Leading Beyond Civilian Power: Germany’s Role Re-conception in European Crisis Management

German Politics ISSN: 0964-4008 (Print) 1743-8993 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fgrp20 Leading Beyond Civilian Power: Germany’s Role Re-conception in European Crisis Management Nicole Koenig To cite this article: Nicole Koenig (2018): Leading Beyond Civilian Power: Germany’s Role Re-conception in European Crisis Management, German Politics, DOI: 10.1080/09644008.2018.1496240 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2018.1496240 Published online: 16 Jul 2018. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 73 View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fgrp20 Leading Beyond Civilian Power: Germany’s Role Re-conception in European Crisis Management NICOLE KOENIG In 2014, Germany’s foreign policy elite promoted a new international role. It promised more leadership in foreign and security policy, in line with the country’s international responsibility and firmly embedded in the European Union. This article applies sociological role theory and foreign policy analysis to review the origins and implications of this role re-conception. The empirical focus is on Germany’s role in crisis management vis-à-vis Libya and Syria. The analysis shows that the 2011 Libyan crisis fuelled existing intra-role tensions between multilateralism and military restraint. Role re-conception was an attempt to overcome tensions while satisfying international and domestic audiences. In practice, there has been a gradual adaptation based on a more flexible interpretation of military restraint. However, Germany’s ability to project leadership beyond the confines of the civilian power role remains limited and depends on the situation-specific balance between domestic and external expectations. INTRODUCTION ‘At this very moment, the world’s only superpower is reconsidering the scale and form of its global engagement. … Germany and its European partners must themselves assume greater responsibility for their security’ (Gauck 2014). These were the words of Germany’s then federal president during the opening speech of the 2014 Munich Security conference. Joachim Gauck (2014) warned not to use ‘Germany’s guilt for its past as a shield for laziness or a desire to disengage from the world’. He called for a more proactive German role in foreign and security policy, in line with its international responsibility, and firmly embedded in the European Union. This narrative was echoed by the German foreign and defence ministers Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Ursula von der Leyen. What led to this role re-conception and how did it affect Germany’s subsequent behaviour? This article employs sociological role theory and foreign policy analysis to examine Germany’s role and leadership potential in European and international crisis management. The analysis is based on a broad understanding of crisis management comprising crisis diplomacy, humanitarian responses and sanctions as well as military operations and civilian missions. The article introduces the concepts of horizontal (intra-elite) and vertical (elite vs. masses) role contestation to assess how the interplay between domestic and international expectations influenced Germany’s ability to enact a leadership role. The empirical focus is on Germany’s response to the crises and conflicts in Libya and Syria between 2011 and 2016. The article evaluates Germany’s rhetoric German Politics, 2018 https://doi.org/10.1080/09644008.2018.1496240 © 2018 Association for the Study of German Politics 2 GERMA N POLI TICS and positioning in relevant national, European and international decision-making episodes. The analysis draws on insights from academic literature, media reports, parliamentary debates, official statements and declarations, public opinion polls, as well as interviews with German decision-makers. The analysis shows that Germany’s self-image as a civilian power (Maull 1990) is domestically uncontested, enabling it to play a leading role in the EU concerning diplomacy, humanitarian assistance and sanctions. The 2011 Libyan crisis fuelled the existing tension between two core principles underpinning Germany’s international role: multilateralism and military restraint. The convergence of external and internal expectations triggered the elite-driven role re-conception in 2014. In practice, this new role entailed a more flexible interpretation of military restraint, which implied demonstrating greater international responsibility while limiting security-related risks and potential political costs. For instance, Germany joined the militarised fight against the socalled Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), but excluded taking on a role in any offensive action, in line with domestic preferences. Germany is thus a key entrepreneur when it comes to shaping the EU’s civilian power role, but it is (still) unlikely to lead it into military operations when a quick, robust and potentially risky response is required. This article starts by introducing relevant role theoretical concepts and applying them to Germany. Sections 3 and 4 assess why and to what extent Germany’s role effectively changed in the Libyan and Syrian cases. The conclusion discusses broader implications for Germany’s role in crisis management on the one hand, and role theory on the other. ROLES, LEADERSHIP AND CONTESTATION Rooted in sociology and social psychology, role theory focuses on the co-constitution of the ‘self’ (ego) and the ‘other’ (alter). It first entered the realm of foreign policy analysis through Holsti’s (1970) seminal article on national role conceptions. National foreign policy roles have both material and ideational sources. They are based on systemic factors, national resources as well as collective standards of appropriateness derived from history and culture. National role conceptions can be defined as ‘social positions (as well as a socially recognized category of actors) that are constituted by ego and alter expectations regarding the purpose of an actor in an organized group’ (Harnisch 2011, 8). The ego’s role conception is continuously redefined through social interaction and confrontation with the role expectations of relevant others (alter) with the ability to provide feedback on role performance (Aggestam 2006, 18). Leadership roles can be understood as one category of positions within a socially recognised group of actors. Role theorists view power as relational and based on material as well as immaterial sources (Nabers 2011). They often rely on Young’s (1991) distinction between structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership. Structural leadership refers to an actor’s ability to transform material power resources into bargaining leverage. Entrepreneurial leadership is understood as the ability to shape the agenda, overcome deadlock and gain support for salient solutions. Intellectual leadership describes ‘the power of ideas to shape the way in which participants in institutional bargaining understand the issues at stake’ (Young 1991, 288). Leadership success is not limited to altering the behaviour of others in line with self-regarding LEADING BEYOND CIVILIAN POWER 3 interests. It can also imply brokering collective solutions and shaping the shared ideational frames within which roles are enacted. In the EU’s multi-level system, intellectual leadership can mean uploading national role conceptions to the supranational level. National foreign policy roles are considered to be ‘sticky’ (Kaarbo and Cantir 2016). They only change incrementally through repeated processes of social interaction. Leadership roles evolve through the interaction with other leaders and relevant (groups of) followers. One of the factors triggering role change or adaptation is role conflict. Role conflict can refer to three types of situations: clashes between national role conceptions and external role expectations; clashes between competing role prescriptions for the same situation; or clashes between different elements of the same role (Kaarbo and Cantir 2013, 8). Leadership roles of powerful states are frequently contested due to role competition with significant others as well as the often incompatible expectations of followers (Nabers 2011, 89). The desire to restore cognitive consistency is assumed to drive role change or adaptation (Elgström and Smith 2006, 248). Unresolved role conflict can lead to a dysfunctional, hesitant or inconsistent foreign policy (Le Prestre 1997; Tewes 1998) and hence be detrimental to the ability to lead. Another factor affecting a state’s ability to adopt a leading role is domestic role contestation. Traditionally, role theorists based their analyses on a unitary actor assumption and viewed national role conceptions as ideational frames shared by national elites and publics. Questioning this assumption, recent scholarly research introduced the concept of domestic role contestation, which disaggregates the state and examines how domestic actors with different national role conceptions influence foreign policy (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012, 2016; Harnisch 2012; Kaarbo and Cantir 2013). This concept allows ‘role theorists to explain changes and inconsistencies in roles and foreign policy behaviour, no matter how quickly or slowly they may change’ (Cantir and Kaarbo 2016, 16). Following Cantir and Kaarbo (2016), this article distinguishes vertical and horizontal role contestation and draws on insights from foreign policy analysis: . . Vertical role contestation refers to the interaction between elites and masses, which can have a different understanding or situation-specific interpretation of the country’s appropriate role. The relationship between public opinion and foreign policy behaviour is not straightforward. However, research in foreign policy analysis suggests that the public can influence or constrain foreign policy elites under certain circumstances, notably if an issue acquires political salience and divides government and opposition in the face of upcoming elections (Oppermann 2008). We expect decisions concerning military engagement or interference into the internal affairs of a third country to be more salient and contested than other foreign policy decisions (Boin et al. 2005; Wagner et al. 2017). Horizontal role contestation refers to the interaction between different sections of a country’s foreign policy elite including parties, political institutions and bureaucratic players. The influence of horizontal role contestation depends on political constellations and regime characteristics. In this article, we assess horizontal contestation dynamics in the Bundestag – a veto player in decisions on the use of force – and in the context of the governing coalition. 4 GERMA N POLI TICS Combining role theory, leadership and foreign policy analysis has several advantages. Role theory holds the promise of bridging agency and structure (Aggestam 2006; Cantir and Kaarbo 2012). It assumes that foreign policy behaviour and leadership are shaped by reason and predisposition. Roles represent ideational roadmaps that draw boundaries of appropriate foreign policy behaviour. However, patterns of discontinuity in leadership or inconsistency in foreign policy illustrate that agents go beyond these boundaries. The interesting question is how and when they do it. Foreign policy analysis helps answering this question by bringing in the domestic level. The combination with role theory allows us to shed light on the interaction between different sets of internal and external role expectations. Overall, this analytical framework provides for a more fine-grained understanding of Germany’s variable ability and desire to lead in the European and international contexts. GERMANY’S CONTESTED INTERNATIONAL ROLE Germany’s traditional role conception is that of a ‘civilian power’ (Krotz 2001). Shaped by the experience of two world wars and the cold war, it is characterised by a strong preference for multilateralism, an emphasis on cooperative institution building and a distinct culture of political and military restraint (Baumann and Hellmann 2001). Germany is eager to be seen as a reliable and predictable partner in international affairs (Duffield 1999; Krotz 2001). Its most significant others (alters) are France and the US. Germany has attempted to exert intellectual leadership by uploading its own role as a civilian power to the EU level (Frank 2011). It has been a strong advocate of the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management, while emphasising civilian means and complementarity with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since the end of the cold war, Germany’s role has been subject to two tensions that gave rise to horizontal and vertical contestation. The first concerns the appropriate balance between Atlanticism and Europeanism. Traditionally, Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalitions and the Defence Ministry emphasised the former whereas Social Democrat–Green coalitions and the Foreign Ministry focused more on the latter (Hyde-Price 2015). Since the election of US President Donald Trump in 2016 these lines have somewhat blurred. The second and more important tension is between multilateralism and the culture of restraint. German decision-makers tend to face external demands for more political and military leadership on the one hand, and domestic calls for restraint on the other. This tension also runs across German political parties. A study on German deployment votes between 1990 and 2016 indicates that the willingness to approve of military engagement correlates with the parties’ position on the left–right spectrum (Wagner et al. 2017). Approval ratings were highest among Christian Democrats followed by the Liberal Party. The average share of ‘no’ votes was substantially higher among the Social Democrats and the Green Party, while it was almost at 100 per cent for the strictly pacifist Left Party. These patterns are weaker but still apparent when controlling for the positive correlation between government participation and approval. In early 2014, Germany’s foreign policy elite made a concerted effort to resolve the role conflict that stemmed from rising external expectations for more German leadership in foreign and security policy. The federal president, the foreign minister and the LEADING BEYOND CIVILIAN POWER 5 defence minister promoted a new narrative based on the notion of ‘international responsibility’ (Gauck 2014; Steinmeier 2014; von der Leyen 2014). This role re-conception bridged internal and external expectations: it promised a more resolute German foreign policy with a strong European focus, while underlining that military action should still be considered, but as a ‘last resort’. To take root, a new role conception has to be accepted internally and externally (Breuning 2011). The promise to lead the country beyond a strict interpretation of the civilian power role was well received by Germany’s international partners and its domestic elite (Hyde-Price 2015). Between 2014 and 2016, even a growing majority of the public was in favour of a more proactive German foreign and security policy (Steinbrecher et al. 2016). However, polls also show that the public’s expectations related to ‘international responsibility’ differed from those of Germany’s external partners. Over 80 per cent favoured increased diplomatic or humanitarian engagement, but only around one-fifth was in favour of stronger military engagement (Jungholt and Sturm 2014). The tension between multilateralism and military restraint thus persisted. To understand whether and to what extent this unresolved role conflict affected Germany’s ability to lead in European crisis management, it is necessary to review its role performance in concrete cases. LIBYA: FROM ROLE CONFLICT TO RE-CONCEPTION The Libyan uprising started on 15 February 2011 and the international response to violent repression by the regime of Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi was quick and assertive. Within one month, the UN Security Council (UNSC) imposed an arms embargo against Libya, established a no-fly zone and authorised all necessary means to protect civilians (UNSC 2011). Days later, a multinational coalition, led by France, the UK and the US, started an air campaign targeting pro-regime forces, which was soon taken over by NATO. Six months later, the opposition forces had taken control of most parts of the country and Gaddafi had been captured and killed. A complex transition phase marked by intense power struggles ensued and turned into a low-level civil war in August 2014. After disputed elections, the country was led by two competing governments. In January 2016, after one year of UN-brokered negotiations, the rival factions agreed on a ceasefire and a ‘Government of National Accord’ was established. However, the latter remained disputed and has hardly been able to establish full territorial control over the capital. In light of a continued power vacuum, Libya was infiltrated by ISIS and became a key transit hub for migrants headed towards Europe. Role Conflict: Torn Between Multilateralism and Restraint In early 2011, Germany enacted its role as a civilian power and was at the forefront of the EU’s crisis response in the fields of diplomacy, humanitarian aid and sanctions. One week after the outbreak of violence, Chancellor Angela Merkel (2011) strongly condemned the violence against civilians and warned that ‘all possibilities’ could be used to exert pressure on the regime, referring mainly to sanctions. Germany displayed structural and entrepreneurial leadership in the EU’s response in the field of sanctions together with the UK and France. From mid-March 2011 onwards, Merkel and then foreign minister Guido Westerwelle pushed for the imposition of an EU oil and gas 6 GERMA N POLI TICS embargo on the Libyan regime. Initial resistance by some member states, notably Italy, was overcome by 12 April 2011 when the EU agreed on extensive autonomous sanctions against the Libyan energy sector. Germany’s leading role regarding sanctions was domestically uncontested. According to opinion polls of 10–11 March 2011, 70 per cent of Germans were in favour of imposing a trade embargo on the Libyan regime (Stern 2011). Germany’s diplomatic approach to the Libyan opposition was cautious and in line with its culture of political restraint. On 5 March 2011, the National Transitional Council (NTC) established itself as the sole representative of all of Libya. Five days later, and one day before the extraordinary European Council meeting on Libya, France unilaterally granted the NTC full diplomatic recognition, expecting its European partners to follow suit. However, this display of entrepreneurial leadership was not successful. It angered Germany as well as other EU member states which judged the move as preventing the forging of a common European line. After heated discussion, the EU’s Heads of State or Government only agreed to recognise the NTC as a and not the sole political interlocutor (European Council 2011). The German government justified its more cautious approach with the fact that the NTC’s composition was still not clear and that it only grants diplomatic recognition to states (in Süddeutsche Zeitung 2011). Although single members of the Green and Social Democratic parties called for a more proactive stance, the government’s cautious and legalistic approach was not really subject to horizontal contestation and did not acquire enough salience to stir the public debate. Germany eventually granted the NTC full diplomatic recognition on 13 June 2011. The EU as a whole only followed after the UN in September 2011. It was the issue of military intervention that triggered role conflict and contestation. As a non-permanent UNSC member at the time, Germany abstained on the vote on Resolution 1973. The government justified this decision by arguing that Germany could not intervene everywhere, that the risks associated with German participation exceeded the potential benefits and that the consequences of this intervention were unforeseeable (Westerwelle 2011). The elites and the public were broadly opposed to German participation in the military intervention. However, the way in which the government enacted the traditional tension between restraint and multilateralism triggered horizontal contestation. Critics across party lines and federal ministries argued that a positive vote on the UN resolution would not have made German military involvement obligatory (senior NATO official, 12 April 2013; German diplomat, 11 April 2013). By voting yes and refraining from military participation, the government could have bridged external calls for multilateralism and internal demands for military restraint. Polling data from March 2011 suggests that this would have been in line with the public’s preferences: 62 per cent were generally in favour of the intervention, but 65 per cent opposed deployment of the Bundeswehr (Emnid 2011). In an emotional Bundestag debate one day after the UN vote, several members of the Social Democrats and the Green Party criticised the abstention as inconsistent, dividing the EU and weakening the principle of the responsibility to protect (Bundestag 2011). Yet both parties were internally divided. The Left Party stood out as the only opposition party welcoming the abstention as a second-best to a no-vote. The key driver behind the decision to abstain was the smaller coalition partner – the FDP led by then foreign minister and vice-chancellor Westerwelle (Hansel and LEADING BEYOND CIVILIAN POWER 7 Oppermann 2016). At the time of the UN vote, he stood out as Germany’s least popular foreign minister of all time and his party risked not clearing the 5 per cent hurdle in upcoming regional elections in Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate. When asked about the link between elections and foreign policy, a European diplomat (interview, Berlin, 4 June 2013) said: The question is less whether there is indeed a link. It is about the Foreign Minister’s perception. He knows very well that a small error in foreign policy can be very costly. … The question is thus how risky a foreign policy decision is, whether it can damage an electoral campaign and what his parliamentary group thinks of it. Aware of the public’s antimilitarist sentiment and in line with his party’s traditional preference for restraint, Westerwelle probably saw the UN vote as an opportunity to boost his and the party’s popularity. Coalition politics could explain why the chancellor went along with the foreign minister’s decision (Kaarbo 2012; Oppermann and Brummer 2013). According to press reports, Westerwelle initially favoured a ‘no’ vote on the resolution (Weiland and Wittrock 2011). Meanwhile, Chancellor Merkel was focusing on other priorities, notably the management of the Eurozone crisis and the government’s nuclear turnaround after Fukushima. Contradicting the foreign minister on an issue that was not of primary importance and in his remit would have further undermined the overall stability of the coalition (Hansel and Oppermann 2016; Miskimmon 2012). In addition, the Christian democrats were internally divided on the abstention, whereas the position of the FDP was unified. Research on the role of junior coalition partners shows that they are more likely to influence foreign policy outcomes if a ‘friendly division’ among the senior partners allows for a temporary coalition with favourable fractions (Kaarbo 1996). Merkel thus agreed to a compromise: an abstention on the vote with subsequent demonstrations of alliance solidarity, such as the redeployment of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to Afghanistan. An alternative explanation for the decision to abstain was the government’s adherence to Atlanticism. In the first half of March 2011, German decision makers thought that the US would veto UNSC Resolution 1973 and believed they were ‘on the safe side’ with an abstention (European diplomat, 4 June 2013). The US decision to shift its position in favour of the resolution one day ahead of the UNSC vote caught Berlin by surprise. But despite French and British pressure to align with the Americans on the eve of the vote, the German government stuck to the coalition compromise. The government’s Atlanticist leanings might thus have facilitated this compromise in the first place, but the decision not to align with the US shows that the domestic considerations outlined above prevailed over external expectations (Miskimmon 2012, 398). The German abstention also slowed down the discussion on the EU’s military contribution to the Libyan crisis management. On 1 April 2011, the Council agreed on operation European Union Force (EUFOR) Libya, a military operation to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Libya (Council 2011). Germany supported the operation despite initial reluctance. Due to its humanitarian character, bounded mandate and limited time frame it was also more acceptable to the German public than an open-ended NATO operation without a clear exit strategy. Polls show that a 8 GERMA N POLI TICS narrow majority of Germans were in favour of a military contribution to operation EUFOR Libya (Infratest dimap 2011). However, almost 45 per cent adhered to military restraint and were therefore opposed to the operation. The German government resolved the tension between Europeanism and restraint through rhetoric and action. Together with the UK, Germany was a proponent of making the deployment of operation EUFOR Libya dependent on a call by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The latter was under British lead at the time and known for its reluctance to blur the lines between the humanitarian and military spheres. A call was thus not very likely and in fact it never came. Furthermore, the government carefully downplayed the military dimension vis-à-vis its public audience. In April 2011, then state minister Cornelia Pieper assured the Bundestag, ‘This is not about the approval of military action … We want to enable the implementation of humanitarian action’ (Pieper 2011). Meanwhile, German diplomats in Brussels were instructed to push for the designation of EUFOR Libya as a ‘mission’ rather than an ‘operation’. Even if this had few practical repercussions, this semantic distinction was a very important point for many members of the Bundestag (European diplomat, 4 June 2013). In light of these balancing acts between military restraint and multilateralism, Germany’s leadership projection was low. The Libyan crisis intensified US pleas for more transatlantic burden sharing. In June 2011, then US defence secretary Robert Gates warned that NATO was turning into a two-tiered alliance, divided between those ‘who specialize in “soft” humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting the “hard” combat missions’ (Gates 2011). The call for Germany (and other less active European members) to take on more structural leadership was implicit. The French were more explicit in their criticism of Germany’s lack of both structural and intellectual leadership. Then foreign minister Alain Juppé (2011a, 2011b) accused Germany of restricting the EU’s role to that of a humanitarian non-governmental organisation (NGO). The Libyan abstention was a turning point for Germany’s role, as it clashed with the expectations of the relevant others and parts of the German elite. Some press reports thus called ‘Nie wieder Libyen’ (never again Libya) the informal mantra underlying Germany’s role re-conception, centred on the narrative of responsibility (Schmiese 2014). While the abstention continued to haunt Berlin, the reality of Libya’s complex transition slipped off the German and European priority lists between 2012 and 2014. Germany’s New Responsibility and its Contextual Drivers Two issues put Libya back on the political agenda in 2015: mass migration and ISIS. In April 2015, a smuggling boat sank off the Libyan coast and left hundreds of migrants dead. This was a wakeup call for the EU, which reacted with a range of migrationrelated measures. One of the most visible measures was the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) (later renamed Sophia) in the Southern Central Mediterranean, which aimed at disrupting the ‘business model’ of human traffickers and smugglers (Council 2015). Germany became the second biggest contributor to the operation after the framework nation Italy. The deployment of up to 950 German troops was relatively uncontested at the domestic level. On 1 October 2015, a majority of 450 Bundestag members voted in favour, while 116 mainly Green and Left Party LEADING BEYOND CIVILIAN POWER 9 members were opposed. The latter questioned the operation’s humanitarian aims and underlined the risks of a militarised fight against smugglers. However, these doubts were not shared by a majority of the public. Polls of 2015 show that operation EUNAVFOR MED became the most popular out-of-area deployment of the Bundeswehr (Biehl et al. 2015). Germany also reinforced its engagement in multilateral diplomatic efforts in 2015 by nominating an experienced career diplomat, Martin Kobler, as UN special representative and head of the UN Mission in Libya. In early 2016, the Libyan unity government issued a broad request for EU support in the security sector. Germany was among those insisting that any EU action be backed by a UN mandate (Emmott 2016). In June 2016, the UNSC agreed on an Article 7 mandate authorising the EU to enforce the arms embargo against Libya in international waters. The mandate of operation Sophia was broadened to include this as well as training of the Libyan coastguard and navy. The deployment of German troops under the new mandate was equally uncontested. In July 2016, the Bundestag approved it with 457 votes. Coalition members presented the new mandate as being in line with German security interests and as contributing to restoring order at the EU’s external border (in Bundestag 2016). These arguments were seemingly shared by the public: approval for the operation rose to 66 per cent in 2016 (Steinbrecher et al. 2016). This coincided with broader public opinion trends. Polls show that personal feelings of insecurity reached a 15-year high in 2015–16 and were mainly related to three factors: migratory flows, fundamentalism and terrorism (Biehl et al. 2015; Steinbrecher et al. 2016). Polls also indicate that a broad majority supported the restoration of national border controls (ZDF 2015). Germany’s contribution to operation Sophia thus resonated with the public’s fears and desire to control mass immigration. Summing up, the 2011 Libyan crisis heightened the existing tensions between two core principles underpinning Germany’s international role: multilateralism and military restraint. Role conflict stemming from rising external expectations and horizontal contestation contributed to the elite-driven role adaptation in 2014. Since 2015 Germany displayed more leadership in European and multilateral crisis management efforts in Libya. However, the elite-driven role re-conception was arguably only one factor explaining the observed behavioural change. In 2015–16, the repercussions of instability in North Africa became more visible to the public and fostered greater acceptance for a more proactive German role in Libya. Nevertheless, this role remained bounded by the culture of military restraint. After all, Germany did not join its partners in the military fight against ISIS on Libyan territory. The substantial contribution to the EU’s naval operation allowed Germany to display its Europeanist vocation while limiting potential risks for the Bundeswehr. Behind closed doors, it continued to oppose options involving a deployment of German security personnel on the ground in Libya (Wintour 2016). SYRIA AND ISIS: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND DOMESTIC BOUNDARIES The Syrian uprising started in March 2011 and initially resembled the Libyan one, but the international response was far more hesitant. Unlike Gaddafi, President Bashar alAssad had Iran and Russia as powerful international allies. While Syria gradually descended into a bloody civil war, Russia and China blocked any decisive responses by the UNSC. From 2013 onwards, the international stakes attached to the conflict rose. On 21 10 GERMA N POLI TICS August 2013, the Assad regime conducted a chemical weapons attack against opposition forces and civilians and the US threatened to react with limited air strikes. Moscow and Washington averted military intervention due to their combined pressure on Assad. In the course of 2014, ISIS seized large parts of the territory of Syria and Iraq. An important turning point was the August 2014 ISIS attack on Yazidis, a Kurdish religious minority group, as well as Christians in northern Iraq. The US reacted with airstrikes to prevent an ‘imminent genocide’ and established a broad multinational coalition against ISIS. Stakes rose further when Russia joined the military theatre in September 2015 to back Assad’s fight against ISIS as well as ‘other terrorists’, which included groups of the Free Syrian Army. In 2014, the Syrian conflict became the world’s single biggest driver of forced displacement. By the end of 2015, an estimated 6.7 million Syrians were internally displaced and almost 5 million had sought refuge abroad (UNHCR 2015). While the consequences of this migratory and humanitarian crisis mostly affected neighbouring countries, they also spilled over to the EU, where more than 1.2 million asylum applications were lodged in 2015. Meanwhile, repeated ISIS-linked attacks on European soil illustrated the conflict’s impact on the EU’s internal security. Civilian Co-Leadership and Military Restraint Germany initially acted as a co-leader with the US, France and the UK in the fields of diplomacy and sanctions. The EU’s ‘Big Three’ and Portugal tabled a draft UNSC statement in April 2011 condemning violence against protesters and calling for restraint (The Guardian 2011). The draft statement was backed by the US but rejected by Russia, China and Lebanon. Repeated attempts to impose UN-level sanctions failed. In May 2011, the EU followed the US example and started to impose restrictive measures on persons associated with the Assad regime. Led by the UK, Germany and France, the EU gradually strengthened its sanctions regime to include an arms embargo, an oil import embargo, asset freezes and travel bans. On 18 August 2011, the US asked Assad to step down. This call was immediately echoed by a joint statement from Germany, the UK and France, which was then reiterated by the EU as a whole. Germany’s co-leadership was in line with its self-image as a civilian power as well as the principle of multilateralism. It was largely uncontested at the domestic level. As in the Libyan case, the EU’s ‘Big Three’ failed to find a common approach towards the Syrian opposition. France was the first EU member state to recognise the Syrian National Council (SNC) as the sole representative of the Syrian people in late 2012 and added that this was a first step towards arming the rebels. The UK was vaguer concerning arms deliveries, but granted the SNC full diplomatic recognition one week later. In line with its culture of restraint, the German government reacted with scepticism. The defence minister at the time, Thomas de Maizière, recalled that arms deliveries contradicted the EU arms embargo, which could only be lifted unanimously (in Deutsche Welle 2012). Westerwelle justified the more cautious approach towards the SNC by questioning the sustainability of its unity (in Deutsche Welle 2012). Germany only ever recognised it as a, and not the sole, legitimate representative of the Syrian people – and so did the EU. In early 2013, France and the UK put pressure on their European partners to loosen the arms embargo and allow the delivery of weapons to the Syrian opposition. They LEADING BEYOND CIVILIAN POWER 11 threatened to veto the renewal of the arms embargo and thus put the EU’s whole sanctions regime at risk. The German government warned that weapons deliveries could lead to an arms race and propel a regional conflagration. Its adherence to military restraint was uncontested domestically. Polls of May 2013 indicate that 78 per cent of Germans opposed weapons deliveries to the Syrian opposition (dpa 2012). Several member states, including the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Sweden, shared Germany’s preference for restraint. Berlin then projected entrepreneurial leadership by fostering a European compromise, which entailed renewing the sanctions regime while allowing for unilateral deviations from the arms embargo under a set of agreed conditions (Council 2013). For instance, export licences were to be denied if they risked prolonging or aggravating the conflict. Germany also adhered to its culture of military restraint when the US threatened to conduct military airstrikes after the chemical weapons attack in August 2013. France and the UK immediately signalled their support. The German government declared that the use of chemical weapons ‘must be punished’ and that it ‘cannot be without consequence’ (in Deutsche Welle 2013). However, Westerwelle (2013) clearly excluded any German involvement in military measures and underlined that it had not been requested. He based this stance on the culture of military restraint, which he described as a ‘constant’ of his foreign policy. A few weeks ahead of the general election, this position was domestically uncontested. Opinion polls showed that 58 per cent of the German public opposed a military contribution while only 33 per cent were in favour (ZDF Politbarometer 2013). Germany’s contribution to the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal was one of the last examples of Westerwelle’s contested positioning between multilateralism and restraint. In September 2013, he declared that Germany had the necessary technical expertise to contribute to multilateral efforts aimed at destroying Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal (ZEIT online 2013). Two months later, Merkel’s foreign and security policy advisor at the time, Christoph Heusgen, suggested that, in line with Germany’s responsibility, some of these weapons could be destroyed on its territory. Westerwelle immediately denied this, arguing that there were other more suitable regions. He feared that the measure would trigger domestic protests and demonstrations (Hyde-Price 2015). Busy negotiating the new coalition agreement, Merkel did not challenge her outgoing junior partner. Role Adaptation: Towards Flexible Restraint One of the first measures illustrating Germany’s enactment of enhanced international responsibility was the turnaround on the chemical weapons issue. Soon after taking office in December 2013, Steinmeier and von der Leyen persuaded the Chancellor to agree to the destruction of chemical weapons in Germany (Hyde-Price 2015). Steinmeier viewed this measure as ‘a prime opportunity for Germany to demonstrate its willingness to take on responsibility without having to take much risk’ (Neukirch and Repinski 2014). A far more controversial enactment of Germany’s new international responsibility was the decision to deliver weapons to the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga in August 2014. The government thereby broke with a long-standing taboo: it was the first time in history that Germany supplied weapons to a conflict theatre. Addressing the Bundestag 12 GERMA N POLI TICS on 1 September 2014, Merkel based this decision on a more flexible interpretation of military restraint: ‘No conflict in the world can be solved by military means alone. But in the past four years we faced decisions that have shown: there are situations in which only military means can help open up political options’ (Bundestag 2014). She underlined the need to live up to Germany’s international responsibility and argued that the risks of short-term inaction, namely genocide, outweighed potential side effects. Members of the governing coalition, and thus a large majority of the Bundestag, endorsed this decision and echoed the more flexible interpretation of military restraint. The Green and Left parties were opposed to it and adhered to principled pacifism. This decision was vertically contested. Polls of August 2014 show that 58 per cent of Germans opposed weapon supplies while only 38 per cent were in favour (Reuters 2014). This discrepancy is in line with foreign policy analysis research which shows that a united elite can disregard public opinion: ‘elite consensus inoculates leaders from electoral punishment’ (Kreps 2010). Still, members of the coalition carefully portrayed the decision as an exception rather than a paradigm shift in German security policy (Bundestag 2014). Another important turning point was the ISIS-linked terrorist attack in Paris on 13 November 2015, which caused the deaths of 130 European citizens. The French president invoked, for the first time, the EU’s mutual assistance clause enshrined in Art. 42.7 TEU, requesting support from EU partners for France’s engagements in Syria, Iraq and Mali. The German government immediately promised to ‘do everything in our power to give France help and support’ (Reuters 2015). Within weeks it decided to bolster the existing military engagement in Mali and northern Iraq and to provide military support to France in the framework of the coalition against ISIS in Syria. The latter included the deployment of six Tornado reconnaissance jets, a frigate for the protection of a French aircraft carrier, a refuelling aircraft and up to 1200 troops. It was the third time (after Kosovo and Afghanistan) that Germany joined an offensive military intervention abroad since World War II and the first time under Merkel. It was also by far the quickest decision of that sort. An active combat role was excluded. The government based this decision on two reasons. The first was the need to demonstrate solidarity with France, Germany’s most important European partner. The second was the threat that ISIS posed for the country’s own security. These arguments were uncontested within the coalition. However, the opposition rejected the mandate with arguments resonating with the culture of restraint. They criticised the lack of a sound legal basis, the unclear mandate, the absence of a comprehensive political strategy, the risk for German soldiers and the potential for counterproductive effects in light of negative experiences in Iraq and Libya (Bundestag 2015). The government’s position was vertically uncontested. A poll ahead of the Bundestag debate on 4 December 2015 showed that 58 per cent were in favour of assisting the French military in its fight against ISIS in Syria, while 37 per cent were opposed to it (ARD 2015b). The somewhat surprising shift coincided with broader public opinion trends. In 2015, 66 per cent favoured a more proactive German role in international affairs and 69 per cent viewed alliance solidarity in the framework of the EU, NATO or the UN as an appropriate reason for engaging in international conflict management (Biehl et al. 2015). In addition, the Paris terror attack raised the German threat perception. In its direct aftermath a majority feared a proximate terrorist attack in Germany LEADING BEYOND CIVILIAN POWER 13 (ARD 2015a). The decision was thus in line with Germany’s Europeanist vocation, its uncontested self-image as a reliable partner and the recognition that the Syria conflict had immediate implications for Germany’s own security. Overall, the Syrian case shows that 2014 marked a behavioural shift towards stronger adherence to multilateralism and a more flexible approach towards military restraint. However, the culture of military restraint continued to set important boundaries for the enactment of ‘international responsibility’. The elite and the public continued to oppose an active combat role in the fight against ISIS. In December 2015, Merkel plainly rejected a US request for stronger military engagement and declared: ‘I believe that Germany is playing its part and that we don’t have to discuss any new questions in this context, in these days’ (aar/Reuters 2015). The government subsequently avoided the reference to a ‘war’ when speaking of its engagement in Syria, evoking memories of a similar debate in the context of Germany’s Afghanistan engagement (dpa/dol 2016). This cautious approach towards flexible restraint seemingly matched the public’s broader preferences. In polls commissioned by the Körber Foundation between 2015 and 2017, roughly half of the respondents favoured continued restraint concerning international crises while around 40 per cent supported more German engagement (Körber Foundation 2017). The culture of military restraint might thus be interpreted more flexibly in light of relative elite consensus and a more salient public threat perception, but it continues to set important boundaries for Germany’s ability and willingness to project intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership beyond the civilian power role. CONCLUSION The Libyan and Syrian cases show that Germany’s civilian power role remains uncontested. In cooperation with France and the UK, it displayed structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership concerning the EU’s responses in the realm of declaratory diplomacy, sanctions and humanitarian aid. At the same time, it resisted attempts by its co-leaders to engineer more far-reaching diplomatic and military support to the respective oppositions. Germany thus uploaded its civilian power concept to the EU level, including its culture of political and military restraint. In the Libyan crisis in 2011, this balancing act between restraint and multilateralism was contested by Germany’s co-leaders as well as parts of its elite. The combination of external and horizontal role contestation was a driver for the elite-driven role re-conception in 2014. Germany’s subsequent behaviour indicates that there has been a degree of role adaptation in line with the notion of international responsibility. Two factors contributed to the domestic endorsement of this new role. The first was the grand coalition, which reduced the degree of horizontal contestation concerning decisions on military engagement: each of these decisions was backed by both coalition partners and opposed by the much smaller opposition. The second factor was the public’s growing acceptance of German leadership. The elite’s re-conception might have had a persuasive effect. In addition, mass migration and terrorism in Europe illustrated how closely instability in other European countries was linked to Germany’s own security and stability. The combination of role re-conception and contextual drivers led to a more flexible interpretation of military restraint. The balance between restraint and multilateralism 14 GERMA N POLI TICS shifted towards the latter, but the tension between them persisted. Germany’s interpretation of international responsibility is thus likely to be spelt out on a case-by-case basis and to depend on dividing lines at the level of the elite and public. It thus differs from the American or French understanding of international responsibility, which traditionally includes a principled willingness to intervene militarily when important interests or values are at stake. Germany’s ability to lead the EU beyond the boundaries of the civilian power role remains limited. It is still unlikely to lead or follow other member states (such as the French) into military operations when a quick, robust and potentially risky response is required. The very gradual departure from Germany’s traditional balance between military restraint and multilateralism is in line with role theory’s assumption that national role conceptions are sticky. Changes require reiterated socialisation processes to take root. Gauck (2014) himself referred to the procedural character of role adaptation: ‘Germans are advancing towards a form of responsibility that has not yet become routine for us’. Foreign policy analysis provides fine-grained insight into this process of change by unpacking the black box of the state and building a bridge between agency and structure. A nation’s inclination to adopt and enact a leading role does not only depend on socially shaped ideational frames, but also on their domestic contestation, which is influenced by contextual factors such as coalition politics, elite consensus and issue salience. Germany’s role re-conception was driven by convergent internal and external role expectations as well as a grand coalition, which could disregard horizontal and at times even vertical role contestation. The combination of role theory and foreign policy analysis thus offers interesting avenues towards a more relational and context-specific understanding of power and leadership in international affairs. DISCLOSURE STATEMENT No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Nicole Koenig is senior research fellow and Deputy Head of Research at the Jacques Delors Institut, Berlin, where she focuses on EU and German foreign and security policy, migration, and related political and institutional challenges. She holds a PhD in Politics and International Relations from the Universities of Cologne and Edinburgh (co-tutelle). Nicole worked with various European think tanks and universities, including the Trans European Policy Studies Association in Brussels, the Institute of International Affairs in Rome, the University of Constance and King’s College London. REFERENCES aar/Reuters. 2015. “Bundeswehreinsatz in Syrien: Merkel Weist US-Bitte Nach Mehr Unterstützung Zurück.” Spiegel Online. LEADING BEYOND CIVILIAN POWER 15 Aggestam, Lisbeth. 2006. “Role Theory and European Foreign Policy.” In The European Union’s Roles in International Politics: Concepts and Analysis, edited by Ole Elgström, and Michael Smith, 11–29. London: Routledge. 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