You Shouldn't Trust Me: Learning Models Which Conceal Unfairness From Multiple Explanation Methods

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Abstract

Transparency of algorithmic systems has been discussed as a way for end-users and regulators to develop appropriate trust in machine learning models. One popular approach, LIME (Ribeiro, Singh, and Guestrin 2016), even suggests that model explanations can answer the question "Why should I trust you?". Here we show a straightforward method for modifying a pre-trained model to manipulate the output of many popular feature importance explanation methods with little change in accuracy, thus demonstrating the danger of trusting such explanation methods. We show how this explanation attack can mask a model's discriminatory use of a sensitive feature, raising strong concerns about using such explanation methods to check the fairness of a model.

1 INTRODUCTION

The area of transparency, or interpretability, has emerged as a way to aid our understanding of the inner workings of a machine learning model. One motivation is to ensure fairness as part of the 'Fair, Accountable, and Transparent' research agenda (Diakopoulos et al. 2018; Weller 2019). Fairness is a key concern in many application areas including selecting candidates for hire or approving loans in banking. A popular family of approaches for transparency provide feature importance, or saliency, scores for a given input. These scores show how important each feature of the input was to the algorithm's decision *locally* around the input.

Since in practise these local saliency methods are the most popular approaches for evaluating model trustworthiness (Bhatt et al. 2019), it has been common to suggest that such methods can be used to inspect a model for fairness as follows. We observe whether a model's outputs depend significantly on a protected feature such as gender or race, which are termed *sensitive*. If there is high dependence on a sensitive attribute then the model appears to be unfair.

In this paper we show that the apparent importance of a sensitive feature does not reliably reveal anything about fairness of a model. We explain how this can happen and provide an instructive example demonstrating that a model could have arbitrarily high levels of unfairness across a range of popular fairness measures, even while appearing to have zero dependence on the relevant sensitive feature. We introduce a practical approach to modify an existing model in order to downgrade the apparent importance of a sensitive feature according to explanation methods. We empirically demonstrate that downgrading a feature can occur with little change in model accuracy, while model unfairness can still remain high.

Our observations raise serious concerns for organisations or regulators who hope to rely on feature importance interpretability methods to validate the fairness of models. We focus here on deep learning models, but our ideas extend naturally to other model classes.

2 RELATED WORK

There is a rapidly growing literature on *adversarial examples* (Szegedy et al. 2013), which considers how to fool *classification* accuracy by perturbing data points. Once a model has been well trained, it is possible to take a correctly classified data point and change it by just a tiny amount such that the pretrained model now misclassifies the point with high confidence.

Later it was observed that many *explanation* methods are fragile with respect to small changes in a data point, even if the classification is unaffected (Adebayo et al. 2018; Kindermans et al. 2019; Alvarez-Melis and Jaakkola 2018). It was shown that tiny adversarial perturbations to data inputs can be generated so that the classification remains unchanged, but the explanation returned is very different (Ghorbani, Abid, and Zou 2019). This was analysed in terms of the geometry of the learned function (Dombrowski et al. 2019).

In this work we do not perturb the data. Instead, we modify the *model* in order to manipulate the explanations of common saliency methods. In particular, our aim is to modify the model so that for any given data point, multiple explanation methods will not show the sensitive feature as important - even if in fact it is. Very recently, some works explored similar ideas. Pruthi et al. (2019) examined how attention-based methods could be fooled. Jain and Wallace (2019) showed that 'attention is not explanation', demonstrating that attention maps could be manipulated after training without altering predictions. Heo, Joo, and Moon (2019) considered modifying vision models so that explanations could

be controlled. Slack et al. (2019) employed a 'scaffolding' construction specifically to fool Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations 'LIME' (Ribeiro, Singh, and Guestrin 2016) and Shapley Values 'SHAP' (Lundberg and Lee 2017) explanation methods.

We believe we are the first to focus on fairness of a model in relation to popular explanation methods. We describe our approach to modifying a model in order to hide unfairness in Section 3. We show in Section 4 how unfairness can be arbitrarily high, despite no dependence on a sensitive feature. In Section 5 we show empirically that our approach has little impact on a model's accuracy while being able to fool simultaneously many popular approaches to explanation: 1. Gradients (Simonyan, Vedaldi, and Zisserman 2013), 2. Gradients $\times$ input (Shrikumar et al. 2016), 3. Integrated Gradients (Sundararajan, Taly, and Yan 2017), 4. SHAP (Lundberg and Lee 2017), 5. LIME (Ribeiro, Singh, and Guestrin 2016), and 6. Guided-backpropagation (Springenberg et al. 2014).

Our approach introduces an explanation loss term during training. This is similar to (Kiritoshi, Tanno, and Izumitani 2019), who propose a loss function which enforces an L^1 penalty on the learned function gradient to reduce the noise of explanations. In contrast, we penalise the gradient with respect to specified target feature to reduce its importance score.

3 METHOD

Our approach fine-tunes an existing model with a modified loss objective function: to the original loss we add an 'explanation loss' term, which is the gradient of the original loss with respect to a chosen target feature. Our attack method achieves three objectives: 1. We obtain a model with low local sensitivity to the chosen feature, yet with little loss in accuracy; 2. The low sensitivity generalises to unseen test points; and 3. Low feature sensitivity leads to low attribution for the target feature across all six feature importance explanation methods that we experimented with.

3.1 Notation

We consider differentiable functions $f : \boldsymbol{X} \mapsto \boldsymbol{Y}$, which map an input matrix in $\boldsymbol{X} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{n\times m}$ with n samples and m features (attributes), to an output matrix in $\boldsymbol{Y} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{n\times d}$, where each row is a 1-hot vector of softmax probabilities over d output classes. While our approach applies to arbitrary d, in this paper, we focus on $d = 2$ corresponding to 'good' and 'bad' output classes (e.g., receive a loan or not). We write $\boldsymbol{x}^{(i)}$ for the input vector row i with m feature columns, and $\boldsymbol{X}_{:,j}$ for an entire feature j column vector. Aiming for readability, we allow for various number of points n to be processed, and may write $f(\boldsymbol{x})$ for the function evaluated on one input point $\boldsymbol{x}$. We write g for a local feature explanation function which take as input a model f and an input point of interest $\boldsymbol{x}$, and returns feature importance scores $g(f, \boldsymbol{x}) \in \mathbb{R}^m$, where $g(f, \boldsymbol{x})_j$ is the importance of (or attribution for) feature x_j for the model's prediction $f(\boldsymbol{x})$. We consider neural network functions f_θ parameterised by $\boldsymbol{\theta}$. Although some input features are categorical (e.g. male or female), as is standard, here we encode as numeric values and treat the variables as continuous.

3.2 Formulation

Suppose we have trained a model f_θ with acceptable performance but with undesirably high target feature explanations. We would like to find a **modified classifier** $f_{\theta+\delta}$, with the following properties:

1. *Model similarity:* the new model has similar performance
$$\forall i, \quad f_{\theta+\delta}(\boldsymbol{x}^{(i)}) \approx f_\theta(\boldsymbol{x}^{(i)}).$$
2. *Low target feature attribution:* the importance of the target feature j (e.g., gender or race), as given by a chosen explanation method g, decreases significantly
$$\forall i, \quad |g(f_{\theta+\delta}, \boldsymbol{x}^{(i)})_j| \ll |g(f_\theta, \boldsymbol{x}^{(i)})_j|.$$

3.3 Adversarial Model Explanation Attack

To manipulate the feature importance explanations, we initialise with a pre-trained model and then modify it by optimising with an extra penalty term, *explanation loss*, weighted by a hyperparameter α, which is normalised over all n training points (full batch):

$$\mathcal{L}' = \mathcal{L} + \frac{\alpha}{n} \left|\left| \nabla_{\boldsymbol{X}_{:,j}} \mathcal{L} \right|\right|_p , \tag{1}$$

where j is the index of the target feature that we want the model to appear to avoid using, and $\nabla_{\boldsymbol{X}_{:,j}} \mathcal{L}$ is the gradient vector of the original cross-entropy loss with respect to the entire feature column vector $\boldsymbol{X}_{:,j}$. We apply the L^p norm.[1] We define a new objective that regularises for low derivative with respect to the target feature across the training points, and results in the modified classifier, $f_{\theta+\delta}$. We outline the procedure in Algorithm 1, where we used $\tau = 100$ consistently since this was sufficient for convergence across runs. In all experiments we use $\alpha = 3$. We discuss varying α in Section 5.4.

We clarify a difference between our approach for explanation loss and the recent method of (Heo, Joo, and Moon 2019). While their approach takes the gradient of the one correct label element from the logits layer just before the softmax output, we take the gradient of the cross-entropy loss. Taking the gradient of the loss, rather than only the correct label element, contains extra information about the other classes, with the potential to improve generalisation across explanation methods and test points.

3.4 Fairness Metrics

In this paper we emphasise that an explanation method does not reliably reveal much about fairness of a model. A key question is then whether or not in fact the model is fair. We explore this using standard definitions from the literature (Hardt, Price, and Srebro 2016; Beutel et al. 2017), evaluating the three fairness metrics below before and after learning the modified model. We consider model predictions

[1] We use $p = 1$ since it led to rapid convergence and good results.

Algorithm 1 Learning a Modified Model with Concealed Unfairness

Input: Original classifier f_θ, target feature's index i, input matrix $\boldsymbol{X} \in R^{n \times m}$ with corresponding targets $\boldsymbol{y} \in \mathbb{R}^d$, and number of iterations τ.

Initialise $\boldsymbol{\delta} = \mathbf{0}$
for $t \in [0, \tau]$ iterations **do**
  Calculate the cross entropy loss $\mathcal{L}$ with respect to $f_{\theta+\delta}$
  Calculate the explanation loss

$$\zeta = \frac{\alpha}{n} \times L^p \left(\left[\left| \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\boldsymbol{X}_{1,i}} \right|, \left| \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\boldsymbol{X}_{2,i}} \right|, \ldots, \left| \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\boldsymbol{X}_{n,i}} \right| \right] \right)$$

  Calculate the total loss $\mathcal{L}' = \mathcal{L} + \alpha \times \zeta$ (equation 1)
  Update model parameters with $\nabla_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \mathcal{L}'$ using Adam
end for

Output: Modified classifier $f_{\theta+\delta}$

for two primary sub-groups based on a sensitive feature, designating the sub-groups as privileged or unprivileged following (Bellamy et al. 2018) (e.g., gender males or females).

1. Demographic Parity (DP): the predicted *positive rates* for both groups should be the same.
2. Equal Opportunity (EQ): the *true positive rates (TPR)* for both groups should the same.
3. Equal Accuracy (EA): the classifier accuracy for both groups should be the same.

Note that it is typically not possible to satisfy many fairness notions simultaneously (Kleinberg 2018).

4 HOW EXTREME COULD UNFAIRNESS BE, YET STILL BE HIDDEN?

Here we consider the limits of how unfair a model might be, yet still appear to be fair according to explanation methods. Worryingly, and perhaps surprisingly, we show that in fact a model can be extremely unfair with respect to a feature, yet appear to have no sensitivity at all to the feature.

Consider the situation shown in Figure 1. Each data point has two features: a continuous x_1 and a binary x_2. Let x_2 be a sensitive feature, such as gender, given by the shape of the point: assume circles are female, and squares are male. The true label y for each point is indicated by its colour: red for good and blue for bad. The black curve indicates the model's softmax predicted label value $\hat{y}$ as a function of the features (x_1, x_2). If above 0.5, then 1 is output, else 0 is output; this is shown by the pale blue/red boundary in background colour. Further, assume the model does not vary in the direction of x_2 (hence in particular has 0 gradient).

Five data points are shown. The model makes only one classification mistake (the blue circle receives $\hat{y} = 0$ yet has $y = 1$). However, this model is highly unfair with respect to the sensitive feature for all three metrics described in Section 3.4. Equal Opportunity is maximally violated: for female circles, $0/1 = 0\%$ deserving points get the good (blue) outcome; for male squares, $2/2 = 100\%$ deserving points



Figure 1: This example illustrates a function with no dependence on target feature yet extreme unfairness, showing the softmax predicted label $\hat{y}$ versus an input feature x_1, which is not the target feature. Each shape shown is a data point. The colour indicates the true label, i.e., blue means $y = 1$ and red means $y = 0$. The shape shows the value of the target feature: let square be male and circle be female. The black curve shows a function mapping from features to estimated output label $\hat{y}$. Assume the function is constant across gender. The blue circle is in the red zone, whereas it should be in the blue zone (see Section 4). Best viewed in colour.

get the good (blue) outcome. Equal Accuracy is also maximally violated: for female circles, $0/1 = 0\%$ points are accurate (blue circle should be placed in the blue zone); for male squares, $4/4 = 100\%$ points are accurate (correctly, blue squares are in the blue zone, red squares are in the red zone).

Finally, consider demographic parity (DP): for female circles, $0/1 = 0\%$ get the good outcome; for male squares, $2/4 = 50\%$ get the good outcome. Observe that if we keep adding more blue square data points near the ones already shown then the female ratio stays unchanged while the male ratio tends to 1, thus we can obtain any arbitrarily high level of DP unfairness.

Remark. Another way to view our example is that we have a model which by construction ignores the sensitive feature x_2. This is sometimes considered a form of process fairness via unawareness (Chen et al. 2019; Grgić-Hlača et al. 2018). It is known that even if a model cannot access a sensitive feature, it may still be unfair with respect to it – for example, the model might be able to reconstruct the sensitive feature with high accuracy from other features. This may lead one to wonder how our approach differs from simply removing the target feature.

The difference is that our approach attempts to learn a function which has very low derivative with respect to the sensitive feature at training points – hence, we might learn a function which varies significantly between the two possible sensitive feature settings yielding different outputs for male versus female. We explored this by comparing modi-



Figure 2: A comparison of the accuracies of the modified model, a model trained with the target feature x_2 held at constant, and the original model. Observe that across datasets and target features, our method achieves an accuracy comparable to the one of the original model and significantly higher than that of the constant model, demonstrating that the modified model is not merely ignoring the target feature. Results are averaged across 10 initialisations for a model with 5 hidden layers. Best viewed in colour.

fied models learned with our approach against models where the sensitive feature was held constant (we did this, rather than simply remove the feature, in order to maintain model complexity). Accuracy results are shown in Figure 2, illustrating that our method attains higher accuracy (more results are shown in Appendix A). Further, see partial dependence plots in Figure 7.



Figure 3: Effect of $\alpha \in [10^{-5}, 10^{-5}]$ in applying our explanation attack to the adult dataset and gender target feature on the model similarity and low target feature attribution metrics (y-axis): (top) average explanation loss per sample (Expl. loss); (middle) the mean of the sensitive property importance ranking distribution (Mean diff.); and (bottom) the percentage difference between the two models' predictions (Mismatch). Notice that optimal α values lie in the range $[10^{-1}, 10^{1}]$.

5 RESULTS

Here we report and discuss empirical results of applying our adversarial model explanation attack.

5.1 Experimental Set-up

Datasets We conduct experiments on three datasets with sensitive features from the UCI machine learning repository (Dua and Graff 2017) (adult (*Adult*) – gender, race; German credit (*German*) – age, gender; bank market (*Bank*) – age); and the dataset for Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (Larson et al. 2019) (*COMPAS*) – gender, race, age.

Models For each dataset we train 0-5 hidden layer multilayer perceptrons (MLPs) with 100 units in each layer, regularised with a layer-wise L^2-norm penalty weighted by 0.03 for up to 1,000 epochs with early stopping and patience of 100 epochs with 10 random initialisations. We use L^2-norm regularisation because we want to have as many parameters active as possible so that there would be more directions to manipulate. The penalty 0.03 was empirically validated to give the best validation accuracy. We use Tensorflow (Abadi et al. 2016) to conduct the original optimisation with Adam (Tieleman and Hinton 2012), a global learning rate of 0.01 and 0.005 learning rate decay over each update and with full batch gradient descent. We conducted hyperparameter optimisation to determine that optimisation with L^1-norm and $\alpha = 3$ converges slightly faster and to slightly better configurations both in terms of model similarity and low target feature attribution metrics across different settings in comparison to both the L^2 and L^∞ norms.

Feature Attribution Methods We evaluate six popular feature attribution methods: Sensitivity analysis gradients (Simonyan, Vedaldi, and Zisserman 2013) (**Grads**), Gradients $\times$ input (Shrikumar et al. 2016) (**GI**), Integrated Gradients (Sundararajan, Taly, and Yan 2017) (**IG**), an approximation of Shapley values Expected Gradients (Lundberg and Lee 2017) (**SHAP**), Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations (Ribeiro, Singh, and Guestrin 2016) (**LIME**), and Guided-backpropagation (Springenberg et al. 2014) (**GB**). We conceal unfairness using the training data and report evaluations both on the training data, and on a test set that was used neither for training the original model, nor for the modified model.

Fairness For the fairness evaluation, we use the implementation of IBM AIF360 Toolkit (Bellamy et al. 2018) and we binarise each sensitive features in the following fashion: Gender: Male - privileged, Female - unprivileged; Age: 25 $>$ x privileged, 25 $<$ x unprivileged; Race: White - privileged, Non-white - unprivileged; Martial status: Single - privileged, Not single - unprivileged.

5.2 Evaluation Criteria

Attack We consider the concealing procedure successful when both properties from Section 3.2 are well satisfied. We measure **model similarity** between the modified model and the original model through three metrics:

- **Loss diff.**: Difference between the categorical cross entropy losses ($\mathcal{L}$) of both models averaged over all test points.



Figure 4: Importance ranking histograms for gender as the sensitive feature on adult test set of the original (left) and modified (right) models. Each histogram represents the ranking across the test set assigned by the designated feature importance method. A *higher ranking number* (further to the right) indicates *smaller feature importance*. Observe that the modified model has successfully shifted the ranking for all explanation methods.

- **Acc. diff.**: Difference in the accuracy of both models.
- **Mismatch (%)**: Difference in the output of the two models, as measured by the percentage of datapoints, where the predictions of the two models differ.

Measuring the effect of the concealing procedure on feature importance is more complex. We want to avoid the pathological case of the attack shrinking the importance of all features and inducing a random classifier. Therefore, we introduce four metrics for interpretation dissimilarity based on the relative importance ranking of a feature. Figure 4 illustrates the ranking histogram of the relative feature importance, which describes the ranking probability mass distribution of the explanation. We show a case where the initial model had low target feature gradient, demonstrating that even in this case, the attack was successful. An effective attack shifts the distribution from left to right. We use five metrics to measure attack susceptibility through this shift:

- **Top k:** the number of datapoints where the sensitive feature received rank k or above.
- **Mode shift:** the difference between the modes of the distribution (*Avg. #shifts*).
- **Mean shift:** the difference between the means.
- **Highest rank:** the highest rank that the sensitive feature received across all datapoints.
- **Highest ranking datapoints (HRD):** the number of datapoints where the sensitive feature received the highest rank. This is the same as Top k, where $k =$ highest rank.

5.3 Low Target Feature Attribution

Figure 4 illustrates three important points. First, out method significantly decreases the relative importance of the target feature, effectively making it the least important of all features. Second, the attack transfers across six different explanation methods. Third, the attack generalises for unseen, held-out test datapoints.

Transferability Tables 1 and 2 illustrate that the explanation attack transfers across explanation methods.

The attack transfers to other gradient-based explanation methods and significantly decreases the importance for 6 other explanation methods (Gradients * Input, Integrated Gradients, Guided-backpropagation, LIME, SHAP).

Notice in Table 1 that in the case of the Adult dataset and gender target feature for GI, IG, GB and LIME, the explanation attack has moved down the target feature importance out of the Top ranking features for thousands of data points, demonstrating that the attack works even when the target feature has high relative importance.

Generalisation The generalisation of the attack to test points is noteworthy since we might expect that the decision boundary would be perturbed locally around the training points to affect only their explanations, without significant change for test points, especially if far away in feature space. We investigate this hypothesis in Section 5.6.

	Mode (O)	Mode (P)	#) shifts	Mean (O)	Mean (P)	Mean Diff	Highest Rank(O)	Highest Rank(P)	HRD_O (O)	HRD_O (P)	Top-5 (O)	Top-5 (P)	Top-1 (O)	Top-1 (P)
Gradient*Input	3.7	13.0	9.3	4.292	11.504	7.212	0.4	4.2	714.5	1.2	4485.0	3.2	63.2	0.0
Gradients	5.8	13.0	7.2	6.554	12.602	6.048	3.0	7.6	410.4	32.2	1984.7	0.1	0.0	0.0
Guided-Backprop	6.9	13.0	6.1	5.595	12.590	6.995	2.3	7.8	684.0	0.0	2904.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Integrated Gradients	4.1	12.8	8.7	3.903	11.443	7.540	0.4	4.7	690.0	3.6	4510.5	5.3	38.7	0.0
LIME	4.0	12.8	8.8	4.373	10.573	6.200	0.9	2.5	14.3	0.0	4029.1	28.6	1.2	0.0
SHAP	3.7	12.9	9.2	4.499	12.027	7.528	0.4	6.0	111.5	0.1	3821.1	0.1	106.3	0.0

Table 1: Evaluation of model similarity and low target feature attribution after an adversarial explanation attack for six explanation methods on Adult Gender Train ('O' is original model, 'M' is modified model). Notice that the mode and mean ranking of the sensitive feature increases after our attack. For nearly all datapoints, the sensitive feature moves out of the top five most important features. The results are averaged over 10 random initialisation of a 5 hidden-layer model.



Figure 5: Evaluation of the impact our explanation attack has on unfairness (signed unfairness of modified model minus signed unfairness of original). We show three fairness metrics across 4 datasets and their sensitive features, averaged over 6 model complexities (number of hidden layers) and 10 random initialisations. We find no consistent pattern of impact, though Equal Accuracy (EA) appears to vary the least.

Further, Table 2 confirms that the attack generalises across datasets and features since it is capable of shifting the importance ranking distribution considerably for a total of 10 features over 4 datasets. The table indicates that the test values for both the model similarity and low target feature attribution are either similar or lower.

5.4 Hyper-parameter Investigation

Explanation Loss Norm We observe that the L^1-norm converged slightly faster and to slightly better configurations both in terms of model similarity and low target feature attribution metrics across different settings in comparison to both the L^2 and L^∞ norms.

The intuition behind these results comes from the interpretation of the L^p as a regulariser of the explanations. The backpropagated gradient of the L^1-norm is constant regardless of the norm's parameter value; hence, the feature importance explanations of the target feature ($|\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \boldsymbol{X}_{i,j}}|$) with magnitudes both much greater than and closer to 0 are equally penalised, resulting in sparse explanations. On the other hand, the backpropagated gradient of the L^2-norm is linear with the norm's parameter and penalises explanations with large magnitudes, but does not affect as much explanations with relatively small values. This results in smooth, but not necessarily sparse explanations.

The effect on explanations with relatively small values is even more pronounced for the L^∞-norm, where the backpropagated gradient is non-zero only for the the highest explanation value. Hence, training with L^∞ norm resembles a single sample gradient descent and results in significantly slower convergence. Further, we observed that the choice of the explanation loss norm is strongly coupled with the value of the explanation penalty term α. All three norms converge to very similar configurations with the appropriate α. Since the L^2-norm over emphasises extremely high value explanations, it requires a lower α. This is in contrast to L^∞-norm, which reflects the loss of a single example and requires an α of orders of magnitude higher than the L^1-norm.

Explanation Loss Weight α Figure 3 demonstrates that the learning dynamics of the adversarial explanation attack vary with the explanation penalty term α. At one extreme, the penalty term α corresponds to unnoticeable changes in the explanation loss (first sub-figure), while at the other extreme to a catastrophic change that leads to a constant model which ignores all features and drastically changes the model predictions (third sub-figure). Within the optimum range ($\alpha \in [10^{-1}, 10^{1}]$), we can minimise the explanation loss significantly while keeping the model prediction dissimilarity relatively low. We set $\alpha = 3$ for all experiments.

Learning algorithm We tried various parameter learning approaches and observed that the choice of a learning algorithm could make a significant difference. Similarly to regular training, adaptive learning rate algorithms achieve significantly better results. A vanilla-SGD optimisation is

Dataset	Feature	Train ζ (10^{-2})	Test ζ (10^{-2})	Train Acc Δ	Test Acc Δ	Train Mismatch (%)	Test Mismatch (%)
adult	age	9.79±3.61	9.82±3.59	-2.76±1.03	-3.07±1.16	10.88±1.67	10.72±1.66
	gender	11.03±3.36	11.11±3.38	-2.43±0.86	-2.71±0.94	10.37±2.44	10.29±2.49
	race	10.1±2.75	10.18±2.76	-2.47±0.85	-2.78±0.9	10.24±1.31	10.37±1.35
bank	age	12.79±4.12	13.39±4.17	-1.81±0.35	-2.23±0.4	7.35±0.73	7.5±0.75
	marital	12.5±5.26	12.96±5.46	-1.73±0.34	-2.27±0.4	7.25±0.71	7.43±0.7
compas	age	4.0±1.69	4.34±1.82	-2.23±0.66	-3.2±0.91	19.83±1.68	18.96±1.6
	race	3.4±1.9	3.62±1.97	-1.54±0.75	-2.7±0.87	18.85±2.48	18.38±2.82
	sex	3.01±1.53	3.2±1.59	-1.9±0.83	-2.78±0.99	19.46±2.85	18.39±3.02
german	age	1.77±1.34	1.82±1.43	-7.38±6.38	-5.83±6.6	18.59±10.33	17.72±10.25
	gender	2.21±1.31	2.24±1.38	-6.07±3.27	-4.21±4.01	17.14±4.84	15.88±4.87

Table 2: Summary of model similarity and low target feature attribution metrics over four **train** and **test** datasets and six features averaged over 10 different complexities. We find that the explanation loss (ζ) for **both** the train and test sets is low. Also the change in accuracy (Acc Δ) and the percentage of mismatch points (Mismatch (%)) between the original and modified model over the train and test set is similar. These results suggest that our attack is successful in generalising across unseen test points.



Figure 6: Unfairness across 3 metrics for a particular initialisation of a 5 hidden-layer model: Equal Opportunity, Demographic Parity and Equal accuracy. Red line means that the modified model became more unfair, i.e., it (triangle) moved further away from 0. Blue line means that the modified model became less unfair, i.e., it (triangle) moved closer to 0. We find no consistent pattern. To some extent, the unfairness with respect to Equal Opportunity and Demographic Parity is more often higher for the modified model and does not always behave similarly to removing the feature (represented by the cross). Equal accuracy (of subgroups between both models) was least affected by our attack.

much more likely to converge to constant classifiers that predict the label distribution. It also requires bespoke learning rate scheduling routines similar to (Smith 2018), where the learning rate is adopted dynamically based on the explanation loss. In all experiments, we used Adam (Tieleman and Hinton 2012).

5.5 Fairness Evaluation

Figure 6 illustrates one example where our approach can hide a sensitive feature in such a way that the modified model would appear fair using local-sensitivity explanation techniques, yet actually could become more or less unfair according to multiple fairness measures. The low local-sensitivity can result in a decision boundary that varies irrespective of the sensitive feature values, such as the one illustrated in Figure 1. We investigate the effects of the adversarial explanation attack on decision boundary in Section 5.6.

We run further experiments across model complexities and different initialisations. Figure 5 shows that the adversarial explanation attack does not have a consistent impact on the fairness metrics, despite the fact that the apparent importance of the feature is negligible. The attack causes the resulting model to have unpredictable unfairness behaviour, becoming more unfair for some features, less unfair for others, or maintains a relatively similar fairness levels to the original model. The unpredictability of the unfairness argues strongly against relying solely on transparency to verify model fairness.

Nevertheless, in most cases, the fairness metrics are affected similarly in the sense that if one of the models becomes more unfair according to one metric, most of the remaining metrics vary accordingly. One possible explanation for the inconsistent behaviour of the fairness metrics after the attack could the presence of confounding factors. Although the explanatory importance of a feature could be low, the model might have learned to rely on other features, which could be used to infer the target feature (e.g., someone's marital status of a husband or wife can be used to infer their gender). Another possibility is that the adversarial explanation attack results in a model that: a) effectively keeps



Figure 7: Partial dependence plots showing how the predicted output varies according to the sensitive feature. Results shown are for a 5 hidden-layer model. Best viewed in colour.

the same model, but flattens the derivatives to make it locally insensitive to a feature; or b) ignores the feature altogether. We discussed evidence in favour of a) over b) in Section 4. Further, Figure 6 shows that the unfairness of our modified model does not match that of a model which simply ignores the target feature.



Figure 8: Comparison of the decision boundary between the original (left) and modified (right) classifier after an attack on Adult Capital Gains (most important feature) in 2D reduced input space. Red and green backgrounds indicate negative and positive predictions, respectively. Notice the slightly modified boundary in the lower end region with few datapoints. The circles represent the 2D projections of each point in the training and the test set, while their colour indicates the true label.

5.6 Decision Boundary: How much does the model really change?

We investigate the degree to which the modified model has changed in two ways. First, we visualise the decision boundaries in 2D PCA projected space of both the original and the modified models (see Figure 8. Second, we measure the effect of the sensitive feature on different models through a partial dependence plot (Friedman 2001), which plots $f(\boldsymbol{x_i})$ vs $\boldsymbol{x_i}$, where $f(\boldsymbol{x_i})$ is the response to $\boldsymbol{x_i}$ with the other attributes averaged out. Despite the significant changes in explanation, the small number of mismatches shown in Table 2, coupled with the small change to the decision boundary, as illustrated in Figure 8 suggest that overall the model has not changed significantly. However, Figure 7 shows that the model can change significantly with respect to the target attribute.

6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

We demonstrated that many popular explanation methods used in real-world settings are not able to indicate reliably whether or not a model is fair. We provided an intuitive explanation to show how this can happen. We introduced a method to modify an existing model and showed its empirical success in downgrading the feature importance of key sensitive features across six explanation methods and unseen test points across four datasets, while having little effect on model accuracy.

Our work raises concerns for those hoping to rely on such explanation methods to measure or enforce standards of fairness. For example, a trained loan scoring system might be unfair with respect to a sensitive feature such as gender. However, the model's parameters might be modified in such a way that a feature importance explanation could falsely suggest that the output does not depend on this sensitive feature. If transparency methods are to be used, we argue for rigorous tests of robustness to understand and control the extent to which they can be manipulated.

There are many interesting questions to explore in future work. How might the explanation attack be refined (e.g., to explore its performance if extended in the natural way to be used against multiple target variables), and how might it be well defended against? One could further explore how the attack relates to the dataset, to the model class, to the explanation method, and the difference between the model's representational capacity and the dataset's complexity.

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A Appendix

A.1 Fairness

We also compare a wider range of popular fairness metrics used within the IBM AI Fairness 360 Toolkit:

- Equal Odds (EO): the *true positive rates (TPR)* and the *true negative rates (TNR)* for both groups should the same.
- Disparate Impact (DI): the ratio of *positive rate* for the unprivileged group to that of the privileged group - 1.
- Theil Index (TI): between-group unfairness based on generalized entropy indices (Speicher et al. 2018).

Figure 9 demonstrates that the signed unfairness difference between the modified and the original models is inconsistent across datasets and features, but consistent across fairness metrics. On the contrary, Figures 10 and 10 demonstrate that the absolute unfairness difference is highly dependent on the model complexity. That is for models of lower complexities the attack makes the modified model more unfair consistently across datasets, features and fairness metrics. However, for models of higher complexities, the attack leads to a model that is more unfair according to some fairness measure, but less unfair according to others. This is a particularly surprising results, which we will investigate in future work.



Figure 9: Evaluation of the impact our explanation attack has on unfairness (*signed unfairness* of modified model minus *signed unfairness* of original). We show all fairness metrics used by IBM AI Fairness 360 (Bellamy et al. 2018) across 4 datasets and their sensitive features, averaged over 6 model complexities (number of hidden layers) and 10 random initialisations. We find no consistent pattern of impact, though Disparate Impact (DI) appears to vary the most.



Figure 10: Evaluation of the impact our explanation attack has on unfairness (*absolute unfairness* of modified model minus *absolute unfairness* of original). We show three fairness metrics across 4 datasets and their sensitive features, averaged over model complexities **0-5 number of hidden layers** and 10 random initialisations. We find no consistent pattern of impact, though Equal Opportunity (EQ) appears the most variable.



Figure 11: Evaluation of the impact our explanation attack has on unfairness (*absolute unfairness* of modified model minus *absolute unfairness* of original). We show three fairness metrics across 4 datasets and their sensitive features, averaged over model complexities **6-9 number of hidden layers** and 10 random initialisations. We find no consistent pattern of impact, though Equal Opportunity (EQ) appears the most variable.

A.2 Model Comparison



A comparison of the accuracies of the modified model, a model trained with the target feature x_2 held at constant, and the original model across 10 random initialisations for a models of increasing complexity (number of hidden layers from 0-9) on a held-out test set. Notice that for higher complexities the model constant and the original model overlap. For higher complexities the adversarial attack achieves higher results than both the original and constant models, which suggests that our approach can also be used as a regulariser. Notice that the variance across initilisations also decreases with deeper models suggesting that higher model complexity results in a stronger explanation attack.