

# Corporate Security: A Hacker Perspective

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## **About Myself**

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  - NAC/IPS
- Founder, NMRC
  - Hacker collective



# **Agenda**

- Attacker world
- Attack trends
- Attack techniques
- Mitigation



## **Random Thought #1**

- Seeing :wq in a /var/log/\* file is a Bad
   Thing
- Bad because you see it, but real bad because you've been 0wn3d by someone who is so lame they can't edit logfiles



## **Attacker World**



## **Attacker Goals and Dreams**

- Oday the attacker goal
- Remote root access the attacker dream
- Remote root 0day the holy grail
- The nature of the Oday forms the nature of the attack
- Odays are worth more now than they've ever been



# What is 0day?

- Number of days a commercial piece of software has been on the market
  - Having a cracked copy of a new game before it even shipped was wicked cool
- Security flaw, usually remote (and preferably root access), vendor and sys admins do not know about the flaw
  - As soon as vendor/admin community is aware, no longer 0day
- Currently 0day seems to be:
  - An unpatched flaw that the vendor and sys admins know about
  - Non-public working exploit for a patched flaw



## The Disclosure Cycle

- Researcher finds a flaw
- Researcher reports flaw to vendor
- Vendor develops fix
- Vendor releases patch
- Researcher releases advisory
  - A responsible researcher releases technical details after a suitable patch period, assuming that is possible



# The "Other" Disclosure Cycle

- Blackhat finds a flaw
- Blackhat shares flaw with very few friends
- Usage of flaw is done to minimize vendor notification
- Blackhat tries to find yet another flaw before first flaw is discovered
- Once discovered or blackhat bored, blackhat may sell the exploit
- The object may be to sell the exploit anyway



## When Disclosure Cycles Meet

- Vendor releases patch
- Researcher releases advisory
- Unpatched and patched versions of "fix" files are reverse engineered
  - Bindiff w/IDA, OllyDbg, advisory clues etc
- Exploit code is developed based upon flaw
  - Whitehats use this to develop IDS/IPS signatures
  - Blackhats use this to develop attack code
  - Both hats look for "silent" patches



## **Targeted Penetration**

- Still around, but by proportions not growing
- The "Hacking Exposed" generation
  - Statistically most targeted penetrations are successful by any skilled attacker
  - Tactics have changed substantially, most focus on defeating perimeter security



## **Random Thought #2**

- What is the difference between someone being bad and a Bad Thing?
- An inbound connection to port 4444 is someone being bad
- Before each MetaSploit exploit module runs, it tries to connect on the assigned port in case it is already open
  - Port 4444 connection failed followed by a few packets then port 4444 connection succeeded is a Bad Thing



# **Attack Techniques**



# Various Attack Techniques

- "Click on this"
  - Also applies to "preview this"
- Inject and input manipulation
- Buffer overflows
- Heap overflows
- Format strings



## **New Recon Techniques**

- Repeated attacks from throw-away hosts
- Single packet/connection OS detection
  - E.g. Windows PPTP gives up major build version
  - Port 0 scanning
- Attackers using dark IP space



# **IDS/IPS** mapping

- Compromise DNS server, create subzone
  - Map out related dark IP space
  - Launch attacks from subzone
  - Note DNS queries to subzone
- Trigger simple and well known attacks from throw-away hosts
  - Did we get a response or a "response"?
  - Work on mapping IDS/IPS vendor based upon what is caught/not caught is underway



# One Oday per Target

- Prudent usage of 0day
  - Only used for a foothold, usually just past the perimeter
- Normal non-Oday usage for remainder of the attack (this is usually all that is needed once inside)



# Random Thought #3

 Apparently working for Microsoft is evil but working for spammers is not....



## **Attack Trends**



## A Professional Blackhat

- Works for a single spammer/spyware/id theft organization
  - Many are extremely organized
- Doesn't worry (too much) about IDS/IPS/Anti-virus
- Goal is to hit fast and hit hard
- Pay is decent, around \$200k per year for decent quality work
- Foreign governments/nation states/organized cybercrime willing to pay \$40k-\$120k for remote root 0day



## **Freelance Professional Blackhat**

- Works for spammer organizations
- Works for information brokers
- Involved with identity theft rings
- More concerned with keeping 0days 0day
- Extremely proficient at reverse engineering
- At the high end, mad wicked skills == mad wicked money



## **Finding Flaws**

- Fuzzing still works
- Checking for silent patches via BinDiff
- Checking for similar flaws in different parts of the code
- Checking for lousy fixes



## What's Hot!

- Anything WiFi/Bluetooth
- Client flaws are big
  - No firewall needed
- Targeted malware
  - No more Code Red, it incites patching, awareness, and remediation
- Expect more buzz with handhelds (e.g. Blackberry)
- My botnet is bigger than your botnet
  - Six figure-sized botnets are not unheard of
  - Leasing and timesharing



#### What's Not

- Cross side scripting
  - Big with spammers, not with hacker types
- Individual compromises
  - As stated, proportionately not growing
  - Everything is done en masse



## **Current Hotspots**

- Anything WiFi
- Client-side flaws
- Problems during protocol exchanges
- Microsoft big, Apple even bigger
- The caring and feeding of botnets



## **Random Thought #4**

- On the plane home, fire up your laptop around midflight
- Note how many laptops are advertising a peer-to-peer network
- You can connect to these, and if unpatched, attack them



# **Mitigation**



## **Lock It Down**

- Patch
  - Mean time to exploit from patch is getting smaller
  - Many large banks have adopted a "patch and fix" policy
- Harden
  - Limit access to only what is needed
  - Locking down ACLs can save your bacon with regards to 0day



# **Looking Forward**

- Understand your porous perimeter
  - Perimeter security is dead
- Consider new technologies to mitigate attacks
  - Network access management (yes, shameless plug)
  - Intelligent IPS solutions



## **Bad News, Good News**

- Thousands of computers are being compromised every day
- The good news is that we are probably closer to the "every vulnerable box is compromised" end of the scale, so eventually the level of compromised systems will roughly stablize



#### A Note on Pen Tests

- Don't have the pen tester only test for known bugs, or with public exploits
- There is no reason why a pen tester is the only type of person with a private collection of nonpublic exploit code for publicly known flaws
  - Blackhats do the exact same thing
- While using HE techniques catches low-hanging fruit, a real pen tester will use these advanced techniques to get in



## **Random Thought #5**

- On that flight home, if you get that First Class upgrade, and if you identify a WinCE device via bluetooth, do not connect to it
- It is a Boeing plane that did not get the upgrade to turn off the "default on" for Bluetooth on the WinCE system running the navigation display system
- Don't point this out midflight, nice people with handscuff will help you off the plane
- Have a great flight home!



## Q&A

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