United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
3d 616
The District Court granted Land Holdings Ltd.'s motion for summary judgment.
Appellants, Aquamarine Tours, Inc. and Kathy Mullen d/b/a Regency Charter
Services, Inc., raise four issues on appeal. First, they contend that the District
Court of the Virgin Islands did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this
foreclosure action because Land Holdings collusively manufactured diversity,
and that the amount in controversy did not reach the required threshold.
Second, they contend that Land Holdings should have been precluded from
filing this foreclosure action in the Virgin Islands because they had not
complied with the registration requirements of the Virgin Islands' Criminally
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("CICO"), 14 V.I.C. 600 et seq.
Third, they contend that summary judgment was inappropriate because there
were issues of material fact as to whether Land Holdings had ever actually been
assigned the mortgage, and, finally, Appellants claim that Land Holdings was
precluded from foreclosing Aquamarine's lease because they acquired the
Mortgage with actual knowledge of this lease interest. We will affirm.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
2
In 1986, Virgin Island Yacht Harbor, Inc. ("VIYH") borrowed more than
$15,000,000 from the Bank of Nova Scotia, secured by a duly recorded first
priority mortgage on a parcel of real property in St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin
Islands. VIYH defaulted on the note and mortgage, and negotiated a Deed in
Lieu of Foreclosure Agreement with the Bank, pursuant to which VIYH
conveyed the Property to Yacht Haven Holdings ("YHH"), a separate legal
entity created and wholly owned by the Bank. This transfer constituted
complete satisfaction of VIYH's debt to the Bank.
After this transfer, the Bank sold and assigned the Mortgage on the Property to
Land Holdings, Inc. for more than $3 million. This transfer was recorded. At
the same time, YHH quitclaimed its fee ownership of the Property to Mega
Holdings, Inc. for the price of $1. The result of these, and other, complicated
transactions was that the Bank completely divested itself of all interests
resulting from its dealings with VIYH, and Mega Holdings became the fee
owner of the Property, which was encumbered by a valid first priority lien held
by Land Holdings.
4
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Diversity Jurisdiction
5
Appellants contend that the assignment of the Mortgage from the Bank of Nova
Scotia to Land Holdings was illegitimate or a sham, designed to collusively
manufacture diversity jurisdiction in violation of federal law. We disagree.
When evaluating the legitimacy of the assignment of a mortgage as it relates to
diversity jurisdiction, courts must consider: the amount of interest the assignor
(the Bank) retains in the foreclosure action; what legitimate business purpose
motivated the assignment; and the amount of consideration given by the
assignee for the assignment. See Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice
and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d 3639. Looking at these factors, the District
Court concluded that the assignment was legitimate. We agree.
Case law makes clear that the legitimacy of the transfer or assignment of a
mortgage is a far more important factor in determining whether jurisdiction was
collusively manufactured than is the motive of the parties for the assignment.
As we have previously held, "[i]f the transferor retains no interest in the subject
matter and the transfer is unconditional, the transfer is not improper or
collusive even if motivated by a desire to create diversity." Nobel v. Morchesky,
697 F.2d 97, 101 (3d Cir.1982).1 Thus, parties can enter into a transaction to
create diversity, so long as the transaction is legitimate.
Land Holdings was incorporated outside of the Virgin Islands (it is organized
under the laws of the Isle of Man), and all Defendants/Appellants are citizens
of the Virgin Islands. Thus diversity jurisdiction is proper unless the facts show
that either the offshore organization of Land Holdings or the assignment of the
Mortgage to it was a sham.2 Land Holdings was organized offshore for tax
purposes, and this practice of utilizing offshore corporations is part of the
"normal and customary practice" of its principals.
Furthermore, Land Holdings paid more than three million dollars to the Bank
of Nova Scotia for the assignment of the mortgage. It is also a customary
business practice to sell defaulted loans at a discount. Additionally, the Bank
did not retain any continuing interest in the Mortgage or in the foreclosure
proceedings. Finally, and perhaps most important, the Bank itself was a foreign
corporation that could have brought this foreclosure action in federal court
absent the assignment. Considering these facts, the District Court was correct to
find valid diversity among the parties.
10
The CICO Act requires alien corporations to file with the Lieutenant Governor
a sworn report setting forth the name of the corporation, the address of the
corporation, the names and addresses of each officer and director of the
corporation, the name of the registered agent and the address of the registered
agent and registered office of the corporation, and the signatures of the
corporate president and other officers attesting to the accuracy of the above
information. 14 V.I.C. 611(c). Similarly, 13 V.I.C. 401 requires foreign
corporations desiring to do business in the Virgin Islands to file with the
Lieutenant Governor a certified copy of its charter or certificate of
incorporation, a certificate designating the corporation's agent for service of
process, and a sworn statement of the assets, liabilities and capital stock of the
corporation.
12
III.
CONCLUSION
13
In sum, and for the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Land Holdings.
Notes:
Aquamarine relies onKramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823, 89 S.Ct.
1487, 23 L.Ed.2d 9 (1969) for the proposition that an assignment motivated by
a desire to acquire diversity jurisdiction is invalid. However, Aquamarine
ignores that in Kramer, the attorney who accepted the assignment of the claim
paid $1 for it and agreed to pay back to the assignor 95% of any net recovery.
Under these circumstances, the Court concluded that this was in fact no
assignment at all, but rather, Kramer was paid a 5% fee "for the use of his name
and his trouble in collecting." Id. at 827, 89 S.Ct. 1487. As is discussed below,
the assignment at issue in this case bears no resemblance to that in Kramer.
128 U.S.C. 1359 states "a district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil
action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or
collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court."
The main registration requirement that the CICO Act, 14 V.I.C. 611(c),
imposes on foreign corporations that is not required under 13 V.I.C. 401(a), is
that alien corporations must under CICO provide the Lieutenant Governor with
the address of a "registered office." 14 V.I.C. 611(c)(4). Because Land
Holdings provided an address for its business agent in the Virgin Islands, and
there is no suggestion that it attempted to conceal the location from which it
operated in the Virgin Islands, we think that the District Court did not err in
concluding that Land Holdings substantially complied with the CICO Act for
purposes of proceeding with this case
Appellants' raise two other issues on appeal. First they contend that "it [is] a
disputed fact whether the Bank retained the mortgage that it purported to assign
to Land Holdings." They argue that "[i]f [the Bank] transferred the Mortgage to
YHH in 1997, and then assigned that same Mortgage to Land Holdings in 1998,
they [the Bank] assigned nothing to the Plaintiff, and Plaintiff received nothing
by way of the assignment, because an assignee takes only what his assignor
conveys, and nothing more." Following this reasoning, they argue that if the
Mortgage was not assigned to Land Holdings, it has no foreclosure claim to
bring and this action should be dismissed. Next they argue that Land Holdings