The end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 opened a new era in India by strengthening the commercial and economic arguments for completing supremacy and by removing all fear of the French. The Pindari raids, which grew year by year until they affected both the Bengal and Madras presidencies, added further reasons for action. The final act was directed by Francis Rawdon-Hastings, 1st marquess of Hastings (governor-general 1813–23), who came to India as a consolation for his failure to attain the premiership under his friend the prince regent (later King George IV). Lord Hastings, however, first had to deal in 1814–16 with the Gurkhas of the northern kingdom of Nepal, who inflicted a series of defeats on a Bengal army unprepared for mountain warfare. Each side earned the respect of the other. The resulting Treaty of Segauli (1816) gave the British the tract of hill country where Shimla (Simla), the site of the future summer capital of British India, was situated, and it settled relations between Nepal and British India for the rest of the British period. Nepal remained independent and isolated, supported by the export of soldiers to strengthen the British military presence in India.

Lord Hastings then turned to the Pindaris. By a large-scale and well-planned enveloping movement, he hoped to enclose them in an iron net. But this involved entering Maratha territories and seeking the cooperation of their princes. Sindhia agreed after agonizing indecision, and this really settled the issue. Holkar’s state was in disorder and was easily defeated. Both the raja of Nagpur and the peshwa resisted and attacked the British forces stationed under their respective subsidiary treaties. Nagpur quickly collapsed, but the peshwa kept up a running fight before surrendering in June 1818. The Pindari bands themselves, chased hither and thither, broke up or surrendered.

The East India Company was thus the undisputed master of India, as far as the Sutlej River in the Punjab. This episode was completed by the acceptance of British suzerainty by the Rajput chiefs of Rajasthan, central India, and Kathiawar, as they had formerly accepted the Mughals. Thus the year 1818 marks a watershed, when the British Empire in India became the British Empire of India.

The settlement of 1818

The diplomatic settlement of 1818, except for a few annexations before 1857, remained in force until 1947 and is therefore worth some attention. The company, under the influence of its guiding star of economy, wished to be saved as much of the expense of administering India as possible, especially the less fertile portions. Having controlled the larger states by its subsidiary forces (for which they paid), it was content with tribute from the remainder, with control posts at strategic points. Thus, Kathiawar was controlled from Baroda and Rajasthan from Ajmer. There was no thought of integration as in Mughal days. The states were isolated and excluded from any connection with the British. About half of India remained under Indian rulers, robbed of any power of aggression and deprived of any opportunity of cooperation: in the south were the large units of Mysore, Hyderabad, and Travancore; in the west, the states of Shivaji’s family; across the center to the east, Nagpur and a number of poor “jungle” states; in the west and west-central areas, numerous Rajput and other Hindu chiefs with the surviving Maratha states of Sindhia, Holkar, and the Gaekwar; west of the Yamuna River, some Sikh princedoms; and in the Ganges valley, the still prosperous and disorderly state of Avadh. In all there were more than 360 units; politically, they were like the surviving fragments of a broken jigsaw puzzle, with all its complexity but without its unity.

The subjection of a whole subcontinent containing a unique civilization has long been a source of historical wonderment. The one-time explanations of innate superiority and of mere fate are no longer seriously entertained. But analysis goes far to dissipate the mystery. In the first place, the feat was not unique; Turkic Muslim dynasties had twice done much the same—for shorter periods, it is true, but also with fewer resources. All these achievements were made possible by the innate divisiveness of Hindu society, rent by class and caste divisions, which rendered it unusually willing to call in unwelcome outsiders to defeat the still more unwelcome neighbour. The foreigners, asked in the first resort to assist in defeating a rival, were in the last resort accepted as masters in preference to dominance by a rival. Thus, Marathas preferred the British to the Mughals, and the nizam preferred the British to the Marathas. Long historical memories can be inhibiting as well as inspiring. Against this setting can be set the company’s urge toward unity in the interests of trade. Even when its Indian trade was no longer profitable, India gave profits to others, and its opium bought the Chinese tea, which gave the East India Company its overall profits. Given the fact of expansion, Britain enjoyed the advantage of overseas reinforcement through its sea power and of reserves of power, far greater than that of any Indian prince, through its rapidly expanding industrial economy. A lost battle for the British was an incident in a campaign, for the Indian prince usually the end of the chapter. Then there were the technical advantages of arms and military discipline and the immense general advantage of a disciplined civilian morale. In the later stages this was boosted by the rising self-confidence of Europeans in general, with their belief that the western European civilization was the only truly progressive one that had ever existed. For the Hindu, on the other hand, his world was at its lowest ebb—in the Kali Yuga, or Dark Age—while the Muslim believed in inscrutable fate. The Hindu’s heart was in his religio-cultural complex, and political dominion meant little to the ordinary Hindu so long as this remained untouched.

Organization

The only areas so far definitely settled were those of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. Lord Cornwallis had been charged by Pitt with the reorganization of Bengal under the new act. Besides being a soldier of distinction, Cornwallis was a man of outstanding integrity, a landlord with rural tastes, and an instinctive Whig. Cornwallis first undertook a cleansing of the existing system. Discipline among the company’s servants was enforced at the price of dismissal. Private trade was forbidden to all government officers, and the service was divided into administrative and commercial branches. These measures (which, with others, became known as the Cornwallis Code) were coupled with a generous salary system, which removed the temptation to corruption. From this time the company’s service began to gain its later reputation for efficiency and integrity. All this could be done because the governor-general, with his council of three and his veto power, was now unassailable to the attacks that had ruined Vansittart and frustrated Warren Hastings.

From this base Cornwallis built up the Bengal system. Its first principle was Anglicization. In the belief that Indian officials were corrupt (and that British corruption had been cured), all posts worth more than £500 a year were reserved for the company’s covenanted servants. Next came the government. The 23 districts each had a British collector with magisterial powers and two assistants, who were responsible for revenue collection. The judicial system was organized with district judges for both civil and criminal cases. In civil cases there were four courts of appeal; and in criminal, four circuit courts. Criminal justice was taken over from the nawab’s deputy, thus removing the last shred of Mughal authority. The criminal code was the Islamic one, humanely modified. A new police force replaced the former local constables of the zamindars. This new system, which, with its division of authority, showed its Whig influence, was rounded off by the proclamation of the rule of law, making all governmental acts answerable in the ordinary courts of law. Though hardly noticed at the time by Indians, it was a radical innovation with far-reaching effects. It was a charter of civil—as distinct from political—liberty.

Cornwallis’s permanent settlement of the land revenue is the measure that most deeply affected the life and structure of Indian society, three-quarters of the revenue coming from the land. He found a system of hereditary zamindars, who had acquired police and magisterial powers as well and who were much shaken by the frequent changes of revenue policy under the British. The “settlement” was the decision in 1793 to stabilize the revenue demand at a fixed annual figure, with a commission to the zamindar for collection, and to regard him as the owner of his zamindari; he had the disposal of wastelands within his jurisdiction, but these lands were liable to be sold for arrears of payment. Thus, the land revenue collector became a landlord, with the Achilles’ heel that the lands he administered could be sold for arrears, while the tiers of lesser landholders became his tenants. The zamindar reaped the profit of rising prices and of cultivation of wasteland, while the classes below him lost their occupancy rights. The intended protection of these tenants proved illusory because their rights were customary, unsupported by documents. The legal cases that ensued clogged the courts to the point of breakdown. Initially, the zamindar often lost his holding because the fixed demand was pitched too high. The net result of this measure was the creation of a landlord class, loyal to the British connection but divorced from touch with the cultivators. The government, receiving the revenue from the zamindars, knew little of the people and could do little for them.

At first the Bengal system was thought to provide the key to Indian administration, but doubts multiplied with the years. In Madras, Sir Thomas Munro retained the paternal framework of government but introduced a radically differing method of revenue management known as the ryotwari system, in which the settlement was made directly with the cultivator, each field being separately measured and annually assessed. The system eliminated the middleman but sometimes placed the cultivators at the mercy of lower officials, who often formed cliques of caste groups. Munro considered that innovation and ignorance were the ruling British vices. His system tended to be static and to allow the subordinate tail to wag the directing British dog.

In western India, Mountstuart Elphinstone had the problem of reconciling to British control the resentful Marathas of the peshwa’s dominions. With a masterly mixture of tact and firmness, he largely succeeded. He retained Indian agency as far as possible, and he allowed the Maratha nobles, or jāgīrdārs, to retain most of their land and many of their privileges. He even continued some donations to Hindu temples. He used the ryotwari method of assessing land revenue, collecting through local officials from the village headmen. In Bombay he encouraged Western learning and science, tempting suspicious Brahmans to open their minds to the West. He foresaw the ultimate end of British rule through voluntary Westernization, and he took the first steps toward introducing the new world without antagonizing the old.

In the north, Sir Charles Metcalfe discovered the largely autonomous village with its joint ownership and cultivation by caste oligarchies. He believed this to be the original pattern of rural organization throughout India, and it became his passion to preserve it as far as possible in current conditions. Like Munro and Elphinstone, he was suspicious of change and wished to leave the villagers alone as far as possible. In this he was powerfully supported by the work of Holt MacKenzie, the Bengal secretary whose memorandum of 1819 set a course of recognition and record of village rights for the whole of the northwestern provinces (as later revised and codified, this marked the end of the Bengal system of permanent revenue settlement).

The resulting system of administration of British India was still largely Indian in pattern, though it was now British in direction and superintendence. It was paternalistic and hierarchical, and it suffered, like its immediate predecessors, from a chronic tendency to overassess. The Mughal emperor was replaced by the mystical entity the Company Bahadur, and its representative, the governor-general, moved about with almost equal pomp. The higher direction was exclusively European, but the officers acted in a Mughal spirit, and the administration at subdistrict and village level went on much as before. But there were also large changes. The British established on a national scale the idea of property in land, and the resulting buying and selling caused large class changes. Their new security benefited the commercial classes generally, but the deliberate sacrifice of Indian industry to the claims of the new machine industries of Britain ruined such ancient crafts as cotton and silk weaving. The new legal system, with its network of courts, proved efficient on the criminal justice side but was heavily overloaded on the civil.

The strain and the scandal of this situation created a demand for increased Indian agency and caused the first breaches in the British monopoly of higher office. Indianization began with the confessed inefficiency of the British legal system. The picture is completed by the company’s army, separately organized in the three presidencies and officered, like the civil service, exclusively by the British. It was backed by contingents of the British army. The Bengal army preponderated in numbers and fighting spirit. By European standards it was cumbrous and inefficient; some of its defects were exposed in the early days of the war with Nepal. But it was more than a match for anything that could be brought against it. Of other powers in the region, only the Russians, could they have moved so far in force, might have made short work of it.