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(United Arab Republic)

A NOTE ON SYRIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC


by *Alan W. Horton*

*American
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Reports
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[AWH-1-'62]



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
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ALAN W. HORTON has since 1947 resided in the Middle East as a student, teacher, relief worker, and college administrator. He began the study of Arabic at the American University at Cairo's School of Oriental Studies in October 1947. While continuing

as a student he also taught political science there the following year. For a time he engaged in relief work among the Arab refugees in connection with the program of the American Friends Service Committee and later that of the UN Relief and Works Agency. Before his appointment as Dean of the School of Oriental Studies at AUC in 1955, Mr. Horton did graduate work in social anthropology at Harvard University and he is now a candidate for its Ph.D. From 1956 to 1962, he held posts as Dean of the Graduate Faculty and Director of the School of Oriental Studies at AUC. Fluent in Arabic and French, Mr. Horton, under AUFS auspices beginning February 1962, reports on developments in the U A R and Syria.

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A NOTE ON SYRIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Profiles of Two Nations

by Alan W. Horton

Cairo
April 1962

On a morning in late September 1961 President Nasser, by radio, gave an initial report to the Egyptian public on certain separatist moves made the previous night by segments of the former Syrian army located in the Northern Region of the United Arab Republic. Within 24 hours it had become apparent that they had succeeded in separating Syria from the UAR and thus ending the first modern venture into Arab unity after a trial marriage of some three and a half years. The separation was understandable and, perhaps, inevitable—but in many ways regrettable.

From the beginning the union had had an illogic that was bridged only by faith and fear. The faith was Arabism ('Uruba), a mystical and almost messianic creed that awaits the coming of an Arab hero and the creation of a pan-Arab state. The fear was a Communist take-over in Syria, an alien intrusion into the Arab midst. In the disenchanting reality of bruised regional egos and mutually baffling regional provincialisms the flame of faith apparently flickered. The Egyptian military and political presence easily shifted the unstable center of Syrian political gravity and apparently assuaged the fear. A competing faith, Syria for the Syrians, gained strength and encouraged a reinterpretation of motives and events that ultimately brought feelings of incompatibility and yearnings for divorce.

The illogic of union was always apparent to those less emotionally involved. And, though union must have appealed to President Nasser's Arab heart, it is no secret that he had grave doubts about the advisability of trying to stabilize Syria by means of a United Arab Republic. There was, first, the obvious and inescapable factor of geography: the modern conception of the nation-state calls for contiguity such as would be afforded, for example, by a union of Egypt and the Sudan. And,

second, the differences in the two economies were pronounced. Egypt had a staggering population problem and a tradition of greater governmental direction, whereas Syria, though it had areas of population density, had also an eastern area of ecological outlet and a greater tradition of economic development through individual enterprise. Third, the two nations were at different stages of social development. Syria, at the moment of union, was still governed by a semifeudal aristocracy that had important agricultural and, increasingly, industrial functions; in Egypt there was under way an admittedly slow, but nevertheless certain, social revolution that was being directed by an army elite of no discernible affiliation with any social class. Fourth, each country was attached to its own traditional bureaucracy—one essentially Turkish and French, the other Egyptian and British—that it wished not only to keep but also to staff with its own people. And there were other elements of illogic as well, some of them tangibles that could be seen or demonstrated and some of them the vague but important feelings, recognized but seldom described, that cluster around such concepts as "national mentality" and "cultural ethos."

After the separation it was often said in the world press that the chief reasons for the dissatisfaction of Syrians with the Egyptian-dominated UAR government were to be found in the various socialist laws that were announced in July 1961. This was based on the belief that every Syrian is a natural-born private enterpriser and merchant and that the laws, which were indeed sweeping in their ultimate intent, struck at the very roots of Syrian life. Like many simplistic explanations, this one is beguiling—and, of course, somewhat misleading. The socialist laws did indeed point up some of the illogicalities of union—the Syrian economy prior to union had been doing well on the basis of private enterprise and ownership—but the laws certainly do not merit an ascription of total cause. It is more accurate to speak of a general dissatisfaction with any Egyptian attempt to impose Egyptian concepts, practices, and solutions on a geographical and cultural area for which they were not apt. On the Egyptian side this was seen as the only way to bring unity out of diversity; on the Syrian side it was seen as a direct assault on the rising faith of local nationalism (watania).

Thus the socialist solutions that were apt to the Nile Valley were not, despite the minority preachments of the Syrian Baathists, appropriate for the pioneering economy of the Northern Region. The Egyptian conviction that the economic power of the feudal aristocracy must be broken did not fit a situation in which the only indigenous leadership was still upper class. The Egyptian tradition of a petty bureaucracy schooled to apply the letter of the law and to avoid responsibility was


resisted by a proportionally smaller, better-trained bureaucracy that was accustomed to a more freewheeling atmosphere. The one-party political climate that was felt to be vital to the achievement of the goals of the Egyptian Revolution ran counter to the tradition of tribal-feudal debating societies that had characterized most Syrian politics prior to union—and ran counter also to the expectations of the Baath Party, the Arab socialists who had expected to be President Nasser's chief lieutenants in the Northern Region. And so on. And near the end, when separatist success was threatened, geography got in the way—there were not enough Egyptian regiments in Syria to enforce the legal assault on Syrian separatism. In the final 24 hours, furthermore, there was neither the contiguity nor the beachheads to permit the quelling of the insurrection with additional troops.

But the bald fact is that the union might have worked with more faith, more fear, and above all more time for each partner to become less culturally arrogant. Its failure is especially regrettable because it represents a setback in a struggle toward an ideal that is shared by Arabs in all educated walks of life. A Palestinian once said to the writer: "We Arabs have talked about unity so much that we'll never be psychologically whole until we achieve it." Granted that Palestinians have particular reasons for feeling this way, and that the wistful urge toward unity is most pronounced in the Arab Levant, traces of the urge can be found in every Arab personality. What might have been an intellectually productive era of Arab hope and excitement may now degenerate into a time of greater political cynicism and political despair. In the long run the divorce will be to no one's interest because the Arab personality feels itself to be more split than ever—and split personalities can be delightful in the short run but ultimately they are tiring in every way.

Syria

Syria in its present geographical form is a creature of French imagination and connivance. During the interwar years the French authorities divided their Near Eastern mandate into two political entities, for which they borrowed from older and different uses the names of Lebanon and Syria. With the exception of the Sanjak (Province) of Alexandretta, which the French ceded to Turkey in 1939, it is this French definition of Syria that became an independent state in 1945.

Present-day Syria can be conveniently divided into four geographical regions. A fertile coastal strip, which produces fruits and



vegetables and provides in its evidences of human habitation the red-tiled atmosphere of the Mediterranean littoral, runs from the Lebanese to the Turkish borders. Immediately to the east are two mountain ranges, typified by careful terracing and rugged particularism, that run parallel to the coast and provide between them a valley for the Orontes River. The third region, that of the plains, and the fourth, that of the desert, are contiguous and are divided by the isohyets of annual rainfall into separate and distinct ecologies. The region of the plains, which can be defined as that part of the central plateau that receives a minimum of ten inches of rain each year, is characterized by flat fields of grain and cotton, and occasional clusters of mud-brick huts. Because the amount of rainfall increases as one moves north, North Syria produces the great bulk of the country's wheat—and in the northeastern Province of Jezireh an agricultural boom is under way in an area that was once, for lack of public security, a nomad domain. During the last 100 years the frontier of agricultural settlement has been pushed once again close to the limits imposed by rainfall, and the desert nomad has either become sedentary or has retired to his classic terrain south and east of the ten inch isohyet.

Drawing on Egyptian knowledge and experience, the first properly conducted census of the Syrian population was taken in September 1960. A total population figure of 4,561,000 is known, but the important breakdowns are not yet available. Previous census estimates indicate that, though there has been little emigration, the amount of internal migration has been considerable. This migration has been largely from west to east: between 1949 and 1953 the cultivable eastern areas of Syria are estimated to have increased in population by percentages ranging from 32 to 49. The eastward movement is a remarkable and exciting ecological phenomenon that is not unlike the westward push of 19th-century North America.

The extent of migration from village to urban center is uncertain. Syria's two major cities, Aleppo and Damascus, have certainly attracted many villagers to new suburban areas of industrial development—despite the statistic that some 30% of all Syrians live in towns of 30,000 population or over. But the figures, except for the city of Homs, reflect no significant increases in town size other than natural increase at the national average of an estimated 2.5%.¹

¹ Davis, K. "Population Analysis" in R. Patai, ed., The Republic of Syria (limited distribution). Subcontractor's Monograph, Human Relations Area Files, Vol. 1, p. 71 (New Haven, 1956).

The population of Syria divides itself in various cultural ways. Linguistically, Arabic is, of course, dominant but other languages are spoken by small minorities, all of whom are at least bilingual after a fashion. Kurdish-, Turcoman-, and Circassian-speakers live in scattered villages or semipermanent tents. A large urban minority, chiefly in Aleppo, speaks Armenian, and a small elite still speaks Ottoman Turkish. The badge of the educated urbanite is his knowledge of French and English as second and third languages.

Religious divisions are usually more significant in Syrian eyes. The principal grouping is that of Sunni Islam, whose adherents comprise some 70% of the population (including some linguistic minorities). There are also various Shiite groups, of whom the best known are the economically depressed Alawites or Nusairis of Jebel Ansariya. The Druze, who are not Muslims but spring historically from Shiite Islam, dominate the area of Jebel Druze south of Damascus. There are at least 11 Christian sects, which together embrace some 15% of the population and include a proportionally high number of educated urbanites. The small Jewish colonies of the big cities are disappearing.

Administratively Syria is divided into governorates, qazas, and nahias, the last being not only the smallest but also the basic unit of Syrian bureaucracy. Nahias are the administrative blocks from which qazas, governorates, and other larger units have been built in various sizes and shapes by various governments—but over the centuries traditional nahia boundaries have remained the same. The senior official of the nahia is called the mudir, who appoints, in his turn, headmen of the various villages, tribes, or city neighborhoods of his jurisdiction. He must depend heavily on the police posts scattered through his area not only for the maintenance of law and order but also for the many kinds of information necessary to effective delegation of authority. The instrument by which he governs is a law code that, though largely imported from Europe in the first instance, has become a part of the urban culture of Syria; in the rural areas, therefore, the law code is an instrument of urban imperialism in a struggle with the customary law of village and tribe—and is hence a factor in the general process by which urban culture is increasingly accepted, and even practiced, in nonurban areas.

The most decisive divisions in Syria are, in fact, those that exist between townsman, peasant, and nomad. A city-dwelling landlord has more in common with any other landlord, Muslim or Christian, Kurd or Druze, than he does with a peasant or nomad of his own linguistic or religious persuasion. He also has more in common with the ur-

ban artisan or shopkeeper than he does with the peasant on one of his own estates. Similarly, the peasant and the nomad believe, each in his own way, in the rightness of separate and distinct cultures. Despite clear indications that a common national life will one day emerge, it is still justifiable to speak of three easily distinguishable cultures united by a common economy. To this economy the townsman contributes leadership and enterprise, the peasant furnishes the necessary foodstuffs, and the nomad provides animal products.

It is town enterprise that is the chief agent of change. Both village and tribe recognize this leadership: a new technology, for example, is accepted by villagers not because it comes from the West or from any other place but because it has the approval of Syrian townsmen. It is town enterprise that has seen the value of French road building during the mandate period and has provided the rural bus services that have made the average villager familiar with town ways. It is town government that has developed more effective rural constabulary and brought a new neutral factor into the political and social life of every village. It is town enterprise that has developed new nongovernmental marketing and credit systems for greatly increased acreage of cash crops. And it is town enterprise that has directed the development of the Jezireh and allowed agricultural production to increase faster than population, a prerequisite for do-it-yourself industrialization. The mentality of peasant and nomad is inevitably undergoing a process of urbanization.

The towns provide not only the bureaucrats of government but also the upper-class politicians who seek to control the bureaucracies. Prior to union with Egypt, political parties tended to revolve around well-known personalities and well-known families and to keep alive despite the occasional intervention of military juntas—the military juntas often strengthened their positions by designating as ministers lesser members of the right families. The National Bloc, though a shifting and uncertain confederation of interests, had to its credit the chief role in the achievement of independence and was often in power; its leading personality, Shukri al Kuwatly, is the man who received the title of First Arab Citizen after formally relinquishing his Presidential powers at the time of union. The People's Party, led in recent years by Nazem Al-Qudsi and Rushdi Kekhia of Aleppo, was in power when the National Bloc was not—and Nazem Al-Qudsi was briefly the first President of postunion Syria. Neither of these parties bothered to organize outside urban areas; each depended on its landholding gentry to swing rural votes. Both were old-fashioned in that neither looked ahead to a time when village and tribe would alter the structure of power.

But two other parties did. One was the Muslim Brotherhood, an unmilitant offshoot of the Egyptian organization. The other was the Baath Party (Arab Socialist Renaissance Party), an ideological amalgam led by Akram Hourani and intellectualized by Michel Aflaq. Both parties had, and have, a literature and an organization on modern lines; whereas the Brotherhood seems to be flying in the face of history by an appeal to sentiments on the wane, the Baath has a socialist program that seems to have come before its proper time. Neither the Brotherhood nor the Baath has ever been in power; the former has made a markedly unimpressive showing in national elections, and the latter, despite large followings among the peasantry of Central Syria and the intellectuals of Aleppo and Damascus, has seemingly lacked the political appeal that comes to Syria chiefly by way of an exciting political personality.

During the union all political parties were theoretically dissolved in favor of the National Union of the UAR. The older parties of the gentry, based as they were on social agreements between gentlemen, had no difficulty in achieving temporary disappearance. The cell system of the Brotherhood also provided a method of political evanescence and survival. But the Baath, because it had a privileged position in the first days of the union, lingered publicly on; even after the resignation of prominent Baathists from high public office in the wake of disenchantment, the Baath, unlike other parties, was a recognized public force that, though officially nonexistent, was clearly cohering.

It is natural that separation brought political confusion. And it will be some time before it is clear what political forces and urges will govern Syria for the next stretch. For the time being there is a clear-cut tendency to return to the status quo ante in the sense of political instability. The old-fashioned parties are casting about for suitable platforms and hoping for a return to the preunion economy and social structure. The Baath, which was once publicly and passionately in favor of union with Egypt, is in three-cornered disarray. Other political forces have entered the picture in the form of private-enterprising businessmen, whose positions, like those of the older parties, are not clear. As of this writing the army, in the best Syrian tradition, has just moved in from the wings and forced the resignation (on March 28) of President Nazem Al-Qudsi and the cabinet of the People's Party. The military take-over was justified on the grounds that "the Constituent and Parliamentary Council has not carried out the task entrusted to it and has completely failed to shoulder the responsibility of rule. . . and has sought only the personal interest of its members. . . ."

The internal instability is in large part a function of the rela-


tions of various Syrians with other Arab states. Syria's classical position is an uneasy balance between Egypt and Iraq, the unstable element of an eternal Arab triangle. Once again groups of politicians and groups of army officers are showing signs of being pro-Iraqi or pro-Egyptian—or even pro-Jordanian—and once again Syrian politics are incomprehensible without a clear understanding of the moves and countermoves of other Arabs, who are simultaneously bitter rivals and partners in a great Arab adventure.

But it will not be easy to achieve stability. Gaining considerable acceptance during union, revolutionary ideas are abroad. The major domestic issues of land reform and socialization of industry have by no means been settled by separation—despite various recent pronouncements and edicts. If the older political alignments are to survive, the most careful political footwork will be necessary; these parties seem at the moment to be bent on a return to the social womb that can end only with their complete disappearance. An army statement after the coup of March 28, for example, reveals some traditional but apparently ill-judged footwork on the part of the People's Party and perhaps on the part of the more modern Baath: "The Arab Army of Syria. . .noticed that the authorities were trying to infiltrate into the ranks of the Army with the object of winning certain elements to their side and of sowing the seeds of dissension among the ranks of the Army."

Whether the army intends to "throw the rascals out," or whether there will be the traditional shifts from civilian government to military juntas that seek the support of the "right" families, remains the big question. One thing is certain: lip service must now be paid to certain concepts supported by the Baath and put into practice by revolutionary Egypt. The army, for example, broadcast on March 28 a statement that might, with a few changes, have come from President Nasser himself only a few short years ago.

The General Command. . .calls upon the vigilant Arab people of Syria to help the Army and the provisional government in realizing the objectives of the revolution of September 28. These objectives include, in the domain of internal affairs, the protection of freedoms and of the people's right to practice them; the realization of a constructive Arab socialism, based on justice, ensuring the rights of workers and farmers and encouraging individual efforts; the establishing of a co-operative society of amity; and the implementation of realistic measures toward the realization of a genuine union

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC



on clear and sound bases with liberal Arab countries, particularly our beloved Egypt and our sister state Iraq.

The United Arab Republic

Egypt is essentially an oasis. The Nile River runs through a desert territory of 386,200 square miles and allows agriculture in some 13,600 square miles. From the Sudanese border to Cairo the river irrigates only a slender green ribbon of land; north of Cairo the river proliferates and forms, with the assistance of an ingenious system of barges and canals, the delta that supports more than half of the Egyptian population. West of the Nile a line of oases parallels the river; to the northeast the Suez Canal crosses Egyptian territory between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

Unlike Syria, Egypt has for centuries been a recognized territorial and cultural entity corresponding closely to its present boundaries. It has a continuity and homogeneity of class tradition that few Arab states possess. All who are culturally Egyptian are within its boundaries, and those who are not culturally Egyptian fit into categories that the culture provides. A social and economic system that has prevailed since the Pharaohs provides country-wide organization and orders its many groups and classes.

The census of 1960 placed the population of Egypt at slightly less than 27 million and confirmed the fears of demographers that population increase continues at the rate of an annual 2.5%. Population density of the settled areas averages somewhere in the neighborhood of 1,900 per square mile. There is considerable internal migration from rural areas to towns (some 25% of the population is found in towns of over 50,000 persons) and from Upper Egypt to Lower Egypt (in 1947, the average crop area per person in Upper Egypt was about half an acre and in Lower Egypt, about two-thirds of an acre). The problem is grim, the pressures are tremendous, and no relief is in sight despite the efforts and awareness of the authorities.

The various linguistic divisions within Egypt are most noticeable in the urban areas, especially Cairo and Alexandria. In addition to Arabic, one hears Greek, Italian, and Armenian spoken on all sides. Dark-skinned Nubians, who come from their native area south of Aswan to supplement meager date and grain crops with city wages, speak their own tongue. French, which is used as a lingua franca in urban

minority circles and as a badge of class among French-educated Egyptians is heard everywhere. English is used not only by those educated in English-speaking schools but also, and increasingly, as the principal method of communication between government officials and the foreign world. But the outstanding linguistic phenomenon today is the increasing importance and usefulness of good Arabic for both the social elite and those of the foreign minorities who choose to stay in Egypt or who, like most Armenians, must stay.

Religious diversity is also most noticeable in the cities. Here, despite the continuing exodus, are found various Jewish sects and a multitude of Christian sects, many of which have ethnic affiliations and thus reinforce, along with ethnic schools and clubs, a feeling of total separation from the indigenous culture. The Arabic-speaking population is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, but Egyptian Christians (Copts), who are also found in rural areas, comprise a comparatively well-educated 10%. Syrian Christians, mostly 19th-century immigrants from the Levant, belong to one of several sects and are all bi- and trilingual urbanites.

The basic division of Egyptian life is that between townsman and peasant. Unlike Syria, the number of nomads in Egypt (some 50,000) is relatively insignificant (though there are many peasant villages that are clearly of tribal origin), and one can, therefore, speak of a fundamental duality of culture within a single economic and social system. The links between village and town were traditionally provided by a landowning elite, who held both peasants and urban poor in paternalistic relation, and by a centralized government bureaucracy, which, controlled by the same elite, directed the economy by means of provincial and markaz officials. The basic administrative unit was, and is, called the markaz; its chief officer is the ma'mur.

Though the regime has broken the power of the landowning class by land-reform laws and exclusion from government, the present situation of the Egyptian village does not differ markedly from that of pre-revolutionary days. (It is still usually possible for the wealthy to own 100 acres, an amount that is impressive to any villager.) In land-reform areas, compulsory membership in government agricultural co-operatives provide for the marketing and other services that the landlords used to perform. Villagers remain interested in their own local rivalries and loyalties to the exclusion of participation in a national life. The link to the outside world is still largely through the person of the 'omda, the village headman, who deals with markaz bureaucrats on matters of irrigation and taxes and with markaz police on matters of public security.

But there are signs of change in the rural areas. Roads, rural buses, radios, and other new methods of knowing more about town life (which in the Egyptian instance is the same as national life because it is townsmen who are trying to build a modern nation) are inevitably having an effect. The regime's nonparty political instrument, the National Union, has made attempts to organize understanding of revolutionary goals and to transform local loyalties into patriotism; though these efforts have not been successful, new rural-urban channels have nevertheless been established. The most remarkable effort to date has been that of several of the ministries, notably the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Education; continuing their prerevolutionary work they have succeeded more than others in affecting the interior social mechanics of village life. The Ministry of Education, for example, is building and staffing one rural school per day. It is noteworthy that all these efforts are government efforts; because the standard of living of the overpopulated Egyptian countryside permits so few purchases of town-manufactured goods, private enterprisers, unlike their Syrian counterparts, have shown little interest in a commercial invasion of the village.

The towns are, of course, changing more rapidly. Egyptian towns have always, in fact, responded quickly to new influences. By means of what Carleton Coon has called a mosaic system, they have provided a method of change by ethnic intrusion; when Muhammad Aly wished to modernize economic practices in the 19th century, he did so by the virtual importation of foreign minorities who were skilled at the kinds of commerce and development in which he was interested. Urban Egyptians have also had their place in the mosaic and have, whenever economic need and traditional skill coincided, formed themselves into occupational groups that fostered separate community life. And, at least since the time of Muhammad Aly, the evils of caste have been avoided in that individual social mobility based on education and a knowledge of foreign languages has not been inconsiderable; by way of purchase of land and an acceptable marriage an Egyptian could make his way into the non-Turkish element of the upper class.

The present regime is plainly attacking the mosaic system. Minority communities are under increasing pressure to conform to a nationalist program that envisages a homogeneous, Arabic-speaking citizenry imbued with a willingness to sacrifice for the fatherland. Foreign businesses are being sequestered, nationalized, or otherwise controlled; foreign schools must now follow a basic government syllabus, which, though it still allows the learning of foreign languages, requires immersion in the local language, culture, and goals. Traditional socio-occupa-


tional groupings are being replaced by government-run trade unions and by vastly increased educational opportunity for the development of new and modern skills. Opportunities for climbing the social ladder, though they have increased somewhat, have changed principally with reference to the social end in view; though urban social structure is a wondrously complicated affair and difficult to analyze, there is some evidence that the rising young man would now seek acceptance by influential government circles (and it is too soon to identify them any more closely) rather than acceptance into a fashionable club.

The regime uses various words and phrases to describe the new society that it hopes to establish. One hears often about a "democratic, socialist, co-operative society" and about "social solidarity" and "economic and social justice." These phrases indicate a wish to put an end to the economic gap between rich and poor, to abolish the economic and social privileges of the upper class, and to provide equal educational and economic opportunities to the entire citizenry of the nation. The regime wishes also to make Egypt a modern industrial nation. With the assistance of a socialist doctrine and an increasingly authoritarian and centralized administrative structure, the regime has begun to work at the enormous job of translating these wishes into some kind of imperfect reality.

The Egyptian Revolution, while it is genuine and will ultimately have a revolutionary impact, has had a slow start. The regime has, to be sure, broken the power of the upper class by land-reform laws and the socialist laws of July 1961, and has even sequestered all properties of some of the rich. It has taken over control of all but the smaller categories of private commercial and industrial enterprise. Over the last few years it has done well in the area of industrialization. But there have not occurred the drastic measures that are associated with other revolutions. Aside from a better law on compulsory military service, there has been no wholesale regimentation—nor has there been any forced labor or class bloodshed. No frontal attack has been made on the problems of the peasant mass. And no concerted effort has been made to dismantle the population time bomb that ticks steadily away.

The slowness of the start may be because the regime, despite its stability and its power, feels a lack of support. The National Union has failed to generate much enthusiasm in urban areas and none among the peasantry. No Egyptian has written an intellectually respectable apologia for the Revolution, explaining and defending the necessity of authoritarianism and socialism. It is probable that the new Congress of Popular Powers, to which persons have recently been elected and

appointed by virtue of occupational and class affiliations, will do little more than underscore the regime's need of a better institutional foothold in Egyptian society. The problem is not one of opposition—there is no focus for opposition in the United Arab Republic—but one of apathy. Aside from the far right, the far left, and the ruling army elite itself, there are too few who care whether the Revolution succeeds or fails. This is the same as saying that there are not enough patriots. The creation of patriots is, in fact, the Revolution's central task.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Alan W. Weston". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending from the end of the name.

A READING LIST OF AUFS REPORTS
ON SYRIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

[Especially recommended is Charles F. Gallagher's A Note on the Arab World (CFG-6-'61), dated August 1961. An interpretive essay synthesizing ethnology, history, geography, and political development, the Report is invaluable in providing a perspective from which to view Syria and the United Arab Republic in relation to the other Arab states. It also includes a well-chosen bibliography suggested for further reading of a general nature on Arab affairs.]

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (before separation)

- | | |
|-------------------------|--|
| CFG-6-'58
May 1958 | THE STATE OF THE UNION
Observations on the beginnings of the United Arab Republic. (11 pp.) |
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SYRIA

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