Philosophical Scepticism

Quatrième de couverture:
Réfléchir à la réflexion, penser la pensée et philosopher sur la philosophie, voilà ce que l’on propose de faire ici. Cette démarche est moins formelle qu’il n’y paraît, car interroger la nature et les exigences de la pensée philosophique engage toute une philosophie. Une philosophie qui n’est pas dupe d’elle-même et qui commence par examiner sa propre finitude. « La dernière démarche de la raison, c’est de connaître qu’il y a une infinité de choses qui la surpassent. Elle est bien faible si elle ne va jusque là », disait Pascal. Nous montrons dans un esprit proche que la réflexion est d’autant plus puissante qu’elle reconnaît son impuissance, comme la philosophie authentique doit se savoir doublement bornée, par la pensée scientifique d’une part, et par la pensée mystique d’autre part. Il ne s’agit pas de rabaisser la philosophie, mais au contraire de lui permettre de comprendre ce qui la comprend et de trouver sa juste place dans le champ intellectuel.

Table des matières

Partie I – Enjeux ontologiques, gnoséologiques et axiologiques de la réflexion

1- Fécondité de la réflexion, primat phénoménologique de l’irréfléchi, et horizon métaphysique de la réflexivité philosophique

2- Les insuffisances gnoséologiques de la réflexion et l’horizon scientifique de la philosophie

3- La réflexion sur les valeurs et les valeurs immanentes à la réflexion

Partie II – La religion, la philosophie, la science et la mystique : progrès et bornes de la réflexion théorique

1- Les progrès de la réflexion théorique : la religion, la philosophie et la science

2- Les bornes de la réflexion théorique : la science, la philosophie et la mystique

Partie III – Nature et exigences de la pensée philosophique (étude sur la philosophie et philosophie de la philosophie)

1- Remarques introductives sur le projet de définir la philosophie et d’évaluer les philosophies

2- Les exigences théoriques de la philosophie

3- Les exigences pratiques de la philosophie

4- Bilan sur les questions de définition et d’évaluation

Partie IV – De la réflexivité intradisciplinaire à l’objectivation extradisciplinaire (histoire philosophique et savante de la philosophie)

1- Remarques générales sur les rapports d’une discipline à son historiographie

2- De la sociologie de la philosophie à l’histoire scientifique de la philosophie

This article provides a new account of Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysical philosophy. After framing Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysical project (Section 1), I suggest that in order to understand the logic of his critique we can reconstruct a taxonomy which distinguishes between ‘rich metaphysics’ and ‘thin metaphysics’ in a way that has not been sufficiently recognised in the literature (Section 2). I then consider Nietzsche’s methodological critique of ‘rich metaphysics’, arguing that his position, which alleges motivational bias against ‘rich metaphysics’, is not compelling, since even granting that previous ‘rich metaphysicians’ exemplified such bias there is no necessity to a new ‘rich metaphysician’ doing so (Section 3). Nonetheless, there is much of interest in the second aspect of Nietzsche’s critique, understood in terms of indifference to ‘thin metaphysics’ which I consider in Section 4. I argue that the existing readings are unsatisfactory, and as an alternative we should think of this idea in sceptical terms by drawing on an argument from ‘thin metaphysical’ disagreement. The overall interpretation is one in which Nietzsche’s texts provide us with some distinctive tools for carving up and criticising metaphysics.

Resumen: La pretensión del autor es iluminar, en contraste con los dos proyectos que dominan el panorama filosófico contemporáneo: una reconstrucción de la filosofía de corte pragmatista e historicista y una reconstrucción en filosofía que acentúa su carácter sustantivo y autónomo; algunos de los aspectos, frecuentemente ignorados, del método desarrollado por Wittgenstein en su última producción, aspectos tan radicales como novedosos.
Pretendemos, por tanto: (i) Mostrar que, de acuerdo con Wittgenstein, la fuente de la inquietud filosófica es la existencia de imágenes inconscientes que funcionan como normas de representación absorbidas dentro de las formas de nuestro lenguaje y que excluyen posibilidades alternativas. Estos símiles fijan cómo las cosas deben y cómo no pueden ser. (ii) Demostrar que la finalidad del método filosófico diseñado por Wittgenstein es cambiar nuestras representaciones y reemplazar viejos hábitos de pensamiento, esto es, que su meta es la creación de nuevos objetos de comparación y la yuxtaposición de símiles con el objeto de quebrar la fascinación que una analogía única ejerce sobre nuestra inteligencia. (iii) Subrayar que los modelos de presentación carecen de valor de verdad; que la imaginación es esencial en la práctica del método wittgensteiniano; que su consecuencia es la libertad intelectual y que, en la medida en que al concebir como absurdo un problema filosófico se alcanza lo que podría denominarse “una suspensión de interés”, la estrategia de Wittgenstein es análoga a la formulada y ejemplificada por el pirronismo. 

Palabras clave: Actitud reformista en filosofía - Actitud revolucionaria en filosofía - Método de representación - Modelos alternativos - Normatividad - Pirronismo - Presentación perspicua - Suspensión de interés - Terapia - Wittgenstein.

Abstract: The author aims at shedding light, against the background of two projects which share the whole present philosophical landscape: a “reconstruction of philosophy” inspired by pragmatism and historicism and a “reconstruction in philosophy” defending the autonomous and substantive character of philosophical theses and methods; on some neglected aspects of Wittgenstein’s late method, aspects so much radical as novel.
Therefore, we pretend: (i) To show that, according to Wittgenstein, the source of philosophical disquiet is the existence of unconscious pictures which function as norms of representation deeply ingrained in our thinking and which exclude alternative possibilities. They fix how things must and cannot be. (ii) To demonstrate that the philosophical method Wittgenstein envisages tries to change someone’s way of looking at things and to replace entrenched habits of thinking by new ones, that is, it tries to create new objects of comparison and to juxtapose pictures with pictures in order to break the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of an unique analogy. (iii) To stress that analogies are not true or false; that imagination is essential to practising Wittgenstein’s method; that its consequence is intellectual freedom and that, because coming to see that a philosophical problem is meaningless we reach what might be called “a suspension of concern”, this purge of our philosophical anxieties resembles the persuasive use of arguments in Pyrrhonism.

Key words: Alternative Models - Method of Representation - Normativity - Perspicuous Presentation - Pyrrhonism - Reforming Attitude in Philosophy - Revolutionary Attitude in Philosophy - Suspension of Concern - Therapy - Wittgenstein.

Da Pirrone a Rorty, passando per Socrate, Carneade, Cicerone, Giovanni di Salisbury, Guicciardini, Montaigne, Sorbière, Pascal, Bayle, Hume, Nietzsche, Russell, Rensi, Oakeshott e Popper: il volume offre per la prima volta un quadro completo della storia dello scetticismo politico, rappresentato da alcune delle figure intellettuali più influenti del pensiero occidentale ma ritenute politicamente “scomode” per la loro incessante critica alle ideologie, ai dogmatismi dei partiti, ai paradigmi normativi e ai mezzi di persuasione diversi da quelli improntati al buon senso, alla prudenza e alla moderazione. L’autore dimostra che a unire tutti gli scettici politici è uno “stile” che privilegia il saggio al trattato, l’ipotesi alla certezza infallibile, il pluralismo al monismo, la verità conversazionale alla soluzione finale. Benché quasi tutti siano stati additati dai loro contemporanei come infedeli, reprobi, esiliati e gretti, le loro posizioni si sono rivelate essenziali non solo per la teoria politica in senso proprio, ma anche per l’affermazione di idee “altre” di libertà, tolleranza e convivenza civile.

in "Mind, Self and Person, ed. Anthony O'Hear (Cambridge University Press 2015) - It is often thought that as human agents we have a power to determine our actions for ourselves. And a natural conception of this power is as freedom - a power over alternatives so that we can determine for ourselves which of a variety of possible actions we perform. But what is the real content of this conception of freedom, and need self- determination take this particular form? I examine the possible forms self-determination might take, and the various ways freedom as a power over alternatives might be constituted. I argue that though ordinary ethical thought, and especially moral blame, may be committed to our possession of some capacity for self-determination, the precise nature of this power is probably ethically underdetermined - though conceptions of the nature of the power that come from outside ethics may then have important implications for ethics.

Aristotle is one of the important sources for studying pre-platonic Philosophers, among whom Heraclitus was the subject of Aristotle's main focus. His focus on Heraclitus was most importantly for the reason that Heraclitus was, as Plato states, the Intellectual godfather of Sophists and according to Aristotle, the Intellectual godfather of Plato himself. Aristotle therefore sought to make fundamental critiques of doctrines of Heraclitus and to thereby attack foundations of sophistic and platonic thoughts as well. This paper aims firstly to show the domains in which the doctrines of Heraclitus influence on doctrines of Sophists and Plato's thoughts. it seems that Heraclitus' attempt to reject authenticity of sensible and particular things convinced Sophists in their idea that there is no truth, and made Plato to claim that, since there is no truth in sensible and particular things, one should search for another container which would, based on doctrines of Parmenides, provide degrees of solidarity in order for one to acquire science and knowledge. Plato introduced the container to his theory of Ideas. After examining the influence of Heraclitus on Sophists and Plato, the paper then looks at Aristotle's critiques of two famous doctrines of Heraclitus, namely the doctrine of Universal Flux and that of Identity of Opposites, and demonstrates which particular thoughts of platonic ideas or sophistic paradoxes can be the target of the criticisms. it seems that criticisms endeavor to imply that sensible and particular things have some sort of solidarity. Sophistic doctrines will thereby be rejected altogether and platonic doctrines on his Ideas and his creation of their container will be pointless.

The intended title was “Universe Oriented Ontology” or “Multiverse Oriented Ontology”, or “Universe or Multiverse Metaphysics”.
I mention this as it gives an idea about the meaning and intention of the title and the work as well as the titles I considered and why I moved away from them to the present one.
The sub-title provides a further hint towards the intentions of the work, namely: ” Beyond Earth- and Human-centricity’. I opted for ‘transcending’ rather than beyond, as I am still in the process of describing the process of transcending and many of the ideas I am obliged to use from our conceptual system and practices are still earth- and anthropo-centered, And, they have not yet gone to a state beyond those two -isms.
I say something about universe-centeredness, then about planet earth as point and frame of reference and anthropo-centricity.
The socio-cultural practice of philosophy and the doing of philosophy is merely one of many human, social and cultural practices. I post different notions of philosophy by a number of writers, some of them philosophers. These notions are about their perceptions of what philosophy is. Few of them go into detail about the subject-matter of philosophy. No one really deal with the aims, purposes and objectives of the discipline and none deal with the nature of the doing of philosophy or philosophizing. Activities that I suggest resemble certain features of the processes of theorizing.
I end with explorations of possible characteristics of original- and creative thinkers. I do this by mentioning a number of themes of meta-philosophy listed and described by Peter Suber. I make a number of comments in them and highlight aspects relevant to these type of thinkers.
One find them of course in all disciplines and socio-cultural [racticesand disciplines be they the arts,humanities, sciences, etc. I am of course specifically concerned with original andcreative thinkers inthe Western tradition of philosophy.
As I am a radical and absolute sceptic, I end with an article on this theme.
It is said by everyone, for example Hume, Russell and Pascal, that such a radical position is psychologically impossible and that it cannot be lived 24/7. Pascal for example opted for believe or faith and he and a number of writers suggest that that  is the only way out and the final position of radical sceptics. I disagree with him.

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One of the most renowned pages of Pascal's Pensées offers an astonishing phenomenology of the all-powerful action of imagination in human life. This article retraces the genesis of this text and reassesses the sources of Pascal's conception of imagination. It argues that Pascal builds up his definition of the imagination as an ‘anti-theodicy’ which carefully recalls and then criticizes the Cartesian ‘theodicy of error’ and the foundation of the ‘general rule’ of truth proposed by the Fourth Meditation. In doing so, Pascal undermines the major aim of Descartes's Meditations, which is to secure human nature against any doubt as to its intrinsic perfection. Where, according to Descartes, human knowledge is finite yet perfectly secured in its accomplishments when we use the faculties of our mind correctly, Pascal describes imagination as a deceptive faculty that seems to have been given to us specifically to lead us into necessary error.

The Illusion of Doubt confronts one of the most important questions
in philosophy and beyond: what can we know? The radical sceptic’s answer is ‘not very much’ if we cannot prove that we are not subject to (possibly permanent) deception. For centuries philosophers have been impressed by the radical sceptic’s move, but this book shows that the
radical sceptical problem turns out to be an illusion created by a mistaken picture of our evidential situation. This means that we don’t need to answer the radical sceptical problem ‘head on’, but rather to undermine the philosophical assumptions that it depends on. For without these assumptions, radical scepticism collapses all by itself. This result is highly significant, as it manages to dissolve one of the most intractable philosophical problems that has bedevilled some of the greatest minds until the present day.

In this essay, I argue that a proper understanding of the Cartesian proof of the external world sheds light on some vexatious questions concerning his theory of sense perception. Three main points emerge from the discussion: a picture of the mind, conceived as the power of understanding, as essentially related to the physical world; an extension of rationality such that it includes a set of necessities that neither can be deduced from the principles furnished by pure understanding alone nor are to be found among the particular items of sense experience; and a conception of human sense perception as a composite power that includes sensory awareness as well as understanding, and so that establishes a sharp distinction between human and animal sensory awareness. As far as agency is a constitutive ingredient of human sense perception, Descartes’ doctrine is in line with some current versions of a virtue epistemology.

‘Hegel and scepticism’ remains an intriguing topic directly concerning the logical and methodological core of Hegel’s system and its formation. Hegel’s thought evolved through his vivid involvement in the vigorous debates over scepticism that took place in Germany around 1800. His strategy did not consist of any fatal immediate confrontation with scepticism. On the contrary, he aimed to immunize philosophy against the threat of scepticism by integrating the latter into the former as its negative and free moment. Hegel’s interpretation of Sextus’ five tropes remains invaluable for his attempt to form a philosophical system that sublates both dogmatism and scepticism. A series of contributions is unfolding around a keynote paper by Klaus Vieweg – a prominent Hegel scholar who has devoted much of his academic work to the historical and systematic relationship between Hegel and scepticism – which tries to understand and restate the limits and the content of this relationship. Various Hegel readers with different theoretical concerns are dealing with Hegel’s strategy in a large range of areas from logic and epistemology to political philosophy, aesthetics and the history of science.

This essay presents some of the key facts of ancient scepticism and what is more important, it tries to respond to the question whether ancient scepticism is practically coherent. It gives a brief description on the historical and philosophical context on that time, what was before that, who are the main leaders of ancient scepticism and what every philosopher intended to say. On that time, there were two big school of scepticism: Academic and Pyrrhonian. The paper also discusses the main differences between them and how each one replies to the Apraxia Charge (whether sceptics can act if they do not hold any belief) and other objections.

This article is concerned with some of the criteria which Hegel believes apply to a scientific treatment of logic. I briefly address criteria which I take Hegel to inherit from traditional rationalism before focusing on two fairly idiosyncratic criteria: the requirement that a science of logic exhibit a circular structure and that it begin with the concept of pure being. I offer an explanation of these criteria which understands them as motivated by anti-sceptical concerns, before arguing that Hegel's mature treatment of the latter criterion is problematically ambiguous.

This chapter begins by tracing the complex argumentation of Meditation One. The second section explores the differences between Cartesian skeptical arguments and the skeptical arguments discussed in the ancient world, while the third section considers whether there might be medieval antecedents for the radical doubts that end Meditation One. The final section suggests that the radical nature of the doubts raised in Meditation One has its sources in two fundamental characteristics of Cartesian science: the radical error that Cartesian science posits in our everyday experience of the world, and the hypothetical and (only) morally certain nature of the scientific edifice that is proposed to replace the commonsense view of the world enshrined in Aristotelian science.

"Scritto da un Agostino trentaduenne all’indomani della conversione, il «Contra Academicos» è un dialogo filosofico in tre libri, basato sulle conversazioni realmente avvenute a Cassiciaco nell’autunno del 386.
Il problema discusso nel I libro è il rapporto tra felicità e verità: per il giovane Licenzio all’uomo basta cercare la verità per essere felice; per il suo compagno Trigezio, al contrario, occorre trovarla.
Nel II e nel III libro Agostino in persona discute con l’amico Alipio, il quale sostiene il punto di vista degli Accademici “nuovi”, cioè lo scetticismo di Arcesilao, Carneade e Filone di Larissa, appoggiato dallo stesso Cicerone. Secondo questi filosofi, l’uomo non può ottenere conoscenze certe nel campo della filosofia, perciò il sapiente deve trattenere il suo assenso e limitarsi a seguire, nella vita, il “probabile” o “verosimile”. Con una serie di argomentazioni, Agostino cerca di mostrare che, invece, la verità è conoscibile con certezza e che, senza la conoscenza del vero, il criterio della “probabilità”o “verosimiglianza” non riesce a tutelare l’agire umano dall’errore; suggerisce infine l’ipotesi che lo scetticismo accademico sia stato solo una mossa tattica per contrastare il materialismo stoico.
Ne risulta un’appassionata esortazione a filosofare, un vero e proprio “protreptico” che Agostino indirizza al benefattore Romaniano e, tramite lui, a tutti i suoi lettori.
Quest’edizione è curata da Giovanni Catapano (che per i “Testi a fronte” ha già tradotto, del medesimo autore, il «De immortalitate animae» e il «De quantitate animae»: Agostino, «Sull’anima», Milano 2003) e intende fornire tutti gli strumenti per una lettura approfondita dell’opera: un’ampia e articolata introduzione, una traduzione chiara e affidabile, una gran quantità di note al testo, un elenco minuzioso di parole chiave e una bibliografia aggiornata. Il testo latino a fronte corregge e modifica in vari punti quello dell’edizione critica più recente, a cura di W.M. Green (contenuta nel vol. XXIX del «Corpus Christianorum, series Latina», Turnhout 1970). «"

Here I bewail the slapdash and confusing way in which philosophers bandy about the word ‘incoherent’ (and ‘incoherence’ and ‘incoherently’).  To some it appears to mean: inconsistent; to others: pragmatically self-defeating; and to yet others: nonsensical, i.e. meaningless.  And often one is left guessing.

Объектом исследования является проблематика интроспекции в философии сознания. С целью выяснить эпистемологические возможности интроспекции применялся метод теоретической реконструкции, а также сравнительный и исторический. Новизна работы состоит в том, что она предлагает фундаментальное теоретическое переосмысление проблематики интроспекции в условиях невозможности принятия как позиции, наделяющей ее абсолютной достоверностью, так и точки зрения, полностью отрицающей ее исследовательские возможности. Практическая значимость исследования состоит в том, что его результаты могут быть применены в преподавании курсов гносеологии, философии психологии, проблем современной философии сознания.

Dans un article paru en 2010 dans la Revue de métaphysique et de morale, Stéphane Marchand pose la question suivante : « le sceptique cherche-t-il vraiment la vérité ? ». Cette interrogation trouve son origine dans un passage des Vies et doctrines des philosophes illustres, dans lequel Diogène Laërce définit le néo-pyrrhonisme comme une philosophie « zététique », qui « recherche continuellement la vérité », et « sceptique », qui « examine toujours et ne trouve jamais ». Cette citation semble révéler le caractère paradoxal de la démarche sceptique des néo-pyrrhoniens, telle que rapportée par Sextus Empiricus dans ses Esquisses pyrrhoniennes. Pour Sextus, le sceptique ne trouve pas la vérité et suspend son jugement ; il atteint par là la tranquillité. Dès lors, le sceptique peut-il chercher la vérité sans penser pouvoir la trouver, sans volonté de la trouver ? La recherche de la vérité a cela de problématique qu'elle semble exiger du sceptique un cadre de pensée en contradiction avec sa philosophie. Et c'est toute la philosophie sceptique qui est alors inquiétée, et en premier lieu en tant que philosophie. Si le sceptique se soumet à la recherche de la vérité, n'entre-t-il pas déjà dans un cadre qu'il veut pourtant mettre en doute ? Si au contraire il ne recherche pas la vérité, peut-il seulement justifier sa démarche et sa qualité philosophique ?

Genel olarak modern felsefenin kurucu filozofu olarak kabul edilen Fransız filozof Rene Descartes'in "felsefe yapma" biçimi, kendisinden önceki gelenekten belirgin şekilde farklıdır. Bu yüzden ona bu "kurucu" ünvanının verilmesinde en büyük payın söz konusu özgün yöntemine ait olduğu söylenebilir. Felsefe literatüründe kısaca "metodik kuşku" olarak adlandırılan bu yöntem onun bilgi ve varlık hakkındaki görüşlerini baştan sona belirlemiş, kendinden sonraki felsefelerin "sorgulama biçimlerini" de büyük ölçüde etkilemiştir.Descartes'in bilgi kuramı bilginin doğası ve neliğinden çok, elde ediliş yolu ve kesinlik derecesi üzerinde yoğunlaşır. Bu felsefede ağırlıklı olan, doğru bilginin hangi yol ile mümkün olduğu şeklindeki metodik kaygıdır. Söz konusu metodik yaklaşım doğrultusunda ortaya koyduğu varlık kuramında da Descartes varlık kavramının içeriği ya da varlığın neliği sorunuyla değil, neyin hangi temel özellikleriyle var olduğu ve var olanların birbirlerine göre konumları konusuna ağırlık vermiştir.

This paper explores a certain kind of concessive, non-evidentialist response to scepticism. The discussion is framed both at a general level and with a specific focus on mathematics. The general aim of the paper is to introduce and articulate a pluralist consequentialist form of concessive, non-evidentialist anti-scepticism. The view to be articulated is concessive and non-evidentialist because it grants that the sceptical challenge points to a genuine constraint on warrant for accepting cornerstone propositions (such as <There is an external world> or <Peano Arithmetic is satisfiable>): it has to be non-evidential in nature. In making this point the paper offers a detailed presentation of a scepticial argument in the context of mathematics. Satisfiability is an important mathematical property: if a given mathematical theory is satisfiable, there is a structure that satisfies its axioms. A satisfiable theory can thus be said to successfully delineate a subject-matter. An unsatisfiable theory, on the other hand, cannot. I argue that, just like <There is an external world> and other well-known anti-sceptical hypotheses are cornerstones for our thinking about the empirical world, the satisfiability proposition of a mathematical theory T (<T is satisfiable>) is a cornerstone for T-theorizing. Against this background, a mathematical sceptical argument is developed, transposing a familiar argument from mainstream epistemology and fitting the details to the mathematical case by drawing on Gödel's second incompleteness theorem. Having presented the mathematical sceptical argument, the remainder of the paper has a mostly general focus. I introduce a two fundamental, related challenges for concessive, non-evidentialist anti-sceptics. First, they must characterize a non-evidential notion of warrant that applies to cornerstone propositions (such as <There is an external world> and <T is satisfiable>). Second, they must answer the question: what is epistemically good about cornerstone acceptance? I address both of these questions by developing a pluralist consequentialist framework. The framework is explicitly axiological, making it apt for addressing the second question concerning value. However, it is likewise apt for addressing the first issue, due to the nature of positive epistemic standings such as warrant, rationality, and being underwritten by epistemic reasons. Such standings are positive standings with respect to epistemic goods. Thus, answering the question of value naturally provides answers to questions concerning warrant, rationality, and other positive epistemic standings.

First place winner of the Thomas Hardy Association Student Essay Prize 2017.

In one of his most lucid statements about matters of belief, Hardy identifies himself as “a harmless agnostic” and speculates: “Perhaps I can express more fully in verse ideas and emotions which run counter to the inert crystallized opinion […].” Taking this passage as a starting point, this essay studies Hardy’s tentative, provisional views of life that are signaled by this “perhaps,” which values fluid, rather than “inert,” thinking. His conflicted attitudes towards religious belief resist being summarized as “agnostic,” especially since the assertions of agnostics such as Leslie Stephen were underpinned by rationality: certain in their logical uncertainties. Hardy’s unknowing is characterized by open uncertainties, expressed through what he calls “obstinate questionings.” His fragmentary theorizing never settles on a final solution: recording “seemings” and “unadjusted impressions”; willing to make “endless adjustments”; observing that “all things merge in one another,” rather than making sharp-cut classifications; and, as in William James’ pragmatic view of reality as “still in the making,” believing that poetry and religion, like all things, must “keep moving, becoming.” This essay sounds out the subtle nuances in Hardy’s provisional thinking, while paying particular attention to the texture and patterns of his language, both in his personal writings (such as letters and notes) and in his creative work. It reconsiders Hardy’s impiety in light of Kenneth Burke’s understanding of the term: “an attempt to reorganize one’s orientations from the past,” which takes the form of “questionings.”

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In this paper we approach Eugeniu Sperantia’s contributions to the theory of knowledge, by focusing on the topic of skepticism. We first discuss Sperantia’s subjectivist theory of perception, showing that it fatally entails skepticism about the external world and other minds. Then we discuss Sperantia’s overcoming of the limits of his own theory of perception in the framework of an commonsensist epistemology inspired by Hamilton. Finally we emphasize the non-evidentialist features of Sperantia’s brand of foundationalism.

Cet article montre comment Jean Meslier reconfigure plusieurs considérations faites par Michel de Montaigne dans ses Essais, en donnant une orientation différente de l'original, mais non moins légitime. Meslier aurait utilisé les prémisses d'incrédulité postulées par Montaigne pour obtenir des conclusions irréligieuses. Cet article est présenté comme la première ébauche d'une étude à venir, dont la fin est de montrer, à travers quelques exemples, certaines de ces réécritures effectuées par le curé d'Étrépigny.

Foot argues that there are certain things that all human beings - perhaps all rational agents - need.  This gives a sense in which certain values and disvalues can be called 'objective'.  I suggest that, with certain relatively minor adjustments, her argument can be made cogent but that it cannot be used to show that there are objective answers to questions about what one should do when values conflict.  If Foot's own virtue ethics, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics or any other first-order moral system were to be established as objectively valid, this would require some completely different form of argumentation. 


Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

There are a number of debates that are relevant to questions concerning objectivity in science. One of the eldest, and still one of the most intensely fought, is the debate over epistemic relativism.-All forms of epistemic relativism commit themselves to the view that it is impossible to show in a neutral, non-question-begging, way that one " epistemic system " , that is, one interconnected set of epistemic standards, is epistemically superior to (all) others. I shall call this view " No-metajustification ". No-metajustification is commonly taken to deny the objectivity of standards. In this paper I shall discuss two currently popular attempts to attack " No-metajustification ". The first attempt attacks No-metajustification by challenging a particular strategy of arguing in its defence: this strategy involves the ancient Pyrrhonian " Problem of the Criterion ". The second attempt to refute No-metajustification targets its metaphysical underpinning: to wit, the claim that there are, or could be, several fundamentally different and irreconcilable epistemic systems. I shall call this assumption " Pluralism ". I shall address three questions with respect to these attempts to refute epistemic relativism by attacking No-metajustification: (i) Can the epistemic relativist rely on the Problem of the Criterion in support of No-metajustification? (ii) Is a combination of Chisholmian " particularism " (i.e. the insistence that we know lots of things) and epistemic naturalism an effective weapon against No-metajustification? And (iii) Is Pluralism a defensible assumption?