

About this Report

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Annual Performance Report (APR) for Fiscal Years (FY) 2022-2024 presents the Department's mission programs, progress summaries, performance measure results, and FY 2023 and FY 2024 targets. It also summarizes information on other key initiatives in the DHS Performance Management Framework related to the Strategic Review and our Agency Priority Goals (APG). Also included are other key management initiatives and a summary of our performance challenges and high-risk areas identified by the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The report is consolidated to incorporate our annual performance plan and annual performance report. Appendix B provides a list of the more significant DHS program evaluations conducted in FY 2022 by the GAO and DHS OIG.

For FY 2022, the Department's Performance and Accountability Reports consist of the following three reports:

- DHS Agency Financial Report | Publication date: November 15, 2022
- DHS Annual Performance Report | Publication date: March 13, 2023
- DHS Report to our Citizens (Summary of Performance and Financial Information) | Publication date: April 11, 2023

When published, all three reports will be located on our public website at:
<http://www.dhs.gov/performance-accountability>.



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Introduction

Independent program evaluations provide vital input to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as they offer insight to the performance of our programs and identify areas for improvement. These evaluations are used across the Department to look critically at how we conduct operations and to confront some of the key challenges facing the Department.

This appendix provides a list of the more significant DHS program evaluations conducted in FY 2022 by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG). For each report, the report name, report number, date issued, summary, and a link to the publicly released report are provided.

Detailed information on the findings and recommendations included GAO reports, as well as other information about the auditor, is available on GAO's website at: [U.S. Government Accountability Office \(U.S. GAO\)](#)

Detailed information on the findings and recommendations of DHS OIG reports, as well as other information about the auditor, is available on DHS OIG's website at: [Home | Office of Inspector General \(dhs.gov\)](#)



Relevant GAO and OIG Reports by DHS Component

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

GAO Reports

Title: Customs and Border Protection: Innovation Team Has Opportunities to Mature Operations and Improve Performance

Number: [GAO-22-105984](#)

Date: 9/29/2022

Summary: GAO was asked to evaluate the CBP Innovation Team—a group created in 2018 to deliver innovative technologies like surveillance drones and transform how Border Patrol agency and others conduct their work—to determine the team’s role in CBP’s overarching process for acquiring new technologies. GAO’s report presents their analysis about the extent to which CBP’s Innovation Team established a performance assessment system that reflects key practices and collaborated with stakeholders. GAO found that the team could improve its processes, to include improving guidance regarding roles and responsibilities for stakeholder coordination. GAO made three recommendations to CBP, including that the Innovation Team strengthen its performance assessments, update its guidance for collaborating with key operator groups, and document formal transition agreements. DHS concurred with these recommendations and efforts are underway to implement them.

Title: Southwest Border: CBP Oversees Short-Term Custody Standards, but Border Patrol Could Better Monitor Care of At-Risk Individuals

Number: [GAO-22-105321](#)

Date: 9/28/2022

Summary: In recent years, CPB has experienced a significant increase in the number of individuals encountered or apprehended between U.S. ports of entry along the southwest border. The 2021 House Appropriations Committee Report for DHS included a provision for GAO to review CBP processes for overseeing its personnel’s adherences to the National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention and Search (TEDS), which sets the procedures for how CBP should transport, escort, detain, and/or search individuals in short-term custody. GAO found that CBP uses various mechanisms at various levels of the agency to monitor the care of individuals in short-term custody and to help ensure that CBP personnel are adhering to TEDS. However, GAO found that there is no agency-wide mechanism to verify that agents have conducted and recorded the required checks across individual field locations. GAO recommended that CBP develop and implement just such a mechanism to monitor agency-wide compliance with welfare check requirements for certain individuals in custody. DHS concurred with this recommendation and efforts are underway to implement.

Title: COVID-19: CBP Acted to Mitigate Challenges Affecting its Trade Operations

Number: [GAO-22-105034](#)

Date: 9/19/2022

Summary: In this report, GAO reviewed general trends in U.S. international trade since the beginning of COVID-19; identified steps CBP took in response to challenges caused by the



pandemic; and determined the extent to which the pandemic had affected CBP's processing and release of import shipments and other operations at U.S. ports. GAO found that CBP took steps to maintain operations and minimize staff exposure to COVID-19, to include implementing procedures for social distancing and the use of personal protective equipment. Overall, GAO found that the pandemic had not noticeably affected the time it takes CBP to process and release imports.

Title: Facial Recognition Technology: CBP Traveler Identity Verification and Efforts to Address Privacy Issues

Number: [GAO-22-106154](#)

Date: 7/27/2022

Summary: In this report, GAO assessed the extent to which CBP has incorporated privacy principles in and assessed the accuracy of its use of facial recognition technology (FRT) at air, sea, and land ports of entry to create records for foreign nationals entering and exiting the U.S. As of July 2022, CBP has deployed FRT at 32 airports to biometrically confirm travelers' identities as they depart the U.S. and has deployed FRT at all airports for arriving international travelers. While CBP has taken steps to incorporate privacy principles in its program, GAO found that CBP had not consistently provided travelers with information about FRT locations, and that related signage in airports provided limited information on how travelers could opt out of FRT screening. GAO also found that while CBP has taken positive steps to help ensure air traveler information is safeguarded, opportunities exist for CBP to improve its processes for auditing other partners who have access to personally identifiable information. GAO made five recommendations to CBP regarding privacy and system performance for FRT. DHS concurred with the recommendations and has implemented two of them, with CBP leading efforts to implement the remaining three.

Title: Maritime Cargo Security: CBP Should Provide Additional Guidance for Certain Non-Containerized Cargo Inspections

Number: [GAO-22-10420](#)

Date: 6/22/2022

Summary: This GAO report examines the degree to which CBP's inspections of inbound non-containerized maritime cargo vary across select U.S. seaports. Non-containerized cargo includes goods such as liquids, grains, and those transported individually or packaged and shipped on pallets or crates. GAO reviewed nine seaports that processed crated cargo, and found that CBP applied a range of approaches to its inspections, from some seaports that use additional procedures that may address crated cargo risk, to others that adhere to CBP's minimum requirements for examining shipments flagged as high-risk. By identifying additional actions to address crated cargo risks at seaports—and by updating and standardizing guidance accordingly—GAO found that CBP could better ensure it addresses these risks while implementing national policy in a uniform manner. GAO made two recommendations to CBP to identify additional actions to address high-risk items in the non-containerized inspection process, and to update national processing guidance. DHS concurred with these two recommendations and CBP is leading implementation efforts.

**Title: Border Security: CBP Could Improve How It Categorizes Drug Seizure Data and Evaluates Training****Number:** [GAO-22-104725](#)**Date:** 5/11/2022

Summary: GAO reviewed CBP's drug seizure data and training, examining how CBP collects and categorizes drug seizure data in its systems and monitors trends in drug seizures; determining the extent to which CBP trains its officers and agents on the process for recording drug seizures; and assessing the extent to which CBP evaluates this training. As noted by GAO in its report, CBP officers and agents follow a multi-step process when seizing drugs and leverages several mechanisms to perform quality assurance efforts on drug seizure records. However, GAO found that CBP has not assessed whether the categories it uses for drug type in its various databases and reporting mechanisms adequately reflects the drug smuggling scenarios encountered by CBP officers and agents. Additionally, GAO found that CBP officers and agents are trained on the process for recording drug seizures during their academy and post-academy programs, but CBP has not evaluated its post-academy drug seizure training. GAO made three recommendations, that CBP assess the drug type categories available in its data systems, and that CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) and Border Patrol each finalize and implement a plan to regularly evaluate their post-academy drug seizure training. DHS concurred with the recommendations and CBP is leading efforts to implement them.

Title: Southwest Border: CBP Should Improve Data Collection, Reporting, and Evaluation for the Missing Migrant Program**Number:** [GAO-22-105053](#)**Date:** 4/20/2022

Summary: This GAO report reviews how the U.S. Border Patrol has implemented the Missing Migrant Program to help reduce the frequency of migrant deaths; the extent to which Border Patrol collects and reports complete and accurate data on migrant deaths; and how Border Patrol evaluates the Missing Migrant Program. As noted by GAO, the U.S. Border Patrol established the Missing Migrant Program in 2017 to help rescue migrants in distress and reduce migrant deaths along the southwest border. Border Patrol has taken significant steps to implement and continually improve this program, including releasing nationwide procedures in September 2021 and placing rescue beacons and 9-1-1 placards in remote areas. However, GAO found that Border Patrol could take additional steps to ensure that it improves how it collects and records available information on migrant deaths. Additionally, while the U.S. Border Patrol collects and reviews information at the field level about the implementation of the Missing Migrant Program, and while CBP headquarters (HQ) leverages weekly field reports to monitor and provide oversight, GAO found that CBP could benefit from a more robust evaluation of the impacts of the Missing Migrant Program. GAO made three recommendations to Border Patrol to take steps to collect and record available information on migrant deaths; include known migrant deaths and associated data limitations in future reports to the public and Congressional stakeholders; and develop a plan to evaluate the Missing Migrant Program. DHS concurred with all three recommendations and CBP is leading implementation efforts.



DHS OIG Reports

Title: U.S. Border Patrol Screened Migrants at the Southwest Border but Could Strengthen Processes

Number: [OIG-22-71](#)

Date: 9/19/2022

Summary: DHS OIG's report examines the extent to which CBP screened migrants to prevent criminals, drug traffickers, and terrorist watch list individuals from entering the United States along the Southwest Border. DHS OIG found that the U.S. Border Patrol followed its screening procedures to prevent such individuals from entering the U.S, including required record checks on migrants released into the country. However, DHS OIG found that Border Patrol did not always assign registration numbers to individuals within Border Patrol processing, which had downstream impacts on other records and data management systems. DHS OIG made two recommendations to improve the screening and overall tracking of migrants processed along the Southwest Border through implementation of a comprehensive policy. DHS concurred with both recommendations and CBP is leading efforts to implement them.

Title: U.S. Border Patrol Faces Challenges Administering Post-Apprehension Outcomes Consistently Across Sectors

Number: [OIG-22-68](#)

Date: 9/13/2022

Summary: This DHS OIG report examines how a select number of Border Patrol sectors on the Southwest border determine post-apprehension outcomes for noncitizens encountered between ports of entry. Each of the Border Patrol sectors reviewed by DHS OIG had a different ability to manage high volumes of migrants. While Border Patrol sectors on the Southwest Border receive the same guidance from HQ, DHS OIG found that consistent application of the guidance is challenged by individual sector capabilities and resources, as well as by the fluidity, irregularity, and complexity of the internal and external circumstances related to migration. As a result, DHS OIG found that many migrants during recent influxes in cross-border volumes were processed for outcomes allowing them to be released. DHS OIG made two recommendations to CBP to develop and implement guidance for Border Patrol sectors to address the expiration of Title 42 and develop and implement contingency plans for increased apprehension and processing. DHS concurred with both recommendations and CBP is leading implementation efforts.

Title: CBP Complied with Facial Recognition Policies to Identify International Travelers at Airports

Number: [OIG-22-48](#)

Date: 7/5/2022

Summary: DHS OIG assessed whether CBP complied with its agency policies and procedures when resolving facial biometric discrepancies flagged by the system. DHS OIG analyzed 100 percent of the encounter data for travelers processed between May 2019 and September 2021 and confirmed that CBP complied with all agency policies and procedures for resolving facial biometric discrepancies. Additionally, and to further strengthen its facial biometric procedures, DHS OIG found that CBP recently implemented system control to remove CBP officers' ability to override facial mismatches for travelers; enforce mandatory referrals to



secondary inspections, as appropriate; and alert CBP supervisors when a facial mismatch is flagged. DHS OIG made no recommendations in this report.

Title: CBP Needs Improved Oversight for Its Centers of Excellence and Expertise

Number: [OIG-22-34](#)

Date: 3/31/2022

Summary: This DHS OIG report reviews the extent to which the establishment of CBP's Centers of Excellence and Expertise (Centers) has improved the assessment, collection, and protection of revenue. DHS OIG found that CBP had not established performance standards for the Centers in accordance with the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA). DHS OIG also found areas in which CBP could improve its compliance with the TFTEA, its agency guidance for the Centers, and the reliability of trade import and enforcement data in its information systems. DHS OIG made five recommendations to CBP to improve oversight for its Centers of Excellence and Expertise. DHS concurred with the recommendations and CBP is leading implementation efforts.

Title: CBP Officials Implemented Rapid DNA Testing to Verify Claimed Parent-Child Relationships

Number: [OIG-22-27](#)

Date: 2/28/2022

Summary: This DHS OIG report examined the extent to which DHS is implementing Rapid DNA technology. From 2012 to 2015, S&T funded a Rapid DNA program. Two contractors developed technology to perform rapid, low-cost, DNA-based family relationship verification. Since 2015, contractors further develop Rapid DNA technology into portable machines capable of determining parent-child relationships in about 90 minutes. Beginning in May 2019, ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) began piloting Rapid DNA technology to verify claimed parent-child relationships. On September 12, 2021, CBP officials implemented Rapid DNA testing in situations in which CBP suspected a fraudulent claim of biological parent-child relationship. CBP's Rapid DNA testing program replaced ICE HSI's pilot program, which ended the same day and was the only Rapid DNA testing program in DHS. There were no recommendations in this DHS OIG report.

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD)

GAO Reports

Title: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: DHS Could Improve Its Acquisition of Key Technology and Coordination with Partners

Number: [GAO-22-104498](#)

Date: 4/19/2022

Summary: GAO was asked to assess CWMD's ability to carry out its mission and serve federal, state, and local partners. This report presents GAO's evaluation of the extent to which CWMD continues to perform the function of predecessor offices; evaluates the extent to which CWMD has coordinated with state and local partners; and describes CWMD's efforts to improve morale. One example of the functions that CWMD continues to carry forward from its



predecessor offices is a program to acquire replacements for radiation portal monitors that scan cargo at U.S. ports. The new monitors were intended to reduce nuisance alarms from naturally occurring radiation in consumer goods, improving process efficiency and effectiveness. However, the new monitors have been delayed by more than 3 years, and those being tested have displayed higher nuisance alarm rates than monitors currently in use at ports. GAO also found that state and local partners interviewed were generally satisfied with CWMD's coordination of technology acquisition but could improve in other areas such as stakeholder communication. GAO made four recommendations in its report, including that CWMD should reassess its current acquisition strategy for replacing radiation portal monitors and specify its plans for convening state and local partners. DHS concurred with the four recommendations, and CWMD efforts since—such as the release of a State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT) Engagement Strategy Implementation Plan for FY 2022-2025—has since resulted in GAO closing three of the four recommendations as implemented, with work on the fourth ongoing.

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

GAO Reports

Title: **Cyber Insurance: Action Needed to Assess Potential Federal Response to Catastrophic Attacks**

Number: [GAO-22-104256](#)

Date: 6/21/2022

Summary: This GAO report reviews the extent to which cyber risks for critical infrastructure exist; private insurance covers catastrophic cyber losses; and cognizant federal agencies have assessed a potential federal response for cyberattacks. GAO found that critical infrastructure (such as utilities, financial services, and pipelines) faces increasing cybersecurity risks, and that understanding these risks and associated vulnerabilities, threats, and impacts is essential to protecting critical infrastructure. As noted in GAO's report, the effects of cyber incidents can also spill over from the initial target to economically linked entities, magnifying damage to the economy. GAO found that cyber insurance and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program (TRIP)—the government backstop for losses from terrorism—are both limited in their ability to cover potentially catastrophic losses from systemic cyberattacks. Additionally, while CISA and the Department of the Treasury's Federal Insurance Office (FIO) have both taken steps to understand the financial implications of growing cybersecurity risks, GAO found that both have not assessed the extent to which risks to critical infrastructure from catastrophic cyber incidents and potential financial exposure warrant a federal insurance response. GAO recommended that CISA and FIO should jointly assess this issue and inform Congress of the results of their assessment. Both agencies concurred with the recommendations contained in GAO's report and implementation efforts are underway.

Title: **Critical Infrastructure Protection: CISA Should Improve Priority Setting, Stakeholder Involvement, and Threat Information Sharing**

Number: [GAO-22-104279](#)

Date: 3/1/2022

Summary: GAO was asked to examine CISA's critical infrastructure prioritization activities and reviewed the extent to which the National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program currently



identifies and prioritizes nationally significant critical infrastructure; CISA's development of the National Critical Functions (NCF) framework; and key services and information that CISA provides to mitigate critical infrastructure risks. GAO found that many CISA and infrastructure stakeholders questioned the relevance and usefulness of the National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program, and that participation in the program has been low. In 2019, CISA developed the NCF framework to better assess how failures in key systems, assets, components, and technologies may cascade across the 16 critical infrastructure sectors, but GAO found that most of the federal and nonfederal critical infrastructure stakeholders interviewed were uninvolved with, unaware of, or not understanding the goals of the framework. GAO also found that opportunities remain for CISA to improve coordination between HQ and field elements, and to improve the applicability and specificity of analysis and information products to address regional threats. GAO made six recommendations that CISA improve its process for identifying critical infrastructure priorities to better reflect current threats; seek input from states that have not provided recent updates on identifying critical infrastructure; involve stakeholders in the development of the NCF framework; document goals and strategies for the NCF framework; improve efforts to coordinate cybersecurity services; and share regionally specific threat information. DHS concurred with all six recommendations and CISA is leading implementation efforts.

Title: Critical Infrastructure Protection: Agencies Need to Assess Adoption of Cybersecurity Guidance

Number: [GAO-22-105103](#)

Date: 2/9/2022

Summary: The U.S. has 16 critical infrastructure sectors that provide clean water, banking, and other essential services. To help protect them, in 2014 the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) created cybersecurity standards and procedures that organizations within these sectors may voluntarily use. GAO found that only three of the federal agencies with a lead role in assisting and protecting one or more of the nation's critical infrastructure sectors—known as sector risk management agencies (SRMA)—have determined the extent of their sectors adoption of the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (framework). Those SRMAs that have identified or taken steps to identify sector-wide improvements from NIST framework implementation have seen increases in use of framework-recommended cybersecurity controls and improvements in cybersecurity performance metrics and information standardization. As noted in GAO's report, federal agencies have taken steps to improve capability and capacity for determining framework adoption and for identifying sector-wide improvements, such as DHS's implementation of an information network that enables sectors to share best practices. The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 included provisions for GAO to review aspects of the NIST framework and resulting implementation and has issued recommendations in prior reports that the nine SRMAs develop methods for determining the level and type of framework adoption by entities across their respective sectors and collect and report sector-wide improvements. DHS and CISA are taking steps to support implementation of GAO's interagency recommendations.



DHS OIG Reports

Title: Additional Progress Needed to Improve Information Sharing under the Cybersecurity Act of 2015

Number: [OIG-22-59](#)

Date: 8/16/2022

Summary: This DHS OIG report reviews CISA's progress in meeting the Cybersecurity Act of 2015's (Cybersecurity Act) requirements for 2019 and 2020. DHS OIG found that CISA has addressed the basic information sharing requirements of the Cybersecurity Act but has made limited progress improving the overall quality of threat information. DHS OIG reports that CISA continued to leverage its Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) capability to share cyber threat information between federal and private sectors. During the time of this review, CISA reportedly increased the number of federal participants by more than 15 percent and increased the number of non-federal participants by 13 percent. Despite this reported growth, DHS OIG found that the quality of information shared with AIS participants was not always adequate to identify and mitigate cyber threats. DHS OIG made four recommendations that CISA complete system upgrades, hire needed staff, encourage compliance with information sharing agreements, and develop a formal reporting process with quality controls. DHS concurred with all four of DHS OIG's recommendations with CISA leading implementation efforts that are currently underway.

Title: CISA Should Validate Priority Telecommunications Services Performance Data

Number: [OIG-22-15](#)

Date: 1/10/2022

Summary: DHS OIG assessed whether DHS effectively supported operable and interoperable emergency communications for federal, as well as state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) officials and critical infrastructure operators during the COVID-19 pandemic. DHS OIG found that CISA effectively ensured its Priority Telecommunications Services (PTS) program was operable early in the COVID-19 pandemic. DHS OIG also found that CISA conducted periodic tests and coordinated simulated tests of priority telecommunications services, works with service providers to mitigate technical issues, and measures performance of the overall program. However, DHS OIG found that CISA did not have an adequate process in place to validate its performance data. DHS OIG recommended that CISA establish a process to validate this data reliably. DHS concurred with the recommendation and CISA's implementation efforts are underway.

Title: DHS Needs Additional Oversight and Documentation to Ensure Progress in Joint Cybersecurity Efforts

Number: [OIG-22-06](#)

Date: 11/17/2021

Summary: DHS OIG conducted this audit to assess DHS' progress implementing the joint DHS and Department of Defense (DOD) cybersecurity efforts as required in the various Cyber Action Plans (CAP) and memorandums. DHS OIG found that DHS made some progress improving cybersecurity collaboration and coordination in accordance with the CAP and memorandums but could not easily determine whether DHS had completed all requirements outlined in the CAP and memorandums because DHS did not sufficiently document the progress of its



activities and failed to establish an implementation plan that identifies and documents milestones and other targets, completion dates and success criteria, and progress. DHS OIG made five recommendations to CISA—as the lead for the DHS cybersecurity mission—to develop and implement just such a plan, along with performance measures and improved mechanisms for stakeholder coordination and guidance standardization. DHS concurred with all five recommendations with CISA leading implementation efforts.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

GAO Reports

Title: Flood Mitigation: Actions Needed to Improve FEMA Property Acquisitions

Number: [GAO-22-104694](#) and [GAO-22-106037](#)

Date: 9/13/2022

Summary: FEMA provides funding for communities to acquire and demolish flood-prone properties from willing owners, leveraging grant programs that support local hazard mitigation projects. In this report, GAO reviews FEMA’s property acquisition efforts, including the benefits and challenges associated with these efforts, and compares FEMA’s efforts to improve acquisitions with alternative improvement options. GAO found that FEMA’s property acquisition efforts permanently eliminate structures at risk of flooding, lower disaster response costs, and can reduce financial risk to the government, but that many stakeholders cite barriers to implementation, including length of process, limited state and community capacity, and other financial challenges. In its report, GAO identified several options for improving acquisitions that could help address these challenges. Additionally, GAO recommended that Congress consider providing FEMA direction or authority to implement one or more of the options identified by GAO to address property acquisition challenges. GAO also made four recommendations to FEMA, including that it evaluate improvement options and determine whether to pursue implementation. DHS concurred with GAO’s recommendations.

Title: Disaster Resilience: Opportunities to Improve National Preparedness

Number: [GAO-22-106046](#)

Date: 5/17/2022

Summary: FEMA provides fundings for communities to acquire and demolish flood-prone properties from willing owners, leveraging grant programs that support local hazard mitigation projects. In this report, GAO reviews FEMA’s property acquisition efforts, including the benefits and challenges associated with these efforts, and compares FEMA’s efforts to improve acquisitions with alternative improvement options. GAO found that FEMA’s property acquisition efforts permanently eliminate structures at risk of flooding, lower disaster response costs, and can reduce financial risk to the government, but that many stakeholders cite barriers to implementation, including length of process, limited state and community capacity, and other financial challenges. In its report, GAO identified several options for improving acquisitions that could help address these challenges. Additionally, GAO recommended that Congress consider providing FEMA direction or authority to implement one or more of the options identified by GAO to address property acquisition challenges. GAO also made four recommendations to FEMA, including that it evaluate improvement options and determine whether to pursue implementation. DHS concurred with GAO’s recommendations.

**Title: Earthquakes: Opportunities Exist to Further Assess Risk, Build Resilience, and Communicate Research****Number:** [GAO-22-105016](#)**Date:** 5/4/2022

Summary: Established in 1977, the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) helps U.S. communities strengthen their earthquake resilience through initiatives like public education or helping to update building codes and improve design and construction practices. While the NEHRP has goals outlined in its most recent Strategic Plan for FY 2009-2013 to improve earthquake resilience in U.S. communities, officials from NIST stated that no national risk assessments have been conducted to identify improvements and remaining gaps in resilience. GAO found that FEMA has taken steps to identify improvements by collecting data on the adoption of building codes, and NEHRP agencies are currently working to update the Strategic Plan for FY 2022-2029. However, GAO concurred with NIST officials and found that a national risk assessment would drive greater awareness of earthquake resilience improvements implemented under NEHRP and would support NEHRP planning overall by helping to identify gaps towards which long-term goals could be aimed. GAO made seven interagency recommendations, including that NEHRP agencies conduct a national assessment to identify progress and remaining gaps in earthquake resilience; develop strategies to better communicate research priorities; and follow leading practices to identify and leverage resources. NIST, the National Science Foundation (NSF), and DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. As part of DHS' audit follow-up, FEMA is leading efforts to implement a plan to increase awareness among tribes about earthquake risk reduction initiatives.

Title: COVID-19: Current and Future Federal Preparedness Requires Fixes to Improve Health Data and Address Improper Payments**Number:** [GAO-22-105397](#)**Date:** 4/27/2022

Summary: By the end of March 2022, the U.S. had about 80 million reported cases of COVID-19 and over 980,000 reported deaths, with the country continuing to experience lingering economic repercussions related to the pandemic. As of February 28, 2022, the federal government had obligated \$4.2 trillion and expended \$3.6 trillion for pandemic relief. This GAO report—GAO's 10th comprehensive report on the subject—examines the federal government's continued efforts to respond to and recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. GAO made 15 recommendations for various federal agencies in this report, as well as one suggestion for Congress. Specific to DHS, GAO found that as of February 28, 2022, FEMA had received and processed more than 444,000 applications for funeral assistance since April 2021 and awarded more than \$1.92 billion for more than 296,000 approved applications. However, GAO identified gaps in FEMA's internal controls meant to prevent improper or potentially fraudulent payments. GAO made two recommendations that FEMA take action to identify the causes of the gaps in internal control in COVID-19 Funeral Assistance and design and implement additional control activities as needed, and update data records to ensure consistent and accurate data are available for monitoring of potential fraud trends and/or control deficiencies. DHS concurred with the recommendations, with FEMA leading implementation efforts. The GAO report also contained one finding and recommendation that CISA assess and document lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on the Critical Manufacturing Sector. DHS concurred with this recommendation and CISA is leading development of a lessons-learned report.

**Title: Disaster Recovery: Additional Actions Needed to Identify and Address Potential Recovery Barriers****Number:** [GAO-22-104039](#)**Date:** 12/15/2021

Summary: Congress asked GAO to report on the impact of federal recovery programs on different societal groups. This GAO report presents research findings on recovery outcomes related to select federal programs; research findings and recovery stakeholder perspectives on participation in these programs; and the extent to which federal disaster recovery agencies have taken actions to identify and address potential access barriers and disparate outcomes. Of the federal programs GAO reviewed, some had taken actions that could help officials identify and address potential access barriers and disparate outcomes. However, GAO found that programs lack key information that would allow them to examine patterns and indicators of potential access barriers and disparate recovery outcomes and have not taken action to identify or obtain the universes of data needed to support this kind of analysis. GAO also found that many of the federal agencies reviewed lack interagency processes to address such barriers within or across recovery programs on an ongoing basis. GAO recommended that FEMA, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the Small Business Administration (SBA) lead an interagency effort to plan to ensure use of comprehensive information and processes to identify and address access barriers and disparate outcomes. DHS concurred with the recommendation and FEMA has taken significant steps to implement it, including planning to collect additional demographic characteristics from FEMA Individual Assistance registrants and revising interagency data sharing agreements to improve the utility of its data.

Title: FEMA Flood Maps: Better Planning and Analysis Needed to Address Current and Future Flood Hazards**Number:** [GAO-22-104039](#)**Date:** 10/25/2021

Summary: This GAO report reviews issues related to 2018 disasters, and addresses the extent to which FEMA has developed Flood Insurance Rate Maps and nonregulatory products that reflect current and future flood hazards; the extent to which FEMA has assessed its efforts to enhance flood resilience; and how FEMA prioritizes its mapping resources to create and update Flood Insurance Map Rates. GAO found that FEMA's Risk Mapping, Assessment, and Planning (Risk MAP) program has increased its development of flood maps and other flood risk products but faces challenges ensuring they fully reflect current and future flood hazards. GAO also found that Risk MAP has been operating under an outdated plan that does not reflect new goals, objectives, activities, performance measures, or associated timeframes. Additionally, GAO found that FEMA does not periodically assess the usefulness of its nonregulatory flood risk products, which are intended to help communities increase their resilience to floods. Lastly, GAO found that FEMA prioritizes its mapping projects with input from all levels of government and FEMA's regional office but could better use available data to inform its efforts. GAO recommended that FEMA update its Risk MAP program plan, develop mechanisms to assess the usefulness of its nonregulatory flood risk products, and consider ways to leverage its flood risk data to help prioritize its mapping investment decisions. DHS concurred with the recommendations and FEMA has taken significant implementation steps, including developing a new data tool to consolidate datasets from across FEMA and other partners; establishing a plan for continued evaluation of Risk MAP nonregulatory products in assisting communities



with increasing flood resilience; and developing an updated multiyear plan for the Risk MAP program.

DHS OIG Reports

Title: FEMA’s Management of Mission Assignment to Other Federal Agencies Needs Improvement

Number: [OIG-22-76](#)

Date: 9/13/2022

Summary: DHS OIG reviewed the extent to which FEMA developed and oversaw mission assignments for COVID-19 in accordance with its policies and procedures. FEMA used mission assignments (MA)—work orders to complete specific tasks—to provide pandemic funding to federal agencies in support of the national COVID-19 response. As of March 9, 2022, FEMA had approved over 1,700 Mas and obligated more than \$8.3 billion in funding. DHS OIG found that FEMA processed and obligated funds in a timely manner to other federal agencies but did not provide sufficient oversight to ensure these funds were used as required, largely due to challenges related to guidance and resourcing. As a result, DHS OIG found that FEMA does not have adequate visibility into how other federal agencies ultimately used obligated funds for COVID-19 MAs. DHS OIG made four recommendations to improve the effectiveness and oversight of FEMA’s MAs. DHS concurred with all recommendations and FEMA is leading implementation efforts.

Title: FEMA Made Efforts to Address Inequities in Disadvantaged Communities Related to COVID-19 Community Vaccination Center Locations and Also Plans to Address Inequity in Future Operations

Number: [OIG-22-74](#)

Date: 9/28/2022

Summary: DHS OIG examined the extent to which FEMA’s Civil Rights Advisory Group (CRAG) alleviated potential inequities in vaccine mission activities and reviewed how FEMA intends to ensure integration of civil rights and equity in future activities. Established in January 2021, the CRAG is intended to help evaluate policies, practices, strategies, and plans to ensure equity in vaccine access and administration. DHS OIG found that FEMA’s CRAG implemented a methodology that prioritized states based on the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Social Vulnerability Index (SVI). This methodology sought to address differences in COVID-19 care and outcomes within minority and disadvantaged communities, among other underserved populations. To also address inequity, DHS OIG notes that FEMA’s 2022-2026 Strategic Plan outlines objectives for instilling equity in emergency management, has established an Equity Enterprise Steering Group to review and recommend changes to FEMA’s policies, and is developing a system to collect demographic data on applicants to help identify and target resources to underserved and marginalized communities. DHS OIG recommended that FEMA finalize internal policies and establish a plan for obtaining new systems or modifying present systems, where feasible, to collect demographic data about applicants. DHS concurred with the recommendations and FEMA is leading implementation efforts.

**Title: FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent More than \$3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program****Number:** [OIG-22-69](#)**Date:** 3/31/2022

Summary: DHS OIG reviewed the extent to which FEMA ensured that states and territories distributed Lost Wages Assistance (LWA) to eligible recipients. Initiated on August 8, 2020, FEMA implemented a \$44 billion LWA program to ease the economic burden for people who lost work because of COVID-19. Fifty-four state workforce agencies (SWA) offered LWA to their residents during the 6 weeks the program was active. DHS OIG found that FEMA did not implement controls that may have prevented the SWAs reviewed by DHS OIG from distributing more than \$3.7 billion in improper payments through FEMA's LWA program. DHS OIG found that this occurred because FEMA launched the LWA program in 11 days, in response to the unprecedented pandemic, and without developing and implementing clear guidance for the program or verifying and monitoring the SWA's controls to ensure they prevented and mitigated improper payments. Instead, FEMA integrated LWA into SWAs' unemployment insurance (UI) programs, many of which did not have sufficient internal controls to prevent fraudulent activities or overpayments, and some of which even relied on self-certification. DHS OIG made seven recommendations for improving FEMA's management of its federal assistance programs and for recovering LWA improper payments.

Title: FEMA Needs to Improve its Oversight of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program**Number:** [OIG-22-56](#)**Date:** 8/10/2022

Summary: This DHS OIG report analyzes the extent to which FEMA's oversight of the National Board's (Board) administration of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program (EFSP) ensured individuals experiencing financial hardships received aid in accordance with federal requirements. DHS OIG found that for FY 2017-2020, the Board did not spend approximately 10.4 percent of \$560 million in appropriated grant funds. In addition, DHS OIG found that FEMA's EFSP program office was unable to identify areas in which the program achieved its goals or needed improvements. Lastly, DHS OIG noted that the Board and its fiscal agents did not have written policies or procedures in key areas and did not enforce written guidance. DHS OIG recommended that FEMA and the National Board develop and document policies and procedures to improve oversight of the EFSP.

Title: FEMA Needs to Improve its Oversight and Management of Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Property Acquisitions**Number:** [OIG-22-46](#)**Date:** 6/22/2022

Summary: DHS OIG examined whether FEMA is properly using the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) for property acquisitions. Through grants to states, FEMA uses the HMGP to purchase properties that are flood damaged or in flood-prone areas, demolish any structures on them, and ensure they are maintained forever as open space. DHS OIG found that FEMA did not oversee and manage HMGP property acquisition projects efficiently or effectively, nor could FEMA provide assurance that projects were awarded equitably. DHS OIG also found that FEMA's property records since 1989 were incomplete. Lastly, DHS OIG found that HMGP



officials could not ensure that states considered demographic and economic data when selecting projects because FEMA had not yet developed a method for states to gather this data or provided guidance on using it when awarding funds. DHS OIG made four recommendations to help FEMA strengthen its property acquisition activities. DHS concurred with all four recommendations and FEMA is leading implementation efforts.

Title: FEMA Successfully Assisted HHS in Providing Shelter and Supplies to Unaccompanied Children from the Southwest Border

Number: [OIG-22-35](#)

Date: 3/31/2022

Summary: DHS OIG examined whether FEMA is properly using the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) for property acquisitions. Through grants to states, FEMA uses the HMGP to purchase properties that are flood damaged or in flood-prone areas, demolish any structures on them, and ensure they are maintained forever as open space. DHS OIG found that FEMA did not oversee and manage HMGP property acquisition projects efficiently or effectively, nor could FEMA provide assurance that projects were awarded equitably. DHS OIG also found that FEMA's property records since 1989 were incomplete. Lastly, DHS OIG found that HMGP officials could not ensure that states considered demographic and economic data when selecting projects because FEMA had not yet developed a method for states to gather this data or provided guidance on using it when awarding funds. DHS OIG made four recommendations to help FEMA strengthen its property acquisition activities. DHS concurred with all four recommendations and FEMA is leading implementation efforts.

Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC)

DHS OIG Reports

Title: DHS Component Collaboration on Law Enforcement Virtual Training Is Limited

Number: [OIG-22-67](#)

Date: 9/15/2022

Summary: This DHS OIG report examines the extent to which DHS law enforcement components collaborate and leverage resources for virtual training. DHS OIG found that such collaboration is limited, noting that DHS law enforcement components are not always aware of other DHS components' research, purchase, capabilities, or availability of law enforcement virtual training simulators. In September 2021, DHS established the Law Enforcement Coordination Council (LECC) to coordinate department-wide law enforcement related matters on training and policy, but DHS OIG found that this initiative did not always include all relevant offices and components. Additionally, DHS OIG found that USSS does not have a system to track use of force incidents, which challenges the U.S. Secret Service's ability to assess use of force activities, conduct meaningful trend analysis, or take appropriate corrective actions, such as providing additional training. DHS OIG made six recommendations to improve DHS collaboration and improve the Department's ability to leverage resource for virtual training. DHS concurred with all recommendations, with FLETC, USCG, USSS, and the LECC leading implementation efforts.



Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)

DHS OIG Reports

Title: The Office of Intelligence and Analysis Needs to Improve Its Open Source Intelligence Reporting

Number: [OIG-22-50](#)

Date: 7/6/2022

Summary: DHS OIG reviewed the extent to which I&A has an effective process for collecting, managing, and protecting open source intelligence (OSINT) for operational and intelligence purposes. To identify and mitigate threats, I&A shares intelligence analysis with decision makers, and—as noted by DHS OIG—has taken steps to address known challenges related to insufficient guidance and technology. However, DHS OIG found that additional process improvements are needed to ensure that intelligence reporting is effective and efficient. DHS OIG made four recommendations to improve I&A’s OSINT process. DHS concurred with all recommendations and I&A is leading implementation efforts to improve their ability to identify and mitigate threats to the Nation through relevant and timely intelligence reports that are in line with evolving threats.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

GAO Reports

Title: Alternative to Detention: ICE Needs to Better Assess Program Performance and Improve Contract Oversight

Number: [GAO-22-104529](#)

Date: 6/22/2022

Summary: This GAO report examines what data show about participation in ICE’s Alternatives to Detention (ATD) program; the extent to which ICE has assessed ATD performance; and how ICE manages and oversees ATD contractors. The ATD program, which ICE administers through a \$2.2 billion contract, uses electronic monitoring and case management to help ensure that individuals enrolled comply with release conditions, such as appearing at immigration court hearings. GAO found that the number of individuals enrolled in the ATD program more than doubled from approximately 53,000 in 2015 to 111,000 in 2020. During this period, GAO found that ICE unenrolled most participants before their immigration proceedings concluded. GAO also found that while ICE collects data on the ATD program and developed a performance goal for FY 2022, ICE does not assess program performance for all core program activities and outcomes. Lastly, GAO found that ICE conducts some oversight of the contractor that helps implement the ATD program nationwide but does not fully assess the contractor against the standards for performance established in the contract. GAO made ten recommendations, including that ICE establish performance goals that cover core program activities, improve external reporting of absconson information, collect information needed to assess the contractor’s performance against standards, and ensure the contractor addresses all audit findings. DHS concurred with the recommendations and ICE is leading implementation efforts.



DHS OIG Reports

Title: ICE and CBP Should Improve Visa Security Program Screening and Vetting Operations

Number: [OIG-22-70](#)

Date: 9/26/2022

Summary: This DHS OIG report examines the extent to which ICE, CBP, and—to a limited extent—USCIS collaborate under the Visa Security Program (VSP). The VSP screens and vets visa applications to identify potential terrorists, criminals, and other ineligible applicants to prevent them from receiving visas and entering the nation. Although the components collaborate, DHS OIG identified issues involving VSP processes and systems, to include items related to records management and system functionality. As the VSP program continues to grow, DHS OIG posits that the absence of accurate information about program costs or estimates further hinders DHS' ability to oversee the VSP. To mitigate this, DHS OIG made three recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of the VSP. DHS concurred with the recommendations and components are taking key steps to implement. For example, ICE has redesigned elements of its VSP Tracking System (VSPTS) to address data transfer issues, disseminated program guidance and other resources to VSP personnel and users, and ensured that new personnel receive this documentation as part of a standard onboarding process. ICE and CBP will continue collaborating to lead implementation efforts for the recommendations in this DHS OIG report.

Title: ICE Spent Funds on Unused Beds, Missed COVID-19 Protocols and Detention Standards while Housing Migrant Families in Hotels

Number: [OIG-22-37](#)

Date: 4/12/2022

Summary: From April to September 2021, DHS OIG performed remote inspections of ICE hotel facilities to assess compliance by contractors providing housing services for migrant families with ICE detention standards and COVID-19 requirements. DHS OIG found that ICE did not adequately justify the need for the sole source contract to house migrant families and spent money for hotel space and services at six hotels that were largely unused between April and June 2021. DHS OIG also found that the contractor delivering these housing services did not meet new healthcare protocols or ensure proper COVID-19 testing for families. DHS OIG made one recommendation to improve ICE's contracting and oversight of hotel facility management and operations. DHS concurred with the recommendation with ICE leading implementation efforts.

Title: Many Factors Hinder ICE's Ability to Maintain Adequate Medical Staffing at Detention Facilities

Number: [OIG-22-03](#)

Date: 10/29/2021

Summary: This DHS OIG report provides an evaluation of the causes and impacts of medical vacancies at ICE detention facilities to determine whether existing medical staffing plans and vacancies at detention facilities hinder ICE detainees' access to adequate medical care. As reported by DHS OIG, ICE relies on a distributed network of detention facilities governed by a variety of contracts and payment agreements to house detainees, and faces challenges at



these facilities with recruiting, hiring, and retaining medical staff. DHS OIG found that root causes range from the facilities being in remote locations to ICE's hiring processes that often prove cumbersome and adversely affect ICE's ability to attract qualified staff. DHS OIG found that these staffing challenges directly affect ICE's access to offsite specialty care and increase the risk of inadequate care at detention facilities, but ultimately concluded that the full effects of medical vacancies are difficult to evaluate. DHS OIG made five recommendations for ICE to evaluate options for enhancing resources for medical staffing and ensuring medical staff assist with relevant detention contract negotiations. DHS concurred with the recommendations and ICE has taken key steps to implement them, with efforts underway to improve pay rates, hiring processes, and contract oversight.

Title: ICE Needs to Improve Its Oversight of Segregation Use in Detention Facilities

Number: [OIG-22-01](#)

Date: 10/13/2021

Summary: DHS OIG Examined whether ICE's use of administrative and disciplinary segregation across all authorized detention facilities complies with ICE detention standards. As noted by DHS OIG, both Congress and the public have expressed concerns regarding the use of segregation at ICE detention facilities, and academic research has found that this practice can have negative psychological effects for impacted individuals. DHS OIG found that ICE did not always comply with segregation reporting requirements and did not ensure detention facilities complied with records retention requirements. DHS OIG found that these issues occurred because ICE did not have effective oversight or clear policies to ensure accurate and comprehensive tracking and reporting on the use of segregation; proper record retention at detention facilities; or effective reporting policies to ensure timely and transparent distribution of information to stakeholders. DHS OIG made three recommendations to improve ICE's oversight and reporting of the use of segregation at detention facilities. DHS concurred with the recommendations and ICE is leading implementation efforts.

Management (MGMT)

GAO

Title: Federal Protective Service: Many Approved Security Recommendations Were Not Implemented and Preliminary Work Suggests Law Enforcement Deployments Have Increased

Number: GAO-22-106177

Date: 9/22/2022

Summary: The Federal Protective Service (FPS) provides security and protection at more than 9,000 facilities across the country and assesses these facilities to identify security risks and recommend security measures. In a previous report from June 2021, GAO noted that FPS stakeholders—tenant agency officials and building managers at the facilities protected by FPS—held positive views about the content of FPS security assessment reports. However, GAO found that FPS's security recommendations were not implemented in many instances, with the reason often being related to lack of agency resources or tenant agency plans to move to a different facility. GAO also found that FPS's law enforcement deployments have increased since FY 2020 to support DHS operations on the Southwest Border and provide first amendment



protection and other security at federal facilities. While stakeholders continue to report generally positive views of the services provided by FPS, GAO notes that FPS staffing shortfalls will challenge the quality of FPS's service delivery as facilities return to pre-COVID volumes of operation.

Title: DHS Contracts: Opportunities Exist to Improve Oversight and Monitoring of Urgent Noncompetitive Awards

Number: [GAO-22-105074](#)

Date: 3/3/2022

Summary: This GAO report examines trends in DHS' use of the urgency exception from fiscal years 2016 through 2020, select DHS components' reasons for using this justification, whether these justifications met acquisition regulations and policies, and whether selected DHS components monitored and documented the performance of urgent, noncompeted contracts. As noted by GAO, DHS acquires billion of dollars of goods and services each year through contracts awarded through limited or no competition, despite competition generally being required for federal contract awards (and further recommended by GAO as a best practice for the government to determine fair prices). However, certain urgent needs give rise to exceptions to these competition requirements. Of the contracts reviewed by GAO, all justified forgoing competition due to unexpected events such as natural disasters. However, GAO found that DHS did not always revise justifications after significant increases in contract value. GAO also found that some selected components did not have required appointment letters to document contract officer representative (COR) responsibilities for monitoring performance across contracts. GAO made three recommendations, including that DHS take steps to ensure that components revise justifications and approval when appropriate, and maintain COR appointment letters as required. DHS concurred with the recommendations, and the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) has already taken significant steps to implement. GAO considers the recommendations closed as implemented.

Title: Leading Practices: Agency Acquisition Policies Could Better Implement Key Product Development Principles

Number: [GAO-22-104513](#)

Date: 3/20/2022

Summary: GAO examined the principles that guide leading companies' product development efforts and the extent to which primary, department-wide acquisition policies at DHS, DOD, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) reflect the companies' key principles and result in similar outcomes. GAO found that DHS implements some key product development principles but has yet to fully implement others. For example, GAO found that DHS policies do not require all programs to utilize modern design tools during hardware and software development, limiting consistent opportunities for programs to successfully improve revisions to the design. GAO made several recommendations to DHS, DOD, and NASA to update acquisition policies to fully implement key principles of product development. All three agencies concurred with GAO's recommendations. MGMT is currently leading efforts to update the Department's acquisition policy to address items like business case development and incremental program delivery.

**Title: DHS Annual Assessment: Most Acquisition Programs Are Meeting Goals Even with Some Management Issues and COVID-19 Delays****Number:** [GAO-22-104684](#)**Date:** 3/8/2022

Summary: This report represents GAO’s seventh review of the cost and schedule performance of selected major DHS acquisition programs to determine whether they are meeting baseline goals and taking appropriate steps to mitigate COVID-19-related effects on the delivery of capabilities to end users. GAO found that 23 of the 29 programs selected had developed a DHS-approved acquisition program baseline, and that 20 of those 23 programs were meeting their goals. While GAO found that five DHS programs had exceeded their cost or schedule goals, or both, two of the five had restructured their baselined goals to get back on track. Additionally, GAO found that DHS was appropriately leveraging steps to mitigate the effects of COVID-19 on major DHS acquisition programs.

DHS OIG Reports**Title: DHS Can Better Mitigate the Risks Associated with Malware, Ransomware, and Phishing Attacks****Number:** [OIG-22-62](#)**Date:** 8/22/2022

Summary: With the threat of cyberattacks increasing during the past two decades, DHS OIG conducted this review to determine whether DHS and its components have implemented effective internal controls to protect DHS’ sensitive data from malware, ransomware, and phishing attacks. DHS OIG found that DHS implements multiple layers of defense against cyberattacks, and has further implemented specific tools and technologies to further detect and prevent security events on component systems and to help protect DHS’ network communication and data. However, DHS OIG found that DHS can better protect its sensitive data from potential malware, ransomware, and phishing attacks, and made 10 recommendations that DHS revise its policies and procedures to incorporate new controls. DHS concurred with the recommendations and the Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) leading implementation efforts. OCIO has taken key steps to improve relevant controls, including updating internal program guidance and training processes.

Title: Lessons Learned from DHS’ Employee COVID-19 Vaccination Initiative**Number:** [OIG-22-42](#)**Date:** 5/10/2022

Summary: DHS OIG evaluated the impacts of DHS’ partnership with the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) to administer COVID-19 vaccines to certain eligible DHS employees, and how DHS determined employee status for placement into priority distribution groups for vaccination. DHS OIG also examined how DHS planned to triage and distribute available vaccine inventory, and how the Department eventually executed this. DHS OIG found that DHS acted swiftly to identify employees in vaccination priority groups, but provided minimal guidance to components, resulting in inconsistent responses across DHS as to which types of employees were deemed eligible for the priority groups. While DHS successfully vaccinated some employees, DHS OIG found that missing and erroneous personnel data—combined with other resourcing and communication challenges—led to DHS falling short of reaching its



vaccination goals. DHS OIG made one recommendation to improve DHS' ability to identify essential employees, when necessary, in future emergency situations. DHS concurred with the recommendation, with DHS' Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer (OCHO) leading implementation efforts.

Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)

DHS OIG Reports

Title: S&T Needs to Improve Its Management and Oversight of R&D Projects

Number: [OIG-22-30](#)

Date: 3/7/2022

Summary: This DHS OIG report examines whether S&T executes research and development (R&D) projects in accordance with federal and DHS guidelines, policies, and procedures. DHS OIG found that S&T did not consistently comply with sensitive information and privacy requirements to protect information. DHS OIG found that without effective management and monitoring of R&D projects, S&T faces increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of sensitive and/or personally identifiable information, and faces even greater risk of projects missing milestone, exceeding budget, or not achieving desired outcomes. DHS OIG made five recommendations to S&T to improve the execution of its R&D projects. DHS concurred with all recommendations and S&T has taken significant steps to implement, including developing policy, guidance, and other processes to improve program controls and the execution of R&D projects.

Transportation Security Administration (TSA)

GAO Reports

Title: Aviation Security Programs: TSA Should Clarify Compliance Program Guidance and Address User Concerns with Its Data Systems

Number: [GAO-22-105063](#)

Date: 9/27/2022

Summary: GAO reviewed TSA's efforts to implement security programs, including how TSA inspections are designed to improve aviation security compliance, how TSA addressed known instances of noncompliance from during FY 2017-2021, and the extent to which TSA has experienced challenges transitioning to a new data compliance platform. GAO found that TSA guidance is unclear about when airports and air carriers are able to invest their own resources and design corrective action plans to address violations that would otherwise entail civil penalties. In addition, GAO found that TSA's new data compliance platform for managing inspections of airline operations has issues that are hindering TSA personnel's ability to ensure compliance with required aviation security programs. While TSA is addressing some of these issues, GAO found that the agency has not fully assessed user concerns. GAO recommended that TSA develop guidance for when an action plan may be effective for airports or air carriers in resolving instances of noncompliance, assess stakeholder concerns about transitioning to a new compliance system, and develop lessons learned from other systems' transitions. DHS concurred with these recommendation and TSA is leading implementation efforts.

**Title: Surface Transportation: TSA Implementation of Security Training Requirement****Number:** [GAO-22-105315](#)**Date:** 4/20/2022

Summary: In March 2020, TSA issued a new requirement that security-sensitive surface transportation employees receive security trainings, and to submit security training programs for TSA to review by June 2021. This GAO report describes the key regulatory requirements for TSA's security training programs, TSA's processes for and results from reviewing its training programs, industry associations' and select owner/operators' perspectives on the training programs, and the status of the training program implementation and TSA's monitoring plans. GAO found that, as of December 2021, TSA had reviewed each of the submitted training programs and approved approximately three-fourths of those submitted, returning the others to the submitting agencies and owners/operators for revision. Some owners/operators have started training employees as well, and TSA plans to begin inspection for each of the selected operations that will focus on the extent to which these programs meet training, security, and other requirements according to TSA officials.

Title: Transportation Security: TSA Efforts to Coordinate with Stakeholders on COVID-19 Security Directives**Number:** [GAO-22-104583](#)**Date:** 3/14/2022

Summary: This GAO report examines TSA's security directives related to COVID-19, TSA's coordination with interagency and industry stakeholders on COVID-19 security directives, and efforts to ensure operators' implementation of TSA's COVID-19 security directives. GAO found that TSA issued security directives to operators of transportation systems to implement executive actions related to COVID-19, expediting coordination with external stakeholders to develop and issue these directives due to the urgent nature of COVID-19. GAO found that TSA took steps to ensure operator implementation of its security directives, including providing in-person inspections of air carriers' preboarding procedures for U.S.-bound flights. GAO also found that TSA conducted investigations into incidents regarding passengers who refused to comply with the face mask security directives and became disruptive or aggressive towards transportation operators or others. Of the more than 3,800 incidents investigated by TSA regarding the implementation of its security directives, TSA issued more than 2,800 warning notices and over 900 civil penalty fines.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)**GAO Reports****Title: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: Additional Actions Needed to Manage Fraud Risks****Number:** [GAO-22-105328](#)**Date:** 9/19/2022

Summary: GAO examined USCIS fraud detection activities and the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS), describing FDNS's workload and evaluating USCIS processes to determine staff resource needs; efforts to assess fraud risks and develop



antifraud strategies; and efforts to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of antifraud activities. Every year, USCIS processes millions of applications and petitions for persons seeking to visit or reside in the U.S. or become citizens, with FDNS leading efforts to combat fraud and detect national security and public safety threat. GAO found that USCIS uses a staffing model to estimate the number of Immigration Officers needed to handle FDNS's project workload; however, GAO found that the FDNS staffing model does not accurately reflect operating conditions. GAO also found that USCIS has conducted fraud risk assessments for different immigration benefit types but does not have a process for regularly conducting these assessments. Lastly, GAO noted that USCIS has taken steps to improve its antifraud activities—including adding new activities, modifying ongoing activities, and developing technology and tools to support staff—but found that USCIS has not developed a comprehensive strategy for antifraud activities. GAO made six recommendations to USCIS that it identify factors affecting its workload; implement additional data entry guidance; and implement processes to regularly conduct fraud risk assessments, develop an antifraud strategy, and conduct risk-based evaluations of the effectiveness of antifraud activities. DHS concurred with the recommendations and USCIS is leading implementation efforts.

DHS OIG

Title: USCIS Should Improve Controls to Restrict Unauthorized Access to Its Systems and Information

Number: [OIG-22-65](#)

Date: 9/7/2022

Summary: DHS OIG conducted this review to determine the extent to which USCIS is applying information technology (IT) access controls to restrict unnecessary access to systems and information. As noted by DHS OIG, one of the most effective ways for an organization to reduce overall risk of cyberattacks is to ensure that only authorized users can access its networks, systems, and information; access controls help to limit individuals from gaining inappropriate access to these systems, data, or information. DHS OIG found that USCIS did not apply the IT access controls needed to restrict unnecessary access, stemming from insufficient internal controls and oversight. DHS OIG made ten recommendations to improve USCIS' IT access controls and system security. DHS concurred with all recommendations and USCIS is leading implementation efforts, taking significant steps including updating policy and guidance, improving coordination and oversight efforts, and enhancing overall internal controls.

Title: Continued Reliance on Manual Processing Slowed USCIS' Benefits Delivery during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Number: [OIG-22-12](#)

Date: 9/7/2022

Summary: This DHS OIG report examined the effectiveness of USCIS technology systems to provide timely and accurate electronic processing of benefits while offices were closed or operating at reduced capacity as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. DHS OIG found that USCIS' technology systems and infrastructure enabled some electronic processing to benefits to continue from March 2020 through May 2021, despite offices being closed or operating at reduced capacity during COVID-19. DHS OIG found that USCIS leveraged its Electronic Immigration System to continue electronically processing several of the benefits it delivers and relied on various operational flexibilities to continue benefits delivery during the pandemic. As



DSH OIG found, USCIS' primary operational challenge during this time was its continued reliance on paper files to process and deliver benefits, as well technology performance issues and other resourcing challenges. Although USCIS has taken steps to digitize key benefits in recent years, DHS OIG found it must further eliminate manual workflows and paper file dependency to achieve its 5-year plan to improve benefit processing time. DHS OIG made two recommendations to improve the effectiveness of USCIS electronic processing. DHS concurred with the recommendations and USCIS is leading implementation efforts.

U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)

GAO Reports

Title: Coast Guard: Workforce Planning Actions Needed to Address Growing Cyberspace Mission Demands

Number: [GAO-22-105208](#)

Date: 9/27/2022

Summary: This GAO report addresses the extent to which the U.S. Coast Guard has identified its cyberspace workforce and determined its associated mission needs, as well as the extent to which the U.S. Coast Guard has implemented selected leading practices in its cyberspace workforce recruitment, retention, and training. As noted by GAO, the Coast Guard is increasingly dependent upon its cyberspace workforce to maintain and protect its information and systems and data from threats. While Coast Guard guidance calls for the use of its Manpower Requirements Determination process to identify the necessary staffing levels and skills required to meet mission needs, GAO found that the Coast Guard had not used this process for a large portion of its cyberspace workforce. Additionally, of the 12 selected recruitment, retention, and training leading practices GAO leveraged as criteria during its review, GAO found that the Coast Guard had fully implemented seven, partially implemented three, and not implemented two. GAO made six recommendations to the Coast Guard to determine the cyberspace staff needed to meet its mission demands and to fully implement the remaining five leading practices identified by GAO for improving the Coast Guard's recruitment and retention processes. DHS concurred with these recommendations and the Coast Guard is leading implementation efforts.

Title: Coast Guard: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Tsunami Emergency Planning in the Pacific Northwest

Number: [GAO-22-105220](#)

Date: 9/7/2022

Summary: GAO reviewed the extent to which the U.S. Coast Guard developed tsunami evacuation plans and procedures for its personnel and dependents in the Pacific Northwest. This is a region that is home to seismic hazards, such as earthquakes and tsunamis, that may necessitate the evacuation of Coast Guard personnel and dependents during a major event. GAO found that of the 39 U.S. Coast Guard units on the Pacific Northwest coast, 19 had a written tsunami evacuation plan for unit personnel. As noted by GAO, individual unit leadership determines whether it is appropriate to develop an evacuation plan for their unit, and no Coast Guard-wide guidance exists to ensure units in this seismically active region of the U.S. create tsunami evacuation plans. GAO also found that the Coast Guard does not provide guidance for units on how best to create evacuation plans, which results in varied content across individual



units' evacuation plans. GAO made three recommendations that the Coast Guard ensure that coastal units in the Pacific Northwest develop and exercise tsunami and evacuation plans for personnel and dependents, and provide guidance to assist units with developing evacuation plans. DHS concurred with the recommendations and the Coast Guard is leading implementation efforts.

Title: Military Child Care: Coast Guard is Taking Steps to Increase Access for Families

Number: [GAO-22-105262](#)

Date: 6/30/2022

Summary: GAO examined how the U.S. Coast Guard compares to DOD in providing access to child care for its personnel, and further assessed how the Coast Guard is working to increase access to quality child care through its programs. Compared to DOD, GAO found that the Coast Guard operates proportionally fewer on-base child development centers, so most eligible Coast Guard personnel receive fee assistance to help them obtain child care through community-based providers. GAO found that the Coast Guard is working to increase access to quality child care by planning facility improvements and centralizing information for families. The Coast Guard has also increased its fee assistance subsidy amounts to help make child care more affordable, especially for families who live in high-cost areas.

Title: Sexual Assault: DOD and Coast Guard Should Ensure Laws Are Implemented to Improve Oversight of Key Prevention and Response Efforts

Number: [GAO-22-103973](#)

Date: 3/28/2022

Summary: Congress has passed over 200 statutory requirements directing DOD and the Coast Guard to address victim assistance and advocacy, management and oversight, military justice and investigations, and other preventions efforts. This GAO report identifies and describes the status of each statutory requirement for sexual assault prevent and response, evaluates the extent to which DOD and the Coast Guard have implement the statutory requirements, and—for select statutes—examines effectiveness when directed by statute. GAO found that DOD and the Coast Guard implemented most statutory requirements but face some challenges from a management and oversight perspective. GAO made recommendations to improve the oversight of DOD and USCG's sexual assault prevents and response efforts, including that Coast Guard establish mechanisms to track and document that relevant laws are implemented. DOD and DHS concurred with all recommendations. In the case of DHS, the Coast Guard has taken significant steps towards implementing GAO's recommendations, including policy and record retention updates, among other organizational and process improvements.

Title: Coast Guard Health Care: Improvements Needed for Determining Staffing Needs and Monitoring Access to Care

Number: [GAO-22-103973](#)

Date: 2/4/2022

Summary: This GAO report examines how the U.S. Coast Guard staffs its clinics and sick bays, determines its staffing needs, and monitors whether access-to-care standards are being met at its clinics and sickbays. As noted by GAO—and in support of its maritime safety, security, and environmental stewardship missions—the Coast Guard is tasked with providing health care to



its approximately 47,000 active duty and reserve personnel and offers certain outpatient medical and dental services through clinics and sickbays, small facilities typically staffed by a health technician. GAO found that the Coast Guard staffs its clinics and sickbays with Coast Guard enlisted personnel and officers, as well as with U.S. Public Health Service officers, including physicians and dentists. GAO found that the Coast Guard generally fills positions for its clinics and sickbays based on historical staffing levels, but that the current staffing approach does not address surge deployments of health care staff for missions away from clinics (e.g., response to hurricanes). To monitor access to care, GAO found that the Coast Guard relies on each of its clinics to manually estimate access by counting the number of days to the next available appointment. While the Coast Guard is planning to collect system-wide data on access to care using a new electronic health record system, GAO found that improving internal processes in the interim will enable the Coast Guard to more accurately monitor whether its clinics and sickbays are meeting its access standards. GAO made recommendations that the Coast Guard implement staffing standards for its health services program and a process for collecting more reliable data to monitor access to care. DHS concurred with the recommendations and the Coast Guard is leading implementation efforts.

Title: Coast Guard: Enhancements Needed to Strengthen Marine Inspection Workforce Planning Efforts

Number: [GAO-22-104465](#)

Date: 1/12/2022

Summary: GAO reviewed the extent to which the U.S. Coast Guard has assessed its marine inspection workforce needs and addressed these needs. As noted by GAO, the safe operation of vessels is critical to the maritime sector, which contributes nearly \$5.4 trillion annually to the U.S. economy. The U.S. Coast Guard uses a tool called the Sector Staffing Model to assess its marine inspection staffing levels at operation field units for the upcoming year. GAO found that while the Coast Guard collects and analyzes limited data to forecast future workforce and industry trends that could affect the supply and demand for marine inspectors, the supply of marine inspectors has consistently not met the estimated need. GAO also found that the Coast Guard has initiatives as part of its workforce improvement plan to address long-standing marine inspection workforce needs, but they are at varying stages of completion. GAO made five recommendations to strengthen the Coast Guard's workforce planning efforts, including to collect additional data to forecast future industry and workforce trends and to establish performance measures with targets and to use them to assess outcomes. DHS concurred and the Coast Guard has taken key steps towards implementing GAO's recommendations, including awarding a contract in February 2022 to study and fully model the Coast Guard Prevention Workforce pyramid, which includes marine inspectors, and further updating internal policy and guidance.

Title: Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Better Manage Shore Infrastructure

Number: [GAO-22-105513](#)

Date: 11/16/2021

Summary: This GAO testimony and report addresses the condition of the U.S. Coast Guard's infrastructure, Coast Guard actions to improve management of its shore infrastructure, and challenges for the Coast Guard to address. GAO testified about the challenges the Coast Guard faces in managing its aging shore infrastructure—such as piers, boat stations, runways, and so on—almost half of which is beyond its service life. In GAO's prior work, the auditor found that



the Coast Guard took steps to make its shore infrastructure more resilient and to help reduce its vulnerability to natural disasters. GAO also found that the extent of costs to address maintenance and recapitalization (i.e., major renovations) project backlogs may be understated, and that the Coast Guard continues to face challenges in ensuring that its infrastructure investments meet mission and user needs. Lastly, GAO found that the Coast Guard didn't always provide complete information in its annual budget request about the money it needs to rebuild and repair its infrastructure. GAO recommended that the Coast Guard include more information in its annual budget requests and related reports. DHS concurred with the recommendation and the Coast Guard is leading implementation efforts. DHS and the Coast Guard have also taken steps to address recommendations issued in prior GAO reports that informed this report and testimony (GAO-22-105513).

U.S. Secret Service (USSS)

GAO Reports

Title: U.S. Secret Service: further Progress Made Implementing the Protective Mission Panel Recommendations

Number: [GAO-22-105100](#)

Date: 1/26/2022

Summary: In December 2014, the U.S. Secret Service Protective Mission Panel—an independent panel of experts established to review White House security and other aspects of Secret Service operations—made recommendations related to training and personnel, technology, operations, and leadership. This GAO report examines the progress the Secret Service has made toward implementing these recommendations. GAO found that the agency has made progress implementing the Panel's recommendations, including taking steps to revise budget processes, issuing a new human capital strategic plan, and implementing a Leadership Development System framework across all occupational categories in the agency to promote leadership within individuals, teams, and projects. As noted by GAO, in prior work the auditor has recommended that the Secret Service develop and implement a plan to ensure that special agents assigned to select divisions reach annual training targets and develop and implement a policy that documents the process for collecting complete and appropriate data on officer training. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations and the Secret Service has taken significant steps towards addressing them.



Acronyms

AIS – Automated Indicator Sharing	NCF – National Critical Functions
APG – Agency Priority Goal	NCR – National Capital Region
APR – Annual Performance Report	NEHRP – National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program
ATD – Alternatives to Detention	NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology
CAP – Cyber Action Plan	NSF – National Science Foundation
CBP – U.S. Customs and Border Protection	OCHCO – Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer
CDC – Centers for Disease Control	OCIO – Office of the Chief Information Officer
CISA – Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency	OCPO – Office of the Chief Procurement Officer
CWMD – Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office	OIG – Office of Inspector General
DHS – Department of Homeland Security	OSINT – Open Source Intelligence
DOD – Department of Defense	PTS – Priority Telecommunications Services
EFSP – Emergency Food and Shelter Program	Risk MAP – Risk Mapping, Assessment, and Planning
FDNS – Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate	S&T – Science and Technology Directorate
FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency	SBA – Small Business Administration
FIO – Federal Insurance Office	SLTT – State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial
FLETC – Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers	SRMA – Sector Risk Management Agency
FPS – Federal Protective Service	SVI – Social Vulnerability Index
FRT – Facial Recognition Technology	SWA – State Workforce Agency
FY – Fiscal Year	TEDS – Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search
GAO – U.S. Government Accountability Office	TFTEA – Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act
HMGP – Hazard Mitigation Grant Program	TRIP – Terrorism Risk Insurance Program
HQ – Headquarters	TSA – Transportation Security Administration
HSI – Homeland Security Investigations	UI – Unemployment Insurance
HUD – Housing and Urban Development	USCG – U.S. Coast Guard
I&A – Intelligence and Analysis	USCIS – U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
ICE – U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement	USSS – U.S. Secret Service
IT – Information Technology	VHA – Veterans Health Administration
LECC – Law Enforcement Coordination Council	VSP – Visa Security Program
LWA – Lost Wages Assistance	VSPTS – Visa Security Program Tracking System
MA – Mission Assignments	
MGMT – Management Directorate	
NASA – National Aeronautics and Space Administration	

