Paper 2022/1410
Breaking and Protecting the Crystal: Side-Channel Analysis of Dilithium in Hardware
Abstract
The lattice-based CRYSTALS-Dilithium signature scheme has been selected for standardization by the NIST. As part of the selection process, a large number of implementations for platforms like x86, ARM Cortex-M4, or – on the hardware side – Xilinx Artix-7 have been presented and discussed by experts. While software implementations have been subject to side-channel analysis with several attacks being published, an analysis of Dilithium hardware implementations and their peculiarities has not taken place. With this work, we aim to fill this gap, presenting an analysis of vulnerable operations and practically showing a successful profiled Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and a Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) on a recent hardware implementation by Beckwith et al. Our SPA attack requires 700 000 profiling traces and targets the first Number-Theoretic Transform (NTT) stage. After finishing profiling, we can identify pairs of coefficients with 1 101 traces. The full CPA attack finds secret coefficients with as low as 66 000 traces. In response, we present specific countermeasures and show that they effectively prevent both attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. PQCRYPTO 2023
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40003-2_25
- Keywords
- FPGASide-Channel AnalysisSPACPAPQCDilithium
- Contact author(s)
-
h steffen @ tuvit de
mail @ georg land
tim gueneysu @ rub de - History
- 2023-08-16: revised
- 2022-10-18: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1410
- License
-
CC BY-SA
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1410, author = {Hauke Steffen and Georg Land and Lucie Kogelheide and Tim Güneysu}, title = {Breaking and Protecting the Crystal: Side-Channel Analysis of Dilithium in Hardware}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1410}, year = {2022}, doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40003-2_25}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1410} }