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Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory

arXiv:1902.09251 (cs)
[Submitted on 25 Feb 2019]

Title:Incentive Compatibility, Scalability and Privacy in real time Demand Response

Authors:Georgios Tsaousoglou, Konstantinos Steriotis, Nikolaos Efthymiopoulos, Prodrommos Makris, Emmanouel Varvarigos
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Abstract:The high penetration of Renewable Energy Sources in modern smart grids necessitated the development of Demand Response (DR) mechanisms as well as corresponding innovative services for the emerging flexibility markets. From a game theoretic perspective, the basic key performance indicators (KPIs) for such DR mechanisms are efficiency in terms of social welfare, practical applicability, and incentive guarantees, in the sense of making it a dominant strategy for each user to act truthfully according to his/her preferences, leaving no room for cheating. In this paper, we propose a DR architecture, including a mechanism based on Ausubel clinching auction and a communication protocol, that provably guarantee both efficiency and truthful user participation. Practicality/easiness of participation is enhanced via simple queries, while user privacy issues are addressed via a distributed implementation. Simulation results confirm the desired properties, while also showing that the truthfulness property becomes even more important in markets where participants are not particularly flexible
Subjects: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
Cite as: arXiv:1902.09251 [cs.GT]
  (or arXiv:1902.09251v1 [cs.GT] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1902.09251

Submission history

From: Georgios Tsaousoglou [view email]
[v1] Mon, 25 Feb 2019 13:23:37 UTC (589 KB)
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Georgios Tsaousoglou
Konstantinos Steriotis
Nikolaos Efthymiopoulos
Prodromos Makris
Emmanouel A. Varvarigos
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