David Gurney

As the United States Marine Corps charges ahead with force transformation, they must temper their expectations with the reality of US Navy construction, which has failed to deliver adequate vessels, on time and on budget. From my article in the Marine Corps Gazette: "A modern and well-structured amphibious fleet enables power projection while ensuring the Joint Force can fight and win in a contested maritime environment. The Marine Corps plans to use Landing Ships Medium (LSM) to deploy and sustain forces in future engagements—especially those that may erupt within the first island-chain. As the LSM program transitions from research and development to fielding and testing, it is crucial for the Navy and Marine Corps to exercise caution and prioritize the continued procurement of San Antonio-class (LPD) amphibious warfare ships... The LSM, recently redesignated from the Light Amphibious Warship, represents a radical transformation of the Nation’s amphibious capability. The concept revolves around smaller, less expensive vessels that can more effectively evade detection while offloading platoon-sized elements in remote locations. Marines would embark on LSMs and disperse across the sea, leveraging reconnaissance drones, loitering munitions, and anti-ship cruise missiles to detect, deter, and defeat enemy naval forces. Such capabilities could enable the Joint Force to gain and maintain sea control and enact a blockade to cripple an enemy’s economic and financial systems. Aside from the apparent tactical and strategic benefits, the LSM is anticipated to save money while increasing the total quantity of ships in service... While the LSM’s potential cost savings are enticing, it is crucial to assess the risks associated with this approach. The Navy has fallen under scrutiny for the state of shipbuilding and acquisitions. There is good reason to be skeptical. A recent example demonstrates the problem of relying on unproven technology before validation. The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was developed under a similar pretense as the LSM. It was envisioned as a low-cost, multi-role vessel that could be produced en masse and support the future needs of the force. The LCS faced numerous delays and ballooning expenses that saw its cost skyrocket from a projected $220 million to roughly $478 million.4 Meanwhile, the vessels performed poorly in service, with some vessels already slated for retirement. The late Senator John McCain derided the LCS program as an example of unrealistic and unclear expectations that were exacerbated by an aggressive strategy that sought to field them before they were proven effective... In baseball, the winning strategy involves getting on base reliably and consistently. The Marine Corps is swinging for the fences when it should simply get to first base."

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An assessment of the Middle East with focus on Iran Israel enmity. It's a question of simplifying the complexity of the sub conflicts which dot the Middle Eastern landscape. Some predictions for this year have also been made. https://lnkd.in/gxwsmbkG

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Tony Vacha - interesting article and look at the problem. I might have a different view of it all though - kind of a reverse angle. The NG is now so often used for so many things as a Federal force... and at odds with its State duties - that we will eventually hit a wall when it is needed for both and Federal wins out at a time when the threat level at home is through the roof. Short of that - your right - no way states and territories are letting it happen. But what is instead of the whole - we shifted the old after cold war rice bowls to reflect what should be a Title 10 force and what should be a Title 32. We know well which units are so often called on and in demand... place them all in the Title 10 and place all the other units into the NG. Hey - did say it was a reverse angle. https://lnkd.in/eMXNSsUt

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