Skip to main content
We gratefully acknowledge support from the Simons Foundation, member institutions, and all contributors. Donate
arXiv logo
Cornell University Logo

Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory

arXiv:1604.02676 (cs)
[Submitted on 10 Apr 2016]

Title:Approximating Nash Equilibria in Tree Polymatrix Games

Authors:Siddharth Barman, Katrina Ligett, Georgios Piliouras
View PDF
Abstract:We develop a quasi-polynomial time Las Vegas algorithm for approximating Nash equilibria in polymatrix games over trees, under a mild renormalizing assumption. Our result, in particular, leads to an expected polynomial-time algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria of tree polymatrix games in which the number of actions per player is a fixed constant. Further, for trees with constant degree, the running time of the algorithm matches the best known upper bound for approximating Nash equilibria in bimatrix games (Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta 2003).
Notably, this work closely complements the hardness result of Rubinstein (2015), which establishes the inapproximability of Nash equilibria in polymatrix games over constant-degree bipartite graphs with two actions per player.
Comments: Appeared in the proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2015. 11 pages
Subjects: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
Cite as: arXiv:1604.02676 [cs.GT]
  (or arXiv:1604.02676v1 [cs.GT] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1604.02676

Submission history

From: Siddharth Barman [view email]
[v1] Sun, 10 Apr 2016 11:34:26 UTC (15 KB)
Full-text links:

Access Paper:

  • View PDF
  • TeX Source
  • Other Formats
view license
Current browse context:
cs.GT
< prev   |   next >
new | recent | 2016-04
Change to browse by:
cs

References & Citations

DBLP - CS Bibliography

listing | bibtex
Siddharth Barman
Katrina Ligett
Georgios Piliouras
export BibTeX citation

Bookmark

BibSonomy logo Reddit logo

Bibliographic and Citation Tools

Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)

Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article

alphaXiv (What is alphaXiv?)
CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers (What is CatalyzeX?)
DagsHub (What is DagsHub?)
Gotit.pub (What is GotitPub?)
Hugging Face (What is Huggingface?)
Papers with Code (What is Papers with Code?)
ScienceCast (What is ScienceCast?)

Demos

Replicate (What is Replicate?)
Hugging Face Spaces (What is Spaces?)
TXYZ.AI (What is TXYZ.AI?)

Recommenders and Search Tools

Influence Flower (What are Influence Flowers?)
CORE Recommender (What is CORE?)

arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators

arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.

Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.

Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.

Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)