Descartes

Una fortunata rappresentazione storiografica ha voluto che il dualismo di Descartes si costituisse in diretta rottura col concetto tommasiano di anima-forma. Sulla scia dei numerosi studi che negli ultimi decenni si sono opposti a questo pregiudizio, L'angelo e la macchina ricostruisce nel dettaglio il dibattito cinque-seicentesco sulla psicologia, focalizzandosi specialmente sull'ambiente gesuita e sul contesto aristotelico, platonico e agostiniano di area francese. A partire da una rigorosa indagine sulle teorie dell'anima separata, particolare attenzione è data poi alla derivazione indirettamente angelologica del cogito e dell'innatismo cartesiano. Negli anni in cui Descartes elabora la sua metafisica, infatti, l'immediata prossimità tra anime e angeli costituisce per certi versi un dato di fatto, alla luce del quale appaiono chiare molte scelte argomentative delle Meditationes e persino le dinamiche che congiungono strettamente la "sostanza pensante" con il corpo-macchina.

— Review: Dr. Nicolò Galasso, in La Cultura. Rivista di Filosofia, Letteratura e Storia, 57 (2019, 1), pp. 129-132.
— Review: Dr. Jacopo Francesco Falà, in Lo Sguardo. Rivista di Filosofia, 27 (2018, 2), pp. 369-373.
— Review: Dr. Laurence Dupas-Gelin, in Bulettin Cartésien (Archives de Philosophie), 49 (2020), pp. 196-197.
— Review: Emanuele Landi, in Biblos. Revista da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra (forthcoming).

Depuis 1633, date à laquelle Descartes range son Monde dans un tiroir pour éviter d’avoir les mêmes ennuis que Galilée, aucun éditeur n’a jamais publié ce livre comme tel, et dans l’ordre où le souhaitait Descartes.
Cependant, pour Descartes lui-même, c’est un traité à part, même s’il est resté inachevé. L’homme est en effet le chapitre XVIII du Monde. Leur dissociation est dommageable car elle masque le projet même de Descartes, qui est d’articuler la révolution de Copernic à celle de Vésale, et de proposer ainsi une relation nouvelle de l’homme et  du monde, où la médecine joue un rôle éminent.
Cette édition intégrale du Monde est donc un événement - en ce qu’elle procure un  texte complet, scrupuleusement établi (modernisé dans son orthographe et sa ponctuation), introduit par Annie Bitbol-Hespériès et annoté par Annie Bitbol-Hespériès et Jean-Pierre Verdet.

This paper is on Descartes' account of modality and, in particular, his account of the necessity of the laws of nature. He famously argues that the necessity of the "eternal truths" of logic and mathematics depends on God's will. Here I suggest he has the same view about the necessity of the laws of nature. Further, I argue, this is a plausible theory of laws. For philosophers often talk about something being physically necessary because of the laws of nature, but this necessity is thought to be metaphysically contingent. However, they struggle to explain how the laws could be genuinely necessary while being metaphysically contingent. The chief advantage of Descartes' view, I argue, is that God's will can plausibly explain both the necessity of the laws (because God made them necessary) and the contingency of the laws (because God could have done otherwise). So, Descartes' theistic account of laws provides a plausible explanation, perhaps the best explanation, of the contingent-necessity of laws of nature.

Musicology is a small discipline within the wide spectrum of human knowledge, yet it is already divided into various branches, each with its own societies, conferences, journals, jargons, degrees, prejudices, …, and jobs. Although they share their object of investigation-"the art of music as a physical, psychological, aesthetic, and cultural phenomenon", these branches very often ignore one another. Research in musicology is mostly a solitary task, as investigations, papers, and publications are commonly signed by single authors, in contrast with STEM disciplines where teamwork is the rule. This is in part the result of tradition-the "Musicological Toolbox"-but also the aftermath of the job market and financing programs. Large funding schemes such as the European Research Council (ERC) grants are becoming a major disruptive factor in many disciplines in the humanities, including musicology. Scholars in all fields now have the opportunity to build research teams, and most of their members receive their salaries to exclusively work on the project. In other words, we are starting to build what could be called a Musicology Lab, learning along the way how teamwork is reshaping and transforming the Musicological Toolbox, the look and feel of our discipline, the way we work as well as the way we publish and disseminate our results. This paper presents some of the key features of the ERC Didone project, one of its principal tasks being to create a digitally encoded corpus of some 3,000 arias in MusicXML format from about 180 musical settings of a small number of opera librettos by Pietro Metastasio. It focuses on some of the project's research tasks, emphasizing how the skills of a team of eighteen scholars with very different expertise-historical musicology, music theory and analysis, cultural history, librettology, archival research, music performance, music engraving, MIR, computer science, and statistical modeling-combine to explore the potential answer(s) to the main research question of the project: How are emotions expressed through music?

Descartes regularly claims that questions concerning the possibility of causal interaction between mind and body due to their heterogeneous natures are based on a misunderstanding of how mind and body are united. To illustrate this point, Descartes draws an analogy with the scholastic notion of heaviness in an effort to clear up this misunderstanding and to dispel their concerns about mind to body causal interaction. This paper examines the heaviness analogy in some detail. The main conclusions are that Descartes maintains a holenmeric notion of mind-body union such that the whole mind is in the whole body and wholly in each one of its parts while also exercising its function primarily in the pineal gland. This, for Descartes, implies a teleological rather than a mechanistic understanding of how the mind moves the body and thereby avoids this version of the problem entirely. The paper concludes with a short discussion of what these considerations may mean for Paul Hoffman's hylomorphic understanding of Descartes' theory of mind-body union.

La tesi presenta inizialmente il pensiero di Jacques Derrida sull'animalità. Il tema affrontato è la sovranità dell'uomo sul resto dei viventi, in particolare nei riguardi della discriminazione dell'animalità. Nei capitoli a seguire si attua un'emancipazione dell'animalità e non dall'animalità come la corrente umanista voleva. Attraverso l'ontogenesi del concetto di "umanità" viene decostruito il costrutto che sorregge la soglia che divide l'uomo dagli animali, laddove essi partecipano all'animalità in maniere differenti. L'emergenza di questa composizione dei temi trattati si erge ad azione esemplare con cui Derrida, prima di morire, ha lasciato delle tracce da seguire durante il ricevimento del premio Adorno.

This paper dispels the Cartesian reading of Augustine’s treatment of mind and other minds by examining key passages from De Trinitate and De Civitate Dei. While Augustine does vigorously argue that mind is indubitable and immaterial, he disavows the fundamental thesis of the dualistic tradition: the separation of invisible spirit and visible body. The immediate self-awareness of mind includes awareness of life, that is, of animating a body. Each of us animates our own body; seeing other animated bodies enables us to see other animating souls or minds. Augustine’s affirmation of animation lets us perceive that other minds are present, but Descartes’ denial of animation renders others ineluctably absent. Augustine’s soul is no ghost, because his body is no machine.

این مقاله ترجمه فصل پنجم از کتاب «دکارت و تأمّلات» است.این کتاب شرح و تفسیر کامل تأمّلات دکارت است که در مجموعه کتاب های راهنمای راتلج برای کتب مهم تاریخ فلسفه منتشر شده است.مشخصات این کتاب به شرح ذیل است:
Gary, Hatfield, Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Descartes and the Meditations, Routledge, 2003

The following article is an attempt to reappreciate one of Descartes' earliest philosophical texts: Rules for the Direction of the Mind. Due to historical circumstances it did not receive as much attention as some of his later works, and, seemingly, did not have as much impact on the development of modern philosophy. Since multiple conceptions , appearing in Descartes' more classic texts, were in fact developed in Reguale, it is important that they are understood within the context where they originally appeared, the only place, where their full meaning is explicitly discussed. The author will attempt to demonstrate how through understanding 'intellectual intuitions', the key concept of the text, one may get insight into Descartes’ method, and his more enigmatic formations, including the cogito argument. The author will demonstrate that according to Descartes, having an intuition of a concept means immediately intuiting all the implicit statements about the concept. Thus, since intellectual intuitions are innate, there is no chronological or logical order in which they are intuited.

My aim in this paper was to bring together a theoretical, historical enquiry and an empirical, contemporary project. At the time I was preoccupied, on the one hand, with Walter Benjamin’s writing on images and cities, and on the other hand, with the exhibition project Video as Urban Condition.[1]

The paper locates the crossing point where Benjamin’s thought — in particular, his conception of urban experience — intersects with the technology of television — that is to say, seeing at a distance.

I did not attempt to reconcile Benjamin’s suggestions with the post-war television phenomena that he neither saw nor foresaw. The question I posed myself was whether some observations of Benjamin’s, or rather, some observations on Benjamin’s thought, might furnish the distance necessary for observing the present.

I found, in the interior of the nineteenth century, the pre-vision of television — television almost without technology — and I traced its philosophical heritage. I entered that interior with Benjamin and exited with the flâneur, to whom the city opened up like a landscape even as it enclosed him like a room, as a private domain.

Hence the screen, the façade, the shop window and the television set revealed themselves as the sites where one could interrogate the intersections between exterior and interior, between media and architecture, the city and its phantasmagoria.

[1]: On the one hand, see ‘Imagine no Metaphors: the dialectical image of Walter Benjamin’ in Image & Narrative, special issue edited by Hanneke Grootenboer, no. 18, September 2007. On the other hand, see ‘Who is Big Brother? or The Politics of Looking’, in Dérive Zeitschrift für Stadtforschung, no. 42, January 2011.

With an appendix: Video as Urban Condition

Rene Descartes (1596 – 1650) is considered the founder of modern philosophy. Profoundly influenced by the new physics and astronomy of Kepler and Galileo, Descartes was a scientist and mathematician whose most long-lasting contributions in science were the invention of Cartesian coordinates, the application of algebra to geometry, and the discovery of the law of refraction, what we now call Snell’s law. His most important books on philosophy were The discourse on method(1637) and The meditations (1642). Descartes’ writings display an exemplary degree of clarity and an aversion to pedantry. I explore Descartes' break with Aristotle, but also shine a light on the intellectual continuity Descartes had with Aristotle's thought. I also draw attention to some overlooked but interesting possibilities for an experimental test of a dualistic theory of mind.

Esta nota tem como objetivo formular questões que mostram certas dificuldades na compreensão da dúvida metódica cartesiana. Trata-se de uma avaliação crítica que parte da seguinte hipótese: ou a dúvida metódica não é inteligível ou ela não é uma dúvida.Prima facie, a dúvida metódica parece ser irracional, pois em seu escopo estão proposições que parecem ser paradigmas de racionalidade. Algumas explicações da inteligibilidade da dúvi- da metódica parecem destituí-la do caráter de dúvida, como aquelas que procuram compatibilizar a dúvida metódica e a crença. As principais questões tratadas nesta nota são: (1) Qual é a motivação epistêmica da dúvida metódica? (2) Dado o que está disponível ao medi- tador na Primeira Meditação, o que é apresentado como razão para duvidar pode ser cons ide- rado realmente desse mo do? Em especial, por que o apelo ao provável não ne u t raliza essas supostas razões? (3) A dúvida metódica é compatível com as necessidades epistêmicas da vida prática? (4) Qual é a na t u reza da atitude denominada “dúvida” e qual é o seu objeto?

Course Description: A continuation of the Classical Mind, the Modern Mind is an introduction to modern philosophy focusing on texts from selected early modern and modern thinkers. The class builds upon the history, thought concepts, and themes developed in the Classical Mind and traces the development of Western philosophical thought from the seventeenth to the twentieth century. In particular, this course deals with philosophers that consider the nature of thinking and reasoning, the idea of metaphysics and the foundations of human knowledge, the idea of a universal moral law, the nature of political society and the concept of right, and the idea and value of historical thinking. This course utilizes canonical philosophic texts situated in the history of philosophy to establish the structure and methodology of philosophical thinking. As the second course of the introductory sequence of philosophy classes, this class culminates not only in the identification of philosophic issues, concepts, and questions, but also the practical examination and analysis of fundamental human questions as preparation for students' continuing engagement with their liberal arts education. — Prerequisite for PHIL 202: successful completion of PHIL 201.

En el siguiente trabajo presentamos una reflexión acerca de la cuestión del lenguaje en Descartes, considerando que el lenguaje es la prueba fundamental que establece para diferenciar al ser humano de los animales y el reconocimiento de la posesión de una mente. El lenguaje, como veremos, trata de un elemento de distinción ontológica fundamental en la filosofía del pensador francés y plantea importantes preguntas acerca de la naturaleza de los animales.

We are a binary consciousness. Perhaps the most striking outcome of psychoanalysis is the formalization of this fact in the notion of the distinction between the conscious and the unconscious. Whether we follow orthodox Freudian readings of the unconscious as the repressed remainder of all that is rejected from consciousness, or the Jungian line of thought which sees the unconscious as the primary ground from which the conscious sense of self we call the ego emerges, we are left with the simple fact of a bifurcation between what we consider us, and what is not us, but nevertheless lives within and through us. Descartes was not yet psychological. His famous formula for the supremacy of the ego, ​ cogito, ergo sum​ , is to be understood as the declaration of our sense of self-regard as being correct — there is nothing else, besides what we know of ourselves. Nietzsche was perhaps the first depth psychologist, and from his time to ours, we have entered into a decidely psychological era. We might distinguish between pre-psychological and psychological views of self and world: ​ pre-psychological​ asserting that it is what we know of ourselves which is ultimately true, and ​psychological asserting that our vastness, or depths, to use the popular metaphor, can only be known in glimpses. It is not simply that the unconscious remains repressed. The bar of repression is a swinging door. Psychic contents emerge from unconsciousness into consciousness, as if through this door, or, to use the metaphor Jacques Siboni, a student of Jacques Lacan's, provides: a conveyor belt. This conveyor belt from the "other half" of our consciousness can get stuck. It can move too quickly, or too slowly, or not at all. When it moves too quickly, we may suffer from an inflation of consciousness — by identifying with affect-laden psychic contents being delivered up into consciousness, we may lose our reasonableness — that same reasonableness which is the hallmark of the ego.

In this paper, I aim at providing a picture of the pivotal difference between the Cartesian conception of the world and the Heideggerian conception of the world hood of the world. A difference that will take the ready-to-hand mode of Being as Heidegger’s point of departure from traditional ontlolgy altogether.

This paper consists of four sections; in the first section, I shall prepare the ground by making clear the difference between readiness-to-hand and presence-of hand. In the second section, I will show how the Cartesian model is built ontically on a mathematical model that conceives of Being deficiently as what is constantly present-at-hand. In the third section, I will give a detailed account to the absent element in the Cartesian model, namely, readiness-to-hand as a mode of Being. Moreover I will show the central role of equipmentality within Heidegger’s ontology. In the fourth section, I will briefly draw a picture of how the phenomenon of the world is assimilated through a network of ready-to-hand references and significations.

U prvom dijelu rada izlaže se Suárezovo razumijevanje vječnih istina. Tri su momenta relevantna za tumačenje Descartesa: hipotetička nužnost vječnih istina, uloga djelotvornog uzrokovanja i vječne istine o bićima razuma. U drugom dijelu teksta brani se teza da 16. odlomak Treće meditacije (AT VII 42) sadržava dvije
suarezijanske vječne istine i da obje tvrde da Bog postoji. Između ostalog, to vodi
zaključku da taj odlomak Treće meditacije zapravo sadržava Descartesovu nestvorenu
vječnu istinu o egzistenciji Boga (AT I 150).
Ključne riječi: vječne istine, nestvorene vječne istine, Meditacije, Suárez, Descartes, potentia objectiva, egzistencija Boga

The mind-body problem is a philosophical dilemma that concerns the relationship between the mind and body of humans  (Garcia-Albea, 2018).  This question arises when the mind is viewed as a metaphysical construct, separate from the body in its entirety (Descartes, 1953). Theories ranging from the early Greeks philosophers to modern day neuroscientists aim to show how the mind works in tandem with the physical body and if they are indeed separate entities.
This mind-body problem was first defined by Descartes (1953), as the relationship between the immaterial, thinking mind and the material, non-thinking and reactionary body. However, this concept was debated long before Descartes’s (1953) theory, with the likes of Aristotle and Plato both proposing that the mind and body are comprised of two entirely separate entities. This thesis will discuss the development of the mind-body problem as well as its comparison to other theories and disciplines, such as the neuroscientific approach and functionalism  (Brysbaert & Rastle, 2013).

Šajā rakstā ir aplūkots Jauno laiku kultūras konteksts un iezīmētas dažas šā laika filosofijas tendences, lai mēģinātu uzrādīt Jaunajiem laikiem specifisku attieksmi pret zinātni un patiesību. Noteiktā veidā noformulētu izziņas metožu un matematizēta dabas skaidrojuma ietekmē ir veidojusies tāda zinātne, kas tiecas ieņemt absolūtās vērtības lomu. Tādā veidā Jauno laiku domāšana zinātnisko subjekta pieredzi un padara to statisku un acumirklīgu, lai novērstos no vēsturiskuma, individuālisma un tēlainuma. Ar Heidegera, Huserla un mūsdienu filosofa Martina Džeja komentāriem rakstā tiek izgaismota pārvirze uz tādu dabas un cilvēka interpretāciju, kas to iekļauj matematizētā (mērāmā) pasaules ainā.

Si Pascal et Descartes, scientifiques et philosophes, se sont rencontrés à Paris, les 23 et 24 septembre 1647, lors du voyage en France de Descartes, et alors que Pascal était malade, c’était surtout pour parler des expériences sur le vide, de la machine arithmétique de Pascal et de la maladie de celui- ci. La plus jeune sœur de Pascal, Jacqueline, a évoqué la rencontre dans une lettre à l’aînée, Gilberte, devenue Mme Périer. En rester à l’opposition tranchée de caractères entre Descartes le rationaliste et Pascal le mystique,-opposition qui a nourri la pièce de Jean-Claude Brisville, L’Entretien de M. Descartes avec M. Pascal le Jeune-, serait oublier que Descartes et Pascal font chacun mention de l’autre dans leurs écrits, et que leur différence d’âge et le rayonnement des textes cartésiens forcent à examiner l’influence que Descartes a exercée sur le jeune Pascal.

L’article fait partie de la série publiée dans la rubrique Traits de plume de la revue Dialogues de Descartes de l’Université Paris-Descartes (Paris 5).

The purpose of my research essay is to assess the most prominent forms of dualism and find out which theory is the most satisfactory theory dualism. I will not be arguing for dualism over any type of physicalism, my paper will be more of a building block for future arguments against physicalism. I begin my paper by explaining the three criteria I use to evaluate each theory, as well as why I have chosen these three criteria. The criteria I use are substance distinction, causal interaction, and moral responsibility. I explain each of the dualistic theories these being; property dualism, epiphenomenalism, and substance dualism. I evaluate each against my criteria, showing the faults that property dualism and epiphenomenalism have in satisfying the criteria. I conclude my essay by arguing that substance dualism is the most satisfying form of dualism, as it accounts for each of the three criteria.

A central theme in the scholarly literature on Enlightenment Europe concerns the increased focus on the role of reason in the development of European thought, especially in the context of the new science and natural philosophers’ radical successes in this burgeoning field. As a consequence, there is a tendency in both philosophical scholarship and teaching to bind philosophy and science tightly together and emphasize the way in which one aspect of rationality in early modern philosophy led to the development of modern science. While there is certainly much that is correct in this approach, one motivation for pluralizing philosophy’s past is that this story leaves out a great deal that is important in Enlightenment views of reason. Margaret Cavendish provides a compelling example of a thinker from this period who was not only engaged in the scientific enterprises of her day, but included within her purview disciplines we typically categorize today as belonging squarely to the humanities. Her philosophical work opens a window into how enlightenment thinkers conceived of the role, and arguably more importantly, the limits of reason and the sciences. In contrast with the traditional interpretation of the modern period, I argue that reason was significantly broader in scope — its developments in science were paralleled by equally important advances in the music, art, literature, medicine, philosophy, etc. Cavendish’s work forces us to recognize the lack of a sharp boundary between these areas; philosophy was able to act as a bridge between the sciences and humanistic disciplines. Integrating Cavendish into the canon helps us to see that the narrow focus on the scientific version of reason within Enlightenment philosophy creates a false distinction between science and the humanities and misses out on central, humanistic features of philosophy that make its practice fruitful. I use the example of Cavendish to make a broader point about the nature of higher education today. With the increased focus on so-called “practical” skills, vocational, and STEM focused education, I argue that we have lost focus on the end for the sake of which we pursue education: to live well. Cavendish provides us an opportunity to re-evaluate the narrowly scientific conception of reason during the 17th and 18th centuries as well as our current outlook on why we pursue education. In doing so, I make a case for a well-rounded liberal arts education.

이 연구는 오늘날 도덕성과 관련하여 감정이 어떤 사상사적 변천을 거치면서 현대사회에서 중요한 위치를 점하게 되었는지 탐구하고, 감정의 교육적 시사점을 탐색하는 데 그 목적이 있다. 고대부터 근대에 이르는 서양 사상사를 살펴보면, 감정은 항상 이성에 대비되어 부정적으로 간주되거나 하위의 요소로 간주되곤 하였다. 그러나 근대 이후 최근에 이르기까지 감정의 위상은 점차 변화해왔고, 도덕성의 중요한 원천으로 인정받고 있다. 그러나 감정이 도덕성에 있어서 어떻게 이런 지위를 확보할 수 있었는지, 그 과정에 대한 연구는 부족한 실정이다. 본 연구는 찰스 테일러의 연구를 바탕으로 플라톤, 데카르트, 로크, 도덕감정론자, 그리고 루소 등 각 철학자들의 감정에 대한 관점을 탐색하면서 고대에서 근대로 이행하는 과정에서 감정이 이성과 어떤 방식으로 관계 변화를 겪 는지 집중적으로 살펴본다. 플라톤으로 상징되는 서양 고대에서, 이성은 불변하는 외적 실재를 직관하고 그 의미를 통찰하는 기관이었으나, 근대로 접어들어 한 인간을 합리적으로 통제하는 주체처럼 변했다. 이 과정에서 감정은 순전히 부정적인 지위를 탈피하고 도덕성에 있어 점차 중요한 원천으로 상승하기 시작한다. 근대적 인간은 더 이상 외부에서 옳고 그름을 판단하는 기준을 찾을 수 없었기에 자신의 내면으로 들어가서 도덕성의 원천을 찾기 시작하는데, 이 때 감정은 중대한 고려사항으로 자리 잡는다. 이후 도덕감정론자를 거쳐 루소에 이르러 마침내 감정은 올바름을 말해주는 중요한 지위를 얻게 된다. 한편 찰스 테일러는 “자기진실성”이라는 개념을 통해 감정 이 현대사회만의 독특한 윤리형식을 구성하는 한 가지 요소라고 주장하고 있는데, 오늘날 우리나라의 젊은이들은 자기진실성에 충실한 방식으로 살아가는 것처럼 보인다. 그러나 오늘날 우리나라 교육현실에서 감정은 그 중요성을 좀처럼 주목받지 못하고 있으며 학생들은 외적인 이유들로 자기진실성에 기초한 삶의 방식을 배우지 못하고 있다. 그러나 만일 감정이 자기진실성의 윤리와 관련하여 도덕성의 원천으로 간주될 수 있으며 옳고 그름을 발견하고 삶의 의미를 찾는 과정에서 중요한 역할을 하고 있다면, 우리는 감정에 대한 선입견을 벗고 그 교육적 가능성을 적극적으로 모색할 필요가 있다.

This paper will attempt to present Hamlet’s examination of his life and the unavoidable postponement of vengeance as a result of puritanical humiliation. It will analyze that Hamlet is religious and Christian. He believes in God and all the Christian belongings including chastisement for sin and damnation. It is not supposed, theoretical or hypothetical for him, rather all part of his veracity, and the question he asks, and the fears he has are also bona fide and solemn for him he is not using religion as justification in the way of making excuses, but trying to remain a puritan emphasizing total depravity. As man is naturally unable to exercise free will, since through Adam’s fall he has suffered hereditary corruption.

Free download: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/y3DipH2m3WDBKSa2QB65/full

One of the most renowned pages of Pascal's Pensées offers an astonishing phenomenology of the all-powerful action of imagination in human life. This article retraces the genesis of this text and reassesses the sources of Pascal's conception of imagination. It argues that Pascal builds up his definition of the imagination as an ‘anti-theodicy’ which carefully recalls and then criticizes the Cartesian ‘theodicy of error’ and the foundation of the ‘general rule’ of truth proposed by the Fourth Meditation. In doing so, Pascal undermines the major aim of Descartes's Meditations, which is to secure human nature against any doubt as to its intrinsic perfection. Where, according to Descartes, human knowledge is finite yet perfectly secured in its accomplishments when we use the faculties of our mind correctly, Pascal describes imagination as a deceptive faculty that seems to have been given to us specifically to lead us into necessary error.