IT Brew’s Post

A new "EUCLEAK" flaw found in FIDO devices using the Infineon SLE78 security microcontroller, like Yubico's YubiKey 5 Series, allows attackers to extract Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) secret keys and clone the FIDO device. [...]

The explosion of internet usage has made it increasingly difficult and expensive for governments to monitor internet traffic and identify threats. Therefore cost effective network monitoring solutions, with mission critical reliability, are required for governments to effectively protect their citizens and their national interests. HUBER+SUHNER Polatis is at the forefront of delivering mission-critical optical switching solutions to enhance network monitoring and surveillance to combat cyber threats.  Learn more about Polatis optical circuit switch: https://bit.ly/3HM0zso #networksecurity #networkmonitoring

The Eclypsium research team recently disclosed a vulnerability that allows for arbitrary code execution during boot when Secure Boot is enabled in Getac-branded computers produced in 2016 or later. Our latest blog discusses how threat actors could be specifically targeting the first-responder industries that most often use the rugged computing devices Getac manufactures, and how Eclypsium recommends the threat risks be mitigated. https://bit.ly/4c5cwaI

This highly technical exercise in noise control takes me back to my time working on the Cray/Sun E10K, a technological beast of its era that continually produced one-bit memory errors. These errors were adeptly managed with error-correcting code, and we suppressed displaying the constant error messages to avoid causing concern among our clients. #quantumcomputing #cybersecurity

We want to inform you that we (luckily) do not use Infineon chips, which are affected by the EUCLEAK side-channel attack identified by NinjaLabs. This attack exploits a vulnerability related to the extended Euclidean algorithm used in modular inversion. The chips we use, including those from TMC, TSMC, and NXP (in some models), do not rely on this algorithm and are therefore not susceptible to the EUCLEAK vulnerability. This type of attack is well-known and has been addressed with existing mitigations. For users with FIDO2 keys from other manufacturers that use the vulnerable chips, setting and enforcing a strong PIN, along with enabling the always_uv setting, can effectively prevent exploitation of this vulnerability. Detailed information can be found here: https://lnkd.in/ezk8cvFc 

Where Is Computer Bios Stored Leveraging a secure chip, the storage location of Computer BIOS is a vital mystery waiting to be unraveled. https://lnkd.in/ehtvVCax

Hear more about post quantum cryptography that doesn’t compromise performance in our joint webinar with Intel tomorrow. Register here: https://lnkd.in/egshsu-N #intel #quantumsafe #defence #telco #IoT #networks #IPsec #networksecurity

“Our work unearths a side-channel vulnerability in the cryptographic library of Infineon Technologies. This vulnerability – that went unnoticed for 14 years and about 80 highest-level Common Criteria certification evaluations – is due to a non constant-time modular inversion. The attack requires physical access to the secure element in order to extract the ECDSA secret key. In the case of the FIDO protocol, this allows to create a clone of the FIDO device.” Great research and write up by NinjaLab ! 👏 And one more important point: “[…] it is still safer to use your YubiKey or other impacted products as FIDO hardware authentication token to sign in to applications rather than not using one.” https://lnkd.in/ejniS265

☝️ Facts about AES 🔹 It was established in 2001 for the U.S. Government to use 🔹 #AES supports key lengths of 128, 192, or 256 bits 🔹 It will take billions of years to crack AES on existing or near-future hardware Understand AES on #Lu0Bot example ⬇️ https://lnkd.in/enb9ajnX