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Commander, INSCOM
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Fort Meade, MD 20755-5995

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

MAY 02 2018

This is in further response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of June 10, 2008, for the INSCOM Annual History FY 1978 and supplements our letter of March 11, 2015.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 13526. As a result of this review, information has been sanitized as it is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.2 (a)(2), 1.2 (a)(3) and 1.4(c) of EO 13526. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1). A brief explanation of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.2(a)(2) of EO 13526, provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.2(a)(3) of EO 13526, provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.4(c) of EO 13526, provides that information pertaining to intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, and cryptologic information shall be considered for classification protection.

The deleted information is also exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with EO 13526, Section 3.3(b)(1) because its release would clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the identity of a confidential human source, a human intelligence source, a relationship with an intelligence or security service of a foreign government or international organization, or a nonhuman intelligence source; or impair the effectiveness of an intelligence method currently in use, available for use, or under development.

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Major General Christopher S. Ballard, the Commanding General U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. Your appeal must be postmarked no later than 90 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 90-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts. You should state the basis of your disagreement with the response and provide justification for a

reconsideration of the denial. An appeal may not serve as a request for additional or new information. An appeal may only address information denied in this response. Your appeal is to be made to this office, for forwarding, as appropriate to the Secretary of the Army, Office of the General Counsel.

Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (APPEAL)
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office
2600 Ernie Pyle Street, Room 3S02-B
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-5910

Coordination has been completed and we have been informed by the National Security Agency (NSA), that their information, contained in the records has been sanitized from the records pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3).

5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(1), The information is properly classified in accordance with the criteria for classification in Section 1.4 of Executive Order (EO) 13526, as amended. The information is exempt from automatic declassification in accordance with Section 3.3(b) of EO 13526.

5 U.S. C. 552 (b)(3) – The specific statutes are listed below:

50 U.S.C. Code 3605 (Public Law 86-36 Section 6)

50 U.S.C. 3024(i)

18 U.S.C. 798

The withholding of the information by the NSA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be sent to NSA/CSS Freedom of Information Act Appeal/Privacy Act Authority. The appeal shall be in writing to the NSA/CSS FOIA Appeal Authority (DJ4), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Mill Road, STE 6248, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-6248. The appeal shall reference the initial denial of access and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds upon which you believe release of the information is required. Please cite FOIA Case #67173 assigned to the case so that it could be easily identified.

Coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been completed and we have been informed by the CIA that their information is partially releasable pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the FOIA.

The withholding of the information by the CIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision to the Agency Release Panel within 90 days from the date of this letter. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the following: Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC 20505. Please explain the basis of your appeal. Cite CIA #F-2016-00162 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

We have been advised by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that information has been sanitized from the records pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) (b)(3) and (b)(6) of the FOIA and Executive Order 13256 §§ 1.4(a) and 1.4(c). The applicable Statute is 10 U.S.C. §424 .

Their information is exempt from public disclosure pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(3). The statute invoked under Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(3) is 10 U.S.C. §424 (b)(3), which allows for the protection of organizational and personnel information for DIA.

The withholding of the information by the DIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision directly to the DIA. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Attention: DAN-1A (FOIA), Washington, DC 20340-5100. Please cite DIA MDR-0174-2012 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

There are no assessable FOIA fees for processing this request.

If you have any questions regarding this action, feel free to contact this office at 1-866-548-5651, or email the INSCOM FOIA office at: usarmy.meade.902-mi-grp.mbx.inscom-foia-service-center@mail.mil and refer to case #597F-08. Please note that you now have the ability to check the status of your request online via the U.S. Army Records Management and Declassification Agency (RMDA) website: <https://www.foia.army.mil/FACTS/CaseStatus.aspx>. Please refer to FOIA Control Number: FA-08-2825. You may also seek dispute resolution services by contacting the INSCOM FOIA Public Liaison, Mrs. Joanne Benear at 301-677-7856.

Sincerely,



Michael T. Heaton
Director
Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Office
Investigative Records Repository

Enclosure

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ANNUAL HISTORICAL REVIEW

US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND

FISCAL YEAR 1978

OC 001

History Office
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command
Arlington Hall Station
Arlington, Virginia 22212
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September 1979

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Contain Special Intelligence

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SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

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PREFACE

The purpose of the Annual Historical Review is to present a summary of significant activities, events, and accomplishments of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). One of the major themes of the US Army Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS) was the need for consolidation of the Army's intelligence disciplines. The establishment of INSCOM on 1 January 1977 represented only the beginning of the effort to construct an organization and concept to implement a multidiscipline approach to collection, production, and security support. A portion of the FY 1978 Annual Historical Review is devoted to providing an overview of the early stages of multidiscipline intelligence operations and activities within INSCOM.

This summary was prepared in compliance with AR 870-5, Military History: Responsibilities, Policies and Procedures. The Annual Historical Review is primarily a reference document and, coupled with the annual historical reports of subordinate units, it represents a large part of the command's institutional memory. As in the past, the basic documentation for the Review has included the annual historical reports of headquarters staff elements/subordinate units, INSCOM Quarterly Program Reviews, interviews conducted with HQ INSCOM personnel, and correspondence/documents within the headquarters files. The summary was limited by security compartmentation of some data.

This volume was prepared by Mr. James L. Gilbert with review and editing accomplished by Miss Virginia A. Ferrell.

September 1979


LAWTON L. STERNBECK
Command Historian

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)
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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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CHAPTER I

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MULTIDISCIPLINE CONCEPT

(U) Integration of intelligence information into a complete picture of the enemy situation has been performed throughout military history. The intelligence staff officer pieced together unevaluated data collected from various sources and attempted to provide the commander with accurate and pertinent intelligence; however, with modern technology constantly increasing the capability to collect raw data, the intelligence staff officer faced a growing amount of information from which to assess the enemy situation. The capability to direct and manage data collection to best answer information requirements was often neglected in favor of increased volume of data collection. Additionally, the intelligence staff officer's ability to manage collection resources over which he had management responsibility had become increasingly difficult due to the overload of the analytical effort.

(U) In the years since the Vietnam War, Army intelligence increasingly recognized the growing importance of information integration. Reorganization of Army intelligence as recommended by the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS) and use of terms such as "all-source" and "multidiscipline" reflected the growing belief that integration was essential not only at the planning and production levels, but also at the collection and processing levels to manage the increased data problem.

(U) With the integration of Army intelligence collection units in the mid-70's, a wide range of potential advantages accrued. One of these advantages was the ability to integrate various intelligence collection disciplines to provide more accurate and pertinent intelligence to the commander. This integration of two or more intelligence disciplines improved planning, tasking/collection management, gathering, processing, fusing, and dissemination of information, intelligence information, and/or intelligence.

(U) The multidiscipline approach recognized the interrelationship of collection, production, and security support. It also recognized that each collection discipline was part of the total intelligence collection scheme. In order for the intelligence officer to make the most effective use of intelligence information, it was necessary to fuse separate pieces of intelligence information into a single analysis. Planning the collection effort required extensive knowledge of the capabilities of each discipline as well as proper employment in a given situation. The multidiscipline approach placed more responsibility on collection managers to integrate collection planning and reporting, thereby providing a more complete picture to the commander and his intelligence staff.

(S) The IOSS, dated 1 August 1975, identified areas of concern to the Army intelligence community. The need for consolidation of the Army's intelligence disciplines was a major theme in the study. Chapter 7, "Intelligence Production," addressed the many diverse production agencies existing in the

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Army. Their conflicting, competitive roles were discussed and particularly, the duplicative nature of their command, control, and support staffs. This chapter recommended the consolidation of production agencies and a functional structuring of an Army intelligence center which permitted a single point customer service for the Army and the Department of Defense (DOD). Chapter 8, "Management and Major Command Organizational Structure," described the major operational agencies and commands charged with management of intelligence by discipline and discussed the role of the Department of the Army (DA) staff in the management area. It was recommended that a single agency be established within DA to act as operational director for the Army's intelligence effort and, at the same time, provide for continued support to DOD and the national requirements. It was also recommended that the intelligence production center, addressed in Chapter 7, be subordinated to the proposed agency to enhance the Army's total intelligence collection and production efforts.¹

(U) Many problems emerged in the early stages of developing the multidiscipline concept, even as to definitions. In some of the writings during this period, the term "multidiscipline" was used to emphasize the interrelationship of collection, production, and security support. By other writers, the term was used to stress that each collection discipline was part of the total intelligence collection scheme. In the final analysis, there was a merger of these definitions. Multidiscipline Intelligence was defined as "the integration of two or more intelligence disciplines to improve planning, gathering, processing, fusing, and dissemination of information, intelligence information and/or intelligence."

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(b)(1) (b) (3)
Per NSA
50 USC 3024
(I)
P.L. 86-36

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1. The term "multidiscipline" will be used in lieu of "all-source" since INSCOM units do not have access to all-source data.

2. All existing reporting criteria/requirements will be adhered to in the continued issuance of SIGINT and Intelligence Information Report (IR) type reports. The MDIR will neither delay nor replace the issuance of a SIGINT or IR report.

3. Multidiscipline reports will be based and issued only when there appears, via comparative analysis, to be an association of SIGINT and HUMINT data; i.e., the data confirms, supports and/or refutes each other.

4. No MDIR data will be produced or combined which has not already been reported via separate and appropriate channels.

5. Multidiscipline reports will not be stated or issued as product type reports but will only reflect the opinion of the unit/analyst issuing the report, and will not be used for any other purpose.

6. Multidiscipline reporting will be accomplished using existing resources and will not be used to justify additional personnel or equipment.

7. The MDIR's would be issued by the [redacted] Group and not [redacted]

At the close of FY 1978, the [redacted] Group had generated less than 10 MDIR's.

(C) As early as December 1977, BG James E. Freeze, Deputy Commander, INSCOM had stressed the need to begin multidiscipline intelligence reporting at the 66th Military Intelligence Group (Europe) and the 501st Military Intelligence Group (Korea). But no action had been taken by 30 September 1978. It was intended that the [redacted] Group's efforts would serve as a forerunner to implementing MDIR's elsewhere.²

(U) FY 1978 witnessed the initial attempts at reorganizing the HQ INSCOM structure to accommodate the new concept of centralized staff management of multidiscipline operations. The planners, however, were automatically limited by two important constraints. First, until a final stationing decision was made, personnel of the various staff elements would be physically located at two separate sites (Arlington Hall Station and Fort Meade). Secondly, the US Army Intelligence Agency (USAINTA)(redesignated HQ INSCOM, Fort Meade on 1 October 1977) had to remain in existence until a new integrated HQ INSCOM TDA could be approved by DA.

(U) Through independent actions, the integration of virtually all support-type staff elements at Fort Meade and Arlington Hall Station was scheduled for 1 October 1977. The actual integration of the two primary collection management staffs (DCSOPS, AHS and DIROPS, Ft Meade) was delayed because there did not exist a comprehensive pre-integration statement on the

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NSA;(b)(3):P.L.
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relationship between the two staffs. A primary cause for this inability to address the subject at the time was the need to re-examine integration methodology. The INSCOM Concept Plan described a collection operations staff oriented along discipline lines, i.e., HUMINT, SIGINT, and PHOTINT elements. This methodology was predicated on the relatively heavy resource management responsibilities of the SIGINT collection managers as compared to the operational control exercised by the HUMINT managers. These differing conditions reflected NSA's SIGINT operational control (OPCON) and INSCOM's "non-relationship" with echelon corps and below SIGINT units perceived in January/February 1977. This "non-relationship" appeared to be changing to require a deeper involvement of the HQ INSCOM's SIGINT staff in the technical management of non-INSCOM SIGINT collectors. It was uncertain whether or not this changing relationship would dictate a different organizational form than envisioned in the concept plan. Additionally, since the concept plan was written, the operational management of all Army CONUS (Continental US) imagery collection platforms had accrued to INSCOM, another substantive impact on the collection management staff.

(U) At the direction of the INSCOM Chief of Staff, an ad hoc study group, composed of representatives of each intelligence discipline and headed by the DCSOPS, was created to determine and develop a DCSOPS organization which would allow multidiscipline application of intelligence techniques and at the same time provide, through an evolutionary process, a multidisciplined approach to implementing the objectives of the approved INSCOM Concept Plan.

(U) From the proposed alternatives, the DCG for Intelligence chose to retain operating divisions along the lines of single discipline, but would establish a small management office to develop operational policy (both single and multidiscipline); to provide command interface with Army and national policy makers; and to conduct resource programming. As a result, in the DCSOPS organization which emerged in January 1978, each of the major disciplines was represented by a major division: HUMINT, SIGINT/EW, and Imagery. In addition, the Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) was established. The Center's mission was to provide multidiscipline coordination of INSCOM intelligence collection activities. The ICC was to maintain data on current operational and readiness status of all INSCOM units and communications with these units through OPSCOM circuits and secure voice communications. The Center began operations on 15 January 1978 and manning was accomplished by temporary fill until August. However, six personnel assigned represented only a half of the proposed authorized strength.³

(S-CCO/NF/WNINTEL)

(b) (1) Per NSA;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

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(b) (1) Per NSA;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

(U) Chapter 7 of the IOSS noted the fragmentation of effort among the nine Army intelligence production and analytical organizations. The Chief of Staff, US Army (CSA), directed that five of these organizations be unified under INSCOM. On 1 January 1977, the following units were assigned to INSCOM: FORSCOM Intelligence Group (later redesignated INSCOM Intelligence Group), and four OACSI-DA field operating units: US Army Imagery Interpretation Center, US Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment, US Army Intelligence Operations Support Detachment, and US Army Intelligence Support Detachment. For the next year, a provisional US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center served to integrate the personnel and missions of the five organizations. On 1 January 1978, the US Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment was redesignated as US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, at which time the former provisional status of the Center no longer applied. The four other units which comprised the provisional center were concurrently discontinued. Within six months, the Center's authorized strength stood at 91 officers, 25 warrant officers, 126 enlisted and 185 civilians. The projected yearly budget was \$72 million (10 percent of the INSCOM total).

(U) The mission of the US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC) was to: Process, analyze, produce, report, and disseminate multi-source, integrated intelligence and counterintelligence products, threat analyses, and imagery exploitation for DA and Major Commands (MACOM's) in support of combat operations, training, planning, and materiel and combat development activities; to identify intelligence gaps of interest to DA; and to serve as threat validation executive agent for the Department of the Army.⁵

(U) From the ITAC organization emerged a new concept in INSCOM support of tactical units, the Field Assistance Support Team (FAST). FAST was an attempt to bridge the gap between national level intelligence agencies and CONUS-based tactical units, primarily those with worldwide, quick reaction missions. Flexibility was the key word in the concept. Personnel of the team were to come from: ITAC's Field Support Office, which maintained a close working relationship with tactical units; other organizations/units within INSCOM with particular expertise; and ultimately, from national agencies with first hand knowledge and experience in the area in question. Normally FAST, upon being placed on alert, would be airlifted to the supported unit and carry with it an intelligence package of all available pertinent information/intelligence. At the unit, the Team would serve as a channel of intelligence between the G2 and the national level agencies. The Intelligence Coordination Center at HQ INSCOM would normally provide FAST with the information.⁶

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(S-CCO) Worldwide, many separate actions were taken to implement the multi-discipline concept. Three of these are discussed in detail.

(b) (1) Per NSA;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

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(b) (1) Per NSA;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

(S-^{(b)(1)}) Aside from specific examples of substantive multidiscipline interaction in specific reports, analyst discussions and information sharing among disciplines were very fruitful. As an example, the 470th Group produced two significant Intelligence Information Reports (IIR's) in August 1977 which revealed that BG Torrijos was ready to accept the proposed Panama Canal Treaties as written.

(b)(1)

(U) As a result of its efforts, the 470th MI Group received various recognitions, including the following letter of commendation from the ACSI:

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Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC) dealt with those requiring production. ITAC's first response was to send, by message, current order of battle (OB) data on the situation in Shaba Province, Zaire. HQ INSCOM spent a great amount of effort during the first 24-hour period coordinating among various intelligence agencies, such as [] NSA, and insuring that INSCOM, FORSCOM, and the XVIII Airborne Corps were in receipt of messages from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), State Department, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

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U
(S/NOFORN) After the XVIII Airborne Corps was officially placed on alert, FORSCOM requested that a FAST team be dispatched. The FAST, consisting of the Chief, Field Support Office, an African area expert, and a representative of ITAC's Imagery Intelligence Production Division, departed Davison Army Air Field at 1855 hours on 16 May. The team carried with them annotated enlargements of photography of five principal target areas which had been decompartmented. Upon arrival at Fort Bragg, the team briefed the XVIII Airborne Corps G-2 and staff members, participated in initial Corps G-3 planning sessions, checked availability of linguists, updated status of targets in Zaire, and briefed the 82d Airborne Division.

U
(S/NOFORN) On the morning of 17 May, HQ INSCOM dispatched satellite imagery targets requested by Corps and collected during the night along with a packet of available message traffic. By mid-morning of the 17th, the situation had been somewhat defused with the successful evacuation of US Citizens. The remainder of the support was mainly one of monitoring the current situation and providing updated information.

U
(S/NOFORN) During the crisis, INSCOM served primarily as a catalyst to provide national intelligence collection and information in response to the XVIII Airborne Corps. In the process of producing, analyzing, and disseminating the intelligence, INSCOM tailored the support to the Corps' needs. The XVIII Airborne Corps expressed their thanks for the efforts of the FAST.⁹

U
(S/NOFORN) Several lessons learned surfaced as a result of the crisis. There were limited resources at ITAC, including definitive OB, map coverage, and area expertise. Imagery support required updating, and in some cases it was unavailable. It also appeared that INSCOM was structuring itself with an awkward system of protocols when dealing with other agencies who had information needed. Communications required a constant monitoring to insure that those involved in planning were receiving the technical data on a timely basis.¹⁰

(U) The multidiscipline concept went beyond collection and production of intelligence; it also impacted upon management of resources as evidenced by the changes which occurred in the Peacetime Utilization Program (PUP). The program was initiated to improve the readiness training of personnel assigned to SIGINT support units. In a briefing held for GEN Kerwin, Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, on 26 May 1978, HQ INSCOM outlined the beginning of the Multidiscipline Peacetime Utilization Program (MDPUP). Previously, the program had not included Reserves or non-SIGINT intelligence disciplines. On

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8 August 1978, the Chief of Staff, HQ INSCOM, designated elements within the headquarters as focal points for the development of the program in their respective disciplines in regard to the primary functions of mission development, technical support, and live environment training. 11

(S-CCO/NOFORN) Despite the progress made during FY 1978, much remained to be accomplished if intelligence was to become the norm and not the exception. Maximum support for the tactical commander and maximum utilization of US Army intelligence resources would not be achieved until the mechanism/procedures for interdiscipline interface were formulated and implemented. INSCOM still had several important subjects to address. One of these areas of concern was the utilization of data from one sensor to tip-off and drive others. In

(b) (1) Per NSA;(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i)

ascertain the approximate size and location of the exercise; from GUARDRAIL to provide data concerning location as well as additional intercept; and from QUICKLOOK to provide ELINT relative to noncommunications emitters associated with the exercise. Exercises in peacetime and combat operations in wartime required that the Army's intelligence sources be able to collect maximum data in the shortest time possible in order that INSCOM could fuse available data from all sensors and report this data on real time basis. This mechanism did not exist.

(U)
(S-CCO/NOFORN) Although progress within INSCOM's multidiscipline interface was being made, the scope of this effort required expansion. Mechanisms were needed to be established to permit field units to exploit local and national level imagery on a real time basis. For example, during an enemy exercise, if imagery of the suspect exercise area was available during the appropriate time frame, the field unit should have established channels to imagery exploitation centers to request time sensitive exploitation to obtain corroborating data for that obtained from organic sensors. This corroborating data could then be used in conjunction with sensor data for multidiscipline reporting while the exercise was in progress or in multidiscipline wrap-up reporting to provide commanders with the most comprehensive and timely intelligence picture possible.

(U)
(S-CCO/NOFORN) Experience proved that close interface between SIGINT and HUMINT disciplines had the potential for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of both. Basically, SIGINT units should be provided with timely tip-off's relative to HUMINT collection potential provided by legal travelers with access to denied areas in order that their requirements could be included in pre-mission briefings and/or post-mission debriefings. Additionally, selected personnel at SIGINT sites should be made aware of the collection capabilities of Resident Agents in the event data from these sources was required to support/corroborate SIGINT operations. Conversely, data might appear in SIGINT for which no reporting guidance existed, this could be useful in planning/implementing/monitoring clandestine collection

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operations. Appropriate SIGINT units should be informed, on a continuing basis, of the general and specific operational data requirements of HUMINT units in order that this data, not normally available outside of SIGINT raw traffic, could be extracted and forwarded to HUMINT units.

(S-CCO/NOFORN) As modern air travel shrinks the globe, the potential for intertheater satisfaction of collection requirements increase. For example,

(b) (1) Per NSA;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

One central element should be assigned the responsibility of monitoring HUMINT lead development for collection capability in order that this capability could be cross-checked on a continuing basis against collection requirements assigned to INSCOM units worldwide. If a unit developed or had the potential to develop the capability to satisfy a requirement levied against another unit that did not have this potential, then steps should be taken to transfer action on the requirement.¹²

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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MULTIDISCIPLINE CONCEPT

1. Ann Rept of Maj Actvs, USASA, FY76/77 (TSC/NOFORN/LIMDIS), pp. 178-179.
2. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY 78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), pp. 179-181; Staff Note, IAOPS-M, 19 Apr 78 (S-CCO/NOFORN).
3. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), pp. 2-6, 12.
4. CMT 3, DF, IAOPS-OR, 10 Jul 78, subj: Results of DAIMYOS II Conference (17-21 Apr 78)(U)(S-CCO/NOFORN/WNINTEL).
5. 1978 USAINSCOM Commanders Conference (23-27 Oct 78) Preconference Packet (S), pp. D-4 - D-7.
6. Ibid. p. D-11.
7. ~~1977~~ Travis Trophy Nominee, 470th MI Gp (SC), pp. 13-16.
8. AHR, 470th MI Gp, FY78 (TSC/NOFORN), App. T.
9. Extracts, Draft Briefing on Zaire Crisis (S/NOFORN).
10. DF, IAOPS-ICC, 13 Jul 78, subj: Zaire Crisis Follow-up (U)(S-CCO/NOFORN/WNINTEL).
11. Fact Sheet, IAOPS-PTR, 5 Sep 78, subj: Peacetime Utilization (U).
12. CMT 2, DF, IAOPS-OR, 27 Jul 78, subj: Intelligence Support for Tactical Units (S-CCO/NOFORN).

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CHAPTER II

MISSION, FUNCTIONS, AND LOCATION

(U)

Mission and Functions. (C) On 2 May 1977, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) requested INSCOM to draft an Army regulation defining the mission, functions, responsibilities, and command relationships of INSCOM which would supersede AR 10-122 and AR 10-46. The draft AR 10-X underwent a number of redrafts, reviews, and coordinations before the final draft, designated AR 10-53, Organization and Functions, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, was forwarded to DA Management Staff on 17 October 1977 for final staffing prior to publication. The document was subsequently approved and became effective on 15 June 1978. The mission for the CG, INSCOM, as set forth in AR 10-53 was to-

1. Conduct intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), and electronic warfare (EW) operations in support of the Army at Echelons Above Corps (EAC).
2. Conduct Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) operations as a member of the United States SIGINT System (USSS).
3. Command the Army component of the Central Security Service (CSS) and serve as Chief of the Army Service Cryptologic Agency (SCA).
4. Conduct Human Intelligence (HUMINT) operations in general support of Army and other authorized United States intelligence community collection requirements.
5. Conduct CI investigations and operations, collection, production, and related CI support activities.
6. Provide Army-wide all-source multidisciplined Operational Security (OPSEC) support.
7. Conduct Army-wide signal security (SIGSEC) support operations.
8. Analyze, produce and disseminate all-source counterintelligence and general intelligence (less medical) and provide all-source threat analysis support to the Army, as authorized by pertinent statutory and regulatory authorities.
9. Provide technical advice and operational assistance to other functional and operating Major Army Commands (MACOM's) in the discharge of their intelligence, EW and security responsibilities.
10. Act as the HQDA Executive Agent for the management of the Military Intelligence Peacetime Utilization Program, Active and Reserve.

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11. Provide advice, assistance and technical/operational support to insure maximum exploitation of national intelligence assets in improving ground processing and dissemination for tactical support from Special Activities Office (SAO) systems.

12. Act as the Initial Denial Authority (IDA) and Access Amendment Refusal (AAR) authority for all requests involving US Army intelligence investigative files.

13. Act as the HQDA Executive Agent for target exploitation (TAREX), a cryptologic directed activity dealing with the collection and exploitation of cryptologic associated information, equipment and documents.

14. Conduct, or participate in, photographic intelligence (PHOTINT) operations in general support of Army and other authorized United States intelligence community collection requirements.¹

Location. (U) Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command was located at Arlington Hall Station, 4000 Arlington Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22212. Until a final stationing decision is effected, certain staff functions will continue to be located at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755.

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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER II. MISSION, FUNCTIONS, AND LOCATION

1. AR 10-53, Organization and Functions, INSCOM, 15 Jun 78 (C), pp. 1-2.

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CHAPTER III

COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS

(U)

Command and Staff Relationships. (C) AR 10-53, Organization and Functions, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, effective 15 June 1978, established the basic command and staff relationships for INSCOM. The regulation outlined the following relationships:

1. The CG, INSCOM, is under the supervision of the Chief of Staff, US Army. Directives, authorities, policy, planning and programming guidance, approval programs, and resource allocations, and other methods of command direction are issued to CG, INSCOM, by the Chief of Staff, US Army.

2. The CG, INSCOM-

a. Commands the Army component of the Central Security Service (CSS) and is subordinate to the Chief, CSS, for the conduct of SIGINT operations.

b. Manages SIGINT resources to accomplish SIGINT operational tasks assigned by DIRNSA/CHCSS.

c. Provides specified military personnel and administrative, logistic, and operational support to the DIRNSA/CHCSS as authorized by HQDA.

d. [REDACTED]

(b)(1) Per DIA

3. INSCOM and other MACOM's are coordinate elements of DA. The CG, INSCOM, is authorized to communicate directly with other major Army commanders or with heads of Army Staff agencies on matters of mutual interest.

4. The CG, INSCOM, will maintain liaison as necessary with MACOM's field operating agencies, other cryptologic and intelligence activities, and other governmental agencies to maintain an awareness of, to exchange information on, and to insure coordination of matters of mutual concern. 1

(U)
Concept for Intelligence and EW Operations at Echelons Above Corps. (S/
NOFORN) HQDA tasked HQ INSCOM to assist the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in the formulation of an Army Intercept and Position Fixing (IPF) position. INSCOM's Concept for Intelligence and EW for Echelons Above Corps was forwarded to TRADOC in August 1977. It was a loosely structured concept which acknowledged both a variety of separate realities

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and the requirement for a definition of echelons above corps (EAC). The INSCOM EAC concept indicated there was no known coherent doctrine for the implementation of tactical intelligence and electronic warfare operations and support at echelons above corps or for joint operations involving Army forces. It addressed those operations at echelons above corps and at joint task force level, proposing a concept to meet the purposes of INSCOM, DA, and Joint Commanders as they were confronted with the resolution of first multi-service, and then multi-national operations.

(U)
(S/NOFORN) INSCOM proposed its concept to TRADOC during the latter part of August 1977, but it was not favorably received. It was generally believed that INSCOM did not address the Army Intercept and Position Fixing sufficiently. Accordingly, HQ INSCOM revised the concept and submitted its IPF concept to TRADOC in late September 1977.²

FM 100-16, Operations: Echelons Above The Corps. (U) A HQ INSCOM working group chaired by OPPA, HQ INSCOM, wrote the initial draft of Chapter 5, Intelligence, Security, and Electronic Warfare, to FM 100-X, formally designated FM 100-16, Operations: Echelons Above The Corps. The document was forwarded to HQDA on 10 November 1977. This chapter established basic intelligence and security doctrine for the US Army at echelons above the corps and was based upon the INSCOM Concept Plan. While the document was still in draft stage, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI), MG Edmund R. Thompson, changed the wording of the Theater Army Intelligence Command's support role from one of being under the operational control of the theater commander to being direct support. The change would indicate a less than permanent support relationship between the Theater Army Intelligence Command and the Theater Army Commander. At the close of FY 1978, the draft of FM 100-16 was still being coordinated at DA level.

(U) The following extracts from the FM 100-16 draft give definitions of INSCOM's role in EAC operations along with those of the Theater Army Intelligence Command (TAIC), the Intelligence Security Support Group (ISSG), and the Field Operating Units:

* * * * *

(U) The US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) provides commanders at EAC with intelligence, security and EW support. It provides a framework for US Army interfaces with the national intelligence community in both peace and war and a means for directly linking the intelligence systems at EAC with the commanders at corps and below. INSCOM provides support to component, joint, unified, and combined commands through a tailored intelligence support structure which may include the establishment of a subordinate Theater Army Intelligence Command (TAIC) in each theater. In theaters and in contingency operations, the magnitude of which does not require more than an Intelligence Security Support Group (ISSG), a TAIC may not be created. In this instance, the supporting ISSG

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would carry out the required functions associated with a TAIC. During wartime INSCOM provides commanders at EAC area oriented national intelligence and CI/OPSEC Support. Additionally, and acting in concert with Theater Army Commanders, INSCOM provides augmentation of in-theater EAC intelligence resources as required.

(U) The limited in-theater intelligence, security and EW resources at EAC require centralized management. In addition, the TAIC provides the capability to tailor support packages for contingency operations without forcing either a cessation or unacceptable draw-down of other critical intelligence operations worldwide. The TAIC provides EAC commanders in a theater of operations with: a total range of intelligence, security, and EW support services; coordination channels with national level intelligence agencies, and a means for managing all Theater Army intelligence resources. It also provides for integration of army resources committed to peacetime national efforts into wartime operations with the least disruption. A TAIC provides administrative, limited intelligence peculiar logistical, and technical support to subordinate elements during wartime regardless of the operational command to which they are committed. A TAIC provides the means with which to address problems of compartmentation and sanitization of information and intelligence at all levels of operation. A TAIC interfaces with the SIGINT technical channel between the Corps CEWI Group and the US national SIGINT system.

* * * * *

(U) HQ INSCOM, under the direction of the Department of the Army and in coordination with the Theater Army commander, tailors a TAIC to support the specific intelligence, security, and electronic warfare requirements of each supported commander.

(U) The TAIC consists of a commander and staff, a sufficient number of Intelligence and Security Support Groups (ISSG's) to support selected EAC headquarters in-theater, and a number of Staff Support Cells (SSC) and field operating units. The TAIC will also have sufficient organic secure communications to communicate with its own elements (its ISSG's and field operating units), TAIC's in other theaters, supported commands, and with joint, combined, national and other intelligence systems as required.

(U) The major deployable elements in the TAIC are ISSG's which deploy and operate to support EAC commanders. An ISSG consists of a commander and an operational staff which provides a base for attached elements. Like maneuver brigades, these ISSG's are flexible organizations which can be configured and deployed to meet specific mission requirements. An ISSG will include a staff support cell as a minimum, and may also include a variable number of field operating units (collection, EW, CI/OPSEC, PHOTINT support). The ISSG is augmented with

attached elements based on the requirements stated in operations and contingency plans of the supported commander. Staff support cells operate under the operational control of the ISSG commander and are tailored to the requirements of the supported commander.

* * * * *

(U) The field operating units of a TAIC are those units which normally operate outside of a supported command headquarters. They include intelligence collection units, EW units, CI/OPSEC Support units, PHOTINT support units, and communications units assigned to the TAIC. The exact number and type of such units assigned is based on overall theater requirements. Field operating units may remain under the command and control of the TAIC or be attached to an ISSG. Field operating units consist of:

(U) Collection and EW units ranging in size from detachments to battalions. They will be assigned to the TAIC based on the peace and war mission requirements of the supported command and collection assets already present in corps and divisions. . . .

(U) CI/OPSEC Support units which provide services throughout the Communications Zone (COMMZ) and into the combat zone, when required. . . .

(U) PHOTINT Support units. In general, all Army image-producing collectors will be organic to corps and lower echelons.

* * * * *

(U) During peacetime the TAIC will be under the command of INSCOM and the operational control of the Theater Army commander. Control of TAIC operations will be exercised by this commander to the maximum extent consistent with national and departmental directives and theater requirements. In wartime command of the TAIC will be transferred to the Theater Army commander who exercises operational control in peacetime.

(U) In both peace and war operational control of deployed ISSG's rest with the supported commander, but command remains with the TAIC. Administrative and limited intelligence peculiar logistical support to ISSG's and field operating units is provided by the TAIC in peacetime. Logistic support in wartime, except for the acquisition of sensitive and unique intelligence items, is the responsibility of the supported command.

(U) TAIC field operating units may either remain under the direct command and control of the TAIC or be attached to an ISSG. Their support responsibilities are determined by their level of assignment

and the operational missions assigned to them by the supported commander, much in the manner as for an artillery unit.³

Designation of ACSI, DA, as the Army Focal Point for SIGINT. (U) A DA Letter, dated 20 March 1978, announced the designation of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, HQDA, as the Army Focal Point for SIGINT. As focal point for SIGINT, the ACSI was responsible to the Secretary of the Army and to the Chief of Staff, US Army, for effective Army participation in the United States SIGINT System (USSS) and for insuring that the Army had an integrated and cohesive SIGINT program. The letter described the HQDA/Major Army Command interaction necessary to accomplish this function.⁴ ACSI's specific SIGINT functions were to-

1. (U) Formulate DA SIGINT policy and promulgate policy guidance to the DA Staff and MACOM's.
2. (U) Develop and coordinate Army positions on SIGINT matters, to include tasking other staff agencies and MACOM's for inputs as required.
3. (U) Provide SIGINT interface between Department of the Army and OSD, OJCS, and other governmental agencies, excluding intelligence related activity (IRA) program matters for which DCSOPS is proponent.
4. (U) Assist Army representatives in preparation and presentation of testimony or information to the Congress.
5. (U) Insure a coordinated SIGINT position for US Army participation in multiservice and multinational forums.
6. (U) Review and participate in US Army management of SIGINT and related activities to insure optimum compatibility and interface with the USSS.
7. (U) Serve as SIGINT Architecture point of contact to NSA and insure appropriate DA Staff and MACOM participation in national level SIGINT architecture planning. DCSOPS has DA Staff proponentcy for overall Army systems to include SIGINT tactical systems within the IRA programs. OACSI insures that these programs are appropriately reflected within the National SIGINT Plan.
8. (U) Guide Army interaction with NSACSS.
9. (U) Provide representation to Director, Central Intelligence/ National Foreign Intelligence Board intelligence committees.

(U) ACSI's specific relationships were stated as follows:

1. (U) Nothing in this charter changes the functional responsibilities of DA Staff agencies and MACOM's.

2. (U) Each staff agency and MACOM will interact with NSACSS within their functional areas, keeping OACSI fully informed.

3. (U) SIGINT or SIGINT-related projects, plans, programs, and/or problems normally will be acted upon by the staff agency having functional primacy, fully coordinating with OACSI.

4. (U) OACSI will be the primary agency for developing the HQDA position on SIGINT policy matters.

5. (U) The ACSI is the authoritative SIGINT policy voice for the Army.

6. (U) USAINSCOM will continue to perform as the Army Service Cryptologic Agency (SCA) in accordance with US Signal Intelligence Directive 1000.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER III. COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS

1. AR 10-53, Organization and Functions, INSCOM, 15 Jun 78 (C), pp. 5-6.
2. Ann Hist Rev, INSCOM, FY77 (TSC/NOFORN/LIMDIS), pp. 18-21.
3. AHR, OPPA, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (C), Chap 2, p.1 and App B; AHR, DCSS, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (S-CCO), p. 18.
4. Point Paper, IACS-P, subj: 20 Jan 78 G.O. Conference on Army SIGINT Activities (16 Jan 78)(U); HQDA Ltr 381-78-1 (DAMI-ISS (M))(7 Mar 78), 20 Mar 78, subj: Department of Army Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Focal Point (U).

CHAPTER IV
ORGANIZATION

INSCOM Organization. (U) At the close of FY 1978, there was a total of 57 units (16 TOE and 41 TDA) in the INSCOM organizational structure. This TDA figure does not include Augmentation, Augmentation (Carrier), or Provisional units. Worldwide organization and deployment, as of 30 September 1978, is indicated in appendix A. For lists of TOE and TDA units at the close of the report period, see appendixes B and D, respectively. Changes in the status of TOE and TDA units occurring during the fiscal year are depicted in appendixes C and E, respectively.

(U) MG William I. Rolya commanded the US Army Intelligence and Security Command throughout the year. BG James E. Freeze served in the dual role of Deputy Commander, INSCOM (FGGM) and Commander, HQ INSCOM, Ft Meade, until 15 May 1978, when his title was changed to Deputy Commander for Intelligence, with continued station at Fort George G. Meade. On that same date, BG John A. Smith, Jr. was assigned to INSCOM and assumed the position of Deputy Commander for Security, with station at Arlington Hall Station. In keeping titles matched with functions for which each deputy was charged, the title of BG Smith's was changed, on 23 August, to Deputy Commander for Security and Production.

(U) Continued transition and consolidation characterized FY 1978. Until a final decision could be made on the stationing study, functions of HQ INSCOM, out of necessity, had to continue operating in a split mode with the command element and major staff being located at Arlington Hall Station and other staff and subordinate commands being located at Fort George G. Meade. One of the primary goals during the year was uniting the functions and personnel of both locations under one headquarters organization even though physically separate. On 1 October 1977, the US Army Intelligence Agency was redesignated Headquarters, INSCOM, Fort Meade. This change was mostly symbolic however, as the unit had to remain in existence until a new HQ INSCOM TDA could be prepared and approved by DA. The new TDA would consolidate all of the manpower spaces under one organization. In the meantime, the staff functions were being integrated. For example, all personnel functions were under one DCSPER even though the staff remained split between the two locations. Internal reorganizations continued over the next three months as functions and manpower were redefined.

(U) To facilitate the integration process, a series of temporary counterpart organizational structures were made at command group level for duty at Fort Meade. The position of Chief of Staff (FGGM) was established on 1 October 1977 and was filled by COL Albert W. Hamel until 16 January 1978 when the office was abolished. COL Hamel was then assigned to the position of Assistant Chief of Staff (FGGM) until 31 July when that office was also abolished. Likewise, the position of Secretary of the General Staff (SGS)

was established and filled by MAJ R. S. Green from 16 January to 1 April 1978 and by 1LT R. G. Hiler from 1 April until 11 August 1978, at which time the office was terminated.

(U) At the end of FY 1978, Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command was organized to consist of a Command Group, General Staff, and Personal Staff as shown below:

Command Group:

Commanding General (CG). (U) The CG, US Army Intelligence and Security Command was responsible to the Chief of Staff, US Army, for accomplishment of the missions and functions prescribed by AR 10-53 and was concurrently responsible to the Chief, Central Security Service, for all SIGINT activities for which National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSACSS) was responsible.

Deputy Commanding General for Intelligence (DCG-I). (U) The Deputy Commanding General for Intelligence assisted the CG in the management of all intelligence operations of USAINSCOM to include electronic warfare in its offensive role (electronic warfare support measures and electronic countermeasures).

Deputy Commanding General for Security and Production (DCG-SP). (U) The Deputy Commanding General for Security and Production assisted the CG in the management of all threat analysis production and intelligence countermeasures operations of USAINSCOM to include electronic warfare in its defensive role (electronic countermeasures).

Command Sergeant Major (CSM). (U) The CSM served as a personal advisor and principal enlisted assistant to the CG on those matters pertaining primarily to enlisted personnel including, but not limited to, morale, welfare, customs, and courtesies of the service; enlistment and reenlistment, discipline, and promotion policies.

Chief of Staff (CofS). (U) The CofS was responsible to the CG and DCG's for formulating and announcing policies pertaining to the operation of the staff and reviewing staff actions to insure compliance with announced policies and plans. The Office of Plans, Programs and Analysis and the Office of Public Affairs were directly subordinate to the CofS.

Assistant Chief of Staff (ACofS). (U) The ACofS acted for the CofS during his absence and performed other duties as assigned by the CofS. Supervised the activities of the Secretary of the General Staff and the Public Affairs Office.

Secretary of the General Staff (SGS). (U) The SGS acted as executive officer for the CofS and as office manager for the offices of the CG, DCG's, and CofS. Assisted the ACofS in supervising the activities of the Public Affairs Office.

Chief, Plans, Programs and Analysis (CPPA). (U) The Chief, PPA was the principal assistant to the CofS for command level management analysis and principal in charge of the MACOM Planning Group, an ad hoc group established to conceptually organize the Intelligence and Security Command, as directed by the IOSS, Department of the Army. Because of the small number of people assigned, the Office of Plans, Programs and Analysis had no internal organizational divisions or branches.

Chief, Office of Public Affairs (COPA). (U) The Chief, OPA advised the CG of general staff responsibilities in the public affairs program through the collection, maintenance, and dissemination of information concerning INSCOM activities. It directed and supervised the audiovisual support activities of the command and provided staff supervision to subordinate commands concerning audiovisual requirements. OPA consisted of the INSCOM Audiovisual Manager, Plans and Services Branch, Graphic Aids Branch, and Audiovisual Branch. On 1 September 1977, the Post Photographic Laboratory was placed under the operational control of the Audiovisual Manager even though the spaces remained on the USAG, Arlington Hall Station TDA. The change was brought about by AR 108-2 which directed that all audiovisual activities be placed under one manager.

General Staff:

Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DCSPER). (U) The DCSPER exercised staff supervision over personnel and administration for the CG to include military and civilian personnel management, personnel planning, human relations (HR), equal employment opportunity (EEO), safety, personnel services, morale and welfare, organizational effectiveness (OE), discipline, non-appropriated fund activities, retention, personnel information systems, and administrative management. In November 1977, CG, INSCOM directed that an Equal Employment Opportunity Office be established under the DCSPER. He further directed that the military counterpart, Human Relations/Equal Opportunity Program, be placed within the same office.

(U) The establishment of INSCOM brought about an expanded civilian personnel mission, e.g., increased civilian strength, a more diverse work force, and considerable geographical dispersion. These added responsibilities, plus the need to remain consistent with the standard MACOM staffing pattern, led to the detailing of Mr. Gott to the Staff Civilian Personnel Officer position on 15 February 1978; however, DA approval for the newly established Staff Personnel Officer had not been received at the end of the year. Individual training functions being performed at Fort Meade were transferred to DCSPER on 24 April 1978. At the close of the year, the ODCSPER consisted of the following subordinate elements: Management Division; Military Personnel Division; Civilian Personnel Division; Staff, Civilian Personnel Office; Administration Services Division; Equal Employment Opportunity Office; and Plans and Training Division.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (DCSOPS). (C) The DCSOPS formulated and

implemented INSCOM policy on multidiscipline collection and electronic warfare (EW) activities; coordinated and supervised conduct of INSCOM operations involving HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, and EW resources; and provided operational advice and assistance on intelligence collection, exploitation, and EW matters to Major Army Commands and activities. During FY 1978, there were several major functional changes within ODCSOPS. Perhaps the most significant was the organizational integration of the HUMINT functions at Fort Meade with the rest of the functions of the ODCSOPS at Arlington Hall Station. Centralized staff management of multi-source (HUMINT, SIGINT, PHOTINT), multidiscipline (collection, counterintelligence, and production) operations was an objective in the establishment of HQ INSCOM and was advocated in the Vice Chief of Staff, US Army's approval of the INSCOM Concept Plan on 2 May 1977. The HUMINT functions were assumed by DCSOPS on 3 January 1978. The second major change in the area of functions was the removal of the requirements and systems functions from the DCSOPS to a newly created staff element, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems on 3 January.

(U) As part of its 3 January 1978 reorganization, ODCSOPS was restructured into the following major divisions: Plans, Training, Reserve Affairs (PTR) Directorate; Operations and Readiness Directorate; SIGINT/EW Directorate; PHOTINT Directorate; HUMINT Directorate (the only DCSOPS subordinate element located at Fort Meade); Management Office; History Office; and the Administrative Office. Basically, the DCSOPS maintained its same structure for the remainder of the reporting period; however, there were exceptions. In June 1978, the PHOTINT Directorate was redesignated as Imagery Directorate to more accurately reflect those specific PHOTINT functions the Directorate was concerned with. In August 1978, the title of Directorate was dropped from Operations and Readiness, SIGINT/EW, HUMINT, Imagery, and PTR. With the exception of SIGINT/EW and HUMINT, the title change more accurately reflected the size of the element. At the same time, the positions of Director, SIGINT/EW Directorate and Director, HUMINT Directorate were changed to Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (SIGINT/EW) and Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (HUMINT), respectively. Finally, the Intelligence Coordination Center, under Operations and Readiness, was established on 12 January 1978 as a result of the ad hoc study group's recommendations. The Center's mission was to provide multidiscipline coordination of INSCOM intelligence collection activities. The ICC would maintain data on current operational and readiness status of all INSCOM units and communications with these units through OPSCOMM circuits and secure voice communications. Although the Center was operational on 15 January, manning was by temporary fill only until August.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics (DCSLOG). (U) The DCSLOG had general staff responsibility for the management of all INSCOM logistic activities. In this capacity, the DCSLOG served as the Director for Military Construction, Army (MCA) Program and was responsible for developing and monitoring the logistic portion of the Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) Program. On 1 October 1977, the ODCSLOG underwent a major reorganization. The Procurement Division was disestablished because of the command's loss of its

worldwide procurement responsibilities to US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) on 1 December 1976. From 1 December 1976 to 1 October 1977, the Procurement Division continued to exercise limited contractual activities. Secondly, the Materiel Division was redesignated Supply and Services Division. Finally, with the integration of the HQ INSCOM staff at Fort Meade and Arlington Hall Station, there was the establishment of Assistant DCSLOG at Arlington Hall Station and the Assistant DCSLOG at Fort Meade. The ADCSLOG (AHS) supervised the Supply and Services Division (AHS), Maintenance Division (AHS), Installation Division (AHS), Fixed Station Engineering Division, Management Office, and Administrative Office. The ADCSLOG (FGGM) supervised the Supply and Services Division (FGGM).

Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems (DCSS). (U) The DCSS was the principal staff assistant in coordinating matters within INSCOM pertaining to planning, development, and acquisition of INSCOM's requirements, conceptual planning, interoperability, and systems management in support of field stations and intelligence, electronic warfare, counterintelligence (CI), operations security (OPSEC), HUMINT, and imagery units at theater/echelons above corps. The INSCOM Concept Plan originally assigned requirements and systems functions (combat development (CD) and research development and acquisition (RDA) interfaces) to the DCSOPS. This would have placed responsibility for CD and RDA staff functions impacting on both counterintelligence and production operations with the collection management staff. This was done in the INSCOM Concept Plan in recognition of the fact that the preponderance of resources being affected by combat and materiel development actions were devoted to collection. However, the required multidiscipline (collection, CI, and production) nature of PTR, CD, and RDA functions as well as the need to allow the management of the functions to occur outside the pressures of day-to-day operations led to the separation of the requirements and systems functions from ODCSOPS to form a new staff element. The DCSS was established on 3 January and consisted of Concepts and Requirements Division and Systems Division.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Threat Analysis (DCSITA). (U) The DCSITA acted as the principal advisor to the CG and exercised principal staff authority in matters of intelligence analysis, production and dissemination; developed and supervised implementation of plans and programs of INSCOM activities in these areas; exercised technical overview of the Army's scientific and technical intelligence production activities; and insured that the INSCOM's intelligence production responded to and satisfied Army needs. DCSITA coordinated INSCOM participation in the Defense Intelligence Production System; and also served concurrently as Commander, Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center. ODCSITA was comprised of a Management Division, a Requirements Division, and a Staff Control Office.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Counterintelligence (DCSCI). (U) On 9 January 1978, for the sake of consistency in titles of staff heads, the Director, Counterintelligence (DCI) was redesignated Deputy Chief of Staff for Counterintelligence. Many organizational changes were experienced in the ODCSCI in FY 1978. On 31 October 1977, the residual assets and functions

of the former Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Security (ODCSSEC) were combined with those of the Security Division, DCI to form the Command Security Office at Arlington Hall Station. On 5 January 1978, the Operations and Management Division (Ft Meade) was redesignated Operations Division, CI and its management functions transferred to the newly designated Policy and Programs Management Division, CI (Ft Meade). The functions being performed by the Assistant Chief, Operations and Management Division (Vint Hill Farms Station) was accomplished by the newly created Operations Division, SIGSEC (VHFS). The Operations Division transferred its management functions to the newly created Policy and Programs Management Division, SIGSEC (Arlington Hall Station). On 5 January, the Policy and Programs Division (Ft Meade) was redesignated Policy and Programs Management Division, CI (Ft Meade). Also on 5 January, resources of the Assistant Chiefs of the Policy and Programs Division located at Arlington Hall Station and Vint Hill Farms Station went into the newly established Policy and Programs Management Division, SIGSEC, at Arlington Hall Station. Finally, during the year, the positions of the Assistant DCI's at Vint Hill Farms Station and Arlington Hall Station were eliminated as it was no longer necessary for the DCSCI to have his representatives on hand oversee the newly acquired elements because of their complete integration into ODCSCI. The close of FY 1978 found the DCSCI with the following major elements: Operations Division, CI; Operations Division, SIGSEC; Policy and Programs Management Division, CI; Policy and Programs Management Division, SIGSEC; and Command Security Office. Dual divisions for SIGSEC and CI were necessary due to the split headquarters locations. The mission of the DCSCI included the directing and coordinating CI and SIGSEC activities within INSCOM. The staff element also acted for the CG in the direction, control, monitorship, and coordination in the areas of signal security, counterintelligence investigations, operations security support, security support services, and polygraph activities. The DCSCI was responsible to the Deputy Commanding General for Security and Production for all activities of the DCSCI and for exercising staff supervision over the US Army Central Security Facility.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management (DCSRM). (U) The DCSRM was the principal staff assistant in matters pertaining to programming, budget, manpower authorization, control and utilization, management analysis and engineering, cost and economic analysis, finance and accounting, accounting policy, control of funds, and internal review. The DCSRM exercised staff supervision over and assisted and advised commanders in all matters relating to resource management throughout the command. During FY 1978, the DCSRM maintained the same internal organization: Administrative Office, Cost and Economic Analysis Office, Manpower Division, Internal Review Division, Program Analysis and Evaluation Office, Budget Division, Finance and Accounting Division, and Management and Analysis Division.

Deputy Chief of Staff for Automated Data Processing (DCSADP). (U) On 10 January 1978, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Management Information Systems was redesignated Deputy Chief of Staff for Automated Data Processing. It was hoped that the new designation would reflect more accurately the scope

of the staff element's mission. The DCSADP was the principal staff assistant for the development of plans, policies, and procedures and for the implementation, evaluation and coordination of automated systems including operations, administration, and logistics associated therewith in INSCOM. No organizational changes took place during the year, and ODCSADP continued to consist of Plans, Programs and Requirements Division and Resources and Evaluation Division.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Telecommunications (DCSTEL). (U) The DCSTEL was the principal staff assistant for all matters pertaining to the development, coordination, and staff supervision of all functions related to telecommunications within the command. As a result of implementing Chapter 6 of the IOSS, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Telecommunications was re-organized effective 1 October 1977. The ODCSTEL consisted of the following elements: Plans, Operations and Resources Division; Communications Electronics Division (Ft Meade); Communications Electronics Division (Arlington Hall Station); Engineering and Installation Division; and Administration Office.

(U) By implementing Chapter 6, spaces and resources of the DCSTEL were transferred from the HQ INSCOM TDA to the TDA of the Directorate, US Army Communications Command-Intelligence and Security Command (USACC-INSCOM). At the same time the non-tactical communications functions of INSCOM were transferred to the US Army Communications Command. Seven spaces of the former Tactical Division, ODCSTEL remained on the HQ INSCOM TDA as the Communications Office. The Director, USACC-INSCOM and the DCSTEL were one and the same and the USACC-INSCOM personnel filled positions within ODCSTEL.

(U) The DCSTEL exercised operational control over the Communications Center, US Army Garrison, Arlington Hall Station and the INSCOM Detachment, US Army Communications Electronics Installation Battalion. The USACC-INSCOM had operational control over the US Army Communications Command Detachment, Arlington Hall Station and paragraph 010 of the INSCOM Detachment of the US Army Communications-Electronics Installation Battalion.

Personal Staff:

Inspector General (IG). (U) The IG, as a member of the personal staff and as Confidential Agent of the CG and DCG's, inquired into and reported on matters pertaining to mission performance and the state of discipline, efficiency, morale, and economy of the command; performed annual general inspections as prescribed by regulations; conducted special inspections as directed; and performed POM (preparation for overseas movement (units)) inspections for alerted units. Throughout the report period, the IG Office continued to be divided into an Assistance and Investigations Division and Inspections Division.

Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). (U) The SJA served as the legal advisor to the CG, DCG's, CoFS, and all staff elements of HQ INSCOM and, as necessary, to subordinate elements of the command.

Advisor for Scientific and Cryptologic Affairs. (U) The Advisor served as the principal advisor to the CG on scientific and cryptologic matters.

Command Chaplain. (U) The Command Chaplain served as the Chaplain of the USA INSCOM, and was responsible for all chaplain related activities within the command; provided advice and assistance to the CG and his staff on religious, moral, moral leadership, and human self development matters. The former Staff Chaplain under DCSPER was, on 1 April 1978, designated a Personal Staff Officer authorized direct access to the Commander. The INSCOM Concept Plan called for a Command Chaplain. This was consistent with other major commands. To provide the manpower space, INSCOM temporarily transferred one of its two chaplain positions at FS Sinop to HQ INSCOM. Once the pending HQ INSCOM TDA was approved by DA and the additional manpower requirement for Command Chaplain recognized, the borrowed space could be returned to FS Sinop.¹

Special Disbursing Officer (SDO). (U) The SDO served as the Special Disbursing Officer for the USA INSCOM, advising the CG and DCG's on all aspects of the control, administration, supervision, and utilization of intelligence contingency funds (ICF). Until 10 July 1978, control and administration of the ICF allotted to this command was provided for through the appointment of an ICF Class B Agent Officer to the local Finance and Accounting Officer. Based on the requirement for functional continuity, the ICF Class B Agent was filled by a civilian employee. As the result of a recent inspection, The Inspector General ruled that appointment of a civilian was in violation of Title 10, US Code, as amended by Public Law 87-480. Since it was deemed essential that the integrity of the current control and administrative procedures for ICF be maintained through the continuity provided by a civilian employee in this position, and appointment as an ICF Class B Agent Officer could not continue, establishment of a special disbursing agent was considered in the best interests of this command. Providing ICF support and the control and administration thereof would be the only activity of the special disbursing agent—he would not be involved in military or civilian pay matters. Mr. Autmer Ackley, Jr., GS-13, was appointed as the Special Disbursing Officer on 10 July 1978.²

New HQ INSCOM TDA. (U) HQ INSCOM was last reorganized under TDA ASWOYAA, CCNUM AS0177, effective 15 February 1977. The TDA failed to take into consideration the implementation of the IOSS concept which brought about the establishment of INSCOM effective 1 January 1977. Thus, HQ INSCOM had to work for the next year and a half under a TDA that was outdated at the time of its publication. During FY 1978, a great deal of effort was expended to prepare a new HQ INSCOM TDA which would reflect the consolidation of staff elements at Arlington Hall Station and Fort George G. Meade. Four of the several goals to be reached by the new TDA would- (1) Provide a one to five-year Interim Organization Structure pending colocation, (2) refine the organizational structure to conform with the INSCOM Concept Plan and FM 101-5 guidelines, (3) improve the MOS balance to reflect a

"fusion" of disciplines, and (4) provide a firm base for the pending DA manpower survey.

(U) The final document, CCNUM AS0179, submitted to DA for approval, incorporated the following changes:

1. (U) A Management Information Systems Officer. Army Headquarters Management Activity (AHMA) dictated the organization of all ADP/Management Information Systems (MIS) spaces into a separate Support Command—the Data Support Activity. The commander of the new organization would be dual-hatted as the Management Information Systems Officer, a special staff officer who operated as a key member of the INSCOM staff.

2. (U) Audiovisual Activities. A separate DOD study/directive required the consolidation and centralized management of all audiovisual personnel and equipment. A visual support center would be organized to include audiovisual elements currently organized under the Public Affairs Office, HQ INSCOM; the photographic laboratory within USAG, Arlington Hall Station; and the audiovisual activities at USAG, Vint Hill Farms Station.

3. (U) The Administrative Services. Administrative Services organized heretofore as a part of the DCSPER, including awards, records management, mail and distribution, and publications, would be organized as a separate TDA Staff Support Activity.

4. (U) Civilian Personnel Office/Staff Civilian Personnel Office. The servicing Civilian Personnel Office would be transferred from the HQ Staff to the TDA of the USAG, AHS. The staff Civilian Personnel Office in ODSPER would be augmented to assume command-wide staff civilian personnel management functions.

5. (U) Three new O6 level Assistant Deputy Chiefs of Staff offices would be established in DCSOPS and DCSCI to manage Army-wide INSCOM mission related SIGINT, HUMINT, and CI/OPSEC activities.³

INSCOM Stationing Alternatives. (U) On 13 February 1978, INSCOM and DARCOM were tasked to develop Case Study Justification Folders (CSJF's) for the stationing of the new commands created as a result of IOSS. These commands included HQ INSCOM, US Army Intelligence Threat and Analysis Center (ITAC), US Army Signals Warfare Laboratory (SWL), and US Army Electronics Materiel Readiness Activity (EMRA). At the same time, FORSCOM was tasked to complete a study on the relocation of the 370th ASA Company, Operations (Rear) (now Co B, 303d MI Bn) from Vint Hill Farms Station. Of six potential sites under preliminary study for 22 months, the following four specific alternatives were considered:⁴

A. (U) Close VHFS and terminate Army occupancy at AHS. Relocate Army activities currently at AHS and VHFS, to include realignment of US Army Electronics Materiel Readiness Activity (EMRA), Signals

Warfare Laboratory (assume that 114 spaces are located at VHFS), INSCOM SIGSEC assets and 370th ASA Co, Ops (Rear). Consolidate INSCOM activities at Fort Meade. Relocate US Army General Intelligence Production Detachment, Fort Bragg to Fort Meade.

B. (U) Terminate Army occupancy at AHS. Relocate intelligence and security activities currently at AHS and Fort Meade and consolidate the INSCOM at VHFS. Relocate US Army General Intelligence Production Detachment, Fort Bragg to VHFS.

C. (U) Close VHFS. HQ INSCOM split location between Fort Meade and AHS. Relocate Army activities currently at VHFS, to include realignment of EMRA, SWL, and 370th ASA Co, Ops (Rear). Relocate INSCOM SIGSEC assets at VHFS and General Intelligence Production Detachment, Fort Bragg with HQ INSCOM.

D. (U) Retention of status quo.

(U) The adjusted milestone date for submission of the CSJF's to DA was 15 August 1978. The DARCOM and FORSCOM studies were completed on 19 May 1978 and furnished to INSCOM for action as prescribed by the 13 February DA tasker. On 2 June 1978, a General Officer in-process review (IPR) was held at the Pentagon to report on progress and to identify any study problem areas requiring resolution at DA level. At the IPR, a summary analysis of alternatives clearly established that none of the alternatives were cost effective when the high one-time costs were compared with the estimated annual savings. (See Table 1.) Subsequent to this IPR, new guidance was provided on 27 June 1978 for a new option (Alternative D) as stated below. (The "status quo" option was redesignated as Alternative E.)

D. (U) Terminate Army occupancy at AHS. Relocate intelligence and security activities currently at AHS and Fort Meade and consolidate INSCOM at VHFS. Relocate EMRA from VHFS to Fort Monmouth and Tobyhanna Depot. Relocate US Army General Intelligence Production Detachment, Fort Bragg to VHFS. SWL and Co B, 303d MI Bn (EW) (formerly 370th ASA Co, Ops (Rear)) remain at VHFS, and "Other alternatives may be considered in accordance with reference A, para 1A (5)."

(*Refers to 13 Feb 78 DA tasker.)

E. (U) Retention of status quo.

(U) Alternative D was costed, and although it had the greatest personnel turbulence for HQ INSCOM, it had the lowest one-time costs. Under this alternative, the DARCOM-prepared CSJF on SWL and the FORSCOM-prepared study on the 370th ASA Co, Ops (Rear) would not be implemented as the affected units would not leave Vint Hill Farms Station.

Table 1.—Analysis of Stationing Alternatives

	<u>ALTN A</u>	<u>ALTN B</u>	<u>ALTN C</u>	<u>ALTN D</u>
DOD ONE-TIME COSTS (\$ in 000)				
(1) Construction				
<u>Construction Required</u>				
INSCOM	\$16,405	\$ 9,698	\$ 6,318	\$10,309
NON-INSCOM	14,780	12,635	14,780	2,158
TOTAL	<u>31,185</u>	<u>22,333</u>	<u>21,098</u>	<u>12,467</u>
<u>FYDP Construction Avoided</u>				
INSCOM	12,451	4,287	12,451	4,287
<u>Net Construction Costs Combined</u>	18,734	18,046	8,647	8,180
(2) Non-Construction				
<u>Total Non-Construction</u>				
INSCOM	8,007	4,379	6,557	4,396
NON-INSCOM	3,642	3,469	3,642	3,035
(3) Total (Net Construction Cost plus Non-Construction)	30,383	25,894	18,846	15,611
ANNUAL COST REDUCTIONS				
OMA and FHMA	1,969	(2,273)	1,984	(993)
DIA Support at AHS (Reimbursable to DA - <u>Not</u> included above)	2,643	2,316		2,316
MPA (Reallocated within DA)	3,603	356	2,300	276
PERSONNEL TURBULENCE				
INSCOM				
Transfer	1,250	1,366	883	1,361
Eliminate	471	25	370	8
Reimb Support to DA	128	112		112
NON-INSCOM				
Transfer	854	588	854	396
New Requirements	74	74	74	22
Total (Transfers plus Eliminates)	2,575	1,979	2,107	1,768

(U) Alternative D, the preferred alternative, was considered to meet all of the Army and INSCOM operational objectives of the IOSS, dated 1 August 1975.

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This alternative, if implemented, would terminate INSCOM's presence at AHS and would relocate 487 military and 465 civilian jobs outside the national capitol region, a long time goal of OSD and the Congress. It would result in a new inter-service support agreement between the Military District of Washington and the Defense Intelligence Agency permitting an anticipated recovery to Army of \$1.7 million in annual costs. Alternative D would also meet the DA approved INSCOM Concept Plan objectives for-

1. A consolidated headquarters at a single location resulting in an integrated command staff structure—a condition not now existing.
2. Centralized command and control of INSCOM subordinate units.
3. Centralized resources for the direction, control and accomplishment of the mission.
4. Enhanced command relationships with other MACOM's, their subordinate commands, the Army Staff, other DOD and national agencies.
5. Integrated all-source and multidiscipline staffs to manage intelligence collection and counterintelligence/OPSEC support activities.
6. An Army Intelligence Production and Threat Analysis staff.
7. An integrated Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center.
8. An integrated Intelligence Automated Data Processing System.
9. HQ INSCOM at the minimum essential authorized manpower level.
10. Meeting DOD headquarters management activities objectives.

Organization of the US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC).

(U) (C) The ITAC was formed as a result of findings and conclusions in Chapter 7 of the 1975 Army Chief of Staff-directed Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS). Several deficiencies were found in the Army's intelligence production system, e.g., (1) There was no method for determining requirements or the extent to which they were being met; (2) there was no adequate threat data and threat analysis support; and (3) production organization resources were not being used effectively. These problems were caused by a fragmentation of effort among nine Army production and analytical organizations. The recommended solution was to form an Army production center to include all elements; however, a CSA decision was made to unify, under INSCOM, only the FORSCOM Intelligence Group (later redesignated INSCOM Intelligence Group) and four other OACSI-DA field operating units: US Army Imagery Interpretation Center, US Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment, US Army Intelligence Operations Support Detachment, and US Army Intelligence Support Detachment. These units were assigned to HQ INSCOM on 1 January 1977.

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(U) To perform the necessary planning for the transfer of these units, an Intelligence and Threat Analysis Planning Office was formed on 26 October 1976 within the Office of Plans, Programs and Analysis (OPPA), HQ INSCOM. Staff responsibilities soon expanded to the extent that a separate office was required. On 1 March 1977, a provisional staff element for Intelligence and Threat Analysis was established under a Director, to plan, supervise, manage, and coordinate the activities of a provisional Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center comprised of the transferred units.

(U) The Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (Provisional) was established officially by HQ INSCOM Permanent Orders 65-2, 13 September 1977, effective 1 October 1977, under operational control of the Director, Intelligence and Threat Analysis (DIRITA). The provisional center served to integrate the personnel and missions of the five production and analytical organizations. This integration process continued until 1 January 1978 at which time four of the units were discontinued and the remaining one, the US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Detachment, was redesignated as the US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC) with headquarters at Arlington Hall Station. Concurrently, the provisional center was discontinued. On 9 January 1978, the title of the staff element was changed from Director, Intelligence and Threat Analysis (DIRITA) to Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and Threat Analysis (DCSITA). The ITAC area of Building A, Arlington Hall Station was accredited as a Special Activities Office (SAO) facility during the 4th Qtr, FY 1978. This enhanced progress toward an all-source production facility fully capable of supporting the ITAC analysts with a broader and more easily accessible range of materials.

(U)

(C) The mission of ITAC was to: process, analyze, produce, report, and disseminate all-source, integrated intelligence and counterintelligence products, threat analyses, and imagery exploitation for DA and MACOM's in support of combat operations, training, planning, and materiel and combat development activities; to identify intelligence gaps of interest to DA; and to serve as threat validation executive agent for the Department of the Army.

(U) The interim 1977 organization was restructured in April 1978 so that major elements of the Center included the Command Group, Production Management Office, Operations Directorate, and Support Directorate. At the close of FY 1978, ITAC's authorized strength stood at 91 officers, 25 warrant officers, 126 enlisted, and 185 civilians. The FY 1979 budget was \$72 million (10 percent of the INSCOM total). The former OACSI Translation Services function was transferred to ITAC effective 22 January 1978. Two civilian personnel and annual contract money in the amount of \$150,000 were transferred with the function. Effective 27 March, responsibility for dissemination of sensitive compartmented information within the Army was transferred from OACSI to the ITAC. As a result, INSCOM provided the single point of contact in the Army for dissemination of both collateral and special intelligence.

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(U) In spite of the functional integration of ITAC and the physical integration of MDW ITAC elements, the overall operation in the areas of administration and operational support continued to suffer from the inability to fully man the ITAC management and support structure. The strictures against movement of personnel, imposed by the lack of a stationing decision, continued to be the single greatest impediment to rapid and full development of ITAC. Insufficient editorial, administrative, and graphic support caused the slowdown of production output. This strain on manpower was brought about primarily by the IOSS precept to improve the quality of support rendered the Army user. In order to accomplish this improvement, ITAC instituted a product review process which insured that- (1) the user question was answered (a major production failing highlighted by the IOSS); (2) the product, where appropriate, employed multidisciplines and sources; and (3) the appearance of the product was professional and the material was readable. In short, ITAC was implementing a new methodology and was experiencing problems and shortfalls for which there were no immediate solutions. However, development of an ITAC word processing center was initiated; a request to move five unencumbered spaces from Fort Bragg into the ITAC management was approved by DA; and there was a continuing review and refinement of the ITAC TDA structure and manning.

(U) At the close of FY 1978, the ITAC Automated Production Management System was being fed initial data. It was expected to ultimately allow for the percentile breakout of disciplines incorporated in the products and a source readout for each product.

(U) The identification of Army user intelligence needs was a continuing process requiring many forms of contact with a wide variety of user levels.⁵

Reorganization of INSCOM Liaison Offices. (U) During Fy 1978, INSCOM underwent a major reorganization of its various liaison offices. The Technical Representative West Coast and the Technical Representative, US Army Electronics Command (ECOM) were transferred as a part of Signals Warfare Laboratory on 1 October 1977. On that same date, the INSCOM Liaison Detachment, US Army, Europe was redesignated the US Army Cryptologic Support Group. The INSCOM Liaison Detachment, Pacific was officially discontinued on 1 April 1979. The Detachment had in reality been down to zero strength for nearly two years; its functions being performed by INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii. Liaison Offices at OACSI and DARCOM were "inherited" by INSCOM from USAINTA. On 13 January 1978, INSCOM appointed a liaison officer to ACSI, however, at the close of the report period, the liaison function was being performed as part time duty by an ODCSOPS action officer. No separate manpower space was allotted the task. The liaison function at DARCOM was a part of INSCOM Ft Meade Hq Support Detachment's TDA.

(U) In June 1978, HQ INSCOM reassessed its INSCOM Liaison Officer requirements and stationing. IN this process, requirements for Command Liaison Officers were identified for FORSCOM, DARCOM, TRADOC, and ACSI. Letters of instruction from the Commander to these liaison officers were promulgated.

The policy of having personnel assigned to a major subordinate command attempt to represent the Commanding General, INSCOM, in a liaison capacity proved impractical and was discontinued. Future formal contacts between INSCOM and other major commands would be conducted by HQ INSCOM.

(U) At the close of FY 1978, pending approval of a new, integrated TDA for HQ INSCOM, the manpower spaces for liaison officers for DARCOM, TRADOC, and FORSCOM remained on TDA's of other units.

Relocation of Arlington Hall Station Tenants. (U) Effective 31 July 1978, the duty station of the employees of the US Army Signals Warfare Laboratory (SWL), Arlington Hall Station and of the US Army Office of the Project Manager Control and Analysis Center, US Army Electronics Research and Development Command also located at Arlington Hall Station was changed to Vint Hill Farms Station, Warrenton, Virginia.⁶

Organization Day. (U) A CofS, HQ INSCOM DF, dated 29 August 1977, designated 1 October as Organization Day, symbolic of the final integration of Army intelligence assets into a single Major Army Command, the US Army Intelligence and Security Command. Personnel assigned to INSCOM units began wearing INSCOM distinctive shoulder patches and crests on that day, and many units held their own organization day celebrations.⁷

INSCOM Personnel Clearance Facility Transferred to MILPERCEN. (U) Effective 1 October 1977, the US Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility (CCF) was established at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, as a field activity of the US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN). The mission of the CCF was to execute and recommend Army-wide policies, systems and programs related to security clearances for the Department of the Army military and civilian personnel. The facility also adjudicated results of all Defense Investigative Service (DIS) investigations and informed requesting commanders of clearability status of individuals. Because it performed adjudications for the entire Army, the facility was centrally located with the investigative records at Fort Meade. Although the CCF was established on 1 October, personnel were not officially assigned until 12 June 1978. These included personnel from the former Personnel Clearance Facility, ODCSSEC, Arlington Hall Station (made OPCON to INSCOM DIRCI on 6 June 1977; OPCON to MILPERCEN (CCF) effective 3 October 1977) and the Personnel Security Office, US Army Central Security Facility, Fort Meade.⁸

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER IV - ORGANIZATION

1. DF, CofS, 3 Mar 78, subj: Command Chaplain Position (U).
2. Ltr, IACGM, HQ INSCOM, Ft Meade, Md, 15 Apr 78, subj: Request for Establishment of a Special Disbursing Agent (U).
3. DF, CofS, 1 Feb 78, subj: HQ INSCOM TDA (U), pp. 1-2.
4. AHR, OPPA, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (C), pp. 2-2 thru 2-4 and Incl 6 to App E.
5. Qtrly Prog Rev, HQ INSCOM, 4th Qtr FY78 (C), p. 71; FY 1978 USAINSCOM Commanders Conference PreConference Packet (S), pp. D-4 thru D-7; Ann Hist Review, INSCOM, FY77 (TSC/NOFORN/LIMDIS), pp. 43-44.
6. AHR, USAG, VHFS, FY78 (FOUO), p. 27.
7. DF, IACS-P, 29 Aug 77, subj: Formal Establishment of INSCOM (U); THE INSCOM JOURNAL, Vol I, No. 2 (Nov 77) (U), pp. 10-11.
8. AHR, DCSCI, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (U), pp. 74-75 and Vol II (C), Tab JJ; AHR, USACSF, FY78 (U), App A, Incl 2; AHR, DCSSEC, HQ INSCOM, FY77 (S), pp. 1-10.

CHAPTER V
RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT

Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) Funds. (U) The US Army Intelligence and Security Command's OMA funding program at the close of FY 1978 consisted of \$72,254,000 in Direct Funds and \$37,000 in Automatic Reimbursements for a total of \$72,291,000. The table below shows a breakout of end FY 1978 direct funding by subprogram.

Table 2.—Direct Funding by Subprogram
(As of 30 Sep 78)

<u>Subprogram</u>	<u>FY 1978</u>
P2 (General Purpose Forces)	\$ 1,606,000
P3I (Intelligence Activities)	52,031,000
P3C (COMSEC)	1,713,000
P30 (Other)	16,401,000
P8T (Training)	375,000
P8O (Education Services)	128,000
	<u>\$72,254,000</u>

(U) Following is an audit trail from the DA dollar guidance for preparation of the FY 1978 command operating budget estimate (COBE) to final FY 1978 Approved Funding Program (AFP):

Program 2

<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 78 COBE</u>	\$ 1,280,000
Transfer from P2 - P3I: 66th MI Gp Realignment	- 73,000
Transfer from EUSA - INSCOM: 704th MI Det	+ 363,000
Transfer from USAREUR - INSCOM: 66th MI Gp	+ 8,000
Transfer from P2 - P3C: COMSEC Realignment Tv1	- 11,000
Transfer from P2 - P2: 502d MI Bn/501st	+ 118,000
Transfer from Eur - INSCOM: 66th MI Gp	- 8,000
Congress Reduction, Flying Hours Program	- 66,000
Congress Reduction, Civ & Strength	- 20,000
TRACER ROUND	+ 53,000
502d MI Bn/501st	+ 63,000
FY78 Non POL Stock Fund Price Increase	+ 28,000

<u>FY 78 Initial AFP</u>	\$ 1,735,000
Civ Pay Raise	+ 10,000
Civ Personnel Reduction (Oct PBG)	- 29,000
Korean Pay Raise	+ 3,000
Korean Foreign National Separation Allowance	+ 10,000
Returned to DA (Excess Funds)	- 73,000
Returned to DA (Excess Funds)	- 50,000

<u>Final FY 78 AFP</u>	<u>\$ 1,606,000</u>
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Program 3I

<u>Dollar Guidance FY 78 COBE</u>	\$ 50,384,000
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Transfer from P2 - P3I: 66th MI Gp Realignment	+ 73,000
Transfer from P95 - P3I: ISD PE Realignment	+ 212,000
Transfer from P2 - P38: 66th MI Gp	+ 64,000
Transfer from INSCOM - USACC Crypto Comm	- 1,411,000
Transfer from EUSA - INSCOM: 502d MI Bn/501st	+ 186,000
TUSLOG Det 4	+ 757,000
FY 78 Non POL Stock Fund Price Increase	- 2,000
Congress Reduction: Contract Studies & Anal	- 400,000
Congress Reduction: Flying Hour Program	- 26,000
Congress Reduction: Unspecified Intel Reduction	- 240,000
Congress Reduction: Civilian and Strength	- 99,000
Electro-Optic Program Management	+ 185,000
All Source Intel for Echelons Above Corps	+ 450,000
Transfer from INSCOM - DARCOM: R&D, Acq Function	- 633,000
FY 78 Non POL Stock Fund Price Increase	+ 58,000
DA FAD #25-32, 16 May 77, Manpower Spt Transfer of 502d ASA Gp to USAREUR	- 31,000

<u>Initial FY 78 AFP</u>	49,527,000
Transfer to DARCOM	- 20,000
Increase for TUSLOG Det 4	+ 538,000
Supplemental Appropriation for Civ Pay Raise	+ 1,586,000
Civ Personnel Reduction (Oct PBG)	- 146,000
Transfer IDHS & Translation Functions from ACSI	+ 962,000
Transfer to DARCOM	- 211,000
Travel Funds Decrease	- 193,000
Transfer to P30	- 885,000
To DA for Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility	- 67,000
Increase for Currency Revaluation	+ 728,000
Increase for Foreign National Pay Raise	+ 778,000
Increase for Korean Pay Raise	+ 27,000
Increase for Korean Foreign National Separation Allowance	+ 74,000
Travel Restoration	+ 193,000
Return to DA Excess Funds	- 15,000
Return to DA Excess Funds	- 845,000

Final FY 78 AFP \$ 52,031,000

Program 3C

Dollar Guidance - FY 78 COBE 2,269,000

Transfer from INSCOM - ACC (Base Communications) - 531,000
Transfer from P2 - P3C (COMSEC Realignment, Tvl) + 11,000
Transfer from P3C - P30 (Civ Pay Spt) - 7,000

FY 78 Initial AFP 1,742,000

Civ Pay (Supplemental Appropriation) + 65,000
Travel Reduction - 6,000
Excess Funds - 94,000
Travel Restoration + 6,000

Final FY 78 AFP \$ 1,713,000

Program 30

Dollar Guidance - FY 78 COBE \$ 10,774,000

Transfer from P2 - P30: 502d MI Bn Spt/501st + 279,000
Transfer from INSCOM - ACSI: IOSS Realignment - 29,000
Transfer from P3C - P30: Civ Pay Spt + 7,000
Transfer from P2 - P30: 66th MI Gp Spt + 55,000
FY 78 Non POL Stock Fund Price Increase + 2,000
Transfer from B0 P3I - P30: VHF + 3,500,000

Initial FY 78 AFP 14,588,000

Decrease for 3 Traffic Management Spaces to MDW - 40,000
Supplemental Appropriation for Direct Hire Civilian Pay Raise + 817,000
Transfer from P3I to Cover Deficiency in CI&IA + 885,000
To DA for USA Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility - 230,000
Increase for Currency Revaluation + 231,000
Increase for Foreign National Pay Raise + 101,000
Increase for Korean Pay Raise + 11,000
Increase for Korean Foreign National Separation Allowance + 38,000

Final FY 78 AFP \$ 16,401,000

Program 8T

Dollar Guidance - FY 78 COBE \$ 442,000

Transfer from INSCOM - TRADOC (new Equip Tng) - 200,000
Transfer from TRADOC - INSCOM: IOSS + 220,000

Transfer from INSCOM - ACSI: Tng Funds	-	<u>5,000</u>
<u>FY 78 Initial AFP</u>		437,000
Travel Decrease DA	-	40,000
Excess Funds	-	36,000
Travel Restoration	+	40,000
Excess Funds	-	<u>26,000</u>
<u>Final FY 78 AFP</u>		<u>\$ 375,000</u>
<u>Program 80</u>		
<u>Dollar Guidance - FY 78 COBE</u>	\$	119,000
VOTEC (UFR #15)	+	6,000
MOS Related (UFR #19)	+	4,000
Civ Education Programs	+	<u>7,000</u>
<u>FY 78 Initial AFP</u>		136,000
Civ Pay Raise	+	3,000
Excess Funds	-	<u>11,000</u>
<u>Final FY 78 AFP</u>		<u>\$ 128,000</u>

(U) The following table reflects direct obligations by element of expense for FY 1978 (\$ in thousands). Obligation of \$72,108,000 and Annual Funding Program of \$72,254,000 resulted in an obligation rate of 99.8 percent.

Table 3.—Direct Obligations by Element of Expense (FY 1978)

<u>Element of Expense</u>	<u>P2</u>	<u>P30</u>	<u>P3C</u>	<u>P8T</u>	<u>P80</u>	<u>P3I</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>% of Grand Total</u>
Civ Pay & Benefits	96	10,955	927		59	21,083	33,120	45.9
Travel & Trans	84	972	359	328	7	2,361	4,111	5.7
Rents/Comm/Utilities	14	872	14	22		1,372	2,294	3.2
Contr Svcs	172	407	300		37	15,837	16,753	23.2
Supplies & Equip	1,208	3,453	34	3	19	11,113	15,830	22.0
Total	<u>1,574</u>	<u>16,659</u>	<u>1,634</u>	<u>353</u>	<u>122</u>	<u>51,766</u>	<u>72,108</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Military Construction, Army (MCA). (U) At the close of the fiscal year, the following projects were in the construction phase at locations indicated:

Germany:

A/C Rehab - Augsburg (\$614,000)

Korea:

Hangar (\$606,000)

Relocatable BEQ's (\$1,864,000)

Okinawa:

A/C Rehab (\$715,000)

CONUS:

Fuel Conversion - Vint Hill Farms Station (\$118,000)

Sewage Treatment Plant - Vint Hill Farms Station (\$960,000)

(U) In Germany, the air-conditioning upgrade of Augsburg was in final design with completion scheduled for 1st Qtr, FY 1979. In Korea, both active projects supported the move of the 146th Aviation Company to US Army Field Station, Korea. The hangar was completed in the fourth quarter as was the first unit of the BEQ's. At Okinawa, the air-conditioning rehab and upgrade was underway. Both CONUS projects were at Vint Hill Farms Station. The dual fuel conversion which would give the boiler plant the capacity to revert to oil firing whenever natural gas was interrupted was completed during the 4th Qtr, FY 1978. For a long time the sewage treatment plant was on "hold" based on the possible closure of Vint Hill Farms Station but, as the year ended, bids were in and the contract should be awarded and work commence in 1st Qtr, FY 1979.²

Family Housing Units. (U) This command operated and maintained family housing units at Arlington Hall Station and Vint Hill Farms Station. Funds were also received from DA for leased housing. The Annual Funding Program for these units for FY 1978 was \$622,000 of which \$611,000 was obligated (98.2 percent).³

Manpower Program. (U) Based on the 22 May 1978 DA Program and Budget Guidance, as changed by other DA correspondence, the INSCOM Manpower Program stood at the following levels for 30 September 1978:⁴

1. (U) Program 2 (General Purpose Forces). Manpower resources amounted to 960 spaces. This authorization will decrease by 94 enlisted spaces in FY 1979 due to the loss of temporary spaces that were loaned to INSCOM to implement IOSS.

2. (U) Program 3 (Intelligence and Communications). Manpower resources amounted to 9,555 spaces for FY 1978 or an increase of 315 spaces over FY 1977. The increase was mainly due to the re-acquisition of USAG, Vint Hill Farms Station from DARCOM.

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(3) (U) Program 6 (Research and Development). Under IOSS all R&D spaces were transferred out of INSCOM.

(4) (U) Program 8 (Training, Medical and Other Personal Activities) stayed at the FY 1977 level of 22 total authorizations.

(5) (U) Program 9 (Administration and Associated Activities). Also under IOSS, these 31 spaces were converted to Program 3 and INSCOM no longer had any P-9 resources.

(6) (U) Joint Activity (Program 3 Army Support to NSA). The 708 spaces included 23 more than FY 1977 due to changes in the mission.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Military Strength by Program. The table below reflects authorized and assigned military strength by program. Shortfalls existed in all program elements except the training subelement of Program 8.⁵

Table 4.—Military Strength by Program

<u>Program</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Plus/Minus</u>
2 Gen Purpose Forces	955	780	-175
3: Cryptologic Activity	4,923	4,757	-166
AMHA CCP	194	164	- 30
HUMINT	612	557	- 55
Imagery Intelligence	55	42	- 13
Intel Production Actv	145	104	- 41
Intel Data Handling Sys	45	42	- 3
COMSEC	225	174	- 51
Base Ops	227	142	- 85
CI & IA	1,062	993	- 69
AMHA IRA & Others	6	2	- 4
Spt to NSA	708	692	- 16
8 Training	12	12	
Family Housing	3	2	- 1
TOTAL	<u>9,172</u>	<u>8,463</u>	<u>-709</u>

(U) ~~(C)~~ Command Personnel Situation. Manpower trends in FY 1978 continued downward. Authorized and actual total command strengths for FY 1977 and FY 1978 are shown below.⁶

	30 September 1977					
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOT MIL</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>
Authorized	1,063	461	7,923	9,447	1,797	11,244
Actual	1,016	456	7,258	8,730	1,749*	10,479

*Full time permanent and temporary direct hire, including direct hire Foreign Nationals and US Force dependents filling foreign national indirect hire positions.

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30 September 1978

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOT MIL</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>
Authorized	1,058	472	7,807	9,337	1,417	10,754
Actual	899	435	7,129	8,463	1,280*	9,743

*Does not include Wage Board and Foreign Nationals (FN). Assigned totals, as of 30 Sep 78: Wage Board worldwide - 146; FN (direct hire) - 101; FN (indirect hire) - 392.

(U) For FY 1978 command personnel strength by unit, see appendix F.

INSCOM Key Personnel. (U) Appendix G contains a listing of personnel occupying key positions within the command, as of 30 September 1978.

Communications Programs and Resources. (U) The Directorate, US Army Communications Command-Intelligence and Security Command (USACC-INSCOM) was the Program Manager within USACC for Program Element (PE) 381055A, Cryptologic Communications, Army. This program was divided into two subelements (SE). The SE-49, Cryptologic Communications, NON-DCS, included all telecommunications resources, except cryptographic equipment, required to provide, operate and maintain ACC fixed station Special Intelligence communications. The SE-54, Cryptologic Communications, DCS, included funds necessary to support leased or government owned communications circuits, to include AUTODIN subscriber tails and other circuits in support of the cryptologic effort, but did not include AUTODIN backbone costs.

(U) Although the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) manpower levels remained austere, there was relative stability in PE 381055A during FY 1978. The only significant change resulted from restoration of SE-49 spaces, originally deleted in anticipation of various remoting proposals. As these anticipated remoting plans slipped, a decision was made to restore program spaces, and address future reductions only after planned remoting plans were actually approved for implementation.

(U) With the exception of seven SE-49 spaces comprising the Communications-Electronics (CE) Division (formerly Tactical Division), INSCOM, all INSCOM cryptologic communications manpower resources were transferred to US Army Communications Command effective 1 October 1977 in accordance with Chapter 6 of the IOSS.

(U) During FY 1978, only one action impacted upon Other Procurement, Army (OPA) funding. Project ADVENTURER was integrated into the NSA Project FASTBACK. Associated OPA dollars (\$2,021,000) were reallocated to this project. Also during FY 1978, all PE 381955A funds were apportioned to NSA for budgetary management. Major expenditures of these funds included: STREAMLINER equipment and associated maintenance and test equipment; Model 40 Teletypewriters; and a secure telephone system for USA Field Station, Augsburg and USA Field Station, Berlin. The total FY 1978-84 OPA program

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for PE 381055A, as of 30 September 1978, is depicted in the table below (in thousands).

Table 5.—OPA Funding - PE 381055A

<u>Item</u>	<u>FY 78</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>	<u>FY 84</u>
Secure Phones	242K	200K					
Comm Sys Improvement	982K	560K	125K	757K	480K	512K	0
ADVENTURER	2,021K	(transferred to Project FASTBACK)					
STREAMLINER	108K	357K					
Test Equip	60K	137K	0	130K	140K	145K	31K
TOTAL	<u>3,413K</u>	<u>1,254K</u>	<u>125K</u>	<u>887K</u>	<u>620K</u>	<u>657K</u>	<u>31K</u>

(U) FY 1978 Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) funds were approved at a level of \$544,000 for telecommunications projects and supplies, TDY, and various support services. In addition, \$451,000 were approved for civilian compensation.⁷

Project STREAMLINER. (U) NSACSS established the STREAMLINER program under Program Management Directive 3-73, 20 June 1973. Project STREAMLINER had the broad objective of improving communications in support of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program. More specifically, the project was designed to reduce writer-to-reader time, conservation of point-to-point transmission facilities, and enhance communications reliability.

(U) Under the program management concept, NSA had the overall management responsibility. The Service Cryptologic Agencies (SCA's) were responsible for the installation, test, and acceptance of all peripheral equipments associated with the system, site preparation of the ties to accommodate the STREAMLINER system and operation and maintenance of the system after implementation. The STREAMLINER system consisted of three types of configuration—Small Automated Communications Terminal (SACT), Medium Automated Communications Terminal (MACT), and Large Automated Communications Terminal (LACT).⁸

(U) The installation of the STREAMLINER systems at INSCOM field stations was complete. The USA Field Station, Pyong Taek in Korea was the first site to receive a STREAMLINER system and USA Field Station, Berlin was the last. Implementation dates were as follows:

<u>Station</u>	<u>System Installed</u>	<u>Implementation Date</u>
USAFS Korea	MACT (32 chan)	24 Feb 77
USAFS Augsburg	LACT (48 chan)	31 Mar 77
Arlington Hall Station	LACT (48 chan)	25 May 77
USAFS Okinawa	LACT (48 chan)	7 Nov 77
USAFS Berlin	LACT (48 chan)	27 Apr 78

Project LEMONADE. (U) Project LEMONADE was the approved plan that provided red multiplexing and bulk encryption of selected CRITICOM circuits. The objective of the project was to obtain savings in communications manpower, leased circuit costs, equipment, space and energy without degradation of communications service. INSCOM sites designated to be multiplexing hubs were USAFS Berlin (three trunks), USAFS Augsburg (four trunks), USAFS Korea (four trunks) and USAFS Okinawa (three trunks). During FY 1978, trunks installed the previous year were activated at USAFS Okinawa and USAFS Korea. This brought the total number of trunks activated to four at USAFS Augsburg, three at USAFS Berlin, two at USAFS Korea, and one at USAFS Okinawa. The activation of the remaining trunks for INSCOM stations were delayed pending the installation of LEMONADE equipment at connecting stations.⁹

Resource Management Officer. (U) Over the last 30 years, comptrollership in the Department of the Army evolved in divergent forms among the various MACOM's. The statutory base for comptroller functions was defined in the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent amendments. The position of Comptroller was established by this Act. The Comptroller was charged with the responsibility for budgeting, accounting, internal audit, and progress and statistical reporting. The additional responsibility to maintain an adequate system of fund control grew from the budgeting and accounting functions included in the National Security Act. Over the years, new functions, including Programming, Management Engineering, and Cost/Economic Analysis, have become associated with the Comptrollership. More recent initiatives by some commands to establish a single organizational element to be responsible for all resource management functions have combined Manpower Management with those of the Comptroller. On 1 December 1976, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, HQ INSCOM, was disestablished and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management (DCSRM) was established in its place. DCSRM assumed new finance and review functions and those dealing with manpower management.

(U) Organizational structures for the combined resource management functions vary widely within the Army. This situation was reflected in the divergent resource management organizations, functions and methods being brought together by Army-wide elements forming INSCOM and dictated that these concepts be applied with consistency throughout the new INSCOM organizational structure.

(U) In early FY 1978, HQ INSCOM directed the establishment of Resource Management Officers (RMO's) within the organization of each major subordinate command/activity. Organizational concept and definitions with regard to the resource management functions in INSCOM were outlined in a HQ INSCOM letter, IARM-P, 28 October 1977, subject: INSCOM Resource Management Organization and Functions. Resource management represented the role involving all managers in considering the effective and efficient use of manpower and financial resources in the accomplishment of their assigned missions and functions. The key elements of the letter were as follows:

1. (U) The Resource Management Officer at each organizational level would be a principal staff officer and would be responsible for coordinating resource planning, distributing, controlling, reviewing, and evaluating the utilization of command resources. The INSCOM RMO function would be organized as a separate staff entity in those commands/units with a functional coordinating staff. In smaller commands where a full time position was not required, the Commander, Deputy Commander, or Executive Officer might assume the RMO functions.

2. (U) The RMO would not be subordinate to any other staff element.

3. (U) The RMO would be responsible for manpower authorization, utilization and control within the unit in addition to the more traditional functions associated with the management of financial resources.

(U) The subordinate commands faced several problems during the implementation phase. One was the lack of qualified financial management officers, and another was the necessity of taking the required spaces out of their own resources. It was anticipated that time would bring an upgrade in number of qualified candidates, but for the time being, the positions were largely filled by military (officer and NCO), although there were a few civilians.¹⁰

Automatic Data Processing Activities. (U) During the latter part of FY 1978, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Automated Data Processing (DCSADP) and the INSCOM Data Systems Activity spent a great deal of effort preparing for a major reorganization of ADP resources and functions which would take place with the approval of a pending HQ INSCOM TDA. In fact, unofficially, functions were beginning to be carried out as the reorganizations had already taken place. As in FY 1977, the lack of personnel hindered ADP activities throughout FY 1978.

(U) Highlights of ADP support provided during FY 1978 included the decision to changeover the current punched card machine (PCM) on-site at the Intelligence Reports Repository (IRR), Fort George G. Meade, to an automated process centered around the ASA Hewlett Packard HP21MX minicomputer. Equally important was the decision to develop the civilian PCM operators, via an upward mobility program, into data processing professionals in computer operations and programming/analysis.

(U) In support of HQ INSCOM, the FY 1978 workload of executing production job streams increased nearly 350 percent over the FY 1976 level. This meant that priorities had to be given to existing production systems upon which customers were dependent at the expense of new developments. Investigation of the possibility of doing requirements by contract was explored; however, processing delays appeared to prohibit successful use of contracts. Although there was a backlog of jobs due to manpower shortages, there would have been a limit placed upon production by the fact that the computer was reaching a point of saturation and being down due to age. At

the close of FY 1978, attempts to find an alternative upgraded system through DA or NSA channels had failed.

(S) During FY 1978, LAFINE WINE (LFW) II software development proceeded along lines outlined in a division of effort agreement between USA Field Station, [redacted] and the CONUS development team. The CONUS team developed processing modules for collecting external and intra-station communications. The USA Field Station, [redacted] software team assumed responsibility for the following modules: reports generation, analytic aids, computational aids, target identification, and data base administration.

(U) The following major program decisions were made regarding LFW II during FY 1978:

1. (U) After LFW II software simulations revealed that the Central Processing Unit (CPU) was marginally adequate, negotiations ensued between NSA and INSCOM which resulted in a swap of the LFW II 370/145 plus cash for an NSA 370/158 scheduled for upgrade to a 3033.

2. (S) The LFW II Configuration Control Board was established with NSA/R42 as chairman and NSA/T31, HQ INSCOM, and USA Field Station, [redacted] as board members.

3. (U) Due to the cancellation of EELPOT, it was decided that LFW II would be designed and implemented as a stand alone DF system.¹¹

Management By Objectives Program. (U) Management by Objectives was adopted as a principal means of management within the INSCOM. This program was promulgated by the publication of INSCOM Circular 5-1 and distributed to all elements of the command by a cover letter from the Commanding General on 9 May 1977. The Circular announced the INSCOM goals; tasked each unit reporting to this Headquarters to develop internal objectives in support of the goal and forward them to this Headquarters; exempted former USAINTA elements from the program until 1 October 1977 in light of the USAINTA "Key Command Management Objectives" program which was in being at the time; and made the requirement for the submission of an annual summary status report.

(U) Implementation of the Program met with varying degrees of success. It was hampered by the large number of unit reorganizations taking place; the four-month exemption for the former USAINTA elements; a number of changes of command during the summer months; and the lack of adequate feedback to the Headquarters.¹²

Organizational Effectiveness. (U) Organizational Effectiveness (OE) refers to the systematic military application of selected management and behavioral science skills and methods to improve how an organization functions to accomplish assigned missions and increase combat readiness. From 1975 to 1977, about 200 Organizational Effectiveness Staff Officers (OESO) were trained

(b) (1) Per NSA;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i); (b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Army-wide and assigned to a variety of levels in the Army. These trained advisors are now available to assist commanders in assessing and improving their procedures. In compliance with paragraph 2-8b, AR 600-76, Organizational Effectiveness Activities and Training, dated 8 November 1977, HQ INSCOM and several subordinate organizations initiated actions to convert spaces to provide OE support within the command. Eight spaces were submitted to HQDA for conversion on the FY 1979 TAADS documents. HQDA would authorize one NCO space for the Headquarters in addition to the converted spaces.

(U) On 19 October 1977, the INSCOM Organizational Effectiveness Plan was published. This plan provided further guidance on the implementation of OE activities and training, identified objectives which would contribute to the institutionalization of OE within the command, established milestones, assigned responsibility for actions, and provided information on desired results for each objective.¹³

INSCOM Officer Fellowship Program. (U) The INSCOM Officer Fellowship Program was established on 13 December 1976 to identify a select few, highly capable military intelligence officers (cryptologists, counterintelligence, HUMINT, etc.), in the grade of captain, who would be provided widely diversified experience by one-year rotating assignments to three of the following staff elements: Chief of Staff; Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations; Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource Management; Deputy Chief of Staff, Management Information Systems; and Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics. These assignments would prepare participants for earlier attendance to the Command and General Staff College and for subsequent high level command and staff assignments. Through this intensive personnel management, INSCOM was enabled to play a more direct role in the early development of outstanding MI officers. During FY 1977, three officers were nominated and accepted for the program. The fourth officer, CPT Howard B. Lavy, was appointed to the program in August 1978.¹⁴

General and Field Grade Officer Promotions. (U) A comparison between FY's 1976, 1977, 1977 and 1978 general and field grade officer promotions are reflected in the table below. Only the FY 1977 and FY 1978 figures include all officers assigned to INSCOM.¹⁵

Table 6.—General and Field Grade Officer Promotions

<u>Promotion To</u>	<u>FY 1976</u>	<u>FY 1977</u>	<u>FY 1977</u>	<u>FY 1978</u>
General Officer	1	0	2	1
Colonel	5	8	19 (15 MI)	*
Lieutenant Colonel	12	15	26 (22 MI)	34 (23 MI)
Major	45	19	32 (24 MI)	56 (50 MI)

*No Selection Board.

Enlisted Strength Summary. (U) The assigned enlisted strength on 30 September 1978 was 7,129 against a Command Program authorization of 7,712 for a 92.4 percent fill. This compared to a beginning fiscal year strength of 7,116 assigned against a Program Budget Guidance authorization of 7,537 or a 94.4 percent fill. The geographical distribution of enlisted resources at the end of FY 1978 is shown below. 16

Table 7.—Enlisted Strength By Geographical Area

<u>Area</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
CONUS	2,693	2,337
Europe	2,941	2,864
Pacific	1,950	1,765
Turkey	73	76
Canal Zone	55	75
TSA Worldwide	0	12
TOTAL	<u>7,712</u>	<u>7,129</u>

No-Show Problem Among Reassigned Personnel. (U) A considerable number of gains assigned through the Centralized Assignment Procedures (CAP III) System either did not arrive or failed to arrive during the report month reflected on CAP III assignment rosters, which impacted upon the mission management capability of the gaining INSCOM units. Failure of gains to arrive when scheduled resulted in last minute requests to this headquarters and/or NSA for mission reduction/realignment based on personnel shortages.

(U) The problem was concentrated in three major areas. The first was AIT students who were subject to recycle, academic drops, security holds, etc. The average AIT (advanced individual training) student arrived at the gaining command 45-60 days after the date specified in the assignment instructions. The problem was referred to MILPERCEN for corrective action. A manual tracking of randomly selected O5H students proved to MILPERCEN that the problem was not isolated to a small number of students but was of sufficient magnitude to be categorized as the rule rather than the exception.

(U) A second problem lay with 50 percent of the soldiers appearing on CAP III assignment but who were not eligible. They had been placed on orders based on erroneous data from the Enlisted Master File. Consequently, MILPERCEN was having to place 140 soldiers on orders to fill 100 requirements.

(U) The third and most critical problem area was the deletion and deferment system. Timely submission of this data was critical if the gaining commander was to get additional nominees against his requisitioned requirements before they aged out of the system. In January 1978, an appeal was made to unit commanders to get involved and to insure that the records of personnel

under their command were correct and that requests for deletion/deferment were processed within the time limits specified by HQDA. New procedures were being developed within MILPERCEN to improve the deletion/deferment system and were expected to be implemented during 1st Qtr, FY 1979. One of the primary elements of the revised system would require a notification to MILPERCEN indicating the status of every soldier in receipt of CAP III assignment instructions. An inquiry would be generated automatically to the losing command for soldiers within 60 days of movement date but for whom no action had been taken to defer, delete, or confirm their ability to move.¹⁷

Reenlistment Rates. (U) This command continued to have reenlistment problems during FY 1978. The table below shows INSCOM's FY 1978 reenlistment rate compared by subordinate units.¹⁸

Table 8.—Subordinate Unit Reenlistments (FY 1978)

Subor Comd (by size)	First Termers			Careerists		
	Obj	Reenl	% Obj	Obj	Reenl	% Obj
<u>Group I</u>						
USAG AHS	25.11	11	43.81	58.74	47	80.01
CONUS MI Gp	63.98	47	73.46	119.82	93	77.62
USAFS Augsburg	146.36	49	33.48	104.68	87	83.11
USAFS Berlin	68.13	23	33.76	41.59	29	69.73
USAFS Okinawa	41.45	52	125.45	21.75	30	137.93
66th MI Gp	23.73	22	92.71	80.92	71	87.74
501st MI Gp	46.06	41	89.01	46.03	61	132.52
<u>Group II</u>						
HQ INSCOM - Meade	5.97	6	100.50	27.08	18	66.47
USAITAC	7.23	6	82.99	14.52	6	41.32
TUSLOG Det 4	2.54	2	78.74	3.39	3	88.50
USAG VHFS	14.07	8	56.85	26.99	15	55.58
USAFS Misawa	9.42	11	116.77	7.94	10	125.94
USAFS San Antonio	60.26	23	38.17	67.78	49	72.29
902d MI Gp	13.62	3	22.03	85.63	50	58.39
500th MI Gp	.09	0	0.0	12.89	10	77.58
<u>Group III</u>						
INSCOM Det Hawaii	2.58	0	0.0	4.73	1	21.14
CSG, USAREUR	.18	0	0.0	.98	1	102.4
Pers Det, Ft Dix	----	0	---	5.97	5	83.75
Pers Det, Ft Jax	----	--	---	9.75	8	82.05
Pers Det, Ft LWood	----	1	---	12.22	7	57.58
USAFS Homestead	2.49	1	40.16	5.59	0	0.0
470th MI Gp	4.40	2	45.45	6.41	3	46.80
SIGSEC Activity	1.46	0	0.0	.97	1	103.09

Subordinate Unit Reenlistments (FY 1978)—Continued

	First Termers			Careerists		
	Obj	Reenl	% Obj	Obj	Reenl	% Obj
COMMAND TOTAL	<u>539.13</u>	<u>308</u>	<u>57.13</u>	<u>766.73</u>	<u>605</u>	<u>78.91</u>

Recruitment Posture by MOS. (U) Although INSCOM was not in the recruiting business, it continuously monitored recruitment results and remedial DA enlistment incentives programs to insure that emphasis was placed on problem areas. Effective in July 1978, MILPERCEN granted authority to recruit 200 non-high school graduates in MOS 05H and at the close of FY 1978, 36 personnel had been enlisted. The table below depicts the INSCOM recruitment posture by critical MOS's.¹⁹

Table 9.—Recruitment by MOS, FY 1978

MOS	Quota*	Enlistments	% of Fill
33S	196	173	88
05D	198	181	91
05G	116	110	95
05H	1,034	886	86
05K	252	233	92
96B	551	530	96
96C	347	119	34
96D	209	149	71
98C	635	588	93
98G	1,033	976	95
98J	68	66	97

(U) The table below reflects the 98G recruitment by language skill.

Table 10.—Recruitment by Language (MOS 98G)

Language	Quota*	Enlistment	% of Fill
French	4	2	50
Russian	417	417	100
Chinese Mandarin	97	80	82.5
German	158	158	100
Czech	27	27	100
Arabic-Syrian	21	18	85.7
Arabic-Egyptian	47	39	83
Korean	178	175	98
Polish	40	33	82.3
Spanish American	36	19	52.8
Vietnamese-Hanoi	8	8	100
TOTAL	<u>1,033</u>	<u>976</u>	<u>95</u>

*Training seats available on REQUEST System.

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Critical MOS Shortages. (U) The most critical shortage confronting the command in the 98 Career Management Field (CMF) was MOS 05H (Morse Interceptor). This shortage was a continuation of a problem which surfaced originally in March 1977. The shortage was most significant at USAFS [redacted] and USAFS San Antonio where considerable mission was lost because of operator shortage. USAFS [redacted] had an average monthly assigned strength of 253.6 against an average authorization of 303.8. The average monthly fill was 83.4 percent of authorization. USAFS San Antonio had an average monthly assigned strength of 235.5 against an average authorization of 323.3. The average monthly fill for the fiscal year was 72.8 percent.

(S-CCO) At the end of 2d Qtr, FY 1978, only 81 percent of the Army-manned collection requirements were being met. It was necessary to close 33 collection positions at USJ-783 in San Antonio, 15 positions at FS [redacted] and 3 positions at FS [redacted]. Each position closure represented approximately five billets. The closure of these positions seriously affected INSCOM's ability to maintain SIGINT order-of-battle on certain Soviet military targets and the People's Republic of China. The shortage of personnel not only limited the amount of intercept collected but it also eroded the SIGINT community's flexibility to satisfy new intelligence requirements and its all important technical base.

(b) (1) Per
NSA;(b)
(3):50
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(i);(b)
(3):P.L. 86
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(C) Pressure on the DA staff to meet the 05H requirements of the command, which was initiated in FY 1977, continued. Most notable of these actions was a back channel message of 23 March 1978 from MG Rolya to MG Paul S. Williams, Jr. (Director Personnel Management, DCSPER, DA) and a letter from Vice Admiral Inman, Director, NSACSS to the Secretary of the Army on 14 April 1978. The results of these and prior efforts resulted in a review of the MOS 05H from the perspectives of long range TAADS projects, recruitment objectives, qualification standards, course qualifications, attrition rate, and even the sick call rate. FY 1978 saw recruitment objectives raised by 200 to accommodate authorization of enlistment of non-high school graduates. CONUS tactical units were denuded of MOS 05H personnel and utilized under the Peacetime Utilization Program directed by DCSPER, DA. Despite almost two years of continual discussion, MILPERCEN projected the command to have only a 85 percent fill of the 31 December 1977 authorization by 31 December 1978. This meant that FS [redacted] and FS San Antonio would still be undermanned. In addition, extraordinary measures to lessen the immediate impact of these shortages were undertaken, including elongating work schedules and assigning Navy and Air Force resources where possible to forestall more position closures. Potential utilization of reserve personnel was another area explored by the SCA's. INSCOM, AFSS, and Naval Security Group representatives met at Hq, AFSS, prior to a 28 February 1978 conference with NSA representatives, and were unable to identify sufficient resources to offer practical assistance to Consolidate Security Operations Center (CSOC) manning.

(U) Another area of interest within the 98 CMF was the shortage of language qualified traffic analysts (MOS 98C). Of the 947 MOS 98C authorized, as of

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30 September 1978, 267 were designated as requiring language qualifications. The assigned strength as of 30 September 1978 was 180 (67 percent). Unlike the 98G who had to be qualified for language training prior to enlistment, the 98C had to be qualified only for training for his MOS. This procedure made it extremely difficult to identify qualified personnel for input to language training upon completion of the basic traffic analysis course. The fill of these requirements was hampered also by the reliance on 98C (linguist) volunteers as opposed to a definitive program to meet these requirements. The problem was referred to MILPERCEN for resolution. As a result of this referral, MILPERCEN directed that every 98C in the inventory be administered the Defense Language Aptitude Test (DLAT), which could be the first step towards directed language training for qualified personnel. Because of the length of training time for linguists, no significant improvement could be obtained from an improved program for 12 to 15 months after adoption.

(U) MOS 97B (CI Specialist) and MOS 97C (HUMINT Specialist) with a 74.7 percent and 58.6 percent fill, respectively, at the close of the fiscal year, were the two major problem areas in this CMF. A major deterrent to the personnel fill was reliance solely on a "recruit from within" program. The command submitted a study to the DA staff on recommended measures to increase the Army-wide fill, and subsequently the INSCOM fill, in these MOS. The study addressed the program from recruitment to assignment and retention. Although several meetings were held on this subject and DA was receptive to most of INSCOM's recommendations, little real progress was made by the close of the year.

(U) Shortages in the DA MOS, especially the maintenance and ADP career fields, plagued the command much of the year. One of the primary deterrents to increased personnel fill in these MOS was the fact that until April 1978, the MP/MI Branch of MILPERCEN managed the total INSCOM requirements. This was contrary to the MILPERCEN structure which provided for management entirely by CMF. As long as the MP/MI Branch processed the command requirements, INSCOM requisitions were always out of phase with other Army requirements thus negating the value of a higher DA Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) rating. With the transfer of DA MOS from MP/MI Branch to the appropriate CMF, there was a noticeable improvement in fill of these requirements. The affects of the transfer was readily apparent in the 74 CMF (Data Processing) which slowly eroded under the control of the MP/MI Branch but improved significantly when placed under the control of the CMF 74 managers.²⁰

Enlistment and Reenlistment Incentives. (U) At the close of FY 1978, the tables below depict the enlistment and reenlistment monetary incentives that were in effect.²¹

Table 11.—Enlistment Incentives

<u>MOS</u>		<u>Incentive</u>
05D	EW/SIGINT Ident/Location Operator	\$1,500
05H	EW/SIGINT Interceptor	\$1,500
96C	Interrogator	\$2,500
98G	EW/SIGINT Voice Interceptor	
	Korean	\$2,500
	Russian	\$2,500
	Czech	\$1,500
	Chinese Mandarin	\$1,500
	Arabic-Syrian	\$1,500

Table 12.—Reenlistment Incentives

<u>MOS</u>		<u>Bonus*</u>
05H	EW/SIGINT Morse Interceptor	4A
33S	EW/Intercept Systems Repair	2B
96C	Interrogator	2A
96D	Image Interpreter	3A
97B	Counterintelligence Agent	4A
97A	Area Intelligence Specialist	2B
98C	EW/SIGINT Specialist	2A
98G	EW/SIGINT Voice Interceptor	3A/4B
	Arabic-Syrian	
	Chinese Mandarin	
	Czech	
	Korean	
	Polish	
	Spanish American	
	Russian	
	German	

*Zone A applies to 1st Termers (6 or less years active service at ETS). Zone B applies to career soldiers 6-10 years active service at ETS). The numerical multiplier times the service member's monthly base pay at time of reenlistment determined the amount of bonus.

Additional Skill Identifiers. (U) The new Additional Skill Identifiers (ASI) in the table below were established by DA, based on recommendations by this command under the provisions of AR 611-201, to identify the specialized skill requirements of selected duty positions within the INSCOM and those personnel qualified to fill the positions.²²

Table 13.—Additional Skill Identifiers

<u>ASI</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Associated MOS</u>	<u>Date Approved</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>
K6	Sr Non-Morse Collec- tor/Controller	05K	17 Oct 77	1 Sep 78
L5	Automated HFDF Systems Operator (EELPOT)	05D	17 Oct 77	1 Sep 78
N5	IATS System Controller	05H	21 Nov 77	1 Sep 78
N6	LEFOX Collection and Processing Sys Maint	33S	21 Nov 77	1 Sep 78
N8	IATS Systems Maint	33S	21 Nov 77	1 Sep 78
R4	Automated HFDF Sys Maint (EELPOT)	33S	21 Nov 77	1 Sep 78
U9	ICR Non-Morse Operator	05K	24 Mar 78	1 Mar 79
R1	MOD 37D Teletypewriter Maint	31J	13 Apr 78	1 Mar 79
R7	DCCS Maint	34F	13 Apr 78	1 Mar 79
D4	Data Acquisition System (AN/GSQ-76) Maint	33S	18 Jul 78	1 Oct 79
D5	Voice Intercept Position (EASTLACK) Maint	33S	18 Jul 78	1 Oct 79

(U) INSCOM proponent ASI's shown below were revised to more accurately identify the duties with which associated, or to update associated training course date. The following table reflects the revisions:

Table 14.—Revised Additional Skill Identifiers

<u>ASI</u>	<u>Revision</u>
R9	To delete association with 31J and 34F. Retitled STRAWHAT Maintenance.
K9	To add USAISD Course 231-F10.
Y4	To delete association with MOS 98C.
M9	To change description and prerequisite for award.
Q4	To amend title and add USAISD Course 102-F25.
T9	To correct course data.
U1	To correct course data.

(U) A request was forwarded to DA for approval, on 3 May 1978, for the establishment of a new ASI entitled, Specialized Teletype Equipment Maintenance (associated MOS 31J). Also forwarded for approval, on 7 August 1978, was the action to authorize award of ASI Y5 to qualified personnel in MOS 32F. Approval of both actions was pending at year's end.

Contract Training. (U) MILPERCEN showed an inability to identify sufficiently qualified personnel to fill INSCOM's requirements for contractor

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training. Throughout FY 1978, MILPERCEN selected less than fully qualified personnel to attend contractor training. In many cases, these individuals were below grade levels authorized on unit TDA's and did not possess the background required to absorb the contractor training. Of further concern was the fact that a number of these contractor trained personnel were diverted to other assignments before being utilized in their contractor acquired skills. Through informal agreement with MILPERCEN in early FY 1978, all INSCOM contract training requirements, whether TDY enroute or TDY and return to home station, were routed through MILPERCEN. On 4 April 1978, MILPERCEN directed that procedures for training of personnel in a TDY and return status be revised. From 4 April 1978 through the end of FY 1978, these requirements were coordinated directly with TRADOC/USAISD and MILPERCEN was informed if a change in availability date was required.²³

Language Training. (U) The most significant language training action in FY 1978 was the implementation of INSCOM's In-Country Language Training (ICLT) program in Europe. This four-part program consisted of the following: (1) Full time intermediate level German training in Berlin (Goethe Institute); (2) short, intensive Russian refresher/upgrade courses at the US Army Russian Institute in Garmisch; (3) attendance at a civilian seminar on Russian language and culture; and (4) short, full or part time courses taught at unit locations by instructors from the USAREUR Office of the Army Continuing Education System (ACES).²⁴

Czech Linguist Shortage. (S-CCO) Throughout FY 1977, USA Field Station, [redacted] suffered a chronic shortage of Czechoslovakian linguists, MOS 98G-CX. FS [redacted] authorization of 45 Czech linguists (including eight from USAREUR (MUDPACK requirement)) fell to as low as 59 percent of authorization during the 3d Qtr, FY 1977. MOS 98G-CX fill during the year averaged approximately 68 percent. Over the same period, Czech multi-channel intercept increased 60 percent while single channel increased 20 percent.

(S-CCO) In a July 1977 meeting held at NSA and attended by INSCOM and MILPERCEN representatives, it was agreed upon that FS [redacted] would receive first priority on 98G-CX fills. This occurred, and by 2d Qtr, FY 1978, FS [redacted] had received its authorized manpower of 98G-CX. In addition, many of these were experienced personnel which aided appreciably in the quality of work accomplished. The Czech tape backlog was done away with more by default than by actual processing the material. The introduction of the LEFOX PURPLE system [redacted] in August 1977 made it impossible to retain material over three days. After this time frame, the system would require the computer space for more current data.²⁵

(b) (1) Per NSA;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

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(b) (1) Per NSA;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

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(b) (1) Per NSA;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

The 142d Military Intelligence Linguist Company, Utah National Guard. (U) The 142d Military Intelligence (MI) Linguist Company, Utah National Guard had an authorized strength of 46 officers and 144 enlisted men. More importantly, the active members of the unit possessed a reading and speaking capability in 23 languages and each had a SECRET clearance. Upon discovering the unique resources offered by the unit, INSCOM sought and obtained an MOU with the National Guard Bureau, FORSCOM, and the State of Utah, which would allow direct contact and tasking between INSCOM and the 142d Company. Upon signature of the MOU, in September 1978, the TAREX Office at HQ INSCOM shipped 30 open source military-related documents to the unit for translation.²⁷

Transfer of US Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies (USAIAREES) (U) By message, dated 15 December 1976, CINCUSAREUR requested that the US Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies be transferred to another command. This would be in keeping with USAREUR's desired policy of having only the responsibility for activities which contributed to its mission. AS USAIAREES was a Field Operating Agency (FOA) of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI), the Institute's military personnel were assigned to a non-USAREUR unit identification code. However, the civilians working at the school (6 DA civilian professors, 5 local wage rate (LWR) instructors, 2 DA civilian support personnel, and 8 LWR support personnel) were presently included in USAREUR's personnel authorization. USAREUR also funded USAIAREES. In the 15 December message, CINCUSAREUR requested transfer of the civilian personnel authorization and budgeting/funding responsibilities for the Institute.

(U) HQDA agreed with USAREUR's request, and with OACSI's recommendations, it was decided in August 1977 that INSCOM would receive the funding/personnel responsibilities for USAIAREES. Several reasons were cited why INSCOM control of USAIAREES was better than the existing control of the school as an FOA of OACSI. First, there was a potentially significant direct relationship between the operational mission of INSCOM and that of USAIAREES. Linguistic/regional expertise was essential for many INSCOM personnel. USAIAREES was an excellent facility to support INSCOM's unique training requirement. Secondly, OACSI, as a policy maker and monitor, was not the proper agency for exercising the managerial/administrative functions being performed for the

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Institute. From an organizational standpoint, the administration, management, and funding of USAIAREES could be more effectively accomplished under the control of INSCOM. The transfer of USAIAREES to INSCOM was scheduled for 1 October 1978.28

INSCOM Support to Joint Readiness Exercises. (U) In every Joint Readiness Exercise (JRX), certain elements of the Readiness Command (REDCOM) staff required augmentation. Depending upon the size of the exercise, the joint task force (JTF) commander increased his staff with between 15 and 60 personnel. The exercise director, who administratively controlled the event, generally augmented his activity with 50 or more personnel. With respect to all augmentees, including intelligence specialists, REDCOM normally depended upon its components, Air Force Readiness (AFRED)(Tactical Air Command) and Army Readiness (ARRED)(FORSCOM), to provide the personnel. However, both components, and in particular FORSCOM, did not have the ability to field the numbers or grades of personnel required. This was especially true in the case of Counterintelligence, prisoner of war interrogation (IPW), and operations security (OPSEC) specialists. It appeared that REDCOM and FORSCOM desired INSCOM support in obtaining intelligence augmentees but were unsure of what INSCOM could or wanted to provide, and INSCOM gave no firm commitment along these lines since its formation under IOSS. The mechanics of coordinating such support were politically sensitive since FORSCOM jealously guarded its role as exclusive Army intermediary with REDCOM. In addition, REDCOM might not readily acknowledge any shortcomings. At the close of FY 1978, INSCOM had made no firm decision to commit specific INSCOM support to REDCOM or to clearly indicate that this command could not provide assistance.29

REFORGER 78. (S-CCO)^(U) In September 1978, the 66th MI Group supported REFORGER 78. The Group had staff supervision over aviation assets of the 2d MI Battalion (AE)(P) and the 502d Intelligence and Security Battalion (EW)(P). It was the best REFORGER performance by the 330th ASA Company since they were fielded to Europe. This was also the most difficult REFORGER exercise for the unit to support in that for the first time they supported both Blue and Orange Forces throughout the exercise. Unit pre-exercise planning was extensive and included the development of teams, working areas, and split integrated processing facility operations for both the Orange and Blue Forces. The success of Orange/Blue operations demonstrated the feasibility for the GUARDRAIL system to be tasked simultaneously against real-world targets while dedicating several positions to support division/brigade exercises/ARTEP's. High quality tasking by the corps throughout the exercise was also outstanding. Finally, the Tactical Commanders Terminal (TCT) concept again proved itself to be a fast and reliable means for delivering intelligence to tactical commanders.

(U)
(S-CCO) The 2d MI Battalion participated in its first REFORGER exercise, and all of its elements provided outstanding support. SLAR (side-looking airborne radar) missions dominated the contributions of the 73d MI Company (AS), 2d MI Battalion, during the exercise. High quality reports on moving targets were reported in a timely manner throughout the exercise. Tasking

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of the unit's photo and infra-red (IR) capability was strictly for OPSEC purposes in the division rear areas. The QUICKLOOK I system also performed well during the exercise although there were a few instances of airframe problems which delayed missions.³⁰

Reserve Component MI Program Recommendations. (U) In response to the query from the Vice Chief of Staff, US Army- "What is the status of the MI Reserve, and what is needed to improve that status?"—BG Rolya, CG INSCOM, presented a briefing to the CSA in early December 1977. He made evaluations and recommendations concurred in by both FORSCOM and INSCOM. Three of the recommended items were: (1) That there must be a strong, centralized, intensive management element at HQ FORSCOM to resolve MI Reserve Component personnel, training, and logistics problems; (2) that a greater number of smaller units should be formed to encompass a wider geographical area so that virtually all population resources could be tapped; and (3) that non-SI simulated SIGINT be developed in order to provide realistic simulated SIGINT product and technique without the extreme security restriction of real SIGINT.³¹

Equipment for ASA Reserve Units. (U) In October 1975, the Reserve Affairs Officer, HQ USASA, initiated a management program to inventory, redistribute, and acquire excess equipment within DOD to improve the readiness of ASA Reserve Units, for which ASA, with FORSCOM, shared varying responsibility. In March 1978, CDR, FORSCOM approved the INSCOM-developed plan for redistribution of the equipment obtained from the Defense Property Disposal Service and being stored and refurbished at the Tobyhanna Army Depot. The actual redistribution of the equipment occurred during March and April, resulting in the doubling of mission equipment configurations with the Army Security Reserve Units.³²

Status of Individual Ready Reserve. (U) Although many programs have been tried, nothing to date has made any permanent affect on the problem of recruiting/retention and the dramatic decline in strength of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR was almost totally fed by the draft and since its end, no significant substitute has been presented. In 1973, the IRR consisted of some 1.3 million bodies, and in 1977 was reported to have about 200-300 thousand personnel. The rate of decline at last report was some 10,000 per month. INSCOM had direct responsibility for about 325 Mobilization Designee (MOBDES) spaces which had about 70 percent fill at the close of FY 1978. INSCOM depended primarily upon referrals from OACSI, US Army Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC), and other commands/individuals to fill the spaces. In addition, INSCOM attempted to screen personnel leaving the Active Army for possible reassignment to the Reserve Components.³³

Transfer of Statutory Tour Position. (U) Effective 30 June 1976, one of the two Statutory Tour (Reserve Officers under contract) positions at HQ USASA was eliminated, and on 1 July 1976, one position was established at USAINTA. In essence, the position was transferred from ASA to USAINTA.

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However, once INSCOM was established on 1 January 1977, there was again two spaces under one command. It was decided that the space then unfilled should be filled, and once the incumbent's contract expired in the now-filled slot, the position should be transferred to FORSCOM. The rationale was that the incumbent was already doing FORSCOM duties in supporting ASA Reserve units and that the transfer would continue to serve INSCOM's interest and that it would be fulfilling INSCOM's service claim to support FORSCOM efforts. The incumbent, LTC Ray Chamberlain, was transferred to FORSCOM on 14 August 1978.³⁴

Transfer of Investigative Functions to DIS. (U) In November 1977, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) proposed investigative policy guidelines that would transfer to the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) responsibility for conducting in CONUS and controlling OCONUS all "post-adjudication" investigations concerning suitability, hostage and loyalty matters, but retaining service responsibility for investigation of espionage, sabotage, and subversion cases where foreign involvement or influence was clearly indicated. OSD viewed this change as consistent with the definition of Counterintelligence contained in Executive Order 12036 which stated that counterintelligence did not include personnel security. After departmental comments were submitted and reviewed, OSD confirmed the guidelines in March 1978, with an effective date of 16 July 1978 for the transfer of the post clearance investigation for cause function to DIS. As a result, the INSCOM Investigations Office under the Central Security Facility was disestablished.

(U) To implement the policy changes, on 18 September 1978, INSCOM submitted a proposed revision of AR 381-20 to ACSI, DA for consideration and prepared implementing procedural instructions for MI Groups outside the continental United States to follow in conducting investigations under DIS control. Under DA implementing instructions issued on 13 July 1978, the MI Groups became sub-control offices for DIS in conducting the investigations. As a follow-on, ACSI, DA and INSCOM developed similar procedures for conducting Limited Access Authority (LAA) investigations of foreign nationals overseas.³⁵

Arrival of Uncleared Personnel. (U) The number of INSCOM military personnel arriving at a new station without the required security clearance increased during FY 1978 despite MILPERCEN assignment policies which required that the soldier be adjudicated for the required security clearance prior to departure from the old duty station. In a study covering the 1 January-31 July 1978 timeframe, it was found that on a command-wide basis, 578 of all the persons who should have been eligible for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)(i.e., SI and SAO information) upon their arrival, reached their new assignments without the gaining unit having sufficient information to immediately indoctrinate those persons and put them to work. Delays in obtaining the authority to indoctrinate these 578 persons resulted in 140,895 lost man hours to INSCOM (\$654,491), additional permanent change of station (PCS) costs to the Army of \$9,850, for a total loss of \$669,976.

(U) In an effort to alleviate the situation, MILPERCEN adopted a policy of pre-screening nominees and issued assignment instructions only on those soldiers meeting the selection criteria. In addition, INSCOM trailer carded all requisitions for DA MOS which required an SI clearance to specifically address the screening requirement, procedures for initiating the Special Background Investigation (SBI) paperwork and reiterating the fact that the soldier would not depart the old duty station until the appropriate security clearance was granted. HQDA, through the ACSI staff, MILPERCEN, and the DA IG would monitor to assure compliance by losing commands with MILPERCEN instructions. To aid in the identification of repeated offenders, INSCOM subordinate units were required to provide notification to HQ INSCOM of every arrival of persons not eligible for SI. If warranted, a file with continuous offenses by a unit would be forwarded to the DA staff for appropriate action.

(U) Prior to the integration of INSCOM adjudicators into the Central Security Clearance Facility at Fort Meade, the time required for a completed background investigation and adjudication averaged four months for members of INSCOM. Delays in adjudication or administration were negligible. However, with the formation of the US Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility (CCF), there surfaced numerous problem areas resulting in lengthy delays in responses and granting authority to indoctrinate. The delays were the direct result of the innumerable problems inherent in the formation of a new organization—one of which was having less than 50 percent of authorized strength. INSCOM undertook to alleviate some of the delays by taking several actions through its Command Security Office, DCSCI: (1) It interceded on behalf of INSCOM commanders by submitting 34 Compelling Need Requests to the CCF; (2) it contacted, by letter, each officer receiving orders to an INSCOM assignment, explaining the security requirements; and (3) it provided canned instructions and requirements for SI access to MILPERCEN to be included in both officer and enlisted orders.³⁶

Military Justice. (U) The number of non-judicial punishments imposed under Article 15 continued to decrease from previous years. In FY 1977, they totaled 252, dropping to 232 in FY 1978. There were 4 Special Courts-Martial in FY 1977; 2 Summary, 7 Special, and 1 General Courts-Martial in FY 1977; and 1 Summary, 4 Special, and 1 General in FY 1978.

(U) The table below gives a breakdown of serious crime by category for FY's 1977, 1978, and 1979. Overall, there was little change during FY 1978 from the previous year in the area of Crimes of Violence and Drug Offenses; however, Crimes Against Property increased from 4 to 23.³⁷

Table 15.—Serious Crime Offenses

<u>Crimes of Violence</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 77</u>	<u>FY 78</u>
Rape	2	0	0
Robbery	1	0	0
Aggravated Assault	0	6	1
Assault	0	5	9
Assault/Battery	0	2	1
<u>Crimes Against Property</u>			
Larceny	1	4	16
Burglary	0	0	0
Breaking/Entering	0	0	0
Auto Theft	0	0	1
Malicious Damage	0	0	0
Destruction of Property	0	0	6
<u>Drug Offenses</u>			
Use Possession	0	0	0
Narcotics	0	1	1
Dangerous Drugs	1	0	0
Marihuana	27	21	23
Sale/Trafficking	0	3	2
All Categories	2	1	0

(U) Personnel were administratively discharged for the reasons, shown in the table below, during FY 1978. 38

Table 16.—FY 1978 Administrative Eliminations

<u>Authority</u>	<u>Hon</u>	<u>Gen</u>	<u>Less Than Hon</u>
Chap 5, AR 645-200	11	0	0
Chap 10, AR 635-200	0	0	2
Chap 13, AR 635-200			
(1) Unsuitability	10	3	0
(2) Unfitness	0	1	0
Chap 14, AR 635-200	0	0	0
Chap 15, AR 635-200	0	0	0
Chap 16, AR 635-200	0	0	0
AR 635-206	0	0	0

(U) Beginning with the 2d Qtr, FY 1977, units were required to indicate in their military justice reports the number and method of disposition of

certain offenses. The information provided is summarized in the table below.

Table 17.—Disposition of Other Offenses, FY 1978

<u>Method/Offense</u>	<u>No.</u>
Art 86 (Absences Without Leave)	41
Art 89 (Disrespect)	4
Art 90 (Disobeying Order of Commissioned Officer)	8
Art 91 (Disobeying Order of Warrant Officer or NCO)	17
Art 92 (Violating/Failure to Obey Order; Dereliction of Duty)	59
Art 95 (Resisting Arrest)	1
Art 111/112 (Drunk Driving; Drunk on Duty)	15

Polygraph Examinations. (U) During FY 1978, polygraph examiners assigned to Military Intelligence units in CONUS, Republic of Korea, and Western Europe, conducted 226 polygraph examinations in support of US Army counter-intelligence investigations, offensive and defensive CI operations, HUMINT activities, and the Army Limited Access Authority (LAA) Program. Worldwide activities involved conduct of examinations in Japan and Central and South American in addition to those in geographical areas to which MI examiners were assigned. Of the total examinations conducted, 74 were adjudged "deception indicated" (DI) by the examiners. During the interview portions of DI examinations, 52 examinees provided significant admissions for a 70 percent admission rate worldwide. The table below reflects the polygraph activities for FY 1978.

Table 18.—Polygraph Activities, FY 1978

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Total</u>
Technical Review of Polygraph Examinations	226
Review of Permanent Polygraph Files:	
New Files Created	666
DIS	142
FOIC/Privacy Center	39
Other Authorized Requesters	2,488
TOTAL	<u>3,335</u>
Examiner Certification Actions	28
Polygraph Examinations Conducted:	
ODCSCI/902d MI Gp	85
66th MI Gp	88
501st MI Gp	53
TOTAL	<u>226</u>
Seminars	1
Examiner Refresher Training	3

(U) The number of examinations conducted by the 209th MI Detachment, 501st MI Group declined by more than a third in FY 1978. The reason for the decline began in FY 1977 when some of the Koreans employed by US Forces objected to the annual polygraph examination required in conjunction with LAA investigations. Although all examinations were voluntary, technically, and the examinee was required to attest willingness in writing, certain employees objected on the grounds that a polygraph examination was not a basis for reliable conclusions, was an affront to the honest worker, and had resulted in injustices. In May 1978, anti-polygraph articles began to appear in the Korean press and the unfavorable press attention generated a reevaluation of the Army's Limited Access Authority program. On 29 September 1978, MG Robert C. Kingston, Chief of Staff, US Forces, Korea, issued the directive that polygraph examinations might be used in the employment selection process in cases wherein LAA was necessary as a pre-condition of employment. Thereafter, however, polygraph examinations would be conducted only in instances wherein derogatory information, or lack of information, could not be resolved through other investigative means; and that employees refusing to undergo polygraph examination when requested would be denied access to classified information. This new policy would undoubtedly result in a further decrease in the number of examinations conducted in Korea and would probably cause reduction of examiner strength from two (authorized) to one certified examiner. 39

Congressional Inquiries/Requests for Assistance. (U) Responses to Congressional Inquiries during FY 1978 totaled 68 and represented virtually no change from the 66 accomplished in FY 1977. Nevertheless, certain statistically significant trends were noted. Inquiries in four categories (Unit Conditions, Security Matters, Transfer/Reassignment, and Transportation/Travel) continued to account for approximately one-half the total actions processed—29 of 66 in FY 1977 and 33 of 68 in FY 1978. While relatively minor fluctuations were noted within these and almost all other categories, a notable exception occurred in the category of Assignment/Utilization, wherein the number of inquiries decreased from nine in FY 1977 to only one in FY 1978 and clearly reflected a decrease in the personnel turbulence created by INSCOM's inception.

(U) Responses to IG Actions Requests (IGAR) received by HQ INSCOM during FY 1978, including those evolving from complaint periods conducted as an integral part of all General Inspections, totaled 149 and represented a 37 percent decrease from FY 1977. The extent of this decrease was illusory, however, inasmuch as the total of IGAR's processed INSCOM-wide decreased by only 8 percent (441 to 404). Rather, it represented a significant shift in IGAR workload to Acting Inspectors General (AIG) appointed for that specific purpose at principal INSCOM subordinate units—from 46 percent of IGAR actions in FY 1977 to 63 percent in FY 1978. It was also important and encouraging to note that AIG workload was composed of IGAR's received directly from and responses provided directly to requesting personnel rather than upon referrals from this headquarters. Ideally, the most effective and responsive IGAR system was that operated at the lowest possible

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echelon. This was clearly occurring and was a significant systemic improvement.

(U) Those IGAR's received by detailed HQ INSCOM Inspectors General were rather evenly distributed among 26 established categories, with no single category accounting for more than 10 percent of the total. Major decreases (more than 50 percent) were noted in the categories of Assignment/Utilization, Mistreatment, Civilian Employee Matters, Security Matters, Transfer/Reassignment, and Transportation/Travel. With the exception of Civilian Employee and Security Matters, decreases in other categories were probably attributable to greater problem solving efforts by subordinate commanders, coupled with greater confidence in the INSCOM AIG system. The decrease in Civilian Employee Matters likely stemmed from a lessening of anxiety concerning HQ INSCOM relocation. To some degree, the decrease in Security Matters probably reflected the transfer of clearance granting/denial authority from INSCOM to US Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility, MILPERCEN. 40

(U)

Status of Aircraft Resources. (C) The only change within INSCOM's aviation resources during the year was the addition of a C-12 aircraft to USA Field Station, Sinop. The plane was originally planned for USA Field Station, Udorn, but with the station's closure, the aircraft was diverted to Sinop. It was a pressurized, all-weather aircraft which permitted passengers to fly comfortably up to 25,000 feet and represented the Army's newest models. Aircraft resources, as of 30 September 1978, are shown in table below. 41

Table 19.—Aircraft Resources (30 Sep 78)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Type of Aircraft</u>	<u>30 Sep 78</u>
146th ASA Co (Avn):	RU-21H	6
	U-21A	1
USAFS Korea	UH-1H	3
704th MI Det	OV-1D	6
USAFS Sinop:	U-21A	2
	C-12	1
USAFS Augsburg	UH-1H	2
66th MI Group	UH-1H*	1
TOTAL		<u>22</u>

*Inadvertently omitted in aircraft type in FY 1977 Annual Historical Review.

(U)

MOU on the Control and Employment of Army Program II SIGINT Units. (C) The Chief of Staff, US Army (CSA) requested from DIRNSA that a blanket SIGINT Operational Tasking Authority (SOTA) be delegated to the CSA for all Army commanders. Consequently, a proposed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the US Army and NSACSS, on the control and employment of Army Program

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II, SIGINT/EW tactical support units, was drafted. ACSI, DA coordinated the draft among the commanders of USAREUR, TRADOC, FORSCOM, and INSCOM on 6 January 1977. In its response, INSCOM indicated that the MOU was not necessary but rather appropriate changes to existing directives would suffice. In October 1977, ACSI, DA coordinated a final draft among the major commands; this draft had met the approval of DIRNSA/CHCSS. INSCOM found it acceptable with the exception of two major points: (1) It did not mention INSCOM as both the Service Cryptologic Agency (SCA) and the Army's executive agent for peacetime utilization of the Army's SIGINT tactical resources; and (2) EUSA was not in receipt of the draft MOU nor was it mentioned in the draft on the basis of the 329th ASA Company assignment to the 2d Infantry Division. INSCOM's recommended changes addressing these two points were not adopted in the final document which was signed on 28 December 1977.

(U)

(U) The purpose of the Memorandum was to codify the agreed upon views of the CSA and DIRNSA as to the control, employment, and technical interface of US Army tactical SIGINT activities. It recognized both US Army and NSA-CSS responsibilities for US SIGINT operations. The tenets of this MOU provided corps and division commanders the authority to designate objectives and assign SIGINT missions, and directive authority to accomplish the missions.

(U)

(U) NSACSS retained SIGINT operational control over all US SIGINT units through the US Signals Intelligence Directive (USSID) system. USSID's prescribed the authoritative uniform techniques and standards by which SIGINT information was collected, processed, and reported, and they also prescribed the manner in which requisite management information was reported to NSACSS. The CSA also designated the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence as the Army focal point for SIGINT.

(U)

(U) As two complementary actions, the DIRNSA/CHCSS signed a new USSID-1000 which prescribed the SIGINT mission, relationships, functions and tasks of the Army's Service Cryptologic Agency and HQDA published AR 10-53, Organization and Functions, US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), effective 15 June 1978. In the SIGINT arena, INSCOM, as the Army's SCA, would perform SIGINT functions and tasks required by the DIRNSA/CHCSS, command assigned intelligence units and activities; provide technical advice and assistance to major Army commands on SIGINT/EW matters; be the executive agent of the peacetime utilization program for Army SIGINT matters; and assist in coordination between Army tactical SIGINT resources and NSACSS.

(U)

(U) INSCOM was chartered by both HQDA and NSACSS as the technical expert in Army SIGINT management. Army commanders responsible for SIGINT units, all of which are components of the US SIGINT system, were to rely on INSCOM to assure adherence to the US Signal Intelligence Directive system.42

Cover and Deception. (U) Annex I of the Army Capabilities Plan called for major commands to designate a point of contact regarding cover and deception matters. However, there was little compliance to the plan. By message,

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dated 6 April 1978, DA specifically requested a point of contact be submitted. As a result, HQ INSCOM designated the Readiness Office, ODCSOPS, as responsible for military cover requirements coordinated between HQ INSCOM and the Special Plans Office, DCSOPS, DA.⁴³

US Army Investigative Records Repository (IRR). (U) The IRR was established as the single central repository for Army investigative files in 1962, at Fort Holabird, Maryland, as a result of the Security Shield Study that led to the creation of the US Army Intelligence Command. The IRR used, as an organizational base, the US Army Central Records Facility (CRF) which was part of the Counterintelligence Corps Center, Fort Holabird. At that time, decentralized files held by the CONUS Armies and overseas commands were transferred to the IRR.

(U) Even though the IRR was purged as late as 1971-74, a number of factors subsequently arose which indicated a re-screening was necessary. The Freedom of Information Act Amendments (effective in February 1975) and the Privacy Act (effective in September 1975) became new considerations. It was evident that full compliance could not be insured until procedures were worked out for locating the unauthorized files still in the IRR, and for eliminating authorized files that had become outdated. Requests received under the two laws began to surface an uncomfortable number of unauthorized files, and it was evident that explanations of "acceptable error rates" would not suffice indefinitely. Finally, a series of studies conducted by USAINTA from late 1974 through mid-1975 disclosed a significant amount of information to be considered in screening and handling processes, more than previously realized. For example, a study of the various special handling requirements mandated for the IRR disclosed 34 separate items for concern during screening, rather than the two that attracted primary interest during the 1971-74 purge.

(U) When it was determined that a new screening program would be necessary, a detailed and well thought out plan for purging was developed and resource requirements identified. First, a new retention criteria was approved by the National Archivist. This was based largely on criteria disseminated by DOD in 1976. The new guidelines established a basic 15-year/25-year/Permanent criteria (favorable and minor derogatory files would be retained 15 years; significant incidents and investigations resulting in unfavorable personnel actions would be retained 25 years; serious espionage and sabotage files would be retained permanently). The new criteria also required that certain types of files be offered to the National Archives after a period of time (25 years for most; when no longer authorized for Army retention, AR 380-13 type material). In addition, the Army addressed some types of files not addressed by the DOD instructions. The entire set of guidelines identified a total of eight types of files existent in IRR, with disposition instructions established for each.

(U) It was concluded in 1975 that it would require approximately 240 man-years to complete a screening of the personality hard copy dossiers. If

this were to be done in a two-year period, it would require 120 people; physical space availability precluded this option. A more manageable screening team size was decided upon—30 people for approximately eight years. Requests for people to accomplish the screening were submitted in 1975 and 1976, and were disapproved by HQDA both times. The OACSI could not understand why the added resources were needed to screen the files when the IRR had just completed purges in 1974 and 1975 and the estimated error rate had been deemed acceptable. By 1977, however, the weight of evidence, to include the fact that there was more than simply AR 380-13 factors to consider, reversed HQDA view, and the request for 30 people was accepted and submitted to DOD, where it was also approved, effective 1 October 1978. It was planned that the 30 spaces authorized for the screening program would be organized into a new division in the IRR, the Files Maintenance Review Division, with three operating branches.

(U) The IRR maintained all counterintelligence and security files created by or for the Department of the Army that met the criteria specified in AR's 381-45 and 380-13 and provided service to authorized Army, DOD, and other authorized agencies of the Executive Branch of the Government by furnishing files or documents (reproductions). Most troublesome of the requests for the IRR were those concerning litigations against the government and Congressional inquiries which required an intensive search of all records maintained in the repository. These actions of immediate nature often required a virtual shut-down and overtime to complete. As an example, one request required 776 manhours to complete. These type files located by USAIRR personnel were exhaustively reviewed, page-by-page, by members of the Investigations Element, DCSCI exclusively, as it was necessary, in the interests of speed, thoroughness, and critical perception, that review be conducted by personnel of extensive CI background and experience. Approximately 4,500 manhours, including time of USAIRR personnel, were expended on Congressional inquiry/litigation actions during FY 1978. Tasking was fulfilled on 27 litigations and 36 Congressional inquiries; the litigations figures included 16 requests for information regarding electronic surveillance. It was estimated that between 6,500 to 7,500 USAIRR files were reviewed. In September 1978, the IRR transferred the function of processing special interest requests emanating from litigation actions, motions for discovery, electronic surveillance, and Congressional requests to the newly created Special Acts Office under the USA Central Security Facility, but the Special Acts Office would not become effective until 16 October 1978.

(U) During FY 1978, a total of 187,636 dossiers were reviewed by the personnel of the repository to determine their retainability under the criteria set forth in AR 380-13, Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Non-Affiliated Persons and Organizations. Of this amount, 152,520 were retained and 35,116 deleted. Army Reserve personnel, serving for periods of 12 to 26 days each from 5 December 1977 - 30 September 1978, accounted for the review of 44,995 of these files. The personal qualities and capabilities of the reservist personnel were outstanding and contributed immeasurably to the IRR function of insuring that file holdings were legally

retainable. The IRR also accomplished the review of 32,710 pieces of supplemental investigative material and created 7,099 personality dossiers and 111 impersonal files. The joint efforts of all personnel and the increased emphasis on the types of material to be stored in the repository reduced the IRR holdings from 3,728,788 records to 3,649,455 during FY 1978.

(U) Since mid-1977, efforts by OACSI, US Army Central Security Facility, and DCSCI, INSCOM have been underway to sort out investigative material forwarded to the IRR under the provisions of AR 604-5 and to determine the proper repository for filing of investigative material and adjudicative data subsequent to the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) investigation. The OACSI CI personnel concurred in the conclusion that DIS should file approximately 15 various types of material for which their office currently had a file and remove the favorable Entrance National Agency Check/National Agency Check (ENTNAC/NAC) entry in the Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII) when subsequent unfavorable information existed. The issue was forwarded by OACSI to the Department of Defense for resolution. To date, no final resolution of the matter was received. The issue of filing supplemental data in the IRR and concurrent growth rate was a matter of major importance in the records management area for determining the feasibility of micromation.⁴⁴

SCI Facility at Fort Meade. (U) Preliminary planning for establishment of a Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence (SCI) Facility encompassing administrative offices of the INSCOM Deputy Commanding General for Intelligence at Fort George G. Meade, began in February 1978. The upgrade of the existing facility by contractor personnel and complete modernization of communications facilities/equipment included installation of shielded cable, new main distribution frame, type 568HA and 680A telephone equipment, NSACSS gray telephone capability, and AUTOVON. Current planning for this area was to provide an OPSCOMM capability to the DCG-I which would enable him to communicate directly with the Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) at HQ INSCOM, Arlington Hall Station and with subordinate elements around the world. Occupancy of the upgraded area began in late August 1978.⁴⁵

Base Operations Support, USA Field Station, Okinawa. (U) At the direction of DA in August 1976, US Army, Japan (USARJ) pursued the objective of transferring responsibility for base operations support on Okinawa to the other services so as to permit the zeroing out of its personnel on the island. INSCOM opposed the suggestion by USARJ that USAFS Okinawa, as the largest residual Army command on the island, assume responsibility for certain functions being performed by US Army Garrison, Okinawa. In June 1977, the Pacific Review Group, an ad hoc group from the DA staff, took a second look at the US Army realignment actions in the Pacific and concluded that by the end of FY 1978, the USARJ presence in Okinawa should be reduced to approximately 882 spaces. Beyond that date, this residual activity should be further examined, looking toward transfer of all base operations support (BOS) facilities and responsibilities to other services. The Chief of Staff, US Army approved these recommendations on 26 September 1977. In a letter to

the Commander, US Army Garrison, Okinawa, dated 26 September 1977, the USAFS Okinawa Commander indicated his projected support requirements. A month later, the Station Commander emphasized to LTG Eivind H. Johansen, the DCSLOG, DA, visiting the island, that INSCOM was unconcerned as to the service supplying support as long as its needs were met.

(U) The Joint Services Conference convened on 4 November 1977 and was chaired by BG J. D. Bruen, Director Resources and Management, ODCSLOG, DA. The Conferees, comprising representatives of all services and DOD, initiated discussion of 19 unresolved function and facility transfer issues. The DOD representative stressed the fact that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) was completely behind the transfer by DA. Agreement in principle was reached on 14 issues, leaving five unresolved: United Seamen's Service Club, BOS for Ports/Common User Land Transportation (CULT), Okinawa Petroleum Distribution System, BOS for Torii Station, and Army Peculiar Support. By a Joint Coordinated US Army, US Navy, US Marine, and US Air Force message, the remaining five issues were referred to OSD for decision. Of the five, the two of primary importance to INSCOM were BOS for Torii Station and Army Peculiar Support.

(U) The BOS for Torii Station issue included accountability and maintenance responsibility for all real property on the station (communications, operational, administrative, cantonment, storage, community, and recreational facilities), as well as the station's recreation program. In summarizing the issue sheet, USARJ identified the following USARJ resources as associated with the function and available for the transfer to gaining service upon acceptance of responsibility for its performance in Table 20.

Table 20.—USARJ Resources Available For Transfer

<u>Manpower Spaces</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>USDH CIV</u>	<u>FNIH CIV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Engr	0	0	3	58	61
Recr Svcs	0	3	6	15	24
					<u>85</u>

Equipment and Funds

TDA - \$ 55,300
 CTA - 1,500
 Supplies - 42,000
 OMA - 2,271,000
 MPA - 30,000

Facilities

Real Estate - 467 Acres/20,342,520
 Sq Ft
 Buildings - Comprising 431,999 Sq Ft

(U) The Army Peculiar Support issue sheet included the following functions: Military Police (Investigations), Serious Incident Reporting (SIR), Chaplain, Military Justice, Class B Agent, COMPACT, Education Assistance, Alcohol/Drug Abuse, and EEO/RREO. In accord with INSCOM's position, DCSLOG, DA withdrew

and retained as USARJ responsibilities, three functions: Military Justice, Class B Agent, and COMPACT (military personnel administration) prior to referring the issue to OSD for resolution. The retention of these three functions brought the total manpower reduction from 98 down to only 24. The DCSLOG, DA retitled the issue, Minor Miscellaneous Support Activities.

(U) Pending the OSD (ASD (MRA&L)) decision on the Minor Miscellaneous Support Activities and BOS Torii Station, there arose several actions which weakened the Army's position. First, the Air Force, by separate Memorandum, dated 2 March 1978, stated to OSD its opposition to the DA proposal that the Air Force be directed to accept responsibility for these Army residual support functions. Regarding BOS Torii Station, the Air Force remarked that NSACSS tasking was the only reason for the presence of SCA personnel on Okinawa, and therefore the issue should be passed to NSA for study and resolution with appropriate service activities; the Army should continue to provide BOS including real estate accountability and property maintenance until the issue was resolved. The Air Force alleged that NSA N-2 had concurred in this proposal. Concerning the proposed transfer of the remaining "miscellaneous support functions," the Air Force asserted that retention of installation host responsibility by the Army at Torii Station would provide adequate BOS base to permit USARJ to continue support to residual Army activities.

(U) The second event to weaken the Army's drive for a complete phase-out was the April 1978 decision by OSD on the petroleum distribution system. It was contrary to the Army recommendation and continued Army's responsibility for the function.

(U) On 19 June 1978, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L) issued a decision memorandum directing that the Services jointly review the BOS Torii Station and submit a combined recommendation. OSD stated that any recommendation should meet the objective of eliminating Army responsibility, personnel and other resources for BOS to the extent possible. In regard to Minor Miscellaneous Support Functions, the ASD (MRA&L) directed that the Army make arrangements with other Services to obtain such services, based on the location of the residual Army personnel requiring them.

(U) To obtain Air Force concurrence on a resolution of Minor Miscellaneous Services, DCSLOG, DA found it necessary to modify INSCOM's desire that "gaining organization should insure that resources received from USAG, Okinawa are used to provide the same service in the same location." The modification read- "transferred functions will be provided at the installation of the gaining service." As this limiting condition was unacceptable with respect to Chaplain and Educational Assistance, DA transferred those functions from the Minor Miscellaneous issue package to BOS Torii Station. Because of the manhours lost in travel time by Torii personnel to obtain finance and personnel (COMPACT) support from USAG, Okinawa activities located 18 miles away, the Commander, USAFS Okinawa proposed that residual USAG, Okinawa personnel activities (finance, SJA, Chaplain, COMPACT)

be moved to Torii Station and that he be permitted to assume responsibility for these functions for all remaining Army personnel. In a reply, dated 9 August, MG Rolya, CG INSCOM, reiterated his position opposing assumption of BOS responsibilities by INSCOM on Okinawa unless directed by DA. He did agree to promote relocation of USAG, Okinawa personnel service elements to Torii Station subject to availability of suitable facilities. On 8 September 1978, the Chief of Staff, INSCOM, provided the CDR, USAFS Okinawa with additional guidance in exploring the possibility of relocating USAG, Okinawa support.

(U) In the area of BOS Torii Station, the issue was addressed at the Pentagon level because of the inability to resolve the problem at lower levels. DA did coordinate its positions with INSCOM. Both DCSLOG, DA and INSCOM were pessimistic concerning the likelihood of achieving the type of agreement on "BOS Torii" directed by OSD. It should be noted that USAFS Okinawa had little to gain by transfer of the installation to Air Force responsibility. On 5 December 1977, CDR, Torii Station had reported that the CDR, 18th Tactical Fighter Wing (prospective AF host), had stated as his condition of acceptance that Torii Station would be established as a sub-post of Kadena, with an AF commander. This subordination would work to the detriment of INSCOM's long term objectives by weakening its control over essential support facilities.

(U) On 1 September 1978, DCSLOG, DA representative met with the N2/L3 at NSACSS. The latter expressed the fact that NSACSS was concerned with only the costs and capability of the gaining service to provide support and was not otherwise involved with resolving the BOS Torii issue. As the impact of any NSA study which might affect the action would be "some years down the road," it should not be a basis to defer decision concerning transfer. (This contradicted an AF statement that N-2 concurred in the AF recommendation that transfer of responsibility for BOS Torii should be deferred, the Army remaining responsible until the issue was resolved by NSA.)

(U) In the final week of FY 1978, DA concluded its longstanding dispute with the other services over base operations responsibilities on Okinawa by agreeing with the Air Force that the WESTPAC III objectives in the Pacific had been effectively achieved, and action to transfer further functions/facilities should be discontinued. At the close of the year, the Air Force had a ratio of 47 percent operations and 53 percent support on Okinawa; the Army's was 73 percent and 27 percent, respectively. This represented a vast improvement from the beginning of the transfer effort when Army had 21 percent of the military population and provided 95 percent of the base operations support.

(U) A 28 September 1978 message to CDR, USAFS Okinawa noted that this would mean that USAG, Okinawa (redesignated USA Support Activity Okinawa effective 1 October 1978) would continue to support Torii Station in most of the important areas. However, the Chaplain, Educational Advisor and Equal Opportunity/Race Relations functions could not be integrated with the BOS Torii

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function. Action to transfer these functions to other services should be completed by 1 January 1979.46

Rehling Nuclear Power Plant. (S)(b)(1) The Lech Power Company planned FY's 1979-85 construction of a nuclear power plant 3.5 km from the INSCOM Gablingen facility in Germany. An electromagnetic interference (EMI) test at a similar site, extrapolated, indicated that interference to Gablingen reception would result. Through USAREUR, the Bavarian Government was advised of US objections to the proposed construction. As of December 1977, Augsburg city and county, as well as (b)(1) had all objected to the proposed construction. Indications at that time were that German authorities would disapprove the project without further intervention of US Forces. Assuming the project to be a dead issue, at USAREUR's recommendation, (b)(1) deferred a contract to identify and cost-out remedial measures should the construction be approved.

(S-CCO)

(b) (1) Per NSA;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

(S-CCO)

(b)(1);(b) (1) Per NSA;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

(S-CCO)

(b) (1) Per NSA;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

(C-CCO)

(b) (1) Per NSA;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

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(b) (1) Per NSA;(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

(U) (C-CCO) In August 1978, the USCOB approved the project, and Bonn funded it for 3d Qtr, FY 1980. The funding limit was 16,275 million DM. The plans for the facility were presently being drawn up by the German Construction Agency. The plans were scheduled for completion in May 1979.⁴⁸

Declassification of Cryptologic Records. (U) On 10-11 April 1978, NSACSS hosted a workshop on declassification at Fort Meade. The workshop was the first in a series of meetings and discussions concerning the coordination of a cryptologic record declassification effort stemming from intense White House pressure to release more historical SIGINT documents to the public. The purpose of the first workshop was to reach a common approach to declassification guidelines and procedures. The upshot of the meeting was the circulation among the three Service Cryptologic Agencies (SCA's) of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), initiated by Admiral Inman, DIRNSA, and ultimately signed by the SCA commanders. The MOU accomplished the following:

1. (U) Established that NSA would provide the SCA's with declassification guidelines, and a list of key words and phrases to be used in identifying cryptologic records.
2. (U) Established that NSA and the three SCA's would fully exchange information on their declassification work to prevent duplication and establish a division of declassification effort by broad categories of subject matter.
3. (U) Constituted a decision-making declassification panel made up of members of the SCA's and NSA.
4. (U) Required the SCA's to examine immediate ways to participate in the NSACSS declassification program.
5. (U) Provided that there be an exchange of available listings of permanent cryptologic holdings as soon as possible.

(U) Mr. Edward Hersh, Chief, Records Management Branch, ODCSPER, HQ INSCOM, briefed MG Rolya on the workshop and the implications of the MOU. In his briefing, Mr. Hersh emphasized the following:

1. (U) Any program designed to identify cryptologic records by key words and phrases that NSA provided would have to take into consideration the fact that the Army followed AR 340-18-5 in identifying its cryptologic holdings. This was a numbered system and not a key word system.
2. (U) A records management representative should accompany the INSCOM declassification representative to the panel.

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3. (U) Since there were no detailed listings of permanent cryptologic documents available, development of listings and conduct of actual declassification of records would require assets not currently available. At a minimum, five additional personnel spaces would be required immediately in the INSCOM Cryptologic Records Center to begin the declassification effort.

(U) Based on this briefing, MG Rolya instructed the staff to find five spaces to support the declassification effort. Subsequently, five permanent overhire spaces were authorized, and five recognized space requirements were reflected on the TDA for the Administrative/Audiovisual Support Activity (Provisional). Recommended job descriptions for the declassifiers were submitted to Civilian Personnel in August 1978; however, at the end of the fiscal year, no hiring action had begun.⁴⁹

INSCOM Historical Collection. (U) During a 31 March 1978 meeting with the Command Historian, MG William I. Rolya, CG INSCOM, indicated that there was a need to place greater emphasis on the collection and preservation effort and directed establishment of a historical collection to preserve historically significant items pertaining to Army intelligence. Prior to this, the History Office had sought to preserve those few memorabilia and historical properties entrusted to its care but had not actively searched out additional items. As a result of the 31 March meeting, the History Office prepared a long range plan to accomplish the collection. Some of the actions undertaken included: (1) Acquiring a storage area, (2) sending a command-wide letter informing personnel and organizations of the historical collection, (3) making agreement with DCSLOG, HQ INSCOM, to identify turned-in items of historical significance, and (4) determining sources for photographs with historical significance.⁵⁰

Badge Changeover. (U) During the period 31 July-11 August 1978, the Security Identification Credentials (security identification card and badge) for HQ INSCOM, Arlington Hall Station were changed. The changeover came as a result of the three-year requirement for a new issuance. The previous system was implemented at Arlington Hall Station in September 1975. There was no change to the basic format of the new badges with the exception that a number from 1 to 4 was placed in the upper right-hand corner and the background color represented access to various compartmented subjects.

Conversion to the Competitive Service. (U) By letter, dated 28 September 1977, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) approved the conversion of 594 miscellaneous intelligence support-type positions to the Competitive Service. It was stipulated that individual recommendations for the conversion of eligible employees to career or career-conditional employment had to be submitted within six months of 28 September 1977. All employees, except those in the GS-132 series, Intelligence Research Specialist, were considered eligible for conversion. The GS-132 series positions remained in the Excepted Service under career direction.

(U) Individual recommendations for conversion of eligible employees to career or career-conditional employment were submitted to the CSC. During the period 1 October through 31 December 1977, 575 employees were converted to the Competitive Service with only minor problems encountered.⁵¹

Follow-up Survey of INSCOM CIVPER Management by DCSPER, DA. (U) A follow-up survey to the 1976 DA survey was conducted by a DCSPER, DA team during 31 July-11 August 1978. The survey included the Operating Civilian Personnel Officers at Arlington Hall Station (AHS), Vint Hill Farms Station (VHFS), the HQ INSCOM Civilian Personnel staff, and management officials at AHS, VHFS, and HQ INSCOM. The purpose of the survey was to determine the current status and degree of progress that had been made in CIVPER management since 1976. The survey team also focused on the CIVPER ramifications of organizational and systemic changes since the last survey, e.g., the IOSS study, the establishment of INSCOM, the split-mode headquarters, and the conversion of approximately 1,200 former ASA civilians to the Competitive Civil Service System.

(U) Compared to the 156 deficiencies cited in the 1976 survey, the 1978 survey listed only 42 findings as shown below.⁵²

Table 21.—1978 CIVPER Survey Findings

<u>Major Responsibility</u>	<u>Recommendations</u>	
	<u>Programmatic</u>	<u>Regulatory Violations</u>
AHS CPO	} 11	5
VHFS CPO		11
Staff CIVPER	4	0
INSCOM Supv/Mgrs	9	0
EEO Office	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	<u>26</u>	<u>16</u>

Civilian High Grade Control. (U) In a letter, dated 18 July 1978, DA placed constraints on INSCOM for the number of Senior Level positions that INSCOM could have filled at the end of FY 1979. The Army computed ceilings for each of its commands. It was not a uniform formula because some commands, such as INSCOM, had been doing their job in meeting the previously established ceilings; consequently, INSCOM's reduction was near the 2 percent per year mark in contrast to some commands which were required to take up to an 8 percent cut in Senior Level positions the first year.

(U) The new DA ceilings allocated to INSCOM were: 138 GA-13's and 59 GS-14/15's for a total of 197 filled Senior Level positions by the end of FY 1979. INSCOM was also advised that there would be an additional 2 percent cut each year through FY 1981. On 30 June 1978, INSCOM had 202 Senior Level filled positions. At first glance it appeared that INSCOM must reduce only 5 Senior Level positions in the next 13 months. However, INSCOM's TDA showed a total

authorization of 235 Senior Level positions. Some of these positions were the result of newly added mission and functions which may be determined to be more critical than some of the currently filled Senior Level positions.

(U) A ceiling on GS-13 and GS-14/15 filled positions was established and transmitted to all organizational elements on 6 September 1978 with the request that an impact statement be provided HQ INSCOM by 1 November. The establishment of these ceilings had an adverse effect on morale throughout the command as many civilians saw few opportunities for progression to the Senior Level positions. Consequently, INSCOM lost experienced personnel to other agencies or private enterprise which could offer advancement.⁵³

Adoption of Flexitime. (U) Flexitime was a term used by the US Government for the concept of providing maximum possible latitude in the times civilian employees could work the prescribed 8-hour days. The CG INSCOM approved Flexitime, beginning 26 June 1978. Because of the duty station, the principles of Flexitime which were applicable to civilians were also applied to military personnel. The degree of flexibility was determined at the lowest practical supervisory level. Basically there were two types of Flexitime which could be adopted: Flexitour and Gliding Time. Flexitour consisted of pre-arranged arrival and departure at specific times within the Flexible Bands (0600-0900 and 1500-1800 hrs) as mutually agreeable to employee and supervisor. A 15-minute leeway before and after arrival time could be allowed under Flexitour as long as 8 hours were worked. Gliding Time offered maximum flexibility. This allowed a person to arrive and depart at any time within the Flexible Bands on a person's own initiative, taking a minimum 1/2 hour and a maximum of 2 hours for lunch, as long as 8 hours of duty were performed.⁵⁴

Labor Relations. (U) Although INSCOM continued to be exempt from the Federal Labor Relations Program (Unionization) with no challenges to this exemption from labor unions, the General Intelligence Production Division (GIPD), a unit of the Intelligence Threat Analysis Center, located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, continued to be included in a unit of recognition encompassing all of Fort Bragg. The Fort Bragg Civilian Personnel Office attempted to take GIPD out of the unit during negotiations for a labor-management agreement in the first quarter but were unsuccessful since a union officer was employed in GIPD.

(U) Although the GIPD function was considered to be an intelligence function eligible for exemption by regulation as the Continental Intelligence Center (CONTIC), under the Continental Army Command, it was determined that since it did not report directly to ACSI, it would be included in the Federal Labor Relations Program. An unfair labor practice charge was filed against the commander over the distribution of parking spaces but was resolved without submission to the US Department of Labor. It was anticipated that action would be taken in FY 1979 to have the GIPD excluded from the Federal Labor Relations Program.⁵⁵

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INSCOM Intern Program. (U) On 14 June 1978, the Chief of Staff, HQ INSCOM gave tentative approval for 4 percent overhire, representing approximately 65 persons. Within this group of overhire (recognized but not authorized spaces), 25 spaces were allotted for a Command intern program. The purpose of the intern program was to select highly talented and highly motivated persons from both internal and external sources. These persons would be developed by a systematic rotation and intensive training program in order to provide INSCOM with a broader base in the future from which to select senior action officers, first level supervisors, and managers. There would be no guarantee beyond the target job and even in respect to the latter, the only guarantee would be that the selected must advance at a reasonable rate to the GS-9 journeyman target job or be removed from the program. Finally, there was no guarantee as to where within the command placement would be made at the completion of the training. It was not anticipated that the actual advertising of positions and hiring would take place prior to mid-FY 1979.⁵⁶

Executive Order 12036. (U) On 24 January 1978, the President signed Executive Order (EO) 12036, United States Intelligence Activities, which supersedes Executive Order 11905, 18 February 1976, United States Foreign Intelligence Activities. EO 12036 provided that where intelligence activities under EO 12036 were to be conducted pursuant to procedures approved or agreed to by the Attorney General, those activities may be conducted under terms and conditions of EO 11905 and any procedures promulgated thereunder until such Attorney General procedures were established. Essentially, EO 12036 was a rewrite of EO 11905, but it was more clearly written in many ways. The main difference between the two involved a much greater role for the Director of Central Intelligence and for the Attorney General.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Copies of the new Executive Order were transmitted to all INSCOM staff elements, field stations, MI Groups and separate detachments for inclusion in their policy books. DCSCI personnel spot-checked various INSCOM elements to insure their compliance with regulatory authorities. The major impact the EO 12036 had on INSCOM was that implementation by DA on other sorely needed documents had to be held in abeyance pending DOD EO 12036 implementation. The most important of these documents were revisions of AR 380-13, Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Non-Affiliated Persons and Organizations and AR 381-20, Counterintelligence Activities.⁵⁷

Freedom of Information/Privacy Office (FOI/PO). (U) In FY 1978, the FOI/PO received and processed a total of 2,655 requests. This total figure represented an increase of 17 percent over the previous reporting period. While Privacy Act (PA) requests increased from 1,653 to 1,718 from the previous year, the most dramatic increase was once again in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests from 614 to 937 for a 52 percent increase. The table below shows a breakdown of both types of requests by month:

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Table 22.—FOIA and PA Requests During FY 1978

<u>Month</u>	<u>FOI</u>	<u>PA</u>	<u>Total</u>
Oct 77	92	138	230
Nov 77	92	129	221
Dec 77	58	146	204
Jan 78	70	160	230
Feb 78	62	161	223
Mar 78	102	185	287
Apr 78	89	129	218
May 78	82	167	249
Jun 78	72	149	221
Jul 78	78	93	171
Aug 78	72	143	215
Sep 78	68	118	186
TOTALS	<u>937</u>	<u>1,718</u>	<u>2,655</u>

(U) The following table shows the costs for implementing the Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act for INSCOM during the first three years of the Acts' existence.

Table 23.—FOIA and PA Costs (FY 1975-1977)

<u>Year</u>	<u>FOIA</u>	<u>PA</u>	<u>Total</u>
FY 1975	\$116,793	\$0	\$116,793
FY 1976	106,722	193,253	299,975
FY 1977	<u>157,181</u>	<u>369,535</u>	<u>526,716</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$380,696</u>	<u>\$562,788</u>	<u>\$943,484</u>

(U) A breakdown for the FY 1977 costs of the FOIA and PA are shown in the table below.

Table 24.—FOIA and PA Costs, FY 1977

<u>Item</u>	<u>FOIA</u>	<u>PA</u>	<u>Total</u>
Direct Personnel Costs	\$119,060	\$274,185	\$393,245
Overhead	30,054	68,124	98,178
Copy Reproduction	<u>8,067</u>	<u>27,226</u>	<u>35,293</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$157,181</u>	<u>\$369,535</u>	<u>\$526,716</u>

(U) The manhours required per calendar year to administer the FOIA and PA are shown in the table below.

Table 25.—Manhours Required for FOIA and PA (CY's 1975-1977)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Professional</u>	<u>Clerical</u>
CY 1975	13,310	7,486
CY 1976	22,217	14,812
CY 1977	17,662	8,698

(U) It was expected that Privacy Act requests would continue to increase moderately for the coming year. On 1 October 1977, the US Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility (CCF) was organized with the mission to process all Army-wide clearances. As with any new organization, there was an initial slowdown of work processed until the full personnel authorization was assigned. Since a major portion of the Privacy Act requests was the result of adverse adjudications for clearance, a steady increase was anticipated with the CCF becoming fully operational.

(U) The increase of Freedom of Information Act requests was a reflection of the concentrated effort extended by the FOI staff of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to drastically reduce their backlog. By augmenting their staff, the number of Army documents referred to this office increased proportionately. In addition, several national level interest FOI requests being processed by the FBI contained a large number of Army documents and these referrals were given increased emphasis by the FBI. Freedom of Information requests from researchers continued at a moderate increase and became more specific.

(U) The FOI/PO, HQ INSCOM, remained one of the few agencies in the Executive Branch to have processed all requests within the time restraints imposed by the law. This record was a result of a workforce with high morale exhibiting true professionalism in work performance.⁵⁸

Equal Employment Opportunity Office. (U) In November 1977, the CG INSCOM directed that the Equal Employment Opportunity Office be established under the staff cognizance of the DCSPER a full time staff be named. He further directed that the military counterpart, the Human Relations/Equal Opportunity (HR/EO) Program, be placed in the same office. At the close of FY 1978, required spaces had been identified, authorized and filled as shown in Table 26.

(U) During FY 1978, the EEO Office was tasked to furnish DA with a Case Study and Justification Folder on final structuring and consolidation of the INSCOM organization. Among the five alternatives considered, it was decided that there would be an adverse impact on both racial minorities and women under four of the five plans. During the year there also remained the continual problem of obtaining a functional EEO statistical

Table 26.—EEO Office Staffing

<u>Position</u>	<u>Grade-Series</u>	<u>Rqr</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Act</u>
EEO Officer	GS-0160-12	1	1	1
HR/EEO Officer	GS-0160-12	1	1	1
EEO Specialist	GS-0160-07 (FWPM)	1	1	1
EEO Specialist	GS-0160-07	1	0	0
EEO Clerk	GS-0301-05	1	0	1*
TOTAL		<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>

*Position filled with a temporary hire.

data base to be able to assess the command EEO status for racial minorities and women. The reason for this was the fact that INSCOM had to rely upon several different personnel reporting systems in effect among its worldwide units. However, the statistics obtained revealed that minorities increased their representation by 3.5 percent among the civilian workforce.⁵⁹

INSCOM Human Relations/Equal Opportunity Program. (U) Within INSCOM units, there were few, if any, racial problems involving the military populace. Those reported, centered primarily around individual disputes and were not indicative of the attitudes of the majority of unit personnel. The attitude survey again indicated differences in perceptions between white and non-white personnel and some lack of trust in whites by non-whites. However, there were only slight indications that these attitudes resulted in any differences of treatment and they did represent an improvement over 1977. Total discrimination complaints dropped from 26 in 1977 to 25 in 1978, continuing a two-year downward trend.

(U) A statistical analysis of the command by race and sex indicated fill slightly exceeded target levels established by HQDA Affirmative Action Plan. A further examination of unit composition verified that fill levels were generally uniform throughout the command. The DA goal set for INSCOM for Black fill was 12.44 percent; for "other" racial groups, 2.01 percent; and for female, 12.08 percent. The respective actual fill within INSCOM was 12.53 percent, 1.23 percent, and 13.85 percent.

(U) The raw data for the most part was insufficient to determine if adverse actions within INSCOM were biased against Blacks. A paucity of cases existed in every area (administrative discharges, bars to reenlistment, punitive discharges, courts-martials, and pretrial confinements) except in the category of Article 15. Command-wide, Blacks received twice as many Article 15's (24.31 percent). Here the imbalance could be traced to two units (USAFS Berlin and USAFS Korea) and attributed to a combination of factors. These included a predisposition of the commanders involved to utilize formal punishment to maintain order; multiple offenders which distort statistics;

and alleged racial bias at supervisor level.⁶⁰

Upward Mobility Program. (U) Public Law 92-261, the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, required that Federal agencies provide programs of training and education which would afford employees an opportunity to acquire skills and abilities needed to compete for advancement to positions of greater responsibilities. Administrative procedures were developed to support the program, e.g., INSCOM Regulation 690-17, Upward Mobility Program (UMP) and the UMP Procedures Manual were published, a UMP Coordinator was appointed, and a UMP Panel was established. This panel consisted of the Equal Employment Opportunity Officer or his designated representative, the UMP Coordinator or his designated representative, and one supervisor selected from the Panel Referral Roster. The panel would select the "best qualified" candidates for each position and forward the list of the "best qualified" candidates to the selection official for final action. By the close of FY 1977, nine spaces had been identified to be filled under the Upward Mobility Program. Three of these spaces were filled during FY 1978. Two of the candidates were selected for GS-06, Accounting Assistants, one in DCSRM and one in Finance and Accounting, with target positions of GS-07, Accountant. The third candidate was selected for a current position, GS-05, Signal Security Assistant in DCSCI, with target position of a GS-09, Signal Security Specialist.⁶¹

INSCOM Federal Women's Program. (U) On 1 November 1977, a full time EEO Office was established which included a full time Federal Women's Program (FWP) Manager with responsibilities for clerical support of the office, and a temporary hire of an EEO Assistant. However, in June, the clerical responsibilities were dropped from the FWP Manager's job description, and it became a full time EEO Specialist/Command FWP Manager position. Also in early FY 1978, the 66th MI Group designated a part time FWP Manager, the first subordinate unit to do so.

(U) FWP highlights for the year included- (1) Hosting INSCOM's Second Annual Women's Week (11-14 October 1977), featuring Ms Jill Wine-Volner, General Counsel of the Army as Keynote Speaker; (2) sponsoring activities for Secretaries Week (24-28 April 1978) with guest speakers, Congressman Clawson and Mrs. Lucile Boyd; (3) participating in the DA Advisory Group Committee; and (4) hosting the Third Annual Women's Week (18-22 September 1978), featuring Miss Ann Carachristi, Chief, A Group, NSA as Keynote Speaker.⁶²

Suggestions Program. (U) During FY 1978, military personnel submitted 490 suggestions and civilian personnel submitted 50 for a total of 540 suggestions. Of these, 16 from the military and 8 from civilians were adopted. In FY 1977, 842 suggestions were submitted and 140 adopted. Although the number of suggestions submitted and adopted were down in FY 1978, the tangible savings were up—\$268,806 compared to \$144,028 in FY 1977.⁶³

Military-Civilian Team Day. (U) On 14 April 1978, Arlington Hall Station hosted INSCOM's Third Annual Military-Civilian Team Day. An "INSCOMFEST"

was held and included a luncheon, awards ceremony, and an evening party. At the luncheon, BG John H. Johns, the Army's Director of Human Resource Development, hailed INSCOM as the first major command to address the military and civilian working relationship. An evening of activity centered around a German theme to climax the annual event. Many INSCOM units throughout the world held similar activities in recognition of the cooperation between their civilian and military communities.

(U) Awards, based on worldwide competition within the Command were presented at HQ INSCOM on 14 April 1978 to the following recipients:⁶⁴

<u>Award</u>	<u>Recipient</u>
The Albert W. Small Award	Bruce W. Stein
The Action Officer of the Year Award	James F. Carmody
The Virginia McDill Award for Outstanding Secretarial Ability	Marion E. Glass
The Equal Employment Opportunity Award	Bonny Jo Perez
The Wage Grader of the Year Award	William R. Johnson
The Non-Appropriated Fund Employee of the Year Award	Margaret P. Scott
The Military-Civilian Team Improvement Award	
Military Winner	COL L. H. Whitt
Civilian Winner	George H. Schmidt

Command Information Activities. (U) In October 1977, the Public Affairs Office issued the first edition of the Journal of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command, which replaced both the Hallmark (INSCOM) and the Intelegram (USAINTA). The first edition had 24 pages, was printed in black and blue, and was produced in a news magazine format under provisions of AR 360-81. During FY 1978, the monthly publication fluctuated between 20 and 32 pages, and for three of the months was printed in color. A readership survey conducted in June 1978 revealed that the Journal was well received and much improved from its predecessors.

(U) USA Field Station, Augsburg's The Augsburg Profile received third place honors in the mimeograph/multilith category of the 1977 Keith L. Ware Awards. Editor of the publication during the time of the competition was SGT Georgia L. Seitz. In addition, US Army Field Station, Korea's newspaper, the Zoeckler Zephyr, received the US Forces Korea Green Eyeshade Award for Excellence in Journalism for its November/December 1977 issue. Especially recognized were SSG Ralph Hopkins, SP4 Marie Corinne Price, and LT Thomas B. Goode.⁶⁵

(U) The following is a list of INSCOM publications as of 30 September 1978:

Publication

Unit

<u>The Journal</u>	HQ INSCOM
<u>Augsburg Profile</u>	USA Field Station, Augsburg
<u>Torii Typhoon</u>	USA Field Station, Okinawa
<u>Write-On</u>	INSCOM CONUS MI Group (SIGINT/EW)
<u>The Vanguard</u>	USAG, Vint Hill Farms Station
<u>Zoeckler Zephyr</u>	USA Field Station, Korea
<u>66th MI Scrambler</u>	66th MI Group
<u>FS Bee</u>	USA Field Station, Berlin

Commander's Plaque for Operational Achievement. (U) The award of the Commander's Plaque for Operational Achievement came about as a result of MG Rolya's visit to Headquarters Intelligence Centre, Templer Barracks, Ashford, Kent, England. At the British Intelligence Corps Museum, MG Rolya commented that he would like to initiate an award recognition similar to the British Intelligence Corps' Intelligencers Prize. The Intelligencers Prize was awarded annually in the form of Premium Bonds to any member of the Corps, including Volunteers, below the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, whose activities during the previous year had brought particular credit to the organization. Nominations with descriptions of how the nominee brought credit to the Corps were received by a panel of judges. The name of the winner was then inscribed on the World Globe which was prominently displayed in the Corps Museum. Based on this information, the DCSOPS, DCSITA, DCSCI, and CSM at HQ INSCOM provided their comments concerning a similar award. The DCSPER consolidated the input from the staff and provided the CG with a recommendation.

(U) INSCOM Regulation No. 672-3, 1 August 1978, established the Commander's Plaque for Operational Achievement, to be awarded annually to the non-supervisory service member who made the single greatest contribution to the operational effectiveness of INSCOM during the preceding calendar year. Consideration for nominations would include non-operational personnel whose accomplishments significantly impacted on the operational effectiveness of INSCOM. Each major subordinate commander, reporting directly to this Headquarters, would nominate only one member of his/her command for consideration to arrive in ODCSPER not later than 15 February. The plaque, bearing the engraved name, rank, and organization of its winner, would be prominently displayed at HQ INSCOM, and a smaller replica of the plaque would be presented to the winner as a personal memento of his/her achievement. Announcement of the winner was to be made by message not later than 15 April.66

Travis Trophy Award. (U) The Travis Trophy was originally presented in 1945 by Sir Edward Travis as an award in athletic contests between US Army and US Navy cryptologic activities in the cryptologic activities in the Washington, D. C. area. It was last awarded as an athletic trophy in 1948. On a visit to HQ USASA in 1964, LTG Gordon A. Blake, DIRNSA, saw the trophy and had it reactivated as an annual award to the Service Cryptologic Agency which had made the most significant contribution in the areas of operations,

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management, administration, and suggestions.

(C-CCO) The Travis Trophy for CY 1977 was awarded to the 470th Military Intelligence Group for its contribution to the national intelligence community

(b) (1) Per NSA;(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

Units receiving honorable mention were USN-15, Naval Security Group Command and USA-518, Air Force Security Service. The ceremony, held on 27 September 1978, was the Fourteenth Annual Presentation of the Travis Trophy and represented an unprecedented third year in a row win for the Army (CY 1975 was shared with the Air Force) for a total of seven trophies. See appendix J for a list of previous Travis Trophy winners and the INSCOM nominees.

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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER V. RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT

1. AHR, DCSRM, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (S), pp. 19-25.
2. Qtrly Prog Rev, HQ INSCOM, 3d & 4th Qtrs FY78 (C), pp. 42-43; p. 6, resp.
3. AHR, DCSRM, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (S), p. 25.
4. Ibid. pp. 37-38.
5. Qtrly Prog Rev, HQ INSCOM, 4th Qtr FY78 (C), p. 6.
6. Summary of INSCOM Strength, As of 30 Sep 78 (C), 27 Oct 78.
7. AHR, DCSTEL, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (C), pp. 7-10.
8. Ibid. pp. 20-21; 1978 USAINSCOM Commanders Conference PreConference Packet (23-27 Oct 78)(S), pp. F-13, F-14.
9. AHR, DCSTEL, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (C), pp. 21-22; 1978 USAINSCOM Commanders Conference PreConference Packet (S), p. F-13.
10. 1978 USAINSCOM Commanders Conference PreConference Packet (S), p. G-23; Ltr, IARM-P, HQ INSCOM, 28 Oct 77, subj: INSCOM Resource Management Organization and Functions.
11. AHR, INSCOM Data Systems Actv, FY78, pp. 34, 46-48, 55-56.
12. 1978 USAINSCOM Commanders Conference PreConference Packet (S), p. G-25.
13. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (S-CCO), pp. 9-12; Ltr, CSA, 21 Sep 77, Organizational Effectiveness.
14. Ann Hist Rev, HQ INSCOM, FY77 (TSC/NOFORN/LIMDIS), pp. 60-61.
15. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (S-CCO), p. 19.
16. Ibid. p. 36.
17. Ibid. pp. 25-26.
18. Ibid. p. 34.
19. Ibid. pp. 21, 28.
20. Ibid. pp. 21-23; Msg fm USAINSCOMDETNSA to CDR INSCOM, DTG 171855Z Apr 78 (S-CCO); AHR, CSOC (FS San Antonio), FY78, Vol I (TSC/NOFORN), p. 8.
21. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (S-CCO), pp. 29, 32.
22. Ibid. pp. 57-59.
23. Ibid. pp. 48-49.
24. Ibid. pp. 55-57.
25. Ann Hist Rev, HQ INSCOM, FY77 (TSC/NOFORN/LIMDIS), p. 62; AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), p. 86; Interview, CW4 C. W. Courtney, PTR Div, ODCSOPS (26 Jun 79).
26. Black Book Item, IAOPS-SE-0, HQ INSCOM, 13 Apr 78, subj: (b) (1) Per NSA;(b)(3):P.L. 86-36
(S-CCO) (C)
27. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), pp. 218-219.
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33. Fact Sheet, IAOPS-PTR, 22 Sep 78, subj: Army Commanders' Conference (Program to Fill Mobilization Manpower Base)
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35. AHR, DCSCI, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I, pp. 22-23, 32.
36. Ibid. pp. 74-75, and Vol III (C), Tab JJ; AHR, CSF, FY78, App A; AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (S-CCO), p. 24.
37. AHR, SJA, HQ INSCOM, FY78, pp. 3-4.
38. Ibid. p. 5.
39. AHR, DCSCI, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I, pp. 38-39; Hist Sum, Poly Element, ODCSCI (IACI-OCI-O), 2 Feb 79.
40. AHR, IG, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Chap II.
41. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), p. 207.
42. Msg fm CDRINSCOM to DA (DAMI-TSS), 3 Oct 77, subj: Command and Control Army SIGINT/EW Units, (C); MOU, 28 Dec 77, subj: Command, Control, Employment, and Technical Interface of Integrated US Army SIGINT Activities, (C).
43. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), p. 197.
44. AHR, DCSCI, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I, pp. 18-19, 36-37; Vol II (C), Tab F; AHR, USACSF, FY78, App C.
45. 1978 USAINSCOM Commanders Conference PreConference Packet (S), p. F-18.
46. AHR, DCSLOG, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (S-CCO), pp. 17-26.
47. Ibid. pp. 31-32.
48. AHR, [redacted], FY78, Vol II (TSC), p. III-13; Black Book Item, IAOPS-SE-0 and IALOG-IC, 17 Apr 78, subj: [redacted] Construction, (C-CCO).
49. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (S-CCO), Records Management Branch.
50. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), pp. 166-169.
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53. Ibid. p. 81; Ltr, IAPER-DCP, 6 Sep 78, subj: INSCOM Senior Level Position Ceiling.
54. DF, CofS, HQ INSCOM, 16 Jun 78, subj: Flexitime.
55. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (S-CCO), pp. 80-81.
56. Interview, Dr. Charles Gott, Staff CPO, HQ INSCOM w/Mr. James L. Gilbert, History Office (17 May 79).
57. AHR, DCSCI, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I, pp. 20-21.
58. AHR, USACSF, FY78, App D; Statistical Summary FOI/PA (29 Nov 77).
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60. Ibid. Tab A.
61. Ibid. p. 73; INSCOM FWP Bulletin (Vol 3, No 1)(Feb 78), p. 8.
62. AHR, DCSPER, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (S-CCO), pp. 92-94.
63. Ibid. p. 68.
64. The Journal of the INSCOM, May 1978 (Vol I, No 7), pp. 10-13.
65. AHR, OPA, HQ INSCOM, FY78, pp. 3-4.

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(3):P.L. 86-36

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66. Ltr fm MAJ Stanley T. Winarski, Hq Intelligence Centre, Templar Barracks, Ashford, Kent [England] to MG Rolya, CG INSCOM, 14 Dec 77; INSCOM Regulation No 672-3, 1 Aug 78, subj: Commander's Plaque for Operational Achievement.

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CHAPTER VI
OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

US Signal Intelligence Directive (USSID) 1000. (U) After an extended period of coordination between INSCOM and NSACSS, the latter published USSID 1000, SIGINT Tasking of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command, dated 14 December 1977. This was the first version of USSID 1000 to reflect the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS) and more specifically delineated Army SCA functions under the INSCOM organization. The writing of USSID 1000 was greatly facilitated by the fact that many of the major issues concerning relationships and mission were resolved by other documents being agreed upon by DA, INSCOM, and NSACSS.¹

^(U)
~~(S)~~ The primary SIGINT functions and tasks of CDR INSCOM as the Army SCA are indicated as follows:

1. Serves as Chief of the Army SCA and commander of the Army's cryptologic element of the Central Security Service (CSS). Within this responsibility, CDR INSCOM responds to the objectives of the United States SIGINT System (USSS) and is the non-tactical intelligence operator in general Army support.
2. Provides advice and assistance on cryptologic operational matters to other major Army commands as appropriate.
3. Serves as executive agent for peacetime utilization of Army tactical SIGINT resources.
4. Serves as the Army representative to NSACSS for the USSID system.
5. Assists Army MACOM's as required to manage and distribute Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) resources and DA in coordination of the SIGINT portion of major Program II Budget with NSA, DOD, and Congress.
6. Participates with ACSI, DA to prepare the Army's SIGINT architecture and its fusion into the National SIGINT Plan.
7. In coordination with ACSI, DA and appropriate MACOM's, participates with NSACSS to develop/maintain a cryptologic personnel career development program.²

Development of Intelligence and EW Systems. (U) The Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems, HQ INSCOM, was the principal staff assistant in coordinating matters within INSCOM pertaining to planning, development, and acquisition of INSCOM's requirements, conceptual planning, interoperability, and systems management in support of field stations and intelligence, EW, CI, OPSEC, HUMINT, and Imagery units at theater/echelons above corps. In this capacity, the DCSS

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supervised several developmental studies during FY 1978. One such study was made by the Kuras-Alterman Corporation, McLean, Virginia, who submitted a Technical Proposal for Echelons Above Corps Study, Proposal No. KA-4117, dated May 1978. An interim Technical Report on Intelligence, Security, and Electronic Warfare Support to EAC was submitted to INSCOM on 26 September 1978. It was anticipated that the study would provide an overview of the Joint, National, and Multi-national environments or contexts within which INSCOM must fill its assigned missions in accordance with AR 10-53 and FM 100-X. Another objective of the study was to provide a concept of operations stemming from the interaction of assigned roles and missions. Finally, it was hoped that major issues could be isolated so as to be addressed by future study and action.

(U) The Army Command and Control Master Plan, a DA-directed study, was conducted for the purpose of identifying the inputs and demands on the Army Command and Control System through 1985. Through ODCSS participation, INSCOM reviewed the contractor prepared studies for accuracy and consistency with other major planned actions.

(U) In 1975, the Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study (IOSS) recommended the integration of tactical all-source intelligence, OPSEC, and EW in support of Corps and lower echelons. The Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) concepts began to emerge in 1976 through TOE's and doctrinal literature. Ongoing at this time was the testing of the CEWI Group through the preparation of a Group Force Development Test and Experimentation at Fort Hood, Texas. If successful, the test results would have a significant impact upon INSCOM missions worldwide.

(U) On 29 September 1978, the Operating Systems, Incorporated, based in California, launched a 17-month, \$190,000 effort to describe the analytical process from the cognitive standpoint. The study was expected to have an impact on training, analysis, and ADP programming.

(U) INSCOM Pamphlet No. 71-9, Test Materiel Acquisition (Draft), was introduced to provide a meaningful guide for INSCOM field commanders and staff officers to use in the formulation and processing of requirements documentation for the acquisition of Army materiel to include INSCOM SIGINT, Field Station, tactical SIGINT/EW equipment/systems, and other intelligence materiel requirements. The pamphlet detailed the procedures INSCOM personnel must follow in order to initiate and process new equipment/systems acquisitions documents.

(U)

CRITIC Program. HQ INSCOM proposed that NSACSS conduct/oversee CRITIC testing inasmuch as a uniform procedure would be applied to all SCA's and that the testing function was one of a Central Security Service role to maintain "operational readiness" vis-a-vis an "INSCOM unit training" role. On 7 December 1977, NSACSS released three messages to the Major Army Commands (MACOM's) concerned with SIGINT. Essentially, these messages—

1. (C) Non-concurred in INSCOM recommendations that NSACSS oversee

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Army testing and stated that CRITIC testing was considered a "training" function. (U)

2. (C) Directed CDR INSCOM to establish a program and begin internal CRITIC testing in accordance with provisions of Annex M, USSID 301.

(U)
3. (C) Requested that CDR INSCOM develop/schedule CRITIC tests in coordination with MACOM's for Army tactical SIGINT units and include results in an Army-wide consolidated quarterly CRITIC test/evaluation report.

(U) As a result of these messages, HQ INSCOM notified INSCOM field sites to begin CRITIC testing in accordance with Annex M, USSID 301. In addition, the headquarters informed other MACOM's of its intent to publish a supplementary INSCOM regulation to USSID 301 and invited them to participate in the regulation development.⁴

Field Assistance Support Team (FAST) Concept. (C) The Field Assistance Support Team was brought into being to bridge the gap between national level intelligence agencies and CONUS-based tactical units, primarily those with worldwide, quick reaction missions. The FAST organization was flexible and designed to meet the needs of the alerted force G2 and other principal staff members. Personnel from the USA Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center's Field Support Office, who maintained a close working relationship with tactical units, formed the nucleus of the team. Personnel within INSCOM who had expertise in a variety of skills such as collection, imagery, or a first-hand knowledge of the objective area (FAO's, etc.) were to be added to the team. In the future, it was hoped that the team would be enlarged to include available representatives of [redacted]

(b)(1) Per DIA [redacted]

(U) The FAST concept was tested for the first time in support of XVIII Airborne Corps Exercise CABER WARRIOR V from 14 February to 11 March 1978. Again, during 17-20 April, the FAST concept was tested, this time in support of the 24th Infantry Division's Ranger Exercise. This was the first time that the concept was tested without prior knowledge by the national level intelligence agencies. A team of ITAC analysts worked with the XVIII Airborne Corps G2 personnel, providing extensive briefings and background data on North Korean combat capabilities. The ITAC also provided timely imagery on the Korean DMZ and North Korean indications and warning targets. An ITAC team stayed with G2 personnel throughout the exercise, providing instruction on methods of testing national systems to satisfy tactical needs. Next, FAST received its first crisis support mission in support of the XVIII

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Non-Codeword SIGINT Reporting Program. (S-CCO) An NSACSS (DDO) message of 19 July 1978 listed the main features of an expanded program to remove, as far as possible, restrictive COMINT codeword caveats from reports using selected extracts of COMINT-derived data. The non-codeword (NCW) program represented a positive step toward the improvement/streamlining of COMINT dissemination to tactical users. During wartime most products derived through plain text exploitation would be issued without codewords. It was important that the Army adopt a peacetime posture as close as possible to that expected in wartime. The NCW program began to eliminate within the bounds of existent security discretion, restrictions upon COMINT dissemination from a producer. The program did not involve INSCOM field sites.

~~(S-CCO)~~

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(U) ~~(S-CCO)~~ The Vice Chief of Staff, US Army endorsed the NSACSS NCW program as "extremely beneficial for training and as a real contribution to readiness." By late September 1978, the GUARDRAIL NCW reporting had been initiated as a test for eventual worldwide use.⁸

INSCOM Operational Readiness Report. (U) In addition to JCS and DA reporting requirements for unit readiness status data, CDR, INSCOM directed that all operational units submit a quarterly status report. The purpose of the report was to provide a vehicle for submitting a command readiness profile

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for use by the DA staff. A pilot report was to be submitted for November 1978. After a process of development and coordination with the HQ INSCOM staff, the standard JCS/DA FORSTAT readiness report was selected as the base Operational Readiness Report (ORR) with selected topics added by command direction.⁹

(U)

INSCOM Operations Report. (C) On 2 March 1978, the Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC), ODCSOPS, became responsible for the preparation and subsequent transmission of a weekly INSCOM Operations Report (OPREP). The purpose of the OPREP was to apprise the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, DA, and INSCOM subordinate unit commanders of significant operational and reporting activity in areas of INSCOM interest. The format of the OPREP was divided by geographical regions (Pacific, Europe, Western Hemisphere) and by type of intelligence collection employed (SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT, or Multidiscipline). INSCOM field units submitted items for OPREP consideration which in turn were culled for pertinence and interest by ICC action officers. The resultant product was then put into electrical message format for transmission to OPREP addressees worldwide.¹⁰

C&P Company Communication Facility Development. (U) During FY 1978, the Army's first automated transportable communication facility (COMFAC) for the intelligence community was under development and would be fielded in 1979. This transportable facility, under the acronym COMFAC, was conceived by the USACC-INSCOM to satisfy rapidly increasing tactical communication requirements. COMFAC would provide highly unique automated communication capabilities controlled by a AN/UYK-19 computer system for handling both formal and informal traffic. During field exercises, traffic between a division EW company and the corps Control and Processing (C&P) company averaged 300 messages per day. This information had to be manually processed for distribution within the corps. Analysts at the C&P company needed rapid access to the data and particularly the capability to discuss the data with analysts at other echelons by OPSCOMM circuitry. COMFAC would give field units the fast, reliable and flexible means to communicate this highly perishable signal intelligence data to the combat commanders within the corps' area of operation. COMFAC would support 19 secure full duplex circuits consisting of three medium speed AUTODIN DSSCS MODE I circuits operating up to 2400 baud and 16 low speed traffic and operational communication circuits (OPSCOMM). The OPSCOMM circuits would be controlled by a central processor under which any subscriber to the system could be connected to any other subscriber.

(U) The COMFAC contract was awarded to ECI Division/E Systems Incorporated on 8 September 1977 as an 18-month procurement package. COMFAC was scheduled to be deployed to HHC, 302d ASA Battalion, supporting the V Corps, and the second COMFAC was scheduled for HHC, 307th ASA Battalion, supporting the VII Corps in Europe. Both COMFAC's were scheduled for OT II testing in Europe during the July 1979 time frame.

(U) Among the milestones occurring during FY 1978 were the following: ECI

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completed the physical mock-up of the Crypto-Tech Control Van to government satisfaction in November 1977; the draft system/hardware design plan was approved on 7 December 1977; the draft software design plan was reviewed and approved, with changes by DCSTEL and DCSMIS during a 9-13 January review; and the COMFAC software for the MODE I interface successfully passed the CAT I test by the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) on 23 August 1978.

(U) The COMFAC contract was to have been completed for an estimated \$2.5 million. However, in June 1978, the government was informed that an extensive cost overrun of \$2 million was anticipated. Vendor related and unanticipated excessive costs for the procurement of the commercial hardware and complete military specifications (MIL SPEC) documentation for the sub-contractors ran over \$900,000. Burden rates and accounting charges authorized by public law led to another \$350,000. Finally, ECI underestimated the manhours and costs associated with the technical complexity of COMFAC by \$750,000.

(U) TRADOC was given three possible courses of action: (1) Expend the \$2 million, (2) reduce the scope of the contract, or (3) terminate the contract. TRADOC provided a statement of urgency for continuing the COMFAC project which was to be deployed to US Army, Europe. DA approved the additional monies in sufficient time to preclude work stoppage although it appeared certain that the project would slip past its April 1979 deadline.11

Project EELPOT. (C-CCO) EELPOT was an NSA project conceived in 1973 to consolidate USAFSS and USAINSCOM HFDF Networks in Europe and the Pacific. It was also to provide interface with the Navy's BULLSEYE HFDF Network at selected sites.

(b)(3):50 USC
3024(i);(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36;
(b) (1) Per NSA

In November 1977, HQ INSCOM and AFSS requested that NSA conduct a complete review of Project EELPOT to determine the feasibility and cost effectiveness of completing the project. In response to the Director's suggestion, NSA decided it was necessary to recycle project EELPOT through the Requirements Review Group (RRG) and the Concept Review Group (CRG) process, in accordance with NSA Circular 25-16, to revalidate the requirements for EELPOT and to determine if the EELPOT concept was adequate to meet the requirements.

(U) (C) As a result of the Requirements Review Group's meeting on 14 February 1978, NSA's Deputy Director, Research and Development (DDR) was tasked to prepare a plan on how to compare the planned EELPOT capabilities with stated requirements. HQ INSCOM provided input which disagreed with NSA's draft HFDF System Concept Paper (SCP III). INSCOM's objections were that the paper slanted toward justifying retention of EELPOT and failed to address a concept designed to meet the stated requirements. Basically, all parties except the SCP III action office, DDR, agreed that EELPOT should not be pursued further. However, the SCP III that was forwarded to the Concept Review Group conveyed only the DDR position. Dissenting views were only covered in the executive summary.

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(u)
~~(C)~~ On 6 June 1978, the CRG reviewed the HFDF System Concept Paper. Group members generally agreed that EELPOT should not be pursued, and that the best alternative appeared to be retention and upgrade of existing HFDF networks using EELPOT resources when feasible. Before making a final determination on the fate of EELPOT, the CRG requested a cost analysis to determine cost impact of upgrading current nets.

(u)
~~(C)~~ In a 29 August 1978 Memo, DIRNSA advised the Assistant Director for Plans and Resources that he did not concur in only relying on SCA HFDF upgrades as the solution to EELPOT problems. He requested a coherent long range strategy which insured development of a modernized worldwide interoperable system which was dollar constrained and used as much of EELPOT developed equipments systems as was feasible. However, at the end of FY 1978, a joint NSA/SCA attempt to develop a course of action for a long range HFDF strategy, in accordance with the Director's guidance, was unsuccessful. Consequently, a NSA working group was formed to develop the plan with SCA participation if desired.¹²

Direction Finding Nets. (S-CCO) At the close of FY 1978, INSCOM direction finding (DF) net configurations were as follows:¹³

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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
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~~(S-CCO)~~ INSCOM sites that participated in other SCA Nets were the following:



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Single Station Locator-Europe. (S-CCO) The Joint Congressional Committee on the Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 1978 (Report No. 95-565, 4 August 1977) deleted all funds from NSA's budget (\$1.8M) for the Single Station Locator-Europe project. In October, a Resource Change Proposal (RCP) was resubmitted which identified the requirements for funding to procure and install a dual scope AN/GSQ-185 SSL System in Europe. The RCP was resubmitted under the Economic Stimulus package for FY 1978, pointing out the requirement for improving DF capability in Europe as well as providing for substantial savings in resources. This resubmitted RCP was presented to NSA during the second quarter and identified funds for the FY 1978 program. Although the RCP was not supported by NSA under the Economic Stimulus package, the requirement for an SSL in Europe was resubmitted as an SCP-1 during 4th Qtr FY 1978 under the cover name of TRACKSTAR.15

HF Modernization Study (MAROON SHIELD). (S-CCO) The High Frequency (HF) Modernization Study was an in-depth review of the MAROON SHIELD program and was initiated in September 1977. The Defense Intelligence Program Guidance charged NSA, in coordination with the Service Cryptologic Agencies to develop a plan to update the HF collection systems. The HF Modernization Study was completed in April 1978 and, after final coordination, was published in June 1978. Upon publication of the new plan, the term MAROON SHIELD was discontinued. The study planned a multi-level program consisting of various degrees of modernization and remoting and increased manpower. The study impacted significantly on the INSCOM field stations.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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TRUSTY HUNTER. (U) The TRUSTY HUNTER program (previously called "Milli-meter Wave Intercept System") involved the procurement of 10 complete 10-40 GHz noncommunications intercept systems for US Army, Europe tactical units. These systems were given the nomenclature, Receiving Set, Countermeasures AN/TLR-31, and were to be fielded with operation and maintenance manuals, a one-year renewable maintenance contract, two spares/float kits, and a built-in test capability which was a later addition to the system. Initially envisioned for the system test method was an independent calibration unit, but after investigation into the connection problems encountered at the higher frequencies, it was determined that built-in test equipment was more practical. It would give the operator and maintenance personnel a means for instant checks of the total receiving system without the costs of time and money incurred by having to insert an external signal. The BITE was being added as a Value Engineering Change Proposal and was not expected to increase the overall cost of the program. The TRUSTY HUNTER systems were configured to fit into existing spaces in the AN/MLQ-24 Countermeasures Receiving Set. The tuner enclosure and antenna system were mounted on the mast formerly used to mount the MLQ-24 secondary antenna. Inside the shelter, four pieces of equipment were added: A control unit, multi-function display, servo-amp, and power supply. Although the TLR-31 was packaged for installation in the MLQ-24, there was no requirement for interconnection between the two, and the TLR-31 could operate as a stand-alone system given an antenna mast and power source. The power requirements were 115V AC, 47-400 Hz, single phase power at 10 Amps.

(U)
(C) Fielding of the system to USAREUR Divisional Support Companies (DSC's) began on 13 May 1978. Final deliveries of the remaining systems (9 and 10) occurred at the end of August. One system (from the 326th ASA Company under VII Corps control) was permanently deployed to Mt Schneeberg for continuous, long-term operations. Other systems remained in garrison when not deployed to forward area sites or other areas for operator training/collection missions. TRUSTY HUNTER deployments surfaced a number of problems, mostly hardware; however, these difficulties were not considered major in scope. 18

Project Kunia. (S-CCO) While DA and INSCOM were exerting every effort during FY 1978 to assure adequate base operations support to permit long term operations on USAFS [redacted] NSACSS was, in the same period, developing another project which would eliminate the requirement for the station and result in its closure. This was the Kunia Plan. The genesis of the Kunia Plan was an NSACSS search for a site for an Alternate Remote Operating Facility (ALTROF) outside the Washington, D. C. area for many cogent reasons, including reduction of military build-up at the MAROON SHIELD Central Operating Facility (COF) at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. In response to an

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NSACSS 28 June 1977 request for candidates for ALTROF sites, the Chief of Naval Operations, on 29 August 1977, offered Kunia, Oahu, as the only facility in Hawaii affording sufficient operations space for a projected 1,000-2,000-man mission operation in an area where sufficient support facilities could be made available (e.g., housing, schools, medical support, exchange/commissaries, but not including BEQ and transportation). The facility had been constructed in 1943 by the Army Corps of Engineers, originally as an underground aircraft assembly plant, more recently in use as the Pacific Fleet Operations Control Center, finally for ammunition/torpedo storage. In Navy hands since 1953, it had been subject of an Environmental Impact Assessment for deactivation and closure in December 1976, and had been determined excess to Navy requirements for real property on Hawaii.

(u)
(S-~~CCO~~) NSACSS dispatched a survey team to Hawaii in mid-October 1977 where it performed an in-depth review of the operational and support potential of the site (facilities, logistical and services support activities, local environment, etc.). Comparative surveys were accomplished at four CONUS sites, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; Goodfellow AF Base, Texas; Patrick AF Base, Florida; and Lowry AF Base, Colorado. The Patrick and Lowry AFB sites were eliminated as unsuitable. Of the three remaining sites assessed as having good potential as ALTROF's, Kunia was the preferred site. On 22 February 1978, just prior to a Navy deadline for a report to Congress for disposition, NSACSS stated official interest in Kunia to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L). This request, approved on 30 March 1978, granted NSACSS a 90-day "period of analysis" during which it was required to pay for protection and maintenance of the facility.

(S-~~CCO~~) In a status briefing on 4 April 1978, DIRNSA tasked B Group to examine the possibility of consolidating (b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Permission at Kunia. Accordingly, on 5 May 1978, the Remote Operations Planning Group (ROPG) coordinated with the NSACSS staff and the SCA's its preliminary plan for establishment of an ALTROF at Kunia, with new emphasis on the consolidation of US collection, processing and timely reporting of

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Projected advantages were to achieve international balance of payments (IBOP) savings, reduce Program III manpower space requirement, and in latter phases provide more capability and benefits to the cryptologic effort than the MAROON SHIELD replan.

(S-~~CCO~~) A 19 May second draft of the Kunia Plan reflected the operation as a tri-service rather than a joint cryptologic facility, with US Navy as DOD Executive Agent for host support. The cryptologic host had not been designated. Implicit in the plan was the

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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(S-CCO) A revision of the Kunia Plan, as briefed to DIRNSA and the SCA's on 2 June 1978, included the following phasing: Phase I, [REDACTED]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

DIRNSA's reaction to this planning was to name the Army as Executive Agent and advance the target date for IOC of the entire operation to FY 1980. In [REDACTED]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(S-CCO) The Kunia Plan next appeared 19 June 1978 as a proposed Annex E (Kunia Tri-Service Station Option) of the HF Modernization Study. The INSCOM comment to NSACSS on 3 July 1978, pointed out the following requirements: (1) A clear definition of a Tri-Service Activity, (2) an Alternate Intercept Collection Plan (AICP) for Kunia, (3) the use of Program II personnel stationed on Hawaii, (4) the need to address the impact of closure of [REDACTED] (5) the need to use latest technology instead of currently available equipment, and (6) the need for a site survey. (The earlier NSACSS survey of October 1977 had been for comparison of potential ALTROF sites rather than station establishment.)

(U)

(S-CCO) In the proposed Kunia Plan, INSCOM was referred to variously as "Executive Agent," "SCA host," and "BASOPS hosts." The USA Support Command, Hawaii (USASCH) was already the established Army base operations (BASOPS) host in the area, reducing INSCOM's role to that of coordinator of requirements on behalf of Kunia. Early action was required to coordinate detailed station support requirements with USASCH and other sources of support, and to introduce requirements into the plans and programs of the appropriate supporting commands to preclude later discovery of "hidden costs."

(U)

(S-CCO) The CDR, INSCOM advised DIRNSA, on 25 July 1978, of his intent to establish a Project Manager's Office to provide a single management focal point to carry out his responsibilities as Executive Agent. To support this requirement to DA, DIRNSA was requested to designate INSCOM formally as Cryptologic Executive Agent for Kunia. In a reply, dated 11 August 1978, DIRNSA did not respond to this request, but instead redesignated the Remote Operations Planning Group (ROPG) as the HF Modernization Group (HFMG).

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(b)(3):50 USC
3024(i);(b)(3):P.L.
86-36;(b) (1) Per
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charged with responsibility to develop a detailed plan for the Tri-Service SIGINT facility at Kunia. INSCOM representation was requested. CDR, INSCOM designated COL D. D. Yoxtheimer as INSCOM Project Manager to plan and implement the Kunia Remote Operations Facility, and also as INSCOM Representative on the HFMG.

(U)

(S-CCO) Admiral Turner, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, disapproved funding for Kunia. NSACSS immediately made a reclama. The reclama was also rejected, softened somewhat as a disapproval for FY 1980 only, which offered the possibility of only one year's delay. However, DIRNSA continued to press the project, identifying in-house money—a proposed \$5 million from MAROON ARCHER and \$22 million from MAROON SCIMITAR. This money was procurement money and did not satisfy the large initial requirement for OMA funding. At the close of FY 1978, INSCOM was developing a concept of its role as Executive Agent, and an outline to govern the conduct of a proposed site survey for Kunia. 19

(S/NOFORN)

(b)(1) Per
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position horizontally polarized, thereby changing its mini-directional transmit capability. severely impacting on the possibility of success.²⁰

^(U)
TRIVIAL TIGER. (S/NOFORN) INSCOM special project TRIVIAL TIGER was associated with GRAVEL STREAM in that it utilized basically the same sensor unit. (See write-up on GRAVEL STREAM.) During the planning stages of GRAVEL STREAM, an alternate means of enplacing the sensors within the target area was studied. It was decided that two of the five GRAVEL STREAM sensors under fabrication at that time would be modified for hand-held operations. A means of delivering these microminiaturized devices into the proper area was studied with the resultant sensor/camera piggy back configuration. The sensor was designed to fit an adapter that would attach to the 1000 MM Nikor lens used by the US Military Liaison Mission to Commander in Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (USMLMCINCGSFG). This effort became known as TRIVIAL TIGER. Object of the project was to acquire Electro-Optics signals believed associated with such tactical devices as field artillery range finders, helicopter-borne target designator, and other weapons associated systems that might use lasers to increase offensive operational effectiveness. Such targets were accessible as the US Military Liaison Mission members photographed systems of this type on a regular basis.

^(U)
(S/NOFORN) In September 1977, the sensors were ready for modification. And by March 1978, the modifications had been accomplished and systems delivered.

(S/NOFORN) On 24 April, LTG Sir David Willison, Director of General Intelligence, Ministry of Defense (MOD); Dr. F. Alistair Johnson, Director of Scientific and Technical Intelligence, MOD; and COL Hall-Tipping, Chief Defense Liaison Staff, Washington, D. C., were briefed on the INSCOM E-0 effort as well as being given a demonstration of the TRIVIAL TIGER sensor array. The briefing was well received and LTG Willison stated his desire for increasing United States/United Kingdom cooperative efforts and thought that TRIVIAL TIGER would be an excellent starting point. He intended to bring BRISMIS (British Military Liaison Mission) personnel from Berlin to London during a proposed E-0 Conference (22-24 May) of UK/ACSI/INSCOM personnel in order to discuss UK utilization of TRIVIAL TIGER by BRISMIS personnel. Post-briefing conversations indicated a ready willingness on the part of MOD to work with the United States on all aspects of E-0 collection. At the close of FY 1978, TRIVIAL TIGER was being prepared for testing against equipment at Fort Hood, Texas.²¹

TOKAY MARC. (C-CCO) In an attempt to enhance the capability of the Far East HFDF Net 30, a computer (Data General C-300) system was procured to provide HFDF Mission Management. This system allowed real-time, on-line, automated control over all Net control functions of the New 30 DF mission. Field Systems Support Division (FSSD) performed initial system programming (software) development; the ODCSOPS provided operational guidance. Initial conceptional planning had been that all debugging and initial acceptance testing would be performed prior to shipment of the system to [redacted] but slippage and installation team availability dictated an early shipping date, with finalization

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);
(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1)
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(b)(3);50 USC 3024(i);(b)
(3);P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per
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performed on site.

(C) The C-300 Computer System was installed at [redacted] in February 1978 to perform on-line DF mission management for [redacted]. After adjustments on station to speed up the entering of tip-offs from the external tasker, [redacted] accepted the system on 4 May. However, it was noted in the acceptance message that the system did not meet all of [redacted] DF requirements. An upgrade was planned for the TOKAY MARC system to rectify the shortcomings. Although the upgrade was originally projected for July 1978, it slipped into the summer of 1979.22

GUARDRAIL V and QUICKLOOK II. (C) The next generation of airborne intelligence systems slated for deployment was GUARDRAIL (GR) V and QUICKLOOK II. GR V was a SIGINT system comprised of specially configured RU-21H aircraft, one integrated processing facility (IPF), tactical commanders terminals, and assorted ground support equipment. The Army planned to deploy four systems, each consisting of six aircraft. The first of the systems was scheduled to

(b)(3);50 USC 3024(i);(b) (1) Per NSA

(C) QUICKLOOK II was an ELINT system comprised of specially configured OV-10 Mohawk aircraft, a ground processor, and ground support system. Six QUICKLOOK II aircraft were placed with each of four units. The projected deployment schedule for QUICKLOOK II was similar to that of GUARDRAIL V. Both were on the TOE of the ASA Company (Avn)(Forward).

(U) During FY 1978, the staff of the Aviation Branch at HQ INSCOM spent many hours in consultation with US Army, Europe; Commander, US Forces, Korea; Troop Support, Aviation and Readiness Command (TSARCOM); Communications and Electronics Materiel Readiness Command; and the system contractors. The CDR INSCOM had directed that every effort be made to insure that the new systems would be fielded on time without degrading intelligence support to the supported commanders. At the close of the fiscal year, the deployment of the first GUARDRAIL V and QUICKLOOK II systems to USAREUR had begun; it was anticipated that they would be operational by 1 January 1979, in time for REFORGER 79 exercise series.23

TRACER ROUND. (S-CCO) TRACER ROUND was conceived at the USASA Training Center and School (USASATC&S), Fort Devens, Massachusetts, in November and December 1974 during a detailed COMINT analysis of a May 1974 exercise of

(b)(3);50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3);P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

the findings of the school training team documented serious inadequacies in the national technical data bases and reported mechanisms [redacted]

(b)(3);50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3);P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

[redacted] From this proposal evolved a concept plan which was approved by the Vice Chief of Staff, US Army on 25 August 1975. As a result of discussions between USASA and NSA, a revised concept was written in June 1976 and approved by DA in September 1976. The revised concept provided a more balanced approach with equal emphasis on [redacted]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(S-~~CCO~~) To support Project TRACER ROUND, there was a 42-man CONUS element authorized the Signals Development Laboratory (SDL), which was ultimately located at Vint Hill Farms Station, Warrenton, Virginia; a 51-man European element known as STUBBY PENCIL with 42 personnel authorized at [redacted] and 9 personnel authorized at [redacted] the Signals Warfare Laboratory (SWL), located at Arlington Hall Station (AHS), Virginia; a Project Manager, also at AHS; and a TRADOC representative, located at Vint Hill Farms Station.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(S-~~CCO~~) TRACER ROUND culminated in an operational test during January-March 1978 which was designed to demonstrate an in-theater [redacted] real-time processing and reporting capability, responsive to the tactical commander. [redacted]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(U) ~~(S-CCO)~~ The project test results demonstrated that TRACER ROUND, as an entity, provided a viable, near real-time processing and reporting capability that would be responsive to the needs of the tactical commander if communications were available, timely, and reliable. This was evident in the USAREUR, V Corps, and VII Corps' positive evaluation of the TRACER ROUND test and project.

~~(S-CCO)~~ The project test results also demonstrated that the TRACER ROUND [redacted] data base was adequate, maintainable, retrievable and responsive. This was further evidenced by an enthusiastic, although informal, evaluation of the [redacted] data base by both NSA [redacted] national center SIGINT experts, who reviewed the data base during the [redacted] technical conference.

(b)(3):50 USC 3024
(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;
(b) (1) Per NSA

~~(TSC)~~ Of the 1,498 Tactical Reports (TACREPS) issued, 1,377 provided data supporting the validity of the TRACER ROUND concept as an in-theater combat information production element. This evaluation included an average overall report time, from receipt of the intercepted raw data at TRACER ROUND test sites to TACREP production of 13 minutes; and the identification and reporting of the locations of [redacted]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

[redacted] This type of data would be invaluable to the supported tactical commanders in a war-time situation, if communications could support the timely dissemination of the information.

(U) ~~(S-CCO)~~ Even though TRACER ROUND was found to be a viable concept, it was concluded that the current tactical SIGINT collection, processing and communications capabilities could not effectively use, contribute to, or support a centralized analytical and processing system; nor was a viable SIGINT management system available. Tactical SIGINT/EW production of combat intelligence had to rely on a smooth working system comprised of signal acquisition, processing, analysis, reporting, and communication. The front line intercept operator had to be continually appraised of the priorities and signal identifications resulting from rear echelon analysis. The rear echelon had to be constantly updated with Communications-electronics Operating Instructions (CEOI) and locational technical data from the front end operator.

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(U) ~~(S-CCO)~~ The project test results demonstrated that TRACER ROUND, as an entity, provided a viable, near real-time processing and reporting capability that would be responsive to the needs of the tactical commander if communications were available, timely, and reliable. This was evident in the USAREUR, V Corps, and VII Corps' positive evaluation of the TRACER ROUND test and project.

~~(S-CCO)~~ The project test results also demonstrated that the TRACER ROUND [redacted] data base was adequate, maintainable, retrievable and responsive. This was further evidenced by an enthusiastic, although informal, evaluation of the [redacted] data base by both NSA [redacted] national center SIGINT experts, who reviewed the data base during the [redacted] technical conference.

~~(TSC)~~ Of the 1,498 Tactical Reports (TACREPS) issued, 1,377 provided data supporting the validity of the TRACER ROUND concept as an in-theater combat information production element. This evaluation included an average overall report time, from receipt of the intercepted raw data at TRACER ROUND test sites to TACREP production of 13 minutes; and the identification and reporting of the locations of [redacted]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

[redacted] This type of data would be invaluable to the supported tactical commanders in a war-time situation, if communications could support the timely dissemination of the information.

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or these targets which required sophisticated centralized processing, neither the intercept operation nor the rear echelon analysis and reporting operation could function without the other. However, a synergistic mechanism did not exist, and only an effective communications link-up between them permitted them to function at all.

(U) ~~(C)~~ By 1 June 1978, the equipment and personnel assigned to Project TRACER ROUND had been transferred. Many of the recommendations and findings of the project were left unresolved, but the basic analytical techniques were being recognized and used at NSA and worldwide.²⁴

SIGSEC Positions. (U) The table below depicts the status of programmed and actual COMSEC monitoring and TEMPEST test positions for 4th Qtr FY 1978.²⁵

Table 27.—SIGSEC Positions

Unit	Monitoring				TEMPEST Test	
	Radio Telephone		Conventional Telephone		Field	
	Prog	Act	Prog	Act	Prog	Act
CI/SIGSEC Bn, Ft Meade	0	0	4	4	4	4
CI/SIGSEC Bn, Ft Sam Houston	1	1	6	6	1	1
CI/SIGSEC Bn, Presidio of SF	0	0	2	2	1	1
INSCOM Det Hawaii	0	0	2	2	1	1
209th MI Det	1	1	1	1	0	0
Scty Det Korea	1	1	1	1	0	0
66th MI Gp	0	0	2	2	2	2

SIGSEC Support Activities. (U) Support activities of INSCOM SIGSEC units worldwide in terms of monitoring and analysis missions, cryptofacility inspections and approvals, and TEMPEST inspections and tests conducted during FY 1978 are shown in table below.²⁶

Table 28.—SIGSEC Support Activities

	Monitoring and Analysis Missions		Cryptofacility		TEMPEST	
	RATEL	Conv'l Tel	Insp	Appr	Insp	Fld Test
Worldwide	47	110	913	345	603	98

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SIGSEC Publications. (U) During FY 1978, the following actions were taken in regard to publications on signal security:

1. AR 530-3, Electronic Security. A draft revision of this regulation was submitted to HQDA in August 1977. HQDA then staffed the regulation and submitted it to The Adjutant General's Office (TAGO) for publication. TAGO reviewed and edited the draft and returned it to DCSOPS, DA for additional editorial corrections. On 9 March 1978, DCSOPS, DA requested that INSCOM assume proponency for AR 530-3. INSCOM accepted proponency on 31 March, made the required editorial corrections, restaffed the draft with the DA staff and the MACOM's, and resubmitted it to TAGO on 14 August 1978.

2. AR 530-4, Control of Compromising Emanations. The proposed revision of this regulation was submitted to HQDA on 13 May 1977. DCSOPS, DA staffed the regulation and submitted it to TAGO for publication. TAGO reviewed the draft and returned it to DCSOPS, DA for editorial corrections. On 9 March 1978, HQDA requested that INSCOM assume proponency for AR 530-4. On 31 March, INSCOM accepted proponency, made the required editorial corrections, restaffed the draft and resubmitted it to TAGO on 28 April. The AR was published and dated 15 August 1978.

3. TB 530-1, Identification and Application of Compromising Emanations Control Measures. The revision was completed and the draft submitted to TAGO for publication on 21 June 1978. The revised Technical Bulletin included a new set of eligibility criteria for the TEMPEST testing of those facilities which electrically processed classified information. The revision also removed the prohibition against testing high level teletype-writers and hardened sites.

4. TB 380-7, TEMPEST Inspection and Test. This Technical Bulletin (TB) provided technical guidance for the conducting of TEMPEST support activities, prescribed technical procedures for the reporting of TEMPEST support operations, and introduced commands to the basic TEMPEST support available to them from INSCOM. The TB was submitted to TAGO during the last report period. On 12 October 1977, advance copies were provided INSCOM TEMPEST units and select MACOM headquarters. Subsequently, the manuscript was edited at HQDA and, on 21 March 1978, editorial changes were provided recipients of the advanced copies. The TB was published and dated June 1978.²⁷

LEFOX PURPLE (AN/FSQ-88(V2)). (~~S-CCO~~) LEFOX PURPLE (LFP) was a fixed site application of the LEFOX GREY program. LEFOX GREY was laboratory tested in 1969, and an operational test was conducted at Berlin in 1970 and 1971. The contract for LEFOX PURPLE was awarded in 1973, and the system acceptance test was conducted at the contractor's facility during the latter part of 1976. LEFOX PURPLE installation at [redacted] was completed in May 1977, and the on-site acceptance test was conducted during May and June 1977. The system became fully operational on 29 August, and the on-site user test was conducted from 1 September to 15 December 1977. Overall, the system improved and expanded [redacted] capabilities in accomplishing the VHF/UHF mission.

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L.
86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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(S-CCO) There were four major operational advantages provided by the LEFOX PURPLE system. Collection volume using LEFOX PURPLE increased an average of 91.4 percent over conventional operations. Scan ratios, the time spent transcribing intercept, were decreased by LEFOX PURPLE operations. The exact amount of decrease varied greatly with the material being processed, but overall the decrease was 25.1 percent. Processing throughput times were improved. The average time between intercept and technical reporting (STRUM) were reduced by 34 percent. Product reporting timeliness improved approximately 40 percent. Detailed displays provided supervisors with explicit real-time management and target information on the status of collection and processing resources and on the progress of intercept through the stages of the processing cycle, thus permitting more effective control.

(S-CCO) The LEFOX PURPLE system was an effective tool that increased [redacted] capabilities to effectively and efficiently collect, transcribe, and report clear voice intercept. LEFOX PURPLE also represented a significant, almost revolutionary advance in the clear voice processing field. It had gained the acceptance and trust of the user and was preferred over the conventional system.²⁸

Field Station Position Manning. (S-CCO) The table below indicates field station position manning as of the end of the 4th Qtr FY 1978.²⁹

Table 29.—Position Manning

	<u>Position Equivalents</u>		<u>% Manned</u>
	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Manned</u>	
(b)(3):50 USC	114:08	105.07	92.1
3024(i);(b)(3):P.L.	65:08	54:08	83.2
86-36;(b) (1) Per	25:00	24:22	99.7
NSA	14:08	14:08	100.0
	4:16	4:16	100.0
	1:08	1:16	125.0
INSCOM TOTAL	<u>223:08</u>	<u>226:02</u>	<u>101.0</u>

Project MUDPACK. (C) Project MUDPACK began in 1974 and consolidated the wideband retrieval efforts of USASA and USAFSS at Medina, Texas [redacted]. The consolidation was directed to achieve reduced cryptologic manpower ceilings imposed by Program Budget Decision 289. USASA accepted the consolidation but opposed the utilization of 300 direct support spaces in the effort. After extensive negotiations, NSACSS approved USASA's proposal whereby 225 Program 3 spaces at [redacted] would be transferred to [redacted]. In turn, 225 personnel from the 502d ASA Group in Germany would fill the void left by the transfer of these spaces. This USASA proposal was approved by NSACSS in May 1974 and went into effect in July 1974. Over

(b)(3):P.L. 86-36

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per
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the months, however, it became increasingly difficult for the Army to honor the commitment because of recruitment and training shortfalls. Attempts were made to fill the MUDPACK commitment at approximately a 65 percent level.

(c) In December 1976, INSCOM's policy concerning MUDPACK fill was clarified whereby the 502d ASA Group, soon to be assigned to USAREUR, would continue to fill the commitment in proportion to the personnel assigned. This action, coordinated with NSA and USAREUR, reduced MUDPACK spaces to 182 in FY 1978. It was later learned that USAREUR was committed to an even lower rate of actual fill than INSCOM had previously attempted to fill. During the 4th Qtr FY 1978, MUDPACK reached the low ebb of 42 percent fill. The number of MUDPACK personnel assigned with duty at [redacted] decreased continuously throughout the year to a point where collection positions were not being manned due to personnel shortages.

(C-CCO) [redacted]

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(c) During the 4th Qtr FY 1978, the CDR, [redacted] requested HQ INSCOM to investigate the possibility of reassigning those USAREUR personnel filling MUDPACK slots to [redacted]. In response, BG Freeze, DCG-I, stated that such an action would only tend to further confuse and compound an already Army-wide shortage of 98 CMF personnel.³⁰

Advanced GOODKIN Acquisition System (AGAS). (S-CCO) Project GOODKIN was an automatic spectrum scanning system capable of signal detection, analysis, and reporting. It could be programmed to scan a continuous portion of the radio frequency (RF) spectrum and also to recognize various types of signal modulation. Project GOODKIN was first operated in the wideband environment at the Consolidated Security Operations Center (CSOC), San Antonio, Texas, and proved to be cost effective in providing intercept operator manpower savings.

(S-CC) The GOODKIN system was deployed to [redacted] in March 1976. Following the return of GOODKIN to CSOC, NSACSS was advised that HQ INSCOM intended to conduct additional tests with the system and that the installation at [redacted] (CSOC) was not considered permanent. On 6 July 1977, NSACSS, AFSS, and [redacted] were advised of the HQ INSCOM decision to test [redacted]. On 15 July, NSACSS nonconcurred in the proposal. Because there was an Army shortage of 05H personnel at CSOC, INSCOM agreed to let the GOODKIN system remain at CSOC until 31 December 1977.

(b)(3):P.L.
86-36

(S-CCO) In FY 1978, attention shifted away from redeployment of the GOODKIN acquisition system [redacted] to installment of the new Advanced GOODKIN Acquisition System at CSOC as a replacement. As a result of a \$1.864 million

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per
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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per
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(C-CCO)

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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(S-CC) The GOODKIN system was deployed to [redacted] in March 1976. Following the return of GOODKIN to CSOC, NSACSS was advised that HQ INSCOM intended to conduct additional tests with the system and that the installation at [redacted] (CSOC) was not considered permanent. On 6 July 1977, NSACSS, AFSS, and [redacted] were advised of the HQ INSCOM decision to test [redacted]. On 15 July, NSACSS nonconcurred in the proposal. Because there was an Army shortage of O5H personnel at CSOC, INSCOM agreed to let the GOODKIN system remain at CSOC until 31 December 1977.

(b)(3):P.L.
86-36

(S-CCO) In FY 1978, attention shifted away from redeployment of the GOODKIN acquisition system [redacted] to installment of the new Advanced GOODKIN Acquisition System at CSOC as a replacement. As a result of a \$1.864 million

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per
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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);
(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1)
Per NSA

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cut from the FY 1979 intelligence budget, the impact on operational problems for AGAS/GOODKIN programs had to be reevaluated. There was also concern among CSOC managers regarding which methods would be used to prioritize the tasking.

(S-CCO) On 6 June 1978, the GOODKIN test facility was terminated at CSOC. In accordance with contractual agreement, GOODKIN was deinstalled during 11-13 June 1978 and the hardware was shipped to the Signals Warfare Laboratory at Vint Hill Farms Station. The ten GOODKIN positions were dismantled and the mission which was assigned to the GOODKIN positions was transferred to conventional positions.

(S-CCO) On 26 September 1978, AGAS operating consoles were installed and tasked. Plans were that two positions were scheduled to be used as a test position in the system development module; one position was scheduled to be unmanned and used for acquisition alarming on [] single-channel printer activity. The AGAS turn-on date was scheduled for early FY 1979.31

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

MAROON SAIL Modernization Project at FS Homestead. (SC) FY 1978 witnessed the finalization of modernization planning for the implementation of the MAROON SAIL program in FY 1979. The program would update analytical and collection functions at FS Homestead to the latest "state of the art" possible. Analysts would have direct access to on-station computers to obtain formatted analytical information on a real-time basis as a means of providing instantaneous collection analysis and product reporting support to the cryptologic effort against []. Planning throughout the year consisted of determining the computer programs necessary to support the Army analysis and reporting mission and of determining the necessary floor plan and space required for the MAROON SAIL configuration. A final determination was developed for floor space necessary in the temporary location of the station offices while the modernization effort was being completed.

(SC) At the close of FY 1978, planning called for FS Homestead to relocate to its year long temporary spaces in early December. It was further anticipated that the modernization program would be completed in accordance with

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)
(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per
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two milestones. The first was to be the completion of the initial operating capability in February 1980 in which major portions of the MAROON SAIL system were to be operational. The second milestone was set for December 1980 at which time all aspects and capabilities of the MAROON SAIL system were to be fully operational.

~~(S)~~ This entire modernization project was a follow-on to a similar effort underway at the Navy Cryptologic site at [redacted] Due to the small size of this unit, modernization at Homestaed would have a measurable but not an overwhelming impact on the unit. 33

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

Project SEEK. ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Project SEEK, a positive intelligence collection program of interviews and debriefings of Jewish and other emigres from the USSR, was formed from Operation STRAW JEWEL, which was begun on 10 May 1974. The 902d Military Intelligence Group first implemented the debriefing program at Fort George G. Meade, utilizing linguistic assets of the 528th Military Intelligence Company. Involvement by DA was based upon a Memorandum of Understanding between the Domestic Collection Division, Central Intelligence Agency and OACSI, dated 29 May 1974. The mission of the project was "to collect and report intelligence information derived from the debriefing of Soviet Jewish emigres." After the inactivation of the 528th Military Intelligence Company, the responsibility for STRAW JEWEL was transferred to the Free World Division of the Directorate of Operations, USAINTA.

- (U) ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ In February 1975, this national collection effort became known as Project SEEK. The first linguist asset specifically dedicated to Project SEEK was assigned to the Free World Division in April 1975. By early 1976, five persons had been assigned with SEEK responsibilities. In February 1976, the Directorate of Operations was reorganized and Project SEEK was assigned to the newly created Detachment O, USAINTA, formed from the discontinued Washington Field Office of the Free World Division. LTC Calvin Korf was named Detachment Commander. The physical location of Project SEEK was moved from USAINTA Headquarters to the building at Columbia Pike in Arlington, Virginia and subsequently, in May 1976, to the Hoffman Building South, in Alexandria, Virginia.
- (U) ~~(C/NOFORN)~~ Project SEEK thus became buried within the framework of a related but by nature remote, positive collection activity. While most of the activity of Detachment O centered on contacts with US official personnel, Project SEEK dealt with alien parolees, unfamiliar with their new country of residence and still very much in the shadow of the closed society which they had recently left. The burden carried by two contact specialists/linguists was overwhelming. From 300 to 400 prospects required assessment in 1976. Debriefers were both contact specialists and administrators, editors, and substantive reviewers. Their administrative tasks were interspersed with TDY. So, the contact specialist remaining behind to carry out administrative chores was not completely in the picture concerning activity which went on during his temporary absences. The different collection mission of the rest of the detachment resulted in lack of command emphasis on the program. Ms. Snider was named Chief of Project SEEK within Detachment O in March 1976. Her liaison duties occupied the majority of her time.

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(C/NOFORN) Project SEEK continued to suffer from lack of personnel, but due to increased emphasis at all levels of the Intelligence Community, USAINTA decided in conjunction with ACSI [redacted] to increase Army's efforts on behalf of Project SEEK. On 16 October 1977, Project Seek personnel moved from Alexandria to Building 2841 at Fort Meade. With the occupation of permanent Project headquarters came a slow buildup of personnel, offset again and again through scheduled and unscheduled losses due to medical discharges, voluntary releases from active duty, ETS, etc. Personnel buildup was followed slowly by personnel authorizations. The senior member of the SEEK Project obtained an authorized position through the CONUS retention of a valid overseas Army Interrogation Unit slot in 1974. In spite of the fact that, as of 30 September 1978, Project SEEK numbered 16 personnel, the only authorized personnel were two warrant officers, one enlisted TAREX specialist, and one [redacted]. In addition to the 16 assigned, Project SEEK regularly received TDY assistance from personnel stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and Fort Hood, Texas. During FY 1978, actions were being taken to increase the number of authorized spaces to 36 by FY 1980. Still, the number of assigned personnel fell short of the potential SEEK sources.

(b)(1) Per DIA

(C/NOFORN) [redacted]

Deployment of Detachment E, USA Operational Group. (S/NOFORN) The genesis of Detachment E, USA Operational Group was found in the abortive plans of 1974 to establish a Middle-East detachment in USAREUR. Later, it became evident that the Western European scientific community offered a lucrative area for satisfying national requirements concerning Soviet Military R&D targets. On 31 March 1977, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed between DCSI, USAREUR and CDR, INSCOM which allotted deep Warsaw Pact/USSR targets to INSCOM. On 17 May 1977, the DCSOPS, DA approved a 20-man increase in USAREUR personnel strength to accommodate the establishment of Detachment E in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The initial elements of Detachment E arrived in Munich during August 1978.

(U) ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The mission of Detachment E was to plan, coordinate, and conduct clandestine HUMINT collection operations against the USSR, selected Mid-East states, the People's Republic of China, and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, from the FRG in response to Department of the Army and Department of Defense strategic collection requirements.³⁶

Iranian Liaison. (S/NOFORN) The mission of Detachment I, USA Operational Group was to conduct liaison activities on behalf of INSCOM with the Iranian J-2 and its operating commands and to support those liaison projects of

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[Redacted]

(S/NOFORN)

[Redacted]

(b)(1) Per DIA

Support to Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations. (S^{(b)(1)}) From May through August 1977, the 470th Military Intelligence Group (b)(1) supported the last phase of the Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations taking place in Washington, D. C.

[Redacted]

(b)(1)

(U) (C) As in FY 1977, activities surrounding the process of approving the new Panama Canal Treaties dominated the operational scene during FY 1978. Relevant key developments included the successful treaty plebiscite in Panama

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in October 1977, the US Senate Treaty ratification period which culminated in April 1978, and the US President's visit to Panama to exchange the instruments of ratification in June 1978. Each of these periods required unusually extensive collection and collection support activities on the part of the Group, with particular emphasis on official attitudes and dissident activities in Panama as well as contingency planning on the part of Panamanian authorities in the event the Treaties were not approved.

~~(C)~~ As a result of its efforts, the 470th Group received various recognitions including the following Letter of Commendation from the ACSI:39

~~(C)~~ I am in receipt of a memorandum from [redacted] (b)(1) Per CIA
[redacted] (b)(1) Per CIA
[redacted] (b)(1) Per CIA the State Department and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, for the timely, accurate and important information furnished by the intelligence community to US negotiators involved in the recently ratified Panama Canal treaties. The 470th Military Intelligence Group was specifically cited for its contribution which enabled US negotiators to bargain from an advantageous position of knowledge.

~~(C)~~ I would like to add my personal appreciation [redacted] (b)(1) Per CIA
[redacted] (b)(1) Per CIA for the 470th MI Group's professional effort in collecting, compiling and expeditiously disseminating intelligence of vital importance to the US negotiators.

Post Panama Canal Treaty Planning. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Post-treaty planning was an on-going process throughout FY 1978. It was not planned to eliminate any of the Group's missions as a direct result of implementation of the first Panama Canal Treaty (Implementation Treaty) scheduled for 1 October 1979, hence planning for future operations in a nevertheless changing/changed environment was a high priority, ongoing requirement. The desire of the Commander in Chief, US Southern Command (CINCSOUTHCOM) for the 470th MI Group [redacted] (b)(1) to have a post-treaty collection capability resembling its present one, at least during the three-year transition period, was summed up in a message he sent to the INSCOM Commander on 14 July 1978.

~~(S-CCO)~~ [redacted]

[redacted] (b)(1)

~~(S-NOFORN)~~ ^(U) As early as October 1977, a post-treaty operational review emphasizing considerations effecting HUMINT and CI activities, was formulated in elaborate detail. Later, in March 1978, a refined CI post-treaty concept

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[redacted] (b)(1)

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was drawn up, envisioning greatly enhanced needs in the area of countering opposition intelligence efforts in the Group's area of responsibility.

(S/NOFORN) Specifically planned for implementation in the post-treaty period were the following: A new, deep-cover HUMINT collection element which would operate under clandestine collection projects currently in effect or such other projects as might replace or supplement them; enhanced cover support for existing collection operations, as they phase down, taking into consideration a new and more restrictive collection environment; receipt of a new controlled collection objective (CCO) pertaining to Soviet Bloc activities in Latin America; and bilateral operations with the National Guard G-2 (currently foreseen for implementation during the 1980-1984 time frame).

(C) (b)(1) Finally, plans were completed for the 470th MI Group (b)(1) to relocate within the Panama Canal area. The major portion of the Group would relocate to the Cerro Corozal area. At this location, HUMINT and CI operations (b)(1) would be reported. The

(b)(1)

Mini-Camera of the 470th MI Group. (S/NOFORN) On 22 September 1978, the 470th MI Group in Panama produced the first known INSCOM operational intelligence by mini-camera. The mission was to photograph Enrique Malek Airfield, which was located in the northern part of Panama near the Costa Rican border. The platform for the mission was a Gamboa Canal Zone Aviation Club, two-place fixed wing aircraft, piloted by an American, and flown on a typical student training flight plan. Photographs taken showed four Venezuelan jet aircraft (T-22) and a transport plane. These aircraft were moved to the airfield in support of a contingency plan to support the Sandinista Rebels in Nicaragua.

(S/NOFORN) The mini-camera had a NIKON body with a specially modified lens and high resolution film and processing technique. Because the lens was ordinary in appearance and unobtrusive, the camera appeared to be like any photographer's NIKON with a motor drive and could be used to obtain intelligence photographs without arousing any undue scrutiny.⁴¹

Products Produced by US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center.

(U) The table below lists significant products produced by ITAC.⁴²

Table 30.—Products Produced by ITAC

<u>Title</u>	<u>Date Published</u>
Base Development Study	
Dharan/Rao Tanura/Ad Damman (A-4)	Dec 77
Libya, Benghazi	Jan 78
Libya, Al Bayda	Mar 78

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Products Produced by ITAC—Continued

<u>Title</u>	<u>Date Published</u>
Libya, Country Resume	Mar 78
Libya, Darnah	Mar 78
Syria, Country Resume	Mar 78
Syria, Damascus	Jun 78
Syria, Latakia	Jun 78
Syria, Dara	Jun 78
Syria, Tartus	Aug 78
Drop Zone Study, Haiti (A-2)	Mar 78
Emergency Evacuation Studies	
Libya	Nov 77
Morocco	Feb 78
Jordan	Jan 78
Ground Forces Order of Battle Books	
Israel	Nov 77
Persian Gulf States	Dec 77
Algeria	Jan 78
Syria	Mar 78
Iran	May 78
Iraq	Jun 78
Morocco	Jun 78
Handbooks of Military Forces	
Jordan	Nov 77
Saudi Arabia	May 78
Three Mission Oriented Packages	
	Oct 77
	Dec 77
	Jan 78
Special Study, Bahamas	Nov 77
Tactical Commander's Terrain Analysis	
Iran, Meshad	Jun 78
Telecommunication Electric Power Facility Study	
Cuba	Feb 78

Products Produced by ITAC—Continued

<u>Title</u>	<u>Date Published</u>
Studies:	
IAG-1-SNF-78, Ethiopia-Somalia Comparison	Sep 77
IAG-2-SI-78, Helicopter Support of Soviet Ground Forces	Jan 78
IAG-6-SI-78, Soviet Intelligence Assets: Criticality and Vulnerability	Dec 77
IAG-7-S-78, The Role of Armor in the PRC: Armor and Mechanized	Dec 77
IAG-16-SNF-78, Egypt - Infantry and Special Forces Capabilities	Jan 78
IAG-26-SI/SAO/G-78, Trends in Warsaw Pact Exercises from 1961-1976	Mar 78
IAG-35-U-78, US and Soviet Division Comparison	May 78
IAG-39-SNF-78, North Korean Artillery Force	Mar 78
ATC-CR-1100-060-78, South African Arms Procurement	Jul 78
ATC-CR-1100-077-78, Warsaw Pact Northern Front	Aug 78
ATC-CR-1100-078-78, Use of Smoke in Soviet Tactics	Sep 78
ATC-CR-1100-081-78, Soviet Antitank Doctrine, Tactics, Organization, Weapons and Training	Aug 78
NATO Readiness in North AG Study	
Input to AFPDA (CAA)	
Input to COSAGE (CAA)	
Commonality of Ammunition Study (DCSOPS)	
Tank Comparison Study (DCSOPS)	
POL Vulnerability Assessment (DAPE)	
Political Projections for Eventual Employment of US Special Forces in the Middle East. (USA War College)	
Political Projections for Eventual Employment of Special Forces in Greece and Turkey. (USA War College)	
Input to OSD New Assessment Project on Comparison Between US and Soviet Special Forces Concepts and Utilization.	
Input to OSD Net Assessment on NATO Mobilization Procedures.	
Stand Off Target Acquisition System Threat Annex	May 78
Threat Packages for IFV/CFV Tanks Force	Jul 78
Air Threat to Central Europe	Aug 78
Unconventional Warfare Operations Against NATO Threat Annex to AFPDA	Sep 78
Soviet Extended Planning Annex	

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Products Produced by ITAC—Continued

<u>Title</u>	<u>Date</u>
Briefings:	
MG Mahaffey briefed OSD/OMB on IFV/CFV SSG report	19 Oct 78
ARM briefing presented by FTD to Under Secretary of the Army	17 Oct 78

(U)

Peacetime Utilization Program (REDTRAIN). (C-CCO) For some years it was apparent that SIGINT resources in the USASA Direct Support (DS) units were underutilized. With the increasing constraints on funds and manpower, it became imperative that these DS units be thoroughly trained and capable of providing effective SIGINT support. In addition, some of the DS units were ideally located and had the capability to perform SIGINT missions contributing to national and Army intelligence requirements while continuing to perform their tactical support roles. A Joint Memorandum of Understanding, signed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Commander, USASA, and Director, National Security Agency, was promulgated on 5 November 1974. This policy statement codified the basis for all future planning and conduct of peacetime utilization operations by Army tactical SIGINT assets. In June 1978, the name of the program was changed to reflect more dynamic, wartime-oriented effort. The acronym to be used informally was REDTRAIN (Readiness Training for US Army Intelligence Resources).

(U) General Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., VCSA, obtained a briefing on 26 May 1978. The briefing outlined the beginning of the Multidiscipline Peacetime Utilization Program (MDPUP). In the past, Peacetime Utilization had been restricted to SIGINT and for practical purposes excluded other intelligence disciplines and the Reserve Component. General Kerwin was very receptive to the concept for future MDPUP. On 8 August 1978, the CofS, HQ INSCOM, designated elements within the headquarters as focal points for the development of the program in their respective disciplines in regard to the primary functions of mission development, technical support, and live environment training. These included: CPAR Element (SIGINT PU); HUMINT Directorate, DCSOPS (HUMINT PU); ODCSITA (PHOTINT/OB PU); and ODCSCI (CI/SIGSEC/OPSEC PU).

(U) (C) In recognition of INSCOM's role as DA's Executive Agent for peacetime utilization, plans were initiated in June 1977 for the activation of a new unit with the resources to accomplish INSCOM responsibilities. Called the Control, Processing, Analysis, and Reporting (CPAR) Element, the unit was organized on 1 November 1977 as Company E of the CONUS MI Group (SIGINT/EW) (formerly the INSCOM Support Group) at Fort Meade. Personnel to fill the unit came from the 376th ASA Company, Control and Processing when the unit transferred to Fort Hood, Texas as part of the CEWI Group activated in April 1978.

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(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

(C) There were basically two ways to conduct peacetime utilization training in units that did not have access to a live signal environment. The first was to bring the mission to the unit which was through the provision of tapes and technical working aids. Many units were enjoying some success through this method. The other way was to take the people to the mission which was termed as Forward Area Training (FAT). Between June 1977 and April 1978, 90 FORSCOM personnel participated in FAT activities worldwide. These included linguists who comprised a FAT team that deployed to [redacted]

[redacted] In addition to the FAT program, there was also Live Environment Training (LET) for those tactical SIGINT/EW units already in a forward area. Specialized Operational Training (SOT) applied to all units regardless of where they were located and was accomplished by sending individuals to a strategic site, such as NSA or a Field Station, for technical proficiency training in non-tactical environment.

(U) The CPAR, augmented by the 99th AS Company (C&P), USAR, constituted the only existing organization which was manned and trained to implement SIGINT/EW PU in the US Army Reserve. However, the CPAR unit lacked the staffing to undertake such an expanded mission unless augmented and the 99th Company could provide only limited and part time augmentation. The provision of two PUP dedicated Reserve Officers would assure the technical and continuity bridge between the CPAR and the 99th AS Company in the implementation of USAR SIGINT/EW PUP. At the close of FY 1978, the prospects for approval of these two special Active Duty for Training (ADT) tours were uncertain.

(U) There were several major problem areas facing the Multidiscipline Peacetime Utilization Program at the end of the year. These included a lack of adequate funding, a lack of organizational framework to expand the program to non-SIGINT disciplines, and a lack of linguist training facilities in CONUS and overseas.

(U) AR 350-3, Peacetime Utilization of US Army Tactical Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Resources, was published in September 1977 before FORSCOM and INSCOM could program funds through the normal budget cycle. While acceptance of the program was good, funds for live environment training had to come "out of hide." It was hoped that future budget submissions by INSCOM and FORSCOM would provide the monies needed to get the program on its feet. However, in September 1978, the Comptroller, DCSOPS, DA, gave peacetime utilization a setback by disapproving funding for FY 1979. This meant a delay to the full implementation of the program.

(U) The SIGINT discipline enjoyed a great advantage in that CPAR was a dedicated organization to support peacetime utilization of tactical SIGINT resources. The only step in supporting other disciplines was designating functional managers within INSCOM. Finally, there was the problem of providing language training for those EW/Cryptologic personnel assigned to tactical units. The problem was two-fold—how to maintain and enhance pure language proficiency and how to maintain and enhance the technical skills required in applying these skills to EW/Cryptologic tasks and missions.

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It was difficult to provide an adequate training environment for linguists in CONUS. Overseas, there were not sufficient opportunities at fixed stations, and deployment to border sites was expensive. To overcome these deficiencies, INSCOM proposed the formation of a Language Center in CONUS and a Forward Area Training and Operations Facility in Europe. 43

(b)(3):50 USC 3024(i);(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

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Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

(b)(1) (b)(3) Per NSA 50 USC 3024i; PL 86-36

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

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Other:

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Page(s) 132-133

Crash of U-21A Aircraft Near Sinop. (U) About 1405 hours Turkish local time (1205Z) on 20 January 1978, Army 18011, an Army U-21A aircraft, Serial Number 66-18011, crashed on the southeast slope of a 3,740-foot mountain known as Kulluck (Pig) Mountain at an elevation of 3,606 feet. The crash site was about 16 nautical miles from the Sinop Army Airfield. Three military personnel passengers and a crew of two were on board and all were killed on impact of the aircraft which itself was destroyed by impact damage and post-crash fire.

(U) The aircraft was on a routine flight from Istanbul to Sinop, Turkey, with passengers and mail. The aircraft departed Istanbul Yesilkoy Airport at 1225 on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight to Sinop. At 1344, the flight was released from IFR to Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC). Between 1355 and 1400, the crew contacted the Sinop Military Police Station on FM radio and received current weather at Sinop and gave estimated time of arrival of 1420 hours. The aircraft crashed within an estimated five minutes after their last radio contact with no further radio calls received. The Collateral Investigating Board determined that the probable cause of the accident was material failure of the No. 2 (right) engine. Contributing to the accident was the possible icing conditions and instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) known to have existed at lower altitudes. An additional contributing fact was a suspected premature descent into or through the IMC using the aircraft's weather radar to determine range to the Sinop Army Airfield.46

(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1)
Per NSA

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VI. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), pp. 72-73 and Vol II (S-CCO/NOFORN/LIMDIS), Tab 16.
2. Ibid. Vol II (S-CCO/NOFORN/LIMDIS), Tab 27.
3. AHR, DCSS, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (S-CCO), App J thru N, Q.
4. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), pp. 73-74.
5. AHR, ITAC, FY78, Annex A, Tab A; 1978 USAINSCOM Commanders Conference PreConference Packet (S), p. D-11.
6. AHR, FS Berlin, FY78, Vol II (TSC), p. 31.
7. Black Book Item, IAOPS-SE-0, HQ INSCOM, 17 Jul 78, subj: Exploitation of [redacted] (SC).
8. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), p. 77 and Vol II (S-CCO/NOFORN/LIMDIS), Tab 24.
9. Ibid. Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), p. 198.
10. Ibid. p. 190.
11. AHR, DCSTEL, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (C), pp. 18-19; 1978 USAINSCOM Commanders Conference PreConference Packet (S), p. F-8, F-9.
12. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), pp. 131-134.
13. Interview, Mr. Maahs, ODCSOPS with Mr. Gilbert, History Office (Jun 79) re Update of DF Nets.
14. OPS CHATTER, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, 5 Aug 78 (S-CCO/NOFORN), p. 12.
15. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), pp. 144-145.
16. AHR, DCSS, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (S-CCO), pp. 15-16.
17. Interview, Mr. J. J. Keith, ODCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, with Mr. Gilbert, History Office (27 Jun 79); Ann Hist Review, INSCOM, FY77 (TSC/NOFORN/LIMDIS), pp. 125-126.
18. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), p. 120; OPS CHATTER, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, 5 Apr 78 (S-CCO/NOFORN), p. 13.
19. AHR, DCSLOG, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (S-CCO), pp. 26-31; AHR, DCSS, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (S-CCO), Annex E.
20. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), pp. 110-116.
21. Ibid. pp. 116-119.
22. Ibid. pp. 134-136.
23. Ibid. pp. 210-211.
24. Ibid. p. 41; TRACER ROUND, Final Report - Executive Summary, HQ INSCOM, 15 Jun 78, pp. 1-4, 6-10.
25. Interview, Mr. J. D. Lytle, ODCSCI, HQ INSCOM, with Mr. Gilbert, History Office (26 Jun 78).
26. Interview, Mr. Gordon Doody, ODCSCI, HQ INSCOM, with Mr. Gilbert, History Office (26 Jun 78).
27. AHR, DCSCI, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I, pp. 12-13.
28. AHR, FS [redacted] FY78 (TSC/NOFORN/WNINTEL), pp. 261-262.
29. Qtrly Prog Rev, HQ INSCOM, 4th Qtr FY78 (Suppl)(SC), p. 4.
30. AHR, [redacted] FY78 (TSC/NOFORN/WNINTEL), pp. 258-259; AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), pp. 84-85; Ann Hist Rev, INSCOM, FY77 (TSC/NOFORN/LIMDIS), p. 140.

31. AHR, CSOC (FS San Antonio), FY78, Vol I (TSC/NOFORN), pp. 51-52; Ann Hist Rev, INSCOM, FY77 (TSC/NOFORN/LIMDIS), pp. 143-144.
32. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), pp. 84-85.
33. AHR, FS Homestead, FY78 (SC), pp. 31-32.
34. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), pp. 125-129 and Vol III (SC/NOFORN), Tabs 53, 54, 57.

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(b)(3) Per
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38. Travis Trophy Nominee (470th MI Gp), 22 Mar 78 (SC), p. 12.
39. AHR, 470th MI Gp, FY78 (TSC/NOFORN), Chap II, p. 1 and App T.
40. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), p. 95; AHR, 470th MI Gp, FY78 (TSC/NOFORN), Chap II, pp. 19-21.
41. AHR, 470th MI Gp, FY78 (TSC/NOFORN), Chap II, pp. 3-4; Interview, Mr. James P. Cowgill, Chief, Imagery Div, ODCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, with Mr. Gilbert, History Office (Nov 78) (S/NOFORN).
42. AHR, ITAC, FY78, App E and Annexes F & G.
43. Msg fm CDRINSCOM to CINCUSAREUR, 20 Apr 78, subj: Peacetime Utilization of Army Tactical SIGINT Resources, (C); OPS CHATTER, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, 5 Apr 78 (S-CCO/NOFORN), pp. 1-2; Fact Sheet, IAOPS-PTR, 5 Sep 78, subj: Peacetime Utilization; Msg fm CDRINSCOM to CDRFORSCOM (& others), DTG 202100Z Jun 78, subj: USA Multidiscipline Peacetime Utilization Program (MDPUP); AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), p. 224; Ann Hist Rev, INSCOM, FY77 (TSC/NOFORN/LIMDIS), pp. 147-148; Ltr fm CDRINSCOM to Chief, Army Reserve, undtd, subj: Request for Two Special ADT Tours of 2 Years Each.
44. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), p. 75 and Vol II (S-CCO/NOFORN/LIMDIS), Tabs 17, 18.
45. AHR, DCSLOG, HQ INSCOM, FY78 (S-CCO), Chap III; Msg fm CDRINSCOM to DIRNSA, DTG 131830Z Apr 78, subj: Possible Resumption of Operations at

(b)(3):P.L. 86-36;(b) (1) Per NSA

46. AHR, DCSOPS, HQ INSCOM, FY78, Vol I (TS-CCO/NOFORN), pp. 204-206; Report on Fatal Crash of TUSLOG Det 4 U-21A.

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APPENDIX A

USA INSCOM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
(As of 30 September 1978)

<u>UIC</u>	<u>Unit Designation</u>	<u>Location</u>
WO0YAA W31ZAA	HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND Hq, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Meade	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia Fort George G. Meade, Maryland Arlington, Virginia
W000AA W001AA	US Army Garrison, Arlington Hall Station USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (SIGINT/EW)	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W002AA W01CAA	US Army Element, National Security Agency USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Fort Dix	Fort Dix, New Jersey
W01DAA W01EAA	USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Fort Jackson USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Fort Leonard Wood	Fort Jackson, South Carolina Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri
W01HAA W01KAA	US Army Garrison, Vint Hill Farms Station US Army Field Station, Homestead	Warrenton, Virginia Homestead Air Force Base, Homestead, Florida
W02BAA W02RAA	US Army Field Station, Okinawa US Army Field Station, Berlin	Sobe, Okinawa, Japan Berlin, Germany
W0DRAA W0KLAA	US Army Field Station, Sinop Classified Unit	Sinop, Turkey
W1U3AA W372AA	US Army Administrative Survey Detachment US Army Foreign Area Officers Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland Fort George G. Meade, Maryland Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W3AGAA W3BRAA	US Army Field Station, Augsburg US Army Field Station, Misawa	Augsburg, Germany Misawa, Japan
W3CCAA W3NBAA	USA INSCOM Data Systems Activity US Army Technical Support Activity	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
W3NSAA W3QNAA	USA INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii US Army Cryptologic Support Group	Fort Shafter, Hawaii Heidelberg, Germany
W3RAAA W3YDAA	USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, Pacific US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center	Fort Shafter, Hawaii Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
W31UAA	US Army Field Station, San Antonio	San Antonio, Texas

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APPENDIX A

<u>UIC</u>	<u>Unit Designation</u>	<u>Location</u>
	HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND	
W32BAA	US Army Central Security Facility	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W35GAA	USA INSCOM Finance and Accounting Activity	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
W36SAA	USA INSCOM Engineering and Maintenance Assistance Activity	Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia
W39CAA	US Army Special Operations Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W318AA	USA INSCOM Ft Meade Hq Support Detachment	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W319AA	US Army Operational Group	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
WBU6AA	902d Military Intelligence Group	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
WBU699	Augmentation, 902d Military Intelligence Group	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W005AA	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence Detachment, Pentagon	Pentagon, Washington, D. C.
W009AA	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Ft Houston	Fort Sam Houston, Texas
W01AAA	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Presidio of San Francisco	Presidio of San Francisco, California
W01BAA	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence Detachment, Defense Nuclear Agency	Alexandria, Virginia
W3S2AA	USA INSCOM Security Support Detachment, Ft Meade	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
W32AAA	USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Ft Meade	Fort George G. Meade, Maryland
WBU7AA	66th Military Intelligence Group	Munich, Germany
WBU799	Augmentation, 66th Military Intelligence Group	Munich, Germany
WGNTAA	18th Military Intelligence Battalion	Munich, Germany
WBNVAA	5th Military Intelligence Company	Munich, Germany
WBVHAA	HHC, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion	Frankfurt, Germany
WBVKAA	HHC, 511th Military Intelligence Battalion	Nurnberg Furth, Germany
WBVLAA	HHC, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion	Kaiserslautern, Germany
WBWKAA	430th Military Intelligence Detachment	Munich, Germany
WBWVAA	766th Military Intelligence Detachment	Berlin, Germany

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<u>UIC</u>	<u>Unit Designation</u>	<u>Location</u>
	HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND	
WBU8AA	470th Military Intelligence Group	Fort Amador, Canal Zone
WBU899	Augmentation, 470th Military Intelligence Group	Fort Amador, Canal Zone
W3CUAA	USA INSCOM Detachment, Southern Command	Fort Amador, Canal Zone
WBU9AA	500th Military Intelligence Group	Camp Zama, Japan
WBU999	Augmentation, 500th Military Intelligence Group	Camp Zama, Japan
WH6AAA	HHC, 501st Military Intelligence Group	Yongsan, Korea
WH6A99	Augmentation, 501st Military Intelligence Group	Yongsan, Korea
WBWFAA	209th Military Intelligence Detachment	Yongsan, Korea
WBWF99	Augmentation, 209th Military Intelligence Detachment	Yongsan, Korea
W33YAA	USASA Security Detachment, Korea	Yongsan, Korea
W3F1AA	US Army Field Station, Korea	Uijongbu, Korea
WDLPA A	146th ASA Company (Aviation)(Forward)	Pyong Taek, Korea
WEDVAA	332d ASA Company, Operations (Forward)	Taegu, Korea
WGQ4AA	704th Military Intelligence Detachment	Pyong Taek, Korea
W4ASAA	US Army Combined Research Detachment	Seoul, Korea
WGTX90	641st Military Intelligence Detachment (Collection) Augmentation (Carrier)	Yongsan, Korea Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

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APPENDIX B

TOE UNITS

(As of 30 September 1978)

WBU7	66th Military Intelligence Group
WBU8	470th Military Intelligence Group
WBU9	500th Military Intelligence Group
WH6A	Hq & Hq Company, 501st Military Intelligence Group
WBU6	902d Military Intelligence Group
WGNT	18th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVH	Hq & Hq Company, 165th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVK	Hq & Hq Company, 511th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVL	Hq & Hq Company, 527th Military Intelligence Battalion
WBVN	5th Military Intelligence Company
WDLP	146th Army Security Agency Company (Aviation)(Forward)
WEDV	332d Army Security Agency Company, Operations (Forward)
WBWF	209th Military Intelligence Detachment
WBWK	430th Military Intelligence Detachment
WGQ4	704th Military Intelligence Detachment
WBWV	766th Military Intelligence Detachment

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APPENDIX C

CHANGES IN STATUS OF TOE UNITS

ACTIVATED

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority*</u>
WBWF 209th Military Intelligence Detachment	1 Jan 78	PO 62-1, 26 Aug 77
WH6A HHC, 501st Military Intelligence Group	1 Jan 78	PO 62-1, 26 Aug 77

REASSIGNED

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority</u>
66th Military Intelligence Group From: USAINTA To: HQ INSCOM	1 Oct 77	PO 70-3, 27 Sep 77
470th Military Intelligence Group From: USAINTA To: HQ INSCOM	1 Oct 77	PO 70-3, 27 Sep 77
500th Military Intelligence Group From: USAINTA To: HQ INSCOM	1 Oct 77	PO 70-3, 27 Sep 77
525th Military Intelligence Group From: USAINTA To: HQ INSCOM	1 Oct 77	PO 70-3, 27 Sep 77
901st Military Intelligence Detachment From: USAINTA To: HQ INSCOM	1 Oct 77	PO 70-3, 27 Sep 77

INACTIVATED

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority</u>
WBVE HHC, 502d Military Intelligence Battalion	1 Jan 78	PO 73-3, 7 Oct 77
Companies A, B, C, 502d Military Intelligence Battalion	1 Jan 78	PO 17-1, 22 Mar 78
WBUY HHC, 525th Military Intelligence Group	1 Jan 78	PO 12-1, 24 Feb 78
WCWN 901st Military Intelligence Detachment	1 Jan 78	PO 12-1, 24 Feb 78

*All Permanent Orders are from HQ INSCOM.

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APPENDIX D

TDA UNITS

(As of 30 September 1978)

W00Y Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command
W000 US Army Garrison, Arlington Hall Station
W001 USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (SIGINT/EW)
W002 US Army Element, National Security Agency
W005 USA INSCOM Counterintelligence Detachment, Pentagon
W009 USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support
Battalion, Ft Houston
W01A USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support
Battalion, Presidio of San Francisco
W01B USA INSCOM Counterintelligence Detachment, Defense Nuclear Agency
W01C USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Ft Dix
W01D USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Ft Jackson
W01E USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Ft Leonard Wood
W01H US Army Garrison, Vint Hill Farms Station
W01K US Army Field Station, Homestead
W02B US Army Field Station, Okinawa
W02R US Army Field Station, Berlin
W0DR US Army Field Station, Sinop
WOKL Classified Unit
W1U3 US Army Administrative Survey Detachment
W31U US Army Field Station, San Antonio
W31Z Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Ft Meade
W32A USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support
Battalion, Ft Meade
W32B US Army Central Security Facility
W33Y USASA Security Detachment, Korea
W35G USA INSCOM Finance and Accounting Activity
W36S USA INSCOM Engineering and Maintenance Assistance Activity
W39C US Army Special Operations Detachment
W318 USA INSCOM Ft Meade Hq Support Detachment
W319 US Army Operational Group
W372 US Army Foreign Area Officers Detachment
W3AG US Army Field Station, Augsburg
W3BR US Army Field Station, Misawa
W3CC USA INSCOM Data Systems Activity
W3CU USA INSCOM Detachment, Southern Command
W3F1 US Army Field Station, Korea
W3NB US Army Technical Support Activity
W3NS USA INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii
W3QN US Army Cryptologic Support Group
W3RA USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, Pacific
W3S2 USA INSCOM Security Support Detachment, Ft Meade
W3YD US Army Intelligence Threat and Analysis Center

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APPENDIX D

W4AS US Army Combined Research Detachment
WBU699 Augmentation, 902d Military Intelligence Group
WBU799 Augmentation, 66th Military Intelligence Group
WBU899 Augmentation, 470th Military Intelligence Group
WBU999 Augmentation, 500th Military Intelligence Group
WBWF99 Augmentation, 209th Military Intelligence Detachment
WH6A99 Augmentation, 501st Military Intelligence Group
WGTX90 641st Military Intelligence Detachment (Collection) Augmentation
(Carrier)

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APPENDIX E
CHANGES IN STATUS OF TDA UNITS

ORGANIZED

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority</u>
WH6A99 Augmentation, 501st Military Intelligence Group	1 Jan 78	PO 62-1, 26 Aug 77
WBWF99 Augmentation, 209th Military Intelligence Detachment	1 Jan 78	PO 62-1, 26 Aug 77
W4ASAA US Army Combined Research Detachment	1 Nov 77	PO 73-3, 7 Oct 77
WGTX90 641st Military Intelligence Detachment (Collection) Augmentation (Carrier)	16 Sep 78	PO 60-1, 14 Sep 78

REASSIGNED

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority</u>
US Army Administrative Survey Detachment From: USAINTA To: HQ INSCOM	1 Oct 77	PO 70-3, 27 Sep 77
US Army Operational Security Group From: USAINTA To: HQ INSCOM From: HQ INSCOM To: 902d Military Intelligence Group	1 Oct 77 1 Oct 77 1 Jan 78	PO 70-3, 27 Sep 77 PO 70-3, 27 Sep 77 PO 12-1, 24 Feb 78
US Army Central Security Facility From: USAINTA To: HQ INSCOM	1 Oct 77	PO 70-3, 27 Sep 77
US Army Special Operations Detachment From: USAINTA To: HQ INSCOM	1 Oct 77	PO 70-3, 27 Sep 77
US Army Intelligence Agency Hq Support Detachment From: USAINTA To: HQ INSCOM	1 Oct 77	PO 70-3, 27 Sep 77
US Army Operational Group From: USAINTA To: HQ INSCOM	1 Oct 77	PO 70-3, 27 Sep 77
Classified Unit From: USAINTA To: HQ INSCOM	1 Oct 77	PO 70-3, 27 Sep 77

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APPENDIX E

REASSIGNED (Continued)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority</u>
US Army Field Station, Korea From: 501st MI Group Augmentation (Carrier) To: 501st MI Group	1 Jan 78	PO 62-1, 26 Aug 77
US Army Security Agency Security Detachment, Korea From: 209th MI Detachment Augmentation (Carrier) To: 209th MI Detachment	1 Jan 78	PO 62-1, 26 Aug 77
USA INSCOM Security Support Detachment, Ft Meade From: HQ INSCOM To: 902d MI Group	1 Jan 78	PO 12-1, 24 Feb 78
USA INSCOM Counterintelligence Detachment, Defense Nuclear Agency From: HQ INSCOM To: 902d MI Group	1 Jan 78	PO 12-1, 24 Feb 78
USA INSCOM Counterintelligence Detachment, Pentagon From: HQ INSCOM To: 902d MI Group	1 Jan 78	PO 12-1, 24 Feb 78
US Army Combined Research Detachment From: 501st MI Group Augmentation (Carrier) To: 501st MI Group	1 Jan 78	PO 73-3, 7 Oct 77
USA INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii From: US Army Signal Security Activity To: HQ INSCOM	1 Nov 77	PO 82-1, 7 Nov 77

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APPENDIX E

REDESIGNATED

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority</u>
Old: US Army Intelligence Agency New: Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Meade	1 Oct 77	PO 69-1, 26 Sep 77
Old: US Army Intelligence Agency Headquarters Support Detachment New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Ft Meade Hq Support Detachment	1 Oct 77	PO 85-1, 16 Nov 77
Old: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Liaison Detachment, US Army, Europe New: US Army Cryptologic Support Group	1 Oct 77	PO 85-1, 16 Nov 77
Old: US Army Security Detachment, Hawaii New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Detachment, Hawaii	1 Nov 77	PO 82-1, 7 Nov 77
Old: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Support Group New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command CONUS Military Intelligence Group (SIGINT/EW)	1 Nov 77	PO 90-3, 5 Dec 77
Old: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Liaison Detachment, TRADOC New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Counterintelligence Detachment, Defense Nuclear Agency	1 Jan 78	PO 12-1, 24 Feb 78
Old: US Army Signal Security Activity New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Security Support Detachment, Ft Meade	1 Jan 78	PO 12-1, 24 Feb 78
Old: US Army Security Detachment-Region I New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Counterintelligence Detachment, Pentagon	1 Jan 78	PO 12-1, 24 Feb 78
Old: US Army Security Detachment-Region III New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Ft Houston	1 Jan 78	PO 12-1, 24 Feb 78

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APPENDIX E

REDESIGNATED (Continued)

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority</u>
Old: US Army Security Detachment-Region IV New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Presidio of San Francisco	1 Jan 78	PO 12-1, 24 Feb 78
Old: US Army Operational Security Group New: US Army Intelligence and Security Command Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Ft Meade	1 Jan 78	PO 12-1, 24 Feb 78
Old: US Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment New: US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center	1 Jan 78	PO 15-2, 20 Mar 78

TRANSFERRED

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority</u>
US Army Security Agency Test and Evaluation Center TRANSFERRED from HQ INSCOM to: DARCOM	1 Oct 77	PO 68-1, 23 Sep 77

RELOCATED

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority</u>
USA INSCOM Counterintelligence Detachment, Defense Nuclear Agency, Ft Monroe, Va RELOCATED to: Ft George G. Meade, Md	1 Jan 78	PO 12-1, 24 Feb 78
USA INSCOM Security Support Detachment, Ft Meade, Warrenton, Va RELOCATED to: Ft George G. Meade, Md	1 Jan 78	PO 12-1, 24 Feb 78
US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, Washington, DC RELOCATED to: Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Va	1 Jan 78	PO 15-2, 20 Mar 78

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APPENDIX E

DISCONTINUED

<u>Unit</u>		<u>Eff Date</u>	<u>Authority</u>
W3PU	USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, FORSCOM	1 Jan 78	PO 12-1, 24 Feb 78
W3TL	US Army Intelligence Support Detachment	1 Jan 78	PO 15-2, 20 Mar 78
W3YS	US Army Intelligence Operations Support Detachment	1 Jan 78	PO 15-2, 20 Mar 78
W003	USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, NSA/CSS	30 Apr 78	PO 36-1, 13 Jun 78
W00X	US Army Imagery Interpretation Center	1 Jan 78	PO 15-2, 20 Mar 78
WH6A90	HHC, 501st Military Intelligence Group Augmentation (Carrier)	1 Jan 78	PO 62-1, 26 Aug 77
WBWF90	209th Military Intelligence Detachment Augmentation (Carrier)	1 Jan 78	PO 62-1, 26 Aug 77
WBUY99	Augmentation, 525th Military Intelligence Group	1 Jan 78	PO 12-1, 24 Feb 78
W1WN	USA INSCOM Intelligence Group	1 Jan 78	PO 15-2, 20 Mar 78
WBVE99	Augmentation, 502d Military Intelligence Battalion	1 Jan 78	PO 73-3, 7 Oct 77
WCWN99	Augmentation, 901st Military Detachment	1 Jan 78	PO 12-1, 24 Feb 78

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APPENDIX F

USA INSCOM PERSONNEL STRENGTH BY UNIT
(As of 30 September 1978)

Unit	OFF		WO		ENL		MIL TOTAL		DH CIV	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
HQ, US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)	134	95	13	7	81	64	228	166	253	210
HQ, US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Fort Meade	43	37	9	11	52	54	104	102	98	90
USA INSCOM, Ft Meade Hq Support Detachment	5	4	1	1	6	13	12	18	12	14
USAG, Arlington Hall Station	15	14	2	2	179	204	196	220	54	43
US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center	91	75	25	17	126	104	242	196	185	163
USA INSCOM CONUS Military Intelligence Group (SIGINT/EW)	128	107	38	39	1008	821	1174	967	11	4
USA Element, NSA	16	13	0	0	0	0	16	13	0	0
USA Central Security Facility	10	3	2	0	24	7	36	10	73	95
USA Special Operations Detachment	9	4	12	10	29	15	50	29	6	6
USA Administrative Survey Detachment	38	38	27	26	37	42	102	106	271	260
Classified Unit (WOKL)	1	1	0	0	5	6	6	7	10	9
USA Operational Group	45	39	13	17	31	26	89	82	3	4
USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Ft Dix	1	1	0	0	28	31	29	32	0	0
USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Ft Jackson	1	1	0	0	30	35	31	36	0	0
USA INSCOM Personnel Detachment, Ft Leonard Wood	1	1	0	0	26	28	27	29	0	0
USAG, Vint Hill Farms Station	16	14	2	0	139	130	157	144	92	77
USA Field Station, Homestead	1	1	0	0	18	9	19	10	0	0
USA Field Station, San Antonio	13	11	7	6	442	344	462	361	5	3
USA INSCOM Data Systems Activity	3	7	1	2	54	56	58	65	44	35
USA INSCOM Finance and Accounting Activity	1	1	0	0	19	15	20	16	19	15

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APPENDIX F

Unit	OFF		WO		ENL		MIL TOTAL		DH CIV	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
USA INSCOM Engineering and Maintenance Assistance Activity	2	2	2	2	66	65	70	69	10	7
902d Military Intelligence Group w/Augmentation	11	9	4	4	19	13	34	26	9	9
USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and SIGSEC Support Battalion, Ft Meade	36	25	35	27	87	74	158	126	6	4
USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and SIGSEC Support Battalion, Presidio of San Francisco	22	13	24	21	45	51	91	85	2	1
USA INSCOM Counterintelligence and SIGSEC Support Battalion, Ft Houston	22	16	16	14	59	47	97	77	1	1
USA INSCOM Counterintelligence Detachment, Pentagon	10	8	16	12	46	36	72	56	0	0
USA INSCOM Counterintelligence Detachment, Defense Nuclear Agency	3	3	5	4	7	8	15	15	2	2
USA INSCOM Security Support Detachment, Ft Meade	21	16	16	20	42	39	79	75	31	21
641st Military Intelligence Detachment (Collection) Aug (Carrier)	19	0	15	0	39	0	73	0	0	0
SUBTOTAL CONUS	(718)	(559)	(285)	(242)	(2744)	(2337)	(3747)	(3138)	(1197)	(1073)
470th Military Intelligence Group w/Augmentation	11	13	2	4	41	75	54	92	4	6
USA INSCOM Detachment, Southern Command	2	*	0	*	36	*	38	*	0	*
SUBTOTAL CARIBBEAN	(13)	(13)	(2)	(4)	(77)	(75)	(92)	(92)	(4)	(6)

*Assigned included within 470th MI Group total.

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APPENDIX F

Unit	OFF		WO		ENL		MIL TOTAL		DH CIV	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
USA Cryptologic Support Group	2	2	4	3	11	11	17	16	0	0
USA Field Station, Berlin	31	32	19	19	755	770	805	821	9	8
USA Field Station, Augsburg	67	64	33	35	1638	1510	1738	1609	12	11
66th Military Intelligence Group w/Augmentation	29	33	11	14	169	180	209	227	130	118
5th Military Intelligence Company	4	4	3	3	46	30	53	37	0	0
18th Military Intelligence Battalion	10	12	11	8	101	117	122	137	0	0
165th Military Intelligence Battalion	9	11	6	4	73	62	88	77	0	0
511th Military Intelligence Battalion	9	15	6	5	73	62	88	82	0	0
430th Military Intelligence Detachment	14	12	15	14	30	29	59	55	0	0
527th Military Intelligence Battalion	10	12	6	5	71	64	87	81	0	0
766th Military Intelligence Detachment	5	7	2	2	17	29	24	38	0	0
USA Field Station, Sinop	17	16	3	4	73	76	93	96	0	0
SUBTOTAL EUROPE	(207)	(220)	(119)	(116)	(3057)	(2940)	(3383)	(3276)	(151)	(137)
USA INSCOM Detachment, Hawaii	6	7	2	2	26	26	34	35	0	0
USA INSCOM Liaison Detachment, Pacific	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	2
USA Field Station, Okinawa	22	21	5	6	667	634	694	661	0	0
USA Field Station, Misawa	3	3	1	1	140	159	144	163	0	0
500th Military Intelligence Group w/Augmentation	18	14	16	14	86	75	120	103	57	56
501st Military Intelligence Group w/Augmentation	23	25	3	6	153	139	179	170	1	1
209th Military Intelligence Detach- ment	7	6	5	6	99	75	111	87	0	0
USA Combined Research Detachment	6	3	1	2	8	8	15	13	0	0
USA Field Station, Korea	12	14	8	9	265	238	285	261	1	1
USASA Security Detachment, Korea	1	1	0	0	8	8	9	9	0	0

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APPENDIX F

Unit	OFF		WO		ENL		MIL TOTAL		DH CIV	
	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd	Auth	Asgd
146th Army Security Agency Company	5	4	14	15	126	111	145	130	0	0
332d Army Security Agency Company, Operations	7	5	3	2	241	226	251	233	0	0
704th Military Intelligence Detach- ment	2	2	6	8	75	66	83	76	0	0
SUBTOTAL PACIFIC	(113)	(105)	(64)	(71)	(1894)	(1765)	(2071)	(1941)	(61)	(60)
USA Technical Support Activity (Worldwide)	7	2	2	2	35	12	44	16	4	4
GRAND TOTAL	<u>1058</u>	<u>899</u>	<u>472</u>	<u>435</u>	<u>7807</u>	<u>7129</u>	<u>9337</u>	<u>8463</u>	<u>1417*</u>	<u>1280*</u>

*Does not include Wage Board and Foreign Nationals (FN). The 30 Sep 78 totals for Wage Board worldwide was 164; for FN (direct hire) 101; and for FN (indirect hire) 392.

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Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

APPENDIX G
USA INSCOM KEY PERSONNEL

<u>Position/Name</u>	<u>Dates Served</u>
COMMANDING GENERAL MG William I. Rolya	1 Sep 75 - Present
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, INTELLIGENCE BG James E. Freeze	1 Sep 75 - Present
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL, SECURITY AND PRODUCTION BG John A. Smith, Jr.	15 May 78 - Present
COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR CSM Lee K. Stikeleather	30 Nov 72 - Present
CHIEF OF STAFF COL John M. Carr	1 Aug 77 - Present
CHIEF OF STAFF (FGGM) COL Albert W. Hamel	1 Oct 77 - 16 Jan 78
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF LTC Donald York COL Rodney K. Roberts	21 Aug 78 - Present 15 Oct 76 - 20 Aug 78
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF (FGGM) COL Albert W. Hamel	16 Jan 78 - 31 Jul 78
SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF MAJ John H. Prokopowicz MAJ Dale E. Duncan MAJ Paul D. Sutton	7 Jul 78 - Present 1 Mar 78 - 7 Jul 78 17 Jan 77 - 1 Mar 78
SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF (FGGM) 1LT R. G. Hiler MAJ R. S. Green	1 Apr 78 - 11 Aug 78 16 Jan 78 - 1 Apr 78
INSPECTOR GENERAL COL Robert A. Hyatt	1 Sep 77 - Present
STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE LTC Raymond K. Wicker	1 Sep 75 - Present

APPENDIX G

<u>Position/Name</u>	<u>Dates Served</u>
COMMAND CHAPLAIN COL Richard W. Mansur	1 Apr 78 - Present
STAFF ADVISOR FOR SCIENTIFIC AND CRYPTO AFFAIRS Mr. Edwin A. Speakman	12 Aug 68 - Present
SPECIAL DISBURSING OFFICER Mr. Autmer Ackley	10 Jul 78 - Present
CHIEF, PLANS, PROGRAM AND ANALYSIS COL Alan Stern COL James W. Shufelt	10 Jul 78 - Present 1 Aug 77 - 10 Jul 78
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, PERSONNEL COL Richard E. Jewett	12 Jul 77 - Present
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, SECURITY COL William B. Holden	10 Jun 74 - 31 Oct 77
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS Mr. Jimmie B. Garrett (Acting) COL John L. Heiss III COL Francis X. Lillis	18 Sep 78 - Present 3 Jan 78 - 18 Sep 78 1 Nov 76 - 3 Jan 78
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, LOGISTICS COL Harold D. Yawberg LTC Charles E. DeShields (Acting) COL Jimmie M. Chaffin	14 Jul 78 - Present 25 May 78 - 13 Jul 78 1 Jun 73 - 24 May 78
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT COL Lawrence H. Whitt COL Dwyer K. Mitchum	1 Feb 78 - Present 1 Dec 76 - 1 Feb 78
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, SYSTEMS Mr. George A. Harvey, Jr. (Acting)	3 Jan 78 - Present
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COL Richard L. Cary Mr. William Stefen LTC Jimmy R. Harris	18 Sep 78 - Present 30 Jun 78 - 18 Sep 78 31 Aug 77 - 30 Jun 78
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS COL Albert F. P. Jones LTC Robert R. Sieck (Acting)	3 Oct 77 - Present 1 Mar 77 - 3 Oct 77

APPENDIX G

<u>Position/Name</u>	<u>Dates Served</u>
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, TELECOMMUNICATIONS COL Clarence A. Trowbridge	28 Jun 77 - Present
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING COL Daniel Moore, Jr.	1 Aug 76 - Present
 <u>Unit/Commander</u>	
HQ US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND, FORT MEADE BG James E. Freeze	29 Aug 77 - Present
66TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP COL Charles F. Scanlon COL Norman S. Wells	2 Aug 78 - Present Aug 76 - 2 Aug 78
470TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP LTC Thomas N. Sherburne	9 Jun 77 - Present
500TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP COL Roy M. Strom COL Howard M. Gabbert	24 Jul 78 - Present 16 May 75 - 14 Jul 78
HHC, 501ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP COL Julius Parker, Jr.	26 Jul 77 - Present
HHC, 525TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP LTC Russell E. Cooley	6 Jul 77 - 1 Jan 78
902D MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP COL Richard E. Littlefield	4 Aug 77 - Present
USA INSCOM CONUS MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP (SIGINT/EW) COL Joseph D. Howard	13 Jul 76 - Present
USA INSCOM INTELLIGENCE GROUP COL Chester L. Arnzen	1 Aug 77 - 1 Jan 78
US ARMY OPERATIONAL GROUP COL Frederick T. Barrett	13 Sep 76 - Present
US ARMY CRYPTOLOGIC SUPPORT GROUP LTC Sigmund J. Haber	1 Oct 77 - Present

APPENDIX G

<u>Unit/Commander</u>	<u>Dates Served</u>
US ARMY FIELD STATION, AUGSBURG COL James W. Hunt COL Thomas J. Flynn	23 Jun 78 - Present 19 Jun 76 - 23 Jun 78
US ARMY FIELD STATION, BERLIN COL Charles B. Eichelberger COL Dallas C. Brown, Jr.	6 Jun 78 - Present 4 Aug 77 - 6 Jun 78
US ARMY FIELD STATION, HOMESTEAD CPT Bruce Jackson	1 Jul 75 - Present
US ARMY FIELD STATION, KOREA LTC William B. Guild MAJ Donald J. Seaborn LTC Michael M. Schneider	26 Jun 78 - Present 26 May 78 - 26 Jun 78 7 Jun 77 - 26 May 78
US ARMY FIELD STATION, MISAWA LTC Thomas J. Hogan	15 Jul 77 - Present
US ARMY FIELD STATION, OKINAWA COL Charles E. Schmidt	25 Aug 77 - Present
US ARMY FIELD STATION, SAN ANTONIO LTC Donald W. Steiger LTC Jack H. Holbrook	15 Mar 78 - Present 9 Jul 76 - 14 Mar 78
US ARMY FIELD STATION, SINOP COL James D. Neighbors COL James D. Canfield	31 Aug 78 - Present 17 Sep 77 - 30 Aug 78
18TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION LTC Roy J. Davis LTC Michael E. Grant	2 Aug 78 - Present 30 Aug 76 - 2 Aug 78
HHC, 165TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION LTC Bruce H. Davis	3 Jan 77 - Present
HHC, 511TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION LTC Arthur L. Henderson MAJ Carl M. Jordan (Acting) LTC Anthony J. Gallo, Jr.	13 Jul 78 - Present 17 Jun 78 - 13 Jul 78 Jan 77 - 17 Jun 78

APPENDIX G

Unit/Commander

Dates Served

HHC, 527TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION LTC Nicholas F. Quintarelli LTC Nelson B. Bond	28 Jun 78 - Present 2 Feb 77 - 28 Jun 78
USA INSCOM COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SIGNAL SECURITY SUPPORT BATTALION, FT MEADE MAJ William J. Foley MAJ Francis J. Adamouski LTC Donald P. Press	18 Sep 78 - Present 19 Aug 78 - 18 Sep 78 1 Oct 76 - 19 Aug 78
USA INSCOM COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SIGNAL SECURITY SUPPORT BATTALION, FT SAM HOUSTON LTC Robert M. Weikle	1 Jan 78 - Present
USA INSCOM COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SIGNAL SECURITY SUPPORT BATTALION, PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO LTC Russell E. Cooley	1 Jan 78 - Present
5TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMPANY CPT Alverne C. Mueller	1 Oct 77 - Present
146TH ARMY SECURITY AGENCY COMPANY (AVN)(FWD) MAJ Harry E. Cryblskey MAJ James M. Coughlin	1 Dec 77 - Present 31 Mar 77 - 1 Dec 77
332D ARMY SECURITY AGENCY COMPANY, OPERATIONS (FWD) CPT Danny W. Braudrick CPT Lane E. Thames CPT Eric W. Hawkins	8 Jun 78 - Present 5 Dec 77 - 8 Jun 78 15 May 77 - 5 Dec 77
209TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT MAJ Howard W. Moore, Jr. LTC William R. Gegner	May 78 - Present Oct 77 - May 78
430TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT LTC Robert G. Lunt	24 Jun 77 - Present
704TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT CPT Mark L. Kogle CPT William T. Brown III	15 Jul 78 - Present 1 Oct 77 - 15 Jul 78
766TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT LTC James L. Ford	1 Oct 77 - Present

APPENDIX G

<u>Unit/Commander</u>	<u>Dates Served</u>
901ST MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DETACHMENT LTC Bruce A. Phinney	27 Jan 77 - 30 Sep 77
USA INSCOM CI DETACHMENT, PENTAGON LTC Joaquim D. Martins LTC Donald York	16 Aug 78 - Present 1 Jul 76 - 15 Aug 78
US ARMY COMBINED RESEARCH DETACHMENT LTC David E. Crew	18 Dec 76 - Present
USA INSCOM CI DETACHMENT, DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY LTC John L. Bohach, Jr. MAJ Thomas R. Johnson (Acting) LTC Bruce A. Phinney	7 Aug 78 - Present 16 Jun 78 - 6 Aug 78 1 Jan 78 - 15 Jun 78
US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS CENTER COL Albert F. P. Jones BG James E. Freeze	3 Oct 77 - Present 1 Oct 77 - 3 Oct 77
US ARMY IMAGERY INTERPRETATION CENTER LTC Marion Pinckney LTC Hayden B. Peake	30 Dec 77 - 1 Jan 78 Aug 75 - 29 Dec 77
USA INSCOM DATA SYSTEMS ACTIVITY COL Daniel Moore, Jr. MAJ Richard R. Mercer	10 Jan 78 - Present 1 Jul 77 - 9 Jan 78
US ARMY CENTRAL SECURITY FACILITY LTC Charles T. Grimes LTC Arland R. Mitchell LTC Alton R. Westrick LTC William E. Pearce	11 Sep 78 - Present 17 Jul 78 - 10 Sep 78 17 Jun 78 - 16 Jul 78 19 Sep 77 - 16 Jun 78
US ARMY SIGNAL SECURITY ACTIVITY LTC Horace S. Kelley, Jr.	18 Aug 75 - 1 Jan 78
US ARMY TECHNICAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY LTC Richard T. Kane	18 Jul 77 - Present
US ARMY GARRISON, ARLINGTON HALL STATION LTC Francis V. Varallo LTC Jimmie R. Eckard LTC James D. Neighbors	1 Jul 78 - Present 15 May 78 - 1 Jul 78 29 Dec 76 - 15 May 78

APPENDIX G

Unit/Commander

Dates Served

US ARMY GARRISON, VINT HILL FARMS STATION
COL John P. Brown
COL Richard H. Benfer

12 May 78 - Present
3 Jan 77 - 11 May 78

APPENDIX J

TRAVIS TROPHY WINNERS

<u>Calendar Year</u>	<u>Winner</u>
1964	6988th US Air Force Security Squadron [USASA NOMINEE: 53d USASA Special Operations Command]
1965	313th ASA Battalion (Corps)
1966	1st Radio Company Fleet Marine Force (C) [USASA NOMINEE: USASA Training Center and School]
1967	509th USASA Group
1968	6990th US Air Force Security Squadron [USASA NOMINEE: USASA, Europe]
1969	6994th US Air Force Security Squadron [USASA NOMINEE: 330th ASA Company]
1970	USASA Field Station, Udorn
1971	US Naval Security Group Activity, Bremerhaven, Germany [USASA NOMINEE: USASA Field Station, Vint Hill Farms]
1972	6916th US Air Force Security Squadron [USASA NOMINEE: USASA Field Station, Udorn]
1973	USASA Field Station, Berlin
1974	US Naval Security Group Activity, Misawa, Japan [USASA NOMINEE: USASA Field Station, Augsburg]
1975	Consolidated Security Operations Center, San Antonio (USASA Field Station, San Antonio/6993d US Air Force Security Squadron)
1976	USASA Field Station, Sobe
1977	470th Military Intelligence Group

GLOSSARY

AAA	antiaircraft artillery
AAR	access amendment refusal
AB	air base
A/C	air-conditioning
AC	alternating current
ACC	[US] Army Communications Command
ACES	Army Continuing Education System
ACofS	Assistant Chief of Staff
acq	acquisition
ACSI	Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
act	actual
actg	acting
actv	activity
ADCLOG	Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics
ADM	Admiral
admin	administration
ADP	automatic data processing
ADT	active duty for training
AE	aerial exploitation
AF	Air Force (USAF)
AFB	Air Force Base
AFP	annual funding program
AFPDA	Army Force Planning Data and Assumption
AFRED	Air Force readiness
AFSS	[US] Air Force Security Service
AGAS	Advanced GOODKIN Acquisition System
AHR	annual historical report
AHS	Arlington Hall Station
AICP	alternate intercept collection plan
AIG	acting inspector general
AIT	advanced individual training
altn	alternative
ALTROF	alternate remote operating facility
AMHA	Army Management, Headquarters Activity
amps	amperes
anal	analysis
ann	annual
AOP	approved operating program
app	appendix
appr	approved
AR	Army regulation
ARM	antiradiation missile
ARRED	Army readiness
art	article
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program
AS	aerial surveillance

GLOSSARY

ASA	Army Security Agency
ASD (MRA&L)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics)
asgd	assigned
ASI	additional skill identifier
auth	authorized
AUTODIN	automatic digital network
avn	aviation
BASOPS	base operations
BEQ	bachelor enlisted quarters
BG	brigadier general
BITE	built-in test equipment
BMC	base maintenance contract
bn	battalion
BND	Bundesnachrichtendienst
BOS	base operations
BRISMIS	British Military Liaison Mission
CAA	Concepts Analysis Agency
C&P	control and processing
CAP	Career Advancement Program; centralized assignment procedures
CAT	category
CCF	US Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility
CCO	controlled collection objective
CCP	Consolidated Cryptologic Program
CD	combat development
CDAA	circular disposed antenna array
cdr	commander
CE	communications-electronics
CEOI	communications-electronics operating instructions
CERCOM	US Army Communications and Electronics Materiel Readiness Command
CEWI	Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence
CFV	cavalry fighting vehicle
CG	commanding general
CGG	Combined Group Germany
chan	channel
chap	chapter
CHCSS	Chief, Central Security Service
CI	counterintelligence
CI/IA	Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCUSAREUR	Commander in Chief, US Army, Europe

GLOSSARY

CINCUSOUTHCOM	Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command
civ	civilian
CIVPER	civilian personnel
CMA	Collection Management Authority
CMF	career management field
CMT	comment
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
co	company
COBE	command operating budget estimate
COF	central operating facility
CofS	Chief of Staff
COL	colonel
comd	command
COMFAC	communications facility
COMINT	communications intelligence
comm	communication(s)
COMMZ	communications zone
COMPACT	Consolidation of Military Personnel Activities at Army Installations
COMSEC	communications security
COMUSFK	Commander, US Forces, Korea
Cong	Congress
CONTIC	Continental Intelligence Command
contr	contract
CONUS	Continental United States
convl	conventional
COP	collection objective priority
COPA	Chief, Office of Public Affairs
COSAGE	computer program model
CPA	central procurement activity
CPAR	collection, processing, analysis and reporting
CPO	Civilian Personnel Office
CPPA	Chief, Plans, Programs and Analysis
CPT	captain
CPU	central processing unit
CRF	US Army Central Records Facility
CRG	Concept Review Group
CRITIC	critical intelligence
CRITICOMM	critical intelligence communications
CSA	Chief of Staff, US Army
CSC	Civil Service Commission
CSF	[US Army] Central Security Facility
CSG	cryptologic support group
CSJF	case study and justification folder
CSM	command sergeant major
CSOC	Consolidated Security Operations Center
CSS	Central Security Service

GLOSSARY

CTA common table of allowances
CULT common user land transportation
CY calendar year

DA Department of the Army
DAMI-ISS Office Symbol for SIGINT Division, OACSI
DAMPL Department of the Army Master Priority List

DAPE Office Symbol for ODCSPER, DA
DARCOM US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command
DCA Defense Cooperation Agreement; Defense Communications Agency

DCG deputy commanding general
DCG-I Deputy Commanding General, Intelligence
DCG-SP Deputy Commanding General, Security and Production
DCI Director, Counterintelligence
DCII Defense Central Index of Investigations
DCS Deputy Chief of Staff; Defense Communications System
DCSADP Deputy Chief of Staff, Automatic Data Processing
DCSCI Deputy Chief of Staff, Counterintelligence
DCSI Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence
DCSITA Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Threat Analysis
DCSLOG Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics
DCSMIS Deputy Chief of Staff, Management Information Systems
DCSOPS Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
DCSPER Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
DCSR&D Deputy Chief of Staff, Research and Development
DCSRDA Deputy Chief of Staff, Research, Development and Acquisition
DCSRM Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management
DCSS Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems
DCSSEC Deputy Chief of Staff, Security
DCSTEL Deputy Chief of Staff, Telecommunications
DDR Deputy Director for Research and Development (NSA)
det detachment
dev development
DF direction finding; Disposition Form (DA Form 2496)
DH direct hire
DHOC daily hours of coverage
DI deception indicated

DIRCI Director, Counterintelligence
DIRITA Director, Intelligence and Threat Analysis
DIRNSA Director, National Security Agency
DIROPS Director of Operations
DIS Defense Investigative Service
div division

(b)(3)
Per DIA

GLOSSARY

DLAT	Defense Language Aptitude Test
DM	deutsche mark
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DMZ	demilitarized zone
DNA	Defense Nuclear Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DS	direct support
DSA	Defense Security Agency (Korea)
DSC	divisional support company
DSE	direct support element
DSSCS	Defense Special Security Communications System
DSU	direct support unit
DT	development testing
DTG	date-time group
EAC	echelon above corps
ECI	ECI Division/E Systems Incorporated
ECOM	US Army Electronics Command
EEO	equal employment opportunity
eff	effective
ELINT	electronic intelligence
EMI	electromagnetic interference
EMRA	US Army Electronics Materiel Readiness Activity
enr	engineer
enl	enlisted
ENTNAC	Entrance National Agency Check
EO	Executive Order; equal opportunity
E-O	electro-optics
equip	equipment
ERADCOM	US Army Electronics Research and Development Command
ETS	expiration term of service
EUCOM	US European Command
EUR	Europe
EUSA	Eighth US Army
eval	evaluation
EW	electronic warfare
FAD	Funding Authorization Document
FAO	foreign area officer
FAST	Field Assistance Support Team
FAT	forward area training
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEBA	forward edge of the battle area
FGGM	Fort George G. Meade
FHMA	family housing management account

GLOSSARY

fld	field
fm	from
FM	field manual
FN	foreign national
FNIH	foreign national indirect hire
FOA	field operating agency
FOI	freedom of information
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act
FOIC	Freedom of Information Center
FORSCOM	US Army Forces Command
FORSTAT	forces status report
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FS	field station
FSA	Field Station Augsburg
FSK	frequency shift keying
FSSD	field systems support division
FSTC	Foreign Science and Technology Center
Ft	fort; feet
FTD	Foreign Technology Division
fwd	forward
FWP	Federal Women's Program
FWPM	Federal Women's Program Manager
FY	fiscal year
FYDP	Five Year Defense Program
GCHQ	Government Communications Headquarters (British)
gen	general
GHz	gigahertz
GIPD	General Intelligence Production Division
GO	general officer; general orders
GOJ	Government of Japan
GOT	Government of Turkey
gp	group
GR	GUARDRAIL
GS	General Schedule-Civilian Employees
GSFG	Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
HF	high frequency
HFDF	high frequency direction finding
HFMG	high frequency modernization group
HHC	headquarters and headquarters company
hist	historical
Hon	honorable
Hq	headquarters
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
HR	human relations

GLOSSARY

IATS	Improved AG Terminal System
IAW	in accordance with
IBM	International Business Machines
IBOP	international balance of payments
ICC	Intelligence Coordination Center
ICF	intelligence contingency funds
ICLT	in-country language training
ICR	intelligence collection requirement
IDA	initial denial authority
ident	identify
IDHS	intelligence data handling systems
IFR	instrument flight rules
IFV	infantry fighting vehicle
IG	inspector general
IGAR	inspector general action requests
IIR	Intelligence Information Reports
IMC	instrument meteorological conditions
IMINT	imagery intelligence
INSCOM	US Army Intelligence and Security Command
insp	inspected
intel	intelligence
IOC	initial operational capability
IOSS	Intelligence Organization and Stationing Study
IPF	integrated processing facility; intercept and position fixing
IPR	in-process review
IPW	prisoner of war interrogation
IR	infra-red; (DOD) Intelligence Information Report
IRA	intelligence-related activity
IRR	Intelligence Reports Repository; US Army Investigative Records Repository; Individual Ready Reserve
ISD	intelligence support detachment
ISSG	intelligence and security support group
ITAC	US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center
Jax	Jackson
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFAP	Japan Facilities Adjustment Program
JRX	joint readiness exercise
JTF	joint task force
K	thousand
KATUSA	Korean Augmentation to the US Army
km	kilometer(s)

GLOSSARY

LAA	limited access authority
LACT	large automated communications terminal
LET	live environment training
LFC	LAFITE CLEAR
LFP	LEFOX PURPLE
LFW	LAFINE WINE
LHTA	Letzlinger-Heide Training Area
LIMDIS	limited distribution
LT	lieutenant
LTC	lieutenant colonel
LTG	lieutenant general
ltr	letter
LWood	(Fort) Leonard Wood
LWR	local wage rate
M	million
MACOM	major command
MACT	medium automated communications terminal
MAFOR	military absentee in, or attempting to go to, a foreign country or embassy
maint	maintenance
MAIT	maintenance assistance and instruction team
MAJ	major
MASDR	measurement and signals development requirements
MBO	management by objectives
MCA	Military Construction, Army
MDIR	Multidiscipline Intelligence Report
MDPUP	Multidiscipline Peacetime Utilization Program
MDW	Military District of Washington
MG	major general
mgr	manager
mgt	management
MHz	megahertz
MI	military intelligence
Mil	military
MILPERCEN	US Army Military Personnel Center
MIL SPEC	military specification
MIS	Management Information System
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOBDES	mobilization designee
MOD	Ministry of Defense; model
MOS	military occupational specialty
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	military police
MPA	Military Personnel, Army
MRA&L	Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics

GLOSSARY

msg	message
Mt	mountain
MTOE	Modification Table of Organization and Equipment
NAC	National Agency Check
natl	national
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NCRJ	NSA Representative, Japan
NCW	noncodeword
NF	NOFORN
NOFORN	not releasable to foreign nationals
NSA	National Security Agency
NSACSS	National Security Agency/Central Security Service
NSG	Naval Security Group
OACSI	Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
OB	order of battle
obj	objective
OCONUS	outside continental United States
OCSA	Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
ODCI	Office, Director, Counterintelligence
ODCSADP	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Automatic Data Processing
ODCSCI	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Counterintelligence
ODCSITA	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Threat
ODCSLOG	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics
ODCSOPS	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations
ODCSPER	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
ODCSS	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems
ODCSSEC	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Security
ODCSTEL	Office, Deputy Chief of Staff, Telecommunications
OE	organizational effectiveness
OESO	organizational effectiveness staff officers
off	officer
OJCS	Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OMA	Operation and Maintenance, Army
OPA	other procurement, Army
OPCON	operational control
OPLAN	operation plan
opnl	operational
OPPA	Office, Plans, Programs and Analysis
OPREP	Operations Report
ops	operations
OPSCOMM	operations communication
OPSEC	operations security

GLOSSARY

ORR	Operational Readiness Report
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSG	Operational Security Group
OT	operational test
PA	Privacy Act
PACOM	Pacific Command
PBG	Program Budget Guidance
PCM	punched card machine
PCS	permanent change of station
PE	program element
pers	personnel
PHOTINT	photographic intelligence
PI	Philippine Islands
PO	permanent orders; Privacy Office
POL	petroleum, oils and lubricants
POM	preparation of overseas movement (units)
PRC	People's Republic of China
prod	production
prog	programmed
prov	provisional
PTR	Plans, Training and Reserve Affairs
PU	peacetime utilization
PUP	Peacetime Utilization Program
qtr/qtrly	quarter(ly)
R&D	research and development
RATEL	radio telephone
RC	Reserve Component
RCF	remote collection facility
RCP	resource change proposal
RCPAC	US Army Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center
RCS	reports control symbol
RDA	research, development and acquisition
recr	recreation
REDCOM	(US) Readiness Command
REDTRAIN	Readiness Training for US Army Intelligence Resources
reenl	reenlistments
rehab	rehabilitate(d)
reimb	reimbursable
rept	report
rev	review

GLOSSARY

RF	radio frequency
RMO	Resource Management Officer
ROF	remote operating facility
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROPG	Remote Operations Planning Group
rqr	required
RRG	Requirement Review Group
RRED	race relations/equal opportunity
SACT	small automated communications terminal
SAM	surface-to-air missile
SAO	Special Activities Office
SBI	Special Background Investigation
SCA	Service Cryptologic Agency
SCI	sensitive compartmented intelligence
SCP	system concept paper
scty	security
SDL	Signals Development Laboratory
SDO	special disbursing officer
SE	subelement
SF	San Francisco
SGS	Secretary of the General Staff
SGT	sergeant
SI	special intelligence
SIC	security identification credentials
sig	signal
SIGAD	SIGINT Activity Designator
SIGINT	signal intelligence
SIGSEC	signal security
SIR	serious incident reporting
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SLAR	side-looking airborne radar
SOTA	SIGINT Operational Tasking Authority
SOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
SP	specialist
sp	special
spt	support
SQT	skill qualification test
sr	senior
SSC	Staff Support Cells
SSG	special security group; special study group; staff sergeant
SSL	single station locator
SSM	surface-to-surface missile
SSO	special security officer
subj	subject

GLOSSARY

subor	subordinate
sum	summary
suppl	supplement
supv	supervisor
svcs	services
SWL	US Army Signals Warfare Laboratory
sys	system
TAADS	The Army Authorization Documents System
T-Berg	Tuefelsberg
TACREPS	tactical reports
TAGO	The Adjutant General's Office
TAIC	Theater Army Intelligence Command
TAREX	target exploitation
TB	technical bulletin
TCT	tactical commanders terminal
TDA	tables of distribution and allowances
TDY	temporary duty
tel	telephone
tng	training
TOE	table(s) of organization and equipment
tot	total
TR	TRACER ROUND
TRADOC	US Army Training and Doctrine Command
trans	transportation
trf	transferred
TSA	US Army Technical Support Activity
TSARCOM	Troop Support, Aviation and Readiness Command
TUSLOG	The United States Logistics Group
tv1	travel
UFD	unintentional frequency deviation
UFR	unfinanced requirement
UHF	ultra high frequency
UK	United Kingdom
UMP	Upward Mobility Program
US	United States
USA	United States Army
USACC	US Army Communications Command
USACSF	US Army Central Security Facility
USACSG	US Army CINCPAC Support Group
USAFS	US Army Field Station
USAFSS	US Air Force Security Service
USAG	US Army Garrison
USAGO	US Army Garrison, Okinawa

