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Oaths (ρκοι), Covenants (συνθκαι) and Laws (νόμοι) in the Athenian
Reconciliation Agreement of 403 BC
Christopher Joyce
Antichthon / Volume 49 / November 2015, pp 24 - 49
DOI: 10.1017/ann.2015.1, Published online: 25 November 2015
Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0066477415000015
How to cite this article:
Christopher Joyce (2015). Oaths (ρκοι), Covenants (συνθκαι) and Laws (νόμοι) in the
Athenian Reconciliation Agreement of 403 BC. Antichthon, 49, pp 24-49 doi:10.1017/
ann.2015.1
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Antichthon 49 (2015) 24-49
doi:10.1017/ann.2015.1
Oaths (ὅρκοι), Covenants (συνθῆκαι) and Laws (νόμοι) in the
Athenian Reconciliation Agreement of 403 BC*
ABSTRACT
There has been much discussion in recent years as to whether the Athenian
amnesty of 403 BC can be understood in terms of political forgiveness. A number of scholars have denied that it can. Nevertheless, if the oaths, covenants,
and laws are properly analysed, it will become clear that, though ancillary to
the earliest clauses of the agreement, the promise μὴ μνησικακεῖν was a blanket
measure forbidding prosecutions for crimes under the Thirty and before in the
courts after 403. The covenants (συνθῆκαι) chiefly laid down conditions for
future relations between Athens and Eleusis. The promise not to dredge up the
past was just one concern, and should not be confused with the agreement in
its entirety. This article re-examines the agreement as a whole in light of recent
discussion of the meaning of amnesty in the ancient world, and argues that the
oath μὴ μνησικακεῖν, sworn subsequently, affirmed just one of the covenants,
not, as is sometimes held, every covenant. Other clauses may have been reaffirmed by separate oaths. The legislation (νόμοι) which followed was designed
to give clearer legal definition to μὴ μνησικακεῖν, but was distinct and separate
from the covenants of amnesty.
There has been in recent years a renewed interest in the concept and
practice of amnesty in the ancient world. Most recently Kaja HarterUibopuu and Fritz Mitthof co-edited a series of papers from a wide range
of contributors analysing the application and understanding of amnesty
from the time of the Pharaohs until the downfall of the Roman Empire in
the West.1 Although each examines evidence from a different period, these
articles reflect a broad shift in the way in which amnesty in antiquity has
been understood. Traditionally, amnesty has been defined in terms of a
reconciliation agreement between warring parties, often, but not always,
in a civil conflict, which normalised civic relationships and restored the
status quo ante.2 In contrast, the thrust of recent scholarship has been to
*
I would like to thank Edward Harris for his astute comments and suggestions on the final
version of this paper. Certain comments which he has made on some of the questions
raised by this topic have been included as a separate Appendix at the end of this article
(see pp. 46-9). I would like also to acknowledge the useful comments of the anonymous
referees for Antichthon.
1
K. Harter-Uibopuu and F. Mitthof (eds), Vergeben und Vergessen? Amnestie in der
Antike, Wiener Kolloquien zur Antiken Rechtsgeschichte, 2013.
See e.g. the definition by G. Thür in ‘Amnestie’, DNP 1 (1996) 602-3 of amnesty as:
‘Gesetzmässig festgesetzter Verzicht auf Anklage, Wiederaufnahme von Verfahren,
Urteils-vollstreckung und Strafvollzug als Mittel, die streitenden Parteien nach internen
2
24
© The Australasian Society for Classical Studies 2015
The Athenian Reconciliation Agreement of 403 BC
25
challenge the idea that the practical application of amnesty in the ancient
world, in any real sense, reflected a ‘Staatsnormalisierung’, or a turning
back of the clock, which resulted in the reinstatement of affairs prior to a
given conflict. Martin Dreher, for example, in a survey of amnesty
agreements dating from archaic times to the end of the fourth century BC,
has argued that some important attested cases in Greece evince a
tendency not to bring about reconciliation and, indeed, that in some
amnesty was a politically weighted mechanism which promoted a specific
partisan interest.3 Lene Rubinstein has made some similar observations in
respect of amnesty measures in Hellenistic times, where often larger
power structures interfered in the internal affairs of cities and enforced the
claims of one party or grouping for reasons of self-interest.4 From a
slightly different angle, but with overlapping implications, Csaba La’da
has argued that, while often a means of reconciliation, amnesty in Ptolemaic Egypt was not so much a peace deal between competing factions as
an act of grace bestowed by royal edict, and the concentration of
amnesties toward the end of the Ptolemaic dynasty might suggest the
ineffectiveness of the central power to restore law and order locally.5 If
examined on their own terms, amnesty seems in the majority of instances
to have been less about the ‘abolition of the past’ than about the creation
of new legal and political circumstances for achieving specified political
objectives.
Within the framework of this theoretical shift, it will be useful to
re-examine the evidence for the best attested of all amnesties from the
ancient world, the Athenian reconciliation of 403 BC which Cicero
famously characterised as the Atheniensium vetus exemplum.6 Very
recently, Edwin Carawan dedicated an entire monograph to this episode in
3
oder externen Krisen zu versöhnen.’ Implicit in this definition is the claim that amnesty
measures are there to alleviate crisis and to bring about through legislation reconciliation
in the wake of a conflict. In the case of Athens, with which this article specifically deals,
I will argue that this definition fits the facts which we can glean from the ancient sources,
but I leave open the question as to whether other amnesty arrangements in antiquity
match the definition.
M. Dreher, ‘Die Herausbildung eines politischen Instruments: Die Amnestie bis zum Ende
der klassischen Zeit’, in Harter-Uibopuu and Mitthof (n. 1) 71-94.
4
L. Rubinstein, ‘Forgive and Forget? Amnesty in the Hellenistic Period’, in HarterUibopuu and Mitthof (n. 1) 127-61.
5
C.A. La’da, ‘Amnesty in Hellenistic Egypt: A Survey of the Sources’, in Harter-Uibopuu
and Mitthof (n. 1) 163-209.
6
Cic. Phil. 1.1.1. For modern discussions as to whether Cicero truly understood the nature
of the Athenian amnesty, see Th. Mommsen, Römisches Strafrecht (Leipzig 1899) 458;
M. Sordi, ‘La fortuna dell’amnestia del 403/2 a.C.’, in Sordi (ed.), Amnistia, perdono e
vendetta nel mondo antico (Milan 1997); E. Carawan, ‘The Athenian Amnesty and
Scrutiny of the Laws’, JHS 122 (2002) 1-23, esp. 5-7; P. Scheibelreiter, ‘“Nicht Erinnern”
und “Übles vergessen”: Zum Amnestiebegriff im klassischen Griechenland’, in O. Brupbacher (ed.), Erinnern und Vergessen. Tagungsband des europäischen Forums junger
Rechtshistorikerinnen und Rechtshistoriker (Münich 2007) 365-84.
26
Christopher Joyce
which he proffers some important new suggestions and expands some of
the revisionist standpoints of his earlier articles.7 Most significantly, he
seeks to disengage discussion of the amnesty of 403 from notions of
political forgiveness and argues that, as a legislative measure, its use and
scope was limited to a group of written covenants (συνθῆκαι) which the
oath of reconciliation simply reinforced. This was by no means a universal
amnesty, and to that extent should be understood, not in the Ciceronian
sense of oblivio, but as a tightly controlled measure to reconcile the
opposing sides under a limited set of legal terms. In its favour, Carawan’s
study is in line with the changing Zeitgeist which has taken an ever more
sceptical view of amnesty as a measure of forgiveness, but its general
argument rests on some deeply problematic interpretations of ancient
sources which I intend to analyse carefully here. In particular, his claim
that the oath μὴ μνησικακεῖν solidified a series of legislative enactments, or
covenants, involves a significant amount of surgery in reconstructing the
chronology of events as represented in our most contemporary literary
source, the speech by Andocides On the Mysteries, delivered around 400 to
defend himself against the charge of impiety. Moreover, the comparanda
he offers to support his view of μὴ μνησικακεῖν as a swearing-in of preexisting covenants are at best inconclusive, at worst refuting of the
position he seeks to uphold.
In two earlier articles, I challenged Carawan over the formula
μὴ μνησικακεῖν.8 In contrast, I maintained that μὴ μνησικακεῖν involved far
more than the mere solemnisation of a contract exchange and was a genuine
attempt by Athenians to ensure, in the interest of restoring harmony, that
citizens would not bring charges in court for past wrongs.9 My most recent
paper was unable to respond to the expanded argument of Carawan’s
monograph, which appeared after its submission, and so one of my
present aims is to plug that gap. Specifically, I wish to take issue with his
argument that the oath formalised a series of legislative enactments. The
evidence indicates, to the contrary, that μὴ μνησικακεῖν was one of a series of
provisions in the agreement, most of which had little or nothing to say about
annulment of the past. The covenants provided mainly, but not exclusively,
for future relations between Athens and the newly created enclave at Eleusis;
their nature was different from μὴ μνησικακεῖν. Though the latter featured in
7
E. Carawan, The Athenian Amnesty and Reconstructing the Law (Oxford 2013). For
earlier articles expressing comparable views, see n. 6 above and n. 8 below.
8
C.J. Joyce, ‘The Athenian Amnesty and Scrutiny of 403’, CQ 58 (2008) 507-18; ‘Mὴ
μνησικακεῖν and “All the Laws” (Andocides On the Mysteries 81-2): A Reply to
E. Carawan’, Antichthon 48 (2014) 37-54. The first of these was written as a reply to
Carawan’s 2002 article (n. 6), the second a reply to his retort entitled ‘The Meaning of MÊ
MNÊSIKAKEIN’, CQ 62 (2012) 567-81.
9
The oaths together formalise the text of a single written treaty, and not two separate ones:
thus, A. Heuss, Abschluss und Beurkundung des griechischen und römischen Staatsvertrages
(Darmstadt 1967) 7-8; P. Scheibelreiter ‘Atheniensium vetus exemplum: Zum Paradigma
einer antiken Amnestie’, in Harter-Uibopuu and Mitthof (n. 1) 95-126 at 101.
The Athenian Reconciliation Agreement of 403 BC
27
the covenants also, its effect was to eradicate the scars of the past, and
cannot therefore be understood as a sealing clause for the earlier agreements.
Orators refer to the amnesty under the umbrella phrase συνθῆκαι καὶ
ὅρκοι.10 In all probability these were inscribed and set up in a conspicuous
location.11 The main focus was to sort out property rights and other matters
to do with the shrine at Eleusis, but they also included a guarantee not to
dredge up past wrongs. It was this guarantee, and this alone, which
granted that old wrongs would not be mentioned, but, because this needed
further definition and clarification, subsequent laws were passed
at Athens.12
The twofold nature of the amnesty, both to allay memory of the past
and to lay down new conditions regulating the future, is a vital feature of
the reconciliation. It might be objected that my view of the Athenian
amnesty as a measure against dredging up the past swims against the
changing tide of opinion, but I should like to emphasise that, in
contrast to more traditional studies, which have understood the
reconciliation of 403 mainly in those terms, my approach sees the abrogation of grievances as one aspect of the agreement, but not the only, nor
perhaps, its most important aspect. The most important source for the
covenants of amnesty shows that the majority of its provisions related to
matters of future concern, and that the clause μὴ μνησικακεῖν did not in
any way pertain to those; moreover, it indicates that the agreement of 403
aimed less at restoring the status quo ante than at stipulating new terms
dealing with fresh and unprecedented circumstances. Once μὴ μνησικακεῖν
is disentangled from the other covenants of the agreement, the full impact
of this observation will be felt. The earliest negotiations which led to the
conclusion of peace in 403 may have said little or nothing about
‘forgetting the past’, as the objective at that time was to provide refuge for
those oligarchs who feared reprisals at the hands of returning democrats.
The promise μὴ μνησικακεῖν could have been an additional measure once
the main provisions for Eleusis had been established, and once the
democrats decided that it was more in their interest to have an expanded
community embracing erstwhile oligarchs than two small, weak, divided
communities.
10
Lys. 13.88, 25.23, 28.34; [Lys] 6.39; Isocr. 18.29.
11
Thus J.L. Shear, Polis and Revolution: Responding to Oligarchy in Classical Athens
(Cambridge 2011) 198-9.
12
I do not wish to revive here the now discredited view that a separate agreement was
concluded after the re-integration of Eleusis in 401, to which Xen. Hell. 2.4.43 might
possibly allude. What I do wish to suggest, however, is that there was more to the
amnesty than just the covenants, or συνθῆκαι. The various laws which ensued made
provisions not incorporated in the original terms. Against the view of two separate
amnesties, see J.M. Stahl, ‘Über athenische Amnestiebeschlüsse’, RM 46 (1891) 251-86;
T.C. Loening, The Reconciliation Agreement of 403/2 BC in Athens, Hermes Einzelschr.
53 (Stuttgart 1987) 26-7.
28
Christopher Joyce
1. DEFINITIONS AND CHRONOLOGY
The ancient sources which detail the provisions of the amnesty agreement
of 403 refer to three self-contained phases of reconciliation. The first, in
chronological order, consisted of contracts drawn up between Athens and
Sparta following the victory of the democrats over the oligarchs in the
summer of that year. Ancient authors refer to these negotiations variously
as συνθῆκαι, διαλλαγαί, or διαλύσεις, but they concur that they formed
the earliest basis for the reconciliation following the civil conflict. These
agreements were succeeded by a series of oaths, one of which was
μὴ μνησικακεῖν, often, but not always, translated as ‘to forget the past’,
and which may or may not have been backed by a decree of the people.
Finally, we hear of supplementary laws (νόμοι) which came into effect
once difficulties brought about by the amnesty came to light. Our most
chronologically precise account, Andocides’ self-defence, details the main
events in the sequence in which they occurred (On the Mysteries 81-90):
when the party of Piraeus (the democrats) prevailed over the men of the
City (the oligarchs), the people swore μὴ μνησικακεῖν, but it soon transpired that many were liable for offences under existing laws, and so a
legal scrutiny followed, and some new laws were ratified which the orator
summarises.
In order to understand better the circumstances which led to the
peace it would be profitable to review briefly the circumstances of
the Thirty and their overthrow. When Athens lost to Sparta in 404 and
a peace treaty was drawn up, a commission of thirty tyrants was set up
with the official remit to research the ancestral laws and establish a
new constitution for Athens.13 Very soon, however, they ignored
their constitutional mandate and inaugurated a reign of terror in which
around five percent of the resident population are estimated to have
perished.14 Isocrates and Lysias mention a blacklist of targeted opponents
who in some cases were murdered, in other cases had their
property confiscated and were driven into exile.15 To ward off external
threats, three thousand armed cavalrymen, or Hippeis, were sent to
the Piraeus where they held down the population by force.16 Little by
little, resistance took shape in northern Attica and, under the leadership
of Thrasybulus, the democrats seized Piraeus. The Thirty withdrew
to Eleusis, and the men who had stayed behind in the city chose ten
13
Xen. Hell. 2.3.11-12.
14
Thus, G.A. Lehmann, ‘Überlegungen zu den oligarchischen Machtergreifungen im Athen
des 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.’, in W. Eder (ed.), Die athenische Demokratie im vierten
Jahrhundert vor Christus. Vollendung oder Verfall einer Verfassungsform? (Stuttgart 1995)
139-50, esp. 145; W. Nippel, ‘Bürgerkrieg und Amnestie: Athen 411-403’, in G. Smith and
A. Margalit (eds), Amnestie und Politik der Erinnerung in der Demokratie (Frankfurt am
Main 1997) 103-19, esp. 107.
15
Isocr. 18.16, 21.2; Lys. 25.16.
16
Xen. Hell. 2.3.20.
The Athenian Reconciliation Agreement of 403 BC
29
men – henceforth known just as the Ten – to negotiate with Thrasybulus
and entreat the help of Sparta.17 King Pausanias and his general Lysander
gathered an army to lay siege to Piraeus, but the democratic resistance
remained firm, and so the Spartans appointed a commission of fifteen
deputies to oversee negotiations between the two sides at Athens.18 The
aim of the negotiations which ensued was to provide for the return of the
exiles under the Thirty, restoration of property, and the possibility that
anyone from the city who feared the return of the democrats could join the
Thirty at Eleusis.19
In his account of the negotiations of early summer 403, Xenophon
omits to mention an oath. The first time we hear from Xenophon of a
clause μὴ μνησικακεῖν, it refers not to the events of 403 but to the
later circumstances of 401, when Eleusis was reintegrated into the Athenian
polis and new oaths were sworn.20 Nevertheless, it seems most likely
that this was a re-affirmation of the oath sworn two years earlier,
which Andocides cites verbatim, and which resembles the wording of the
terms spelled out in Xenophon’s narrative for 403 barring the Thirty,
the Ten and the Eleven from the city.21 Andocides attests that
μὴ μνησικακεῖν was sworn after the compacts (μετὰ τὰς διαλλαγάς). He
does not say that the clause μὴ μνησικακεῖν reinforced every covenant,
but he seems to think that the pledge not to nurse grudges was taken after
the initial bargaining. The chief aim of the διαλλαγαί was to reverse
decrees of the Thirty which had driven opponents into exile and to
provide circumstances whereby partisans of the Thirty need not fear
future reprisals. The evidence indicates that the initial purpose of
the διαλλαγαί was to provide for the return of the democrats and
recovery of some, but not all, of their sequestered goods, but this
developed into a further discussion about Eleusis and provisions for
the settlement there of the Thirty and any other collaborator who wished
to join them.
The promise not to harbour grudges for past wrongs was included
among the covenants of reconciliation, and Andocides clarifies that this
was re-iterated in a separate oath (Myst. 90). When the democrats
returned to Athens, their principal concern was to ensure that the decrees
of the Thirty under which they had been exiled were annulled and that
measures should be taken to specify the relationship between the two
political communities. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 39 shows that the pacts of
reconciliation mostly pointed to future arrangements, whereas only one of
17
18
[Arist.] Ath. Pol. 41.2; Diod. 14.33.5-6; Lys. 12.58-60.
Xen. Hell. 2.4.29-30.
19
Xen. Hell. 2.4.38
20
Xen. Hell. 2.4.43
21
Compare Xenophon’s wording at Hell. 2.4.38 with that of the oath cited by Andocides at
Myst. 90.
30
Christopher Joyce
its provisions, the clause μὴ μνησικακεῖν, had anything to say about
the past.22 Carawan’s view of μὴ μνησικακεῖν as a formality which bound
the συνθῆκαι in their entirety simply ignores the fact that this was one of
the provisions stipulated in the agreement, and cannot therefore be read as
a byword for the agreement as a whole.23 As we shall see, the oath
μὴ μνησικακεῖν re-affirmed, though perhaps not with as much verbal
detail, the covenant spelled out at §6, and was concerned to re-affirm that
covenant alone. The fact that it begins with καὶ, as reported by Andocides,
almost certainly indicates that it was preceded by at least one other oath, if
not more than one, which affirmed other covenants of the agreement. In a
strict legal sense, μὴ μνησικακεῖν was one clause of the agreement. When
the orators refer to the amnesty in a blanket way they use the expression
συνθῆκαι καὶ ὅρκοι, but do not refer to one clause only. It is vital to
observe a proper distinction between μὴ μνησικακεῖν and the amnesty
as a whole.
The relationship between the oaths and covenants has been debated for
over a century. P. Cloché supposed that the decree of general amnesty did
not take place until 401, when the oligarchic enclave was dissolved.24
Cloché’s view was questioned by A. Dorjahn, who discounted the notion
that the oath came about by decree, and preferred instead to speak of μὴ
μνησικακεῖν as a morally binding commitment which never found official
legal expression, but which carried the same force as law.25 Thomas
Loening, in contrast, understood μὴ μνησικακεῖν as a legal term which
prohibited action in a court of law for earlier offences and, on the grounds
that the oath expressly provided against such litigation, argued against the
existence of any formal covenant which spelled out the rule.26 More
recently, Stephen Todd has argued that the oath formally forbade offences
committed in the time of civil conflict but was taken only half-heartedly, as
political show-trials rapidly ensued which violated the spirit of the
oath, and which were allowed to take place while Sparta occupied its
22
It always used to be thought that the homicide rule spelled out in §5 was an exemption to
μὴ μνησικακεῖν, but a careful reading of the text of Ath. Pol. 39 shows that it cannot
point to the past; for a better reading, see Harris’s appendix to this article and, in a
similar vein but with rather different implications, B. Gray, ‘Justice or Harmony?
Reconciliation after Stasis in Dikaia and the Fourth-Century BC Polis’, REA 115 (2013)
369-401, esp. 385-7, 398-401.
23
In my two earlier articles (n. 8) I examined three inscriptions which show decisively that
μὴ μνησικακεῖν did not in fact seal earlier agreements in any of the parallel examples
which Carawan adduced in his 2002 paper (n. 6). Comparative studies of inscribed texts
of other amnesty agreements confirm that μὴ μνησικακεῖν was, in the best documented
cases, separate and distinct from the other covenants of reconciliation which brought
together internal or external parties.
24
P. Cloché, La restauration démocratique à Athènes en 403 avant J.-C. (Paris 1915).
25
A. Dorjahn, Political Forgiveness in Old Athens: The Amnesty of 403 BC (Evanston
IL 1946).
26
Loening (n. 12).
The Athenian Reconciliation Agreement of 403 BC
31
attention elsewhere.27 From a broader historical standpoint, Nicole
Loraux understands μὴ μνησικακεῖν to imply an attitude of oblivion to the
past which, since Homeric times, was essential to the cohesion of society,
and intended forgiveness for offences committed before the amnesty.28
Andrew Wolpert and Julia Shear have individually argued that, within the
prevailing ideology of the restored democracy, blame was attributed to a
very small group of outstanding political criminals who did not come to
terms, and that a blame culture was, perhaps paradoxically, avoided by
heaping blame on a limited group of miscreants; consequently, the only
people who committed ‘wrong’ in the eyes of the restored democracy were
the Thirty and their immediate cohorts who were not covered.29
Throughout this long tradition of scholarship there exists substantial
disagreement as to the function of the oath and its relationship to the
covenants. Now, Carawan proffers a daring solution.30 He holds that the
amnesty came about in a series of legal covenants which μὴ μνησικακεῖν
formalised. The purpose of the oath was to do no more than ratify
pre-existing covenants; thus, a separate decree of amnesty is redundant. But
in order for Carawan’s reconstruction to work, some tampering with the
chronology is required. In those sections from his self-defence (81-90),
Andocides differentiates between the stages of the reconciliation. First came
the negotiations, or διαλλαγαί, which preceded the conclusion of peace (90);
then followed the oath μὴ μνησικακεῖν (81); next arose objections by citizens
liable under old laws (82), so a scrutiny and publication of the laws
followed (82-85); once revised laws were written up, new laws were
passed (85-89). The order is clear: discussions, oaths, re-publication of old
laws, passing of new laws. Carawan’s treatment of the evolving agreement,
in contrast, draws no clear distinction between the covenants of
amnesty (συνθῆκαι) and the additional laws passed after the oath was
sworn.31 His approach ignores the etymology of μὴ μνησικακεῖν, which
27
S.C. Todd, ‘Lysias against Nikomachos: The Fate of an Expert in Athenian Law’, in
L. Foxhall and A.D.E. Lewis (eds), Greek Law in its Political Setting: Justification not
Justice (New York and Oxford 1995) 101-32, esp. 120.
28
N. Loraux, La cité divisée: L’oubli dans la memoire d’Athènes (Paris 1997). Loraux’s
monograph has been translated into English by C. Pache and J. Fort, The Divided City:
On Memory and Forgetting in Ancient Athens (Cambridge MA 2002).
29
A. Wolpert, Remembering Defeat: Civil War and Civic Memory in Ancient Athens,
Baltimore 2002; Shear (n. 11) esp. 295-301. In a similar vein, see also R. Thomas, Oral
Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens (Cambridge 1989) 132-8; A. Dössel, Die
Beilegung innerstaatlicher Konflikte in den griechischen Poleis vom 5.-3. Jahrhundert v.
Chr. (Frankfurt 2003) 110-12, 141-2; S. Forsdyke, Exile, Ostracism and Democracy: The
Politics of Expulsion in Ancient Greece (Princeton NJ 2005) 262-3.
30
Carawan (n. 7). For his understanding of the relationship between the oaths and covenants, see esp. 69 with n. 4 and 184-9.
31
Carawan (n. 7) 68-90, esp. 86-9, where provisions (4) and (5) of the second part of the
agreement according to his schema refer to laws cited by Andocides at Myst. 85-8. On
p. 86 he does appear to recognise that further nuancing took place after the covenants
were concluded and even claims that the rule ‘to apply the laws from the time of
32
Christopher Joyce
refers to crimes of the past, not to agreements affecting the future.32
Moreover, he maintains, without good supporting evidence, that the covenants (συνθῆκαι) entailed, or implied, legal principles which the νόμοι listed
at Myst. 85-8 re-stated.33 Unless Andocides has muddled his chronology, the
oath could not have entailed any of laws which Andocides spells out at
Myst. 85-8.
Carawan’s effort to read the νόμοι back into the original covenants is
problematic. The orator differentiates between at least two separate and
self-contained stages of legal enactment, the earliest being the διαλλαγαί,
or ‘exchanges’, that preceded the oath-taking, the second being the νόμοι
enacted after the oath was sworn. In §90 he states that the oaths were
sworn μετὰ τὰς διαλλαγάς, which cannot be identical with the laws to
which he alludes in the previous sections. Andocides’ chronology shows
that those νόμοι were additional measures taken after the ratification of
amnesty, and not before. The laws cited cannot have been part of the
agreement concluded after the democrats returned. In some sense, they
added to, refined, or nuanced the agreement, but they cannot be regarded
as identical or synonymous with it. Xenophon (Hell. 2.4.38) refers to
fifteen men sent from Sparta to Athens to negotiate (διαλλάξαι). The verb
implies the same διαλλαγαί to which Andocides and Lysias allude,34
arbitrated by the ten (or fifteen) arbiters, or διαλλακταί.35 He tells us that
the arbitrations brought about peace between the warring factions, but
Ath. Pol.’s account is more substantial: the covenants listed at 39.1-5
pertain to oligarchic émigrés to Eleusis and focus on property rights. The
term used is not διαλλαγαί but διαλύσεις. We know from other evidence
32
Eucleides (403/2)’ did not feature in the original terms. But there is a strong implication
that the essential stipulations of the new laws were stated, or at least implied, in the earlier
covenants. For example, at p. 82 he writes: ‘. . . the testimony suggests that the new rules
were based on the covenants or inspired by them [my italics]. Often we can only conjecture
about the connection, whether the legislation adopted wording from particular clauses or
followed the wider implications.’ This quotation suggests that the laws which came
afterwards re-stated principles spelled out in the terms of the peace. But it is unclear why
any of these later laws, the chief purpose of which was to clarify μὴ μνησικακεῖν in legal
terms, should have had precedents in the covenants.
The comparative case studies, which form the backbone of Carawan’s argument in all
three publications listed above, that μὴ μνησικακεῖν in Greek legal terminology closed off
contracts of reconciliation between the two sides, do not support any of Carawan’s
contentions as regards the amnesty agreement of 403: see especially my 2014 article cited
at n. 8.
33
Andocides’ chronology that the oath was sworn after the covenants were drawn up is
followed by Ath. Pol. 39.6 and Xen. Hell. 2.4.37-8, both of which attest that μὴ μνησικακεῖν was sworn once the exchanges had taken place. It is noteworthy, however, that
neither mention any of the legal principles which Carawan reads back into the covenants.
34
Andoc. Myst. 90; Lys. 12.53; see also IG ii 2 10 (= SEG 30.54) line 8.
35
Cloché (n. 24) 239-44 believed that two separate agreements were reached in 403, but his
view has since been discounted by P.J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian
Athenaion Politeia, rev. edn (Oxford 1993) 463, and P. Krentz, The Thirty at Athens
(Ithaca NY 1982) 102-30.
The Athenian Reconciliation Agreement of 403 BC
33
that some of those covenants addressed property. The pledge
μὴ μνησικακεῖν is separate. Andocides (Myst. 81) specifies that the oath
was sworn once the negotiations had taken place. Its terms are not to be
confused with the earlier covenants between Athens and Eleusis, as its
provisions were relevant only to Athens.36
The διαλλαγαί, συνθῆκαι, or διαλύσεις were not the same legislative
enactments as those Andocides calls νόμοι at Myst. 85-88. One of the aims
of those νόμοι was to iron out imperfections in the oaths and covenants
which had resulted in the ensuing legal quandary (Myst. 82), though this
would not have been the sole aim, as Andocides seeks to relate the
legislation specifically to his own circumstances. The etymology of the
relevant terms militates against such identification. With διαλλαγαί, some
exchange or bargain is implied; συνθῆκαι implies ratification of a treaty
between two sides of a negotiating table.37 The implication is that the
covenants were brokered with Sparta and the remnants of the oligarchy
over property and citizenship. In contrast, the subsequent νόμοι were
carried unilaterally by newly created lawgivers, and their concerns were
mainly separate from those of the covenants (συνθῆκαι).38 The issue of
criminality in the time of Thirty, and how to quash both civil and criminal
action against oligarchs, were handled after the oaths and covenants
were sworn.
2. THE COVENANTS (συνθῆκαι) AND THE OATH μὴ μνησικακεῖν
When referring to the amnesty package, the orators used
the blanket expression συνθῆκαι καὶ ὅρκοι. The main purpose of the
συνθῆκαι and the oaths which ratified them was to lay down rules
by which the restored democracy at Athens and the newly created
oligarchic enclave at Eleusis could co-exist; their focus was
directed towards the future. In contrast, the provision μὴ μνησικακεῖν
concerned past actions solely. This is clear not only from the wording
of §6 (τῶν δὲ παρεληλυθότων μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδένα μνησικακεῖν ἐξεῖναι,
πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς τριάκοντα καὶ τοὺς δέκα καὶ τοὺς ἕνδεκα καὶ τοὺς
τοῦ Πειραιέως ἄρξαντας) but from an inscription governing affairs
at Iulis on Ceos immediately following the suppression of an
anti-Athenian rebellion, in which the same formulation (τῶν δὲ
παρεληλυθότων) is used in reference to past misdeeds of the losing
side, which were to be wiped from the record under the terms of
36
Thus Joyce (n. 8, 2014) 42.
37
For the etymology of διαλλαγαί, see Y. Garlan, ‘Études d’histoire militaire et diplomatique I’, BCH 89 (1965) 332-48, who connected the term historically to the exchange
of hostages. For attestations of συνθῆκαι, see LSJ s.v.
This is clearly implied by Andocides (see below). The speech of Isocrates Against
Callimachus is aware of a conceptual distinction, as it refers to the law of Archinus on
παραγραφή in a separate sense from the συνθῆκαι (Isoc. 18.2).
38
34
Christopher Joyce
the amnesty of 363/2.39 Though, as we would expect, a number of oaths
would have been used to seal the various covenants of the amnesty, the
one and only aim of the oath μὴ μνησικακεῖν was to provide immunity
from prosecution for earlier crimes against the demos. It cannot have
sealed every covenant of the peace, as the majority of the terms of the
agreement had nothing to say about crimes of the past.
In approaching the covenants of reconciliation we run up against an
important methodological problem. Though Ath. Pol. 39 is almost certainly
based on a reliable documentary tradition, it is clear from two extraneous
authors, Lysias and Isocrates, that the account was abridged. Carawan holds
that the narrative draws on two amalgamated documents, one dating from
403 and the other from 401, but the evidence for such an amalgamation is
tenuous.40 It seems probable that Ath. Pol. referred either to an inscription
or to an archival record, but still does not recount the covenants completely.
Wherever Xenophon says anything of material value, his evidence confirms
what Ath. Pol. says.41 We therefore have good reason to trust the account of
Ath. Pol. at this point, despite its omissions. Importantly, we must not insert
covenants into the schema where the term συνθῆκαι is not mentioned. As a
starting-point for discussion I therefore offer in place of Carawan’s schema
this twenty-point reconstruction of the covenants (the source references are
always to Ath. Pol. unless specified otherwise):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
The reconciliation agreement took place in the archonship of
Eucleides (403/2) (39.1).
Those of the city party who wish to emigrate may have Eleusis (39.1;
Xen. Hell. 2.4.38).
They retain full citizenship rights with full power and authority over
themselves (39.1).
They are entitled to draw revenues of property elsewhere (39.1).
The sanctuary of Demeter at Eleusis is to be common to both parties
(39.2).
It is to be controlled by the Ceryces and Eumolpidae according to
custom (39.2).
Those at Eleusis may not go to the city (39.2).
Those in the city may not go to Eleusis except for the Mysteries
(39.2).
39
IG ii 2 111 = Rhodes and Osborne 39, esp. lines 57-61. For my most recent discussion of
this document, see Joyce (n. 8, 2014) 47-8, where I argue that, as in Ath. Pol. 39.6, the
phrase μὴ μνησικακεῖν cannot refer back to earlier covenants but must pertain to misdeeds of the Cean rebels, who under the terms are re-integrated into the political
community.
40
Carawan, ‘Amnesty and Accountings for the Thirty’, CQ 56 (2006) 57-76; contra Shear
(n. 29) 191 n. 9.
Compare Xen. Hell. 3.4.38 with Ath. Pol. 39.1 and 6. The only additional point Xenophon
reports is that the Thirty, the Ten, and the Piraeus Ten are not to return to their homes, but
this looks like an interpretation of the covenants mentioned in §§1 and 6.
41
The Athenian Reconciliation Agreement of 403 BC
35
9. The Athenians at Eleusis must contribute funds to the alliance (39.2).
10. If anyone departing take a house at Eleusis he must persuade the
owner, but if they cannot come to terms each party is to choose three
assessors (39.3).
11. Those natives of Eleusis whom the new settlers accept may stay
(39.3).
12. Rules about registration for residents in Attica and abroad (39.4).
13. No one at Eleusis may hold office in the city before being re-registered
(39.5).
14. Homicide trials are to take place at Athens according to ancestral
custom (39.5).
15. No one is to remember past wrongs against any except the Thirty, the
Ten, the Eleven [and the Ten in Piraeus] (39.6; Xen. Hell. 2.4.38;
Andoc. Myst. 90).
16. If any listed above submit to accountings, they are to be protected (39.6).
17. Those ruling in Piraeus are to appear before courts in Piraeus; those
in the city before courts of men with timemata. If they wish it will be
possible for these men to emigrate (39.6).
18. Each side in the former conflict shall pay off its former war loans (39.6).
19. Items confiscated under the Thirty and not sold off may be recovered,
but items sold off to a third party may not be recovered (Lys. Against
Hippotherses lines 34-48).
20. Anyone who has informed against or denounced someone in the time of
the Thirty is to be immune from criminal prosecution (Isocr. Call. 20).
The first priority was to restore those who had lost their citizen rights
under the Thirty. This was inevitably linked to matters of property, as
citizens alone were entitled to own land. Athenians had to be able to show
parentage on both sides. At least two separate decrees were passed in or
shortly after 403 reaffirming the principles of Pericles’ citizenship enactment of 451/0, but there is no evidence that the covenants included rules
about parentage.42 Concerning Eleusis, any member of the defeated could
move to the enclave with full citizen rights there, which entailed autonomy
and enjoyment of proceeds from property.43 Significantly, the specifications did not limit land ownership within the geopolitical boundaries of the
newly created entities.44 Those who migrated to Eleusis appear to have
held on to property elsewhere in Attica, as was the case half a century later
when Athens put down a revolt at Iulis and permitted émigrés enjoyment
of the proceeds of existing property.45 Thus, the covenants endowed the
oligarchs, who in many cases owned estates, with extensive concessions,
42
Schol. Aeschin. 1.39 = FGrHist 77 F 2; Athen. 577b-c. See A. Dössel, (n. 29) 135-7.
43
Ath. Pol. 39.1.
44
Pace Cloché (n. 24) 251-3, who held that this applied only to Athens.
45
IG ii 2 111 = Rhodes and Osborne 39, lines 65-6. See also Xen. Hell. 4.1.35; Dem. 7.41;
[Dem.] 59.102.
36
Christopher Joyce
and, despite the emerging political division between them, a considerable
overlap remained between Athens and Eleusis as far as ownership of land
and estates was involved.
Another matter to be clarified was access to the sacred precinct. This
was to be used by inhabitants of both communities, and was to remain
under the supervision of the Eumolpidae and the Ceryces. Apart from the
sharing of sacred rites, traffic between the two communities was forbidden.
Within this provision, those who emigrated were initially obliged to
contribute funds to the Spartan alliance, though this was later abrogated.46
Carawan claims on the basis of an allusion in Hypereides that the rule
against trespass was enforced on both sides by a covenant on arrest
(ἀπαγωγή) and denunciation (ἔνδειξισ), but it is difficult to see how any of
this is relevant to the situation in 403; Hypereides was speaking of a much
later law which applied to his own time and which relates to the
circumstances of Chaeronea in 338.47 The reference to contributions to
Sparta can be read to imply either that the émigrés retained Athenian
citizenship or that they did not, but I take the words καθάπερ τοὺς ἄλλους
Ἀθηναίους to mean that oligarchs were obliged just like other Athenians to
contribute. The implication here and elsewhere seems to be that citizenship
was officially shared, but in practice a limitation on the ability of
oligarchs to participate in the governance of Athens and vice versa was
imposed by the exigencies of having to live apart.48 In the eyes of the
restored democracy, the oligarchs at Eleusis were still Athenian citizens,
but in their case a special provision was taken to practise a form of
government which was different and separate from the democracy of
Athens.
Those who took possession of a house at Eleusis were to reach an
agreement with the existing owner over price, but if an agreement could
not be settled, the price would be decided by assessors.49 The political
advantage of the émigrés over the original inhabitants entailed that those
with whom the oligarchs did not wish to share polity would be required to
leave. A narrow time-limit of twenty days after the swearing of the oaths
was prescribed for an exchange of populations. Within the first ten days
the decision to migrate would have to be taken.50 If émigrés had a change
46
Ath. Pol. 39.2.
47
Hypereides, Athen. col. 14, §29 refers to a law prescribing ἀπαγωγή and ἔνδειξιϛ against
any who leave the community during war and later return. We have no reason to think
that this law dates from the time of the amnesty; the orator seems to refer to a much later
statute passed in the time of Philip of Macedon.
48
Thus Loening (n. 4) 35; contra Carawan (n. 7, 2013) 72.
49
Ath. Pol. 39.3. The implication is refusal to sell was prohibited: thus G.A. Lehmann, ‘Die
revolutionäre Machtergreifung der “Dreissig” und die Staatliche Teilung Attikas
(404-401/0 v. Chr.)’, in R. Stiehl and G.A. Lehmann (eds), Antike und Universalgeschichte, Festschrift Hans Erich Stier (Münster 1972) 222.
50
Ath. Pol. 39.4.
The Athenian Reconciliation Agreement of 403 BC
37
of heart and decided at a later date to reside in Athens, citizenship at
Eleusis could be renounced and re-enrolment at Athens was permitted.51
Carawan understands this permission to extend exclusively to natives of
Eleusis, on the grounds that rules against trespass had already been laid
down, but his view ignores the force of παλίν in reference to those who
re-register.52 The prohibitions on trespass remained in effect against those
who were registered in one community or the other, but if an oligarch
decided to renounce enrolment at Eleusis and re-enrol at Athens, it was
permitted for him to do so. Presumably, this would have meant that
property bought up at Eleusis would under those circumstances have to be
relinquished. Both sides, in addition, were expected to contribute to the
Spartan-led alliance.53
A fragment of Lysias’ Against Hippotherses attests that among the
συνθῆκαι was a rule that goods bought in the time of the Thirty would
remain in possession of the new owner, but anything not sold would return
to the possession of the original owner (38-43). As the speech of Isocrates
Against Callimachus confirms, the Thirty had confiscated money and
possessions of those who had gone into exile. These fragments of
Lysias suggest that some of that property was put up for auction and sold
off but the rest remained in the possession of the state. The question was
how to compensate the returnees. Evidently, a complete restoration of
property wrongfully extorted was impossible, as it may have changed
hands more than once, and tracing lengthy transactions was impractical.
Thus, it was decided that the only category of property which
former owners could legally reclaim was that which had not been bought
from the state by a new owner. The law of Archinus on παραγραφή later
clarified that civil suits (δίκαι) brought contrary to the covenants of
amnesty were illegal from 403 and were subject to a penalty of a sixth of
the value of the claim (Isocr. Call. 1-4). The covenant to which the
law referred was the same to which Lysias here alludes in this fragmentary
speech. The aim was to ensure that simple matters of reclaim
could be handled quickly and satisfactorily, but more complex
cases which might have resulted in the outbreak of fresh hostilities were
quashed.
The majority of scholars have thought that the rule ‘no reclaim’
applied to land as well as to movable goods.54 This had been questioned
more recently on that grounds that it contravenes the law invalidating
51
Ath. Pol. 39.5. For the interpretation that registration at Eleusis had to be cancelled, see
P.J. Rhodes (trans.), Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution (London 1984) 83.
52
Carawan (n. 7, 2013) 73.
53
Ath. Pol. 39.2.
54
J.-H. Kühn, ‘Die Amnestie von 403 v. Chr. im Reflex der 18. Isokrates-Rede’, WS NF 1
(1967) 31-72, at 35; Loening (n. 4) 52-3; S.C. Todd, The Shape of Athenian Law (Oxford
1993) 234 with n. 4. Contra: M. Sakurai, ‘A New Reading in POxy 13.1606’, ZPE 109
(1995) 177-80; Carawan (n. 7, 2013) 84-5.
38
Christopher Joyce
arbitrations under the Thirty.55 But there is no evidence that the law to
which Andocides and Demosthenes later refer re-iterated a clause stated in
the covenants; Carawan’s insistence that it did stems from a conceptual
confusion between the laws and the covenants themselves. There is little
evidence that a separate rule for immovable goods was included. Lysias
was a metic and could not by law own land. The issue at stake in the
speech Against Hippotherses is the recovery of slaves which had been taken
from the plaintiff, and for some of whose value Hippotherses had sued.
The issue of land is irrelevant to this speech; the contested matter was
whether confiscated goods had been bought.
Among the covenants was a rule barring lawsuits against informers and
denouncers. In the speech Against Callimachus Isocrates refers to a covenant barring proceedings against informers and denouncers (20) and refers
to the rule which upheld civil suits in the time of democracy (21-24). This
was later reinforced by the law of Archinus which imposed financial
penalties against any who litigated contrary to the oaths. This would have
included murder cases brought by δίκη, and is further evidence that no
special exemption was made for homicide in the terms of the covenants (see
below). We learn that in the wake of the amnesty agreement many had
started to ignore its terms. In this particular case, it seems that money was
not the only issue; in addition was the claim of Callimachus that the
defendant (here, the plaintiff in the παραγραφή) had denounced. What is
clear from this and most of the other covenants is that the treaty of amnesty
was weighted in favour of the defeated. The principal beneficiaries were
those who otherwise would stand most to lose from the peace.56
The most often misunderstood of the covenants stated that homicides who
killed or wounded by their own hand (αὐτοχειρίᾳ) would be liable to stand
trial at Athens in the traditional way. This has conventionally been understood as an exemption to the rule μὴ μνησικακεῖν.57 But if the passage is read
in the correct way, there is no need to read this as a special exempting clause.
Its focus is not on deeds committed in the past but ones committed in future
(see the comments of Edward Harris in the Appendix).58 Indeed, there is no
sign in Lysias speech Against Agoratus that any special exception for specific
55
Andoc. Myst. 1.88; Dem. 24.26. Carawan (n. 7, 2013) 86 takes it for granted that this rule
was specified in the earlier covenants, but Andocides ascribes it to a law passed after the
covenants and oaths were ratified.
56
Carawan (n. 7, 2013) 88.
57
Among those who have taken the view that this covenant is retrospective, see e.g.
R.J. Bonner, ‘Note on Aristotle Constitution of Athens XXXIX.5’, CP 19 (1924) 175-6;
P.J. Rhodes, A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford 1981) 69-70;
S.J. Todd, A Commentary on Lysias. Speeches 1-11 (Oxford 2007) 639 with n. 55;
E. Carawan, (n. 40), esp. 271-2. For Carawan, this has been crucial in developing the case
that the amnesty had legal gaps and cannot be understood as a universal measure.
For a slightly different formulation, which Harris in the Appendix criticises, see Gray
(n. 22) 399. Like Harris, however, Gray understands Ath. Pol. 39.5 to refer to a future,
not a past, arrangement.
58
The Athenian Reconciliation Agreement of 403 BC
39
types of homicide was made. If such a distinction had been made, we
would expect the prosecution to have harped on a distinction between
αὐτοχειρία and accessory, but it is noteworthy that this line of attack is not
canvassed. Ath. Pol. 39.5 does not refer to crimes of homicide under
the Thirty. The clause at 39.5 is about homicide trials in the future; it does
not create an exception for those who committed the crime of murder with
one’s own hand in the past. As the trial of Eratosthenes shows (Lys. 12
with Harris’s remarks in the Appendix), it was still possible to bring a case
for homicide under the terms of exemption laid out at 39.6. Emphatically, this
is not a qualification of the rule μὴ μνησικακεῖν. Only 39.6 relates to crimes
committed in the past.
Ath. Pol.’s account attests that the covenants contained a
clause enjoining μὴ μνησικακεῖν. The orators, in contrast, refer to an
oath. It appears that the pledge was included among the συνθῆκαι but
re-affirmed by a separate oath. The fact that the covenants contained
a clause μὴ μνησικακεῖν is sufficient proof that the phrase cannot
have meant what Carawan reads into it. As with the amnesty at Iulis,
μὴ μνησικακεῖν was one of many promises made by the terms of
agreement; it cannot have ratified the agreement in its entirety.59 Its
basic provision was that the Thirty, the Ten, the Eleven (and those
officers in Piraeus?) under the oligarchy should not be forgiven. The
exemption list in Ath. Pol.39.6 is not fully compatible with the
other sources, but the evidence together shows that the Thirty and their
cohorts were not protected under the covenant.60 The exempting clause
entailed a further exemption, which stated that among the aforesaid
those who were willing to submit to accounting were protected. The
case of Rhinon, one of the Ten, shows that those who submitted to and
passed scrutiny could not be prosecuted thereafter for their part in
the oligarchy.61 This was the ‘exception to the exception’. While the scope
of μὴ μνησικακεῖν was stipulated in the covenants, how the principle of
forgiveness was to work in legal terms was specified in subsequent
legislation. Still, it is likely that part of this definition had already
been supplied by a term which Ath. Pol. does not cite but which Isocrates
reports in the speech Against Callimachus (20): anyone who had
denounced in the time of the Thirty was immune from prosecution. This
was not as Carawan holds a guarantee against lawsuits involving property,
but a promise to rule out criminal proceedings against collaborators.62
59
See the arguments of my 2014 article (n. 8).
60
For a full discussion of the problems of the sources and how to decide between them, see
Rhodes (n. 59) ad loc.
61
We know that Rhinon was commended for his goodwill and benefactions towards the
people and was later elected general under the restored democracy; thus, Ath. Pol. 38.3-4;
IG ii 2 1371 line 10.
62
Carawan (n. 7) 88 misunderstands this guarantee; it was a shield against criminal, not
civil, proceedings.
40
Christopher Joyce
When the covenants were ratified, oaths were sworn probably on 12
Boedromion.63 The aim of μὴ μνησικακεῖν was to bar prosecution against
all except the Thirty, the Ten and the Eleven. Ath. Pol.’s account refers not
to the oath itself but to the covenant it reinforced; our most reliable witness
for the oath is Andocides (Myst. 90): καὶ οὐ μνησικακήσω τῶν πολιτῶν
οὐδενὶ πλὴν τῶν τριάκοντα <καὶ τῶν δέκα> καὶ τῶν ἕνδεκα: οὐδὲ τούτων
ὃς ἂν ἐθέλῃ εὐθύνας διδόναι τῆς ἀρχῆς ἧς ἦρξεν. Notably, it re-applies the
covenant (Ath. Pol. 39.6) about amnesty, its exemptions, and their
exemptions, but does not re-affirm all of the covenants mentioned in the
agreement.64 Carawan’s failure to note this is the fatal weakness of his
entire case. The aim of the oath μὴ μνησικακεῖν was to reinforce one
provision, and one only, which dealt with the past. The plural expression
συνθῆκαι καὶ ὅρκοι implies there was more than one oath. It would
be misleading to infer that μὴ μνησικακεῖν was the single principle to
which the Athenians swore, since we know they also swore a bouleutic
oath, as Andocides subsequently reports. If the oaths solidified covenants,
it is important to recognise which of the covenants they reinforced.
If Ath. Pol. 39 is read correctly, it ought to be clear from context that
μὴ μνησικακεῖν covered none of the provisions spelled out at §§1-5, but
only those of §6.65
In my 2008 article I claimed that the oath of amnesty came about by a
separate decree. This claim has been criticised since on the strength of an
old argument of Douglas MacDowell that ἔδοξε at Andoc. Myst. 81 was
not meant in the technical sense.66 But, as Julia Shear recognises, it is
equally possible that the covenants and oaths of amnesty, when published,
were prefaced by a decree. The stele containing Draco’s homicide law (IG
i 3 104 = ML 86) also contains a decree for re-publication. The decree of
63
Thus, Shear (n. 29) 209.
64
It is not completely compatible; the list of exemptions in Andocides does not mention the
Ten or the Piraeus Ten.
I am not persuaded by Shear’s claim (n. 29) 197 that the wording of the oath gleaned
from Andocides cannot be taken as read, or that it did not detail those who were exempt
and under what circumstances. The words given form a bleeding chunk of a larger oath,
as D.M. MacDowell recognised (Andokides: On the Mysteries, with Introduction,
Commentary and Apppendices [Oxford 1962] 130), but this would confirm my argument
that μὴ μνησικακεῖν was not the only oath sworn.
65
66
Joyce (n. 8, 2008) 508; contra Shear (n. 29) 199 n. 34); Carawan (n. 7) 185 n. 25. The
argument that there was no separate decree of amnesty was originally made by
MacDowell (n. 65) 120 and 128, who argued that the decree to which Myst. 81 refers was
the enabling decree for the government of the Twenty which was installed straight after
the return from Piraeus, and that Andocides here refers to a resumptive clause, not a
separate measure. But MacDowell’s argument is predicated on the claim that the oath of
amnesty was brought into effect by the law cited later, barring litigation for crimes
predating 403/2. As argued here, that statute was part of a later legislative package which
gave further definition to the amnesty, but did not bring it into existence. For Carawan,
MacDowell’s interpretation is crucial, as he claims that μὴ μνησικακεῖν cemented the
covenants of reconciliation and did not have any separate decree authorising it.
The Athenian Reconciliation Agreement of 403 BC
41
408/7 to which it refers sanctions publication of an older text. In the case
of 403, the decision of the people to authorise the amnesty should not rule
out a separate decree, just because the amnesty was defined by earlier
enactments. Later sources refer to a decree of amnesty, and it seems clear
that the Athenians decreed to swear μὴ μνησικακεῖν and to publish the
oaths and covenants.67 If the assembly voted to have everyone swear an
oath, then they would have to have passed a decree.68
Old coals were raked up after the conclusion of the oaths, as both
Andocides and Isocrates confirm (Andoc. Myst. 82; Isocr. Call. 2). This
has led some to infer that it was not taken seriously in the climate of
vendetta that followed, or, as Carawan claims, that the scope of the oaths
was limited and therefore permitted certain types of trial. Nevertheless, the
trial of Socrates in 399 concerned the present crime of impiety and
corruption; the fact that Socrates was condemned four years after the
amnesty has little bearing on the terms of the amnesty itself. Andocides
engages in a lengthy legal argument to show that, though his offence predated the fall of democracy and might not, according to the prosecution,
have been protected under the terms of 403, Athenians took every measure
after the restoration to ensure that those like him were sheltered.69 The
παραγραφή against Callimachus (Isocr. 18) shows that, though many grey
areas remained over property, criminal proceedings against former
denouncers were barred. The trial of Eratosthenes (Lys. 12) involved a
member of the Thirty and by the terms of exemption (Ath. Pol. 39.6) did
not therefore violate the rule μὴ μνησικακεῖν.
The trial of Agoratus (Lys. 13) is more difficult to assess as it inculpates
a man who was not himself one of the Thirty. It did not, as Carawan
maintains, entail a debate on whether a murder was committed αὐτοχειρίᾳ
or otherwise: its aim was to suggest that Agoratus had committed
homicide through his act of denunciation.70 As a murder case it seems that
this one violated terms of amnesty, as it relates to a period of political
instability, and it was decided in 403 that crimes of this sort would not be
67
Plut. Mor. 814B; Dion. Hal. Lys. 32; schol. Aeschin. 1.39; schol. vet. Ar. Wealth 1146a;
schol. Tzet. Ar. Wealth 1146; schol. rec. Ar. Wealth 1146b; Val. Max. 4.1 ext. 4; Vell.
Pat. 2.58.4; Nep. Thras. 3.2.
68
See the oaths in decrees of the assembly listed by Canevaro and Harris (n. 75).
69
Thus, Joyce (n. 8, 2014) 44-5.
70
Carawan (n. 7) chap. 6, esp. 125-35. In none of the passages he cites can he show that the
phrase αὐτοχειρίᾳ was used against Agoratus, or that this case had any relevance at all to
the specifications of Ath. Pol. 39.5. For the meaning of the controversial phrase ἔπ’
αὐτοφώρῳ, see M.H. Hansen, Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, Atimioi and Pheugontes (Odense 1976) 48-53; E.M. Harris, ‘“In the act” or “red-handed”?
Apagoge to the Eleven and Furtum Manifestum’, Symposion (1994) 169-84. It is worth
noting that Carawan cites Harris’s paper (n. 25) 126, only to misrepresent it. Hansen
claimed that the phrase changed its meaning from the fifth to the fourth century. By
contrast, Harris analysed all the passages in which the term is found and showed that the
phrase did not change its meaning from one period to the next.
42
Christopher Joyce
prosecuted.71 There is no reference in the speech to a special ‘rule’ in the
covenants which exempted certain categories of killer from protection
under the amnesty. Carawan’s tortuous reading of the case to imply that
the amnesty did not cover every kind of crime ignores the fact that, as with
the trial of Andocides, litigation could take place in spite of the amnesty
which forbade it, and it remained for the defendant to show by the
covenants of amnesty that the trial was illegal.
3. THE LAWS (νόμοι) (ANDOC. MYST. 85-88)
When the democrats returned, the legally more shrewd among the
oligarchs may well have foreseen complications, and this might explain, in
some cases, why the decision was taken to migrate to Eleusis, despite the
promise of shelter. It soon became obvious that a general proclamation of
amnesty was not as simple or straightforward as expected. What was to be
done about those who had committed murder and who, with blood on
their hands, were barred from sacred precincts, or others who might have
been exiled previously for crimes against the gods, like Andocides? What
about slaves or metics who claimed citizenship? What measures should be
taken to ensure that arguments over property would not escalate and
threaten the peace? How were those who had lost sizable estates to be
compensated? What about repossession of movable goods? What about
shady cases where direct acts of violence had not been participated in but
where individuals had been accessories to particularly heinous crimes?
And what about old laws under which citizens were still liable? Were they
to be abrogated? Or should limiting clauses be inserted to prevent
application to crimes predating 403?
These, and other, similar questions must have weighed upon the minds
of legislators in the immediate aftermath of the amnesty decree. Letting go
of the past had to be qualified in some way. Vitally, these later enactments
were modifying measures; they make sense only against a backdrop of
universal amnesty, since they resolved problematic cases where total
oblivion was not practical, or where letting go could only be accomplished
in a practical way if older laws did not conflict with the decree which
guaranteed against recrimination for past grievances. These qualifying
statutes (νόμοι) did not supply the main legal framework for the amnesty,
which was guaranteed by the earlier oaths and συνθῆκαι. In an important
sense, they were further calibrations to the rule μὴ μνησικακεῖν. Their most
valuable effect was to define the hierarchy of laws against decrees, mentioned by Andocides who needed to show that the decree of 415 which had
declared him ἄσεβης was inapplicable. But the legal issue, from the point of
71
On memory as a civic duty, see now A. Chaniotis, ‘‘Normen stärker als Emotionen? Der
kulturhistorische Kontext der griechischen Amnestie’, in Harter-Uibopuu and Mitthof
(n. 1) 47-70, esp. 50-5, on the trials of Eratosthenes and Agoratus.
The Athenian Reconciliation Agreement of 403 BC
43
view of the legislators of 403, was to ensure that the decree of amnesty did
not override, or cancel out, the enactments (νόμοι) which followed.
Andocides (Myst. 85-8) does not recount the legislation (νόμοι) exhaustively. The laws he mentions are only those which had a direct bearing on
his case. But the picture that emerges is that the enactments gave a more
precise legal definition to the problems which the amnesty had unleashed.
It has been suggested that the reference to ‘all the laws’ at Myst. 82 means
only the laws of amnesty, those which Andocides partially recounts at
85-88 and that there was no comprehensive redaction of the laws of
Athens, as once widely believed.72 That recent suggestion, however,
ignores the context in which the reference appears. Andocides states (81)
that the original contract of the lawgivers was to provide Athens with a
constitutional blueprint, but that the remit was then expanded once
the problems of amnesty came to light. There is no good reason to doubt
that a complete compilation of the laws of Athens was authorised.73
The laws to which Andocides refers in the passage that follows are not
related to the scrutiny; these were additional laws necessary to define the
amnesty legally.
The purpose of these νόμοι was to define more clearly what μὴ μνησικακεῖν amounted to in terms of the law. Evidently, a complete eradication
of the past was not possible. As we have seen, democrats exiled in the time of
the Thirty whose land had been confiscated demanded compensation.
Without some legal modification, μὴ μνησικακεῖν would have failed to
guarantee this, and, indeed, might have guaranteed against it. Furthermore,
without the necessary adjustments, the oath might inadvertently have cancelled out legal transactions made in the time of democracy, before the
period of the Thirty. This, no doubt, was one of the legal entanglements with
which the legislators of 403 needed to deal urgently. And so it was decided
that civil suits (δίκαι) and arbitrations (διαίται) taken in the time of
democracy should remain valid, but as part of the same principle, such
decisions taken under the Thirty were now invalid.74 As far as matters of
private law were involved, there was a legal continuum from the old
democracy to the new, interrupted only by the transactions of the Thirty
now stricken from the record. But criminal procedures (γραφαί, φάσεις,
ἐνδείξεις, or ἀπαγωγαί) for public liabilities were forbidden. Andocides
(Myst. 88) draws on the distinction between the private domain (τῶν ἰδίων
συμβολαίων) and the public (τῶν δημοσίων) to show that the case against him
in 415, which had been a public liability, could not now be revived. Though
the chief aim of the law negating past public liabilities was to reverse any
action of this sort committed under the Thirty, from Andocides’ point of
72
Carawan (n. 7) makes this claim in all three works cited. For the most recent formulation
of his ‘minimalist position’, see 2013, 7-19. For a totally different view of the legal
redaction, see now Shear (n. 29) 286-312.
73
Joyce (n. 8, 2014) 48.
74
For slightly different wordings of this rule, compare Andoc. 1. 88 with Dem. 24.56.
44
Christopher Joyce
view the crucial by-product was that any public liability from before the time
of oligarchy was eradicated in addition. Apart from the matter of property,
the legislation that came after the oath did not undermine the guarantees of
amnesty. Its aim, however, was to ensure that Athenians understood in
precise legal and procedural terms what μὴ μνησικακεῖν meant.
It has been argued here that the legislation which Andocides cursorily
summarises provided a clearer legal framework in which the pre-existing
pledge μὴ μνησικακεῖν should be understood and practically applied.
The important specification of the laws was that old liabilities to the polis
were now swept aside. This did not contradict the oath, but clarified that
its provisions did not pertain to matters of private law. The rule ‘to apply
the laws from the archonship of Eucleides’ (Myst. 86-87) was to ensure
that old laws under which citizens were liable for offences prior to 403/2
could not apply: a notable example is the case of Epichares, who had
served on the Council under the Thirty and was liable under an ancient
statute which proclaimed all conspirators against democracy ἄτιμοι
(Myst. 95-102).75 These and other similar laws came into the limelight in
the wake of the amnesty, and so it was decided that a limiting clause
should be applied.76 To prevent other forms of vexatious litigation, the law
of Archinus provided a special procedure of παραγραφή, so that, in the
event crimes of the past were revisited, special legal procedures were put in
place to block action.77 These laws were passed in the wake of the
amnesty, so that the oath μὴ μνησικακεῖν could properly be understood in
its legal sense. As Andocides attests (Myst. 82), this understanding was
not firmly in place when the oath of amnesty was issued. The purpose of
the legislation which followed on from the oath was to define in procedural terms exactly what kinds of legal process were forbidden for crimes
predating 403/2.
In addition to new laws, older statutes were also published. I have
already addressed the aim of this process of redaction extensively in
my previous two articles, and there is not space to repeat all of those
arguments in detail. In brief, the purpose of the legal redaction was
to clarify which of the older statutes passed before 403/2 were still valid
and which not. The aim was to invalidate statutes like the decree of
Isotimides of 415 which exiled Andocides, and under which the orator
might still have been liable if a clear distinction between decrees and
laws had not been made. This was part of a broader process of
re-publication which had been going on since 410, and which perhaps
finished at some point around 399 when Nicomachus, who had headed the
commission, was tried.
75
For the problematic citation of the decree of Demophantus and other quoted documents
in the speech On the Mysteries, see M. Canevaro and E.M. Harris, ‘The Documents in
Andocides’ On the Mysteries’, CQ 62 (2012) 98-129.
76
Thus Joyce (n. 8, 2014) 53.
77
Isocr. 18 (Against Callimachus) esp. 1-4.
The Athenian Reconciliation Agreement of 403 BC
45
4. CONCLUSIONS
This article has suggested that the Athenian amnesty of 403 came into being
in two main stages. The first was a set of legal covenants providing for
Athens and Eleusis and guaranteeing protection for all except the most
notorious oligarchs, with the oaths of amnesty solemnised. The second was
a set of additional laws which limited the possibility of vexatious litigation
against those who had fallen foul of the law before the archonship of
Eucleides. The covenants were mainly, but not exclusively, directed to the
future and affected both communities. The second stage focussed on the
past and pertained exclusively to Athens. The most important and vital
point to recognise is that the oath μὴ μνησικακεῖν solidified only one
covenant of the amnesty agreement. The covenants of amnesty did not deal
exclusively with the past, and it might be said that there was a greater
degree of innovation in than ‘normalisation’. But letting go of past evils was
a crucial component, and it was this, above all, which for later antiquity
rendered the Athenian amnesty of 403 BC a lasting moral exemplum.
The Haberdashers’ Aske’s Boys’ School
Elstree, Hertfordshire
APPENDIX
BY
CHRISTOPHER JOYCE
[email protected]
EDWARD HARRIS
Suits for Homicide at Ath. Pol. 39.5
The Constitution of the Athenians attributed to Aristotle states that there
was an agreement during the archonship of Eucleides to end the conflict
between the men of the city and the men of the Piraeus (Ath. Pol. 39.1).
The terms of this agreement dealt mainly with the relationship between the
two communities created as a result of the agreement, one in the city of
Athens, one in Eleusis. Among the terms is a clause about private suits for
homicide (39.5). The first part of the clause presents no textual problems:
τὰς δὲ δίκας τοῦ φόνου εἶναι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια (‘there are to be private suits
for homicide according to traditional rules’). What follows is very corrupt:
αυτοχιραεκτισιοτρωσασ, which has been emended in various ways.78
Thalheim proposed: εἴ τίς τινα αὐτοχειρίᾳ ἐκτείσαιτο τρώσας (“if anyone
should kill anyone with his own hand after wounding”).79 Several scholars
have thought that this clause makes an exception to the general amnesty
for actions in the past, which follows in the next sentence (39.6: τῶν δὲ
παρεληλυθότων μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδένα μνησικακεῖν ἐξεῖναι). It provides that
the ‘amnesty is not to apply to cases of homicide or of wounding not
covered by the homicide law ( . . . ) in which a man is accused not merely
78
See Rhodes (n. 35) 468 for various suggestions.
79
Thalheim’s emendation has recently been endorsed by Gray (n. 22) 399-400.
46
Christopher Joyce
of arresting or of procuring a condemnation (that is of helping to implement the policies of the Thirty) but of doing the deed in person.’80 This
Appendix does not propose a new emendation of the corrupt passage, but
shows that this clause does not provide an exception to the Amnesty.
It is important to study the structure of the entire passage so as to place
the problematic clause in context. The passage gives the regulations for the
two communities.81 These are to apply in the future. One of the issues the
drafters of the agreement had to face was what had to change and what
would remain the same. At Ath. Pol. 39.2 the temple at Eleusis is under the
jurisdiction of both communities (innovation), but the Kerykes and
Eumolpidae are to retain the priesthoods of the temple (traditional – kata
ta patria). Those residing at Eleusis cannot go to the city and those
residing in the city cannot go to Eleusis (innovation) except to attend the
Eleusinian Mysteries (traditional). Ath Pol. 39.3 deals with the acquisition
of houses – if the buyer/oligarch cannot persuade the resident to sell
(traditional), assessors will be appointed to fix a price and arrange a sale
(innovation). The last phrase has to do with registration of those leaving
Athens and taking up residence in Eleusis (innovation). Now we come to
39.5. Those who live in the city cannot hold office at Eleusis, and those
who live at Eleusis cannot hold office at Athens. All these provisions are
prospective – they look to the future. Next we come to the phrase about
homicide trials. The question arises, what happens if someone from the
city kills someone from Eleusis or vice versa – this should be the issue
addressed here, because the rest of the document regulates relations
between the two groups. In other words, this clause should apply to any
homicides that occur in the future. Here the agreement follows traditional
procedure – kata ta patria – which should mean that the standard procedures for homicide should apply. This is the way the phrase is used in
39.2 about the Kerykes and Eumolpidae: they are to retain their traditional
jurisdiction over the Mysteries.82 The clause about homicide trials should
therefore mean that all the procedures followed in the past are to be followed
in the future. As far as we can tell, this is in fact what happened. There is
not much evidence for homicide procedure before 403, but we know
from Antiphon’s speech On the Chorister (6.35-36; cf. Soph. OT 236-242)
80
Rhodes (n. 35) 468, following Cloché (n. 24) 259-61 and Bonner (n. 57) 175-6. For more
recent bibliography see Gray (n. 22) 385 n. 49. Carawan (n. 7) 139-70 accepts this
interpretation and claims that because of the rule contained in this clause, Lysias could
not have delivered his speech Against Eratosthenes. As this Appendix demonstrates, this
view is untenable.
81
Cf. Gray (n. 22) 386.
82
Rhodes (n. 35) 468 believes ‘There would be no special point in stipulating that for
homicide trials traditional procedure was to be followed.’ But then why in a previous
clause did the agreement use the same phrase (39.2: κατὰ τὰ πάτρια) and state that for the
administration of the shrine at Eleusis the Kerykes and the Eumolpidai were to hold their
traditional privileges? If the phrase was not pointless in that clause, it should not have
been pointless in this clause.
The Athenian Reconciliation Agreement of 403 BC
47
that after the Basileus received a charge of homicide, he made a proclamation that the defendant had to keep away from ‘from lustral water,
libations, bowls of wine, holy places, and the marketplace.’ This practice
continued after 403 (Dem. 20.158; Ath. Pol. 57.4). The speeches of
Antiphon Against the Step Mother and On the Chorister also indicate that
there were separate charges of deliberate homicide and involuntary
homicide.83 This distinction was continued after 403 (Ath. Pol. 57.3-4;
Dem. 23.22-61).
What is important for Ath. Pol. 39.5 is that before 404 one could bring
a charge of homicide not just against the person who caused death by
direct violence or giving poison, but also against someone who gave an
order to kill (Antiphon 1) or gave an order to someone to administer a
potion that resulted in the victim’s death (Antiphon 6).84 This principle
may have gone back to Draco’s law on homicide, if a common restoration
of the first clause is accepted (IG i3 104, lines 11-13: δ]ι|κάζεν δὲ τὸς
βασιλέας αἴτι̣ο[ν] φόν̣[ο] [τὸν ἐργασάμενον] ἒ [β]ολ|εύσαντα).85 One can see
this principle at work in Attic tragedy. In Euripides’ Hippolytus, Theseus
causes the death of his son by uttering a curse, which causes a monster to
rise from the sea and frighten the horses of his son’s chariot, who drag the
young man to his death. Theseus never touches his son, yet considers
himself responsible for killing him (Eur. Hipp. 1448-50). In Aeschylus’
Agamemnon, Aegisthus plots with Clytemnestra to kill her husband. Even
though she carries out the murder, he is still responsible for killing him
(Aesch. Ag. 1613-14). As Andocides (1.94) states, the same principle
applied after 403 (τὸν βουλεύσαντα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐνέχεσθαι καὶ τὸν χειρὶ
ἐργασάμενον).
The next clause starts with the words ‘but about past events it is permitted for no one to recall past wrongs against anyone’ (Ath. Pol. 39.6:
τῶν δὲ παρεληλυθότων μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδένα μνησικακεῖν ἐξεῖναι). There
are good reasons not to see the clause about homicide trials as an
exception to the promise not to recall past wrongs in this clause. First,
there is a strong contrast between the previous clauses, which concern the
present and future, and this clause about the Amnesty, which looks to the
past, creating a clear break between the clause about homicide trials and
the clause about the Amnesty.86 Second, when one makes a general rule
and provides an exception to it, one normally states the general rule first,
83
On the charges in these two speeches, see E.M. Harris, Democracy and the Rule of Law in
Classical Athens: Essays on Law, Society and Politics (Cambridge and New York 2006)
398-400.
84
For this and what follows about liability in homicide law, see Harris (n. 83) 391-404,
apparently unknown to Gray and Carawan.
85
For discussion, see M. Gagarin, Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law (New Haven
and London 1981) 37-41.
86
Cf. Gray (n. 22) 387: ‘The sentence about the amnesty ( . . . ) seems quite clearly to mark
a shift . . .’
48
Christopher Joyce
then the exception. There is a good reason for this: an exception only
becomes meaningful in the context of the general rule. In fact, the
following phrase gives a very good example of this principle: there was a
general ban on recalling past wrongs, except for the Thirty, the Ten, the
Eleven and those who ruled in the Peiraieus, unless they submit to their
euthynai (Ath. Pol. 39.6: πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς τριάκοντα καὶ τοὺς δέκα καὶ τοὺς
ἕνδεκα καὶ τοὺς τοῦ Πειραιέως ἄρξαντας, μηδὲ πρὸς τούτους, ἐὰν διδῶσιν
εὐθύνας. Cf. Andoc. 1.00). Third, the way to indicate in Greek that one is
making an exception is to use the word πλήν (‘except’). This word does not
occur in the previous clause about homicide procedure.87
But the strongest evidence against the view that there was an exception
to the Amnesty limiting cases of homicide to those in which the defendant
was accused of doing the deed in person is the evidence of Lysias’ speeches
Against Eratosthenes and Against Agoratus.88 In Against Eratosthenes
the defendant is accused of arresting Polemarchus, the brother of
Lysias, who was then condemned tο death by the Thirty and executed
(Lys. 12.12-17). Lysias admits that Eratosthenes did not kill Polemarchus
with his own hand, but performed actions that caused his death. The
same is true for the case against Agoratus: the accuser says that
Agoratus denounced his brother-in-law Dionysodorus to the Council
(Lys. 13.29–33). As a result, he was tried by the Thirty and condemned to
death (Lys. 13.39–42).
I have no new proposal to emend the corrupt portion of the text of
Ath. Pol. 39.5.89 For the moment all that can be done is to place brackets
around the phrase starting with εἴ τίς τινα. At this point, there is no
satisfactory solution to the problems posed by this passage, which may
have been a marginal comment that crept into the text. What is relatively
certain is that this clause did not provide an exception to the terms of the
Amnesty or limit accusations of homicide to those who killed with their
own hand. Both the democrats and the oligarchs appear to have agreed to
have cases of homicide committed anywhere in Attica tried by the traditional courts according to the traditional procedures. The reason for this
provision is possibly because the Areopagus, which was responsible for
trying cases of intentional homicide, was viewed by both sides as an
impartial body, which had stood above the conflict and not participated
87
Compare IG i3 40, lines 71-74; IG ii2 244, lines 90-95; SEG 26:72, lines 4-8.
88
Gray (n. 22) 399-400 realises that this speech creates a serious obstacle to his view.
89
The proposal of Gray (n. 22) 399-400 to defend Thalheim’s emendation (εἴ τίς τινα
αὐτοχειρίᾳ ἐκτείσαιτο τρώσας) is vulnerable to several objections, as he himself recognises. One is that Athenian laws sometimes contain a conditional clause followed by a
clause indicating a procedure to be followed (see e.g. Dem. 23.26, and E.M. Harris, The
Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens (New York and Oxford) 139-40, but the
conditional clause always contains ἐάν followed by the subjunctive, not the optative.
Gray wants to restore εἴ followed by the optative ἐκτείσαιτο, which is unparalleled in
Athenian laws. Another is that cases of wounding were tried under a separate procedure,
the graphê traumatos, not by the dikê phonou.
The Athenian Reconciliation Agreement of 403 BC
49
on either side.90 Both sides respected the traditional role of the Kerykes
and the Eumolpidae; in a similar way they also respected the traditional
role of the Areopagus. An additional reason for the provision was the fear
of pollution, which would have affected both communities. But pollution
was not just incurred by murder committed with one’s own hand, but also
by causing death indirectly (Lys. 13.82; Eur. Hipp. 1448-50).91
Durham University
EDWARD HARRIS
[email protected]
90
For the role of the Areopagus as a guardian of the land that stood above political
factions, see Dem. 23.66: ‘More recently no tyrant, no oligarchy, no democracy has dared
to take trials for homicide away from this court alone. All men think that in this tribunal
alone no defendant who has been convicted or accuser who has lost has ever proved that
his case was wrongly decided.’ Cf. Zelnick-Abramowitz, ‘Guardian of the Land’, in
Gabriel Herman (ed.), Stability and Crisis in the Athenian Democracy (= Historia
Einzelschriften 220) 103-26.
91
This point is missed by Bonner (n. 57).