Indian security studies

The end of the cold war has changed the notion of security. In classical terms, security primarily means to defend and safeguard the territorial integrity and autonomy of the nation. In other words security envisages protection and welfare of the state from other neighboring states. But the process of globalization has changed the whole world " a global village ". States and communities have come together to promote their shared interests either forgetting or ignoring their differences. This changed environment has also led changes in the concept of security. The scope of the studies on security has therefore expanded with the emergence of diverse concepts like cooperative security, comprehensive security, human security, non-traditional security. i In such an interdependent world, the multidimensional concept of security has given way to social, economic, political, cultural security also. The globalist approach to security addresses issues of global inequality, poverty, human rights, democracy, individual and group security, sustainable economic development, protection of environment etc. The importance of energy raised energy security question and energy security turned to the integral part of a countries foreign as well as domestic policy. The energy security became one of the major components of the security by states. In this paper an attempt has been made to analyze and evaluate India " s energy security policy. Simultaneously, this paper explains the ever-increasing gap between India " s energy vision and its energy reality.

Religious and other communal violence, though they are ever recurring phenomenon in South Asia, in its modern history it is increasing dramatically day by day. People in South Asia are becoming more and more violent. The main cause of communal violence in South Asia is more or less related to religion, ethnicity, and fundamentalist ideology and so on. In this paper firstly I mentioned different scholars thought regarding South Asian communal violence and its historical root. Some of the authors blame the British ‘’Divide and Rule’’ policy and some others argued that Muslim invaders are responsible for religious and communal violence in South Asia. Then I discussed different south Asian counties communal violence from the 20th century to the present time era. I’ve explained also some communal violence incident which occurred in different parts of South Asia.

China is facing a growing strategic dilemma in the Indian Ocean. The balance of power in the Indian Ocean is changing, driven by the erosion of the longstanding US strategic predominance and the rise of China and India as major powers. Many analysts see a significant danger of an increasing strategic contest between China and India in the Indian Ocean as they jostle for influence and position in ways reminiscent of US-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War.

Control over access to the Indian Ocean is often seen through a highly securitised lens. Strategic actors have long sought to use geographical constraints to maintain the region as a relatively enclosed strategic space. It has only a few narrow maritime entrance points and the littoral is not well connected to the interior of the Eurasian continent. These factors have contributed to the historical domination of the Indian Ocean by a succession of extra-regional maritime powers and the virtual exclusion of Eurasian land powers such as China and Russia. This paper considers how the physical geography of the Indian Ocean has contributed to its control by some powers and the exclusion of others. It then discusses China's Maritime Silk Route/One Belt One Road initiative, which includes growing interests in Indian Ocean ports and plans to build new overland pathways to connect China with the Indian Ocean. The paper concludes that while China's growing maritime interests in Indian Ocean are strategically important, it is the new overland routes connecting the Eurasian hinterland with the ocean that have the potential to change the entire geostrategic character of the region.

A summary of this paper is available for download.

Post Cold War international relations have undeniably been a litmus test for the bilateral relations between India and Russia. With the emergence of a new international system, the foreign policies of both countries vacillated to explore new avenues of partnerships with other international players, an opportunity that otherwise proved effective to a large extent. National priorities and the geo-political architecture remodelled by the US, thus, compelled New Delhi and Moscow to pursue a foreign policy that moved away from serving the interests of each other. While defining the trends in the bilateral relations between the two countries, the strategic community has questioned whether the relationship can remain as special and strategic as it had been in the past. Are both countries still as relevant to one another as they once were?

As the constant debate revolves around these questions, the two entities have, however, indicated a certain level of distinguishing characteristics in order to address the complexities and challenges in the partnership and have acknowledged that their relationship is not only special but also indispensable. What has also continued to remain undamaged and an integral part of the bilateral relations is mutual trust, understanding and concern, thus, resulting in maturity and pragmatism, irrespective of the uncertainties that the two countries face. It is in this context, that the new stage in the bilateral relations between the two countries requires a thorough assessment. It stands to reason that with the developments that are taking place in the current international milieu, there is a need for India and Russia to reemphasise their strong strategic partnership, goodwill and diplomatic trust that have stood the test of time. This book undertakes a serious assessment of the strategic partnership in the contemporary international set up. The seven chapters of the book attempt to address the myriad challenges through detailed analyses and evaluation of the partnership between India and Russia in various spheres, including the political, defence, economic, nuclear, energy, science and technology, security, and strategic engagement.

India faces numerous contemporary security challenges, many of them internal. Domestic politics plays a major role in determining which security challenges are construed by Indians as the most pressing. This article first touches on the evolution of India’s domestic politics and foreign policy since independence, then discusses various domestic, regional and global security challenges relevant to India today, and concludes by considering whether the country’s current foreign policy can hasten its emergence as a Great Power or conversely, will confine it to its current reach as merely a regional one.

India’s role as a security provider has increasingly been discussed and debated over a period of time. This has received a fillip as a result of India’s growing capabilities, both economic and military. The 2015 edition of the Asian Strategic Review, is possibly the first book which analyses this facet in the Asian context. The book assesses India’s capabilities as well as existing limitations. It contextualises India’s role in relation to important regions, multinational fora and specific countries in Asia. The publication aims to provide greater clarity on the past, present and future contours of India’s role as a security provider, in light of evolving strategic contours and its security implications.

Terrorism finance has aptly been termed as the lifeblood of terrorism. Yet, this remains one of the most under researched facets of terrorism. This limitation is even more apparent in the Indian context, despite the fact that the country has faced the scrouge of terrorism and insurgency for over five decades. Lifeblood of Terrorism: Countering Terrorism Finance, is the first book on the subject in an Indian context. The book contextualises the concept of terrorism finance to local realities based on distinct peculiarities as related to India. It documents the sources, transfer mechanisms and employment of funds for supporting organisational structures and acts of terrorism. The book also analyses two case studies to highlight in detail the methods employed for external and internal funding. The challenges associated with terrorism finance are further related to contributing factors which have aggravated the threat.

A SWOT analysis of existing sources, challenges and approach to terrorism finance is employed to suggest a strategy for countering the financing of terrorism. The strategy recommends measures at the policy planning level to curb the threat at the source of terror funding, transfer stage and during distribution of finances. The book further suggests organisational changes to improve the approach to terrorism finance without undertaking major restructuring of the existing setup.

The Bay of Bengal region is now growing in economic and strategic importance. The good economic prospects of many Bay of Bengal states are making the region a cockpit for Asian growth and a key economic connector between East and South Asia. This article looks at strategic developments in the Bay of Bengal and their implications for our understanding of the Indo-Pacific. It argues that the Bay of Bengal needs to be understood as a region with its own particular strategic dynamics and issues. The area is fast becoming a key zone of strategic competition in Asia and is of vital strategic importance to India.

"Political instability in the Kashmiri cities of Handwara and Srinagar has given the impression of a resurgence of conflict in Kashmir. Along with poor economic indicators, the rise of Hindu right-wing nationalism and the increase in the number of youths joining militant groups are growing sources of concern for India."

The rise of Asia’s two giants, China and India, is forcing Australia to re-examine its understanding of the regional order that has existed since the 1940s. There has been much debate about the choices that Australia faces with a rising China, but there has been less discussion about the strategic consequences of India’s emergence. 

Many are beginning to see a rising India as a major element in the Indo-Pacific strategic balance.  Australia’s security relationship with India has been growing much closer over the last decade, driven by concerns about China as well as a host of other shared interests.  In the long term, India is likely to become a key security partner in the Indian Ocean and possibly one of Australia’s most important security partners in the Indo-Pacific region. 

But there has been little consideration how this burgeoning strategic relationship with India will fit with Australia’s core security relationship with the United States or with the US alliance system. India is not a traditional ally or customary partner for Australia. This report looks at the choices faced by Australia in building its strategic relationship with India in a way that fits with the US alliance and the broader regional order.

As the dispute over Kashmir broke out in 1947, a plebiscite of the people of the state offered a mutually acceptable and ostensibly fair path out of the imbroglio. Critics have often laid the blame on Nehru, and the territory’s salience to India, for why a plebiscite was never held. Based on primary docu- mentation, this article makes the case that it was not a lack of commitment to the formula, but rather Nehru’s deeply held strategic and reputational fears that motivated, first, the set- ting of what Delhi saw as firm but fair pre-conditions, and after the conclusion of the US-Pakistan military pact in 1954, the complete rejection of the plebiscite option.

Since the election of Narendra Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government in May 2014, India's approach to East Asia has changed, principally in response to pressures exerted by China. The Modi government inherited an East Asia strategy that combined a push for greater diplomatic and economic linkages with the region, an effort to improve Sino-Indian relations through a mix of engagement and deterrence, and a strengthening of security ties with the United States (US) and its allies. During its first three years in office, this paper argues that the Modi government stuck with this approach but attempted to pursue it more energetically as well as to assert India's interests more clearly and forcefully in interactions with Beijing. After the Doklam standoff in 2017, however, India was pushed to assume a more clearly competitive stance, despite concerns about the reliability of Donald J. Trump's new administration in Washington, China's growing belligerence towards India and the rest of the region, and the impact of COVID-19. This stance entails both internal and external balancing, and a push for greater economic self-reliance that implies some decoupling from China, but which also has implications for India's relations with other countries in East Asia.

Bringing about change in any setup, especially major shifts, is a challenge. This challenge is accentuated further in a strictly hierarchical organisation like the army, presenting an unenviable contradiction to both senior military practitioner and the governing elite, wherein, change is inevitable, yet, it is most likely to be resisted.

Military change is a relatively nascent area of study, especially in the Indian scenario. This book attempts to analyse this subject through an examination of existing literature, thereby co-relating some of its primary conclusion in the context of the Indian Army. This is done in relation to both conventional and sub-conventional threats and challenges, with a number of case studies as illustrative examples.

The book concludes that given the wide spectrum of threats faced by the Indian Army, as also most major armies across the world, attempts at understanding military change only through the prism of conventional wars could be misleading. It suggests that change need not only be revolutionary to enhance effectiveness. It could be both revolutionary and evolutionary, top-down and bottom-up. While effective change is primarily major in conventional conditions, it could well be tactical and yet make a substantial impact in sub-conventional scenarios. The book reinforces the importance of operational changes in the sub-conventional domain, even as an assessment of strategic and organisational changes is undertaken. It attempts to answer important questions related to the drivers, shapers, facilitating conditions and limitations related to effective change. It also relates military change with organisational change in the corporate world to provide an interesting comparative analysis. Finally, the book reinforces its conclusions through a survey of officers from the Indian Army, to highlight existing limitations that need to be corrected in order to better innovate and adapt in pursuit of effective military change.

India is perhaps one of the most experienced counterinsurgents in the world, having fought a huge array of insurgencies since Independence. To date, the dominant guiding principles and benchmarks established to evaluate India’s performance can be likened to a ‘classical’ model of COIN, forming a consensus across scholars, practitioners and policymakers alike of at least the rhetorical importance of adherence to democracy-friendly practices such as minimum force, the pursuit of political resolutions and hearts and minds. Charting the evolution of and analysing tensions within the model, this paper tests the extent of India’s actual adherence to the model in COIN campaigns in the Punjab and the Northeast, before proposing an alternative model, combining aspects of Kautilyan philosophy with some contextual indicators to better pin down how India responds to insurgencies.

This report examines Indian and Chinese strategic imperatives in the Indian Ocean and perceptions about their respective roles.  It first discusses China’s vital strategic interests in protecting its sea lanes of communication across the Indian Ocean, particularly the unobstructed flow of energy, and China’s moves to develop a military presence to protect its interests.  It will then consider some fundamental differences in Indian and Chinese views over status and legitimacy of their roles in the Indian Ocean.  Delhi tends towards what some may see as a somewhat proprietary attitude to the Indian Ocean, perceiving the presence of extra-regional naval powers, particularly China, as being unnecessary and essentially illegitimate.  At the same time, many Indian strategists view China as having particular strategic vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean, which contributes to that theatre having a special importance in the overall relationship.  For its part, Beijing refuses to recognize India’s claims towards great power status or India’s perceived prerogatives in the Indian Ocean region.  Beijing’s refusal to show sensitivity towards Indian concerns contributes even further towards heightened level of threat perceptions in Delhi.

This paper looks at the key strategic issues faced by China in the Indian Ocean within the context of growing Sino-Indian rivalry. It makes two basic arguments: first, that China has considerable strategic disadvantages in the Indian Ocean as compared with India; and second, that India has had more success than China in developing security relationships in the region. These propositions differ from a more common narrative, according to which China is establishing security relationships throughout the region that seriously threaten India. This paper argues that, on the contrary, China faces a strategic dilemma right across the Indian Ocean that it will only be able to partially mitigate in the short to medium term. Perhaps we should be asking how China’s strategic vulnerability should be best managed.

China and India are fast emerging as major maritime powers of the Indo-Pacific as part of long term shifts in the regional balance of power.  As their wealth, interests and power expand, China and India are also increasingly come into contact with each other in the maritime domain.  How India and China get along in the shared Indo-Pacific maritime space – cooperation, coexistence, competition or confrontation – may be one of the key strategic challenges of the 21st century. 

The relationship is a difficult one: their security relationship is relatively volatile and there are numerous unresolved issues between them.  Not least is China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean where it is perceived in New Delhi to be shaping the strategic environment in its favour and forming alignments that could be used against India. 

Nor is the relationship well understood. There is relatively little informed analysis of how China and India will interact as maritime powers, and discussion of this area in India and China rarely seeks to explore each other’s perspectives and intentions.  There is little understanding of China’s perspectives on the rise of India and expectations about their respective maritime security roles in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The roundtable brings together leading scholars and practitioners from India, China, the United States and Australia to better understand Indian and Chinese perspectives about their respective roles and relationship in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain.

Issues and questions addressed by the essays include:
• What are Chinese and Indian strategic ambitions in the maritime realm, particularly in the Indian Ocean?  How do they understand each other’s legitimate security roles in the region?
• What are China’s strategic imperatives in the Indian Ocean?  Does China have an Indo-Pacific naval strategy?
• How has New Delhi perceived China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean and how has it sought to address those moves at a political and military level?
• What are India’s options in responding to China’s Maritime Silk Road initiative?

A complete copy of the roundtable is available for download at: http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=899

Narendra Modi’s visit to Australia in November 2014 and his fanfare address to the Australian Parliament was accompanied by much discussion of a “natural partnership” between the two countries. The visit was a significant step forward in a relationship that could one day become an important part of Australia’s overall strategic posture. One of the most substantive achievements of the visit was the conclusion of a Framework for Security Cooperation setting out an Action Plan for a more comprehensive security and defence relationship. The Framework signals an intention on both sides to intensify the Australia-India security engagement and take it into some important new areas.

It is widely believed that India agreed to the ceasefire because of the advice tendered by General Chaudhuri, the then Chief of Army Staff, based on his erroneous belief that the war effort could no longer be sustained given that “most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up”. But the reality was different: the Indian Army had used up only 14 per cent of its frontline ammunition and it possessed “twice the number” of tanks than the Pakistan Army. In contrast, the Pakistan Army is believed to have been “short of supplies” and “running out of ammunition” by then. It has been argued that under these circumstances, if India had continued the war “for another week, Pakistan would have been forced to surrender.” There are, however, four problems with this narrative. First, it is based on the erroneous claim that the Indian Army possessed twice the number of tanks than the Pakistan Army at the end of the war. Second, it rests on the unverified assumption that the Pakistan Army's ammunition and spare parts would not have lasted for more than a few days after 22 September. Third, the narrative fails to comprehend the context of the conversation between Prime Minister Shastri and Chaudhuri about extending the war for some more days. And finally, it fails to take into account military and diplomatic factors that actually determined the Cabinet's ceasefire decision, some of which Chaudhuri himself highlighted in a written assessment he shared with Defence Minister Chavan.

[Co-authored with Devesh Kapur]. As India assumes an increasingly salient role in world politics, questions of strategy have come to the fore in the study of Indian security. There is growing scholarly interest in Indian strategic thought and practice across a range of areas including conventional military power, nuclear weapons, maritime security, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and international regimes. This collection of articles expands the horizon of inquiry in some of these areas by situating Indian strategy in its historical context, by challenging conventional wisdom, and by opening new lines of research. In the following sections, we lay out the contours of what the contributors to this special issue collectively take to mean by strategy and then situate the issue in the literature on Indian strategy. We subsequently provide some over-arching observations on Indian strategy that emerge from the articles collected here and conclude by raising some questions regarding the intellectual and practical primacy of strategy in statecraft today.

India has been alleged for adopting a reluctant approach to the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P). In light of this allegation, this paper explains India’s approach to R2P and attempts to answer why India has adopted a cautious and reluctant approach. To give a comprehensive picture and provide a compelling account of India’s cautiousness and reluctance, this paper has used an eclectic approach. The systemic and domestic variables, along with normative and materialistic factors have been taken simultaneously into account. While answering the research question, it has been argued that India’s approach to R2P is shaped by a set of six variables namely, its approach to the doctrine per se; historical legacies, especially India’s colonial experience and its applications for its attitude towards the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty; domestic compulsions such as failure of India to deliver inclusive and equitable development in remote areas and its consequences; the intentions of the great powers; security concerns like insurgency in various parts, including Kashmir; and unintended consequences of conflict escalation and its implication for India have been linchpin in shaping India’s approach. It demonstrates how these factors have cumulatively shaped India to neither vote in favour of intervention nor stand up with the governments that fail to protect their citizens and thus in fulfilling their obligations under the first principle of the doctrine of R2P.

Keywords: responsibility to protect, India, state sovereignty, domestic factors, great powers, insurgency, unintended consequences.

This paper looks at the key strategic issues faced by China in the Indian Ocean within the context of growing Sino-Indian rivalry. It makes two basic arguments: first, that China has considerable strategic disadvantages in the Indian Ocean as compared with India; and second, that India has had more success than China in developing security relationships in the region. These propositions differ from a more common narrative, according to which China is establishing security relationships throughout the region that seriously threaten India. This paper argues that, on the contrary, China faces a strategic dilemma right across the Indian Ocean that it will only be able to partially mitigate in the short to medium term. Perhaps we should be asking how China’s strategic vulnerability should be best managed.

If the IS has been able to successfully recruit Indians for the war in Syria and provide technical support for their travel, it is a matter of time before they find recruits willing to employ violence in India itself. In view of past examples, the most likely methodology that the IS will adopt would be the exploitation of real or perceived religious grievances. The resultant radicalisation is likely to be employed to encourage lone wolf attacks.

The aim of the article is to explore how the European Union (EU) and India developed their activities in maritime affairs, trying to boost their cooperation. The challenge for the EU and India has been to acknowledge each other's role in maritime affairs in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) as a facilitator of good practices in maritime governance as well as an important ally in securing the Strategic Lanes of Communication. The main hypothesis of the paper is that both the EU and India are normative powers in maritime affairs and haven not yet created synergy in their activities. The growing feeling of disappointment among many countries in Asia and Europe with the Belt and Road Initiative, might be used to introduce the joint EU-India program covering the same strategic intercontinental maritime lanes similar to India-Japan recent initiative of Asia-Africa Growth Corridor. The convergence of strategic interests of the EU and India can be materialized in the most democratic and ben...

This brief looks at the growing strategic significance of the Bay of Bengal within the emerging and increasingly contested geography of the Indo-Pacific. In three parts, the brief outlines the historic evolution of the littoral, examines the implications of its strategic location at the heart of the Indo-Pacific, and ponders the unfolding challenges to regionalism in the Bay of Bengal. It concludes with a call on India to intensify its efforts to construct a more secure and cooperative Bay of Bengal littoral.

This is a summary of testimony given to the US China Economic Security Review Commission hearing on China and South Asia held in Washington DC on 10 March 2016.  It focuses on China's security presence in the Indian Ocean region and its impact on the regional balance of power.

America’s pursuit of an Asiatic rebalance has influenced US diplomatic ties with India and has led to a number of academic debates surrounding India’s foreign policies and regional military ambitions. In 2009-10, a number of defense policy analysts published a series of articles that assessed India’s economic growth and international aspirations. Some suggested the United States could influence India to use its modernizing military to support US goals visa vie China. Further, many authors argued that India was attempting to develop naval and other expeditionary capacities to enforce a more assertive security policy. Among those writers were James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara who labeled India’s security policy an Indian version of the “Monroe Doctrine.” Another author, David Scott called the policy “India’s Extended Neighborhood Concept.” Additionally, Walter C. Ladwig III in his article, “India and Military Power Projection: Will the Land of Gandhi Become a Conventional Great Power?” concentrated on security to explain India’s ascendance as an Indo-Pacific power. Collectively, these authors claimed that India was increasing its military capacity commensurate with its rising economic power. If their claims are incorrect US reliance on India in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea would be improvident. Six years have passed since those claims were made and, therefore, it is reasonable to ask whether current evidence still supports the conclusion that India is committed to more aggressive foreign and national security policies.
Determining the direction of India’s security policy required a standard by which to make the assessment. Fortunately, the articles that made the claim contained their own metrics. By using those metrics, all that was necessary was to collect the new data, compare it with the original data, thereby, assess whether the author’s claims still have merit.
The evidence revealed that India has shown neither the political fortitude nor the military capability to prosecute aggressive security strategies. Indian governmental leaders possess three strong historically based policy proclivities that influence Indian foreign and security policy-making. India’s economic ambitions always drive India’s foreign policy. Those economic ambitions dictate that the domestic economy with have priority over military spending. The small investments in maritime modernization have not significantly increased India’s naval capabilities. The MOD’s modest attempts to replace outdated equipment are also handicapped by burdensome civilian bureaucracies and inept defense processes. Therefore, Indian foreign policies are not shifting the nation to pursue aggressive national security policies. Ultimately, it would be a strategic miscalculation for the US to rely on India to counter-balance Chinese ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region.

India's Muslims represent 15 percent of the nation's population, the world's third largest group in any nation after Indonesia and Pakistan. Extremist groups like the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, the Taliban and the Haqqani network increasingly view India as a target, notes author and professor Saroj Kumar Rath. Several trends explain the rise: Terrorism threats in South Asia are linked and mobile - if one source is batted down, jihadists relocate to find another Islamic cause. As NATO withdraws from Afghanistan, some jihadists will eye India. Pakistan regards India as a top enemy and some officials even encourage terrorists to target areas like Kashmir or Mumbai. Meanwhile, a stream of Wahhabi preachers have visited India, offering hard-line messages; extremist groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State compete for influence, and militants even pay jihadists. Muslims as a minority population in India could offer fertile ground for the extremist recruiters. Rath urges the Indian government to profile militants and examine social media sites to attack Wahhabi indoctrination while supporting education and entrepreneurship for all of India's citizens. - YaleGlobal

India has been alleged for adopting a reluctant approach to the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P). In light of this allegation, this article explains India’s approach to R2P and attempts to answer why India has adopted a cautious and reluctant approach. To give a comprehensive picture and provide a compelling account of India’s cautiousness and reluctance, this article uses an eclectic approach. The systemic and domestic variables, along with normative and materialistic factors, have been taken simultaneously into account. It points out that India’s approach to R2P is shaped by a set of six variables—historical legacies, especially India’s colonial experience and its applications for its attitude towards the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty; domestic compulsions such as failure of India to deliver inclusive and equitable development and ensuring human rights and citizen’s dignity in remote areas; the intentions of the great powers; security concerns lik...

Moves by both China and India to develop naval logistics and maritime surveillance infrastructure at points throughout the Indian Ocean presage a long game between them.  One Chinese naval analyst has likened these moves to a Game of Go (the Chinese equivalent of chess).  In Go, each side tries to acquire the largest area in the board using his chips.  One’s posture in the endgame is determined by where one places one’s chips at the beginning.

The internal security situation in the North-eastern states of India is complex. It requires people with in depth knowledge of the terrain, society, politics and culture and history of insurgency in the region to be placed in positions entrusted with the handling of affairs. Frequent change of interlocutors, for example between Naga groups and Government of India, would not be desirable since delicate negotiations require a great degree of trust between negotiators and that can only come about with longevity of engagement. The Government must focus on concluding final peace agreements with the groups that are part of the peace process as soon as possible so that all the energies could then be applied in tackling the groups that remain intransigent. India's Act East Policy could only be successful if we develop connectivity in the North-eastern states and permit greater people-to-people contact with the people of the ASEAN, and particularly with the people of Myanmar. Investments in the region are required for the economic advancement of the people. These would require the creation of a peaceful environment in the North-eastern states. Finally, instead of letting turf wars decide the outcome, Assam Rifles must continue to be responsible for guarding the India-Myanmar border.

This paper examines India as a rising power and questions whether or not India is an example of a rising power that is to be inevitably ‘threatening’. First, rising powers will be examined in light of the International Relations (IR) theoretical debate on the issue. Subsequently, India is analysed and discussed as a case study for a rising power that is threatening. The paper argues that the rise of India is inevitably threatening to Pakistan and China because India’s growing economy and territorial disputes are encouraging India to modernize the Indian Armed Forces (IAF).