



## PLAN OF ACTION TO PROMOTE THE CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS

### **PART 1: Status of Implementation – 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024**

#### **1. General Conference Resolution**

In 2023, in GC (67)/RES/11, the IAEA General Conference:

“[Noted] the commendable efforts of some Member States and the Agency Secretariat in implementing elements of the plan of action outlined in resolution GC(44)/RES/19 and the Agency’s updated plan of action (September 2023), and [encouraged] them to continue these efforts, as appropriate and subject to the availability of resources, and review the progress in this regard, and [recommended] that the other Member States consider implementing elements of that plan of action, as appropriate, with the aim of facilitating the entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and the amendment of operative SQPs”.

#### **2. Secretariat Activities**

In its implementation of the Plan of Action for the period between 1 July 2023 and 30 June 2024, the Agency continued to encourage and facilitate wider adherence to safeguards agreements and additional protocols (APs) and amendments to, or rescission of, small quantities protocols (SQPs) based on the original standard text. During this period, the Agency held consultations with representatives from a number of Member and non-Member States in Geneva, New York and Vienna at various times throughout the year.

#### **3. Achievements**

- Between 1 July 2023 and 30 June 2024: An additional protocol (AP) entered into force for the Plurinational State of Bolivia. Another AP was approved by the Board of Governors for Nauru.
- SQPs based on the original standard text were amended for Fiji, Nauru and Sierra Leone, in keeping with the Board of Governors’ decision of September 2005 regarding such protocols. In addition, an SQP was rescinded for the Plurinational State of Bolivia. As of 30 June 2024, 81 States<sup>1</sup> had an operative SQP in force based on the revised standard text, and 18 States<sup>2</sup> had an operative SQP in force based on the original standard text.

Thus, at the end of June 2024, 190 States<sup>3,4</sup> had safeguards agreements in force with the Agency, 142 of which (including 136 States with CSAs) also had an AP in force. Forty-eight States had yet to bring into force APs to their safeguards agreements. Four States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)<sup>5</sup> had yet to bring CSAs into force pursuant to Article III of the Treaty.

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<sup>1</sup> This number does not include two operative amended SQPs reproduced in INFCIRC/718/Mod.1 and INFCIRC/366/Mod.1, respectively.

<sup>2</sup> This number does not include one operative SQP reproduced in INFCIRC/229.

<sup>3</sup> The designations employed and the presentation of material in this report, including the numbers cited, do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Agency or its Member States concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.

<sup>4</sup> And Taiwan, China.

<sup>5</sup> The referenced number of States Parties to the NPT is based on the number of instruments of ratification, accession or succession that have been deposited.

Progress has therefore been encouraging over the last few years *vis-à-vis* the conclusion of safeguards agreements and APs. In May 2005, as many as 38 States Parties to the NPT had not yet brought into force their NPT safeguards agreements; this number had decreased to 18 by the end of June 2010 and to four as of June 2024. A similar trend can be observed in the case of APs: while in May 2005 only 66 States with safeguards agreements in force also had APs in force, by the end of June 2010 this number had risen to 101; 13 years later, in June 2024, 142 States with safeguards agreements in force also had such APs in force.

#### 4. Planned Activities

For the 2024/2025 period, the Agency's activities will focus on:

- Continuing the Agency's reinvigorated efforts initiated by letters from the Director General to encourage the conclusion of CSA, amendments or rescission of SQPs, and the conclusion of AP.
- Holding bilateral consultations, including through virtual means, with relevant States in the African, Asian, Pacific and Caribbean regions on the conclusion/entry into force of CSAs and APs and on the amendment or rescission of SQPs.

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In addition, the Secretariat will continue with its outreach with relevant States through continued reminders on a periodic basis.

#### 5. Conclusion

Significant progress has been achieved in the period between 1 July 2023 and 30 June 2024 in terms of entry into force of NPT safeguards agreements and APs. It is particularly noteworthy that the number of States with APs in force has increased to 142 since last year's update of this Plan of Action. Encouraged by such progress, the Secretariat will continue its work in safeguards outreach to ensure that this positive momentum is maintained.

## Annex I: interregional, regional and sub-regional outreach events (2000-2023)

Seminar	Partners	Participants/Observers
<b>Minsk</b> , Nov. 2000		Approx. 15 participants from 5 of the Newly Independent States
<b>Tokyo</b> , June 2001	Co-sponsored by the IAEA	Approx. 20 participants from 16 Asian States
<b>Lima</b> , Dec. 2001	OPANAL, UN-LiREC	49 participants from 22 out of the 33 States of Latin America and the Caribbean, observers from Japan and the US
<b>Tallinn</b> , Jan. 2002	Sweden (co-sponsored)	21 participants from 3 countries of the Baltic Region and observers from Kazakhstan (focus on legislation)
<b>Almaty</b> , Jan. 2002		23 participants from 4 Central Asian and 3 South Caucasus Republics, observers from China, Japan and the US
<b>Johannesburg</b> , June 2002	UNREC Africa	75 participants from 35 of the 53 African countries, including 10 non-Member States; observers from the European Union and Japan
<b>Poiana Braşov</b> , February 2003		42 participants from 13 countries of Central and Eastern Europe, observers from Cyprus, Finland, Malta and the US
<b>Kuala Lumpur</b> , March/April 2003	ASEAN Sec., UNREC Asia/Pacific	41 participants from 9 ASEAN States and observers from Australia, Timor-Leste, Ukraine and the US
<b>Tashkent</b> , June 2003		21 participants from 7 States of Central Asia and South Caucasus, Observers from China, Japan and US
<b>Vienna</b> , Nov. 2003		32 participants from 16 States in five regions, mostly with no CSA in force
<b>Ouagadougou</b> , February 2004	ECOWAS Sec., UNREC Africa	37 participants from 13 countries in Africa and 3 international organizations. Observer from France.
<b>Windhoek</b> , March 2004	UNREC Africa	63 participants from 17 countries in Africa, 2 international organizations and one NGO (VERTIC)
<b>New York</b> , May 2004		47 participants
<b>Sydney</b> , Nov. 2004	Australia (co-sp.)	31 participants from 14 countries of the South Pacific Region
<b>Vienna</b> , Nov/Dec 2004		35 participants from 17 States in five regions
<b>Rabat</b> , Oct. 2005		39 participants from 21 African States
<b>Vienna</b> , Feb. 2006		59 participants from 33 SQP countries and 10 observer States
<b>Quito</b> , Apr. 2006		44 participants from 20 countries in LAC (inc. 17 SQP States)
<b>Sydney</b> , July 2006	Australia (co-sponsored)	56 participants from 33 countries in Asia/Pacific with limited nuclear material and activities, and from 2 observer States
<b>Vienna</b> , May 2007	Held back-to-back with the NPT PrepCom	30 participants representing 13 NPT States parties with no safeguards agreements and two high-level invited speakers
<b>Vienna</b> , February 2008	Co-organised with SG/CTR	17 participants representing 9 SQP States in Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America (and one high-level speaker).
<b>Geneva</b> , May 2008	In the margins of the NPT PrepCom	17 participants from 15 States in the briefing on the conclusion of NPT safeguards agreements; 32 participants from 23 States and one international organization in the briefing on the strengthened safeguards system (and one high-level speaker).
<b>Santo Domingo</b> , July 2008		27 participants representing 14 SQP States in the Greater Caribbean and 2 high-level speakers from international organizations (OPANAL and UN-LiREC)
<b>New York</b> , May 2009	In the margins of the NPT PrepCom	24 participants from 14 States and several NGOs
<b>Arusha</b> , Nov. 2009		26 participants from 15 States; observer from Italy
<b>New York</b> , May 2010	In the margins of the NPT RevCon	37 participants from 22 States; two high-level speakers
<b>Lisbon</b> , June 2010		20 participants from 6 States; observer from the USA
<b>Singapore</b> , 21-22 March 2011		12 participants from 4 States (States in Southeast and South Asia with limited nuclear material and activities)
<b>Singapore</b> , 23-24 March 2011		16 participants from 6 States (States in Southeast Asia with Safeguards Significant Nuclear Activities)
<b>Geneva</b> , May 2011		6 participants from 6 States


<b>New York, October 2011</b>	In the margins of the UNGA 1 <sup>st</sup> Committee	50 participants from 17 States and other organizations
<b>Suva, June 2012</b>	In the margins of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Regional Security Committee (FRSC) meeting	Around 40 participants from 15 States and other organizations in the Pacific Region
<b>Mexico City, June 2012</b>		18 participants from 10 States in the Greater Caribbean Region with limited nuclear material and activities as well as Mexico, one speaker from CARICOM, one observer each from the Netherlands and OPANAL.
<b>Nadi, Fiji, 29 April - 1 May 2013</b>		30 participants from 12 States in the Pacific Island Region and 2 observers (from Secretariat of the Pacific Community and Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat).
<b>Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, 26-28 August 2013</b>		Around 40 participants from different government agencies of Myanmar
<b>Vientiane, Lao P.D.R. 30 August 2013</b>		Around 40 participants from different government agencies of Lao P.D.R.
<b>Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam 16 Jun 2014</b>		Around 30 participants from different government agencies of Brunei Darussalam
<b>Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar 3-5 Dec 2014</b>		Around 30 Participants from different government agencies of Myanmar
<b>Vienna, Austria, IAEA HQ 27-28 Jan 2015</b>		25 Participants from 14 African States
<b>Geneva, Switzerland 11 Feb 2015</b>		A number of Permanent Missions in Geneva
<b>Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia 15-16 June 2015</b>		Around 30 Participants from different government agencies of Mongolia
<b>Singapore, Singapore 23-25 June 2015</b>		Around 22 Participants from Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos and Singapore
<b>Panama City, Panama 26 June 2015</b>		15 Participants from 8 Caribbean States and one speaker from CARICOM
<b>Niamey, Niger 24-26 May 2016</b>		26 Participants from 11 States in West Africa
<b>Khartoum, Sudan 17-18 April 2017</b>		Around 25 participants from different government agencies and parliament of Sudan.
<b>Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 20-21 April 2017</b>		Around 40 participants from different government agencies and parliament of Ethiopia.
<b>Lusaka, Zambia 14 August 2017</b>		Around 40 participants from Sub-Saharan African States.
<b>Vienna, Austria 11-12 June 2018</b>		10 participants from Permanent Missions from Berlin, Brussels, Geneva and London.
<b>Kathmandu, Nepal 10-12 Dec. 2018</b>	US-DOE/INSEP	50 participants from various governmental agencies.

<b>Muscat, Oman 17-18 June 2019</b>		17participants from various Ministries.
<b>Vienna, Austria 9-10 April 2019</b>		9 participants from Permanent Missions from Berlin, Brussels, and Geneva.
<b>Virtual event for Lao P.D.R. 11 February 2021</b>		Around 10 participants from various Ministries.
<b>Virtual event for Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 7 April 2021</b>		Around 10 participants from various Ministries.
<b>Virtual event for Samoa 10 March 2022</b>		Around 10 participants from various Ministries.
<b>Vientiane, Lao PDR 27-28 June 2022</b>		Around 20 participants from various Ministries.
<b>Event for the Pacific Islands States 25 and 27 April 2023</b>		Around 35 participants from various Ministries of Fiji, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

**Annex II: status of conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols**


**Conclusion of Outstanding Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements  
2004 - 30 June 2024 (cumulative)**

*(States yet to conclude Agreements Pursuant to the NPT)*



**Conclusion of Additional Protocols**

**2004- 30 June 2024 (cumulative)**





## PLAN OF ACTION TO PROMOTE THE CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS

### **PART 2: Background and Generic Description of Activities**

#### **1. Purpose**

The aim of this Plan of Action is to focus the Secretariat's efforts in this regard and to provide a strategy for the Agency's outreach activities. It is a document of the Secretariat that serves as a blueprint for cooperation within the Secretariat and among Member States to achieve wider adherence to the strengthened safeguards system, as mandated by the General Conference and the Board of Governors.

#### **2. Background**

The Board of Governors approved the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards (INFCIRC/540(Corrected)) in May 1997. The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference in May 2000 (NPT/CONF.2000/28) recommended:

“that the Director General of the IAEA and the IAEA Member States consider ways and means, which could include a possible plan of action, to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of such safeguards agreements and additional protocols, including for example, specific measures to assist States with less experience in nuclear activities to implement legal requirements.” (Para. 47)

In the same year, the General Conference adopted resolution GC (44)/RES/19 on “Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System and Application of the Additional Protocol”, which recommended:

“that the Director General, the Board of Governors and Member States consider implementing the following elements of a plan of action, as appropriate and subject to available resources, so that safeguards agreements and additional protocols can be brought into force, and review progress in this regard:

- (i) Intensified efforts by the Director General to conclude safeguards agreements and additional protocols, especially with those States having substantial nuclear activities under their jurisdiction,
- (ii) Increased bilateral and regional consultations among Member States at both technical and political levels, with a view to promoting the domestic process to conclude safeguards agreements and additional protocols,
- (iii) Assistance by the IAEA and Member States to other States by providing their knowledge and technical expertise necessary to conclude and implement safeguards agreements and additional protocols,
- (iv) Reinforced co-ordination between Member States and the IAEA Secretariat in their efforts to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements and additional protocols,
- (v) Consideration by Member States, subject to progress made under (i) to (iv) above, of further steps to promote the safeguards agreements and Protocols, including, inter alia, an appropriate international meeting”.

The United Nations General Assembly, in resolution A/RES/55/33R (2000):

“[welcomed] the adoption by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 22 September 2000 of resolution GC(44)/RES/19, which contains elements of a plan of action to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of safeguards

agreements and additional protocols, and [called for] the early and full implementation of that resolution.”

Subsequently, the General Conference has adopted a number of resolutions in which it has noted the efforts by the Secretariat and some Member States in implementing elements of the plan of action outlined in resolution GC(44)/RES/19 and the Agency’s updated plan of action, and *inter alia* encouraged them to continue such efforts (see Part 1 of this Plan of Action for reference to the latest such resolution).

In its Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50), the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons encouraged the IAEA to “further facilitate and assist the States parties in the conclusion and entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols”.

### 3. Secretariat Activities

Since the development of the 2001 Plan of Action, the Secretariat has intensified its outreach efforts. In addition to its traditional activities centred on correspondence and consultations, the Secretariat has *inter alia* organized a series of interregional, regional and subregional seminars, and contributed to national seminars to help States in their preparations for the implementation of safeguards agreements and APs, and, following the decision by the Board of Governors in 2005, for amendments or rescission of Small Quantities Protocols (SQPs). These seminars have been carried out with the active support of the host countries and often in collaboration with other partners.

Other efforts of the Secretariat have included the following:

- **High-level dialogue:** adherence to strengthened safeguards is a priority for the Director General in his dialogue with State representatives; several safeguards agreements and APs have been signed during high-level meetings with the Director General. The Director General has written to a number of Foreign Ministers requesting the State to strengthen safeguards agreements: in 2020, the Director General wrote to States with SQPs based on the original standard text calling upon them to amend or rescind them. In the same year, he also wrote to nine States Parties to the NPT without a CSA in force calling upon them to conclude a CSA. In 2021, the Director General sent letters to States with CSAs but without APs, encouraging them to conclude and bring into force APs to their CSAs.
- **Consultations with State delegations,** mostly in Vienna, Geneva and New York, to facilitate the conclusion of safeguards agreements and APs, and the amendment or rescission of SQPs.
- **National seminars:** to promote the conclusion of AP and amendments to SQP, such as the ones held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Kathmandu, Nepal; Khartoum, Sudan; Lusaka, Zambia; Muscat, Oman; Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar; Suva, Fiji; Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia; and Vientiane, Lao P.D.R as well as online workshops, trainings and meetings with national stakeholders.
- **Training of State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSACs):** national, regional and interregional training courses are conducted periodically to assist States in fulfilling safeguards obligations.
- **IAEA SSAC Advisory Services (ISSAS):** upon request by States, ISSAS missions allow the Agency to evaluate the performance of SSACs and make recommendations in this regard, thereby assisting States in fulfilling obligations under safeguards agreements and APs.
- **Outreach publications:** Agency publications such as the booklets entitled *Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security: IAEA Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols*, and *Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security: Overview of Safeguards Requirements for States with Limited Nuclear Material and Activities* are available upon request.



#### 4. Categories of States

The Plan of Action makes a distinction between three categories of States: IAEA Member States with substantial nuclear activities (Group 1); IAEA Member States with limited nuclear material and activities (Group 2); and non-members of the Agency (Group 3).

The high priority is given to the conclusion of APs with all States in Group 1 – in particular with States that have declared conversion, enrichment, fabrication or reprocessing facilities. Outreach activities for States in Group 2 also focus on the amendment of SQPs, which gives the Agency additional tools to fulfil its verification mandate in such States. This sometimes requires coordination with other IAEA Departments (in particular the Department of Technical Cooperation) that may have regular contacts with decision-makers and regulatory authorities in this group of countries. A special situation – thus special working methods – also apply to most non-member States of the Agency (Group 3), where there are no working level relations with Agency staff. Most of these States can be expected to have little or no experience of the Agency’s mandated activities.

#### 5. Lessons learned

Through its outreach work, the Secretariat has gained a better understanding of the key factors that may affect States’ consideration of the conclusion of safeguards agreements and APs and the amendment or rescission of SQPs. These can roughly be divided into four categories:

1. **Policy Factors** include a lower priority given to nuclear non-proliferation compared to other national priorities, insufficient awareness of the role of strengthened safeguards for nuclear non-proliferation and international security, expectations of reciprocal economic and/or security-related benefits and reluctance to submit to an “intrusive” verification regime.
2. **Legislative factors** include insufficient knowledge about legal requirements and the need for legislative assistance, existing national legislation that may contradict provisions of the AP (e.g. confidentiality provisions) or a lack of legal authority to collect and share information for declarations, for instance, export/import monitoring.
3. **Administrative factors** include gaps in the working relationship between regulatory authorities and Government ministries involved in the conclusion of international agreements (Foreign/Legal Affairs), a lack of communication channels between nuclear authorities and mining companies and research facilities for declaration purposes, and reluctance among policy-makers and law-makers to attend to matters perceived as overly complex and technical.
4. **Technical factors** frequently involve the absence of an established or effective SSAC, sometimes due to the lack of an assigned safeguards focal point, insufficient understanding of requirements to make declarations and the need for technical assistance.

In terms of the categories of States identified above, the typical obstacles facing States would be as follows:

**Table 1: Factors affecting States’ consideration of the conclusion of safeguards agreements and APs**

	Member States	Non-Member States
<b>Substantial nuclear activities</b>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Group 1</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of legislative and technical infrastructure for making declarations (notably for export monitoring)</li> <li>• Inconsistencies with existing legal provisions; expectations of something “in return” for concluding legal instruments</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>DPRK</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Declaration of withdrawal from the NPT</li> </ul>

	<b><u>Group 2</u></b>	<b><u>Group 3</u></b>
<b>Limited nuclear material and activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Technical counterparts’ lack of access to ministries</li> <li>• Limited knowledge of the role of strengthened safeguards</li> <li>• Low priority given to nuclear non-proliferation</li> <li>• Insufficient knowledge of legal requirements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limited awareness of the policy function of the Agency in general and strengthened safeguards in particular</li> <li>• Reluctance to deal with overly technical matters</li> </ul>

## 6. Future Efforts

While concluding APs with substantial nuclear activities – especially those with activities in “sensitive technological areas” (as defined in INFCIRC/267) – remains a matter of high priority, outreach efforts also need to focus on amendment or rescission of SQP as the Agency’s ability to draw a credible and soundly-based annual safeguards conclusion for States with an SQP based on the original standard text is significantly affected. Table 2 below summarizes the focus that such efforts should now take, for each of the three groups identified above for outreach purposes.

**Table 2: Focus of future outreach efforts**

	<b>Member States</b>	<b>Non-Member States</b>
<b>Substantial nuclear activities</b>	<p><b><u>Group 1</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Individualized consultations</li> <li>• National seminars</li> <li>• Use of inspectors on mission to help prepare for AP implementation</li> <li>• SSAC training</li> <li>• Focus on facilitating entry into force of signed agreements</li> </ul>	<b>DPRK</b>
<b>Limited nuclear material and activities</b>	<p><b><u>Group 2</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Outreach visits to provide advice on policy, legislative and technical aspects of safeguards; this includes making use of relevant high-level visits by Secretariat delegations.</li> <li>• Use of good offices to help technical counterparts gain access to relevant ministries</li> <li>• Consultations with officials in Vienna, Geneva and New York</li> <li>• Regional seminars; briefings at international meetings; legislative and technical assistance; this could include back-to-back events with TC and other meetings and, on demand, presentations to parliamentarians to facilitate ratification</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Group 3</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Concerted efforts with Member States with links to the State concerned</li> <li>• Non-member States to be invited to Agency seminars subject to extrabudgetary resources</li> <li>• Briefings involving non-member States to be held in the margins of other regional / international meetings to minimize resource demands</li> <li>• Advocacy of Agency membership and the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology in the achievement of States’ Sustainable Development Goals</li> </ul>

### ***Outreach and SSAC training***

The Secretariat is currently working to implement two separate mandates of the General Conference: on the one hand, the promotion for the concluding safeguards agreements and APs, and the amendment of SQPs; and on the other, the assistance to States with SQPs, including non-members of the Agency, in establishing and maintaining SSACs and putting into place the necessary legislative and technical framework to implement safeguards.

In the Secretariat's experience, confusing these two messages, for instance by providing policy outreach to the technical level or providing training on the detailed reporting requirements to the policy level, risks being counterproductive – in particular when dealing with States that have limited experience of IAEA matters.

Consequently, it is important to first address the policy level, and to concentrate the training efforts on States having already taken the decision to conclude safeguards agreement and/or APs, or to amend SQPs.

## **7. Coordination**

### ***Coordination with States***

In accordance with the fourth element of the Action Plan proposed in GC/(44)/RES/19, which calls for “*Reinforced co-ordination between Member States and the IAEA Secretariat in their efforts to promote the conclusion of safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols*”, the Secretariat takes steps, as appropriate, to ensure that its efforts are coordinated with those of Member States that are actively involved in efforts to promote wider adherence to the AP.

- An international conference held in Tokyo in 2002 aimed at facilitating and coordinating international efforts towards wider adherence to the strengthened safeguards system. It underlined the Agency's role in facilitating the coordination of multilateral and bilateral assistance and cooperation and sharing of related information.
- Several Member States including Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States have coordinated their bilateral efforts with the Secretariat's outreach activities. The Friends of AP, a group of like-minded Member States, invite the Secretariat to their meetings to have an update on the Agency's safeguards outreach activities.
- At the invitation from several Member States, the Agency has participated as lecturers in their outreach events aimed at a wider adherence to CSA and AP and amended SQP as well as their training events aimed at an effective implementation of these instruments.
- At the request of the Presidents of the Conference and relevant Committee Chairs, the Secretariat held briefings and made presentations at the NPT Review Conferences, as well as at sessions of the Preparatory Committees for the NPT Review Conferences. The Secretariat has been invited a number of side events of States Parties for the promotion of safeguards instruments on the margins of these meetings.

### ***Coordination within the Secretariat***

The Director General's Office (DGO) coordinates the implementation of this Plan of Action, with all relevant Secretariat units.

- Each outreach seminar is generally a cooperative undertaking by DGO, the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) and the Department of Safeguards (SG).
- TC and Department of Nuclear Safety and Security (NS) officers may receive guidance by DGO to support, as appropriate, regional outreach efforts. For example, TC arranges for Member State representatives undergoing fellowship training or scientific visits in Vienna to meet with DGO to discuss, *inter alia*, adherence to and implementation of the strengthened safeguards system.
- Enhanced coordination and collaboration are needed among DGO, OLA, SG, TC and NS particularly for planning and implementation of activities for States with limited regulatory capacity to ensure a concerted, effective and efficient delivery of the Agency assistance.

## **8. Resource Implications**

The Secretariat has so far been pursuing its outreach efforts mainly through extrabudgetary contributions from Australia, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and other Member States have provided in-kind support, e.g. by hosting outreach events. The implementation of this Plan of Action has required a significant workload for staff in DGO, as well as in OLA and SG. Staff costs have been borne by the Agency through the regular budget.

## **9. Conclusions**

The Agency continues working to strengthen safeguards by promoting the conclusion of safeguards agreements and APs and the amendment and rescission of SQPs. The success of the Secretariat's Plan of Action will require that sufficient extrabudgetary resources continue to be made available with minimum conditions, that appropriate coordination within the Secretariat and between States and the Secretariat be maintained, and that strengthened safeguards remain a priority for States in peaceful nuclear cooperation and in the wider context of international security and development.

## Annex I. Proposed Agency/State activities

1. Agency Activities	2. States Activities	3. Agency/States Activities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regular correspondence</li> <li>• Preparation of draft agreements/protocols</li> <li>• Presentations/speeches at international meetings</li> <li>• Informal contact in margins of Agency meetings</li> <li>• Back-to-back activities at other Agency events</li> <li>• Consultations during visits of high-level Secretariat staff.</li> <li>• Regional and national seminars</li> <li>• SSAC training</li> <li>• Country visits by DGO and other staff</li> <li>• Formal consultations upon request</li> <li>• Encouragement to other States and regional organizations to use good offices</li> <li>• Tailor-made outreach to remaining states with significant nuclear activities that are considering concluding additional protocols</li> <li>• Cooperation within the Secretariat, in particular to reach out to States with limited nuclear activities.</li> <li>• Continued technical and legislative assistance for AP implementation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inclusion of the conclusion of safeguards agreements and APs as priorities in bilateral consultations on security and non-proliferation</li> <li>• Other individual State-to-State bilateral approaches</li> <li>• High-level bilateral visits</li> <li>• Coordinated efforts to reach out to individual States</li> <li>• Sharing of experience of AP preparation and implementation</li> <li>• Push for general adherence to strengthened safeguards in groups, e.g. EU, NWFZ etc.</li> <li>• Bilateral and multi-country efforts to reach out to States</li> <li>• State-to-state assistance in legislative drafting</li> <li>• State-to-state assistance related to the monitoring of Annex 2 items</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for the secure financing of the strengthened safeguards system</li> <li>• Extrabudgetary support for the Agency's outreach efforts</li> <li>• Hosting of IAEA regional seminars</li> <li>• IAEA co-sponsoring of States' international meetings on the strengthened safeguards system</li> <li>• Agency participation in international meetings on the strengthened safeguards system</li> <li>• Cooperative training programmes</li> <li>• Coordination of regional efforts with Agency seminars</li> <li>• Cooperation with or use of regional organizations</li> <li>• Requests for IAEA assistance to facilitate adherence to and implementation of the strengthened safeguards system</li> <li>• Invitation to the Agency to make presentations at regional meetings.</li> <li>• Coordination of outreach activities with other States and with the Agency</li> </ul>