, 215; 2d Ann Div, 17; 2d Inf Div,
121, 125-128, 140, 156, 182, 192, 24, 28, 30, 34, 36; 4th Inf Div, 69,
197, 214, 223, 241, 249; 17th Cav, 199; 9th Inf Div, 167, 188; 11th Air
28, 31, 237 Ash Div, 4, 22, 25-30, 32-34, 35,
Cay Giep Mms, 76, 96, 98 39, 43, 167, 178, 213, 247; 25th Inf.
Chu Pong Mm, 50, 51, 55, 57, 61, 66, Div, 89, 96, 97, 100, 154, 187, 188;
67, 83 82d Abn Div, 9, 10, 19, 35, 77; 101st
Combat Developments Command (CDC), Abn Div, 10, 22, 25, 35, 36, 1 13, 129,
17, 33, 36, 246, 247, 248 152, 167, 243, 250, 251
Companies, 1st Avn, 18; 1 1th Avn, 201 Dorcy, Mrs. Ben, 213, 214
202; 11th Pathfinder, 202; 15th Ad- Dubia, Lt. Col. Christian, 103, 105, 147
min, 193, 208, 249; 15th Fin, 249; Due Pho, 98-100
170th Avn, 249; 191st Ml, 199, 210,
241; 273d Avn, 202; 334th Avn, 237; Edmonds, Lt. Col. Maurice O., 183, 185
362d Avn, 241 408th S & S, 28; 478th
; Edwards, Capt. Robert H., 57, 60
Avn, 202; 501st Eng, 241; 525th Sig- Eggers, Lt. Col. George D., 87
nal, 241; 545th MP, 92, 106, 193, 206, Esh, Lt. Stephen, 139, 140
249; 7292d Aer Cbt Recon, 12 Exercise AIR ASSAULT I & II, 28, 32-
Conrad, Lt. Col. Michael J., 174, 176 34
Continental Army Command (CON-
ARC), 13, 14, 16, 31, 38, 77, 247 Fesmire, Capt. John, 71
CuChi, 113 Fire Support Base (FSB) Bill, 218;
Index 265
Brown, 183; Buttons, 240; David, 186; la Drang Valley, 45, 46, 50, 52, 54, 55,
Dot, 159; Grant, 165, 166, 170; II- 64-66, 69, 76, 83, 240, 252
lingworth, 174-177; Jamie, 170; Jay, Infantry Regiments, 12th Inf, 183, 185,
174, 176, 177; Myron, 185; Neal, 184, 186; 23d Inf, 30; 38th Inf, 30; 47th
185; Phyllis, 170 Inf, 180; 50th (Mech), 93, 103, 204;
Fishhook Area, 156, 158, 164, 170, 177, 52d (LRP), 146, 199, 225; 75th
178, 180, 244 (Ranger), 191, 193, 199, 233, 237,
Fitzsimmons, Capt., 160-162 241, 242; 187th (Abn), 28, 30; 188th
Forsythe, Maj. Gen. George I., 152-155, (Abn), 30; 501st Inf, 125; 502d Inf,
214 1 18; 51 1th (Abn), 30, see also World

French, Lt. Col. Daniel W., 116, 118 War II
Ingram, Lt. Col., 72

Irby, Brig. Gen. Richard L., 152, 155
Garry Owen Task Force, 241
Gavin, Maj. Gen. James M., 9-1 1, 64,
Johnson, Gen. Harold K., 29, 33, 36
252
Johnson, Lyndon B., 38, 72, 91, 134
GiaLe, 111, 113
Gibney, Lt. Col. John V., 147
Kampe, Lt. Col. Raymond, 67, 71, 72
Gillem, Capt. Richard D., 202
Kann, Brig. Gen. Clifton F. von, 14
Gonzales, SSG George, 58
Karhohs, Col. Fred E., 93, 94, 99, 100
Gorvad, Lt. Col. Peter L., 165, 166
Kennedy, Sgt. George, 225
Groups, 6th Avn, 19; 6th Cav, 7; 11th
Kennedy, John F., 24
Avn, 25, 28, 62, 147, 156, 193, 195,
KheSanh, 111, 120, 129, 131, 133-136,
200; 12th Avn, 238; 17th Cav (Prov),
138-142, 145, 149, 150
18
Kim Son Valley, 73-75, 79, 83, 84, 86,
87, 97
Hamlet, Brig. Gen. James F., 243 Kingston, Col. Joseph P., 165
Hanna, Lt. Col. Robert, 174 Kingston, Col. Robert C, 180
Hardesty, Lt. Col. George D. Jr., 160, Kinnard, Lt. Gen. Harry W. O., 4, 24-
161, 164 37, 39, 41, 50, 61, 66, 69, 73, 76,
Helvey,Capt. Robert L., 120, 121, 124, 77, 90, 246
125 Kit Carson Scouts (KCS), 199
Hennessey, Col. John T., 28, 80, 203 Knowles, Brig. Gen. Richard T., 27
Henry, Lt. Col. Frank L., 155, 156 Kon Truck, 76
Herrick, Lt. Henry, 56 Korean Capital Div, 83, 97
Herren, Capt. John D., 56 Korean War, 3, 4, 7-9, 1, 1 12, 58, 66,
Hoa Hoi, 84-86 77, 183, 211, 212, 221
Horton, Lt. Col. George C, 147 Krupa, Lt. Frederick, 126
Hotchkiss, Sp4 Michael, 101
Howze Board, 17-23, 25, 33, 77, 235, Landing Zone (LZ) Albany, 62-66, 71;
236, 239, 246, 250 Betty, 1 13, 1 16; Billy, 155; Bird, 87-
Howze, Gen. Hamilton H., 3, 12, 15- 89; Carolyn, 168, 169; Gates, 138;
21, 23 Columbus, 59, 62-64; El Paso, 112,
Hue, 112, 113, 119-123, 126-131, 134, 113; Eleanor, 161; English, 92, 112;
135, 145, 151, 155, 158 Falcon, 55; Hereford, 79, 80; Home-
Hyle, Col. Archie K., 83-85 coming, 47; Horse, 80; Goodman, 146;
266 INDEX
Jack, 129; Jane, 129; Joe, 155; Ma- 144, 153, 155, 167, 177, 197, 199,
con, 59; Mike, 138; Pat, 100-102; 211, 212, 215, 216, 233, 238, 251
Pedro, 129; Pepper, 146; Pony, 87; Moore, Col. Harold G., 55-61, 67, 70-
Stallion, 147; Stud, 135, 136, 138- 74, 78, 79
140;Thor, 140; Tiger, 145, 146; Vicki, Morton, Col. Karl R., 160, 165, 167
145, 146; Victor, 59, 61; Wharton,
139-141; Wing, 54; X-Ray, 55-62, Nadal, Capt. Ramon A., 56, 57, 67
65-67 Navajo Warhorse Area, 158, 164, 166
Laos, 14, 20, 21, 39 Navy, 94, 107, 112, 158, 159
Larsen, Lt. Gen. Stanley R., 102 Nevins, Lt. Col. R. H. Jr., 94
Leary, Lt. Col. Arthur J., 141 Nixon, Richard M., 177, 181
LeFebvre, Capt. Louis R., 57, 58 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 1st Div,
Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman L., 13 160, 165, 167; 2d Div, 113, 121; 3d
Lemon, Sp4 Peter C, 175 Div, 83, 100; 7th Div, 160, 165-167,
Loc Ninh, 244 178, 182; 325C Div, 120; 18th Regt,
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 91 70, 74, 84, 86, 87, 89, 96, 98; 22d
Long An, 233 Regt, 70, 72, 75, 88, 89, 97, 105; 32d
Long Binh, 154, 160, 207, 229, 241, 243 Regt, 55; 33d Regt, 50, 54, 56, 66,
Long Thanh, 158 244; 66th Regt, 53, 56, 62; 95th Regt,
Lownds, Col. David E. (USMC), 135 159, 166, 168; 101 Regt, 166; 812th
Lynch, Col. William R., 30, 64, 72, 73, Regt, 115, 116, 118
75, 76 Norton, Maj. Gen. John, 14, 16, 17, 31,
Lynn, Lt. Col. Otis C, 80 77, 78, 80, 82-84, 91, 92, 96, 98,
197, 206, 212
MASSTER Project, 247-250
MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 8 Oberg, Sp4 Michael, 124, 125
Mami, Lt. Walter J. Jr., 57, 58 Ochs, Col. William V. Jr., 173
Malley, Lt. Col. Robert 76 J., Oden, Maj. Gen. Delk M., 16, 17
Marines, 3, 12, 19,35,98,99, 111, 113, Olentine, Lt. Col. Charles G., 99
119, 128, 129, 131, 133-136, 138, Oliver, Lt. Col. James P., 92
140-142, 144 Operation ATLAS WEDGE, 166; CO-
Mayer, Capt. Frederick, 85 MANCHE FALLS, 151, 156; CRAZY
McDade, Lt. Col. Robert A., 59, 61- HORSE, 70, 79, 82, 83; DAVY
64, 70, 71 CROCKETT, 70, 78; DELAWARE,
McDonough, Col. Joseph C, 94, 96, 143, 148; GREEN HOUSE, 50; IR-
125, 129, 138 VING, 70, 84, 86; JEB STUART, 111,
McGraw, Lt. Col. John P. Jr., 156 113, 129, 130, 140, 142, 151; JIM
Mcllwain, Lt. Col. George W., 85 BOWIE, 70, 76, 77; KEYSTONE
McNamara, Robert S., 14, 15, 17, 21- PHEASANT, 244; KEYSTONE
25, 35, 36, 43 ROBIN CHARLIE, 239, 244; LAM
Meszar, Brig. Gen., 180 SON, 719, 238; LEJEUNE, 98, 99;
Meyers, Lt. Col. Edward C, 74 LIBERTY CANYON, 155, 156, 170;
Michlin, Sp4 Clare, 226, 227 LONG REACH, 50; MASHER/
Military Assistance Command Vietnam WHITE WING, 70-73, 76, 203;
(MACV), 39, 40, 66, 69, 75, 91 , 98- MONTANA RAIDER, 167, 170;
100, 111-113, 119, 131, 134, 135, MONTANA SCOUT, 167, 170;
Index 267
PEGASUS, 131, 135, 138, 141-145, Rogers Board, 13, 14

148-150; PERSHING, 92, 97, 98, Rogers, Lt. Gen. Gordon B., 13
102, 105, 106, 110-113; SILVER Root, Lt. Col. James T., 85
BAYONET, 50, 64; THAYER, 70, Rowny, Brig. Gen. Edward L., 17
83, 84, 86, 89, 204, 206; TOAN Runkle, Lt. Col. Robert L., 118, 141
THANG, 178, 180, 182, 183, 187 Russell, Lt. Michael H., 175
Pascual, Pit Sgt. Florendo S., 53 Saigon, 111, 113, 153, 154, 158-160,
Patton, Lt. Gen. George S. Jr., 7 164-167, 171, 177, 185, 241, 243
Peters, Lt. Gregory J., 176 Savage, Sgt. Clyde E., 56, 61
Phan Thiet, 1 1 Seneff, Lt. Gen. George P., 25, 30-32,
Phifer, Sp4 William, 127 249
Phu Bai, 112, 113, 158 Shakey's Hill, 184
Phuoc Vinh, 156, 158 Shoemaker, Brig. Gen. Robert M., 178,
Piper, Lt. John D., 88 180-182, 185
Platoons, 25th Inf (Scout Dog), 199; 34th Signal Hill, 146
Inf (Scout Dog), 199; 37th Inf (Scout Silver, Lt. Col. Benjamin S., 30
Dog), 199; 62d Inf (Cbt Tracker), 200, Smith, Col. James C, 78, 83, 87, 97
237; 184th Chem, 210 Song Re Valley, 100, 102
Plei Me, 46, 47, 50, 51, 54, 55, 65, 66 Soui Ca Valley, 80, 83, 86, 97
Pleiku, 35, 39, 45, 47, 50, 55, 61, 63, Special Forces, 23, 40, 46, 53, 54, 73,
66, 69, 202 79, 100, 134, 141, 143, 145, 156, 168,
Powell, Brig. Gen. Edwin L., 11, 35 238, 242
Putnam, 232
Lt. Col. Cari C, Stahr, Elvis J. Jr., 14, 15, 18
Putnam, Maj. Gen. George W. Jr., 17, Stannard, Col. John E., 100, 103, 138,
135, 235-239 145, 147
Stansberry, Col. Conrad L., 156, 164
QuanLoi, 155, 158, 160, 181, 185,210 Starry, Col. Donn A., 180
QuangTri, 112-116, 118, 119, 127-131, Stevens, CWO James S. Jr., 206
134, 151, 155, 156 Stockfisch, Dr. Jacob A., 21
Que Son Valley, 111, 113, 121 Stockton, Lt. Col. John B., 31, 51, 52,
Qui Nhon, 39, 40, 42, 112, 204 55
Stockton, Lt. Col. Thomas W., 147
Rankin, Col. Alexander J., 14, 16, 17 Sweet, Lt. Col. Richard S., 120-122,
Rattan, Col. Donald V., 102, 103, 105, 124-128, 140
113, 115, 116, 118, 119, 129
Ray, Lt. Col. William B., 80 Taft, Lt. Bob, 57
Regiments, see Armor, Artillery, Cav- Tam Quan, 98, 102-105
alry, Infantry Tay Ninh, 158, 167, 244
Rich, Lt. Gen. Charles W. G., 27, 33, Taylor, SSgt. James L., 175
34 Taylor, Capt. John, 145
Richardson, Brig. Gen. Walter B., 16 Tayloir, Gen. Maxwell D., 24, 25
Roberts, Maj. Gen. Elvy B., 27, 47, 55, Tefft, SSgt. Stephen, 225-227
74, 167, 168, 170, 173, 177, 180, 194 Thach Long, 87
Robinson, Lt. Col. Roscoe Jr., 138, 140, Than Son, 78
141, 146 Theberge, Pit. Sgt. Frank M., 101
268 INDEX
ThonLaChu, 120, 124-126 Vietnam, Army (ARVN) Airborne Div,

Tolson, Lt. Gen. John J. 98 100,
UI, 12, 173, 174, 180-182, 186, 237; 22d Div,
111-113, 115, 125, 134, 135, 139- 97, 106; 40th Regt, 103; 3d Marine
141, 143, 144, 148, 151, 152 Bn, 165; 36th Rgr Bn, 159
TRICAP Program, 246-250 Vinh Thanh Valley, 79, 80, 82
Trudeau, Lt. Gen. Arthur G., 13 Vung Tau, 243
TuUy, Lt. Col. Robert B., 59, 61 62
Tuy Hoa, 46, 83 Walker, Lt. Gen. Walton H., 7-9, 42
War Zone C, 154, 159, 160, 164-168,
Units, 15th Data Processing, 249; 8305th 170, 173, 174, 178, 237
Aer Cbt Recon, 18 War Zone D, 154, 165-167, 236, 240
U.S. Army SEA Signal Training Facil- Wasiak, Lt. Col. Joseph E., 125-128,
ity, 154 138, 145, 146
U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Require- Westmoreland, Gen. William C, 39, 40,
ments Board, see Howze Board 47, 69, 77, 99, 113, 134, 143, 152,
U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV), 78, 167, 153, 204, 215, 246
229, 236 Wheeler, Gen. Earle K., 24
U.S. STRIKE Command, 32, 33, 43 Williams, Brig. Gen. Robert R., 13, 27
Wood, Lt. Col. Richard W., 168
Vance, Cyrus R., 23 World War II, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 24-26,
Vanderpool, Col. Jay D., 12 66, 77, 98, 153, 167, 211, 212, 221,
Vaught, Lt. Col. James B., 122, 124- 235
128, 138, 145 Wright, Lt. Gen. John M. Jr., 26, 30,
Viet Cong (VC) 5th Div, 160, 165, 167, 33,40,41, 212
178; 9th Div, 160, 164-167; 2d Regt,
70, 79, 80 Xuan Loc, 244
*
f
I
I
.
Air assault in Drang Valley,

the la
coastal campaigns, relief of Khe Sanh . .
wherever they were sent, the 1st Cav

demonstrated beyond doubt they were a
superb fighting machine. The airmobile
concept was a reality proved in action.
The story begins, of course, with the
evolution of aerial cavalry from the days
when cavalry meant horses. The discus-
sion goes through the bureaucratic chan-
nels, withemphasis on the foresight and
enthusiasm of Maj. Gen. Kinnard, and
comes back full circle to the relevance
in the current Army of the airmobile
concept and a consideration of its poten-
tial in possible future conflicts.
ANATOMY OF A DIVISION is a well-
reasoned, fascinating and fast-moving
book; a major doctrinal study of a divi-
sion and its impact on the modem de-
velopment of the Army.
About the Author

Shelby Stanton retired from the Army
as a Captain after being wounded in
action. His wartime service included
assignments with the 82d Airborne Divi-
sion and the Special Forces in Southeast
Asia. He is now a recognized military
historian with VIETNAM ORDER OF
BATTLE; U.S. ARMY ORDER OF BAT-
TLE: WORLD WAR II; THE RISE AND
FALL OF AN AMERICAN ARMY; and
GREEN BERETS AT WAR. Recently,
Shelby Stanton was appointed an Ad-
junct Fellow in Strategic Studies at the
Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Georgetown University. He
lives in Bethesda, MD with his wife and
four children.
Photos from the book.
10869

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sholby 1.

As the 1st Cav goes into action in

The striking potential of helicop-

Transport capability. A major task

tory on short notice — Operation

Clearing operations. Operation

Flexible response. Operation JEB

Tactical response. The fighting at

Published by Presidio Press

All rights reserved.No part of this book may be reproduced or uti-

Printed in the United States of America

To the memory of my father

1. "Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses!" 1

Aerial Cavalry Evolution

Historically, the majority of U.S. cavalry served as dragoons. They

Throughout this volume's treatment of division performance in

erational warfare parameters which determined the airmobile divi-

Cavalry, and I Don't Mean

The 1st Cavalry Division's arrival on the battlefields of Vietnam was

The assault helicopter formations were an integral part of division

ability. When property led and interconnected, these components forged

limitations of marching infantry. Mechanized and armored divisions

fusing its manpower, weapons, and transportation with cavalry doc-

light infantrymen and supporting artillery with an aerial armada of

1. Ney, Evolution of the U.S. Army Division, 1939-1968, CORG

In the American tradition, cavalry had always signified the fast

In the United States, cavalry became a force to be reckoned with

or fighting as dismounted infantry.

Renewed bandit and other illegal activity along the desolate

cavalrymen retrained as foot soldiers. Finally, on 20 July 1945, in the

armored divisions were relied upon to punch through enemy lines,

On 18 July 1950, fifteen years before entering Vietnam, the 1st

committed to the rapidly shrinking Pusan perimeter as Walker's allied

through the jagged Korean mountains. This column was composed of

er's divisions were forced by the lack of adequate long-range cavalry

of Unsan. On 1 November a battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division's

3. T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (New York: Macmillan Company,

General Gavin was a paratrooper, a light infantryman well ac-

signment of parachuting between the German reserves and the allied

uation of the older esteemed Cavalry Journal. Gavin wrote urgently,

Cavalry, and I Don't Mean Horses 1

been considered acceptable. The mobility differential to make this

air vehicles now being developed —assauh transports, light utility

6. Ibid., p. 22. Emphasis cited in the original article.

7. U.S. Army Military History Institute, Senior Officers Debriefing Pro-

institution confined embryonic aviation development to practices

horse cavalryman. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, who became one of the

borne department at Fort Benning, Georgia, and created an airmo-

8. U.S. Army Military History Institute Research Collection, Senior Officer

bility section which included a field experiment helicopter company.'

velop material requirements."'*

9. Lt. Gen. John J. Tolson, Vietnam Studies: Airmobility, 1961-1971

aviation means needed on the battlefield

Defense Secretary McNamara sent two strong directives to Stahr

McNamara ordered the Army to implement airmobility, told

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. STAHR

explored the opportunities offered by aeronautical technology for

aviation requirements should be a bold "^new look" at land war-