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Network based mechanisms for competitive crowdsourcing

Published: 11 January 2018 Publication History

Abstract

The working principle of crowd in a crowdsourcing platform is either competitive or collaborative. Occasionally, the tasks submitted to crowdsourcing environments are decomposable. They are challenging to solve because decomposition and composition of tasks and proper selection of workers are difficult. We show that by appropriate inclusion of collaboration in a competitive crowdsourcing environment, we can handle decomposable-type tasks given with posted-price in a better way. We initially attempt to manage 2-decomposable tasks with appropriate mechanism design. Extending it further to n-decomposable tasks, we propose a network based mechanism to choose the best mixture of sub-tasks in a competitive environment for selecting the winners. We are currently interested in developing mechanisms to remove the participation bias from such environments.

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CODS-COMAD '18: Proceedings of the ACM India Joint International Conference on Data Science and Management of Data
January 2018
379 pages
ISBN:9781450363419
DOI:10.1145/3152494
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 11 January 2018

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Author Tags

  1. crowdsourcing
  2. decomposable task
  3. posted-price mechanism

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  • Short-paper

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  • MeitY, Government of India

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CoDS-COMAD '18

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CODS-COMAD '18 Paper Acceptance Rate 50 of 150 submissions, 33%;
Overall Acceptance Rate 197 of 680 submissions, 29%

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