Working Paper Number 197

Religious Diplomacy:

Approaching the Dilemma of Modern-Day *Khawarej*

Ali Al Youha*

Following the September 11, 2001 suicide attacks, numerous Western policymakers and scholars have socially and ideologically constructed and homogenized Islam with violent practices of suicide-terrorism. They covertly propagate Islam as a violent religion despite its deep moral denouncement against the criminality of such practices. This paper investigates how and when religious diplomacy[1] influences modern-day khawarej within the Islamic world. Drawing from two case studies — Taliban and Al Qaeda – I argue that religious diplomacy is an essential diplomatic instrument to effectively undermine the khawarej by significantly improving coercive tactics if constructive diplomacy fails. By employing a hermeneutical approach, I examine the conditions under which jihad (jus ad bellum/jus in bello) become reasonably permissible, while analysing Islamic fatawa on suicide-terrorism and the limitation of these religious verdicts. These critical assessments are significantly relevant, as religious ignorance, wrongful possession of modern technology, and hidden geopolitical interests erroneously promote anti-Islamic ideologies globally.

June 2013

---

[1] I coined the term *religious diplomacy* as rational religious discourse based on the Qur'an and Sunnah, employed by expert Islamic scholars in the field of Islamic jurisprudence. Given the critical importance of religion in the Islamic world, *religious diplomacy* is a pivotal tool, particularly when dealing with groups or nation-states that erroneously use and misapprehend *sharee'ah* law as their rule of governance.

1 – INTRODUCTION

"Committing suicide is considered a sin in Islam, as in Christianity and Judaism"

(Atwan, 2006, p.94)

When trying to understand Islam and *jihad* in global discourse, it is crucial to isolate religion from politics and avoid labelling an entire religion and its followers as "very evil and very wicked" (Graham, 2002) victimized by "a very, very dangerous book - the Qur'an" (Adams, 2002). The suicide attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11), which inflicted 2,793 innocent deaths (9/11 Commission, 2004, p.552), encapsulates the global struggle and dilemma between Western and Islamic states, whereby Islam was socially and ideologically constructed and homogenized as a practice of terrorism[2]. This particular misconception has direct political and policy implications, as it generates global policies and norms unconsciously built on perceived, flawed assumptions, manufacturing both covert and overt abhorrence across the Islamic world. As a result, such anti-Islam rhetoric gradually becomes *embedded* within the societal fabric, propagating erroneous, miscalculated US foreign policies that inevitably result in high casualty rates. More importantly, these real and perceived fears of Islamic fanaticisms, combined flawed assumptions about Islam, have not only constrained the US from abandoning its traditionally militarized foreign policy stand (Operation-Enduring-Freedom, Operation-Iraqi-Freedom, 2001 and 2003 respectively), but also captures what Mitzen (2006) coins *ontological insecurity* (extrapolated from the lowest level of individual fear) within the ideological battle between Western and Islamic states.

For the past decades, Islam has been both linked with terrorism and suicide-terrorist practices in particular to a phenomenon which is not entirely new in "employing military force (i.e., between late 19th and 20th-century anarchists and Japanese kamikaze pilots)" (Horowitz, 2010, p.40)[3]. Even more problematic is attributing suicide-terrorist practices as a poisonous offshoot from *Salafism[4]/Wahabism* (Oliver, 2004). They erroneously link "self-annihilatory acts of violence" (Freamon, 2003, p.303) to Islamic law and jurisprudence (Freamon, 2003), despite Islam's clear principle and ideological denouncement to such practices. Besides clouding the lens of judgement, these misconceptions clearly reinforce faulty foreign policies that only exacerbate the growing pandemic of terrorist-related activities in the Islamic world.

To better understand suicide-terrorism, it is critical to historically trace the roots of such practices within the Islamic community. From the Alamut fortress in the 11th century, Hassan-i-Sabbah, leader of the Shiite Nizari Isma'lis, deployed first forms of suicide-terrorism (Sonn, 1990; Reuter, 2004; Munir, 2008)[5] to openly revolt against the Seljuk leaders (Munir, 2008). The Nizari Isma'li commenced a 170-year cycle, "of targeted murder" (Reuter, 2004, p.25), reflecting the determination of a minority, "to inflict fatal blows on the great powers" (Reuter, 2004, p.25). They became the first form of *Fedayeen* (self-sacrificers), extensively mimicked by contemporary groups (i.e., Al-Qaeda) centuries later (Reuter, 2004). Reuter (2004) states that "self-sacrifice martyrdom" stems from the Shiite minority in Islam, initiated after the demise of the Fourth Islamic Caliph Ali ibn Abi-Talib (600-661 AD) – a

---

[2] Practices of terrorism existed since the 1st century B.C.E. (Cornin, 2002/03; Ashraf, 2008).

[3] The Kamikaze inflicted approximately 5,000 US naval deaths (Atwan, 2006).

[4] Derived from the word *salaf,* referring to the way of the prophet and his companions, simply, "the first three generations of Muslims" (Ibn-Taymiyyah, 2000, p.383). Evidently, they did not utilize methods employed by current Islamic terrorist groups, who claim to be *salafee,* but truly are not.

[5] They were known as the *hashashin* – the derivation of assassins in English.

practice revived later by the Nizari Isma'li. For centuries, suicide tactics have disappeared from the Islamic landscape, yet with the wake of the Iranian revolution (1979), the subjugated tactic gradually arose again. Reuter (2004) reveals the following:

> Murder by suicide began its modern-day renaissance at the start of the 1980s, on the battlefield of the Iran-Iraq War, in which tens of thousands of Iranian youths, with a little key to Paradise around his neck, charged towards Iraqi machine-gun positions in the name of God and the Ayatollah Khomeini. It was as if the charismatic leader of the Iranian revolution had picked up a silent antique instrument and made it sing again. By mobilizing the ancient sacrificial myths of Shi'ite Islam, a rebellious sect born 1,300 years ago in a revolt against the ruling caliphs, the Khomeini successfully reawakened the notion of self-sacrifice as a weapon of war (Reuter, 2004, p.11).

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard then successfully exported modern-day suicide-terrorism to the Lebanese Shiite group, Hezbollah (Reuter, 2004), which has developed a sophisticated mechanism to suicide bombing (Horowitz, 2010), beyond the humble run-and-explode-to-paradise approach employed in the First Persian Gulf War (1980–1988). They soon rebranded their approach to "martyr-operations" (Reuter, 2004), a tactic which spread widely until the early 1990s, particularly among the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, Turkey, Kashmir, Chechnya and beyond national frontiers through Al-Qaeda (Reuter, 2004; Horowitz, 2010). Freamon (2003) asserts that Shiite scholars transformed the concept of self-martyrdom to Hezbollah, and two militant groups — Hamas and Al-Qaeda — later internationalized the act. While the behaviour of "self-annihilation" (Freamon, 2003, p.306), has been normalized as *jihad*, Freamon (2003) critiques underlying inaccurate assumptions that "a great many Muslim jurists, Sunni and Shi'a [collectively agree with this concept…] Rather, it is the Shi'a theology that provides the linchpin for such behaviour" (Freamon, 2003, p.306). Conforming to Freamon's (2003) analysis, I advance his assessment on the inaccuracy of normalizing suicide-terrorism as an approach agreed upon by many Sunni scholars. In particular, I focus on the role of *fatawa*[6] issued by Islamic jurists from the Commission of Senior Ulema in Saudi Arabia as well as other Sunni Muslims across the Islamic world. This is very critical to highlight because Western states, scholars, and policymakers have largely ignored these Islamic jurists despite their aggressive attempts to collectively deter the growing presence of terrorist-related activities.

This paper examines the role of Islamic teachings which have been unintentionally misinterpreted largely due to ignorance, or intentionally augmented to satisfy socio/geopolitical interests. Kelsey (1990) claims that Islamic jurists' views did not develop in a vacuum, but formed as a consensus outcome "in which religious, moral, political and military factors all have parts to play" (Kelsey, 1990, p.200). The existing doctrine of *jihad* and rules of war, as Ahmed (2003) emphasizes, had also developed during specific historical conditions (i.e., Abbasids versus Christian West) (cited in Smock, 2003, p.24). These complementary analyses reinforce the importance of isolating the Qur'an and Prophet's teachings from the tensions that jurists face in issuing their *fatawa* to bolster *Allah's* (God) cause and increase "'the sphere of Islam' *(dar-islam)* by engaging in territorial expansion" (Sachedina, 1990, p.36). Suicide-terrorism — a brutal construct that became accepted among Islamic transgressors *(khawarej)*[7] at periods of Islamic political weakness — has achieved such normalcy that one likens it to other historically accepted social constructs (i.e., Nazism, Fascism, etc.). Therefore, it is reasonable to claim that the socially constructed notion of

---

[6] *Fatawa,* plural of *fatwa*, are verdicts/religious opinions Islamic scholars *(Muftees)* issue to deal with contemporary events based on the Qur'an, Sunnah, and *salaf* (Al-Fawzaan, 2005). Issuing a *fatwa* by Sunni jurists differs from the method employed by Shiite in Islam.

[7] *Khawarej,* coined by Prophet Muhammad, is derived from the Arabic word *karaja,* which means to exit (Al-Albani, n.d., answering extremism).

suicide-terrorism as an Islamic practice has not only resulted from an erroneous assumption but also reached to a level of what Foucault coined a "society of normalization" (Roach, 2008, p.325).

1.1 Research Objectives

This paper investigates how and when *religious diplomacy* influences modern-day *khawarej*. In this dissertation, *khawarej* are Islamic transgressors that employ fraudulent *jihad* in the form of suicide-terrorism. This analysis is particularly important in a period where religious ignorance and limited access (including wrongful possession) of modern technology could significantly inflict instabilities in our contemporary international society – *raison de système* (Watson, 2004). I argue that *religious diplomacy* is essential in undermining the *khawarej* by significantly improving coercion tactics if diplomacy fails. I coined the term *religious diplomacy* as rational religious discourse based on the Qur'an and Sunnah[8], employed by expert Islamic scholars in the field of Islamic jurisprudence. Given the critical importance of religion in the Islamic world, *religious diplomacy* is a pivotal tool, particularly when dealing with groups or nation-states that erroneously use and misapprehend *sharee'ah*[9] law as their rule of governance. Existing Western international relation theories and diplomatic strategies have largely failed or ignored such religious importance, which inevitably constrained their abilities to formulate suicide-terrorism solutions. The Western exclusion of Islamic principles and its actors only reinforce the hidden resentment, conflict and violence within the Islamic world. By ignoring the critical importance of *religious diplomacy*, coercion alone as a first tool of engagement would inevitably fail to address the underlying problem of global terrorism (i.e., Afghanistan). Therefore, *religious diplomacy* is the basic step of engagement to bring sense to Al-Qaeda's supporting cushion (i.e., Taliban) and to provide them with an opportunity to reassess their position. If this fails, then through leveraging Islamic teachings, Muslim governments in collaboration with Western allies can employ targeted force against the *khawarej*, while maintaining the boundaries governing the use of force – *jus in bello* – in accordance with the rules of *jihad* – similar to the Western criteria under the Just War Theory (JWT) (Johnson, 1999).

1.2 Research Questions and Outline

This dissertation explored the following questions:

1. Examine the conditions under which *jihad (jus ad bellum/jus in bello)* becomes permissible.
2. Analyze Islamic *fatawa* on suicide-terrorism and the limitations of issuing such verdicts.
3. Demonstrate the effectiveness of *religious diplomacy* through a possible counterfactual on two cases – Al-Qaeda and Taliban – to effectively address the ideological gap between the Western and Islamic world, specifically on suicide-terrorism issues.

In this dissertation I employ a hermeneutical approach to examine how and when *religious diplomacy,* along with Muslim jurists as an instrument in diplomatic strategy, influences the *khawarej* (Forster, 2007). I particularly use the Qur'an and Hadith (Islam's main reference points), which have been authentically proven by many filtration processes and evidence dating back to historical times[10].

---

[8] "The way and guidance of Prophet Muhammad, as represented in his speech, action and tacit approval, which have been recorded and transmitted in reports and narrations known as Hadith" (Al-Fawzaan, 2005, p.319).

[9] The system of laws and rules that govern Islam (Al-Fawzaan, 2005).

[10] The English Qur'anic verses in this paper are not the exact words of Allah, but merely close translations to the revealed Arabic words of Allah that were sent through *Jebreel* (Gabriel).

2–*JIHAD*

    The Islamic concept of *jihad* is critical in analyzing the ideological struggles between Islam and suicide-terrorism. This section analyzes the role and impact of suicide-terrorism to the internal struggles of contemporary Islamic communities.

    In a Muslim's creed[11], *jihad* is not literally mentioned or justified as portrayed by the *khawarej*. This reflects that *jihad* in the militarized sense does not define a Muslim's faith and submission, but it *is,* however, a self-struggle in the way of God "to strive hard against one's inner self, or to defend one's property, freedom, wealth and religion, making Allah's Word (that none is worthy of worship except him supreme)" (Oliver, 2004, p.165). Despite its clear absence and separation, the fundamental social construction of *jihad* has been misconstrued by radical Islamic groups, which have continued to severely distort the Islamic values and traditions globally (Al-Othman, 2010, p.121).

    Cautioning his disciples from being misguided, Prophet Muhammad warned the Muslims and their leaders to uphold Islam's value system, "'stick to the group Muslims and their *Imam* (Muslim ruler).' I said, 'If there is neither a group of Muslims nor an *Imam*?' He said, 'Then turn away from all those sects even if you were to bite (eat) the roots of a tree till death overtakes you while you are in that state'" (Bukhari, Hadith no.7084, Book 92, Vol.9).

    The chart below illustrates the main components of *jihad* and their relevance in conceptualizing the role of *religious diplomacy* within its on-going ideological struggles. *Jihad* (smaller *jihad*) is not the only form of *jihad*, but there is also a significantly more important yet lacking greater *jihad.* Situated between the greater and smaller *jihad, religious diplomacy* can play a critical role in managing Islamic transgressors through empowering components from both types of *jihad*.

---

[11] Islam has six pillars of faith and five pillars of submission that define a Muslim's creed (Bukhari, Book 2, page 56, Vol.1; Bukhari, Hadith no.8, Book 2, Vol.1).

2.1 Components of *jihad – jus ad bellum/jus in bello*

Jihad is broken into two forms, not merely the narrow sense associated with *harb* (war) – smaller *jihad*. Lacking today within the Islamic world, greater *jihad,* which encompasses *tawheed*[12] and *jihad* of the self from worldly desires (Al-Othman, 2010, p.45). Desires are fought through empowerment of knowledge *(ilm)* in both religious and secular spheres. *Tawheed* and *ilm* then become enabling mechanisms, directly conforming to God's guidelines, the Prophet's teachings and the power of mind. The current dilemma comes from the absence of greater *jihad* but not within the Islamic teachings.

Conversely, the smaller *jihad* is broken into two spheres – offensive and defensive (Atwan, 2006). An offensive *jihad* refers to "the rescue of the oppressed and [deterrence of] tyrants who might contemplate attacking Muslims" (Atwan, 2006, p.69). Within this context, an offensive *jihad* is *fard-kifayah,* which is not a requirement on all Muslims: "if some capable Muslims are engaged in accomplishing the mission, others are exempted from the duty" (Atwan, 2006, p.69). Alternatively, a defensive *jihad* is *fard'ayn,* whereby a Muslim is obliged to fight (Atwan, 2006) when a country is being invaded, the innocent are being raped and money is being plundered.

Interestingly, rules governing *jihad,* were neither fabricated nor created by Prophet Muhammad to satisfy his political interests, but it is simply a divine decree. When the Prophet started preaching the words of God in Mecca, he was not ordered to fight. Instead, he followed a passive stand for thirteen years of his mission (Ibn-Taymiyyah, 1984, vol.28, p.349), even though the *Qur'aish* leaders in Mecca had planned to assassinate him. As the environment in Mecca turned hostile on both his followers and himself, they eventually migrated *(Hijrah)* to Medina in 622 AD.

In Medina, Muslims established *dar al-islam*, a safe shelter for the growing Muslim population. The first militarized Qur'anic verse rendering defensive *jihad – jus ad bellum –* was revealed, which authorized Muslims to fight against the unjust oppressors that drove them out of Mecca, reflecting a collective defensive right (Ibn Taymiyyah 1984, vol.28; Ibn-Katheer 2002, vol.6; Freamon 2003; Al-Othman 2010). The divine rule of *jihad* was in repelling the unjust, restoring peace and protecting the weak in accordance with God's legislated rules (Ibn-Katheer 2002, vol.6):

> [39]Those who have been attacked are permitted to take up arms because they have been wronged – God has the power to help them – [40] those who have been driven unjustly from their homes only for saying, 'Our Lord is God.' If God did not repel some people by means of others, many monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, where God's name is much invoked, would have been destroyed (Qur'an, The Pilgrimage, 22:39-40).

In contrast, offensive *jihad,* revealed by the following Qur'anic verse, encourages Muslims to save oppressed women, men and children in Mecca (Ibn-Kathir, 2003, vol.2, p.515), "[75]Why should you not fight in God's cause and for the oppressed men, women and children who cry out, 'Lord, rescue us from this town whose people are oppressors! By Your grace, give us a protector and gives us a helper!'?" (Qur'an, Women, 4:75).

Both defensive and offensive *jihad* can only be initiated by the appropriate authority and against military personnel (Al-Othman, 2010) contingent on a probability of success (i.e., if loss is inevitable then *jihad* cannot be waged). In this context, authority is reflected through one's respective government and bodies of authority in line with views of Islamic jurists (i.e., Commission of Senior Ulema in Saudi Arabia). While Islamic thought religiously requires permission from proper authority, the *khawarej* today initiate chaotic global *jihad* without respective governments' consents. In Islam, legitimate authority is a key criterion of obeying

---

[12] The foundation of Islam, "the absolute belief in the oneness of Allah" (Ibn-Taymiyyah, 2000, p.384).

God and his commandments in Islam (contingent on non-sinful acts, i.e., prosecuting the innocent, torture, etc.), "He who obeys me, obeys Allah; and he who disobeys me, disobeys Allah. He who obeys a Muslim ruler, obeys me; and he who disobeys a Muslim ruler, disobeys me" (Muslim, Hadith no.1223, Book 37, Vol.2). This, on the other hand, does not entail blindly following the ruler. In fact, disagreeing with views of a leader is a normal conduct of discourse, but Islam stresses the importance of respect and appropriate means in conveying the message to the ruling authority without provoking violence or terror.

It is also evident that various groups proclaim conflicting interpretations of Islamic teachings and *jihad* concepts (i.e., Al-Qaeda). An Albanian Sunni scholar, Sheikh Mohammed Nasiruddin Al-Albani (1914-1999), in a dialogue with a *jihadi* supporter, contested that there is no *jihad* without right authority, emphasizing that religious disagreements among the *mujahedeen* exist. This raises a critical question on how can they go to *jihad* without even understanding the basics of their *Aqeedah*[13] (Al-Albani, n.d., salafipublications(a))?

Current groups (i.e., Al-Qaeda) do not embody Islamic unity; rather only adhere to their emotions by irrationally reacting to their violent surroundings. Evoking terror as a way of God is not permissible under the basic tenets of Islam. The Qur'an particularly stresses the importance of justice and impartiality even towards oneself, commanding Muslims not to be manipulated by hatred, "[8]You who believe, be steadfast in your devotion to God and bear witness impartially: do not let hatred of others lead you away from justice, but adhere to justice, for that is closer to awareness of God. Be mindful of God: God is well aware of all that you do" (Qur'an, The Feast, 5:8). Muslims who adhere to "justice in their rules, in matters relating to their families and in all that they undertake" are awarded proximity to God during the Day of Judgment (Muslim, Hadith no.1207, Book 37 Vol.2).

Apart from *jus ad bellum,* Islam also sets boundaries that govern the use of force – *jus in bello*. Collectively, both defensive and offensive *jihad* require strict adherence to certain divine guidelines. Transgression therefore is clearly prohibited. An Islamic jurist, Hassan Al-Basri (642–728 AD), refers transgression to "mutilating the dead, theft (from captured goods), killing women, children and old people who do not participate in warfare, killing priests and residents of houses of worship, burning down trees and killing animals without real benefit" (Al-Basri, cited in Ibn-Katheer, 2002, vol.1, p.528). Therefore, it is critical to highlight that *jihad* needs to align with Islamic laws as clearly prescribed by the Qur'an and Sunnah teachings. The Qur'an emphasizes that even in self-defence; one must not transgress the limits, rather maintain proportionality and prosecute the wrongdoers to restore peace and justice:

> [190]Fight in God's cause against those who fight you, but do not overstep the limits: God does not love those who overstep the limits [...] [193]If they cease hostilities, there can be no [further] hostility, except towards aggressors. [194]So if anyone commits aggression against you, attack him as he attacked you, but be mindful of God and know that He is with those who are mindful of Him (Qur'an, The Cow, 2:190, 193-194).

Islam also forbids treachery as it breaks the divine trust set by God. It is also equated to betrayal, and thus, a traitor will be, "hoisted as high as his treachery" (Muslim, Hadith no.1124, Book 35, Vol.1). As Battle Gaines notes, "[58]And if you learn of treachery on the part of any people, throw their treaty back at them, for God does not love the treacherous" (Quran, Battle Gaines, 8:58). Nevertheless, killing women and children is an undisputed crime. Therefore, suicide-terrorism transgresses the divine immunity of civilians, and thus produces hypocrisy which is viewed in the Qur'an as propagators of mischief and corruption *(fasad)* in the lands (Munir, 2008).

---

[13] The creed and beliefs of a person.

It is true that "the Messenger of *Allah* (PBUH) forbade killing women and children" (Muslim, Hadith no.1133, Book 35, Vol.1), but crimes also encompass killing the elderly and religious clergy irrespective of their religion (Al-Othman, 2010; Al-Basri, cited in Ibn-Katheer, 2002, vol.1, p.528) as well as burning trees and killing animals (Al-Basri, cited in Ibn-Katheer, 2002, vol.1, p.528: Al-Othman, 2010).

War, however, is not a desirable circumstance in any religion, society or culture. Many conceive Islam as a militaristic religion purely driven by the sword, yet in practice, peace in Islam is more desirable, "[61]But if they incline towards peace, you [Prophet] must also incline towards it, and put your trust in God: He is the All hearing, the All Knowing" (Qur'an, Battle Gaines, 8:61). To maintain peace, Islam clearly states that honouring a treaty is more of a priority[14], "[72][…] but if they seek help from you against religious prosecution, it is your duty to help them, except against people with whom you have a treaty: God sees all that you do" (Qur'an, Battle Gaines, 8:72).

Given the aforementioned Islamic law and guidelines, how and why do transgressors continue to justify suicide-terrorism in the name of Islam? Suicide-terrorism breaks "at least five crimes according to Islamic law, namely killing civilians, mutilating their bodies, violating the trust of enemy soldiers and civilians, committing suicide and destroying civilian objects or properties" (Munir, 2008, p.71). Although *jihad* is an obligation in all forms, there are stringent guidelines not to be transgressed. If such boundaries are misconceived, the whole structure of *jihad* would collapse. The emergence of radical groups (i.e., Al-Qaeda) exemplifies how they leverage *jihad* to satisfy personal political desires masked under religious contexts. In echoing the Prophet's teachings, his first successor Abu-Bakr, commanded Yazid bin Abi-Sufyan during war:

> O Yazid!...You will come across people who have secluded themselves in convents; leave them and their seclusion. But you will also come across people on whose heads the devil has taken his abode so strike their heads off. But do not kill any old man or woman or minor or sick person or monk. Do not devastate any population. Do not cut a tree except for some useful purpose. Do not burn a palm-tree nor inundate it. Do not commit treachery, do not mutilate [dead bodies], do not show cowardice, and do not cheat (cited in Munir, 2008, p.86).

Conversely, *jihad* does not encompass war and suicide-terrorism as depicted by the *khawarej*. Other forms include ethics in work, guiding ones who go astray, tolerance in front of hardship and fighting misconceptions and temptations against worldly desires. Our actions, work, tolerance, education and strive towards religious edification and humanism are the purposes of *jihad* in life. *Jihad* can be achieved through the tongue (fighting through the words of God and rational argumentation similar to the Habermasian approach), heart (maintaining one's morals and ethics in front of the aggressor), money (supporting Muslims against the aggressors) and hand (fighting back if attacked). Thus, how can extremists guide youth to devastation through suicide-terrorism built on the illusion of Martyrdom, when God clearly stated, "[29]Do not kill each other, for God is merciful to you. [30]If any of you does these things, out of hostility and injustice, We shall make him suffer Fire" (Qur'an, Women, 4:29).

Hence, *jihad* is not only war but a way of life. Striving to be a better Muslim by giving charity, fasting, being good and righteous to neighbours are all forms of *jihad* to different degrees. Being a Martyr in the name of God does not necessarily cleanse one from his sins. What if the true purpose in life is not for the sake of God but for some worldly benefit? How can one then become a Martyr? The way *khawarej* depict *jihad* today transgresses the divine decree of God and the Prophet's teachings. Justice in Islam is vital, and thus hate should not be the driving force towards actions, "[135]You who believe, uphold justice and bear witness to God, even if it is against yourself, your parents or your close

---

[14] For more details refer to the treaty of Hudaybiya in the work of Iqbal (1965).

relatives. Whether the person is rich or poor, God can best take care of both. Refrain from following your own desire, so that you can act justly – if you distort or neglect justice, God is fully aware of what you do" (Qur'an, Women, 4:135).

2.2 Limitation

As my hermeneutic empirical analysis suggests, the *khawarej* have successfully mobilized a flawed form of smaller *jihad* (external struggle), largely neglecting the importance of attaining the greater *jihad* (internal struggle). For thirteen years of Prophet Muhammad's life, a passive stand was maintained to help his followers master the greater *jihad*. Even when smaller *jihad* was authorized, it was defensive in nature. After the 9/11 incident, numerous nation-states have collectively and implicitly excluded Muslim scholars from supporting them in developing policy solutions to extremism. To weaken the support of radical Islamic groups, the Islamic world needs to strengthen the greater *jihad* in their societies to empower the future Muslim generations against the *khawarej* within. Without harnessing the knowledge of Muslim jurists, the US will inevitability fail to achieve its objective of eradicating suicide-terrorism.

More importantly, it becomes chaotic when Islamic groups emerge waging smaller *jihad* without truly understanding Islam (Al-Albani, n.d., salafipublications (a)). It becomes destructive if mixed with irrational emotions and political desires (i.e. Al-Qaeda), or when the Western and Arabic states improperly leveraged *jihad* through arming Afghan and Arab *mujahedeen*. It is clear that they simply turned against each other after the Soviet retreat and transgressed further when targeting the West. Addressing such a problem would require proper authorities, through military personnel under the command of their respective state or coalition of allies, guiding *jihad*. That said, has the practice of suicide-terrorism been justified? The subsequent section highlights the role of *fatawa* in understanding the on-going struggle between Western and Islamic states.

3 – FATAWA

The views of major Sunni jurists must be highlighted to understand the on-going internal struggles within Islamic States. This chapter also analyzes the verdicts of a leading Shiite figure in Lebanon, Sayyid Mohammed Hussain Fadlallah. It further supports that "*Wahhabism* actually has very little do with the current *jihadist* use of self-annihilatory violence" (Freamon, 2003, p.306). It particularly interrogates critical discourses and disagreements among Islamic jurists in issuing their verdicts regarding suicide-terrorism.

A *fatwa* can only be issued by well-educated scholars with a track record in the field of Islamic jurisprudence, particularly those that fully grasp the meanings and interpretations of the Qur'an and Sunnah (Ibn-Baz, 1990). It requires attentiveness without neglecting details of differing schools of thought on controversial issues (Ibn-Baz, 1990). Therefore, negligence is detrimental for Islamic scholars, which could result into a "spread of evil, depravity and Munkar (that which is unacceptable or disapproved of by Islamic law and Muslims of sound intellect) all over the world, in Islamic countries and others" (Ibn-Baz, 1990).

3.1 Islamic *fatawa* on suicide-terrorism

Authorized by the supreme Shiite leader Khomeini, Hezbollah targeted the American and French forces in Beirut on October 23, 1983, which resulted "in the death of 298 military men and women" (Munir 2008, p.73). Although this was not the first suicide operation, its magnitude had attracted significant global media attention, expanding the influence of Shiite *jihadi* movement (Horowitz, 2010). Adherence to such an unconventional method distorts the name of Islam in justifying the apparent military inequality between Israel and Hezbollah. Fadlallah argues that suicide attacks are the "answer of the weak and oppressed to the powerful aggressors" (Harik, 2004, p.65, 70, cited in Munir, 2008, p.73). According to Kramer (1993), Fadlallah justifies such tactics as "rebellion against fear" (Kramer, 1993, p.32) rooted in grievances stemming from the Palestinian and Lebanese conflict. To Fadlallah, suicide-terrorism empowers the weak in ways that "the enemy could not confront with its tanks and airplanes" (Kramer, 1993, p.33), contingent on inflicting death equal to or greater than the loss of life of the attacker (Kramer, 1993). By leveraging Islam, Fadlallah justifies suicide-terrorism as a weapon to undermine imperial powers (Kramer, 1993). Unfortunately, suicide-terrorism was not limited to the boundaries of Shiite Islam. This method has been exported to Palestine in retaliation of Dr. Baruch Goldstein's massacre of 29 Muslim worshipers during *fajr* (dawn) prayer on February 25, 1994. Thus, the first suicide operation was then employed by Hamas, targeting the Hadera bus station on April 13, 1994 (Munir 2008).

As a result, Shiite scholars seem to have shown an inconsistent view in their denouncement of the 9/11 incident, but not in their justification of suicide-terrorism against Israeli civilians. They argue that the Lebanese Islamic resistance targets soldiers and not Israeli civilians. Yet no one can rationalize the slaughter of thousands of innocent lives on 9/11 (Reuter, 2004). This contradicts Fadlallah's acknowledgement of the Hamas *mujahedeen*, stating that "we don't consider the settlers who occupy the Zionist settlements civilians, but they are an extension of occupation and they are not less aggressive and barbaric than the Zionist soldier" (cited in Munir, 2008, p.74).

The disagreement among Muslim scholars is clearly apparent, concerning the Palestinian suicide operations against Israel. A Saudi Islamic jurist, Sheikh Muhammad Al-Uthaymeen (1926-2001) contends that when "one of the Palestinians blows himself up and kills six or seven people, then in retaliation, they take sixty or more. This does not produce any benefit for the Muslims" (cited in Oliver, 2004, p.136). Al-Uthaymeen further maintained

his position based on the Qur'an and Sunnah, deeming that such acts as plain suicide cannot be considered martyrdom nor heroism irrespective of context. He asserts that one who commits such a grave act "shall be punished in Hell, for that which is authenticated on the authority of the Prophet (PBUH)" (Al-Uthaymeen, n.d., salafi publications). Al-Uthaymeen validates his claim using the following Hadith text, "Indeed, whoever (intentionally) kills himself, then certainly he will be punished in the Fire of Hell, wherein he shall dwell forever" (Al-Uthaymeen, n.d., salafi publications).

Similarly, Saudi's Chief *Muftee* Sheikh Abdulaziz Ibn-Baz (1910–1999) declared that suicide bombing is "self-murder and therefore unlawful" (Munir, 2008, p.74). In the words of Ibn-Baz, "such attacks are not part of the *jihad*, and I fear that they are just suicides plain and simple. Although the Qur'an allows, indeed, *demands* that the enemy be killed, this has to happen in such a way that it does not run contrary to the religious laws" (cited in Munir, 2008, p.74). Moreover, Ibn-Baz rules "that which is known to everyone who has the slightest bit of common sense, is that hijacking airplanes and kidnapping children and the like are extremely great cries, the world over. Their evil effects are far and wide, as is the great harm and inconvenience caused to the innocent" (cited in Oliver, 2004, p.137). Given the dire importance of eradicating such evil, Ibn-Baz proposes that, "obligatory upon the governments and those responsible from amongst the scholars and others to afford these issues great concern and to exert themselves as much as possible in ending this evil" (cited in Oliver, 2004, p.137). In fact, Ibn-Baz issued a *fatwa* encouraging peace with Israel, contingent on Israel being inclined to peace and that the agreement serve the interests of the Arab-Muslim community. This was firmly criticised by both Hamas and Al-Qaradawi (Mishal & Sela, 2000).

The Egyptian Islamic scholar, Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, follows similar rhetoric as Shiite scholars. Al-Qaradawi refuted Ibn-Baz's *fatwa* asserting that suicide-terrorism is pure *jihad* on Israel's occupation of Palestinian land (Mishal & Sela, 2000; Munir, 2008; Kelsey 2009). He further assesses *jihad* on Israel based on its militaristic nature whereby "both men and women serve in the army and can be drafted at any moment…If a child or an elderly person is killed in this type of operation, he or she is not killed on purpose, but by mistake, and as a result, necessity. Necessity makes the forbidden things permitted" (cited in Kelsey, 2009, p.141). Hence, Al-Qaradawi uses *mistake, necessity* and the notion of *double-effect* to justify suicide-terrorism, which Saudi jurists such as Al-Uthaymeen and Ibn-Baz strongly condemn. Therefore Al-Qaradawi's leniency on suicide-terrorism provides "those engaged in resistance more latitude than would otherwise be the case" (Kelsey, 2009, p.141).

Similar to Fadlallah's position, Al-Qaradawi differentiates between attacks on Israel and US embassies in East Africa (Kenya & Tanzania; 1998) echoing contradictory rhetoric similar to Shiite scholars. On US attacks in East Africa, he asserts that "any explosion that leads to the death of innocent women and children is a criminal act, carried out only by people who are base cowards and traitors. A rational person with only a small portion of respect and virtue refrains from such operations" (cited in Kelsey, 2009, p.142). Al-Qaradawi's assessment of 9/11 emphasizes that the US neither enforces military drafting nor is in conflict with Palestine (Kelsey, 2009). Yet he reasoned that suicide-terrorism in Israel is defensive *jihad* to protect one's land. This similarly reflects an agreement between Al-Qaradawi and Sheikh Ikrima Al-Sbri, the *Muftee* of Jerusalem. They both claim that US attacks are pure suicide against the innocent, yet suicide-terrorism against Israel is justifiable martyrdom with an end goal of liberating occupied lands (Smock, 2003). Other Egyptian scholars, such as Sheikh Mohammed Tantawi, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, reflect inconsistent rulings on suicide-terrorism (Munir, 2008). Despite some discrepancies, Tantawi eventually asserts that whoever partakes in or conducts a suicide operation is an enemy of Islam (BBC, 2003). In Tantawi's words "extremism is the enemy of Islam" (BBC, 2003).

Other Islamic jurists like the current *Muftee* of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdulaziz Al-Ashaikh assert comment on the 9/11: "the recent developments in the United States constitute a form of injustice that is not tolerated by Islam, which views them as gross crimes and sinful acts" (cited in Smock, 2003, p.viii). Simply put, Al-Ashaikh issued a verdict about "plane hijackings and taking people hostage or killing innocent people, without just cause; this is nothing but a manifestation of injustice, oppression and tyranny, which the Islamic *sharee'ah* does not sanction. Rather it is explicitly forbidden and it is amongst the greatest sins" (cited in Oliver, 2004, p.138). The Chairman of the Commission of Senior Ulema in Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Salih Al-Luheidan also argues that "as a human community we must be vigilant and careful to oppose these pernicious and shameless evils, which are not justified by any sane logic, nor by the religion of Islam" (cited in Smock, 2003, p.viii). Furthermore, Sheikh Salih Ibn-Fawzan Al-Fawzan, another Islamic Scholar and member of the Commission of Senior Ulema in Saudi Arabia, contested that suicide-terrorism is not *jihad* in the sake of *Allah*, but simply fighting for the sake of Satan (Okaz, 2009).

Other prominent non-Saudi Islamic Sunni Scholars like Sheik Al-Albani, issued a verdict that suicide-terrorism acts are not "legislated (in the *Sharee'ah*), are unlawful" and "are absolutely non-Islamic" (Al-Albani, n.d., salafipublications(b)). In 2010, Sheikh Mash'hor Hassan Al-Salman, Sheikh Ali bin Hassan Al-Halabi and other Jordanian jurists issued a *fatwa* in 2010 condemning suicide-terrorism in all forms (Aljazeera, 2010). They argued that Islam denounces such forbidden acts against Muslims and non-Muslims alike, weather in Iraq, Egypt, Saudi, Afghanistan, Pakistan or any other part of the Islamic and non-Islamic world (Aljazeera, 2010).

Evidently, Muslim Sunni jurists, especially members of the Saudi Commission of Senior Ulema, agree on Islamic *fatwas,* even before 9/11. In fact, Ibn-Baz further stresses the obligation of governments to eradicate such evil. Disagreement, however, lies between the Shiite Scholars and Al-Qaradawi.

3.2 Limitations

This chapter has shown that the non-binding element of *fatwa* has made these religious opinions limited in effect[15]. This allows the *khawarej* to "cherry pick" the *fatwa* in order to satisfy their flawed *jihadi* cause. However, Saudi scholars remain the most influential among the Sunni community and their *fatwas* are based on evidence stemming from the Qur'an and Sunnah, which can be leveraged alongside policies aimed towards eradicating suicide-terrorism. This dissertation argues that *fatawa* by Sunni jurists can be empowered by shifting from merely providing religious opinions towards mobilizing the masses and labelling Islamic transgressors as modern-day *khawarej.* The fatawa could effectively marginalize the *khawarej* in the Islamic community. Unfortunately, 9/11 placed the West in a trap of labelling Osama Bin-Laden (OBL) as *Salafee/Wahhabi* (Oliver, 2004). Although, Islamic transgressors claim to be *Salafee,* they are not in reality because true *Salafees* should strongly condemn suicide-terrorism (i.e. Commission of Senior Ulema). It is critical to highlight that the West has failed to take advantage of Islamic jurists and their opposition to suicide-terrorism in a society where religion plays a significant role in one's life. Interestingly, Mattson (2001) correctly observes that "Saudi scholars who are Wahhabi have denounced terrorism and denounced, in particular, the acts of September 11" (CNN, 2001).

---

[15] On the other hand, the *fatwa* is a binding verdict issued by the *Imam* (Shiite religious leader) (Freamon, 2003).

Instead, suicide-terrorism is highly revered today by Hezbollah, Hamas, Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaradawi. Qutbism[16] has significantly influenced the ideological foundations of such militant transgressors (Oliver, 2004; Atwan, 2006). The Saudi *Muftees,* on the other hand, denounced suicide-terrorism with *fatawa* based purely on the Qur'an and Sunnah. In contrast, Fadlallah and Al-Qaradawi reflect the interplay between religion and politics, which is more pronounced among Shiite scholars and followers of Qutb. Thus, the convergence between Sunni and Shiite views on suicide-terrorism is specific among Al-Qaradawi, Hamas and Al-Qaeda as opposed to the general Sunni community.

This signifies that religion remains *the* main inspiration in discussing the moral legitimacy of the use of force (Bjola, 2009). From assessing the different *fatawa* regarding suicide-terrorism, one can see that a *fatwa* becomes less contradictory and more powerful when rooted solely in the Qur'an and Sunnah. However, when Islamic jurists allow their surrounding socio/geopolitical landscape to drive them emotionally, their *fatwa* becomes more politicised, enhancing the permissible boundaries of using force outside the boundaries set by the Qur'an and Sunnah. The question then becomes, how can Islam justify *jihad* against Islamic transgressors?

3.3 Issuing a *fatwa* against the *khawarej*

Given that *jihad* is not geared towards non-Muslims, the mechanism authorizing *jihad* against Islamic transgressors falls under the justifiability of fighting the *khawarej.* The *khawarej* have limited understanding of true Islamic teachings but project an outward Islamic devotion through their prayers, fasting and recital of the Qur'an. Ignorant Muslims and non-Muslims perceive this façade as commitment towards Islam.

When Prophet Muhammad was asked about the *khawarej,* he responded by saying that the *khawarej,* "offer *salat* (prayer) in such a way that you will consider your *salat* (prayer) negligible in comparison to theirs and observe *Saum* (fast) in such a way that you will consider your fasting (negligible in comparison) to theirs. They recite the Qur'an but it does not go beyond their throats (i.e., they do not act on it) and they desert Islam" (Bukhari, Hadith no.3610, Book 61, Vol.4). The *khawarej* misinterpret Islam and transgress its religious boundaries, causing *baghy* (injustice)*,* disturbing peace and stability. They further justify suicide-terrorism and *takfeer* (accusing Muslims of apostasy) to attain political objectives through *jihad* that breaches all Islamic rules of warfare while terrorizing the innocent. These acts contradict the Prophets gentle approach, "[159]Out of mercy from God, you [prophet] were gentle in your dealings with them – had you been harsh, or hard-hearted, they would have dispersed and left you" (Qur'an, Family of 'Imran, 3:159). Therefore, the Prophet warns his companions from the *khawarej,* viewing them as foolish individuals that abandon Islam: "there will appear some young foolish people who will use (in their claim) the best speech of all people (i.e., the Qur'an) and they will abandon Islam as an arrow going out through the game" (Bukhari, Hadith no.3611, Book 61, Vol.4).

According to Al-Jahny (2003), *khawarej* are individuals who transgress the right path agreed upon by the Islamic community. In the case of Al-Qaeda, members break from their governing authority – for a Saudi Al-Qaeda member, his governing authority is both the King and Commission of Senior Ulema of Saudi. This becomes problematic when such groups denounce the authority of their governing body by using *takfeer,* and instigate "destructive *jihad* against the whole of mankind" – a problem stemming from Qutbism (Oliver, 2004, p.27). Hence, they secede from the Muslim body as the Prophet stated, "One who quits obeying the ruler and separates from the main body of the Muslims, if he dies in that state, he

---

[16] Qutbism refers to the teaching of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), founder of *al-ikhwan-il-Muslimeen* (Muslim Brotherhood) that emerged during Jamal Abdul-Nasser's era (Oliver, 2004).

will die a death of one belonging to the days of *Jahiliyah*[17] (i.e., would not die as a Muslim)" (Muslim, Hadith 1232, Book 37, Vol. 2).

Nevertheless, Sonn (1990) argues that the *khawarej* employ distinct tactics, "[organizing] in small bands, [striking] quickly and without warning, and [committing] practical assassination without regards for age or gender" (Sonn, 1990, p.136). Such methods reflect strategies employed by Al-Qaeda (1992 Aden attack; 1993 World Trade Centre attack; 1998 US embassy bombing in Kenya; 9/11, etc.). Thus, the Prophet authorized the use of force against the *khawarej*, "so wherever you meet them, kill them, for he who kills them shall get rewarded on the Day of Resurrection" (Bukhari, Hadith no.3611, Book 61, Vol.4).

3.3.a. *Religious diplomacy*

Religious diplomacy provides an opportunity for the misconceived to reassess their erroneous position and improves effectiveness of coercion against the *khawarej*. On the return of Ali ibn Abi-Talib from the Battle of Siffin to Kuffa Iraq on 657 AD, approximately 12,000 of his soldiers turned against him. The *khawarej's* misinterpretation of religious matters led to a false accusation of the Caliph being noncompliant to his religious duties (Al-Shaybani, 2007, vol.3; Ibn-Katheer, 2007, vol.7-8). Consequently, the Caliph successfully employed *religious diplomacy* by sending Abdullah ibn-Abbas as a mediator to deal with the *khawarej*. Ibn-Abbas opened a door of dialogue to examine and falsify their rationale through religious debate. Resultantly, approximately 4,000 men returned to unify their front with Ali ibn Abi-Talib (Ibn-Katheer, 2007, vol.7-8, p.476), thus weakening the opposition's morale. Upon employing *religious diplomacy*, Ali ibn Abi-Talib fought the *khawarej* once they employed violence against the Caliph and terrorized the innocent (Al-Hilali, 2001).

In contemporary history, King Abdulaziz Al-Saud (Ibn-Saud) in the early 20th century employed *religious diplomacy* with the *Ikhwan*[18] who were intolerant to modernization (e.g., telephone, radio, cars, aeroplanes, etc.), non-Muslims and non-*Wahhabi* Muslims (Silverfarb, 1982), who opposed Islam's tolerant approach. They viewed such modernisation "as instruments of the devil" (Silverfarb, 1982, p.228). Given that the *Ikhwan* resisted change and opposed Ibn-Saud's relation with the West, they started revolting and evoked fear across the Arabian Peninsula (Silverfarb, 1982). Failing to reconcile with the *Ikhwan* through employing *religious diplomacy*, Islamic jurists authorized *jihad* against the *khawarej*. Ibn-Saud succeeded in winning the battle against the *Ikhwan* through wars that ended with the *Ikhwan* "leaders and many of the rebel tribesmen [surrendering] to the British forces in Iraq and Kuwait in order to avoid Ibn Sa'ud's wrath" (Silverfarb, 1982, p.246).

Therefore, *religious diplomacy* follows a three-tiered framework. First, Islamic jurists identify transgressors; secondly, *religious diplomacy* is employed to give a window of opportunity for the opposition and their supporters to reassess their positions; finally, and only if necessary, a *fatwa* is issued by an Islamic ruling body (i.e. Saudi Commission of Senior Ulema) proclaiming *jihad* against the *khawarej*. Although a *fatwa* is a non-binding verdict among the Sunni Islamic community, labelling a group as *khawarej* significantly marginalizes the group from the broader Islamic community. Moreover, force is only to be used, if military success is strongly probable within the boundaries of *jus in bello*. Furthermore, governments should not pressure jurists to issue verdicts on groups that oppose government interests. Given the differing opinions of Islamic jurists across the Islamic world, consensus requires constant dialogue among Islamic scholars (at least among the Sunni community in this case). If scholars largely disagree, then labelling a group as *khawarej* may

---

[17] Days of ignorance/pre-Islam.

[18] Has no affiliation to the Egyptian *ikhwan-il-Muslimeen* (Muslim Brotherhood).

engender factions, turning a religious misunderstanding to violent national and international unrest.

4 – AL-QAEDA AND TALIBAN

Because of the Soviet occupation (1979–1989), fragmented groups were united enabling a "unifying sense of political purpose that cut across tribal, ethnic, geographic and economic lines" (Tanner, 2002, p.243). Afghani Mullahs employed defensive *jihad* to mobilize the masses against Soviet occupation. To Washington, *jihad* served to undermine Soviet expansion in Central Asia. Interestingly, Ronald Regan viewed them as, "the moral equivalent of our Founding Fathers" (Lohbeck, 1993, p.161 cited in Sidky, 2007, p.850). To the Afghans, they were simply, the *mujahedeen*. One could see how different actors perceive *jihad* depending on the actors interests within the region.

Rashid (2000) asserts that the wounds in Afghanistan speak loudly to the years of struggle left behind. The war consumed "over 1.5 million people and devastated the country" (Rashid, 2000, p.10). Flocks of Arab Muslims joined alongside the Afghan *mujahedeen* through Maktab Al-Khidamat (MAK), "the service bureau that Abdullah Yusuf Azzam set up in the early 1980s to facilitate young Arabs coming from the Middle East to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan" (Shahzad, 2011, p.xv). After the assassination of Azzam in 1989, MAK was transformed into a global terrorist network known as Al-Qaeda led by OBL. To the Arabs, war in Afghanistan was an opportunity to fight alongside with their Muslim brethren in defending Soviet-occupied lands – offensive *jihad* was *fard-kifaya,* authorized by many Muslim and Arab states (Atwan, 2006). As the Arab and Afghan *mujahedeen* fought the Soviet occupation, "fundraising committees were formed under the Chairmanship of Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz" (Atwan, 2006, p.44). In 1981, Regan's administration increased both its funding and military weaponry to the *mujahedeen* (in the total amount of at least $10 US billion) to combat the Soviets (Rashid, 2000; Global Security, 2004). These were mainly distributed to local agricultural people (Rashid, 2000).

Evidently, the Afghan *mujahedeen* viewed the Arabs as Muslim brothers during a time of need and desperation. The Muslim Brotherhood heavily influenced the Arabs through Azzam's MAK, who was "bin Laden's mentor from his university days" (Atwan, 2006, p.73). Hence, there was an ideological interplay between the Afghan and Arab *mujahedeen* before the emergence of Taliban as a governing authority*,* which influenced the Afghan *mujahedeen* through their linkages to radicals, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu-Hafs al-Misiri that OBL became an integral member to their strategy of global terror (Atwan, 2006, p76). Zawahiri, a follower of Qutb, was also extremely influential to OBL, encouraging him "to break completely with the House of Saud and to become active against it" (Riedel, 2010, p.54). According to Riedel (2010), 1997 was the year the thinker (Zawahiri) found his knight (OBL) to initiate a journey of global terror.

On the television interview show 'Charlie Rose' (2001), Barnett Rubin stated that with the demise of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan served no geopolitical interest to Washington. The US simply turned its back, transforming the country into a "Kalashnikov culture" (Sidik, 2007). It became a region with no authority, where radical anarchic groups violently turned the *mujahedeen* against each other. The Taliban then emerged "when a local strong man raped several girls in the summer of 1994 […] over the next three months the Taliban overran twelve southern provinces as its ranks swelled with thousands of volunteers, primarily Afghan refugees or native Pashtuns" (Tanner, 2002, pp.279-280). The country was transformed to a strict unorthodox form of *sharee'ah* law under the Taliban – admittedly, at least providing a sense of security. A new leadership under Mullah Omar administered "as

much as 90 percent of Afghanistan and controlled the place, it was only recognized by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates" (Bhatia, 2011, p.94). That said, on 'Charlie Rose' (2001) Sayed Rahmatullah Hashimi, Afghanistan's Foreign Ministry representative, argued that the Taliban were successful in, (a) unifying a fragmented country after the Soviet retreat; (g) eradicating the opium trade and (c) disarming the civilians.

Within Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda found refuge. The Taliban harboured and supported the Arab *mujahedeen* who politically and financially supported Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation before the emergence of the Taliban. Although OBL had no authority in issuing a *fatwa,* he declared one in February 1998 and advocated for the murder of US citizens and initiating war against the US (Kleiner, 2006; Riedel, 2010). The US wanted Taliban commitment that Afghan soil would not be used to harbour terrorism and hoped to turn OBL in to Saudi authorities (Kleiner, 2006; Riedel, 2010). The US simply used a stick with no carrot. Taliban's Prime Minister, Mullah Rabbani claimed that "Bin Laden was their guest and they would monitor his activity" (Riedel, 2010, p.70). According to Hashimi on 'Charlie Rose' (2001), the Taliban offered the US State Department three proposals to help formulate a solution to the OBL case. First, OBL would be put on trial if the US provided evidence of his terrorist activity involvement. Second, Hashimi contested that if the US viewed OBL as a threat, they should send a monitoring group to observe OBL's activities and whereabouts. In the Taliban's third proposal, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and a third Muslim country elected by the US would decide on OBL's future. This enables the Taliban to have enough proof that OBL presents a threat to their security. All offers were explicitly rejected by the US (Charlie Rose, 2001).

The last attempt by the Taliban, which was to send Hashimi to open a door of negotiations with the US, only became *a fruitless attempt* (Charlie Rose, 2001). Hashimi recognized that the US had the right to fear its security, but the Taliban also needed a legitimate reason to prosecute OBL. Such legitimacy fails to provide the US the right to unilaterally strike OBL on Afghan soil without coordinating with the Taliban. Hashimi asserts that unilateral decisions simply aggravate the intensity of the situation which made OBL a hero in the eyes of many Afghans (Charlie Rose, 2001).

Pakistan, on the other hand, shares 1,560 km of borders with Afghanistan, yet positions most of its military capability on the Indian border (Riedel, 2010). Maintaining good diplomatic terms with the Taliban politically serve their internal security interests. Pakistan did not exert pressure on Taliban to hand over OBL to Saudi authorities. But what further weakened Mullah Omar's position was the strategically timed Al-Qaeda assassination of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the Northern Alliance leader days before 9/11. This act ensured that if a counter-attack were to ensue, the threat from the Northern Alliance would be removed, and Al-Qaeda would have one enemy to deal with (US). This interplay between Al-Qaeda and Taliban stems from historical experiences that viewed members of Al-Qaeda as supporters of the Afghan cause during the Soviet occupation, which could not be overturned overnight without continuous negotiations.

4.2 *What if*

After 9/11, a delegation from Pakistan headed by General Fiaz Gilani from the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) was sent "to convince Omar to give up bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda associates" (Tanner, 2002, p.292). This was an opportunity for Taliban to negotiate and bargain "diplomatic recognition, cessation of foreign support for the Northern Alliance and a resumption of foreign aid" (Tanner, 2002, p.292). The 9/11 created the proper "ripeness" (Wilkenfeld, 2005) to diffuse growing tension between Taliban and Washington through exerting diplomatic pressure to achieve outcomes yet to be realized by Operation-Enduring-Freedom. A delegation of mediators should have been headed by a mix of diplomatic experts

from countries that recognized Taliban as a government: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), headed by Lakhdar Brahimi, the former UN Special Representative to Afghanistan. What would strengthen the delegations is including Islamic jurists from the Saudi Commission of Senior Ulema who denounced suicide-terrorism even before 9/11. Despite their critical importance, American policy makers largely ignored their views on "suicide-terrorism" before and after 9/11. Given that Saudi Islamic jurists are highly respected in Sunni Arab and non-Arab Islamic countries, they would exert significant leverage over Taliban that recognizes *sharee'ah* law as the only form of ruling. By leveraging Saudi jurists, and their *fatawa* on suicide-terrorism, the delegation could significantly enhance diplomatic effectiveness before enacting force. They would then be able to succeed by aligning the Islamic world with the West in an effort to eradicate terrorism, and thus, sever Taliban from Al-Qaeda multilaterally, as opposed to a US-dominated unilateral approach – a problem with the Bush Doctrine (Jervis, 2005).

The US was fixated on advancing its coercive foreign policy to maintain security of its national and foreign interests irrespective of the international law (i.e., Covert action (Stempel, 2007)), undermining the positive 20th century diplomatic evolution of the *raison de système* (Watson, 2004; Sharp, 2009; Sasson, 1998). When the coercer sees force as the only option against the target (Art & Cronin, 2003), he weakens the power of diplomacy. The recognition of Taliban as a legitimate Afghan government or even acknowledging their effort to re-stabilize the state of anarchy after the Soviet retreat would have been a carrot for the Taliban to assess the cost of not severing their links with Al-Qaeda. Diplomatic recognition does not entail an agreement with Taliban's radical Islamic views, but opening a channel of communication is critical to achieve global stability. Without the carrot, Mullah Omar had no incentive to surrender OBL.

The plausibility of this counterfactual does not "violate our understanding of what is "realistic," or even conceivable" (Lebow, 2010, p.45). Consequently, this paper does not allude to a scenario of "no war" post 9/11, but refining their effectiveness of dealing with the *khawarej* through incorporating Islamic law against an Islamic target. The foundation of plausibility does not create a problem of compounded probability in this case (Lebow, 2010). Instead, this paper follows Max Weber's recommendation of "minimal" and "plausible rewrites" of history (Cited in Piatti & Hurni, 2009; Lebow 2010) in which the basics of a successful path of employing *religious diplomacy* existed during 9/11. There are multiple reasons to accept *religious diplomacy*. First, the Taliban was recognized by a few states to give it a form of legitimacy to enable a possible dialogue post 9/11. Second, the views of Commission of Senior Ulema in Saudi condemned the practice of suicide-terrorism before and after 9/11. Third, 9/11 created the moment of diplomatic "ripeness" (Wilkenfeld, 2005) for the Islamic world and the West to collaborate and strengthen their position against such evil (suicide-terrorism). Fourth, in March 2001, the Taliban sent Sayed Rahmatullah Hashimi to discuss with the US state department a solution to the OBL case (Charlie Rose, 2001), reflecting some form of appetite by the Taliban to attain international diplomatic recognition. Fifth, given that Pakistan shares 1,560 km of border with Afghanistan, maintaining a stable Afghanistan serves Pakistan's best interest. They would have kept their military position on the Indian border without disturbing the *status quo* of their policy towards the predominantly-Pashtun tribes on the Afghan border. In fact, what makes *religious diplomacy* plausible in this case is that, in reality, the alternative root for Pakistan is to maintain stability internally within Pakistan and the tribal areas through avoiding an ethnic conflict between the dominant Punjabi population in Pakistan and the Pashtuns on the Afghan border[19] (BBC, 2012(b)). *Religious diplomacy* would serve as a first path of dialogue with the Taliban to retain stability

---

[19] The Punjabi and Pashtun make 44.68% and 15.42% of Pakistan's population respectively (CIA, 2012).

within its own Pashtun-dominated borders. When Pakistan aligned itself with the Bush administration, Pakistan faced further issues in maintaining, "control over the restive tribal regions along the Afghan border, where Taliban-linked militants became firmly entrenched" (BBC, 2012(b)). In fact, "sending Punjabi soldiers into Pashtun territory to fight jihadists pushes the country ever closer to an ethnically defined civil war" (TWP, 2009). Sixth, and extremely critical, within Afghanistan resides a form of "assembly of founders" (Taizi, 2007) known as *Loya Jirga* in which tribal and religious leaders and scholars discuss, "nationally vital issues, general guidelines, domestic and foreign policies of the state and elect leadership of the country" (Taizi, 2007). In fact, on 'Charlie Rose' (2001), Hashimi contested that the council of scholars pressured Mullah Omar to destroy the Buddhas of Bamiyan, which provides evidence that a form of *religious diplomacy* through the council of scholars would have placed pressure on the Taliban to sever their ties with OBL.

Therefore, a delegation of mediators, coupled with jurists from the Saudi Commission of Senior Ulema employing Islamic reasoning through *religious diplomacy,* would have opened communication to find acceptable agreements between Taliban and Washington. By issuing a *fatwa* upon 9/11 explicitly targeting members of Al-Qaeda as modern-day *khawarej* (for the inhumane attack on the US)*,* it is then possible to mobilize the Muslim masses against Al-Qaeda. Given that the term *khawarej* is not utilized often, due to fears of mistakenly labelling Islamic groups as such, the term would seriously denounce Al-Qaeda is a full-fledged Islamic transgressor. Al-Qaeda failed to adhere to the Islamic teachings regarding *jihad,* and they explicitly rejected international agreements by disobeying the ruler Islamic scholars. In that regard, by utilizing *religious diplomacy* directly with the Taliban and indirectly through the *Loya Jirga* to exert further pressure on Taliban in a similar manner employed by Ali ibn Abi-Talib against the *khawarej* of his time. Therefore, the delegation would convey to the Taliban and *Loya Jigra* that Al-Qaeda embodies characteristics of modern-day *khawarej*. If this first form of soft offense fails to break Al-Qaeda's first line of defence (Taliban), targeted coercion would follow.

The Taliban are considered an extreme authority utilizing unorthodox forms of *sharee'ah* law. However, labelling them as *khawarej* without employing *religious diplomacy* and giving them a window of opportunity along the *Loya Jirga* to reassess their position does not eradicate the root influence on their ideological and religious views (Al-Qaeda). Nonetheless, Taliban are not a small, easily eradicable force. They are backed by a sizable 38% of the Afghan population (CNN, 2009). Therefore, coercion becomes ineffective without employing *religious diplomacy* as a first step, or else, war on terror becomes mere "turkey-shoot" (Ignatieff, 2000, p.161).

Evidently, the US views OBL as a threat to its security, while the Taliban views internal security, diplomatic recognition and future prosperity of Afghanistan as their key concerns. OBL might have been the carrot keeping the US interested in Afghanistan, but the US could have first resorted to soft-power tactics, "the ability to affect others to obtain the outcome one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. A country's soft power rests on its resources of culture, values and policies" (Nye, 2008, p.94). The US would have indirectly spread democratic values through leveraging countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and UAE to act as a bridge between the Taliban and Washington. Simply, democracy cannot be achieved overnight; it requires constant dialogue, persuasion, communication and effective mediation tactics beyond an ideological war as a first step to eradicate Al-Qaeda's global terror. However, it would probably be more effective and less costly to employ *religious diplomacy*, followed by, if necessary, targeted coercion. Because the US bypassed the crucial step of *religious diplomacy* against the *khawarej,* a decade of war on terror failed to eradicate Al-Qaeda and the roots of suicide-terrorism. Instead it strengthened the grip of the *khawarej* on their supporters globally. Hence, "between 2000 and

2007, the number of attacks rose steadily each year, from 54 in 2001 to 71 in 2002, 81 in 2003, 104 in 2004, 348 in 2005, 353 in 2006, and 535 in 2007" (Moghadam, 2008, p.33).

The brutality of war increased the support of terrorism in the region, a by-product of one-sided foreign policy not tailored to the Islamic world. The militarized US foreign policy stand towards Afghanistan solidified the position of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The lack of soft power (Nye, 2008) and the brutality of war worked against US efforts in bringing democracy to and eradicating terrorism in the region. Simply, it proved to the Afghans that the West has no interest in the safety of Afghanistan and the Islamic world in general.

Furthermore, the problem in US policy stems from homogenizing Al-Qaeda and Taliban. The Taliban are predominately from the Pashtun tribe, thus associating Al-Qaeda with the Taliban manifests itself as a war on Islam, and not a war on terror. Muslim countries found difficulty waging war against the Taliban before initiating *religious diplomacy* followed by targeted force against the *khawarej*. Resultantly, this approach would encourage countries of the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) including Pakistan to support eradicating Al-Qaeda as opposed to initiating a full-fledged war on everyone!

And most importantly, Al-Qaeda should not be the driving force behind instigating Islamophobic feelings across the world. Such fear results in inappropriate policy formulations towards the Islamic world (Amr & Singer, 2008). Eradicating terrorism in the Islamic world should be achieved through a process of inclusion and leveraging contributions from Islam. Interestingly, this paper shows that Islam holds a possible solution to eradicating Islamic groups utilizing suicide-terrorism tactics. However, this is only possible if the West does not shun Muslim jurists, specifically from Saudi Arabia. By utilizing their *fatwas* regarding suicide-terrorism and cooperating against Al-Qaeda, the outcome of the US effort to eradicate terrorism would probably differ.

Moreover, the US has failed in finding the roots of influence on Al-Qaeda members. Although OBL and 15 of the 19 hijackers of the 9/11 incident come from Saudi Arabia, this does not mean that the problem stems from what the West inappropriately labels as *Salafee/Wahhabi* (Oliver, 2004). Instead, OBL and other members of Al-Qaeda are heavily influenced by Qutbism (Oliver, 2004). In fact, OBL strongly ties himself to Qutb and his ideologies, formulated through teachings of Marx, Lenin and the French Revolution (Oliver, 2004). Those views were planted in his reform principles strongly covered by his 'religious' radical belief. As Qutbism first emerged in Egypt, it became a sign of religious struggle due to the ignorance of Islamic knowledge, which provided an opportunity for such radical ideologies to be accepted by the marginalized. As the struggles in Palestine, Lebanon and the Islamic world became daily routine in the lives of many Muslims, ignorance about Islam made such movements extremely appealing. Their views in respect to *jihad*, however, are not morally, ethically nor Islamicly acceptable.

The solution to fight Al-Qaeda resides within religion itself, and stabilizing Afghanistan cannot be solely achieved coercively without *religious diplomacy* with the Taliban. Today the Taliban are re-emerging as a strong force once again, sadly, with stronger ties to Al-Qaeda, and even stronger support to suicide-terrorism (NYT, 2009; BBC, 2012(a)). Islamic transgressors are now emerging at a point where the Western world is facing extreme economic fragility. Three factors could lead to a successful application of *religious diplomacy.* First both time and "ripeness" are required (Wilkenfeld, 2005). The effectiveness of religious *diplomacy* would be undermined because of their conflicting ideological tensions between the West and Islamic world. What exacerbates these ideological tensions is the unilateral imposition of Western norms and values on the Islamic world. Second, a genuine multilateral cooperation between Western and Islamic states is crucial. Finally, with the current US economic difficulties and (particularly) with US over stretched federal budget, a "pull back from overseas commitments" (MacDonald & Parent, 2011, p.7) would be

inevitable due to its costly nature. Thus, *religious diplomacy* is the diplomatic mechanism that could multilaterally bridge what is considered an ideological gap between the West and Islamic world. Although there were attempts to open channels of communication between the Taliban and Washington through Qatar (TWT, 2012), the attempt was curtailed due to decades of fruitless war that undermined the American image among average Afghans. A step in the right direction after 9/11 was the General Assembly and Security Council's adoption of a "series of binding resolutions setting out policies and strategies for countering terrorism" (Ramcharan, 2008, p.187). However, what the international community needs is to adopt a mechanism to embrace different religious principles, consider a religious approach and leverage mainstream Islamic scholars especially when dealing with the Islamic world. JWT has been a guiding principle in the formation of the UN charter (Chapter VIII[20]), but as the world becomes more globalized and the wave of decolonization and independence increases the number of states within the UN (Lauren, 1994), Western Christian powers no longer carry the "white man's burden." Understanding differing value systems is essential in addressing future problems of our time. The key to tackling Islamic extremism is not through marginalizing Islam, but through finding a solution within Islam to justify using force against Islamic extremism. Simply, the answer resides not in ignoring religious underpinnings, but instead, in approaching them headfirst—as we should our deepest fears.

---

[20] Action With Respect to Threats of The Peace, Breaches of The Peace, and Acts of Aggression.

5 – CONCLUSION

This dissertation has examined how and when Islamic teachings influence the *khawarej* through *religious diplomacy*. This method justifies the use of force, contingent on diplomacy failing against the *khawarej.* They instigate destructive *jihad* (Oliver, 2004) against the innocent while perpetuating Western views that equate terrorism with Islam. The analysis further shows that the problem with suicide-terrorism does not reside within Islam *per se,* but with ignorance in religion and political desires masked under religious connotations. If Islamic jurists from the Saudi Commission of Senior Ulema had issued a verdict immediately after 9/11, not only denouncing the attacks, but also stressing the *fatwa* by asserting that Al-Qaeda embodies modern-day *khawarej,* they could have marginalized the *khawarej* within the Islamic community. More importantly, leveraging *religious diplomacy* as a first form of soft offense against Al-Qaeda would have effectively undermined their supportive cushion (Taliban). Furthermore, Operation-Enduring-Freedom has failed to liberate the Islamic world from the bondage of suicide-terrorism, a by-product of a flawed one-sided foreign policy. Unfortunately, the West misguidedly linked suicide-terrorism to *Salafee/Wahhabi* Islam (Oliver, 2004) without properly understanding (a) the true force of ideological influence on Al-Qaeda, (b) the Islamic view on suicide-terrorism or (c) how the socio/geopolitical landscape in the Islamic world both fostered and normalized such a poisonous social construct. This dissertation has shed light on the historical roots of suicide-terrorism in Islam, the differing *fatawa* regarding suicide-terrorism and the limitations of issuing such verdicts. Although jurists differ on suicide-terrorism against Israel, they maintained consistency in denouncing the 9/11 incident. In particular, Saudi jurists from the Commission of Senior Ulema have been the strongest condemners of suicide-terrorism even before 9/11. They oppose suicide-terrorism universally, whether against Israel or any other perceived target, and call for nation-states to contain such evil.

The question becomes, was *religious diplomacy* to the best interest of the American foreign policy in the region a decade earlier? Given the sophisticated US intelligence forces, it is reasonable to doubt if the administration lacked the understanding of the internal struggles and discourse within the Islamic community. As my empirical assessment suggests, an internal approach to suicide-terrorism within the Islamic community could aid the limitations to some aspects of Western ideologies. Furthermore, the closer the proximity of jurists to conflict-ridden regions with apparent military inequality, the more they become supportive of suicide-terrorism as a means to defeating a perceived enemy (i.e., Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda). Consequently, when religion is fused with politics, the restrictions on the use of force weaken (Bjola, 2009). Although Al-Qaradawi is not directly in a warzone, his religious opinions have been politicized by Qutb's revolutionary and radical Islamic views. Such views act as foundations to Al-Qaeda's destructive global *jihad* (Oliver, 2004). Instead, the counterterror attack altered the positive development of an evolving diplomatic culture that was part of an American political life (Wiseman, 2005). Evidently, there was a shift from diplomacy as a means of attaining political ends towards immediate untargeted use of force. The use of force reflected an "ideological turn under President George W. Bush in the aftermath of terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001" (Wiseman, 2005, p.415). Subsequently, the US administration resorted to 'hard power,' as oppose to 'soft power' as a diplomatic method (Nye, 2004; 2008). That said, the US was justified in waging war against Al-Qaeda, but success requires cooperation with the Islamic world and the use of Islamic reasoning on groups such as Taliban.

As a result of the unfocused coercive approach against Al-Qaeda and Taliban, "justice" has significantly inflicted more pain on innocent civilians than the initial war

objectives. Therefore, the counterterror attacks transgressed beyond-proportionate means on one hand and failed to discriminate between combatant and non-combatants on another (Crawford, 2003). As Hartigan notes, "it is not permitted to employ unjust means in order to win even a just war" (1967, p.204). Additionally, Burke (2004) argues that, "Moral discourses have been used to brush aside concerns about the disproportionately high level of civilian casualties incurred during US and Northern Alliance operations against Taliban and Al-Qaeda" (Burke, 2004, p.330). Hence, the problem is not in the moral framework and guidelines advised by JWT, but the fusion of morality into politically driven agendas, which dilutes the moral basis of such arguments.

Nevertheless, the lack of Islamic knowledge increased dependence of Muslims on personal value systems. The unjust situations witnessed in the Muslim world have all led to this flawed concept of a violent *jihad*. This movement was fuelled by emotions and desires rather than by divine orders. In Islam, blindly following anyone is a serious crime. Muslims are compelled to verify Islamic facts by researching its source to avoid misguidance, "[6]Belivers, if a troublemaker brings you news, check it first, in case you wrong others unwittingly and later regret what you have done" (Qur'an, The Dwellings, 49:6).

Therefore, Islamic and Western states need to acknowledge and utilize knowledgeable scholars who can spread this awareness and propagate the correct understanding of the religion. Muslims need preachers who can effectively convey the importance of religion and the mentality of seeking knowledge to refine oneself, "[9]How can those who know be equal to those who do not know? Only those who have understanding will take heed" (Qur'an, The Throngs, 39:9).

At present, the core competency of the Islamic belief system, which is steadfastness to God's orders through documented evidence of the Qur'an, Sunnah and the understanding of the Prophet's disciples, is often completely disregarded in order to achieve personal goals or worldly benefits. God has mentioned in his holy book that the religion he sent down is complete and that there will be no further changes, no additions nor deletions. This is the light by which he guides his finest creation, mankind. So why do the *khawarej* then still insist on adhering to their imperfect minds and biased desires?, "[71]but if the truth were in accordance with their desires, the heavens, the earth, and everyone in them would disintegrate" (Qur'an, The Believers, 23:71).

Thus, given that Islamic extremism will remain a problem for the foreseeable future, *religious diplomacy* becomes critically essential in dealing with countries using unorthodox forms of *sharee'ah* law in one hand, and leveraging non-Islamic means of warfare on another. Resultantly, *religious diplomacy* gives the misconceived an opportunity to reassess their position, and therefore, it improves the effectiveness of coercion against Islamic transgressors.

REFERENCES CITED

Al-Jahny, M., 2003. *Al-Mawso'a el-Moyasara fee Al-adyanwa Al-Matha'hibwa Al-ahzab el-moa'sera, vol.2.* Riyadh: Dar Al-Nadwa for Printing, Publishing and Distributing

Al-Bukhari, M., 1997. *The Translation of the Meaning of Sahih Al-Bukhari,Vol.1,4,9.* Riyadh: Darussalam Publishers and Distributors

Al-Fawzaan, S.,2005. *An Explanation of Aspects of the Days of Ignorance*. NY: Al-Ibaanah Book Publishing

Al-Hilali, S., 2001. *Al Magalat Al Salafeya Fee Al Ag'eeda wa Al-da'wa wa Al-manhaj wa Al-wa'gee.* Ajman: Al-Furqan

Aljazeea, 2010, "Na's Fatwa Markaz Al-Albani Behermat Al-Amaleyat Al-Enteharey'ah" January 10. Online available at: http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/5fe8782a-6ff0-49db-92f4-f71ea9044f9d (Accessed May 12, 2012)

Al-Othman, H., I., 2010. *Al-Jihad Anwa'ohwaAh'kamo.* Hawali: MaktabatAhl Al-Athar

Al-Shaybani, M., 2007. *Al-Kamil Fee Al-Tareekh.*Beirut: Dar Al-Marefah Printing & Publishing

Amr, H., and Singer, P., 2008. "To Win the War on Terror,' we must first win the 'War of Ideas': Here's how," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol. 618(1): 212-222

Answering-Extremism, n.d. "Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani: Description of the Khawarej," Online available at: http://www.answering-extremism.com/trans-pub/ae_mnaa_2.pdf (Accessed: April 24, 2012)

Art, R., & Cronin, P., M., 2003. *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy.* Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press

Ashraf, M., I., 2008. *Islamic Philosophy of War and Peace.* Bloomington, IN; iUniverse

Atwan, A., B., 2006. *The Secret History of Al Qaeda.* London: Saqi

BBC, 2012(a), "Afghanistan suicide blasts 'kill 18' in Herat, Helmand" April 10. Online, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17660785 (Accessed: April 23, 2012)

BBC, 2012(b), "Pakistan Profile" February 7. Online, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12965779 (Accessed: May 13, 2012)

BBC, 2003. "Cleric condemns suicide attacks," July 11. Online, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3059365.stm (Accessed: March 2, 2012)

Bellamy, A., J., 2008. "The Responsibilities of Victory: and the Just War," *Review of International Studies,* Vol.34(4): pp.601-625

Bhatia, M., 2007. "The Future of the Mujahideen: Legitimacy, Legacy and Demobilization in Post-Bonn Afghanistan," *International Peacekeeping,*Vol.14(1): pp.90-107

Bjola, C., 2009. *Legitimising the use of force in international politics: Kosovo, Iraq and the ethics of intervention.* London; New York: Routledge

Burke, A., 2004. "Just War or Ethical Peace? Moral Discourses of Strategic Violence after 9/11," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-),* Vol.80(2): pp.329-353

Burrell, D., B., 2004. "Thomas Aquinas and Islam," *Modern Theology,*Vol.20(1): pp.71-89

'Charlie Rose' 2000. *A Conversation About Recent Events in Afghanistan,* television broadcast, PBS Television, March 26 (Accessed: March 12, 2012)

CIA, 2012, "The World Factbook," May 9. Online available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html (Accessed: May 20, 2012)

CNN, 2009. "Afghanistan's Ethnic Diversity," August 19. Online, available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/08/17/afghanistan.ethnic.groups/index.html (Accessed: March 16, 2012)

CNN, 2001. "Ingrid Mattson: What is Islam?" October 18. Online, available at: http://archives.cnn.com/2001/COMMUNITY/10/18/mattson.cnna/(Accessed: March 20, 2012)

Crawford, N., C., 2003. "Just War Theory and the U.S. Counterterror War," *Perspective on Politics,*Vol.1(1): pp.5-25

Cronin, A., K., 2002/2003. "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," *International Security,*Vol.27(3): pp. 30-58

Foucault, M., 2008. "Two Lectures," in Steven C. Roach (ed.) *Critical Theory and International Relations: A Reader*. London: Routledge

Freamon, B., K., 2003. "Martyrdom, Suicide, and the Islamic Law of War: A Short Legal History," *Fordham International Law Journal,* Vol.27(1): pp. 299-369

Forster, M., N., 2007. "Hermeneutics" in Rosen, M., & Leiter, M., *The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Global Security, 2004. "Afghanistan 1979-1992," Online, available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/ops/afghanistan.htm (Accessed: March 10, 2010)

Harik J., P., 2004. *Hezbollah: The Changing Force of Terrorism.* I. B. Tauris, London and New YorkHartigan, R., S., 1967. "Noncombatant Immunity: Reflections on Its Origins and Present Status," *The Review of Politics,* Vol.29(2): pp.204-220

Horowirz, M., C., 2010. "Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism," *International Organization,*Vol.64(1): pp. 33-64

IbnBaz, A., 1990. "Responsibilities of the Seekers of Knowledge," Online, available at: http://www.alifta.net/Search/ResultDetails.aspx?lang=en&view=result&fatwaNum=&FatwaNumID=&ID=907&searchScope=14&SearchScopeLevels1=&SearchScopeLevels2=&highLight=1&SearchType=exact&SearchMoesar=false&bookID=&LeftVal=0&Ri

ghtVal=0&simple=&SearchCriteria=allwords&PagePath=&siteSection=1&searchkeyword=119104111032099097110032105115115117101032102097116119097#firstKeyWordFound (Accessed: April 20, 2012)

IbnKatheer, I., 2007. *Al-BedayaWa al-Nehaya: Al-Kholafa Al-Rashedoon, Vol.7-8.* Damascus-Beirut: IbnKatheer Publications

IbnKatheer, I., 2003. *Tafseer IbnKatheer, Vol.1,3,6.* Riyadh: Darussalam Publishers and Distributors

IbnTaymiyyah, A., 2000. *The Friends of Allah & The Friends of Shaytaan.* Birmingham: Daar us-Sunnah Publications

IbnTaymiyyah, A., 1404 Hijiri (1984). *Majm'oFatawa Shaikh Al Islam Ahmed IbnTaymiyyah, Vol.28.* Cairo: Department of Military Survey

Ignatieff, M., 2000. *Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond,* London: Chatto & Windus

Iqbal, A., 1965. *Diplomacy in Islam: An Essay on the Art of Negotiations as Conceived and Developed by the Prophet of Islam.* Lahore: Zarreen Art Press

Jervis, R., 2005. "Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained," *Political Science Quarterly,*Vol.120(3): pp.351-377

Johnson, J., T., 1999.*Morality and Contemporary Warfare.* New Haven; London: Yale University Press

Kelsay, J., 2007. *Arguing the Just War in Islam.* Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press

Kleiner, J., 2006. "Diplomacy with Fundamentalists: The United States and the Taliban," *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy,* Vol.1(3):pp.209-234

Kramer, M., 1994. "Hizbullah: The Calculus of Jihad," *Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,* Vol.47(8): pp.20-43

Lauren, P., G., 1994. "The Diplomats and Diplomacy of the United Nations" in Craig, G., A., & Loewenheim, F., L., *The Diplomats 1939-1979.* Princeton: Princeton University Press

Lebow, R. N., 2010. *Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations.* Princeton: Princeton University Press

Lohbeck, K., 1993. *Holy War, Unholy Victory: Eyewitness to the CIA's Secret War in Afghanistan.* Washington. DC: Regnery Gateway

Macdonald, P., K., & Parent, J., M., 2011. "Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment," International Security, Vol.35(4): pp.7-44

Mitzen, J., 2006. "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma," *European Journal of International Relations,* 12/3: pp. 341-370

Moghadam, A., 2008. "Motives for Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks," *International Security,*Vol.33(3): pp.46-78

Munir, M., 2008. "Suicide Attacks and Islamic Law," *International Review of the Red Cross,*Vol.90(869): pp.71-89

Muslim, A., 2000. *The Translation of the Meanings of Summarized Sahih Muslim, vol. 1&2.*Riyadh: Darussalam Publishers and Distributors

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, July, 22. Online, available at: http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm (Accessed: March 3, 2012)

New York Times, 2009. "Taliban Open Northern Front in Afghanistan," November 26. Online, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/27/world/asia/27kunduz.html?pagewanted=all (Accessed: March 17, 2012)

Nye, J., 2008. "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol.616(1): pp.94-109

Nye, J., 2004. "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly,* 119(2): pp. 255-270

Oliver, H., J., 2004. *The Wahhabi Myth.*Toronto: T.R.O.I.D. Publications

Okaz, 2009. "Al-Fowzan: El Montaheroon eb esm el jihad hom min atab'a al shaytan," April 22. Online, available at: http://www.okaz.com.sa/okaz/osf/20090423/Con20090423272492.htm (Accessed: March 2, 2010)

Piatti, B., & Hurni, L., "Mapping the Ontological Unreal – Counterfactual Spaces in Literature and Cartography," *The Cartographic Journal,* Vol.46(4): pp.333-342

Ramcharan, B., G., 2008. *Preventative Diplomacy at the UN.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press

Rashid, A., 2000. *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. New* Haven: London: Yale University Press

Religion & Ethics, 2002. *Cover Story: Anti-Islam,* December, 20. Online, available at: http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/week616/cover.html (Accessed: March 10, 2012)

Reuter, C., 2004. *My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing.* Princeton, NJ; Oxford: Princeton University Press

Riedel, B., 2010. *The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology, and Future.* Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press

Sachedina, A., A., 1990. "The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation and History" in Johnson, J., T., & Kelsey, J., *Cross, Crescent, and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition*. New York; London: Greenwood

Salafi Publications, n.d. "Shaikh Ibn Uthaimeen on Committing Suicide Attacking The Enemy by Blowing Oneself Up In a Car," Online available at:

http://www.spubs.com/sps/sp.cfm?subsecID=MNJ14&articleID=MNJ140003&articlePages=1 (Accessed: March 10, 2012)

Salafi Publications,n.d.(a), "Shaikh al-Albaanee: Debate with a Jihadi," Online available at: http://www.spubs.com/sps/sp.cfm?subsecID=IBD17&articleID=IBD170004&articlePages=4(Accessed: April 20, 2012)

Salafi Publications,n.d.(b), "Shaykh al-Albaanee on Suicide Bombings," Online available at: http://www.spubs.com/sps/downloads/pdf/MNJ140007.pdf (Accessed: May 12, 2012)

Sasson, S., 1988. "Old and New Diplomacy: A Debate Revisited," *Review of International Studies,* 14: 195-211

Shahzad, S., S., 2011. *Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bind Laden and 9/11.* London: Pluto Press

Sharp, P., 2009. *Diplomatic Theory of International Relations.* Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press

Sidky, H., 2007. "War, Changing Patterns of Warfare, State Collapse, and Transnational Violence in," *Modern Asian Studies,* Vol.41(4): pp.849-888

Silverfarb, D., 1982. "Great Britain, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia: The Revolt of the Ikhwan, 1927-1930," *The International History Review*, Vol.4(2): pp.222-248

Smock, D., R., 2003. *Religious Perspectives on War.* Washington, DC.; United States Institute of Peace

Sonn, T., 1990. "Irregular Warfare and Terrorism in Islam: Asking the Right Questions" in Johnson, J., T., & Kelsey, J., *Cross, Crescent, and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition*. New York; London: Greenwood

Stempel, J., D., 2007. "Covert Action and Diplomacy," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence,* Vol.20(1): pp.122-145

Taizi, S., 2007. *Jirga System in Tribal Life.* Online, available at: http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-TAC/Jirga%20System%20in%20Tribal%20Life.pdf (Accessed May 13, 2012)

Tanner, S., 2009. *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War Against the Taliban.* New York: Da Capo

The Qur'an: A New Translation by M.A.S Abdel Haleem, 2004. Oxford: Oxford University Press

The Washington Post, 2012. "The Fault Line Between Pashtuns and Punjabis in Pakistan." May 11. Online, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/10/AR2009051001959.html (Accessed: May 13, 2012)

The Washington Times, 2012. "Afghan Taliban to open Qatar office for peace talks," January 3. Online, available at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/3/afghan-taliban-to-open-qatar-office-for-peace-talk/?page=all (Accessed: May 13, 2012)

United Nations. 1945. *Charter of the United Nations.* Online, available at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ (Accessed April 22, 2012)

Watson, A., 2004. *Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States.* London: Routledge

Wilkenfeld, J., *et al* (eds.), 2005. *Mediating International Crisis.* New York: Routledge

Wiseman, G., 2005. "Pax Americana: Bumping into Diplomatic Culture," *International Studies Perspectives,* vol.6(3): pp. 409-430