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Logical Partitions on Many-Core Platforms

Published: 07 December 2015 Publication History

Abstract

Cloud platforms that use logical partitions to allocate dedicated resources to VMs can benefit from small and therefore secure hypervisors. Many-core platforms, with their abundant resources, are an attractive basis to create and deploy logical partitions on a large scale. However, many-core platforms are designed for efficient cross-core data sharing rather than isolation, which is a key requirement for logical partitions. Typically, logical partitions leverage hardware virtualization extensions that require complex CPU core enhancements. These extensions are not optimal for many-core platforms, where it is preferable to keep the cores as simple as possible.
In this paper, we show that a simple address-space isolation mechanism, that can be implemented in the Network-on-Chip of the many-core processor, is sufficient to enable logical partitions. We implement the proposed change for the Intel Single-Chip Cloud Computer (SCC). We also design a cloud architecture that relies on a small and disengaged hypervisor for the security-enhanced Intel SCC. Our prototype hypervisor is 3.4K LOC which is comparable to the smallest hypervisors available today. Furthermore, virtual machines execute bare-metal avoiding runtime interaction with the hypervisor and virtualization overhead.

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    cover image ACM Other conferences
    ACSAC '15: Proceedings of the 31st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
    December 2015
    489 pages
    ISBN:9781450336826
    DOI:10.1145/2818000
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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    Published: 07 December 2015

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