Aristotelianism

The famous argument for the existence of God is analyzed with a survey of the Greek and Arabic influences of Avicenna's system.

Turning to the text, The Salvation, ‘’Metaphysics,’’ II. 12, it is stated that ‘’at any one and the same time there cannot be for anything that is possible in itself a cause that is possible ad infinitum’’ (II.12.2). Here he’s saying that a possible being cannot have an infinite amount of causes at the same time. Because if that infinite totality of causes would itself have either an internal cause or an external necessary cause. It can’t be internal, because it would either be (a) necessary, which is not an option because everything internal to that totality is possible; then (b) an internal possible cause – which is not an option because that would make it a part of the totality and a part can’t be a cause of the whole. So if that cause is not internal, then it has to be external. It can’t be possible, because all of the possible causes have been established in that inner totality. Therefore it has to be necessary. He concludes the argument by stating that:
Thus, things existing possibly terminate in a cause existing necessarily, in which case not every effect that exists as something possible will have simultaneously with it a cause that exists as something possible, and so an infinite number of causes existing at a single time is impossible. (II.12.2)
This argument can be considered as a subsidiary conclusion to Avicenna’s main argument for the proof of God’s existence (McGinnis 166-67). There are considered to be four main categories of arguments: (1) the metaphysical proof from necessity; (2) the proof from movement; (3) the proof from causality; (4) the proof from ontology (Netton 172-73). The themes are similar to the discussions on the problem of infinite causal regress as discussed for example in book two of Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On Aristotle’s Metaphysics. I think that he is essentially concerned with establishing a logical argument that integrates a hierarchy of ontological causality rather than simply natural causality. In that sense, it could be considered similar to the ‘’a posteriori cosmological arguments’’ of the quinque via  of ThomasAquinas (Netton 173).

The pseudo-Aristotelian Hermetica (hereafter PsAH) are a group of texts surviving in Arabic that claim to record conversations between Aristotle and Alexander the Great. In these conversations, Aristotle instructs Alexander about the cosmos, the comingto-be of everything in it, and astral magic-more precisely, talismanry, rituals for attracting the spiritual and planetary forces of the cosmos, the creation of amulets, and extensive astrological rules. The purpose of the instruction is to support Alexander's military career and personal life. Aristotle claims to have received this knowledge from Hermes Trismegistus. There are very few studies dedicated to these fascinating and influential texts; therefore, this article offers a preliminary study of the PsAH that introduces the texts and their contexts systematically.

At the foundation of every scientific study must lie a clear definition of what is being studied. Such a definition of key concepts is reached through the process of conceptualization, to which there exist two main approaches: the classical (or first principles thinking) approach and the prototype (or analogical thinking) approach. Through the example of finding an adequate definition for the concept of 'democracy', both approaches to conceptualization are demonstrated in practice. This article compares the effectiveness of both approaches before proposing a model for the more rigorous and reliable first principles thinking approach.

This article provides a critical analysis of the situationist challenge against Aristotelian moral psychology. It first outlines the details and results from 4 paradigmatic studies in psychology that situationists have heavily drawn upon in their critique of the Aristotelian conception of virtuous characteristics, including studies conducted by Hartshorne and May (1928), Darley and Batson (1973), Isen and Levin (1972), and Milgram (1963). It then presents 10 problems with the way situationists have used these studies to challenge Aristotelian moral psychology. After challenging the situationists on these grounds, the article then proceeds to challenge the situationist presentation of the Aristotelian conception, showing that situationists have provided an oversimplified caricature of it that goes against the grain of much Aristotelian text. In evaluating the situationist challenge against the actual results from empirical research as well as primary Aristotelian text, it will be shown that the situationist debate has advanced both an extreme, untenable view about the nature of characteristics and situations, as well as an inaccurate presentation of the Aristotelian view.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-013-9249-8
https://doctorcroom.com/croom-2014a

Le "Questioni siciliane", risposta del dotto islamico Ibn Sabin alle domande poste dall'imperatore Federico II, costituiscono un caso esemplare di dialogo con l'altro e tra figure che erano "altre" rispetto al contesto storico e culturale nel quale si trovarono ad operare.

Para salir de la sombra protectora representada por el propio maestro Platón, Aristóteles toma en consideración la teoría de las ideas y la somete al propio corte intelectual, selectivo y crítico, a través del cual busca primero desapoderar la separación platónica (inteligible-sensible) y después reorientar la carga formal según finalidades consideradas como naturales, resultados de un proceso por el cual los seres en general pasan del estado de la potencia al - experimentado y convergente, concretamente y no abstractamente inevitable - del acto.

I describe both the German Aristotelian revival and the Anglo-Saxon virtue-ethics approach and argue that there are some reasons why the Grotian dismissal of Aristotelian practical rationality had finally to be overcome. I suggest that such reasons in turn depend on deeper changes in the structure of the building of  modern philosophy, first among them those carried by the critique of Cartesian foundationalism staged by such odd bed-fellows as Peirce, Wittgenstein, Husserl, and Heidegger, adding quasi-Thomists such as Anscombe and Geach. This may account for the apparently unexpected normative turn which took place in the same years (shortly after or before 1958) in two different and comparatively insulated contexts such as Germany and  the Anglo-Saxon world.

Il volume illumina la vicenda umana e scientifica di André Tiraqueau, un magistrato attivo per buona parte della sua vita in provincia, anche se destinato a sedere infine nel Parlement di Parigi, nei cui scritti si rispecchiano la cultura, le convinzioni, i valori, in una parola la Weltanschauung della nutrita schiera di giuristi e funzionari regi che sta assumendo con mano sicura la guida della nazione in un'epoca densa di grandi cambiamenti politici, sociali, culturali e religiosi. André Tiraqueau si pone quale significativa figura di giureconsulto che incarna egregiamente alcune delle caratteristiche salienti della cultura giuridica francese nella prima metà del secolo XVI. tra le molte sue opere, alcuni scritti che a nostro avviso si segnalano per originalità e dottrina, nel pur ricchissimo panorama della produzione giuridica d'Oltralpe in età rinascimentale. I trattati "De nobilitate" e "De poenis temperandis", insieme al monumentale lavoro "De legibus connubialibus et iure maritali", sono in modi diversi dedicati ad una reale sperimentazione, relativa tanto ai generi letterari impiegati, quanto soprattutto ai contenuti in essi riversati. In particolare, nel caso del "De legibus connubialibus et iure maritali", ci troviamo di fronte ad un'opera nella quale Tiraqueau pone la propria straripante cultura umanistica al servizio della soluzione della "quaestio de matrimonio", nella sua duplice articolazione, circa il problema della scelta della moglie ed in merito al comportamento da tenere verso la consorte dopo le nozze. In tale opera, mediante la produzione di una massa enorme di allegazioni dotte tratte da tutti i campi dello scibile, l'autore si propone di dimostrare senza alcun dubbio come la donna sia per natura inferiore al maschio, per carenze oggettive psico-fisiche che devono essere riconosciute e neutralizzate, secondo gli insegnamenti aristotelici.

Il volume è il risultato di una ricerca sull’atteggiamento di medici e filosofi di fronte alla peste, dalle prime reazioni nel ‘300 fino al maturo ‘400, con particolare attenzione all’umanesimo fiorentino e alla figura di Marsilio Ficino. Si è voluto mostrare come l’avvento del morbo abbia profondamente inciso sulla produzione della letteratura filosofica, accelerando l’osmosi tra i saperi e le tendenze culturali, calamitando l’attenzione di molti sull’urgenza medica. La trattazione si concentra sulle opere di Marsilio Ficino, soprattutto sul Consilio contro la pestilentia, pubblicato per la prima volta a Firenze nel 1481 e da allora testo di riferimento per la tradizione posteriore. Attraverso l’analisi delle fonti e della fortuna di quest’opera si possono rileggere le questioni fondamentali che sono al centro della letteratura medico-filosofica contro la peste. In Appendice si presenta un’edizione accompagnata da alcune annotazioni critiche, con un Glossario essenziale di termini notevoli.

This paper looks at the revival of Aristotle in the Middle Ages, paying close attention to the distinction between ascending and descending themes of power and government. In the process it is shown how the recovery of Aristotle was a powerful stimulus to civic urbanism and democratic politics. Aquinas is shown to develop a powerful synthesis that managed to combine Christian supernaturalism and Aristotelian naturalism. Whilst this could buttress existing hierarchies in the short run, the implications for a more populist representation of power in the long run are developed.

Our project workshop from 21-22 Nov 2019 on "Aristotle and Natural Philosophy at Early Modern Central European Universities, 1600-1700", organised by Bernd Roling, Sinem Derya Kılıç, and Benjamin Wallura (né Hübbe).

Contributers:
Ueli Zahnd, Pietro Daniel Omodeo, Esteban Law, Bernd Roling, Sascha Salatowsky, Asaph Ben-Tov, Sinem Derya Kılıç, Zornitsa Radeva, Christoph Sander, Stefano Gulizia, Matthias Roick, Jonathan Regier, Jost Eickmeyer, Gabriel Müller, Lars Reuke, Benjamin Wallura (née Hübbe)

The workshop belonged to a DFG research project (2017-2020) based at Herzog August Library Wolfenbüttel and Freie Universität Berlin:
https://www.hab.de/der-aristotelismus-in-helmstedt-die-karriere-eines-europaeischen-paradigmas/

The workshop proceedings will be published asap in the series of the 'Wolfenbütteler Forschungen'. The preliminary title: "Philosophia vetus et nova. Aristotelismus, neuere Philosophie und protestantische Gelehrsamkeit in Helmstedt und Mitteleuropa, 1600-1700" ("Philosophia vetus et nova. Aristotelianism, Early Modern Philosophy, and Protestant Scholarship in Helmstedt and Central Europe, 1600-1700").

My own contribution to this volume will appear under the title: "Oszillierende Schulphilosophie. Heinrich Rixner, Justus Cellarius und der Helmstedter Physikunterricht zwischen Aristoteles-Exegese und neuerer Philosophie, 1664-1683" (see more under "forthcoming").

El así llamado «regreso de la filosofía práctica», empezado en 1960 por H. G. Gadamer con su Wahrheit und Methode, ha provocado a menudo confusión entre la auténtica filosofía práctica de Aristóteles y la virtud que él llama phronêsis o sabiduría. En efecto, éstas representan dos formas de conocimiento muy diferentes. La sabiduría es la virtud de la razón práctica que consiste en la habilidad de deliberar correctamente, es decir en la habilidad de identificar la acción más adecuada para realizar un buen fin. Al revés, la filosofía práctica es una ciencia, o sea un hábito de razón teórica, a pesar de ser una ciencia práctica, que tiene su fin en la buena acción y tiene un nivel de rigor inferior a aquello de las ciencias teóricas. La filosofía práctica es la ciencia del supremo bien para el hombre, es decir la felicidad —el pleno florecimiento de todas las capacidades humanas—, la cual se determina por medio de la discusión dialéctica con las tesis de varios filósofos.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

The so called «revival of practical philosophy», started in 1960 by H.G. Gadamer with his Wahrheit und Methode, has often provoked a confusion between the authentic practical philosophy of Aristotle and the virtue he calls phronêsis or wisdom. Actually, they represent two forms of knowledge very different. Wisdom is the virtue of practical reason which consists in the ability of correctly deliberate, that is in the ability of individuating the action more suitable for realizing a good end. On the contrary, practical philosophy is a science, that is an habit of theoretical reason, even if it is a practical science, which has its end in the good action and has a degree of rigour inferior to that of theoretical sciences. Practical philosophy is the science of the supreme good for man, that is happiness —the full flourishing of all human capabilities —, which is determined by means of a dialectical discussion with the thesis of the various philosophers.

This article explores the relationship between ethics and metaphysics in critical theory through immanent criticism of Fabian Freyenhagen's reconstruction of Adorno. Endorsing Freyenhagen's overall defence of Adorno's position, it argues that several important features of Adorno's position as Freyenhagen interprets it can be made intelligible only on broadly Aristotelian metaphysical presuppositions. These should be thematized explicitly rather than ignored. Moreover, these metaphysical presuppositions are on independent grounds plausible, as recent Aristotelian and critical realist work has indicated, and special difficulties arising for them in the context of a radical negative critical theory can probably be overcome. Further conversation between critical theorists, Aristotelians and critical realists should prove fruitful in elaborating and defending a radical critical theory alternative to the dominant postmetaphysical paradigm. Progress in this direction, though, will entail rejecting the basic postmetaphysical premise that critical theory must proceed in a metaphysically neutral way.

Nel 1610 Galileo Galilei pubblicava il Sidereus Nuncius per comunicare le scoperte astronomiche che aveva compiuto per mezzo del suo nuovo strumento, il perspicillum o occhiale: la configurazione orografica della Luna (che ne rivelava l'affinità con la Terra), la natura stellare delle nebulose e della Via Lattea, i primi quattro satelliti di Giove (che confermavano la teoria copernicana). La Biblioteca Nazionale di Firenze possiede un esemplare della prima edizione dell'opera che contiene le postille di un anonimo aristotelico: le prime stizzite reazioni di esponente di un sistema minacciato, che opponeva una stantia erudizione libresca alle vittoriose conquiste della nuova scienza sperimentale. Si trascrive il testo (con le sue molte immagini) con le postille ai luoghi loro.

Studying Aristotle’s Politics in the 15th century. Summaries and anthologies in the Greek manuscripts, in S. FARRINGTON (ed.), Enthousiasmos. Essays in Ancient Philosophy, History, and Literature. Festschrift for Eckart Schütrumpf on his 80th Birthday, Academia Verlag-Nomos, Baden-Baden 2019, pp. 147-174.

Artikkel 1 – Hva slags vitenskapelighet? (9465 ord uten litteraturliste) 1 Teori, empiri, praksis m.fl. – gamle og nye begreper Olav Eikeland Formålet med denne teksten er kort å redegjøre begrepshistorisk og filosofisk for noen sentrale begreper av betydning for diskusjonen om vitenskapelighet i profesjonsdisiplinene og i saerdeleshet for det følgende kapitlet om «Utvidede fagfellesskap og symbiotisk laering» 1. Redegjørelsen gjør det enklere å gi en presis karakteristikk og plassering av forslagene i følgekapitlet. Hervaerende kapittel bygger på forfatterens tidligere arbeider (bl.a. Eikeland 1997, 1998, 2008a, 2008b, 2016a, 2016b) hvor referanser til annen litteratur og historiske kilder er omfattende. Fremstillingen her er derfor forenklet, og bruk av referanser begrenset. De historiske linjene er malt med grov pensel. Innledning For å kunne beskrive og analysere «utvidede fagfellesskap» og «symbiotiske laeringssystemer» i det etterfølgende kapitlet, må moderne begreper og distinksjoner mellom «teori», «praksis», «empiri» og «metodologi» som standarder for hva kunnskap eller vitenskap er, diskuteres, problematiseres og løsnes i sammenføyningene. Også dikotomien mellom «kropp» og «sjel», eller mellom «kropp» og «sinn», må problematiseres. Det samme gjelder for nåtidens dominerende organisering og institusjonalisering av kunnskapsproduksjon basert på bestemte typer arbeidsdeling, saerlig mellom «ånd» og «hånd». Disse distinksjonene og institusjonene stammer verken fra naturen eller høyere makter. De er ikke gitt, men produkter av en bestemt historisk utvikling. Begrepenes og distinksjonenes validitet er heller ikke gitt. Både begreper og arbeidsdelinger står for tiden under press både faglig (innenfra, «validitetsmessig») og samfunnsmessig (utenfra, «relevansmessig»). Mange anerkjente utfordringer, saerlig i samfunns-vitenskapelig metodologi og vitenskapsfilosofi, og dermed også for yrkes-og profesjonsdisiplinene, henger sammen med at disse begrepene, distinksjonene, arbeidsdelingene og rammene de setter, likevel tas for gitt. Språklig presisjon og evnen til å kontekstualisere og dermed relativisere sin egen samtid, roller og praksis krever et historisk utviklet og nyansert 1 Enkelte mener at yrker og profesjoner verken er fag eller disipliner, og at disse betegnelsene bare skal brukes om de etablerte vitenskapene på universitetene som fysikk, kjemi, biologi, psykologi, sosiologi, statsvitenskap, historie osv. Siden yrker og profesjoner hevdes å bruke litt av hvert fra disse, skal de selv ikke kalles verken fag eller disipliner. Universitetsfagene er heller ikke natur-eller gudegitt, men i denne artikkelen godtar jeg «fag» som betegnelse på universitetsinndelingene, mens det er gode grunner til å kalle yrker og profesjoner for nettopp disipliner, siden «disciplina» i utgangspunktet betydde en form for praktisk trening eller opplaering i noe det fantes praktiske regler og systematikk for som satte standarder for utførelse som man kunne vurderes i forhold til. Jfr. Eikeland (2008b) om praxis-interne standarder.

The volume "New Directions in Spiritual Kinship: Sacred Ties Across the Abrahamic Religions," edited by Todne Thomas, Asiya Malik and Rose Wellman, undertakes a comparative analysis of "spiritual kinship" (such as God-parenthood) in Christianity, Judaism and Islam. My chapter, "Kinship as Ethical Relation," starts by questioning the usefulness of spiritual kinship as a category for the understanding of Judaism and expands that critique into an alternate model that might be more useful for comparative purposes. I argue that the idea of "Spiritual Kinship" emerges precisely from an a set of Christian taxonomies that are often implicitly or explicitly anti-Jewish (kinship of the flesh vs. kinship of the spirit, the letter and the spirit of the law, etc.) which makes it unsuitable as an "Abrahamic" category. Moreover, the specific ways in which it is unsuitable for comparative purposes actually demonstrate the importance of this category for understanding of Christianity and of the anthropological kinship categories (affinal, consanguineal and fictive)  that were in large measure adapted from European Christian sources. Viewing kinship as a set of ethical relations, by contrast, does indeed allow for useful comparison across these religious divides and makes better sense of the ethnographic and textual data. Examples are brought from both modern and medieval Jewish life.

Kant and Aristotle reassesses the prevailing understanding of Kant as an anti-Aristotelian philosopher. Taking epistemology, logic, and methodology to be the key disciplines through which Kant’s transcendental philosophy stood as an independent form of philosophy, Marco Sgarbi shows that Kant drew important elements of his logic and metaphysical doctrines from Aristotelian ideas that were absent in other philosophical traditions, such as the distinction of matter and form of knowledge, the division of transcendental logic into analytic and dialectic, the theory of categories and schema, and the methodological issues of the architectonic. Drawing from unpublished documents including lectures, catalogues, academic programs, and the Aristotelian-Scholastic handbooks that were officially adopted at Königsberg University where Kant taught, Sgarbi further demonstrates the historical and philosophical importance of Aristotle and Aristotelianism to these disciplines from the late sixteenth century to the first half of the eighteenth century.

""En Filipo II y el Arte de la Guerra tendremos la oportunidad de conocer en profundidad a uno de los más grandes reyes de la antigua Macedonia. Gracias a su habilidad como estratega, diplomático, político y soldado, heredó un reino pobre, débil y acosado por innumerables enemigos y lo transformó en el más poderoso de toda Grecia.

A lo largo de sus páginas podremos conocer la historia del reino Macedonio, desde sus orígenes míticos hasta la formación de un imperio, de la mano del que, a la postre, se convertiría en el padre del mítico Alejandro Magno y en el forjador de un nuevo ejército que cambiaria el devenir de la guerra en la Antigüedad. Filipo II fue el creador de la falange macedonia, formación que se demostraría como inigualable en el campo de batalla y que reportaría incontables victorias sobre poderosos enemigos, como los ilirios, los tesalios, los tracios, los beocios o los atenienses. Pero no sólo eso, logró integrar en el campo de batalla a la infantería y a la caballería para emplearlos en nuevas formaciones tácticas: armó a sus soldados con las míticas sarissas y apreció como pocos las posibilidades militares que la maquinaria de guerra podía proporcionarle, siendo el mecenas de numerosos avances en este campo. Soñó con conquistar el Imperio persa, cuando ya había logrado lo que nadie antes fue capaz: el control de Grecia.

Sólo la muerte le arrebató esa hazaña, pero sentó las bases de lo que más tarde conseguiría su propio hijo. Su figura levantó tanto odios como pasiones; se le conocía como mujeriego y bebedor, pero también por su habilidad para la oratoria, por sus astucia, determinación y valor. Siempre luchó en primera línea junto a sus soldados y nunca permitió que éstos le llamaran rey, sino solo "General".

Die stoische Philosophie steht in ihren grundsätzlichen Annahmen zur Erkenntnistheorie, zur Ontologie, zur Psychologie dem Platonismus diametral entgegen. Wenn mit Simplikios ein Philosoph der neuplatonischen Schule das Werk eines Stoikers durch eine ausführliche Kommentierung würdigt und diesem im Curriculum des Philosophieunterrichts einen Platz einräumt, scheinen sich die gängigen Vorurteile gegen den Neuplatonismus als eine alles vereinnahmende und harmonisierende Philosophie zu bestätigen. Ein Blick auf das Bildungsverständnis des Neuplatonismus und den in den Texten ausführlich reflektierten erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen bietet jedoch Anlass zur Skepsis gegenüber diesen Vorwürfen und zu einer differenzierten Untersuchung des Verhältnisses von platonischer und stoischer Ethik in der Spätantike. Am Beispiel von Simplikios‘ Kommentar zum Handbüchlein der Moral des Epiktet soll im vorliegenden Buch die Möglichkeit der Verwendung stoischer Texte als Vorbereitung für den Einstieg in das neuplatonische Bildungsprogramm dargelegt und begründet werden, ohne dass der Einsatz dieser Texte zu einer Vermischung der stoischen mit den platonisch-aristotelischen Theorien führt. So liefert Simplikios mit seinem Kommentar eine wissenschaftliche Ethik des Neuplatonismus, die mit der Darlegung und Beschreibung der Anweisungen Epiktets dem Unkundigen sowohl einen ersten Zugang in das philosophische Leben bietet als auch mit seinen weiterführenden Kommentierungen die rationalen Begründungen dieser Handlungsaufforderungen offenlegt.

Summary and review by John Dillon: http://www.sehepunkte.de/2015/01/25034.html

There is an incipient tendency in critical edition of Aristotle’s
Work, it consists of considering a multilingual edition of
his Works which includes, when available, Greek, Syriac,
Arabic, Hebrew and Latin versions. Our interest here is to
appreciate the advantages and disadvantages of this type of
work through the examination of concrete examples taken
from the Metaphysics and the Nicomachean Ethics.

I am planning a history of the notion of philosophical nonsense and naturally difficult historical and exegetical questions have come up.  Charles Pigden has argued that the notion goes back at least as far as Hobbes and that Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant (on some interpretations) and pragmatists such as William James, as well as numerous Twentieth-Century philosophers make use of it.  In this ‘paper’ I put forward for general discussion such questions as whether Hobbes was the first 'nonsensicalist', whether Kant was a 'nonsensicalist' at all, which philosophers if any have considered contradictions to be meaningless and whether Wittgenstein thought that his concept of criterion could legitimately be used verificationistically.  I shall continue to add further questions as they occur to me.

Aristotelian (or neo-Aristotelian) metaphysics is currently undergoing something of a renaissance. This volume brings together fourteen new essays from leading philosophers who are sympathetic to this conception of metaphysics, which takes its cue from the idea that metaphysics is the first philosophy. The primary input from Aristotle is methodological, but many themes familiar from his metaphysics will be discussed, including ontological categories, the role and interpretation of the existential quantifier, essence, substance, natural kinds, powers, potential, and the development of life. The volume mounts a strong challenge to the type of ontological deflationism which has recently gained a strong foothold in analytic metaphysics. It will be a useful resource for scholars and advanced students who are interested in the foundations and development of philosophy.

Aristotle (384-322 BC) was a great thinker, an encyclopedic brain of ancient Greek science and philosophy. Perhaps few people know him as an educator who brought out extremely deep opinions about subjects, program contents, role of education, etc. nearly 2500 years ago. In all his researching life, he has many scientific works that are meticulous and scientifically valuable aimed at bringing the best things for humans. In the book Politics-although educational ideas are not the main contents of the book, they are presented quite closely by Aristotle – positive factors are included and have been very important up to now.

This article examines five common misunderstandings about case-study research: (a) theoretical knowledge is more valuable than practical knowledge; (b) one cannot generalize from a single case, therefore, the single-case study cannot contribute to scientific development; (c) the case study is most useful for generating hypotheses, whereas other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building; (d) the case study contains a bias toward verification; and (e) it is often difficult to summarize specific case studies. This article explains and corrects these misunderstandings one by one and concludes with the Kuhnian insight that a scientific discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and a discipline without exemplars is an ineffective one. Social science may be strengthened by the execution of a greater number of good case studies.

This article studies the discussion on Creation and the Trinity by a major seventeenth-century Aristotelian Julius Caesar Scaliger, thereby aiming to shed a new light on the hitherto neglected aspect of Renaissance Aristotelianism. Since the restoration of Platonism in the fifteenth century, proponents of this philosophical current often accused Aristotle of, unlike Plato, embracing ideas contradicting the Christian doctrines of Creation and the Trinity. Scaliger countered this accusation by documenting Aristotle’s remarks that he believed to support these teachings. He in this counterargument resorted to the belief of "prisca theologia," a belief widely shared by the Renaissance Platonists. According to him, since Aristotle shared the supreme wisdom with ancient sages such as Zoroaster and Hermes Trismegistus, he could grasp, albeit partly, the truth that was to be revealed to the faithful several centuries later. Such coexistence of tension and interaction with the newly restored Platonism is what distinguishes Renaissance Aristotelianism from that of the Middle Ages.

Every tool builds a conceptual box. This cognitive box means a situation within which the tool is useful. Outside of that context, that particular conceptual box, the tool ignores everything else. Thus, it is useless in its ability to guide you in thinking and exploring outside of that contextual and conceptual box. To believe that you can successfully use that tool outside of the circumstance for which it has its use is to become tool trapped. The very tool you are supposedly the wielder of, will, if used out of context, wind up metaphorically wielding you. This is what being tool trapped means.
Our most important conceptual tool is common sense logic. Where does that logic come from and what are its limitations?
This paper explores the trap create by common sense logic and thus how to avoid being trapped within its limiting box.

This brief article is an attempt to answer the question of the epistemological status of Avicenna’s psychology: is the soul part of the subject-matter of physics or, instead, of metaphysics? A double answer seems to offer a solution: as Avicenna himself states in his De anima (I, 1), the study of the soul belongs to physics when we consider the soul in its role and functions (the soul as it governs and moves the body), but belongs to metaphysics when we examine the soul as a substance. As we try to clarify the reasons for this twofold answer, which requires both validation and interpretation, another explanation emerges. In fact, the twofold answer is by no means exhaustive. A more thorough analysis reveals that in Avicenna’s system, as in Neo-Platonic thought generally, the real founding principle is metaphysics. In this respect, the study of the soul, which is the principle of the body, cannot be other than metaphysical. The key concept is that of emanation, which explains both soul as substance and soul as governing principle of the
body. The soul is determined by the very emanative process that explains reality. In that sense, the soul’s distinction cannot be horizontal (as if the soul could be divided into different parts, such as the physical ones—vegetable and animal—and the metaphysical ones—the rational souls of man and of celestial intelligences), but must be vertical. Soul as a substance has no real connection with either side (material or spiritual) of the world. Its connection with the physical reality is only operational. If a physical point of view exists (and psychology is to be considered a part of physics), a metaphysical point of view exists more truly: the principle of nature comes from above and physics is no more than a part of metaphysics.
In Ishrāq 2019, pp. 132-150 (English revised and updated version of «L’âme chez Avicenne : quelques remarques autour de son statut épistémologique et de son fondement métaphysique», Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 21 (2010), pp. 223-242).

In this paper, I engage with the question of friendship's possibility. There is initial clarification of the meaning of the question along two lines: first, the kind of possibility in view; second, what the question, then, amounts to. These clarifications result in understanding the question to be an attempt to form a dialectical oscillation between considering the human being as ethical (or normative) and political. Shortly thereafter, I explicate the Aristotelian and Thomistic account of friendship, chiefly through the work of Daniel Schwartz, in reference to this previous dialectical oscillation. This perspective is encountered with various difficulties from Alasdair MacIntyre's account of the fragmented status of the moral life in After Virtue to Martin Heidegger's account of authenticity (and more specifically, authentic-being-with-one-another) in Being and Time. These considerations culminate in an attempt to justify the recognition of friendship's possibility without a full ability to explicate the 'how' of its possibility by recourse to Ludwig Wittgenstein's idea of ethics as transcendental in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to present an alternative grounding for a narrative unity of life.