research-article

Designing for incentives: better information sharing for better software engineering

Authors:

Gabriel A. Moreno,

David C. Parkes,

Kurt WallnauAuthors Info & Claims

FoSER '10: Proceedings of the FSE/SDP workshop on Future of software engineering research

Pages 195 - 200

https://doi.org/10.1145/1882362.1882404

Published: 07 November 2010 Publication History

Abstract

Software-reliant systems permeate all aspects of modern society. The resulting interconnectedness and associated complexity has resulted in a proliferation of diverse stakeholders with conflicting goals. Thus, contemporary software engineering is plagued by incentive conflicts, in settling on design features, allocating resources during the development of products, and allocating computational resources at runtime. In this position paper, we describe some of these problems and outline a research agenda in bridging to the economic theory of mechanism design, which seeks to align incentives in multi-agent systems with private information and conflicting goals. The ultimate goal is to advance a principled methodology for the design of incentive-compatible approaches to manage the dynamic processes of software engineering.

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Cited By

Hu SHou LChen GWeng JLi JSchulzrinne HLi P(2018)Reputation-based Distributed Knowledge Sharing System in BlockchainProceedings of the 15th EAI International Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems: Computing, Networking and Services10.1145/3286978.3286981(476-481)Online publication date: 5-Nov-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3286978.3286981
Yilmaz MO’Connor R(2012)A Market Based Approach for Resolving Resource Constrained Task Allocation Problems in a Software Development ProcessSystems, Software and Services Process Improvement10.1007/978-3-642-31199-4_3(25-36)Online publication date: 2012
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31199-4_3

Index Terms

Designing for incentives: better information sharing for better software engineering
1. Social and professional topics
  1. Professional topics
    1. Management of computing and information systems
      1. Project and people management
2. Software and its engineering
  1. Software creation and management
    1. Software development process management
  2. Software notations and tools
    1. Software configuration management and version control systems

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cover image ACM Conferences

FoSER '10: Proceedings of the FSE/SDP workshop on Future of software engineering research

November 2010

460 pages

ISBN:9781450304276

DOI:10.1145/1882362

General Chair:
Gruia-Catalin Roman
Washington University in St. Louis, USA
,
Program Chair:
Kevin Sullivan
University of Virginia, USA

Copyright © 2010 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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SIGSOFT: ACM Special Interest Group on Software Engineering

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 07 November 2010

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SIGSOFT/FSE'10

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SIGSOFT

SIGSOFT/FSE'10: 18th ACM SIGSOFT Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering

November 7 - 8, 2010

New Mexico, Santa Fe, USA

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Cited By

Hu SHou LChen GWeng JLi JSchulzrinne HLi P(2018)Reputation-based Distributed Knowledge Sharing System in BlockchainProceedings of the 15th EAI International Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems: Computing, Networking and Services10.1145/3286978.3286981(476-481)Online publication date: 5-Nov-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3286978.3286981
Yilmaz MO’Connor R(2012)A Market Based Approach for Resolving Resource Constrained Task Allocation Problems in a Software Development ProcessSystems, Software and Services Process Improvement10.1007/978-3-642-31199-4_3(25-36)Online publication date: 2012
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31199-4_3

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