Access to Justice

This Court should not follow the Panel’s suggestion that Petersons’ challenge to personal jurisdiction be waived because no party made this argument to either this Court or the Court of Appeals. Under our system of government, the role of courts is not to advance arguments in
support of any of the adverse parties. United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575 (2020)(“In our adversarial system of adjudication, . . . in both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal . . ., we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.” Id. at 140 S. Ct at 1579 (quotation marks omitted).) Cf. English v. Buss, supra., at **11-14 (unpublished) (Held one judge could review the order of another judge where lack of procedural due process was apparent.) See also RAP 2.5.
Had Division One panel’s waiver argument been made by the opposing party and its counsel the Petersons, through their counsel, would have been able to demonstrate this position should be rejected because the record reflects the Petersons never agreed to waive their right to adequate, non-fraudulent service of process, which includes being “duly cited to appear.” As to this right, see e.g., Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 418 (1897); Garrison v. Cheeney, 1 Wash. Terr, 489, 503 (1875); Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 368-69 (1873) (“It is a rule, old as the law, . . . , that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his day in court, by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to appear, and has been afforded an opportunity to be heard.”)

As to the law that waiver of constitutional rights must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, see State v. Herron, 183 Wn.2d 737, 743-45, 356 P.3d 709, 712-13 (2015). In fact, a court must “indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental rights.” State v. Frawley, 181 Wn.2d 452, 461, 334 P.3d 1022 (2014). Under these constitutional principles there was no waiver of the Petersons’ right, asserted in their answer and other pleadings, not to be hailed into
a court that had no personal jurisdiction over them.

Another reason that failure to file a specific motion to dismiss for a lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to KCLR 7(b)(5) was not required is because CR 12(h)(1) specifically provides “A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper venue, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process is waived . . . (B) if it is neither made by motion under this rule nor included in a responsive pleading or an amendment thereof permitted by rule 15(a) to be made as a matter of course.” Here, these personal jurisdiction defenses were clearly asserted in the Petersons’ Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Response to the Bank’s motion for summary judgment. And even if it was the intent of this superior court to require persons to file motions to dismiss under these circumstances, a superior court does not have the authority to
compel this result as local rules cannot alter the Washington Rules of Civil Procedure. See Parry v. Windermere Real Estate/East, 102 Wn. App. 920, 928-29 (2000)(Local Rule cannot waive right under CR 12(h) to assert personal jurisdiction defenses in answer); See also Harbor Enters. v. Gudjonsson, 116 Wn.2d 283, 293 (1991); State v. Chavez, 111 Wn.2d 548, 554 (1988)(Local court rules are subordinate to state rules of civil procedure).

In summary, and with such respect as is due the Panel’s suggestion that the Bank’s motion to amend should be granted, it is Petersons’ contention that judges must respect citizens constitutional rights and not waive them without a factual basis for doing so. Similarly, with
respect, the Panel had no constitutional authority—and violated the Petersons’ right to due process of law—when it invented an argument to help the Bank, which was inconsistent with the Civil Rues and cases interpreting them. Thus, this Court should also not waive the Petersons’ right to adequate service of process before granting a motion to amend because such a result would be futile under existing law, notwithstanding anything the Court of Appeals panel has said. Colvin v. Inslee, 195 Wn.2d 879, 899-901 (2020)
                                      *                                  *                                  *

Not since the United States Supreme Court’s constitutionally and morally bankrupt decision in Sanford v. Scott, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)2 has the integrity of America’s judicial system been more in doubt than it is now. See e.g., The Wall Street Journal, “131 Federal Judges Broke the Law
by Hearing Cases Where They Had a Financial Interest” (September 28, 2021); House Judiciary Committee, Nadler & Johnson Statement on Reports Federal Judges Broke the Law by Hearing Cases
Where They Had a Financial Interest (September 29, 2021)4. The problem an economically biased judiciary poses for our democratic republic is that it undercuts the basic premises upon which this
nation was founded, i.e., separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, and due process of law. Unfortunately, for us, the People, these constitutional structures are not self enforcing, but must be enforced by those who have been economically incentivized to promote the interests of government workers—and their creditor allies—against this nation’s citizens.

Este trabajo busca introducir a las lectoras en el conocimiento de los principales institutos procesales necesarios para tramitar, resolver y eventualmente implementar las decisiones judiciales tomadas en el contexto de procesos colectivos y acciones de clase. Asimismo, presenta algunos de los problemas, interrogantes e implicancias de orden político, social y económico que genera el corrimiento del ámbito de debate de cuestiones colectivas hacia el seno del poder judicial.

Como principal clave de lectura les proponemos partir de una premisa fundamental: la enorme magnitud y el tipo de conflictos que se están discutiendo, papel va, papel viene, dentro del poder judicial. Sobre todo, ante los superiores tribunales de justicia de nuestros países.

Solo en Argentina, desde donde escribo, en los últimos 10 años el poder judicial federal y las jurisdicciones locales han dictado resoluciones y sentencias de diverso tipo (cautelares y de mérito) en el marco de procesos donde se debate, por ejemplo, el modo de facturar en el mercado de teléfonía móvil, la cartelización de empresas de distintos rubros, el acceso voluntario a la interrupción del embarazo y la impugnación de la ley que lo autoriza, las condiciones de detención de personas privadas de su libertad en establecimientos penitenciarios y diversos derechos fundamentales que les asisten (educación, requisas dignas, beneficios de la seguridad social, salario por el trabajo realizado, prisiones domiciliarias para embarazadas y madres con niñas pequeñas), las condiciones de internación en establecimientos neuropsiquiátricos, la defensa de sitios de memoria del genocidio argentino, situaciones de contaminación por explotación minera en zonas prohibidas, recuperación de espacios culturales y del patrimonio histórico, el trato digno que deben aplicar las entidades bancarias a sus clientes, la protección de patrimonio paleontológico, los límites de tasa de interés que cobran las tarjetas de crédito, la validez constitucional del blanqueo de capitales por parte de familiares de funcionarias y funcionarios públicos, la comisión que pagan inquilinos e inquilinas para acceder a una vivienda familiar, diversas prácticas ilícitas de mutuales y obras sociales (aumentos indebidos, bajas indebidas, cobros en exceso), la legalidad y razonabilidad de los cuadros tarifarios de servicios públicos esenciales (gas, luz, agua, telefonía), el pago de impuesto a las ganancias integrantes del poder judicial, situaciones de riesgo y daño ambiental por actividades de diversa índole (industrias, desmontes, represas, aplicación de agrotóxicos, obras de infraestructura vial), cargos y comisiones cobradas indebidamente por entidades bancarias, financieras y otras prestamistas, cláusulas contractuales abusivas de todo tipo y color, impuestos tasas y contribuciones que se consideran inconstitucionales, daños por productos elaborados (automotores, protectores solares), derechos de usuarios de servicios de turismo, restricciones de derechos en el contexto de la pandemia de Covid-19, condiciones edilicias de ciertos tribunales, la validez del empréstito contraído por Argentina con el FMI en 2018, el acceso a medicamentos para ciertas enfermedades, la falta de vacantes en las escuelas públicas, y el régimen de derechos y obligaciones de personas migrantes, entre muchas otras cuestiones.

Como podrán advertir, hablamos de conflictos que involucran a cientos de miles, millones y hasta decenas de millones de personas afectadas de manera homogénea en sus derechos, o en riesgo de serlo.

Conflictos que, en nuestra región, se desarrollan en el contexto de marcos convencionales y constitucionales que exigen proteger de manera preferente ciertos bienes y derechos, por un lado, y ciertos grupos de personas que han sido tradicionalmente relegadas o débilmente protegidas, por el otro.

Marcos constitucionales que, además, en diversos supuestos reconocen expresamente el derecho de acceso colectivo a la justicia (como Argentina, Brasil y Colombia), y tribunales que lo han hecho operativo a pesar de su falta de regulación adecuada (adecuación que, por la entidad de los conflictos, debería ser estricta).

Frente a este tipo de conflictos y de marcos convencionales y constitucionales, claramente diferentes a los que se tuvieron en cuenta para diagramar nuestras herramientas procesales tradicionales, resulta imprescindible revisar y repensar diversas técnicas y nociones conceptuales clásicas para adaptarlas a clave colectiva.

L'articolo esamina il principio di effettività, descrivendone la storia e la evoluzione nel nostro sistema. In principio, l'effettività del rimedio era prevista nell'ambito della tutela dello straniero propria del diritto internazionale generale: esso costituiva un obbligo dello Stato territoriale nei confronti degli altri Stati. Successivamente alla seconda guerra mondiale, l'effettività del rimedio ricorre anche nelle carte poste a tutela dei diritti umani (Art. 8 UDHR, Art. 13 ECHR e art. 47 CFREU) e poi diventa parte centrale del diritto dell'unione europea quale diritto del singolo (art. 19 TEU). Di recente anche la nostra giurisprudenza ha impiegato il principio, quale significato ulteriore dell'art. 24 Cost. (Corte di Cassazione 21255/2013 e Corte Costituzionale 238/2014), così da realizzare appieno la strumentalità del processo rispetto al diritto.

The paper aims at presenting and evaluating the conditions of access to the Hungarian Constitutional Court after the coming into force of the new Fundamental Law and Constitutional Court Act on 1 January 2012. The abolition of actio popularis and the concomitant introduction of full constitutional complaint opened a new scenario for the Hungarian Constitutional Court in which a shift of emphasis from abstract to concrete review may be expected. More than one year after the entering into force of the new scheme it is possible to make an early evaluation of the practice based on the new framework. How are these new forms being used by the complainants and interpreted by the Court? Can we already delineate the new trends of case-law?

Accessible, fair, and efficient justice systems are key to effective governance and the rule of law. Without access to justice, people – especially the poor and disenfranchised – are unable to realize their rights, challenge discrimination, or hold decision-makers accountable. As a necessary precondition for both justice and security, therefore, the rule of law is key to sustainable development. For this reason, access to justice recently assumed its rightful place in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The purpose of many rule-of-law assistance projects is to help make justice systems accessible and worthy of public confidence. This article reviews several donor-funded rule-of-law projects implemented in various parts of the world, offering some empirical insights into how they build trust in the judicial system and facilitate access to courts. Because international donors are in a unique position to shape planned interventions to improve access to justice and the rul...

Home Office decisions on asylum and immigration claims have been described as a “lottery”  and the Law Society argues there are “serious flaws in the way visa and asylum applications are being dealt with.”  The fundamental question is how do we improve access to justice for asylum seekers who are fleeing unimaginable persecution? Should their lives depend on a legal system suffering from “long delays, poor decisions, and a total lack of information?”

Technology can be used to solve two problems arising from Home Office and judges’ decisions. A database of key religious and cultural terms pertaining to the asylum seeker’s country of origin can be created so that the Home Office has a clear understanding of the background of immigration cases. Delays and lack of information occur because the Home Office uses poor secondary sources which conflicts with primary source data. Additionally, a program can be created to accurately determine the risk of harm in the asylum seeker’s country of origin. Whilst a judge would have final authority, algorithms pertaining to primary source data (e.g. percentage of internal displaced people, threat of terrorist attacks, availability of food and shelter etc.) can be utilised to guide the legal process. Often there is inconsistent understanding of the threat of persecution in a particular country meaning asylum seekers are not guaranteed procedural and substantive justice in the UK immigration process. Legaltech can change this and give asylum seekers a fair hearing or, a ‘fairtech’ hearing.

Law can be the site through which women's dignity and equality can be expressed and pursued. Speaking the language of rights translates one's needs from private interests to public claims through words and concepts that the community – local, national and/or international – have already validated. Law can therefore offer a medium to confront the injustices and unfairness built into other systems of political, social and economic ordering. Women's rights advocates have won significant victories through law and have generated gains for women's dignity and equality. However, law can also be a place where women's rights are not only silenced but where social, economic and political power structures are replicated and work against women's rights.

This paper argues that effective rule of law programming focused on women's rights and democratic governance must begin with a clear definition of the rule of law, a careful analysis of the causes of women's inequality and the context in which it is perpetuated and sustained, coupled with an ability and desire to harness law as an instrument of social change that is tempered by a sober understanding that law is unpredictable and complex in its results.

This paper proceeds in several parts. First, it identifies the key issues relating to women's democratic governance, women's rights and the rule of law. The second part identifies the importance of normativity and power relations for feminist theorizing around the rule of law. Feminist conceptions of the rule of law recognize that law is shot throughout with social and economic power and that harnessing women's emancipation to law is fraught with uncertainties and complications. At the same time, feminist theorizing around the rule of law also recognizes the importance of using law to speak truth to power and to gain access to the sites in which social relations are defined, evaluated and consolidated. The final sections of this paper discuss the different barriers to access to justice that face elite and marginalized women, the possible roles that NGOs can play in the realization of women's rights, and the possible mutually interdependent and reinforcing roles that women in various positions of power can play in promoting women's rights more generally. The very last section sets out areas for further research and analysis. While scholars and advocates have significantly advanced the thinking about and harnessing of law in support of women's needs and interests, much conceptualization, implementation and assessment or evaluation work remains to be done.

In both private and public justice systems, online dispute resolution (ODR) technologies are profoundly affecting people’s access to justice and redress and the nature of their procedural experiences. Automation and artificial intelligence play a key role in delivering the promise of ODR. At the same time, there are challenging normative and practical concerns regarding the ability of “machine made justice” to meet appropriate procedural and substantive standards. The article presents a conceptual framework for evaluating the role of technology in dispute resolution and its effect on procedural justice. Subsequently, it proposes an instrument for evaluating procedural justice experiences in ODR; and reports the results of a study comparing the impact of automated (software-powered) and human-powered online mediation and arbitration on disputants’ procedural justice experiences. Finally, the article discusses the implications of its findings on ODR process design, regulation, and pra...

Silicosis is an incurable lung disease caused by the inhalation of silica dust. Gold is usually found alongside silica, so goldminers are especially at risk of silicosis. Studies show that up to a quarter of career mineworkers in South Africa have contracted it. As one expert witness in the litigation put it, a 'river of disease' was flowing through the mines. The river metaphor also captures the meandering course of the silicosis litigation, which spanned more than a decade, its course unpredictable, joined by new tributaries and splitting into new streams of litigation along the way. It included test cases, arbitration, massed claims and eventually, a class action. The silicosis class action in South Africa not only provided the first real test for the new court-made rules governing class actions, but is one of the largest and most complex multi-class, multi-defendant, dispersed incident class actions the world has seen. The class action succeeded, culminating in a R5 billion settlement. It also provides a strong basis to consider how best class action law should develop in South Africa. This article engages with the test for certification, representation in class actions, settlements and legal fees and costs. It argues that the constitutional commitment to access to justice undergirds class actions and must inform the development of these rules. The profit incentive presented by class actions presents risks of abuse that must be addressed. The Constitution, and not the market, should determine which poor litigants get legal representation to bring class actions, and how class actions work.

Hay una paradoja que subyace a ser madre en prisiones de Brasil: el exceso de maternidad durante los meses en que el hijo permanece con la madre y la ruptura súbita de esa relación en el momento de la separación. A estos fenómenos las autoras los denominan hipermaternidad e hipomaternidad, respectivamente.  Esta  es  la  principal conclusión  de  la  investigación  en  la  que  está  basado  este  artículo, realizada por las autoras en seis estados brasileños a lo largo de nueve meses de estudio. El objetivo principal fue exponer la percepción de las gestantes y madres recientes presas en relación al ejercicio de la maternidad en espacios de privación de libertad. Se hicieron entrevistas con detenidas, directoras,  agentes  penitenciarias  y  visitas  in  loco  a prisiones  y  unidades  materno-infantiles  del  sistema penitenciario brasileño. En este artículo las autoras reflexionan sobre el exceso de disciplina de la maternidad en la cárcel y la vulnerabilidad de la maternidad en situación de prisión.

As ações coletivas têm como pontos sensíveis a discussão acerca da legitimidade e da coisa julgada. O presente estudo tem por escopo a análise desta última, em que o debate se justifica porque a coisa julgada reflete as consequências do processo no mundo real. A coisa julgada nas demandas coletivas teve sua extensão ampliada para operar-se erga omnes ou ultra partes (redação original do art. 16 da Lei n. 7.347/1985 e art. 103 da Lei n. 8.078/1990), objetivando evitar a multiplicação de demandas com o mesmo pedido e causa de pedir e a existência de decisões conflitantes. Ocorre que a Lei n. 9.494/1997, até hoje em vigor, alterou o artigo 16 da Lei da Ação Civil Pública (Lei n. 7.347/1985) para limitar a coisa julgada à competência territorial do órgão prolator. A partir de então, surgiram grandes celeumas na doutrina e na jurisprudência pátria quanto à constitucionalidade, eficácia e aplicabilidade desta alteração, que ainda não foram definitivamente dirimidas. Diante desse cenário, são feitas considerações críticas, mediante emprego do método dedutivo, acerca da limitação da coisa julgada pela competência territorial do órgão prolator da decisão, que permitem concluir pela sua incompatibilidade com o microssistema processual coletivo e, também, que ela representa barreira ao acesso à justiça.

Invited presentation at the 3rd Annual Asia Pro Bono Conference 2014

The Conference aims to:

Demonstrate the importance of pro bono initiatives to achieve greater access to justice for poor, marginalised and disadvantaged communities in Southeast Asia and internationally;

To provide opportunities for lawyers and law firms to network with potential pro bono partners and develop initiatives to meet unmet legal need in the region;

Educate university academics, law students, lawyers, judiciary, pro bono professionals, policy makers, civil society and non-profit representatives about the meaning and concept of pro bono initiatives;

Foster collaborative ties between conference participants to conceptualise, design, create and strengthen pro bono initiatives locally, regionally and internationally; and

Showcase the successful establishment of pro bono initiatives and programmes.

English Abstract: Online dispute resolution (ODR) technologies are now increasingly used by courts, administrative agencies, companies and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) organizations to handle cases in various legal domains. Two decades have passed since the first ODR systems were launched and their impact on access to justice and the delivery of justice has evolved to a great extent. This Article offers an overview and analysis of these developments. First, it discusses the pragmatic and ideological antecedents of ODR: developments in information technology and online activity, and the rise of the effective access to justice and alternative dispute resolution movements. Second, it proposes a typological framework for evaluating ODR systems in terms of dispute types, resolution methods, settings, technologies, providers, and process designs. It then uses the framework to systematically analyze the current landscape of ODR, offering specific examples of ODR systems that demons...

The domestic impact of the EU on the Central and Eastern European countries is an essential part of the Europeanisation research agenda. It might be interesting to examine whether the acceding countries transpose, implement and enforce the EU acquis in the same way as do the EU-15 region, or if there is a specific eastern way of Europeanisation. As for the chosen policy area, the extent to which post-Communist countries guarantee certain rights for non-governmental actors regarding environmental matters could be considered as a democratic indicator, since their former state approach usually focussed on economic growth driven by industrialisation, while environmental protection was of a lower priority. The subject of this paper is the third pillar of the Aarhus Convention-related EU legislation, the provisions of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive which guarantee the access to justice for the public concerned including NGOs in environmental matters.

Access to Justice is a fundamental right which is generally provided through state legal aid. The South African constitution guarantees the right to legal representation at state expense for criminal matters, children, and a fair public hearing, resulting in marginalised groups or individuals who are denied access to Justice. Alternate provision is investigated

For decades, tribunals have provided a relatively quick, cheap, accessible, and straightforward means of challenging administrative decisions. Given the volume of initial decisions that can be appealed, tribunals handle many times more cases than the courts. The notion of a tribunal appeal implies a wider remedy that provided by way of judicial review: a full de novo assessment to assess an individual's eligibility for the relevant entitlement. This involves an adjudication process in which factual evidence and legal arguments are considered. The tribunal then produces a substantive decision that determines whether the appellant qualifies for the relevant entitlement or status. This decision is binding, unless it can be overturned on appeal. Tribunals are core institutions of administrative justice and will remain so, but they are also changing. One purpose of this chapter is to examine how tribunals are changing and to identify the underlying forces driving such change. Since 2010, various developments have affected the work and operation of tribunals: legal aid restrictions; the abolition of the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council (AJTC); the marginalisation of tribunals following the introduction of internal review mechanisms; and the erosion and abolition of some appeal rights. A second purpose is to assess the likely impact of such changes in terms of the accessibility and effectiveness of tribunals. It is argued that many of these developments are likely to have adverse consequences and limit the role of tribunals. On the other hand, some aspects of tribunals have been strengthened. The courts increasingly recognise the Upper Tribunal's specialist expertise and approach its decisions with a degree of caution. There has also been a stronger focus upon the need for public bodies to make better decisions first time round. Looking forward, online dispute resolution (ODR) methods may reduce the need for oral hearings and increase the accessibility of tribunals. Put together, these developments reflect the next stage in the evolutionary development of tribunals: a new model of tribunals is gradually coming into being. The paper speculates on the likely components of this new model. The Old and New Models of Tribunals Tribunals have evolved over time. Closely linked to the development of administrative government, tribunals in part reflect the changing nature of government itself. In the nineteenth century, they emerged as multi-functional administrative entities operating in areas such as railways regulation and tax which, amongst other things, resolved disputes. 2 The advent of the modern tribunal system can be traced back to the National Insurance Act 1911, which introduced unemployment insurance. The Act bypassed the ordinary courts by requiring that appeals against decisions of insurance officers be brought to a court of referees. In doing so, the Act introduced the concept of a local, non-legal tribunal that specialised in a particular area of administration. These courts were accessible for users and legal representation was unnecessary. 3 Following the Great War, tribunals proliferated. 1 I would like to thank Michael Adler, Ray Burningham, Tom Mullen, Brian Thompson, and David Williams for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies.

Trans individuals face unique sets of obstacles when accessing resources to end the violence due to their marginalized identity and the feminist definitions of what intimate partner violence is. Kimberly Nixon, a transwoman who was refused a volunteer position within the Vancouver Rape Relief Society due to being a transwoman, exemplifies the struggles that trans individuals face due to structural violence and heteronormativity. The case of Nixon v. Vancouver Rape Relief Society demonstrates the additional obstacles that trans individuals face to accessing services to ending domestic violence, and supports the resistance to a heteronormative system which excludes trans individuals.

Among the commitments undertaken by the governments participating in the OGP, there is a growing number of commitments to improve the provision of justice services. Successfully implementing these commitments can entail a reform opportunity that the justice sector needs so as to improve its legitimacy vis-à-vis society, as well as its internal functioning.

The Flint water crisis was a preventable tragedy that has decimated an entire community. This crisis is particularly appalling because Flint is an Environmental Justice community –a community in which the majority of its residents are racial minorities, many of whom live below the poverty level, and bear the disproportionate burdens of environmental risks. As this vulnerable community continues to suffer, we at the Michigan Environmental Justice Coalition are reminded of the Michigan Environmental Justice Plan, and how its implementation may have helped to prevent this catastrophe from happening.

The poor need legal assistance and access to justice in civil matters and in spite of legal aid or justice centres (statutory bodies) acting under a constitutional mandate, they are unable to provide the necessary service. Tenants who do not have the financial means are denied access to legal assistance and to justice to enforce their contractual rights or to challenge their landlords’ unlawful actions. The poor have waited far too long for their freedom and we must all work together to ensure that the government translates Madiba’s dream into a reality.

A baseline survey in the 4 blocks of North 24 Parganas was proposed to understand the state of violence on women in the extreme fringes of the state. These 4 blocks of Sandeshkhali 1&2, Minakhan and Hingalganj, are near Kolkata but are still remote in terms of facilities and service providers.  Most of the islands in sundarban are now self-sufficient in terms of essential service providers likeschools and hospitals. However the one thing needed to uphold the virtues of a civilized society whichonly recognize power, Police Stations are rare. Many of the women interviewed are from familieswhose male members are either part- time agricultural labour and migratory labour for constructions inKolkata or other big cities in India, that include Delhi, Mumbai. The women themselves, many of themare rag-pickers and work as domestic help in the city and its suburbs. This report will help not only us to develop a customized proposal to address the shortcomings of the region but will also help other like minded organizations to comprehend the extent of violence and understand the various impediments faced by the women of this nearly remote landscape(Sunderbans).

"En marzo de este año se cumplieron dos años desde que el Tribunal Supremo de Puerto Rico emitiera su opinión en Fundación Surfrider v. ARPe. Allí, el Supremo nacional reexaminaba la a veces tensa relación entre la doctrina de legitimación activa y las controversias ambientales, y la marcada diferencia hasta ese entonces existente entre el Tribunal Supremo estadounidense y el puertorriqueño, en torno al grado de escrutinio con el que se evaluaría el cumplimiento de cada persona con los requisitos de la doctrina en estos casos. La decisión, quizás la primera en la que dicho Foro concluyó que un litigante ambiental no ostentaba legitimación activa para presentar una reclamación al Tribunal, representó un abandono dramático de las posturas relativamente liberales que prevalecían en Puerto Rico hasta entonces, siendo remplazadas por los criterios de la jurisdicción federal estadounidense, según desarrollados en Sierra Club v. Morton. Desde entonces, los tribunales han descansado en Fundación Surfrider para concluir que ambientalistas opuestos a determinado proyecto no tienen legitimación activa para procurar la revisión judicial de su aprobación. Como resultado de lo anterior, luego de más de cuatro décadas en las que las puertas de los tribunales estuvieron generosamente abiertas para ventilar reclamos presentados por comunidades y organizaciones ambientales, el tema de la legitimación activa en estos casos se ha convertido en uno de los obstáculos principales para entrar a examinar las objeciones de estos grupos a las decisiones impugnadas. El presente ensayo pretende invitar a la reflexión crítica en torno a las causas de tan extraordinario desarrollo, así como los problemas que han surgido o podrían surgir como resultado de la importación, sin más, de la normativa estadounidense en torno a este tema. Argumento que la importación de los postulados de la jurisprudencia federal sobre legitimación activa en casos ambientales no sólo resulta impropia, en atención a las particularidades de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, sino que tiene el efecto de colocar a los litigantes ambientales en Puerto Rico en una posición más difícil que la de sus homólogos estadounidenses a la hora de demostrar que poseen legitimación activa para acudir a los tribunales. Tales elementos, concluyo, limitan severamente el Acceso a la Justicia de estos sectores y socavan la legitimidad de nuestro modelo democrático de Gobierno.

March 2012 marked the second anniversary of the Puerto Rican Supreme Court opinion in Surfrider Foundation v. ARPe. In that case, the Supreme Court reexamined the sometimes tense relationship between standing and environmental controversies, as well as the up-to-then significant difference between the Puerto Rican and United States Supreme Court precedents on the level of scrutiny employed in determining compliance with standing requirements. The decision, perhaps the first in which the Puerto Rican Supreme Court concluded that an environmental plaintiff bore no standing to file a complaint, represented a dramatic abandonment of the relatively liberal stances that prevailed in Puerto Rico until then, which were replaced by the criteria set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton and latter cases. Since then, courts in Puerto Rico have relied on Surfrider Foundation to conclude that environmentalists opposed to a particular project do not have standing to seek judicial review of approval. As a result of this, after more than four decades in which the doors of the courts were generously open to air complaints by communities and environmental organizations, standing has become one of the key obstacles faced by these groups to have courts examine contested government environmental decisions. This paper strives to invite critical reflection about the causes of this extraordinary development, and the problems that have arisen or may arise as a result of the importation of the U.S. criteria on this subject. I claim that the importation of the tenets of federal jurisprudence on standing in environmental cases is not only inappropriate, considering the particularities of the Puerto Rican legal system, but that it also has the effect of placing environmental litigants in Puerto Rico in a more difficult than that of their U.S. counterparts. Such elements, I conclude, severely limit the access to justice of these groups and undermine the legitimacy of our democratic form of government. "

I prepared this paper for UNDP's Hub for Latin America and the Caribbean. It focusses on the challenges faced by justice systems to deal with COVID-19 and showcases new programmatic priorities for transforming Latin American judicial institutions.

Against a backdrop of rising unemployment and increased deprivation, this FRA Annual report closely examines the situation of those, such as children, who are vulnerable to budget cuts, impacting important fields such as education, healthcare and social services. It looks at the discrimination that Roma continue to face and the mainstreaming of elements of extremist ideology in political and public discourse. It considers the impact the crises have had on the basic principle of the rule of law, as well as stepped up EU Member State efforts to ensure trust in justice systems.

For the first time in the American legal profession, non-lawyers can openly, independently, ethically, and legally engage in activities recognized by bar associations as the practice of law. In 2012, the Washington Supreme Court passed Admission and Practice Rule 28 (APR 28), establishing the profession’s first paraprofessional licensing scheme that allows non-lawyers to give legal advice. The process authorizes qualified non-lawyers to provide legal advice without the supervision of a lawyer. Washington’s Supreme Court intends for Limited License Legal Technicians, or “LLLTs” as they are known, to increase access to justice by responding to the unmet civil legal needs of Washington residents, mirroring a broader call in the legal profession for service delivery models that triage the simpler cases from the complex. Doing so, the LLLT model aims to better meet the needs of those who cannot otherwise afford professional legal help.

Will the LLLT model increase access to justice? That depends on how we define “justice”—more specifically, justice for whom? LLLTs have prompted anticipation that the model will do its part to close the gap on the unmet civil legal assistance needs of low- and moderate-income populations, a need perhaps best shown by Washington State’s Civil Legal Needs studies. Yet to fully understand the model and its potential, we must look more closely at who will benefit from it and, critically, who will not.

This Article finds that the LLLT model is not designed to increase access to justice for those from low-income populations. This conclusion is based on first-hand interviews with the architects of the model as well as on original surveys and interviews conducted with the first two cohorts of LLLTs and LLLT Candidates. LLLTs and Candidates expect to keep their pricing schemes high enough to bring in a sustainable revenue stream, intend to work primarily through traditional legal service delivery models at law firms and as solo practitioners, and overall do not report highly salient motivation to target low-income clientele relative to their other motivations for becoming an LLLT. From all of this, we do not have reason to believe that low-income legal consumers will better access justice through the current LLLT model.

This Article first sets forth the context for why and how to weigh whether the model will increase access to justice for low-income populations, and then analyzes why, based on LLLTs’ and Candidates’ responses, we do not have reason to believe that the model will expand access to justice in an appreciable way for low-income consumers. The Article then contemplates the implications of this finding, which Washington and other states may wish to consider as they develop legal paraprofessional licensing schemes like the LLLT model and, ultimately, determine who will gain access to justice through such models.

The article is devoted to some modern trends in the development of justice. The author shows the approaches to justice at the beginning of the XX century, after the Second World War, as well as at the present time. The article presents a critical assessment of legislative changes that complicate the availability of state courts, as well as the statements of scientists who believe that the role of the court in society can and should be minimized.
Keywords: justice; privatization of justice; alternative ways of dispute resolution; accessibility of justice, public interest.
/Статья посвящена некоторым современным тенденциям в развитии правосудия. Автор показывает подходы к правосудию в начале XX в., после Второй мировой войны, а также в настоящее время. Представлена критическая оценка законодательных изменений, усложняющих доступность государственных судов, а также утверждений ученых, считающих, что роль суда в обществе может и должна быть минимизирована. 
Ключевые слова: правосудие; приватизация правосудия; альтернативные способы разрешения спора; доступность правосудия, общественный интерес.

Este livro procura identificar necessidades, detectar entraves e elaborar estratégias para garantia do exercício de direitos materno-reprodutivos no sistema prisional brasileiro. Por meio da observação de estabelecimentos prisionais, da realização de grupo focal com presas e de entrevistas com especialistas, as autoras puderam identificar, no fluxograma do sistema de justiça, os entraves e as lacunas que impedem detentas de terem seus direitos efetivados; mapear a percepção de mães presas do tratamento jurídico-penal-social que lhes é concedido e granjear suas propostas para realização do exercício da maternidade na condição adversa em que se encontram. Como resultado da pesquisa, foram elaboradas trinta propostas sobre desencarceramento, convivência familiar e fluxo do sistema de justiça, se não para diminuir a população prisional feminina, pelo menos para reduzir as violações de direitos e as consequências do aprisionamento. Assim, este livro busca contribuir para o desenvolvimento e a divulgação da pesquisa empírica em Direito e para os avanços na defesa dos direitos de mulheres e crianças encarceradas no Brasil. LINK PARA BAIXAR EPUB http://editoraunesp.com.br/catalogo/9788595463417,dar-a-luz-na-sombra

Justice systems around the world are launching online courts and tribunals in order to improve access to justice, especially for self-represented litigants (SRLs). Online courts are designed to handhold SRLs throughout the process and empower them to make procedural and substantive decisions. To that end, they present SRLs with streamlined and simplified procedures and employ a host of user interface design and user experience strategies (UI/UX). Focusing on these features, the article analyzes online courts as digital choice environments that shape SRLs’ decisions, inputs and actions, and considers their implications on access to justice, due process and the impartiality of courts. Accordingly, the article begins to close the knowledge gap regarding choice architecture in online legal proceedings. Using examples from current online courts, the article considers how mechanisms such as choice overload, display, colorfulness, visual complexity, and personalization influence SRLs’ choi...

Los derechos a la tutela judicial y a la asistencia jurídica se encuentran en los incisos 1°, 3° y 4° del artículo 19 Nº 3 de la Constitución. El inciso 1° del artículo 19 N° 3 incluye lo que en este capítulo se denomina tutela judicial. En la doctrina nacional y comparada también se le ha llamado derecho a la acción, derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva y derecho de acceso a la justicia. Sin embargo, en mi opinión es más preciso el concepto de tutela judicial. Su importancia radica en que permite asegurar el ejercicio de los derechos sustantivos, a través de una decisión independiente e imparcial. Por esto, el Tribunal Constitucional (en adelante "TC") ha señalado que corresponde exclusivamente el conocimiento de asuntos contenciosos a la jurisdicción 2. Los incisos 3° y 4° del artículo 19 N° 3 de la Constitución se refieren a la obligación del Estado de otorgar asesoramiento y defensa jurídica a quienes no pueden proveerla por sí mismos, desde una perspectiva general y específicamente con relación al ofendido por el delito y el imputado en el proceso penal. La asistencia jurídica se relaciona directamente con la tutela judicial, y también con el inciso segundo que consagra el derecho a la defensa, pues puede leerse también como una garantía de este último derecho. El tratamiento conjunto de estos derechos se justifica en tanto ambos se encuentra íntimamente vinculados. El TC ha explicado esa estrecha relación, en base a que la posibilidad de defenderse frente a la eventual vulneración de un derecho requiere dos situaciones. Primeramente, la posibilidad de interponer la acción respectiva en forma previa; y, en segundo lugar, sustentar esa acción a través de los medios establecidos por la ley durante todo el procedimiento, para que ella pueda llegar a ser acogida 3. Se puede afirmar entonces que esta íntima vinculación tiene por objeto evitar la indefensión, que se produciría cuando un justiciable no cuenta con asistencia letrada. De allí que los estudios empíricos sobre acceso a la justicia habitualmente analizan el estado de los servicios de ayuda legal que otorga el Estado, pues su no existencia implica un obstáculo, a veces insuperable, para satisfacer adecuadamente una necesidad jurídica 4. En este capítulo, analizaré la estructura y contenido de estos derechos. Me concentraré en la lectura de los incisos citados del artículo 19 Nº 3 de la Constitución, así como en la jurisprudencia del TC y lo señalado por la doctrina constitucional nacional. Por lo tanto, una inevitable limitación de este estudio es que las referencias al derecho

Cómo citar: Cofré, L. 2020. Derechos a la tutela judicial y a la asistencia jurídica. En Contreras, P. y Salgado, C. (eds). Curso de Derechos Fundamentales. Parte Especial. Valencia, Editorial Tirant lo Blanch, pp. 317-346.